

Gabriel Vazquez of Belmonte.
Frontispiece portrait placed before the title page for this English edition.

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS

on the First Part of St. Thomas - Volume Two

From Question 27 through 64, and from Question 106 through 114, by Father Gabriel Vazquez of Belmonte, Theologian of the Society of Jesus.

To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord Don Andreas Pacieccus, Bishop of Segovia. With privilege.

*

Complutum (Alcala), from the press of Ioannes Gratianus, at the widow's house. 1598.

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Quaestio XLI- On the persons in comparison to the notional acts

Articulus I- Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons *(Quaestio XLI)*

Articulus II- Whether the notional acts are voluntary *(Quaestio XLI)*

Articulus III- Whether the notional acts are from something *(Quaestio XLI)*

Articulus IV- Whether in God there is potency with respect to notional acts *(Quaestio XLI)*

Articulus V- Whether the power of begetting signifies relation, and not essence *(Quaestio XLI)*

Articulus VI- Whether a notional act can terminate in several persons *(Quaestio XLI)*

Disputatio CLX- Whether the act of will precedes, accompanies, or follows the notional acts

Caput II- What Scotus and Cajetan thought *(Disputatio CLX)*

Caput III- That whatever act of God's will concerns the notional acts is in no way prior to them, but posterior to them, is the truer view *(Disputatio CLX)*

Caput IV- How the Fathers spoke on this matter *(Disputatio CLX)*

Disputatio CLXI- Whether the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily, or freely

Caput I - Henry's opinion: the Holy Spirit proceeds in one way freely, and in another naturally *(Disputatio CLXI)*

Caput II- On whether the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary, natural, and free *(Disputatio CLXI)*

Caput III - The common sentence: the Holy Spirit's spiration is necessary, natural, and not free *(Disputatio CLXI)*

Caput IV- The arguments of Scotus are dissolved *(Disputatio CLXI)*

Disputatio CLXII - What the particle "of" (de) signifies, when it is said that the Son is "of" the substance of the Father

Caput I- That the particle "of" does not signify a material principle, against Henry and Durandus, is proved *(Disputatio CLXII)*

Caput II - The particle "of" in the aforesaid locution signifies a consubstantial principle *(Disputatio CLXII)*

Caput III - The formal terminus of procession is the divine essence; but the whole terminus is the person *(Disputatio CLXII)*

Disputatio CLXIII - On whether in God there is a real productive potency with respect to the notional acts

Caput II- In God there is a true real productive potency, not only with respect to the person produced, but also with respect to the notional act; this is the more probable view. *(Disputatio CLXIII)*

Disputatio CLXIV- What the producing power is formally within God

Caput I- The opinion of St. Bonaventure *(Disputatio CLXIV)*

Caput II- Five other opinions of the Scholastics are set forth *(Disputatio CLXIV)*

Caput III - That the potency which produces a divine person is the divine essence connoting a property is the truer opinion *(Disputatio CLXIV)*

Caput IV- That the power of generating or of spiring is not in all the persons *(Disputatio CLXIV)*

Disputatio CLXVI - On whether omnipotence is equally in the three divine persons and whether it includes the potencies of generation and spiration

Caput I- Various opinions of the Scholastics *(Disputatio CLXVI)*

Caput II- The true opinion *(Disputatio CLXVI)*

Quaestio XLII- On the equality and likeness of the divine persons among themselves

Articulus I- Whether equality has a place in the divine *(Quaestio XLII)*

Caput I- Scotus holds that these relations are real *(Articulus I)*

Caput II - These relations are only of reason; the more probable opinion, proved in various ways *(Articulus I)*

Articulus II - Whether a person proceeding is coeternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father *(Quaestio XLII)*

Articulus III- Whether in the divine persons there is an order of nature *(Quaestio XLII)*

Articulus IV- Whether the Son is equal to the Father according to magnitude *(Quaestio XLII)*

Articulus V- Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely *(Quaestio XLII)*

Articulus VI- Whether the Son is equal to the Father according to power *(Quaestio XLII)*

Disputatio CLXVII - Whether among the divine persons there is an order of prior and posterior according to reality

Caput I- What the Scholastics hold *(Disputatio CLXVII)*

Caput II- Whether among the divine persons there is not only order, but that one is prior in reality according to origin *(Disputatio CLXVII)*

Disputatio CLXVIII - Whether opposed origins, distinct according to reality, have among themselves an order of prior and posterior

Caput I- The opinions of St. Bonaventure and Durandus *(Disputatio CLXVIII)*

Caput II- The author's thesis *(Disputatio CLXVIII)*

Disputatio CLXIX- By what ratio one person is said to be in another

Caput I- The sense of the doubt; Henricus; the first opinion *(Disputatio CLXIX)*

Quaestio XLIII- On the Mission of the divine persons

Articulus I- Whether it befits any divine person to be sent *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus II- Whether mission (*missio*) is eternal, or only temporal *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus III- Whether the invisible mission of a divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus IV- Whether it befits the Father to be sent *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus V- Whether it befits the Son to be sent invisibly *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus VI - Whether the invisible mission is made to all who are participants in grace *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus VII- Whether it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Articulus VIII - Whether any divine person is sent except by that from whom he proceeds eternally *(Quaestio XLIII)*

Disputatio CLXX- Various opinions of the Scholastics

Caput I- Various opinions of the Scholastics *(Disputatio CLXX)*

Caput II - That mission is only the eternal procession connoting a temporal effect; this is the truer opinion *(Disputatio CLXX)*

Caput III- Corollaries of the preceding opinion *(Disputatio CLXX)*

Quaestio XLIV- On the procession of creatures from God, and on the first cause of all beings

Articulus I- Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God *(Quaestio XLIV)*

Articulus II- Whether prime matter is created by God *(Quaestio XLIV)*

Articulus III- Whether God is the exemplar cause *(Quaestio XLIV)*

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Disputatio CLXXI- Whether one God is the author of all things

Caput I- Various errors of the heretics *(Disputatio CLXXI)*

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Quaestio XLV- On the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle

Articulus I- Whether to create is to make something from nothing *(Quaestio XLV)*

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Articulus IV- Whether to be created is proper to composites and subsistents *(Quaestio XLV)*

Articulus V- Whether it belongs to God alone to create *(Quaestio XLV)*

Articulus VI- Whether to create is proper to some person *(Quaestio XLV)*

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Articulus VIII- Whether creation is admitted in the works of nature and of art *(Quaestio XLV)*

Disputatio CLXXII- Whether creation is a production from nothing

Caput I- The opinion of Wyclif *(Disputatio CLXXII)*

Caput II- The foregoing opinion is refuted *(Disputatio CLXXII)*

Caput III- Exposition of the definition of creation *(Disputatio CLXXII)*

Disputatio CLXXIII- Whether creation is a pure relation, or something absolute

Caput I- The recent opinion: creation as a real and absolute influx *(Disputatio CLXXIII)*

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Caput III - More probable: the relation of creation is not really distinct from the substance of the creature *(Disputatio CLXXIII)*

Caput IV- The arguments of the prior opinion are resolved *(Disputatio CLXXIII)*

Disputatio CLXXIV - On whether grace and the supernatural gifts are created or co - created in us

Caput I - Many Scholastics judged that grace and the supernatural gifts in us are created *(Disputatio CLXXIV)*

Caput II- That neither grace nor any accidental or substantial form that by its nature depends on a subject or on matter is created or co - created is proved by authority *(Disputatio CLXXIV)*

Caput III- The preceding opinion is confirmed by reason *(Disputatio CLXXIV)*

Caput IV- Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine *(Disputatio CLXXIV)*

Disputatio CLXXV- Whether a native power of creating can belong to a creature

Caput I- Durandus asserts that by absolute power this can be done *(Disputatio CLXXV)*

Disputatio CLXXVI - On whether a creature can be assumed by God as an instrument for creating

Caput I- The opinion that a creature can be assumed as an instrument for creating *(Disputatio CLXXVI)*

Caput II- The opposite, truer opinion *(Disputatio CLXXVI)*

Caput III - The preceding opinion is shown by the best reason, with no innate virtue posited in the instrument *(Disputatio CLXXVI)*

Caput IV- On the so-called "obediential potency" and recent opinions *(Disputatio CLXXVI)*

Caput V- How the other instruments have a prior operation, or something produced in the effect by their proper power *(Disputatio CLXXVI)*

Quaestio XLVI- On the principle of the duration of created things

Articulus I- Whether the universe of creatures has existed always *(Quaestio XLVI)*

Articulus II- Whether the world's having begun is an article of faith *(Quaestio XLVI)*

Articulus III- That the creation of things was in the beginning of time *(Quaestio XLVI)*

Disputatio CLXXVII- Whether the world could have been from eternity

Caput I- The Catholic faith teaches that the world began at the beginning of time *(Disputatio CLXXVII)*

Caput II- Whether a creature could have been from eternity *(Disputatio CLXXVII)*

Caput III- That a permanent creature, even a corruptible one, but without corruption, could have been from eternity; the more probable opinion holds *(Disputatio CLXXVII)*

Against the reasons of the opposing position enough has been said

Caput IV - On the eternity of motion and of generations: whether it is possible, as various Scholastics have taught *(Disputatio CLXXVII)*

Caput V- That this whole universe, apart from the generations of substances and of accidents, as regards the rest, could have been from eternity: the more probable opinion *(Disputatio CLXXVII)*

Quaestio XLVII- On the distinction of things in general

Articulus I- Whether the multitude and distinction of things is from God *(Quaestio XLVII)*

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Articulus III- Whether there is only one world *(Quaestio XLVII)*

Quaestio XLVIII- On the distinction of things in particular

Articulus I- Whether evil is some nature *(Quaestio XLVIII)*

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Articulus VI- Whether punishment has more of the notion of evil than fault *(Quaestio XLVIII)*

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Articulus I- Whether the good can be the cause of evil *(Quaestio XLIX)*

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Articulus I- Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal *(Quaestio L)*

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Articulus IV- Whether the angels differ in species *(Quaestio L)*

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Caput I- Error concerning the number of the angels *(Disputatio CLXXX)*

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Caput I - Not only according to imagination, but also in very reality angels appear in bodies *(Disputatio CLXXXIV)*

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Caput IV- Of what matter, and by what power, bodies are assumed by angels *(Disputatio CLXXXIV)*

Disputatio CLXXXV - Whether all the apparitions of God that are narrated to have been made were made by the ministry of angels

Caput I - Some Fathers judged that not all apparitions were made by the ministry of angels *(Disputatio CLXXXV)*

Caput II - The common and truer opinion is that God always appeared in both Testaments by the ministry of angels *(Disputatio CLXXXV)*

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De locutione

Quaestio LII- On the comparison of angels to place

Articulus I- Whether an angel is in a place *(Quaestio LII)*

Articulus II- Whether an angel can be in several places at the same time *(Quaestio LII)*

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Disputatio CLXXXVII- Whether angels are truly in a bodily place

Caput I- Catholic and certain doctrine *(Disputatio CLXXXVII)*

Caput II- Arguments against the aforesaid doctrine *(Disputatio CLXXXVII)*

Disputatio CLXXXVIII- By what account an angel exists in a place

Caput I- Enumeration of opinions and statement of the question *(Disputatio CLXXXVIII)*

Caput II - Against the opinion that an angel is in a place by a transitive operation *(Disputatio CLXXXVIII)*

Caput III - The third opinion: that an angel is in a place by operation, passion, or presidency *(Disputatio CLXXXVIII)*

Caput IV - The fourth opinion: that an angel is in a place by an application of power to act *(Disputatio CLXXXVIII)*

Caput VI- Against the preceding opinion *(Disputatio CLXXXVIII)*

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Disputatio CLXXXIX- Whether an angel is necessarily where he acts

Caput I- That many theologians teach that an angel can act where he is not *(Disputatio CLXXXIX)*

Caput II- The contrary opinion seems to be embraced *(Disputatio CLXXXIX)*

Caput III- The foundations of the prior opinion are easily overturned *(Disputatio CLXXXIX)*

Disputatio CXC- Whether an angel can be in diverse places at the same time

Caput I- Status of the controversy *(Disputatio CXC)*

Caput II- That some taught an angel can be at once in several non - adequate places *(Disputatio CXC)*

Caput III - The truer opinion: an angel cannot be in several places, even non - adequate, in any way *(Disputatio CXC)*

Disputatio CXCII- Whether an angel can be in an indivisible place

Caput I- On the opinions of the theologians *(Disputatio CXCII)*

Caput II- The view of Scotus *(Disputatio CXCII)*

Caput III - Why the angel who moves the heaven is not in the whole, but in some part of it *(Disputatio CXCII)*

Caput I- There arise also Doctors on this question, indeed many who are brought forward to the same opinion by various arguments. *(Articulus III)*

Disputatio CXCIII- On whether several angels can be in the same place

Caput I- That several angels cannot be in the same place, even if not adequately *(Disputatio CXCIII)*

Caput II- Refutation of the preceding opinion *(Disputatio CXCIII)*

Caput III - That several angels cannot be in the same adequate place, as the Thomists teach *(Disputatio CXCIII)*

Caput IV- The truer opinion: that several angels can be in the same place *(Disputatio CXCIII)*

Quaestio LIII- On the local motion of angels

Articulus I- Whether an angel can be moved locally *(Quaestio LIII)*

Articulus II- Whether the Angel passes through the middle *(Quaestio LIII)*

Articulus III- Whether the motion of an angel is in an instant *(Quaestio LIII)*

Disputatio CXCIV- Whether an angel can be moved from place to place

Caput I- What Hervaeus and Durandus think *(Disputatio CXCIV)*

Caput II- The true opinion: that an angel is moved with respect to place *(Disputatio CXCIV)*

Caput III- That an angel moves himself *(Disputatio CXCIV)*

Disputatio CXCV- Whether the motion of an angel is something in the angel himself

Caput I - That the motion of an angel is something intrinsic to him, taught by Lichetus *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Caput II- That an angel is moved only to an extrinsic form, taught by many *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Caput III- Notes for the explication of the truer view *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Caput IV- The more probable middle sentence *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Caput V- Answers to the arguments opposed to our position *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Caput VI- An Angel can be moved by a continuous motion *(Disputatio CXCV)*

Disputatio CXCVI- Whether an angel can be moved from extreme to extreme without the middle

Caput I- Various opinions of the Scholastics *(Disputatio CXCVI)*

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Caput III- Rebuttal of the arguments *(Disputatio CXCVI)*

Disputatio CXCVII

Caput I- Whether the motion of an angel through the medium can be in an instant *(Disputatio CXCVII)*

Caput II - That an angel cannot be moved through the medium in an instant; the truer opinion concludes *(Disputatio CXCVII)*

Caput III- The arguments of the former sentence are dissolved *(Disputatio CXCVII)*

Caput IV- On the discrete motion of an angel *(Disputatio CXCVII)*

Quaestio LIV- On the knowledge of the angels

Articulus I- Whether the angel's understanding is his substance *(Quaestio LIV)*

Articulus II- Whether the angel's understanding is his existence *(Quaestio LIV)*

Articulus III- Whether the angel's intellectual power is his essence *(Quaestio LIV)*

Articulus IV- Whether in an angel there are an agent intellect and a possible intellect *(Quaestio LIV)*

Articulus V- Whether in angels there is only intellective cognition *(Quaestio LIV)*

Disputatio CXCVIII- On whether intellection in an angel is his substance

Caput I- The opinion of Aristotle and Durandus *(Disputatio CXCVIII)*

Caput II- The truer opinion: that intellection in an angel is not his essence *(Disputatio CXCVIII)*

Disputatio CXCIX- On whether there is in angels an agent and a possible intellect

Caput I- Various opinions *(Disputatio CXCIX)*

Quaestio LV- On the medium of angelic cognition

Articulus I- Whether the angels know all things through their own substance *(Quaestio LV)*

Articulus II- Whether the angels understand by species received from things *(Quaestio LV)*

Articulus III - Whether the higher Angels understand by more universal species than the lower *(Quaestio LV)*

Disputatio CC- Whether the angels understand by species

Caput I- That Durandus and the Nominalists held that angels, by their essence alone and their intellect, understand all things *(Disputatio CC)*

Caput II- The common opinion *(Disputatio CC)*

Caput III- A judgment concerning both opinions *(Disputatio CC)*

Disputatio CCI- Whether the Angel receives species from things

Caput I- The opinion of Scotus and others *(Disputatio CCI)*

Caput II - That the Angel receives no species from things: the common and truer opinion is established *(Disputatio CCI)*

Caput III - In what way the species which the Angel has were from the beginning inborn in his intellect *(Disputatio CCI)*

Disputatio CCII

Caput I - Whether there can be one species, or quality, in Angels representing many things *(Disputatio CCII)*

Caput II- The more common and truer opinion: that one and the same numerically species can represent many diverse things, and that such species were granted to Angels *(Disputatio CCII)*

Disputatio CCIII- Whether, the higher an Angel is, the more he understands by fewer species

Caput I - Scotus and Bassolis deny that higher Angels understand by fewer and more universal species *(Disputatio CCIII)*

Caput II- Thomists affirm that higher Angels understand by fewer species *(Disputatio CCIII)*

Caput III- Two other Scholastic opinions *(Disputatio CCIII)*

Caput IV- The fourth opinion (Henry of Ghent) *(Disputatio CCIII)*

Quaestio LVI- On the knowledge of Angels on the part of immaterial things

Articulus I- Whether an Angel knows himself *(Quaestio LVI)*

Caput II- The common sentence: that an angel understands himself through his essence without any added species as a principle of understanding *(Articulus I)*

Articulus II- Whether one Angel knows another *(Quaestio LVI)*

Caput I- How one Angel knows another *(Articulus II)*

Caput II- That one Angel knows another through that other's essence, as some said *(Articulus II)*

Caput III - That, by the intellect's power alone or through species, one Angel is known by another, as the more probable opinion holds *(Articulus II)*

Articulus III- Whether an Angel can know God by his natural powers. *(Quaestio LVI)*

Disputatio CCVI- In what way an Angel naturally knows God

Caput I- Two Scholastic opinions *(Disputatio CCVI)*

Caput II- The more probable opinion *(Disputatio CCVI)*

Quaestio LVII- On the knowledge of Angels with respect to material things

Articulus I- Whether Angels know material things *(Quaestio LVII)*

Articulus II- Whether Angels know singulars *(Quaestio LVII)*

Articulus III- Whether the Angels know future things *(Quaestio LVII)*

Articulus IV- Whether angels know the thoughts of hearts *(Quaestio LVII)*

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Disputatio CCVII - Whether future contingents proceeding solely from natural causes can be known by an Angel

Caput I- Statement of the question and preliminaries *(Disputatio CCVII)*

Caput II- The more probable opinion: that contingent events not depending in any way on free choice are known with certitude by Angels *(Disputatio CCVII)*

Caput III- Dissolution of contrary arguments *(Disputatio CCVII)*

Disputatio CCVIII - An future contingentia ex libero arbitrio propria virtute ab Angelis certo cognoscantur

Caput II- Some Schoolmen attempt a priori to demonstrate that future contingents from free will cannot be known by Angels, by this reasoning. *(Disputatio CCVIII)*

Caput III- The difficult argument, to which the Doctors reply in various ways *(Disputatio CCVIII)*

Caput IV- The true solution of the foregoing argument *(Disputatio CCVIII)*

Disputatio CCIX- On whether angels know the thoughts of hearts

Caput I- Hervaeus and Durandus: that angels know thoughts and volitions, not only what they are but also what they are about *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput III- The common and much more probable opinion is that the secrets of the heart of one man, or of an angel, cannot be known by another angel. *(Disputatio CCIX)*

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Caput V- Against Henry's "intention" as a mere relation *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput VI - Another way of proving the common opinion; and the attack of Scotus and Durandus *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput VII- Ferrariensis' reply to Durandus *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput VIII- How Cajetan interprets St. Thomas's reasoning *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput IX- Gregory confirms the common opinion by another reason *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Caput X- The author's judgment *(Disputatio CCIX)*

Disputatio CCX - What a cogitation or the secrets of the heart are, which an angel by his nature cannot know

Caput I- Preliminaries and the sense of "secrets of the heart" *(Disputatio CCX)*

Caput II - Not to be judged the same way about affections and about cogitations; a probable opinion *(Disputatio CCX)*

Disputatio CCXI- One Angel's speaking to another is undoubted. cap. 1.

Caput I- That Angels speak among themselves *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput II- That one Angel speaks to another by impressing into his mind the cognition of the object known by himself, as Scotus maintains *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput III- The opinion of Scotus is refuted *(Disputatio CCXI)*

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Caput V- Refutation of the foregoing opinion *(Disputatio CCXI)*

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Caput VII - Angels speak among themselves by one angel's impressing the cognition of his concept into another's mind (Ockham, Gabriel) *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput VIII - That an angel speaks merely by willing his secret to be manifested (Cajetan, Capreolus) *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput IX- What Durandus held *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput X- On angelic locution by spiritual signs *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput XI - The final opinion in the present controversy: that one angel speaks to another by the expression of an interior word *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Caput XII- The arguments against the preceding doctrine are dissolved *(Disputatio CCXI)*

Disputatio CCXII- Whether an angel can speak with another at any distance

Caput I- That a determinate distance is necessary for one angel to speak to another *(Disputatio CCXII)*

Disputatio CCXIII - Whether one angel can speak to another in such a way that others do not hear, even if they wish

Caput I- That it is possible for one angel to speak so to one that others cannot hear *(Disputatio CCXIII)*

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Caput III- On what of the supernatural an angel can know naturally *(Disputatio CCXIV)*

Caput IV - What in the Eucharist angels can know naturally, and what remains hidden *(Disputatio CCXIV)*

Disputatio CCXV - On whether the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the angels in the state of wayfarers

Caput I- The common opinion is that the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the angels in the way *(Disputatio CCXV)*

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Article 2 (Articulus 2)

Disputation 239 (Disputatio 239)

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Disputation 241 (Disputatio 241)

On the other hand it seems impossible that every good suggestion, even a sufficient one, be denied to a demon

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Disputation 242 (Disputatio 242)

On the sadness and pain of demons (De tristitia, et dolore daemonum)

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Opera Theologica omnia (Vol. 2)

Quaestio XXVII - On the procession of the divine persons

Having considered, however, those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence (*essentia*), it remains to consider those things which pertain to the Trinity of persons in the divine things. And because the divine persons are distinguished according to the relations of origin (*relationes originis*), according to the order of doctrine we must first consider origin, that is, procession (*processio*); secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession, five questions are asked: - First, whether there is procession in the divine things. - Second, whether any procession in the divine things can be called generation. - Third, whether besides generation there is some other procession in the divine things. - Fourth, whether that other procession can be called generation. - Fifth, whether in the divine things there are more processions than two.

Praefatio

These matters ought to be called, by name, theological. For the things which are treated about God in theology are of our faith, and therefore what they are entirely lies hidden; many things, however, can be investigated by the light of natural reason, or in some way traced out, not to the prejudice of the mysteries, nor detracting from them. Indeed, against the Trinity of persons in one numerically same essence, if any intellect, not instructed by the light of faith, attempts to rise up, it is dashed to pieces and is not perfected. Nevertheless, in the present disputation of ours, with positions taken only from divine revelation, we shall also not obscurely deduce many things by theological reasoning concerning the matter itself: always holding this, that our Christian faith establishes that true natural reason is not destroyed, but perfected and illumined. It is, moreover, our part to dissolve the arguments and calumnies of adversaries who strive against this mystery, and, aided by the principles of our faith, to overthrow them - so far as theological reasons can afford to a theologian.

And although in this whole present treatment on the Trinity we shall use certain words which Scripture indeed does not expressly have, yet by the Fathers they have been accommodated to this most hidden mystery - such as: essence (*essentia*), Trinity, subsistence (*subsistentia*), person (*persona*), notion, potency (*potentia*), notional act (*actus notionalis*), relation (*relatio*), and the like - which we shall use in their proper places, lest we open a door in the Church to adversaries. For although heretics rightly reject those words by which they attempt to explain away the mystery of the Trinity, Catholics, for good reasons, rightly and readily use those same terms.

Articulus I - Whether there is procession in the divine things

Objicitur: 1) It seems that in God there cannot be any procession. For procession signifies motion outwardly; but in the divine things there is nothing mobile nor extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession. 2) Further, every thing proceeding is diverse from that from which it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity, but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession. 3) Further, to proceed from another seems to be repugnant to the notion of the first principle; but God is the first principle, as was shown above. Therefore in God procession has no place.

But on the contrary: The Lord says in John 7: "I proceeded from God."

I answer that, divine Scripture in divine matters uses names that pertain to procession. Various people have taken this procession in different ways. Some, indeed, have taken this procession according as an effect proceeds from its cause. And thus Arius takes it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as his first creature, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. And according to this, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God. Which is contrary to what is said of the Son in 1 John, last chapter: "That we may be in his true Son: this is the true God;" and of the Spirit is said in 1 Corinthians 3: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit?" But to have a temple belongs to God alone. Others, however, have taken this procession according as a cause is said to proceed into its effect, inasmuch as it moves it, or imprints its likeness on it. And thus Sabellius took it, saying that the very God the Father is called Son according as he assumed flesh from the Virgin, and he calls the same the Holy Spirit, according as he sanctifies the rational creature and moves it to life. But this acceptance is repugnant to the words of the Lord speaking of himself, John 5: "The Son cannot do anything of himself," and many other things, by which it is shown that he is not himself the Father who is the Son. If one consider diligently, each of these accepted procession according as it is toward something external. Whence neither of them posited procession in God himself. But since every procession is according to some action: just as, according to an action that tends into external matter, there is some procession outwardly; so, according to an action that remains in the agent itself, a certain procession is considered inwardly. And this is most clearly evident in the intellect, whose action - namely, to understand - remains in the understanding subject. But whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within him, which is the conception of the understood thing, proceeding by the power of the intellectual faculty, and going forth from his knowledge. This conception is signified by the voice; and the word of the heart is signified by the spoken word. But since God is above all, those things that are said in God are not to be understood according to the mode of the lowest creatures, which are bodies, but according to the likeness of the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances; from which even so the likeness taken falls short of a representation of the divine. Therefore procession is not to be taken according as it is in corporeal things, either by local motion or by the action of some

cause into an external effect, as heat heating proceeds into the thing heated; but according to the emanation of an intelligible, as of an intelligible word from one speaking, which remains in him. And thus the Catholic faith posits procession in the divine things.

Reply to the first: That objection proceeds from procession which is local motion, or which is according to an action tending into external matter, or into an external effect. But such a procession is not in the divine things, as has been said.

Reply to the second: That which proceeds according to a procession which is outward must be diverse from that from which it proceeds. But that which proceeds inwardly, by an intelligible procession, need not be diverse; rather, the more perfectly it proceeds, so much the more is it one with that from which it proceeds. For it is manifest that, the more something is understood, the more the intellectual conception is intimate to the one understanding and the more one with him. For the intellect, inasmuch as it actually understands, thereby becomes more one with the understood. Hence, since the divine understanding is at the term of perfection (as was said above), it is necessary that the divine Word be perfectly one with him from whom it proceeds, without any diversity.

Reply to the third: To proceed from a principle as extraneous and diverse is repugnant to the notion of the first principle; but to proceed as an intrinsic beginning and without diversity, by an intelligible mode, is included in the notion of a first principle. For when we say that the builder is the principle of the house, in the notion of this principle is included the conception of his art; and if the builder were the first principle, the conception of his art would be included in the notion of the first principle. But God, who is the first principle of things, is related to created things not as an artificer to his works of art.

Notandum concerning the article. - The conclusion of the article is: In the divine things there is a procession by way of an immanent, intelligible emanation. By this single conclusion St. Thomas most excellently explained what sort of procession in God must be conceded. For since one kind of procession is according to place, another according to an effect from a cause - like heat proceeding from fire - he concludes that neither of those is found in God, because he is neither located in place, nor does anything within him depend on a cause as on an efficient and superior. Therefore there is a procession within God by way of an intelligible emanation, whereby truly something is produced. He speaks here only of the emanation through the intellect, which belongs to the Son alone. For the emanation through the will, which is of the Holy Spirit, he treats in article 3. - Further, it is to be observed that the name "procession" is of itself common to the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; by the usage of the Church, however, it is accommodated to the Holy Spirit, who is not called begotten, but proceeding, as is had in the Athanasian Creed; and the Schoolmen give various reasons for this accommodation.[1] For us, however, it is enough to know that, by the usage of the Church, it is now rightly accommodated to signify the procession of the Holy Spirit, although in a common and universal signification we also frequently use it. - About this article there is wont to

1. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1.

be a disputation concerning the word of our intellection. Of this, however, so far as a theologian needs, we shall speak in disputation 142. But those things which, concerning the emanation of the Son, are noteworthy against heretics, we shall treat in the special disputation 109.

Articulus II - Whether any procession in the divine things can be called generation

Objicitur: 1) It seems that the procession which is in the divine things cannot be called generation. For generation is a change from non-being to being, opposed to corruption, and the subject of both is matter. But none of these belongs to the divine things. Therefore generation cannot be in the divine things. 2) Further, in God there is procession according to an intelligible mode, as has been said; but in us such a procession is not called generation. Therefore neither in God. 3) Further, every begotten receives existence from the begetter. Therefore the existence of any begotten is a received existence. But no received existence is per se subsistent. Since therefore the divine existence is per se subsistent (as was proved above), it follows that the existence of no begotten is divine existence. Therefore there is not generation in the divine things.

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 2: "This day I have begotten you."

I answer that, the procession of the Word in the divine things is called generation. For the understanding of this, it should be known that we use the name "generation" in a twofold way. In one way, commonly for all things generable and corruptible; and thus generation is nothing other than a change from non-being to being. In another way, properly in living things; and thus generation signifies the origin of some living thing from a living principle conjoined; and this is properly called "birth." Yet not everything of this sort is called begotten and a son, but properly that which proceeds according to a ratio of likeness. Hence hair or a nail does not have the notion of what is begotten and of a son, but only that which proceeds according to a ratio of likeness - not just any likeness; for worms that are generated in animals do not have the notion of generation and of filiation, although there is likeness according to genus; but there is required, for the notion of such generation, that it proceed according to a ratio of likeness in the nature of the same species, as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. Now, in living things which proceed from potency to the act of life, as men and animals, generation includes both senses. But if there be some living being whose life does not go forth from potency into act, the procession (if any be found in such a living being) wholly excludes the first ratio of generation, yet can have the ratio of generation which is proper to living things. Thus, therefore, the procession of the Word in the divine things has the ratio of generation: for it proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is an operation of life; and from a principle conjoined, as was said above; and according to a ratio of likeness, because the conception of the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood, and existing in the same nature as that of the one understanding. For in God to understand and to be are the same, as was shown above. Whence the procession of the Word in the divine things is called generation, and the very Word proceeding is called Son.

Reply to the first: That objection proceeds about generation according to the first notion, insofar as it implies an exit from potency into act; and thus it is not found in the divine things, as was said above.

Reply to the second: To understand, in us, is not the very substance (*substantia*) of the intellect. Whence the word which proceeds in us according to an intelligible operation is not of the same nature with that from which it proceeds. Hence the ratio of generation does not properly and completely belong to it. But the divine understanding is the very substance of the one understanding, as was shown above. Whence the Word proceeding in God proceeds as subsistent of the same nature; and for this reason it is properly called "begotten" and "Son." Hence too, the Scripture, to signify the procession of divine Wisdom, uses those things which pertain to the generation of living beings, namely conception and birth. For it is said in the person of divine Wisdom, Proverbs 8: "The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills I was brought forth." But in our intellect we use the name "conception" according as in the word of our intellect there is found a likeness of the understood thing, although there is not found identity of nature.

Reply to the third: Not everything received is received in some subject; otherwise it could not be said that the whole substance of a created thing is received from God, since there is not some subject of the whole substance receiving something. Thus, therefore, that which is begotten in the divine things receives existence from the begetter, not as something received in a subject.

...than that existence, if it were received in some matter or subject, which is repugnant to the subsistence (*subsistentia*) of the divine existence (*esse*). But according to this it is said to be received, inasmuch as, proceeding from another, it has the divine existence, not as if existing as something other than the divine existence. For in the very perfection of the divine existence there is contained both the intelligibly proceeding Word and the principle of the Word, as also whatever pertains to its perfection, as was said above.

Dubitationes circa Articulum. The conclusion of the Article is: The procession (*processio*) of the Word in the divine things is generation (*generatio*), and the Word proceeding is the Son. Since this conclusion is certain, and will be proved below in Disputation 113, which sets forth nothing beyond what is extrinsic to the proof of the conclusion, let it now suffice to examine the doubts about the argument of the article proposed by Cajetan and Ferrariensis. For it seems that the Blessed Thomas proves that the divine Word is of the same nature with the producing Father in this way. In God to understand and to be are the same; and therefore God's intellection is His substance: but the being of the Word is to understand; therefore the being of the Word is the substance of God. He indicated this reasoning briefly at the end of the article, and expressly adduced it in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 1.[2] Hence such is Cajetan's doubt. To be understood (intelligi) is nothing in the thing understood; for it seems to be only some extrinsic denomination: therefore, since the Word in the divine things is the thing understood, it follows that its real being is not to be understood, but that from this it only contracts some extrinsic denomination. Next, Ferrariensis

2. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, IV, c. 1.

proposes another doubt in this way. Although the being of the Word produced through intellection is to be understood, nevertheless it does not follow from this that the divine being agrees to it, even if in God to understand and to be are the same: otherwise, in like manner one could infer that the creatures objectively existing in the mind of God have God's own being, since their being is to be understood. A third argument is what Cajetan brings later in this way. The act of understanding is really distinguished from the concept and the word produced; but to understand is the being of the intellect itself in act: therefore it is not the being of the Word; because two things that are really distinguished do not have the same being. To the same point looks that argument which Ferrariensis proposes earlier: form and matter have the same being in the composite, and yet are really distinguished among themselves; therefore it does not follow in God that intellection and the thing understood, or the intention (as he calls it), are the same.

To the first and second, the aforesaid doctors answer in the same way: namely, that "to be understood," or intellection properly signified, is referred one way to the thing understood, which is only the object of intellection, and another way to the concept produced, which is called the Word. For this latter is considered as the production of that which, because by intellection as by an action the Word proceeds, and thus being is attributed to it; wherefore, if to understand is the divine being, to be understood in this mode will also be the divine being, and the thing produced by intellection will be of the same nature, and will have the same being in the producer. But intellection does not regard the object objectively present as something produced by itself; and therefore it posits in it nothing beyond an extrinsic denomination. This doctrine pleases me, if it be applied only to the divine intellection. For in God intellection is a true production of the Word; but in us it is not so, as we shall say in its place. To the third argument, which is Cajetan's, he himself answers in the Commentary in this way: intellection, as it has the notion of action, is the being of the intelligible species; but as it has the notion of passion, it is the being of the Word. Nor is it a wonder if two things really distinct have the same being, just as matter and form in the composite, which also really differ, have the same being. This reply of Cajetan is taken from a certain peculiar doctrine of his. For he thinks that to understand emanates from the intelligible species as being emanates from form; which could be shown false in a few words. But since in God really to understand does not differ from the intelligible species, which is the divine essence, but has the same being with it, we could more easily answer the proposed argument, as Ferrariensis answers another like one (which we also reported above): namely, that all things which participate in the same being are not on that account to be reckoned the same among themselves, unless they participate in the same being as parts of some whole, as body and soul participate in the being of man. Wherefore, since intellection in God and the thing produced (namely, the Word) have the same being, and are not parts of some whole, it follows that they have absolutely the same being; except that intellection, as it is the active production of the Word, and the Word itself, are opposed by relation, and by that opposition they really differ: nevertheless they have the same being and the same substance, which is common in God to the persons and the relations.

Articulus III - Whether there is in the divine things another procession besides the generation of the Word

Objicitur 1. It seems that there is not in the divine things another procession besides the generation of the Word. For by the same reasoning there will be some other procession besides that other procession; and so one would proceed to infinity, which is incongruous. Therefore one must stand at the first, so that there be only one procession in the divine things.

Objicitur 2. Further, in every nature there is found only one mode of communication of that nature. And this is so because operations, according to their termini, have unity and diversity. But procession in the divine things is only according to the communication of the divine nature. Since therefore there is only one divine nature (as was shown above), it follows that there is only one procession in the divine things.

Objicitur 3. Further, if there is in the divine things another procession besides the intelligible procession of the Word, it will be only the procession of love: which is according to the operation of the will (*voluntas*). But such a procession cannot be other than the procession of the intelligible intellect (*intellectus*): because in God will is not other than intellect, as was shown above. Therefore in God there is not another procession besides the procession of the Word.

But on the contrary: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, as is said in John 15. But He is other than the Son, according to that of John 14: "I will ask my Father, and He will give you another Paraclete." Therefore in the divine things there is another procession besides the procession of the Word.

I answer: that in the divine things there are two processions, namely, the procession of the Word and a certain other. For the understanding of which, one must consider that in the divine things there is procession only according to an action which does not tend to something extrinsic, but remains in the very agent. But such an action in an intellectual nature is the action of the intellect and the action of the will. Now the procession of the Word is considered according to the intelligible action. But according to the operation of the will there is found in us a certain other procession, namely, the procession of love, according to which the beloved is in the lover, just as, through the conception of the Word, the thing said or understood is in the one understanding. And hence, besides the procession of the Word, another procession is posited in the divine things, which is the procession of love.

Reply to the first: It is not necessary to proceed to infinity in the processions in the divine things. For a procession which is ad intra in an intellectual nature is terminated in the procession of the will.

Reply to the second: Whatever is in God is God, as was shown above. Which does not happen in other things. And therefore by every procession which is not ad extra the divine nature is communicated, and not some other nature.

Reply to the third: Although in God will and intellect are not other, nevertheless it belongs to the notion of will and of intellect that the processions which are according to the action of each have between themselves a certain order. For there is not a procession of love except in an order to the procession of the Word. For nothing can be loved by the will unless it be conceived in the intellect. Therefore, just as a certain order is considered of the Word to the principle from which it proceeds, although in the divine things the substance of the intellect and the conception of the intellect is the same, so, although in God will and intellect are the same, nevertheless because it belongs to the notion of love that it does not proceed except from the conception of the intellect, the procession of love has a distinction of order from the procession of the Word in the divine things.

Dubitatio circa Articulum. The conclusion is: In God there is another procession besides the generation of the Word; about the truth of which it is to be discussed more at large for us in the following disputations. Now, omitting other matters which Cajetan examines here, let it suffice to explain only the mode in which it is said by St. Thomas that the beloved is in the lover. Whether indeed the word of our intellection is the efficient principle of the operation of the will, which is the topic Cajetan treats here, will be more conveniently disputed below in the Prima Secundae, question 9, article 1.[3] Whether moreover the processions in God are distinguished by themselves or by something of theirs, and how, we shall treat in Disputation 148. Finally, whether by the love of the will something is produced in us, or rather the love itself is the very quality produced in the will, we shall say below, when the disputation shall have fallen upon the production of the word of our intellect.

There is therefore in this article the doubt which Cajetan proposes, whether the beloved is in the lover, or conversely. Aureolus, reported by Capreolus in 1, dist. 10, question 1, article 2, affirms that only the lover is in the beloved, not conversely. He proves it thus: because the affection of the will, which is love, is not a motion of the thing loved toward the lover, but of the lover toward the thing loved; therefore it is said rather that the lover is in the thing loved than conversely. And hence this mark of difference is wont to be assigned between will and intellect, that the intellect draws things to itself, because in itself it expresses their likeness; but the will tends to things: because the affection of love is not a likeness of the thing beloved, but a certain motion toward it; wherefore it is said to be drawn by it, and to be more where it loves than where it animates: as Matthew 6 says, "Where your treasure is, there is your heart also."

Yet with good reason the Blessed Thomas taught in this article, and in the Prima Secundae, article 2, and in Contra Gentiles book 4, chapter 19, whom Cajetan and Ferrariensis follow in the same places, together with the Bishop of Caiarien in this article, and Capreolus in 1, dist. 10, question 1, articles 1 and 2, that not only the beloved is in the lover, but also conversely. The Blessed Thomas explains in that question 23 a twofold mode by which the beloved is in the lover, and the lover in the beloved: for there is a certain mutual coupling and adhesion of power. One mode is according to apprehension, insofar as the beloved is present to the thought of the lover;

3. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I - II, q. 9, a. 1.

but conversely the lover is in the thing beloved, insofar as he does not rest, content with a perfunctory consideration of the beloved, but thinks out and investigates the smallest details of the beloved, and strives with his intellect to penetrate into the interior of his friend. Hence when someone is full of thought, we are wont to say that his mind is elsewhere. The other mode is through affection: in this way it is said that the beloved is in the lover by a certain fittingness with him, just as the downward motion of a stone is said to be in gravity, as in a suitable inclination and principle of it, as St. Thomas noted in the same book 4 of the Contra Gentiles. But conversely the lover is said to be in the thing beloved through affection in a twofold way: first, through the love of concupiscence, insofar as he does not rest until he perfectly attains it and fully enjoys it; then through the love of friendship, because he reckons the goods or evils of a friend as his own. And since these modes of speaking follow a metaphor, let what has been said suffice for us, that in both modes we rightly assert both that the beloved is in the lover and conversely.

I answer to Aureolus's reasoning from the doctrine of Cajetan in this article, that the beloved is not said to be in the lover because it is drawn by him; for to be loved by someone is not to be drawn by him; but because it is in his affection as in a suitable inclination, which rather belongs to the affection of the thing beloved itself, as to an end. But the intellect is said rather to draw things to itself than to be moved toward them, because in itself it expresses their image, so as to make for itself, and behold, those that do not exist or are absent as if present; but the will is said to be drawn by things, because from the affection about things there is born in the lover a motion to have them, although sometimes he rests altogether in a simple complacency about them, as we said concerning God's will about possible things in Disputation 79, chapter 2.

Articulus IV - Whether the procession of love in the divine things is generation

Ad quartum sic proceditur. It seems that the procession of love in the divine things is generation. For what proceeds in the likeness of nature in living beings is called generated and being born. But that which

Objicitur 1. It seems that the procession (*processio*) of love in the divine is generation (*generatio*). For that which proceeds in the likeness of nature in living things is called "begotten" and "being born." But that which proceeds in the divine by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and thus it would be a procession ad extra. Therefore that which proceeds in the divine by way of love proceeds as begotten and being born.

Objicitur 2. Further, as likeness belongs to the notion of the word, so too it belongs to the notion of love. Hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus 13 that every animal loves its like. If therefore by reason of likeness it belongs to the word proceeding to be generated and to be born, it seems likewise to belong to love proceeding to be generated.

Objicitur 3. Further, there is nothing in a genus that is not in some species of it. If therefore in the divine there is a certain procession of love, it is necessary that, besides this common name, it have some specific name. But no other name can be given except generation. Therefore it seems that the procession of love in the divine is generation.

Sed contra: On this reasoning it would follow that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, proceeds as begotten. But this is against that of Athanasius: "In his Symbol of faith, 'the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.'"[4]

Respondetur: The procession of love in the divine ought not to be called generation. For the evidence of this, it must be known that this is the difference between intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*), namely, that the intellect is in act by the fact that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its likeness. The will, however, is in act, not by the fact that some likeness of the willed object is in the will, but by the fact that the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed. The procession, therefore, which is considered according to the notion of intellect, is according to the notion of likeness. And to that extent it can have the notion of generation, because every generator generates its like. But the procession which is considered according to the notion of will is not considered according to the notion of likeness, but rather according to the notion of an impulse and a movement toward something. And therefore that which proceeds in the divine by way of love does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but rather proceeds as Spirit; by which name a certain vital motion and impulse is designated: inasmuch as someone is said, from love, to be moved or impelled to do something.

Reply to the first: Whatever is in the divine is one with the divine nature. Hence, on the part of this unity, the proper notion of this procession or of that, by which one is distinguished from another, cannot be taken; rather it is necessary that the proper notion of this or that procession be taken according to the order of one procession to the other. Now such an order is considered according to the notion of will and of intellect. Hence, according to their proper notion, each procession in the divine receives a name which is imposed to signify the proper notion of the thing. And thence it is that the one proceeding by way of love both receives the divine nature and yet is not said to be born.

Reply to the second: Likeness pertains differently to the word and to love. For it pertains to the word insofar as the word itself is a certain likeness of the thing understood, as the begotten is a likeness of the generator. But it pertains to love, not that love itself be a likeness, but insofar as likeness is a principle of loving. Hence it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the begotten is the principle of love.

4. Athanasius, Symbolum fidei: "Spiritus sanctus a Patre, et Filio non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens."

Reply to the third: We are not able to name God except from creatures, as was said above.[5] And because in creatures the communication of nature is only through generation, the procession in the divine has no proper or specific name except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be named spiration, because it is the procession of spirit.

Conclusio est: The procession of love in God is not generation.

Articulus V - Whether there are more processions in the divine than two

Ad quintum sic proceditur. It seems that there are more processions in the divine than two. For, just as knowledge and will are attributed to God, so also is power. If therefore according to the intellect and according to the will two processions are taken in God, it seems that a third should be taken according to power

1. Further, goodness seems especially to be the principle of procession, since the good is said to be diffusive of itself. It seems therefore that according to goodness some procession ought to be taken in the divine.
2. Further, the power of fecundity is greater in God than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of word, but many: for from one word in us another word proceeds, and likewise from one love another love. Therefore also in God there are more processions than two.

But on the contrary: In God there are only two who proceed, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are there only two processions.

I answer: Processions in the divine can be taken only according to actions which remain in the agent. But such actions in an intellectual and divine nature are only two, namely, to understand and to will. For to sense, which even seems to be an operation in the one sensing, is outside the intellectual nature; nor is it entirely removed from the kind of actions which are ad extra. For sensing is perfected by the action of the sensible upon the sense. It remains therefore that no other procession can be in God, except that of word and of love.

Reply to the first: Power is a principle of acting upon another; wherefore, according to power, action ad extra is taken. And thus, according to the attribute of power, the procession of a divine person is not taken, but only the procession of creatures.

Reply to the second: The good (as Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus) pertains to essence and not to operation, unless perhaps as the object of the will. Hence, since the divine processions must be taken according to certain actions, they are taken according to goodness and suchlike other attributes, yet no other processions are taken except of word and of love, according as God understands and loves his own essence, truth, and goodness.[6]

5. "We cannot name God except from creatures": cf. above, Q. 13, art. 1.
6. Boethius, De Hebdomadibus.

Reply to the third: God by one simple act understands all things, and likewise wills all things. Hence in him there cannot be a procession of word from word, nor of love from love; but in him there is only one perfect word, and one perfect love. And in this his fecundity is manifested.

Summa totius quaestionis. Conclusio est: There is no other procession in God than that of word and of love. Therefore the sum of this whole question is that God is so one in essence, that within himself he produces the Son and love, that is, the Holy Spirit, of altogether the same nature, yet distinct in persons; nor are more sons, or spirits, or persons produced by God; and hence there are in God only three persons distinct by production, but undivided in essence: which Catholic doctrine must be examined by us more deeply in some disputations.

Disputatio CVIII - Whether there are more persons in the Deity

An plures sint in deitate persona. Disput. 108.

Various heretics attack the Trinity of persons. cap. 1.

From the Old Testament and the testimony of the Rabbis the plurality of persons in the divine nature is established. cap. 2.

The Trinity of persons against the Jews is shown from the Tetragrammaton. cap. 3.

The same against the heretics is demonstrated from the Old and New Testament. cap. 4.

Caput I - Various heretics attack the Trinity of persons

Although concerning the mode of procession of the persons and about the property of each one we shall in particular say many things later, nevertheless, before all else it is necessary to explain the number of them and their nature, and to establish it with certain faith: since indeed St. Thomas in this question determines both the number of persons and of processions. Now the number, about which at present there is controversy for us, besides the Jews, innumerable heretics also expressly denied, asserting that there is one God in such a way that not only is his essence one, but also his person. The first author of this error, according to Epiphanius in heresy 57, was Noetus, a certain Asiatic from the city of Ephesus, whence they are also called Noetians.[7] Whom, the same Epiphanius asserts, lived before his own times one hundred and thirty years, more or less. But much more ancient than Noetus, Praxeas seems to have taught the same error, as is gathered from Tertullian, in the book On Prescriptions against the Heretics, the last chapter, in the final words: "After all these, too, one Praxeas introduced a heresy, which Victorinus took care to strengthen."[8] This man says that God the Father Almighty is Jesus Christ, and that he himself was crucified, suffered, and moreover died; further, with profane and sacrilegious rashness he proposes that he himself sits at his own right hand. The same Tertullian writes this in the book against this very Praxeas, chapter one, at the beginning.[9] From which it is clear that the Patripassian heresy, which

7. Epiphanius, Panarion (Haereses), haer. 57.
8. Tertullian, De praescriptionibus adversus haereticos, cap. ult.
9. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 1.

is commonly attributed to Sabellius, is much more ancient than he. Since therefore Praxeas, just as Sabellius (of whom later), says that the almighty Father was incarnate; together with that same Sabellius he plainly confounds the Trinity of persons into one; wherefore Tertullian, in the book against him, straightaway from the beginning strives to prove the Trinity of persons in one nature.[9] This Praxeas was the first who, according to Tertullian, brought this heresy from Asia into Rome.[9]

In favor of this opinion St. Augustine, in the book On Heresies, chapter 41, reports the Hermogenians, from Hermogenes; just as also the Praxeans from Praxeas: but with no one else among the more ancient have I read that Hermogenes was of this opinion.[10] Before the times also of Tertullian there were in the same error certain Montanists, in Greek now called Kataphrygians, whose authors, as Eusebius affirms, book 5 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapters 14 and 18, were Montanus, and Priscilla, and Maximilla: and from the Phrygian people they took their name; and as Philastrius testifies, the same people are also called Donatians, from a certain Donatus, who throughout Africa sowed the same heresy: they are also called, as Epiphanius notes, heresy 48, Tascodrugitae.[11] Yet the ancient Fathers seem to have taught the contrary about these Montanists; for Epiphanius not only does not ascribe this error to the Montanists, but also, in the cited heresy, thus says about them: "Concerning the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, they think similarly, as the sound Catholic Church."[11] Wherefore Augustine, in the book On Heresies, chapter 26, does not number this among the errors of the Montanists; but on the contrary Jerome, in the Epistle to Marcella against Montanus, which is 54, thus writes about the same: "They narrow the Trinity into the straits of one person."[12][13] But Nicephorus, book 4 of the History, chapter 22, seems with a few words to have settled this dispute: "Montanus," he says, "concerning the divine Trinity and the creation of the world, taught the same as we do; some, however, of his followers afterwards were of the opinion that the three substances of the divinity are one." Therefore, although Montanus himself thought rightly concerning the Trinity;[14]

- From the Old Testament and the testimony of the Rabbis the plurality of persons in the divine nature is established. Caput II.
- The Trinity of persons against the Jews is shown from the Tetragrammaton. Caput III.
- The same against the heretics is demonstrated from the Old and the New Testament. Caput IV.

Various heretics attack the Trinity of persons

Although below we shall say many things in detail about the mode of the processions of the persons (*processio personarum*), and specifically about the property (*proprietas*) of each, nevertheless before all else it is necessary to explain the number of them and their nature and to set

9. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 1.
9. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 1.
10. St. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 41.
11. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica, V, c. 14, 18; Philastrius; Epiphanius, Haer. 48.
11. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica, V, c. 14, 18; Philastrius; Epiphanius, Haer. 48.
12. St. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 26.

it with certain faith; since indeed the Blessed Thomas, in this question, both determines the number of persons and defines the processions.[15] Now as to the number, about which the present controversy is for us, not only all the Jews but also innumerable heretics expressly denied it, asserting that there is one God in such a way that not only is there one essence (*essentia*) of his, but also one person. The first author of this error, as Epiphanius witnesses in Heresy 57, was Noetus, a certain Asiatic from the city of Ephesus, whence they were called Noetians. The same Epiphanius also asserts that Noetus lived one hundred and thirty years, more or less, before his own time.[16]

Yet Praxeas, much older than Noetus, seems to have taught the same error, as is gathered from Tertullian in the book On Prescriptions against Heretics, in the last chapter, in the last words. After these, Praxeas the heretic took care to strengthen the Patripassian heresy; in the beginning of the book Against Praxeas Tertullian writes the same, from which it is clear that (as would afterwards be said of Sabellius) he confounded the Trinity of persons into one, namely that the Father almighty was incarnate, suffered, and died: besides this, he impiously and sacrilegiously writes in the book against Praxeas that the same Christ crucified and having suffered he sets forth as if sitting at his own right hand with propriety. The same thing is in the first chapter of Against Praxeas; from which it is clear that Patripassianism was his heresy; thus also Sabellius (about whom below) confounded the whole mystery of the Trinity.[17]

When therefore Praxeas, straightway from the beginning, introduced among the Romans this doctrine about one person in one nature, Tertullian thereupon says that Praxeas, a man from Asia, brought this heresy from that region to Rome; with this opinion also, as St. Augustine reports in the book On Heresies, they joined Hermogenes; just as also the Praxeans: but in another author I have read it as Hermotimus. Before the times of Praxeas there were also the Montanists, called in Greek Kata-Phryges, whose authors were Montanus, and Priscilla and Maximilla by name; and they were from the Phrygian people, as Eusebius relates. Likewise also there were the Donatists from a certain Donatus, who sowed the heresy; they were called by that name, as Epiphanius notes in Heresy 48. Yet the ancient Fathers taught contrary to the Montanists; nor does Epiphanius ascribe this very error to the Montanists; instead he writes of them thus.[18]

After Sabellius, the same error was adhered to by Paul of Samosata, as Epiphanius testifies in Heresy 65, and Nicephorus in Ecclesiastical History, book 6, chapter 27; who (as Epiphanius says) after he was elected Bishop of Antioch fell into heresy; then Photinus, Bishop of Sirmium, of whom Epiphanius makes mention in Heresy 71; and since both Catholics and Arians bore with difficulty his error, because he altogether denied the Trinity of persons, they obtained from the Emperor Constantius that the Council of Sirmium be convoked, in which the bishops, wishing to condemn Photinus, adhered to the Arian heresy, as we shall say below. Besides these, Priscillian, Bishop of

13. St. Jerome, Epistola ad Marcellam contra Montanum, ep. 54.
14. Nicephorus, Historia, IV, c. 22.
15. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I - II, q. 9, a. 1.
16. Epiphanius, Panarion (Haer. 57).
17. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, cap. ult.; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 1.
18. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica V, 14, 18; Epiphanius, Panarion (Haer. 48); Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 41; Nicephorus, Historia ecclesiastica IV, 22.

Avila, followed them, as is in Pope Leo the First, Epistle 93 (elsewhere 91) to Turibius; who therefore by episcopal judgment in a council was condemned. Moreover, as Sander relates in book 7 of the Monarchy of the Visible Church, heresy 228, and as Prateolus too notes under the word "Deistae," in the time of Pius IV, under the year 1564, there arose the Deists, or Trinitarians, who, although they confessed three hypostases, denied three persons, understanding God knows what by subsistence (*subsistentia*). Finally, as the same Sander reports in Heresy 227, Servetus, a Spaniard by nation, when crossing over into Africa learned the Koran, and plainly agreed with the Mohammedans and the Jews, affirming only one person in the divine nature; he was followed by George Blandrata and Francis David.[19]

About the Father and the Son, however, they thought differently, as St. Augustine testifies; whence Augustine also wrote against Marcellus, and Nicephorus, book 4 of Ecclesiastical History, recounts in a few words this dispute. "Montanus," he says, "about the creation of the world taught the same as we do: nevertheless some of his followers afterwards opined that the three substances of the divinity are one." Wherefore, even if Montanus himself had thought rightly about the Trinity, some of his disciples later judged that there are three "divinities."[20]

Caput II - From the Old Testament and the testimony of the Rabbis, a plurality of persons in the divine nature is established

Before we draw out against the heretics the Trinity of persons from the New Scriptures, there is need to prove the same mystery against the Jews, who have faith only in the Old Testament, and to convince them by the testimonies of their own Rabbis. It is first established from Abulensis in his little work on the Trinity, and from Nicholas of Lyra in the little work against the Jews which is found in the Gloss on the Ordinaria: although this mystery of the Trinity cannot be so shown from the Old Testament that we might refute deniers with manifest contradiction, nevertheless there are some testimonies which, if we follow an exposition more in accord with reason and also not unknown to the ancient Rabbis, preach not obscurely this mystery of the Trinity, or at least a plurality of persons. Epiphanius, not ignorant of this matter, in the book Ancoratus speaks thus: "The one Godhead was chiefly announced by Moses; the duality of persons was very earnestly proclaimed by the prophets; but the Trinity of persons was made manifest in the Gospels." Add that there are certain places of the Old Testament explained in the New, by which we may certainly prove to Catholics and even to heretics, who believe in the New Testament, the Trinity or at least some person of it: those we shall later enumerate in chapter 4.[21]

Therefore let us now bring forward the testimonies of the Old Testament against the Jews. First, proof is commonly taken from that passage of Genesis 1, from "In the beginning God created" up to that, "and the Spirit of the Lord was borne upon the waters": from here they gather the mystery of

19. Sanderus, De visibili monarchia, lib. 7, haer. 227 - 228; Prateolus, De haeresibus, verbo "Deistae"; Leo I, Ep. 93 (alias 91) ad Turibium; on Servetus and his followers: Sanderus, loc. cit.

20. Nicephorus, Historia ecclesiastica IV, 22.

21. Epiphanius, Ancoratus: "Una Deitas a Moyse..."; see also Nicholas of Lyra, Opusculum contra Iudaeos, in Glossa ordinaria.

the Trinity, Augustine in the book On Genesis to the Letter, in the incomplete first chapter, Origen, and Rupert on that place: namely, that "in the beginning" is the same as "in the Son," or "in the Word," which is the second person; but that the Spirit of the Lord, who was borne upon the waters, is the third person in the Trinity, whom we call the Spirit; and this exposition is favored by Rabbi Eleazar on that place, as Marsilius Ficino reports, book On the Christian Religion, chapter 34; for interpreting that place he said, "The world was not created except through the Word, or with the Word," as it is held in Psalm 32, "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established." Jerome, in the Questions on Genesis, says thus on "in the beginning": "Many thought, as is written in the change of the language, and the Papists too so have it written; and Tertullian in the book against Praxeas disputes, and likewise Hilary in the exposition of a certain Psalm affirms, that in Hebrew it is written, 'In the Son God made heaven and earth,' which, if it were so, the persons of the Father and of the Son would be gathered openly from it." But in Hebrew it is not thus, as Jerome rightly observes; it is said Bere'shith, which word signifies beginning or head only among the Hebrews, and in no way the Son. Wherefore all translate either "in the beginning," as the Vulgate and the Seventy, Symmachus, and Theodotion; or "in the head," "in the chapter," as Aquila: although Hilary in Psalm 2 says a little from the beginning that Bere'shith signifies three things among the Hebrews: in the beginning, in the head, in the Son. Tertullian, indeed, whom Jerome also mentions, reports in the book against Praxeas, chapter 5, that some say that in Hebrew Genesis begins thus, "In the beginning God made for himself the Son," whose opinion he himself does not approve: for it is a mere figment. Nevertheless Jerome teaches that by that phrase, "in the beginning," the Son can be denoted; not because the word itself signifies the Son, but because of the incarnate Son that sentence of Psalm 39 is said, "In the head of the book it is written of me."

But from the aforesaid testimony, all things weighed, I do not see that the mystery of the Trinity is proved, because the word Bere'shith in no way signifies the Son, as Jerome noted against Hilary, but beginning or head, which is the same; and there it denotes the beginning of time, as Jerome says; and Tertullian in the book against Hermogenes, chapter 19, and many others. Then too, that sentence of Psalm 39, "in the head of the book," is not rightly referred to the beginning of Genesis, but either to the beginning of the Book of Psalms, when it is said in the first Psalm, "but his will is in the law of the Lord," as Augustine and Rufinus teach; for straightway in that same Psalm 39 is subjoined, "that I might do your will, O my God; and your law in the midst of my heart"; as if he were saying, "at the beginning of this Book of Psalms it is written of me, that I should do your will." Or, as Augustine, Eugubinus, Curtius, and more recent authors explain, "in the head of the book," that is, in the volume of the law, it is written of me; because there the divine precepts were handed down, that I should do your will by keeping them. And in Hebrew it is said "in the volume." Now a volume is the same as the whole law. For the Hebrews, nay even the Gentiles of old, used to write on parchments which were rolled up; and the Greeks use our word kephalaion, which the Seventy employ, not only to signify the upper part which is called "head," but also the sum and recapitulation. Wherefore "head" there signifies the sum of the whole law, which was ordered to this, that he should "do the will," etc. Besides, that "in the beginning" in Genesis 1 signifies the beginning of duration is taught, besides Jerome and Tertullian cited, by Ambrose, book 1 of

Hexameron, chapters 3 and 4, St. Gregory of Nyssa also in the same work Hexameron, Basil, homily 1 on Hexameron, Athanasius in the oration on that, "All things have been delivered to me by my Father," Chrysostom, homily 2 on Genesis.[22]

Add that the name "spirit," when it is said, "and the Spirit of the Lord was borne upon the waters," much better denotes the air there, as Theodore on question 8 on Genesis and Tertullian in the book against Hermogenes, chapters 31 and 32, explain. For it is called "spirit of the Lord" either because it is a great thing, as "the mind of God" is also called; or because it is moved and impelled by God. Others explain it of the fecundity which God imparted to the waters. Wherefore from that place I do not see how the Trinity is gathered.

Second, the same testimony of Genesis 1, "In the beginning God created," is wont to be brought forward, but for another reason: namely because the Latin word "God" in Hebrew is Elohim in the plural number, whose singular is Eloah; as if in Latin it were said, "created the gods." For the name of God in the plural, joined with a verb of the singular number, is not without mystery: to wit, that Moses might signify the Trinity of persons by the plural name of God, and the unity of essence by the singular verb.

This testimony the Master in I, dist. 2, uses; later Nicholas of Lyra followed him in the places cited, Paul of Burgos in the places cited, Peter Galatinus, book 2 On the Arcana of the Catholic Truth, Cajetan too in the same place upon Genesis, and the like; and of the Rabbis Lyra himself leads forth a witness, Rabbi Huna, who in great price is had among the Hebrews; he said, "Unless by these very letters [of Elohim] the world were created, it would not be created." This is what he says. But Cajetan, whom a little before he cites, without foundation, reproves Catherinus, and with him some more recent writers, who teach that from a similar phrase of Scripture no efficacious argument can be drawn for the Trinity; because it is usual among the Hebrews to use the plural for the singular, and to conjoin a plural noun with a verb of the singular number; indeed even the very name Elohim, Exodus 20, "You shall not have strange gods," in Hebrew is, "There shall not be to you a god other," for "there shall be strange gods," or "there shall be a strange god"; which is the same thing. Therefore the name Elohim joined to a verb of the singular number is empty of mystery, the Hebrew phraseology alone being retained.

Objicitur: They prove this contrary opinion thus: because otherwise it would be permitted even in Latin, for the sake of signifying the mystery of the Trinity, to say, "created the gods," and to call the three divine persons three gods.

Respondetur: But someone could answer that it is not customary among the Latins to signify the divine persons by the name "God," but the nature. Therefore, against Lyra and the opinion of others, let that single argument suffice, namely that it is common among the Hebrews to use the plural for the singular, and to join a plural noun with a singular verb. Therefore from this place of Scripture an efficacious argument for the Trinity cannot be drawn; since it is usual among the Hebrews to use the plural for the singular. Genesis 24: "He placed the hand under the thigh of

22. Jerome, Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim; Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem, cap. 19; Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 3 - 4; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Hexaemeron; St. Basil, Homilia I in Hexaemeron; Athanasius, Oratio; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. II in Genesim.

Abraham his lord": in Hebrew it is Adonav, "of his lords," in the plural. Exodus 21: "If his lord shall have given him a wife": in Hebrew it is in the same way "his lords." 1 Kings 28: "I saw gods ascending out of the earth"; and yet straightway he asked concerning Samuel alone, whom he alone wished to be raised: "What is his form?" For this is no less from that foundation, than what the Rabbis commonly assert, namely that with Samuel Moses too ascended, a witness of his cause. Nor is it only the custom among the Hebrews to use the plural for the singular: but also to conjoin a plural noun with a verb of the singular number: indeed even the very name Elohim, Exodus 20, "You shall not have strange gods," in Hebrew is, "There shall not be to you a god other," which is the same. Therefore the name Elohim joined to a singular verb is empty of the mystery; the Hebrew phrase alone remaining.

Third, a testimony is taken from Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; which, on account of the plural number joined with "let us make" and "our," they urge, and about which, since the authority of the Fathers contends, there is no dispute. From this place they gather this mystery, Origen, Basil, and Chrysostom on that place, Ambrose also; and in the book On the Dignity of the Human Condition...

Second, the same testimony from Genesis 1 is wont to be adduced, namely because the Latin word "God" answers to the Hebrew Elohim in the plural number, whose singular is Eloah; so that, as if one were speaking Latin, it would read: "In the beginning God created," that is, "the gods created." For the name of God in the plural joined to a verb in the singular is not without mystery: namely, that Moses might signify the Trinity of persons by the plural name of God, and the unity of essence (*essentia*) by the singular verb. The Master uses this testimony.[23] After him Nicholas of Lyra, Paul of Burgos in the places cited, Peter Galatinus in book 2 De arcanis, chapter 9, and Catherinus in book 4 against Cajetan; and from a lesser presupposition Onkelos upon Genesis 20 also confirms it, as do Peter Galatinus and Lyra, out of an exposition on Genesis of great price among the Rabbis, where Rabbi Huna is reported to have said: "If this sermon had not been written, it would not have been permitted to say, 'created Elohim,' that is, 'the gods.'"

But Cajetan, whom Catherinus sharply yet groundlessly censures, and with him other recent authors rightly teach that from a like phrase of Scripture no efficacious argument for the Trinity can be drawn, because it is customary among the Hebrews to use the plural for the singular. Genesis 24: "He put his hand under the thigh of Abraham his lord": in Hebrew it is Adonim, "his lords." Exodus 21: "If his lord shall have given him a wife": in Hebrew it is likewise "his lords." 1 Kings 28: "I saw the Lord ascending from the earth": in Hebrew Elohim - "lords," or "gods - ascending"; and forthwith it is subjoined: "What is his form?" In vain does Lyra contrive a response to this latter testimony by feigning that a demon ascended along with Samuel, and therefore that the pythoness said, "I saw lords ascending from the earth," whereas she desired to consult Samuel alone, whom alone it is said to have been permitted to be raised up; for what is "his form"? This indeed denotes one person. Nor is there any better foundation than that which they commonly assert, namely that other persons ascended on account of that cause. Nor only is it that the

23. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences, I, dist. 2.

Hebrews use the plural for the singular, and a verb of the plural number is sometimes joined to a singular noun; nay, the very name Elohim, Exodus 20, "Thou shalt not have gods alien to me," that is, "There shall not be to thee a God alien," - how, then, can the Trinity be gathered from that?

Therefore the name Elohim in the plural number joined with a singular verb is void of mystery; it is the Hebrew phrase alone. Nevertheless some assumed hence that it would be permitted also in Latin, for the sake of signifying persons of the Godhead, to say "gods" in the plural for the three divine persons, to say "created the gods," and to call the divine persons "gods." But others reply that among Latins it is not customary to signify the divine persons by the plural "gods"; and so, against Lyra and the others, that single argument suffices, namely that it is common among the Hebrews that the plural stand for the singular, and that the plural verb be taken for the singular. Thus 2 Kings 7 in that place it is said: "And what nation is there, as is the people Israel, for whom God went" - in Hebrew it reads: Haleka Elohim, "the gods went," for "God went."

The third testimony is from Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness," which, on account of the Fathers' authority, ought not to be contested. From this Origen, Basil, St. John Chrysostom on that place, Ambrose there, and in the book On the Dignity of the Human Condition, Athanasius, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Augustine in the imperfect work On Genesis to the Letter on that place and City of God 16.6, Cyril in book 1 against Julian, Theodoret, question 19 on Genesis, and Rupert, book 2 on Genesis, chapter 4, conclude this mystery; Athanasius in the oration against the Greeks, Hilary in book 5 On the Trinity, Tertullian in Against Praxeas, chapter 16, and Epiphanius in the Anchoratus. For they contend that those words were not spoken for the sake of majesty and authority alone, as princes are wont to speak. For - so say Basil and Theodoret - what wise craftsman, his tools alone being present and no colleague accompanying him, would say: "Let us make a knife," etc.? Peter Galatinus, book 2 De arcanis, chapter 9 near the end, confirms this interpretation from the Midrash Coheleth in the exposition of Ecclesiastes 2 on those words: "What is a man, that he should follow his king, his maker." For in the Hebrew it stands: "his king, who made him (plural: 'who made')." Therefore that exposition runs thus: "After the king - namely the king of other kings, the holy and blessed God - then wilt thou be able to stand." And he teaches by this saying, which is not written "who made him," but "who made (pl.) him," that, since in the Law it is written, one can say: "For the holy and blessed God, and the house of his judgment, made him." Yet if from this you infer that there are two principles, it does not follow; had it not already been said in Deuteronomy 32: "He made and fashioned or prepared thee"? Up to here the exposition. About this Galatinus notes three things. First, that with the singular noun "king" a plural verb "made" is joined: because when God was making man, he spoke in the plural, "Let us make." For which cause also he thinks Psalm 149 reads, "Let Israel rejoice in him that made him"; in the Hebrew, "in his makers." And Isaiah 54: "Thy rulers" - in Hebrew, "thy makers" - "the name of the Lord of hosts." Where the Tetragrammaton, יהוה, is set down. But perhaps by a Hebrew phrase this was said, as we noted in the former testimony. Second, he notes that the holy and blessed God and the "house of his judgment" concurred to the making of man, that is, the one God who is called holy and blessed, and the Three who are called "the house of his judgment." For "the house of judgment," among the Hebrews, was so called when at least three convened for judgment.

Third, he notes that there are not therefore multiple principles - as that exposition most aptly said - from the fact that the divine counsel of God concurred to the making of man; because in the Trinity there is one nature and the power of principle.

The fourth testimony is Genesis 19: "The Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven." From which place they gather a plurality of persons - Ignatius in the Epistle to the Antiochenes, Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho, long before our age, of which more in the following disputation; Athanasius in the oration against the Greeks; Hilary; Tertullian, book Against Praxeas, chapter 16; Epiphanius in the Anchoratus; Rupert, book 6 on Genesis, chapter 11, in the fire. The Hebrew text also favors: יהוה מאת יהוה, Ichoun Mehet Iehona; because when in both places the ineffable Name is put, which is wont to be applied to God alone, and it is said "the Lord from the Lord," it openly denotes "God from God," which cannot be understood without a multiplication of persons. Favoring also, as Galatinus notes, is what Rabbi Eleazar teaches in the exposition of this place: namely, that wherever in Scripture the ineffable name of God is put, there is always to be understood God and the house of his judgment, as we noted in the preceding testimony.[24] And indeed the Council of Sirmium in canons 13, 16, and 17 anathematizes those who say that in Genesis 1 when Scripture says "Let us make man," the Father spoke to himself and not to the Son and the Holy Spirit; and those who deny that in Genesis 19, when it is said, "The Lord rained from the Lord," it must be understood of the Son and the Father.[25] But the authority of this Council is none, since in many things it is found Arian and it was not legitimately assembled, as we shall say in its place; about which Hilary, in the book On the Synods, Socrates, book 2, chapter 27 of the History, and Nicephorus, book 9, chapters 31, 37, and 38 say much.[26] Dionysius the Carthusian, however, replies that by "the Lord," who is said to "rain from the Lord," there is understood an Angel who sustained the person of God and whom he called "Lord," because "as a Lord" he appeared among the other three. But this exposition does not square with the text, because as we noted, the ineffable name of God is put in both places, which can agree only to the true God. Vatablus, on that place, thinks it is a Hebraism, so that by "The Lord rained from the Lord" there is understood "he rained from himself"; but it is not right that, because of a testimony similar to which the Fathers use, we should so easily elude it, although you need not doubt that a like mode of speaking, according to the Hebrew phrase, is found in Scripture.

Fifth, Galatinus proves from Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one." For in Hebrew, in place of that word "Lord," is the ineffable Name: so that by a certain repetition both the Trinity and the unity are insinuated; nor indeed does it seem to be put superfluously, since the ancient Rabbis, whom Galatinus reports, gather the Trinity thence. Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai in the book Zoar thus says: "Hear, O Israel: Rabbi Ibba said: here, O Israel, 'the Ancient,' יהוה, Iehovah, that is, God, who is the beginning of all things, the Ancient of ancients, the root's shoot, and the perfection of all things - and he is called Father; 'our God,' Elohenu, that is, our God, the depth of rivers and the fount of knowledges which proceed from him - and he is called

24. Galatinus, De arcanis, lib. 2, cap. 9 in fine; Rabbi Eleazar in the exposition of this place.
25. Council of Sirmium, canons 13, 16, 17.
26. Hilary, De synodis; Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica II, 27; Nicephorus, Historia ecclesiastica IX, 31, 37 - 38.

Son; 'יהוה,' Iehovah, that is, God - this is the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the two, and he is called the measure of the voice - he is one, that he may conclude and gather up the one with the other. Nor indeed can one be divided from the other." Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai moreover says: "This secret of the sons of Rimon and the first will be revealed to each, until the Messiah shall have come." Something similar is that testimony of Psalm 67: "May God bless us, our God." By which words is signified the Father, "our God," by which is denoted the Son, who, on account of the economy, is in a peculiar way called "ours": "May God bless us," by which the Holy Spirit is insinuated. And that of Isaiah 6: "Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts." On which thus writes Rabbi Simeon: "Holy - this is the Father; holy - this is the Son; holy - this is the Holy Spirit." Something similar says Rabbi Jonathan ben Uzziel. Of all which testimonies hitherto alleged by us Galatinus reports that he has read them in their most ancient codices; though in those which we now use they have been expunged by the perfidious Rabbis of this age. And certainly we ought not to think that without a great counsel of God similar words were inserted; for which cause also - as Galatinus affirms - the ancient Talmudists ordained that by each of the Jews at least twice in a day, morning and evening, they should be recited; under which they asserted that some secret, to be revealed in the time of the Messiah, lay hidden. For the sake also of this mystery the Trisagion has been set among solemn prayers in the Greek Church: "Holy God, Holy Strong, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us"; of which Felix the Pope makes mention in the Epistle to the Emperor Zeno, and John of Damascus in the Epistle on the Trisagion, chapter 6, and other Fathers.[27]

The sixth testimony is Zachariah 2: "Rejoice and be glad, daughter of Zion: for behold I am coming and I will dwell in your midst, says the Lord. And many nations shall apply themselves to the Lord in that day; and you shall know that the Lord of hosts has sent me to you." The Chaldaean version has thus: "Behold I will be revealed, and I will place the divinity in the midst: it is God; and many peoples shall apply themselves to the people in that time; and they shall be before me for a people; and I will place my divinity in your midst; and you shall know that the God of hosts has sent me to prophesy to you." Where, since the ineffable name of God is put in both places, it is clear that there is speech of God sending and of God sent; but mission necessarily posits two persons, as we shall show clearly in disputation 170.

The seventh testimony is what Galatinus reports, book 2, chapter 3, from Isaiah chapter 48: "Not from the beginning have I spoken in secret; from the time before they were done I was there; and now the Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." Which Galatinus explains more at large and contends that there God sent is speaking from God sending. For he proves that those words do not fit the Prophet himself, because he himself was not there before those things were done. But Adamus and certain more recent authors maintain that they can be understood of the Prophet himself, that he was present in spirit and in mind to those things which he foretold to the people before they were done. And let this suffice against the Jews from the Old Testament alone. For other testimonies of the same kind which in the New are brought forward and explained we shall bring in chapter 4 against the heretics; I pass over other things which Galatinus handles, book 2, chapters 5 and 10, and book 3, chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6; for it is not necessary to pursue each one.

27. Felix, Epistola ad Zenonem imperatorem; St. John Damascene, Epistola de Trisagio, cap. 6.

Caput III - The Trinity of Persons against the Jews is shown from the Tetragrammaton

Not only by the testimonies of Scripture and of the ancient Rabbis, but also from the ineffable name of God, יהוה, Iehovah, which Scripture employs everywhere, according to the sense of the ancient Rabbis, Galatinus, book 2, strongly proves the mystery of the Trinity, matters concerning the mode of writing and pronouncing this name - which we have more at large delivered above in disputation 59, chapters 2 and 3. Rabbenus Haccados, as Galatinus testifies, book 2, chapter 10, writing the mysteries of this name to Antonius, a citizen of Rome, signifies God generating and generated; for there cannot be a generator without a generated, nor generation without one generated, and, conversely, out of the same, love proceeding. He says that this name is called "of twelve letters," which in the Latin tongue signifies "Father God, Son God, Holy Spirit"; and "of forty-two letters," which in our tongue sounds: "Father God, Son God, Holy Spirit, God, Trinity in unity, and unity in Trinity." This is the sentence of Rabbenus Haccados, that is, of "our holy master." Yet each name by which that ineffable name is expounded is not one only, but several together. The first, of twelve letters, is "Ab, Ben, Ruah," that is, "Father, Son, Spirit," or "Ab, El, Ben, Ruah Kados," that is, "Father holy, Son holy, Spirit holy." The name also of forty-two letters is similar; it is not one only, as may be seen in Galatinus. But even the letters with which the ineffable name is written signify, as it were, the hinge of the Trinity, as Theodorus very well observed, book 2 Ad Graecos. And by a very efficacious argument for us are the Rabbis whom we have alleged, who before the advent of Christ so clearly and manifestly proclaimed the Trinity of persons marked by their proper names.

Caput IV - The same is shown against the heretics from the Old and New Testaments

We shall adduce some testimonies of the Old Testament which, since they are in the New already explained against the heretics, who abuse either, have especial force; therefore by them, and by others of the same kind from the New Testament, the Trinity, or plurality of persons, is to be proved in this chapter.

The first testimony is from Psalm 44: "Thy throne, O God, for ever and ever; the scepter of rectitude is the scepter of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore hath God, thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." Which Paul rightly uses, Hebrews 1, to prove the divinity of the Son.

Now each name by which that ineffable name is expounded is not one only, but several together. The first is of twelve letters: Ab, that is, Father; Ben, that is, Son; Veruach hakodesh, that is, Holy Spirit. The name also of forty-two letters likewise is not one only, as may be seen in Galatinus.[28] But even the letters by which the ineffable name is written signify the same Trinity, as Galatinus has very well observed. For the first letter is iod, which signifies beginning; it seems properly to

28. Petrus Galatinus, De arcanis catholicae veritatis, lib. 2, cap. 9.

agree to the Father, for it is the beginning from which the other letters seem to draw their origin. The second is be, which denotes to be and to live, appropriated to the Son: for all things were made through him. The third is vaph, which signifies bond; for it is the copulative conjunction, which is the property of the Holy Spirit. In the fourth place there is set another, he, because, whereas the Son has a twofold reference, one to the Father, the other to the Holy Spirit, by that he repeated twice, the Son with his double reference is signified. Moreover, among the Chaldaeans it is established from the ancient codices of the Rabbins that the ineffable name of God was written so as to denote the same Trinity: it used to be written also with a threefold subscript under a circle in this way; since iod signifies beginning, and the whole Trinity is one beginning of things outside itself in one essence and nature: the Trinity of persons is shown by the triple iod, but the unity of essence by the single vowel kametz.

These things, indeed, which we have adduced from the Old Testament against the Jews, although they are more open, are not so perspicuous as those which are handed on in the Gospel, from which against the heretics we must immediately dispute. Yet they are sufficiently efficacious against them - unless they had been hardened in their own perfidy - in whom, if a ray of light had shone so that they might recognize other mysteries of our faith, they would easily persuade themselves that to their fathers the plurality of persons had in some manner been indicated; not so openly as to Christians: because for the time it thus was expedient, as Theodoret most excellently observed in book 2 To the Greeks.[29] And strong argument for us are the Rabbins whom we have cited, who before the advent of Christ so clearly and manifestly preached the Trinity of persons marked by their proper names.

Some testimonies from the Old and New Testaments

There remain some testimonies of the Old Testament from Psalm 44, which, since they have now been explained in the New, have especial force against the heretics who give credence to both. From these therefore, and from others of the same sort in the New Testament, the Trinity, or most broadly the plurality of persons, is in this chapter to be proved.

The first testimony is Psalm 44: "Thy throne, O God, for ever and ever; the scepter of rectitude is the scepter of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore hath God, thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." Which Paul rightly uses, Hebrews 1, to prove the divinity of the Son; for the Psalmist speaks with God, whose kingdom is to remain forever: and when he says that he himself has been anointed by his God, he clearly indicates that he is God who is anointed, and God who anoints. And although God according to the divine nature could not be anointed by God, nevertheless the Son, who is truly God, could according to the human nature be anointed by his God, that is, by the Father. Now the whole Psalm is to be understood of the nuptials of Christ with the Church - not of the nuptials of Solomon with the daughter of Pharaoh, or of Ahasuerus with Esther - without any doubt: or at least many things are said in that Psalm which can be fitting to Christ alone: such as are the words just cited.

29. Theodoret, Ad Graecos, lib. 2.

The second is in Psalm 109: "The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand," which Christ adduces in Matthew 22 to prove his divinity. And, as the Evangelist bears witness, it was so efficacious against the Jews to whom Christ was speaking, that they could not answer him a word; nor was anyone bold any more to ask him further anything. There, however, the plurality of persons is manifestly shown: for "the Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand"; which, unless there were a distinction of persons, could not conveniently be understood.

The third is Psalm 2: "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee"; which Paul adduces at Hebrews 1. Nor do I think that Paul uses that part of the testimony, "this day have I begotten thee," to prove the eternal generation of the Son, as above in disputation 18, chapter 2, I have abundantly proved; but he urges only the particle, "Son," to prove that Christ was the true Son of God: whence no less rightly is gathered the plurality of persons. For where there is a son, there is also a father: nor can the same person be both father and son of himself. There is added that in the same Psalm it is said, "Embrace discipline." For in Hebrew it reads, "Kiss the son," which we have shown to be altogether the same, disputation 18, chapter 1. Now he speaks of Christ, whom he calls the Son of God, as a little later in the same Psalm, "Thou art my Son," etc. Then when it is said, "Lest ever the Lord be angry, and you perish from the just way," in the Hebrew it is not "the Lord," but the word "be angry" is referred to the Son; wherefore when the Seventy added "the Lord," they signified that the Son himself is Lord God: of whom also that is to be understood, "When his wrath shall be kindled in a short time, blessed are all who trust in him": all which things manifestly proclaim the divinity of the Son, as a person distinct from the Father.

But now let us bring forward some testimonies of the New Testament also, by which we may refute the heretics: John 5, "As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself": we have therefore a Father and a Son. That they are moreover of the same substance and nature, against the Arians will be proved below. John 1: "The only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him." John 14: "I am in the Father, and the Father in me": where the distinction of persons is manifestly shown. For although the attributes of God are said to be in God, indeed even "with God," as Psalm 129, "With the Lord is mercy, and with him is plenteous redemption," and Psalm 35, "With thee is the fountain of life," nevertheless it would never be said that "one is in another," and conversely, unless they were personally distinguished: of which mode of circumincession we shall speak in disputation 169. Finally, the Son is often named expressly in Scripture.

But not only is the plurality of persons in the New Testament handed down, but even the Trinity marked by proper names: Matthew last, "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." 1 John 5: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit: and these three are one." About which testimony, in the next disputation, chapter 2, we shall say more. Finally, John, chapter 15: "When the Paraclete shall have come, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father": where not only are three named, but also are openly distinguished. First, when it is said that the Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, he is also distinguished from them, as in disputation 170 we shall plainly show. Then when it is said, "whom I will send from the Father," the Son is

distinguished from the Father, since he there denotes that he received from the Father the power of sending, just as of spirating, which he received by generation: as we shall say there. Now then we have sufficiently, in general, proved against the Sabellians and the Jews that there are several - nay, three - persons in the divinity: for about their property and nature we must afterwards dispute against other heretics. The same truth is defined in all the General Councils after Nicaea, in which the Symbol and its confession are received: especially in those which, against Arius, define the divinity of the Son. Against the Sabellians also they dispute from the Fathers: Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 7, chapter 1, and book 10, chapter 29; Sixtus the Pope, in the Letter to Dionysius; Leo, that Letter 93, chapter 1; Tertullian in the book Against Praxeas; Epiphanius in the places alleged by us in chapter 1; Euthymius, first part of the Panoplia, title 10.[30]

But our theologians of these times, who dispute against the heretics, bring forward many arguments which the new Sabellians use, and solve them, and dwell long enough on their solutions: but because in them various difficulties are touched upon - arguments which in the various disputations on this matter must be seriously handled - I have judged it now worth the effort to preside over them. From those, namely, which are to be said in their proper places, the trifles and childish objections of the heretics will easily fade away. Now therefore let us engage with the other heretics.

Disputatio CIX - Whether the Word or the Son is of the same nature with the Father

To signify that the Son and the Father are of the same nature, rightly - by the Church's term - "homoousios," that is, consubstantial.

An Verbum seu Filius sit eiusdem naturae cum Patre

- Quinam haeretici divinitatem filii negaverint. Caput I.
- Divinitas et aequalitas Filii cum Patre contra haereticos ex Scripturis probatur. Caput II.
- Eadem veritas ex Patribus ostenditur. Caput III.
- Argumenta Arianorum. Caput IV.

Caput I - Which heretics denied the divinity of the Son

Among those who confessed three persons with God there were not a few heretics who did not think well concerning their nature; and first indeed concerning the person of the Son they said that he was not of the same dignity and substance with the Father, but a creature inferior to God, and that he began in time. Some later writers falsely ascribe this error to Ebion and Cerinthus: they are, however, mistaken. For these heretics only taught that Christ was not God, as is evident from St.

30. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica VII, 1; X, 29; Sixtus Papa, Epistola ad Dionysium; Leo, Epistola 93, cap. 1; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean; Epiphanius, loci in cap. 1; Euthymius Zigabenus, Panoplia, pars I, tit. 10.

Irenaeus, book 1, chapters 25 and 26; from Philastrius, in his little book On Heresies; from Epiphanius, heresies 28 and 30: which, to be sure, Ebion and Cerinthus could affirm even if they granted the three persons of the Trinity to be equal in nature. Wherefore neither do these seem to have taught against the Trinity, nor against any person of it. The same heresy is attributed to Origen by very weighty men: Epiphanius, in the Letter to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, which among the letters of St. Jerome is number 260; the same also says it in heresy 64; Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria, in his Paschal Book 2; St. Augustine, in the book On Heresies, chapter 43 - because, as they themselves testify, Origen used to say that it is as absurd to assert that the Father is seen by the Son as that the Son is seen by the Holy Spirit; he said, moreover, that the Son, compared with holy men, is truth, but if compared with the Father, is a lie. Whence he inferred that the Son is not to be prayed to.

But Origen, book 1 of Periarchon, chapters 2 and 3, proves at length that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are equal and of the same nature; and in chapter 3, after the middle, he says thus: "Moreover, in the Trinity nothing greater or less is to be said," which are the words of St. Athanasius in the Symbol; he has many other like things in book 7 on the Epistle to the Romans. Wherefore the same St. Athanasius, in the Letter On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, uses Origen's testimony against the Arians, and says that none of the ancient fathers could have been alleged by the Arians for this error. I grant indeed that Origen, on the Gospel of John, tome 3, near the end, did not speak quite rightly about the Son of God: but perhaps those words were inserted also by some Arian; or, as Vincent of Lérins says, section 51, he himself did not think with the Arians: yet he afforded them a cause of error. Origen is defended, besides Rufinus, by other fathers in Socrates, book 6 of the History, chapter 15; and among the more recent, Pico of Mirandola in the Apology on this matter, and Sixtus of Siena, annotation 165. Perhaps this error which Epiphanius ascribes to him was by some maliciously inserted in certain Greek codices, as Rufinus testifies in the Apology for him; for in the Latin I myself have not found it: or certainly Origen's disciples, called Origenists, added this also to the many other errors of their Master.

Therefore the first and chief author of this heresy was Arius, from whom even down to this day the heresy has taken its name. He was a presbyter of Alexandria in the time of Pope Sylvester and the Emperor Constantine the Great: and his heresy so prevailed in the Church that it infected almost the whole world, and among the Goths in Spain it endured down to King Reccared in the time of Leander, bishop of Seville. From this many other heresies arose, called by the same name, which Sander relates in book seven De visibili monarchia under Sylvester and Constantine, year 324; of which we shall recount three principal ones.

There were then certain heretics called Aetians, or Eunomians; others, Macedonians, or Semiarians; thirdly, there are some who remain under their own name and are called Arians, whose head was Acacius. The first, called Aetians from Aetius the Syrian, asserted that the Son was of another substance than the Father; they were under Constantine the Emperor and Liberius the Pontiff; see Nicephorus, book 9, chapter 17. They were also called Dissimiles, who said that the Son was dissimilar to the Father, that is, not co-existent, as the Tripartite History, book 5, chapter 42,

has it; because they affirmed that the Son was made from non-existents, that is, from nothing. With these agreed Eunomius, at the same time, under Constantine and Liberius; of whom read Nicephorus, book 11, and Rufinus, book 11, chapter 25.

Secondly, there were the Semiarians, whose leader was Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, whence they are called Macedonians, who, although they said that the Son was less than the Father, yet like...[31]

Caput II - The divinity and equality of the Son with the Father is proved against heretics from the Scriptures

Many, with regard to Origen on the Gospel of John toward the end, have noted rightly that he spoke well; but perhaps those words too were by some Arian: Vincent of Lérins himself, Commonitorium, 51, did not think so, yet he drew forth the cause for those things. Others defend Origen, besides the Fathers cited by Socrates, and from the more recent, Pico of Mirandola in his Apology on this matter, and Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, annot. 165: perhaps that error which is ascribed by Rufinus arose in some Greek copies, maliciously inserted; I at least have not found it in Rufinus's Apology for him; or certainly the Origenists, who said they were of Origen, attributed to him, along with the many errors of their Master, this Arian one also. Therefore the first author of this heresy was Arius, from whom down to this day the heresy has taken its name, a presbyter of Alexandria in the time of the Pope and of Constantine the Great: and it prevailed so far in the Church that it almost overwhelmed the whole world, and by the Goths was carried into Spain, and persisted there until the times of King Reccared, as the bishop of Seville attests. From it many other heresies arose, called by the same name, which afterwards in the time of Pope Sylvester and Constantine were condemned in the Nicene Council; among which three chief ones are related by certain authors of this heresy.

First, some heretics were called Aetians, and from them Eunomians; others Macedonians; a third are some who are called by their proper name Acacians. The head of those called Aetians was Aëtius the Syrian. These said that the Son is of another substance, dissimilar; they were under the Emperor Constantius and Pope Liberius. Read Nicephorus, and that they said the Son is dissimilar, not consubstantial, is had likewise in the ecclesiastical histories; for they affirmed that He was from non-beings, that is, from nothing. With these Eunomius agreed under Constantius and Liberius.[32]

Afterwards there were Semi-Arians, whose leader was Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople; these are Macedonians, who, although they proclaimed that the Son was lesser than the Father, yet similar; therefore the Macedonians were called Semi-Arians, because other Arians spoke more

31. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I, 25 - 26; Philastrius, De haeresibus; Epiphanius, Haer. 28, 30; Epiphanius, Epistola ad Ioannem episcopum Hierosolymitanum (inter epistolas Hieronymi 260) et Haer. 64; Theophilus Alexandrinus, Liber paschalis II; Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 43; Origen, Periarchon I, c. 2 - 3; Athanasius, Epistola de decretis Nicaenae synodi; Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, 51; Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica VI, 15; Pico Mirandula, Apologia; Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca sancta, annot. 165; Nicephorus, Historia ecclesiastica IX, 17; XI; Rufinus, Historia ecclesiastica XI, 25; Tripartita historia V, 42.

32. Epiphanius, Haer. 72 - 73; St. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 49 - 54; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium, lib. 4; Nicephorus; Rufinus, in the cited places.

harshly concerning the Son: what they thought, however, about the Holy Spirit we shall see in the following disputation. Of all these Epiphanius makes mention in heresy 72 and likewise 73, and St. Augustine, in the book On Heresies from chapter 49 up to 54, and Theodoret, book 4 of the Heretical Fables, and Nicephorus, and Rufinus in the cited places.[32]

There were also certain new Arians, of whom St. Augustine makes mention, book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 1, who said that the Son is eternal, albeit inferior to the Father, whom some of our times seem to have followed; among whom were those who were present at the Council of Rimini. For these said that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father, as likewise Maximinus, in St. Augustine, in the book Against the Same, not, however, from nothing, as Arius and other severer Arians. But I do not know by what reason St. Augustine, cap. 51, should say that Macedonius thought rightly concerning the Father and the Son, and taught only against the divinity of the Holy Spirit; since the opposite is affirmed by the other Fathers.

To the Arians there afterwards acceded the Metangismonitae, whom St. Augustine commemorates, On Heresies, cap. 58, who said that the Son is in the Father as a lesser vessel in a greater; and on that account they were rightly called by that same name, as it were "pourers-across," says St. Augustine; for in Greek μετὰ is the same as what in Latin is "across," and ἀγγεῖον the same as "vessel," whence metangismos, as it were a pouring of one vessel into another. Prateolus and Sander, however, vary in assigning the time in which these taught. For Prateolus says that they were in the year 221, under the Emperor Heliogabalus and Pope Urban: in which way they were earlier than Arius. But Sander reports them under the Emperor Constantius and Pope Julius: and therefore makes them posterior to Arius.[33]

Afterwards the same error was followed by Variamandus, against whom Idacius Clarus, a Spaniard, writes, whose work is had in the fifth tome of the Bibliotheca sacra. Then Peter Abailard agreed, as Bernard reports, Epistle 190, who posited degrees in the Trinity, assigning to God the Father omnipotence, to the Son semipotence, to the Holy Spirit nullipotence: although at the same time he confessed that the Son, nay the Holy Spirit, is consubstantial to the Father, as Bernard noted there; how this stands with the former I do not understand.

There were also in this error among the sectaries of this age Luther, in the book Against Latomus, where he says, "My soul loathes the word Homoousion," with which word indeed the Fathers have advisedly made use in the Nicene Council, as St. Athanasius testifies in the Epistle on the decrees of that Synod, to show the equality of the Son with the Father. Falsely, however, does Luther assert that the Blessed Jerome wrote that there lies "poison" in that word Homoousion; for he said that not of the name Homoousion, but of the name Hypostasis, as we shall see in disputation 124. Nor did Luther hate only the word Homoousion, but also the very thing signified. For on the first chapter of Genesis he calls the Son the instrument of the Father; which was the way Arius spoke; and from the public prayers he took care to expunge that, "Holy Trinity, one God, have mercy on us": he also deleted that of the First Epistle of John 5, "There are three who give

32. Epiphanius, Haer. 72 - 73; St. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 49 - 54; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium, lib. 4; Nicephorus; Rufinus, in the cited places.

33. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 1; St. John Chrysostom, In Ioan. 10:30.

testimony in heaven, etc., and these three are one." Then Melanchthon, in the book Against Stancarus, and in the Epistle to the Elector of Brandenburg, says, "The Son intercedes, asks;" and again, "The Son is the minister of the Father, priest, pontiff, mediator. Finally, the Father commands the Son, 'Ask of me, and I will give you the nations,' etc." All which he attributes to the Son even according to the divine nature.[34] All these things Arius asserted, as is gathered from St. Augustine, in the book Against the Sermon of the Arians: he said also that the Son of God is in the Father as a lesser vessel in a greater; and for that reason, say Basil, Cyril, Augustine, and others, he used to say that divinity and glory were given and restored to him, John 17.[35]

Lastly, Valentinus Gentilis - of whom we spoke in question 11 - as Benedict Aretius relates in the History of the punishment of Valentinus Gentilis, after he had taught the Tritheite error, asserting three Gods, seeing that by no reason could that be defended by Scripture, declining into Arianism, affirmed that the Son and the Holy Spirit are inferior to the Father, not indeed produced from nothing, as the ancient Arians dogmatized, but from the very substance of the Father: with the new Arians, whom we have mentioned above, he called the Father autotheos, that is, the "essentiator" and God of himself, but the Son and the Holy Spirit "essentiated," in order to denote and show that they are inferior to the Father.[36]

It is much against these heretics, that they may prove the divinity and the equality of the Son with the Father, that they use the Scriptures, by which the divinity of Christ is established: which indeed are illustrious both from the Old Testament and from the New; and those would be of great moment to confirm the divinity of the Son against heretics, if all who deny the divinity of Christ were Arians: but because many deny it, not because they think that the Son according to his proper nature is inferior to the Father, but because they think that in Christ there is only a human nature with its own created person, as Nestorius asserted: and because expressly the divinity of the Son is to be proved by us against Nestorius in part 3, question 2, therefore we have judged it fitting here to set that aside for the moment, and to use only those which speak of the Son as he is the second person in the Trinity.

And first, those testimonies of the Old Testament, and explained by the New, which in the preceding disputation, cap. 4, were brought forward to prove a plurality of persons in God, can also be accommodated to the present purpose. For in Psalm 44 there is set God anointing, and God anointed: and of the latter it is said that his throne shall endure for ever, and the rod of his kingdom is equity; which things cannot in any way belong to a mere creature. Then that of Psalm 2, "Thou art my Son," which whoever is called the Son of God must of necessity be generated from His substance in such a way that he have the same nature with Him. For if he had an inferior [nature], he would not be said to be generated from His substance and from the womb, unless in a most imperfect way: about which testimony we said more there, by which the divinity of the Son is confirmed. Also those places of the same Old Testament make for this, in which both God sending

34. Luther, Contra Latomum; Melanchthon, Contra Stancarum; Epistola ad Electorem Brandeburgensem.

35. St. Augustine, Contra sermonem Arianorum; Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 4; St. Augustine, Tract. 105 in Ioann.; St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 10, cap. 2, 9; In Ioann., lib. 11, cap. 17.

36. Benedictus Aretius, Historia de supplicio Valentini Gentilis.

and God sent are contained. For if he who is sent is God, and he who sends is God, of necessity there will be two persons at least of the same divine nature: wherefore either Arius is forced to concede the Son or the Holy Spirit to be equal to the one sending; certainly if he were to admit two persons equal in the divine nature, he would not deny the Son to be consubstantial.

But let us now bring forward the testimonies of the New Testament, which are most manifest.

1. The principal one by which the divinity of Christ is proved is that most excellent confession of Peter, much commended by Christ Himself, Matthew 16: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." For when he said "the Son of the living God," he indicated a natural Son, and the very equality of nature with the Father: who also elsewhere is called "Only-begotten" (John 3) and "His own" (Romans 8). For if He were only adoptive, as Arius replies, He would be neither "only-begotten" nor "His own": since many others also are [sons]. Then too, if Peter pronounced that Christ was only the adoptive Son of God, why would his confession have been preferred by Christ? For those who thought that He was one of the prophets, confessed Him to be the adoptive Son of God: but if Christ is the natural Son of God, not adoptive, surely He must be of the same nature: for in any other [nature] He could only be adoptive.

To the same point look other testimonies, in which the Jews accused Christ that He had made or professed Himself the Son of God (John 19: "We have a law, and according to the law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God") and John 10, when Christ had said that He was the Son of God, the Jews, understanding that He had named Himself God, and so had made Himself equal to the Father, answered: "For a good work we do not stone you, but for blasphemy, and because you, a man, make yourself God," and John 5: "The Jews sought all the more to kill Him, because He not only broke the sabbath, but also called God His own Father, making Himself equal to God." For Christ never excused Himself that He had said that He was God or the Son of God. But if those had been calumnies of the Jews, surely He would by no means have borne them, but, just as in other [cases] too which they falsely objected, He would have refuted them; which, however, He nowhere did: nay rather, in that same chapter 5 of John, after the cited words He says thus: "Amen, amen, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He sees the Father doing: for whatever He does, these the Son likewise does," etc.; by which words He not only does not respond to the Jews as if they were calumniators, but rather asserts Himself again to be the Son of God, and that He does wholly the same things that the Father does.

1. The second testimony is John 10: "I and the Father are one," which testimony the Fathers commonly use against Arius, that they may prove the divinity of the Son. Here, therefore, first the distinction of persons is asserted when it is said, "I, and the Father"; then the unity of essence (*essentia*) when it is subjoined, "are one": and that He speaks of the unity of essence and power (*potentia*) is proved by St. Basil, book 1 Against Eunomius, near the end, and by St. John Chrysostom on that place, from the preceding [words]. For Christ had said, "And no one snatches them (namely, the sheep) out of my hand": He confirms it then by

these words, "No one can snatch them out of my Father's hand: I and the Father are one": as if, after the major and minor having been posited, He were to gather this conclusion which He had posited: therefore no one can snatch them out of my hand. Now this conclusion would not follow, if He understood in that minor a lesser one, whom, since He would perceive to have a lesser essence and nature, He would not be seen to gather to Himself an equality of power. Then St. Augustine and St. John Chrysostom, on that passage, prove that, upon hearing that word, the Jews were scandalized, understanding that Christ had made Himself equal to God the Father: about which enough has been said above.[33]

Objicitur (of the Transylvanians): From the fact that Christ, when He had been accused by the Jews, adduces that testimony of Scripture: "I said, you are gods," and in this way, "If He called them gods to whom the word of God came, why do you say of Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, 'You blaspheme,' because I said, I am the Son of God?" - from which they wish to infer that Christ followed the nominal mode of speech by which the prophets and just men are called sons of God; and that so too Christ was "Son of God" nominally.

Reply, first (with St. Hilary): Most aptly St. Hilary notes, On the Trinity 7, that Christ was arguing rather in this way: If judges and prophets can be called sons of God, how much more He whom the Father has in a peculiar way sanctified in divine power and sent into the world? We can then say, as St. John Chrysostom interprets Christ's prudence in responding to the Jews and repelling their calumny, that in order to ward off the stones He prudently used this way of speaking; not that He denied what He had a little before boldly professed when He said, "I and the Father are one." For otherwise, if He had denied Himself to be equal to God, and [to be] the Son of God not by adoption only but by nature, the hatred of the prophets would surely have immediately ceased, and their will of stoning Him would have been restrained, and they would have desisted.

1. The third testimony is the first of John: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus sanctus*): and these three are one. And there are three who give testimony on earth, the Spirit, the water, and the blood: and these three are one": by which words St. John signifies that those witnesses are not only heavenly - since certainly there are in heaven also the Angels, who at Christ's nativity and other feasts announced - but are divine witnesses, namely the three persons of the Trinity: and the following words very clearly indicate this: "If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater: because this is the testimony of God, which is greater, that He has testified concerning His Son. He that believes in the Son of God has the testimony of God in himself." And lower: "And this is the testimony, that God has given us eternal life; and this life is in His Son": therefore he has distinctly placed at the end the earthly testimony, on account of which we believe that Christ is the Son of God and true God: much more are we led to believe this by the divine testimony. But the earthly testimony is that which John called "of earth," namely of those three which gave testimony on earth at the time of the Passion - namely the Spirit, the water, and the blood - which, flowing forth after the Passion from the side of

33. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 1; St. John Chrysostom, In Ioan. 10:30.

Christ, are very powerful. For these three plainly indicate that Christ bore the torments not naturally and humanly but by divine virtue: which the centurion also, seeing that He cried out with a loud voice, confessed, saying, Mark 15: "Truly this man was the Son of God," and Luke 23: "Truly this man was just." These therefore again witness that Christ is the Son of God. But the testimony of God is this: which also pertains to the Son of God in heaven, and is of His divinity and person: they testify that He has given us eternal life, and that this life is in His Son. A little earlier the same words are had by John: "Who is he that overcomes the world, but he that believes that Jesus is the Son of God?" And a little below: "There are three who give testimony on earth," etc. By these words it is indicated that the heavenly witnesses - Father, Word, and Holy Spirit - are truly one God and one eternal nature. For these three who are in heaven - Father, Word, and Holy Spirit - are one. And to these are added the words of John: "And we are in the true [one], in His Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God, and eternal life." Three there are, then, who are in heaven, Father, Word, and Holy Spirit; these are God, one and eternal. Three there are who give testimony on earth, the Spirit, water, and blood: these stand as witnesses, because Jesus is the Son of God, and true God: to which words he subjoins, "and the same is nature and substance."

Objicitur, first, by Blandrata, in the Alban disputation, that the words, "There are three who give testimony in heaven," are spurious.

Respondetur, however, by Jerome very gravely: for they are read in that way also in the Epistle of Pope Hyginus; in Cyprian, in the book On the Unity of the Church; in Athanasius, in the book On the Unity of the Deity of the Trinity; in Idacius, in the book Against Variamandus; and Fulgentius handles objections of the Arians against this place in the fifth tome of the Bibliotheca sacra; there also other books treat this matter.[37]

Objicitur, second, by the heretics, that just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are said to be "one," so also the Spirit, water, and blood are said to be "one" on earth; therefore "one" is unity of consent, not of essence (*essentia*).

Respondetur, that the latter three are said to be "one" because they give one testimony; and for this the Evangelists immediately add the effect of this testimony, namely that by it we believe in Christ the Son of God: but of the former three he says, that they are in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit: and these three are one; and he straightway subjoins, "If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater": thereby plainly showing that he called the three heavenly persons "one" as one God and one essence.

Caput III - The same truth proved from Scripture and the Fathers

Solution to the first: I answer first that, as to that clause, "and these three are one," when the discourse is about the Spirit, the water, and the blood, it is not found in many of the common copies. Then, omitting this, because in all the Greek copies, and commonly in the Latin vulgate

editions, it is found, I say that it is expressed otherwise when it is said of the Spirit, the water, and the blood. For in the Greek we read thus: καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν, that is, "and these three are unto one." But of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit he said, "and these three are one," so that John might indicate that those three witnesses on earth are only one in testimony, when he says, "are unto one," namely, one testimony; but the three who are in heaven are one not only in testimony but also in nature and substance (*substantia*). In this sense the Fathers cited interpret John's words. Add that, even if with Blandrata we were to concede that "and these three are one," when said of the three persons of the Trinity, is to be taken in the same sense as when it is said of the Spirit, the water, and the blood, the testimony alleged would lose nothing of its force. For the testimony of God, which we said is borne concerning Christ, clearly proves his divinity, as was shown above.

Third objection: The same Blandrata objects, against that which we alleged from the same chapter of John, "this is the true God and eternal life," that Christ is indeed true God, yet temporal; because divinity was communicated to him in time, according to Apocalypse 5, "Worthy is the Lamb to receive power and divinity." Solution: But since by no other reason could Christ be God than that his humanity is hypostatically united to the Word of God, we cannot call him a temporal God; because his person (*persona*) is eternal; nor could anyone who is true God be temporal.

Rejection of Erasmus's new gloss: Fourth, Erasmus - who strives, after a clandestine fashion, to overturn all the foundations of our faith - replies that the words, "this is the true God and eternal life," are referred not to Christ but to the Father, in this way: "And that we may be in his true Son: he (namely, the Father of this Son) is the true God." But since he has no author whom he might follow, it is manifest that he has invented that interpretation out of his own brain; and how groundlessly he has invented it is clear: for the pronoun "this" (hic) points rather to the nearest person than to one more remote; but what immediately preceded was "in his true Son." And in the Greek it is read thus: "in his true Son Jesus Christ; concerning Christ it is, 'this is the true God and eternal life'"; this also harmonizes with that sentence of the same John in the Gospel, chapter 17: "This is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." Therefore John said in that first epistle, chapter 5, that he is true God whom he also called eternal life. Since therefore Christ is called eternal life - as above also in the same chapter, "and this eternal life is in his Son" - it must be believed that he also said of the same, "this is the true God and eternal life." Many other things against Erasmus are learnedly disputed by the Bishop of the Canaries on this article, disputation 1, part 2, which I purposely pass over.

To these there can be added the testimonies in Hebrews 1, where Paul often, even from the Old Scripture, proves the divinity of Christ. And although, as I noted above, the testimonies which speak of Christ's divinity might not weigh much against the Arians - who could perhaps grant that Christ is God against Nestorius, but not the second person in the Trinity - yet the aforesaid testimonies, since they presuppose Christ's distinction from the eternal Father, also very well refute Arius. Among other things Paul says of Christ: "who, being the brightness of glory and the

37. St. Jerome; Hyginus, Papa, Epistola; St. Cyprian, De unitate Ecclesiae; Athanasius, De unitate Deitatis Trinitatis; Idacius, Adversus Variamandum; Fulgentius, in the fifth tome of the Bibliotheca sacra.

figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power; having made purgation of sins, sits at the right hand in the heights," etc. There is shown a personal distinction when it is said, "the figure of his substance," in Greek hypostasis, that is, of the supposit or person (*suppositum vel persona*), as we shall explain below in disputation 123, chapter 4. Then, when it is said, "upholding all things by the word of his power," it denotes the omnipotence whereby he alone governs all things, as we shall show below in question 34, article 2, when expounding that same passage. On account of which testimony, as Theodoret writes there, the Arians denied this Epistle to be canonical.

The same truth is shown from the Fathers.

Dionysius, in the first chapter On the Divine Names and in chapter 3 of the Mystical Theology, expressly, together with the unity of the Godhead, concedes the Trinity of persons on account of fecundity. This is handed down in express words by Martialis in his Epistle to the Burdegalenses, chapter 10; Ignatius in his Epistle to the Philippians, where he says that one must believe, not in "one three-named," nor in three incarnates, but in three of the same honor; and many other things besides. There are also Justin, in the book On the Right Explanation of the Faith, and in the Apology to Antoninus, and in the Dialogue with Trypho; Athenagoras, in the Apology to Antoninus; Irenaeus, book 3 Against Heresies, chapters 6, 3, and 10; Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Paedagogue; of Origen we have already said enough in the first chapter of this disputation; Tertullian, book 4 Against Marcion, chapter 25, and the book Against Praxeas, chapters 9 and 10.[38]

For the same catholic truth wrote Athanasius his Orations against the Arians; Hilary the books On the Trinity; Ambrose On the Orthodox Faith against the Arians; Augustine the books On the Trinity; but especially, against the Sermon of Arius, against Maximinus the Arian, against Foelicinus; Cyril the books of the Thesaurus; Cassian the books On the Incarnation; Idacius Clarus the book Against Varimandus, which is found in the fifth tome of the Bibliotheca sacra; Gregory the Baetican, Bishop of Eliberris, the book On the Trinity and the Faith against the Arians, which is in the eighth tome of the Bibliotheca sacra; and others whom it would be long to recount.[39]

Finally, this truth has been defined by the Church: first in the Council of Nicaea under Pope Sylvester and the Emperor Constantine; afterwards the same Emperor, in the thirtieth year of his reign, convoked a council at Jerusalem, where the same was defined, and in the Nicene Symbol the clause "consubstantial with the Father" was added, in Greek ὁμοούσιον (Homoousion), because the heretical Semi-Arians said only ὁμοιουσίον (Homoiousion), that is, "of like substance"; the Fathers also added in the same place that part, "God from God, true God from true God." Then in the Council of Constantinople I, chapter 7, and in Toledo I, in the confession of faith, in Ephesus under

38. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 1; Mystica theologia, c. 3; Martialis, Epistola ad Burdegalenses, c. 10; Ignatius, Epistola ad Philippenses; Justin, De recta fidei explicatione; Apologia ad Antoninum; Dialogus cum Tryphone; Athenagoras, Apologia pro Christianis ad Antoninum; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, lib. 3, c. 6, 3, 10; Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, lib. 1; Origen, noted above; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, lib. 4, c. 25; Adversus Praxean, c. 9 - 10.

39. Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos; Hilary, De Trinitate; Ambrose, De fide orthodoxa contra Arianos; Augustine, De Trinitate; also Contra sermonem Arianorum; Contra Maximinum Arianum; Contra Foelicinum; Cyril, Thesaurus; Cassian, De incarnatione; Idacius Clarus, Adversus Varimandum (Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 5); Gregory the Baetican, Bishop of Eliberris, De Trinitate et fide contra Arianos (Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 8).

Celestine, in Chalcedon, and in many others, the same was defined.[40] Of the Supreme Pontiffs, the same was established by Felix I in Epistle 3; Marcellinus I in the Epistle to Salomon; Anacletus in Epistle 2; Hyginus in the first Epistle; John II in the Epistle to Valerius. We could adduce more in confirmation of the same doctrine; but let these suffice, that the new Arians may blush for having recalled from the underworld a doctrine long since condemned.[41]

Caput IV - The arguments of the Arians

In the first place, Valentinus Gentilis and the Transylvanians argue from Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Magnesians, where he says of Christ: "He announced one and only true God his Father." Whence they gather: therefore the Father alone is true God, not the Son. But Valentinus has wrongly understood the particle "only": for it is referred to "God," whom he calls "only and true," as in John 17: "that they may know thee the only true God," so as to exclude other gods; but it is not referred to "Father" so as to exclude the other persons in the same nature, as is clear enough from the words cited.

Second, they object from the same Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Tarsians, where he says of Christ: "And because he is not that very one who is God over all, but the Son of the same," therefore he thinks that the Son of God is not God over all. I answer: Ignatius does not deny that the Son of God is God over all; since a little later, with a few words interposed, he says of Christ that he is not a mere man, "through whom and in whom all things were made"; which he pursues at greater length; and, with some things interposed, he says: "How then is such a one a mere man, having from Mary a beginning whereby he might exist, and not rather the Word of God and the only-begotten Son, of whom it is said, 'In the beginning was the Word,' etc.?" Where he openly confesses him to be God. Therefore, in those earlier words, Ignatius deliberately did not say, "And because he is not he who is God over all," but "And because he is not that very one who is God over all," wishing only to distinguish the Son from the supposed Father, and to assert that he is a different person from that one: therefore he said, "he is not that very one"; for by the pronoun "that one" (ille) he denoted the person. For he appropriated certain of Paul's words to the Father, and certain to the Son: to the person of the Father he attributed those, "one God, the Father, from whom are all things," and him he said is called "God over all"; but those, "one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things," he applied to the Son.

40. Council of Nicaea under Pope Sylvester and Emperor Constantine; the Jerusalem council convoked by Constantine in the thirtieth year of his reign; addition of "consubstantial with the Father" (ὁμοούσιον) against the Semi-Arian ὁμοιουσίον; also the clauses "God from God, true God from true God"; Council of Constantinople I, c. 7; Council of Toledo I; Council of Ephesus under Celestine; Council of Chalcedon; and others.

41. Popes Felix I (Epist. 3); Marcellinus I (Epistola ad Salomonem); Anacletus (Epist. 2); Hyginus (Epist. 1); John II (Epistola ad Valerium).

Third, they allege words of the same Ignatius in the Epistle to the Philippians. For at the beginning of the Epistle he proves that the Father is one, with those words of Deuteronomy 6, "The Lord thy God is one God." Then, after the middle, he introduces Christ speaking with Satan at the time of the temptation in these words: "I know that (namely God) we are one only, to whom I do not refuse to serve," ...

But their arguments, or rather their childish sophistries, let us hear.

Objection 1. They argue first from the same place in Ignatius, where he cites Deuteronomy and John: "that they may know you, the only true God" (John 17), and "The Lord your God is one God" (Deut 6). Therefore, only the Father is God, to whom alone service is due; hence Christ, since he serves, is not God.

Answer to the first. I marvel how blind the eyes of these new Arians are, who either did not see, or rather feign not to have seen, the splendid testimony to Christ's divinity in the same Epistle, in the words that are inserted around the place in question. For after he proved, from those words of Deuteronomy, that the Father is one and not many, he subjoins: "the Son also is one God, the Word, the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father." Therefore, when he says, "The Lord your God is one God," appropriating those words to the Father, he did not deny that the Son is the same God. Wherefore, when afterwards Christ says, "I know one only" (that is, one God), he confessed not one only person but one only God, and that one ought to serve him, understanding this according to his humanity; for he had shown at great length a little before, in the same Epistle, that Christ is not a mere man. I grant that from those words of Deuteronomy one does not rightly prove the unity of the person of the Father but of the nature, unless we choose to use them by a certain appropriation.

Objection 2. They object further from the same Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Tarsians, where he says: "For he is not that very one who is God, but the Son of that one"; therefore he thinks that the Son is not "God over all."

Answer. He does not deny that Ignatius calls the Son "God over all," since afterwards, after other things intervening, he speaks of Christ in such wise as to confess him openly to be God. Rather, in those words he is distinguishing supposits: he wished to distinguish the person of the Son from that of the Father supposed as the one speaking; hence he says "he is not that one," for the pronoun denotes a person. Indeed Paul sometimes ascribes certain words to the Father, others to the Son: "Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things... and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things" (1 Cor 8:6); what he attributes to the Father under the name "one God," he applies to the Son under the name "one Lord," not to exclude the Son from being God over all, but to distinguish the persons, all the while preserving the unity of the divine nature.

Objection 3. From the same Ignatius again: at the beginning of the Epistle to the Philippians he teaches that the Father is the one God; and he introduces Christ, speaking to Satan in the temptation, with these words: "I know God, one only." Therefore the Son is not God over all.

Answer. The reply is as above. When Christ speaks thus, he confesses not one person only but one God, and the service is owed to him; he speaks according to his humanity. Nor did Ignatius, by appropriating testimonies such as Deut 6:4 to the Father, deny that the Son is the same God; rather, he elsewhere confesses openly the Only-begotten Son to be true God, begotten before the ages and the Word in the beginning.

Objection 4. Fourth, they argue from the same Ignatius, at the end of the Epistle to the Antiochenes, where he says, "Farewell in Christ, and in God": therefore he distinguishes Christ from God.

Answer. These are trifles. For Ignatius distinguishes Christ from "God" with respect to the human nature, since the very name "Christ" sometimes signifies the human nature itself, which was anointed, as we shall note below.[42]

Objection 5. Lastly, they allege for themselves those words of the same Ignatius from the Epistle to the Ephesians: "But our physician is the only true God, the Only-begotten, and the invisible Lord of all, the Only-begotten Father and begetter; yet we have also a physician, our Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-begotten Son before the ages, and in the beginning the Word." From which, miserable Arians would insinuate something in their favor, although he plainly admits that the Only-begotten Son is our physician, and true God, begotten before the ages, and the Word. When, however, he calls our physician "the only true God," he is not designating some one person of the Trinity, but only the divine nature, excluding every other false god. In this manner our God is called in Scripture the only true God.

Objection 6. In the second place they argue from Justin.

They bring forward Justin Martyr in the Dialogue with Trypho, long before me, where they relate that he said Christ is another God besides the maker of the world; by which testimony they seem not so much to prove Arianism as Tritheism.

Solution. Although Justin has words that seem to indicate this, nevertheless, if the entire context of his discourse be read, he rather very plainly proves against the Arians that Christ is God. For from that place in Genesis 19, "The Lord rained from the Lord fire and sulphur," he contends that he is God from God, by which the plurality of persons in the same nature is established. He says therefore: those Jews indeed (he means Trypho and his companions) understood nothing, but judged the places which I had adduced to be of no value, to teach that another God or Lord was either or said to be by the Holy Spirit besides the maker of the universe. "I will therefore again try," I say, "to persuade you, who are familiar with the Scriptures, that that which I say is so, and that he who is said and written to be God and Lord, other than the parent of the universe, is also called Angel, because he now announces to men by words," etc. From which words "God, or Lord, other [than the maker of the universe]" should not be read without a pause: rather, after "Dominum" a distinction should be placed. For he contends against Trypho that Christ, whose person that Angel bore - who among the three that appeared to Abraham was seen to be the Lord and "rained from

42. On the name "Christ" sometimes signifying the very human nature that was anointed, see the note below at 36, quaest. 19, art. 9, from the Council of Frankfurt.

the Lord" - is God from God; and therefore it is said, "The Lord rained from the Lord," not because he wants to show that there is another God, but that there is another who is also God besides him to whom by a certain appropriation the creation and conservation of the universe are ascribed, namely, the Father. And in the aforesaid way Justin is to be understood in that whole discourse, when he says that there is "God and Lord another than he who made the universe." Moreover, that Justin wishes to show there to be in the deity another supposit besides the person of the Father, not another God other than the Father, is shown by his words which he subjoins a little after: "then I will again have recourse to the Scriptures, and I will try to persuade you that he who appeared to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is said and written to be God, is different from that God who made all things - not in counsel and sentence, but in number." Note first, that Justin did not say "that there is a different God," but "that he is different from that God who is said to have made all things," that is, from the Father. For although the Son also created all things, still Scripture and the Fathers seem to appropriate creation and power to the Father; to the Son not in this manner, but "through him" or "in him" were all things made, as shall be said below.[43]

That, to signify that the Son and the Father are of the same nature, the Church rightly uses the name Homoousios, that is, consubstantial

Up to now we have shown that the Son is of the same substance (substantia), that is, essence (essentia), with the Father; but since in matters of faith one must not only know what is to be held, but also observe the right mode of speaking, it will be worthwhile to subjoin some remarks on the Greek name homoousios, in Latin consubstantial, about which there was some dissension in the Church of God.

That this word was rejected as new by the Council of Ariminum is attested by Athanasius in the Epistle on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia, and by Augustine in Book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 14, about the middle; that the same term was rejected by the Council of Sirmium is related by the same Athanasius and by Epiphanius in Heresy 73. Emperor Constantine also, in a letter to Alexander and Arius, said that the question about this word was vain, not worthy of discussion, nor of answering those asking about such things. Erasmus too, imitating the liberty of the Council of Ariminum, as Catherinus reports in the tract on the Immaculate Conception, affirms that, if he had had any authority in those synods in which the peace of the world was being treated, he would have taken care not to know what the word homoousios wished to mean in the divine persons, although amid the tumult of affairs he would rather protect it than attack it. This word also displeased the fathers of the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata, as Hilary writes in the book On the Synods toward the end. And to many other Catholics besides, such as Hosius and others, it was not acceptable, as the same Hilary relates: because it was a source of ambiguity - lest, to wit, they seem either to agree with Samosata, or, instead of Homoousion, to say Homoiousion, that is, "of like substance," which word the Arians used.

43. Compare infra, quaest. 45, art. 6, on the phrases "through him" and "in him" all things were made.

For that very reason our heretics of the present time, together with the ancient Arians, pursue it with hatred - because they think it exotic and invented by the Fathers in the Council of Nicaea, and nowhere found in the sacred letters.

Nevertheless, this word ought to be in veneration, and indeed for this reason especially, that, against the Arians to whom it is hateful, it most clearly explains the doctrine which the Catholic Church hands down concerning the Son's divinity. For, as Athanasius well admonishes in the Epistle on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia not far from the end, and Basil in the Epistle to the handmaids of God, and Ambrose in Book 3 On the Faith, chapter 7, and Hilary in the book On the Synods toward the end, this name signifies not only things that are kindred according to essence, but also - when there is causality - that those things which have existence (existentia) from the same cause are of the same nature. Nor is it necessary, as Athanasius notes, that if one be called homoousios to another, both have proceeded from a third substance; rather it is enough if one arises from the other, as the Only-begotten in one and the same nature and substance.

Epiphanius adds in the Ancoratus that the name Synousion is far different from the word Homoousion; for Synousion signifies unity of substance in such a way as to denote no distinction at all - something the Sabellians would admit; but Homoousion signifies, with the distinction of one from another, the same nature and substance. For that reason the word Homoousios was rightly received by the Church, as that which most fitly confuted the Arian heresy. Besides the Fathers already named, Hilary in the book On the Synods, Marius Victorinus in the book against Arius and in a special treatise on this word preserved in volume 5 of the Bibliotheca sacra, Isidore in Etymologies 7.2, Epiphanius in Heresy 68, Cyril in the first book On the Trinity, Augustine in Epistles 174 and 78, and Fulgentius, among others, treat of and approve this term.[44]

Why then was this word not received in certain Synods?

First, it is no wonder that the Councils of Ariminum and Sirmium - which were not legitimate - rejected this word as new and not contained in the sacred letters, since the Arian heretics had much sway. Indeed, had they not preferred a word which the Arians used, for the same alleged cause - that it was exotic and not found in Scripture - they would have rejected every other of similar sound, such as Homoiousion and Homoion, that is, "like in substance and nature"; for though they seemed not to agree with the Arians, they nevertheless retained their sense. As for Erasmus, he has no authority among us when - under the pretext of a freer way of disputing - he often sows the seeds of almost all heresies.

Second, as to Constantine's opinion: out of excessive zeal for peace he exceeded the due measure, thinking that by this means he would compose peace among all parties; and the Catholic emperor, ill-instructed on this matter, could embrace that view, that the word in question be rejected by common consent.

Third, concerning the Fathers of the Antiochene Council: one must say differently. That Council was held long before Arius; the quarrel then was with Paul of Samosata, and thus they rejected the word lest it seem to favor Samosata's perverse sense. They explained themselves, moreover - how

"consubstantial" can be well understood - lest what they repudiated against Samosata be thought to prejudice the sound sense which the Nicene Fathers later declared. Hilary reports this in the book On the Synods, where he says: "Samosata confessed 'homoousios' badly; but what the Arians later denied, eighty bishops of old repelled, and three-hundred and more at Nicaea defined," and so on.[45]

Fourth, it matters nothing that this word is not in Scripture, as the Fathers cited noted, if it signify what Scripture teaches - namely, that the Son is a distinct supposit (suppositum) from the Father, but of the same substance and nature with him. Thus Augustine answers in Tractate 97 on John, on those words, "I and the Father are one"; and Athanasius, in the Epistle on the Creed of the Nicene Synod, speaks at length to the same effect. And this is the best solution; for we are not bound to use Scripture's very syllables alone, but also such words as - though not literally in Scripture - properly express the sense of Scripture. Ambrose nevertheless, Book 3 On the Faith, chapter 7, and Cyril, in the books On the Trinity, endeavor to derive this name from Scripture: both because in the Lord's Prayer "supersubstantial" bread is asked (as some Latin copies read), and because in Exodus 3 the name of essence is insinuated, "I am who am" - in Greek, ho ōn - from which "ousia" and then "homoousios" are conveniently formed.

Lastly, as for the novelty of the word: we say that the charge of novelty was devised not by Catholics but by the Arians themselves, as Ambrose relates, who made it a calumny that the Fathers had introduced a new word. Eusebius of Nicomedia, an Arian, wrote in a certain letter - cited by Ambrose - complaining of the Nicene confession and especially of the word Homoousion. By such arts they tried to discredit the definition; but the Catholic sense of the Church has ever honored the term which, most fitly and briefly, excludes both Arian subordination and Sabellian confusion.

Caput V - Why that word was rejected in those councils

What we adduced against the use of this name are lighter things. First, it is not surprising that those two councils of Ariminum and Sirmium, which were not legitimate, rejected that word as new and not contained in the sacred Scriptures, since they greatly favored the Arian heresy. For the same reason, as though they judged better, they also rejected another word which the Arians were using, namely homoiousion, that is, "of like substance and nature," because it was exotic and not found in the sacred Scriptures; for thus they seemed to themselves not to agree with the Arians, while nevertheless they fully retained their meaning. Erasmus too has no authority with us, since by his excessive license in speaking he has sown almost all heresies.

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44. Hilary, De Synodis; Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arrium and the special tract on this word (Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 5); Isidore, Etymologiae 7.2; Epiphanius, Haer. 68; Cyril, De Trinitate; Augustine, Epist. 174 and 78; Fulgentius.

45. Hilary, De Synodis toward the end. See also Athanasius, Epistola de Synodis Arimini et Seleuciae; Augustine, Contra Maximinum 3.14; accounts of Sirmium and Ariminum in Athanasius and Epiphanius; the imperial letter of Constantine to Alexander and Arius; and Erasmus as cited by Catherinus, De immaculata conceptione.

Second, about Constantine we say that he exceeded due measure through zeal for peace, because he thought on that account he ought to establish peace among all; and the Catholic emperor, ill-instructed on this matter, could have embraced their sentence, that the word in question should be rejected by common consent. Yet from zeal we excuse him.

Third, about the Fathers of the Council of Antioch it must be said otherwise, namely, that before the Arian heresy, or any controversy with the Arians about this word, arose, they rejected it only in the sense of Paul of Samosata, who used it to signify that the Father and the Son are two substances numerically different, yet of the same species, as Peter and John are.

Epiphanius in the book Ancoratus adds that the name synousion or synusion is far different from the word homoousion: for synousion signifies unity of substance in such a way that it denotes no distinction; therefore the Sabellians would admit that; but homoousion, while positing the distinction of one from another, signifies the same nature and substance. Therefore the word homoousios was rightly received by the Church, as that by which the Arian heresy was best refuted - a heresy about which, besides the Fathers already cited, Hilary approves in the book On the Synods, Marius Victorinus in the book Against Arius and in the special tract on this word (found in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 5), Isidore in the Etymologies, book 7, Epiphanius, and Cyril, book 1 On the Trinity; likewise Augustine in Letters 174 and 178, and Fulgentius against the Arians to the seventh objection.[46]

Certainly, as is established from Athanasius, Samosatenus did not say that the Son is consubstantial, but he inferred it as something absurd against the Catholics. That that word had not been introduced into the Mass by Hosius, Hilary makes nothing of, and rightly; but he objects to himself thus: "Yet homoousion can be understood badly." He himself answers: "Let it be established, in what way it can be understood well."

Fourth, it matters nothing that this word is not in Scripture, as the cited Fathers noted, if it truly signifies what Scripture teaches - namely, that the Son is a supposit (*suppositum*) distinct from the Father, but of the same substance (*substantia*) and pure nature with him. So also Augustine answers in tractate 97 on John at the words "I and the Father are one," and Athanasius in the Epistle On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, far from the middle. And this indeed is the best solution: for we must not use only the words of Scripture; but it is also permitted to use certain others, if they rightly express a thing contained in Scripture. Nevertheless Ambrose in book 3 On the Faith, chapter 7, and Cyril in book 1 On the Trinity, try to deduce this name from Scripture, because in Luke 11 (and in Matthew 6 according to some readings) "supersubstantial" bread is said; and because the name ousia, being, has some derivation from Scripture, Exodus 3, "I am who am," in Greek ho on, whence ousia; yet there is no need to take refuge in these.

Finally, about the novelty of the word we say that it was not invented by Catholics but by the Arians, as Ambrose testifies, in the said chapter 7, in order to introduce their own error. For Eusebius of Nicomedia, an Arian, wrote these words in a certain letter, which Ambrose reports: "If

46. Epiphanius, Haeresis 68; Cyril, De Trinitate, lib. 1; Augustine, Epist. 174 and 178; Fulgentius, Contra Arianos, ad septimam objectionem.

we say the true Son of God, and uncreated, we begin to confess him homoousios with the Father." When that letter was recited in the Council of Nicaea, the Fathers (as Ambrose says) put this word into the exposition of the faith, because they saw it to be a terror to the adversaries, so that, as it were, by the sword drawn from them they might cut off the head itself of the nefarious heresy. Therefore what they refused to concede in order to prop up their heresy, the Council, borrowing the same word, rightly defined. The new Arians therefore are deceived when they assert that this word was introduced in the Council of Nicaea. Athanasius also testifies, in the place a little above cited, that this word was used by Dionysius of Alexandria and by Dionysius the Pope of Rome.[47]

Note moreover that the Semi-Arians used some other similar name to establish their error: for they called the Son of God homoiousion, that is, "of like substance," so that the unity of essence with the Father might be retained by mere likeness, which can stand along with distinction; but they utterly denied it. Hilary disapproved this word altogether in the book On the Synods toward the end, where, after many things which he said about both names, he speaks thus: "I call to witness the Lord of heaven and earth, that if I had heard neither, I would always nevertheless have thought that by homoousion, homoousion ought to be understood - namely, that nothing can be like to God according to nature, unless it be of the same nature." Athanasius indeed, although in the cited Epistle against the Sirmian and Ariminian Synods he seems to prove the name homoiousion, that is, "of like substance," yet he adds that it does not rightly signify the origin of one from another in the unity of the same nature; nor properly does likeness signify in nature and substance. For "like" is usually said in quality, form, or figure, not in substance. But however that may be, since the Arians used this word contentiously, by no means is it to be used by us.[48]

Disputatio CX - Whether the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, is of the same substance as the others

Caput I - Heretics deny the divinity of the Holy Spirit

The divinity of the Holy Spirit is said to have been impugned by the Macedonians, called from Macedonius, who taught this heresy in the time of the Emperor Constantius and of Pope Liberius; and the author was Macedonius, and Arius too followed the error concerning the person (*persona*) of the Son which has been said in the foregoing disputation. And again Arius taught the same about the Holy Spirit as Macedonius taught; but because the Arians were divided, and the dispute was more about the person of the Son against them, whereas against Macedonius the action was especially about the person of the Holy Spirit, therefore this heresy was called Macedonian; and the followers of it were called Pneumatomachi, that is, "impugners of the Spirit." Another etymology of the name, which Bernard of Luxemburg reports, is rightly refuted by Castro Against Heresies, book De haeresibus, heresy 10; for Bernard said that Macedonius taught that the Holy Spirit had

47. Hilary, De Synodis toward the end; Athanasius, Epistola de decretis Nicaenae Synodi; on Dionysius of Alexandria and Dionysius the Pope, see Athanasius in the place a little before cited.

48. Hilary, De Synodis toward the end; Athanasius, Epistola contra Synodum Sirmiensem et Ariminensem.

proceeded from the Son of God and from the mother, and therefore they were called Pneumatomachi. This error, however, was taught not only not by Macedonius, but by no other heretic.

Before Macedonius there were heretics who, while abstaining from blasphemies, denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit in the same way as Macedonius, as Philaster writes in the little book On Heresies. They were under the emperors Diocletian and Maximian, and Pope Marcellinus. Afterwards a certain heretic named Airas followed, from whom some were called Airani. Moreover, among the Arians not only did some say that the Holy Spirit was not consubstantial to the Father and the Son, but also that he was less than the Son. To this error like is another of Valentinus, who said that the Holy Spirit was a certain Angel, as Athanasius affirms in the Longer Epistle to Serapion after the middle; and the same Athanasius writes that this fancy pleased some Arians; nay, in our age some writers testify that the Transylvanians and Servetians and Francis David held the same.[49] Hither also tends the error of Abaelard, who, as is established from Bernard in Epistle 109, said that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world, and that he is inferior to the Son; for he attributed omnipotence to the Father, semipotence to the Son, and no power to the Holy Spirit. He also said that the Holy Spirit is not of the substance of the Father, yet that he is consubstantial to him - two things which are mutually repugnant.

Caput II - The Catholic truth is proved

We could first adduce testimonies of the Old Testament by which the divinity of the Holy Spirit would be proved; yet for our present purpose against the heretics the chief places of the New Testament will suffice, in which this is more clearly asserted: Matthew, at the end, "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit"; John 3, "Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God"; Titus 3, "He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit." From these places Nazianzen fitly argues for the divinity of the Holy Spirit in these words: If the Holy Spirit is not God to be adored, how does he make me God through baptism? as if he were to say, if in baptism I am sanctified by his invocation and am made God by participation of holiness, therefore he is God to be adored, because God alone it is who sanctifies and blots out sins. The same can be done from that, 2 Corinthians 13: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity (*caritas*) of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all, amen": for what else is the communion of the Holy Spirit, if not the sanctification of the soul? therefore he is the author of holiness; and hence God. Then Acts 5: "But Peter said, Ananias, why has Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Spirit? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God." Finally, 1 John 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one."

Second, this truth is proved by the decrees of the Councils, wherein against Arius the Son is defined consubstantial to the Father, and in which the Nicene Symbol is received, in which about the Spirit it is said: "And [I believe] in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and lifegiver, who together with the

Father and the Son is adored and conglorified." It is also defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.

Third, besides the Fathers cited in the preceding disputation, those who specifically treated of the Holy Spirit wrote against this error: Dionysius of Alexandria wrote two books, which Jerome translated into Latin and they are among his works; Basil wrote one book against Eunomius; Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit to Gratian, three books.[50]

From which it follows that the Holy Spirit cannot be the soul of the world, otherwise he would be a creature. For if he is God, therefore he is higher than heaven and than the whole universe; nor can he be defined by that, Job 22: "Do you not consider that God is higher than heaven, and is exalted above the top of the stars?" and 2 Paralip. 2: "Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee." But if he were the soul of the world, he would be defined and contained by the whole heaven and the universe as by his proper body - which is against the Scripture alleged, and against what above, in disputation 29, has been expressly proved.

Caput III - The arguments of the Macedonians are dissolved

The first argument of the Macedonians was: Nowhere in Scripture is the Holy Spirit called God; therefore he ought not to be called God. It is answered: this is manifestly false, as is clear from the testimonies cited above.

Second, they objected that of John 1: "All things were made by him" (that is, by the Word); therefore even the Holy Spirit was made. Nazianzen answers, in the cited oration on Theology, in order 5 and 7, that not "all things" absolutely were made by the Word, but "whatever things were made"; but the Holy Spirit is outside the order of those things which were made: otherwise even the Father would have been made by the Word.

Third, they alleged that of Amos 4 according to the reading of the Seventy: "I am the Lord, who strengthens the thunder and creates the Spirit"; therefore the Spirit is created by the Lord. I answer with Nazianzen there, with Athanasius in the Epistle to Serapion, and with Basil, book 3 against Eunomius, that "spirit" in that place signifies wind.

Fourth, Romans 8: "The Spirit intercedes for us with inenarrable groanings": but if he were God, he could not intercede. Augustine, in Epistle 121 and in book one against the Maximian Arian, and Nazianzen in Oration 36, numbers 54, 55, 56, understanding this place of the Holy Spirit as the third person in the Trinity, explain it thus: "he intercedes," that is, he makes to intercede, because he helps our infirmity that we may intercede. By the same reason they think that in Galatians 4 it is said, "God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying Abba, Father," for it is the same as that of the same chapter in Romans 8, "You have received the Spirit of adoption, in whom we cry, Abba,

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49. Athanasius, Epistola longior ad Serapionem; on the Transylvanians, the Servetians, and Francis David (Dauid), see some modern authors.

50. Dionysius of Alexandria, two books on the Holy Spirit (in Latin through Jerome) among his works; Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 3; Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto ad Gratianum, three books.

Father." For because he makes us cry out, in that place we are said to cry out by his power; and he himself is said to cry, "Abba, Father." More easily in my judgment do more recent authors understand it of the Spirit of grace which God infuses into the soul: for he is said to intercede for us, because what we do not know of ourselves how to ask, the Spirit of grace rightly makes us ask. And thus let us weigh the Greek word, hyperentygchanei, which signifies "to intercede," and properly "to petition": there it does not signify "to make to petition," but "to pray"; for he who intercedes also himself asks and entreats.

Finally, that the Holy Spirit is said not to speak from himself, or that he is said to be sent by the Son and to receive from him, and that he is the third person in the Trinity, does not prove that he is a creature; for all these are said of the Holy Spirit by reason of origin (*origo*), because he proceeds from the Father and the Son, as we shall say in their places. And let these things suffice for proving that in God there are processions (*processiones*) of persons in the same nature; for all the Fathers and councils teach nothing else while they teach three persons of the same nature - the second being produced from the first, and the third from both; which is gathered from Scripture. For the names Son and Holy Spirit denote procession from another.

Disputatio CXI - Whether the divine processions are operations of intellect and will

Caput I - The opinion of Durandus

The present controversy is commonly handled around the doctrine of St. Thomas, where he discusses the number of processions: for from the number of immanent operations the number also of processions is gathered. Wherefore, that we may know how many processions there are, we must first see whether there are in God operations of intellect (*intellectus*) and of will (*voluntas*), and of what sort these are. But before we set forth the sentences of the Scholastics, it is fitting to vindicate Richard of St. Victor from a certain false opinion which is ascribed to him; for some say that he held in such a way as to make the processions to be the operations of the intellect and of the will; whereas he teaches that, although there are in God these internal operations, nevertheless the processions are not to be taken as essential acts common to the three persons, but as notional productions according to which the persons are distinguished.

Certain later writers - Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure in 1, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1 and dist. 10; the Master (Peter Lombard) in the first book; and the Major (William of Auvergne) in 1, dist. 10, q. 5, art. 1 - do indeed treat of processions as proceeding per intellectum and per voluntatem; others add that one procession is by way of the intellective operation, the other by way of the will's operation. In this understanding Durandus proposed his own sentence in the first book, distinct. 10, in the beginning, as shall be said below.

The first point to be held is that the essential acts are common to all the persons; the processions, however, are not essential operations, nor common, but relative, according to which the divine persons are distinguished among themselves.

Caput II - The common scholastic sentence

Second reason. The processions are really distinguished; therefore the processions are not acts of the intellect and of the will. Next, fecundity belongs no less to God than to creatures; but creatures are fecund proximally by their nature with the intellect left aside: therefore so also is God himself. Indeed, it so belongs to other natures to produce a son, that it by no means belongs to them to do so through the intellect: therefore God too will be fecund, not formally through the intellect, but through the nature, that is, through the essence as essence. Hence he infers in the first book, distinct. 10, q. 2, n. 1, that it is not rightly gathered from the number of immanent operations - namely, of intellect and of will - the number of processions, as Blessed Thomas claims to deduce in article 5; although, the number of persons having been presupposed, it is rightly proved that there are not more than two processions, because one of them must necessarily be unbegotten, that is, proceeding from none. St. Jerome Zanchius the heretic followed Durandus's sentence in a book on the Trinity which he wrote some years ago at Heidelberg, part one of the work, book 5, the last chapter, asserting that that doctrine of the theologians, that the Son proceeds through the intellect, is rash.

Certain more recent authors also attribute this opinion of Durandus to Gregory of Rimini in the first book, distinct. 7, q. 5, art. 2, and distinct. 10, q. 1, and distinct. 13, q. 1; yet without cause: for in those places he only disputes about the principle by which generation is, and proves that there is no principle by which besides the producing person, which he calls the principle that; for he thinks that in God there is not distinguished a principle whereby, as we shall see in Disputation 135; but he does not deny that the procession of the Word is formally intellection, and that the spiration of the Spirit is an act of willing. Therefore, the opinion of Gregory being omitted, about which we shall treat more fully below, let us refute in the following chapter the sentence of Durandus.

It is proved from Scripture, third, that this sentence is clearly gathered against Durandus. For the Son of God is called the Father's Word (John 1; 1 John 5); but a word proceeds only as utterance, and utterance only through an intellect: therefore the procession of the Word is an operation of the intellect. Wherefore Durandus's manner of speaking seems to fall into the heresy of the Alogians. For when he says that the Son of God, by a certain appropriation, proceeds through the intellect, yet not really; and that the act by which he is generated is an operation of the intellect only by appropriation; he must also say that that which proceeds is a word, not truly, but by a certain appropriation - something we shall show to be false in Disputation 142, cap. 2. Although the Alogians claimed not only that there is not properly a word in God (as we shall say in Disputation 141), but also denied the Trinity of persons: hence, at least in manner of speaking, Durandus's sentence does not differ from their error. But how the Holy Spirit is called love, whence it is gathered that his procession is an operation of the will, we shall see in q. 37, art. 1.

Against Durandus, the Scholastics rightly and vigorously unite to defend that the divine processions are operations of the intellect and of the will. Thus taught St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent Thomists on the same place; the Bishop of the Canaries in a single disputation on that fifth article; Alexander on the procession of the Word; and on the procession of the Holy Spirit; Bonaventure on the procession of the Word in I, dist. 27, q. 1, and on the procession of the Spirit in distinct. 10, through several questions; Henry in quodlibet 6, q. 1; Scotus in quodlibet 2, art. 2, and on I, dist. 2, part 2, q. 4 (which is seventh in order), and dist. 27, q. 1 and 2; Richard on I, dist. 2, q. 1; Marsilius on I, q. 6, art. 1; Gabriel on I, dist. 7, q. 2, art. 1, 2, and 3; and Major. The consent of the Fathers is also common. For, to omit those who call the Son of God speech or word, as the Evangelist John, from whom we shall afterward take an excellent argument, there are some who expressly say of the Son that he is generated by the Father through the intellect, or proceeds from the memory of the Father: Irenaeus, book 2, cap. 48; Basil, homily on the first chapter of John; St. Augustine, book 5 On the Trinity, caps. 6, 13, and 14, and in the books On the Knowledge of True Life, caps. 14, 16, and 17; Cyril, book 1 on John, cap. 5; Theodoret, book 2 Ad Graecos; Anselm, in the Monologion, caps. 45, 46, 47, and 48; add the testimonies of other Fathers which we shall set forth in the following disputation

But on the contrary: if once it has been proved that generation is an operation of the intellect, no one will doubt that the procession of the Holy Spirit is an operation of the will. Moreover, the opinion of Durandus is refuted also by reason. First, because if it were true, we could assign no reason why the procession of the Word rather than that of the Holy Spirit should be generation, as will appear in Disputation 113. Next, we would not be able to assign the order of prior and posterior according to origin among the proceeding persons - why in which respect this should proceed first and that other later; nor why the Holy Spirit should proceed from the Son. Besides, as St. Thomas says in article 5, since the processions in God ought to be spiritual immanent operations, and in an intellectual nature no other immanent operation can be conceived besides that of intellect and of will, we would vainly call the divine processions operations other than intellection and volition. Finally, the Father would not be said in the Son to see himself as in a mirror rather than with his own proper looking, nor would we say that the Holy Spirit is the love whereby the Father and the Son love one another, unless to the Father there belonged a peculiar notional act of the intellect.

From this doctrine they rightly gather the number of processions, as St. Thomas in art. 5, Cajetan and the more recent authors in the same place, the Bishop of the Canaries in a disputation on that article, Henry in the cited place, Alexander I, q. 47, m. 7, reason 3, Bonaventure in I, dist. 2, q. 4, Scotus in that seventh question and in the cited quodlibet, Gabriel in I, dist. 10, q. 1, art. 1 and 2, Richard and Marsilius in the cited places, teach. For since procession is an immanent operation of intellect and will, and these are only two, as has been proved, it follows that there are only two processions. But this argument certainly proves only that there are two in species, that is, that there is no procession which is not an intellection or a volition; but why there are not more in number, so that each person would produce another, since he has an intellect and will common with the others, is to be seen below at q. 41, art. 6.

Now to the arguments of Durandus a response is made without difficulty. To the first I say: to understand and to will can be considered in a twofold way, as will be explained in the following disputation. First, absolutely and in itself, that is, without the relation of production to the produced term; then with that relation of production added. In the first way they are essential acts and common to the three persons; in the latter way they are not common, but are called notional, that is, proper to someone person or to some persons.

To the latter argument I respond first: not every created nature is fecund proximally by its substance for producing another; only the corporeal is; for a spiritual nature, as an angel, is not thus fecund; and why then is it not more imperfect? I say, moreover, that the corporeal creature is fecund in this way, not because it is able to generate by an accidental potency added to it - this is not controverted among philosophers - but because either it produces without intellect and will, or at least by its very intellection and volition as a proximate principle it does not produce another substance, but only with intellect and will accompanying. Therefore, to concede this manner of fecundity to God would be imperfection; since it does not befit spiritual creatures on account of their higher perfection: therefore it is fitting that fecundity belong to him on that more perfect part by which spiritual creatures surpass corporeal ones, namely by intellect and will; and in this part God surpasses the spiritual creatures, because in this part creatures are infertile. And although in God will and intellect are in no way by their nature distinct from the essence, but are distinguished only in our consideration, nevertheless we ascribe to God a production such that it is formally and truly intellection and volition, although it is not distinguished from the essence; and the faculty of producing is intellect and will, which differ from the essence only in our manner of conceiving. But of the very power of begetting and spirating we shall speak more fully in Disputation 164.

Disputatio CXII - What sort of operations of intellect and will the processions are

- What Henry thinks, Caput I.
- The opinion of Scotus and others, Caput II.
- The true sentence, Caput III.
- Replies to the arguments of Scotus, Caput IV.

Caput I - What Henry thinks

Henry, quodlibet 6, q. 1, while admitting that the Word proceeds by an operation of the intellect and the Spirit by an operation of the will, teaches that they proceed not by just any operation, but by a certain peculiar one. To explain this, he notes that in us there is a twofold act of intellect and of will. For the intellect is partly passive, partly active: it is called passive in comparison with simple knowledge, which is as it were indeterminate and confused; but it is called active with respect to discourse, for which the intellect, informed by that simple knowledge, is rendered able to attain the complete and perfect definition and knowledge of a thing. When, however, it discourses, it indeed

has a cognition which is a word, yet still unformed, because it has not yet fully expressed the nature and definition of the thing; but, the discourse having been completed and the perfect definition of the thing having been found, the word is now perfect and full. He took this doctrine from St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, cap. 15.

Then in the will he distinguishes a twofold operation, one in act, with respect to which the will is said to be as it were passive - metaphorically, because it is said to be attracted by the good itself and to be moved in a certain way; and thus love, a simple loving, arises: which operation corresponds to the prior operation of the intellect; the other operation of the will he says is a fervent love, by which the will is borne toward the thing loved and rests in it, which Henry calls zeal or the burning of the will: this love corresponds to the posterior operation of the intellect.

He proposes almost the same notion in God. He distinguishes a twofold knowledge: one he calls essential, which corresponds to the simple knowledge which we first have of things, not because in God it is imperfect, as it is in us, but because the essential knowledge in God is only a certain simple manifestation; whereas the Word in God has the character of manifesting and declaring what already by essential knowledge is made manifest; the posterior knowledge in us makes the prior known and manifest, and so it expresses a word. Therefore, by this posterior knowledge, which is as it were the expression and manifestation of the prior, Henry says, the Word is produced in God.

In the same way, although in God essential love is not imperfect, as in us that prior love is; nevertheless it has only the character of a simple love, and it answers to the prior love which in us is a certain loving whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds; but the posterior love in us - the fervent one, whereby we are vehemently carried - answers in God to the notional operation. He concludes, finally, that the Word in the divine proceeds through a notional act of the intellect, which is to speak, not through the essential act, which is to understand; and that the Holy Spirit proceeds through that fervent love, which is a notional act, not an essential one.

Scotus refutes this sentence of Henry in many places cited in the preceding disputation; and for my part it does not please me especially on these three reasons.

First reason: our intellect and will in the prior act no less exercise the works of life from an internal principle than in the posterior; therefore, no less in the prior act do they move themselves and produce something of life in themselves than in the posterior; the only difference will be that in the prior act, by reason of its imperfection, a more imperfect quality is produced, in the posterior, however, a more perfect one. But since in God the essential operations are carried out no less perfectly than the notional ones, from this side it will not be repugnant that some persons should proceed by essential operations no less than by notional ones.

Second reason: the knowledge of God which is essential is no less distinct and perspicuous than the notional; nor is essential love less fervent and tending toward the thing loved than notional love; therefore Henry's reason, taken from a comparison with us, does not hinder that persons proceed by essential acts, as by notional.

Third reason: Henry seems to assert that notional acts arise from essential ones as from principles, just as in us the posterior act arises from the prior as from its principle. But this is absurd, as Scotus rightly noted in that seventh question cited; for, in part, the principle by which the Father generates the Word is memory according to act (according to our manner of understanding), as St. Augustine teaches, book 15 On the Trinity, cap. 7; therefore essential intellection is not the principle of producing the Word. Add that, as we shall show below, the essential act is included in the notional; therefore it is useless to assign it as the principle of the latter.

Caput II - The opinion of Scotus and of others

Scotus, on I, dist. 2, that seventh question, at the section "They object the contrary" toward the end, and in other places alleged in the preceding disputation, teaching that in God the act of the intellect is altogether essential, in order to satisfy an argument which afterward led Durandus, wants to assert that the Son does not proceed by an act of the intellect, namely, because the act of the intellect is of the essence...

Next, with respect to the will, he distinguishes a twofold cooperation: one in act, with respect to which the will is said to be disposed passively, yet metaphorically, because it is said somehow to be moved by the good itself, being allured by it; and this he calls simple love. This operation corresponds to the prior operation of the intellect. The other operation of the will he says is a fervent love, whereby the will is carried toward the thing loved and rests in it; this Henry calls the zeal or the burning of the will; and this love corresponds to the posterior operation of the intellect.

He explains it thus: in almost the same proportion he distinguishes in God a twofold knowledge (*notitia*): one he calls essential, which corresponds to the simple knowledge which we first have about things, not because it is imperfect in God as it is in us, but because essential knowledge in God is only a certain simple manifestation. The Word, however, in God bears the character of one manifesting and declaring that which is already made manifest by essential knowledge: just as in us that posterior knowledge is a manifestation of the prior, and therefore it expresses the word. By this latter knowledge, therefore, which is as it were the expression and manifestation of the former, Henry says that in God the Word is produced.

In the same way, although essential love in God is not imperfect as in us that prior love is, nevertheless it has only the character of simple love, and it corresponds to the prior love which is in us; but the love by which the Holy Spirit proceeds is as it were that posterior fervent love of ours, moving toward the thing chosen. He concludes finally from these points that in the divine things the Word proceeds through an act of the intellect which is notional (*notionalis*), which is to say (*dicere*), not through an essential act, which is to understand (*intelligere*); and that the Holy Spirit proceeds through that fervent love which is notional, not essential.

Against this opinion of Henry many reasons are brought forward. The first reason: in us the intellect and the will act in the prior act of life no less from an internal principle than in the posterior; therefore they are no less perfect in the former act than in the latter; the only difference

is this, that in the prior act a less perfect quality is produced, but in the posterior a more perfect. And since in God the essential operations are no less perfect than the notional, on this score it will not be repugnant that by those some persons proceed

The second reason, no less distinct and evident, is that God's essential knowledge is not less clear than the notional, nor is essential love less fervent and tending toward the beloved thing than the notional: therefore Henry's rationale does not hinder persons from proceeding through essential acts just as through notional.

The third reason: Henry seems to assert that notional acts arise from essential ones as from principles, as in us a posterior act arises from a prior as from a principle, because we are moved from one to the other. But this is absurd, as Scotus well noted in the cited question 7, because in the Father the principle by which he generates the Word is the fecund memory in the first act for understanding, as St. Augustine teaches (De Trinitate XV, c. 7): therefore essential intellection is not the principle of producing the Word. Add that, as we shall show below, the essential act is included in the notional; therefore it is assigned as the principle of that one in vain.

It is objected, on the contrary, near the end of the cited disputation and in other places, that there are two acts of the intellect in God, so as to satisfy the argument by which Durandus was later induced to assert that the Son does not proceed through an act of the intellect, namely, because the acts of the intellect are essential and common. Scotus therefore says that one act is to understand (*intelligere*), and that this is essential; another is to say (*dicere*), and that this, so far as it is saying (*dictio*), is notional; by the former he asserts that the Son is not led forth to produce the Word, but by the latter he is produced; and that this act is in the Father alone. In the same proportion one ought to philosophize about the act of the will lest he be pressed by the same argument: indeed he said this expressly in Quodlibet 14, q. 4. Here it must be understood a little from the beginning: namely, that one act is the act of love, and that this is essential and common to the three; but another is the act of spirating (*spirare*), and that this is notional and proper to the Father and the Son - yet he himself does not teach this expressly. In the same opinion seem to have been Alexander when he affirms that to generate and to understand are not altogether the same according to reason, although to generate and to say are entirely the same; for he renders the reason that to understand, taken essentially, is the same as to manifest, and therefore it belongs to the three persons, but to generate and to say belong to the Father alone; nor does Gabriel dissent from this opinion in the cited place.

The foundations of this opinion are two. The first is: if to understand and to say did not differ, then to whomever the one were attributed, the other would also be attributed; therefore, since to understand belongs to the three persons, to say would also belong to the three; which is to produce the Word - yet that is absurd. The second is: intellection (*intellectio*), precisely as intellection, since it is of itself, is not the production of a term; but saying (*dictio*) is the production of a term, namely of the Word: therefore procession is not intellection.

This opinion of Scotus is rightly refuted by Cajetan in this article, and by the Bishop of the Canaries in the first article of this question, and in St. Thomas's fourth disputation of the Prima Pars, by this argument. By the very fact that the intellect says something, either simple or complex in an enunciation, it speaks; but to speak spiritually is to understand that very thing which is said and brought forth. For no one speaks or says anything except that which he knows and understands; nor does an intellectual saying only suppose the intellection of that which is said, as happens in the utterance of a bodily voice; rather the very saying is a certain intellection. Otherwise, if in the Father the saying were not formally intellection but presupposed it as prior, common to the three and to all essential things, then the Father would be said to understand himself in his Word no more truly than would the Son and the Holy Spirit; thus the three persons would understand in the Word, while only the Father would produce it. For if the Father does not understand in the Word formally by the very production of the Word, but by essential knowledge; and nevertheless the Word represents things to the Father in such a way that the Father sees them in that essential intellection - why will it not also represent them as in a mirror to the Holy Spirit, so that he too may be said to contemplate those things in the Word itself? But no theologian will grant this. Therefore it cannot be distinguished in God, as Scotus distinguishes, to understand and to say.

Moreover, there is no reason in Scotus's position why the Word should rather represent creatures to the Father than to the Holy Spirit. For if any reason existed, it would especially be that the Father alone produces the Word; but this reason is of no value, if the very saying by which the Father produces the Word is not formally intellection, but the Father is said to understand in the Word by another act, which is intellection, different from the very saying, as is sufficiently clear.

Finally, if the saying by which the Word proceeds were not formally intellection, the Word would not be called begotten Wisdom; for in that case the Holy Spirit would be called Wisdom in the same way, at least proceeding Wisdom, because he is God proceeding, and God is Wisdom. Therefore let it be that the Son is called begotten Wisdom, because he proceeds by the act of Wisdom and of intellection; in which way Athanasius calls the Son such in the oration against the Gregalians of Sabellius, and St. Augustine in many places, especially in De Trinitate XV, chapters 14 and 6, and elsewhere often; for unless this were true, the Son would not be said to proceed from the memory of the Father, which is contrary to Augustine's doctrine in the same book XV, chapter 7; and to Anselm in the Monologion, chapter 47; add also what the same Augustine says in De Trinitate XV, chapter 10: "They said within themselves, thinking," and: "They said within themselves, This man blasphemes"; about which our Lord answered: "Why do you think evil in your hearts?" (Matt 9; cf. Luke 5). From which it is gathered that the very saying of our mind is to think; thus does Augustine say: "What is it to have said within themselves except by thinking?" and below: "Therefore certain thoughts are speeches of the heart"; and among other things he adds: "For it is necessary, since we speak a word within, that we also know; we speak from that very knowledge which we hold in memory; from which knowledge is born a word - what that knowledge itself is, of which that word is born. No one understands the memory and the knowledge in act

which the philosophers call in first act"; for Augustine does not think that the word is born from knowledge in second act; whence he immediately subjoins: "For the formed thought from that whereby we know is the word which we say in the heart."

I confess that Augustine, De Trinitate XV, chapter 15, by the thinking through which he asserts the Word is produced, does not mean any intellection whatsoever, but that which is with a certain search and inquiry, as we shall say in disputation 142, chapter 3.

Caput III - The true opinion

A far easier and truer opinion is that of Cajetan in this article, which the Bishop of the Canaries followed in the same article with a single disputation in part 3: namely, that God by the act of saying (*dicere*), by which he produces the Word, formally exercises intellection (*intellectio*); and that the act of spirating formally is love or dilection (*dilectio*). In this way it is true that the Father sees in his Word and understands himself and other things; and that the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit love themselves and other things. For since the Father by the very intellection produces and expresses the Word, he is rightly said to understand in it, as in the produced term, he and no other person. But that we may make this matter clearer, and satisfy Scotus's arguments, it must be observed that to understand belongs to the very ratio of saying (*dictio*), and to love to the ratio of spiration (*spiratio*), so that there be some distinction of reason between them. For if they were altogether the same, to whomever it belonged to understand, to that one too it would belong to say; wherefore saying would be common to the three persons - which is absurd - because intellection belongs to them all.

Therefore, in our way of conceiving, to understand and to say differ; likewise to love and to spirate: not as two particular realities, in the way in which we say that the divine attributes differ among themselves, but as the included and the including, the exceeding and the exceeded. And just as in the divine things person differs from essence because it includes that and adds a peculiar mode by which the essence is contracted, so that it be a person, so the divine person is formally God and cannot be understood without the Godhead; thus the production of the Word, or saying, is intellection. Wherefore in God we can rightly distinguish two essential acts and two notional acts, yet in such a way that the essential acts are included in the notional; and therefore they are not four acts altogether diverse. On this account the opinion of those Thomists who say that to understand is something essential, and something notional and proper to the person of the Father, if it be rightly understood, is true: namely, if the essential "to understand" be included in the notional, and not altogether different from it, as we shall unfold. For which reason the Bishop of the Canaries, in the place cited, ought not absolutely to impugn the opinion of these men.

It follows that we say briefly what that peculiar element is which intellection or notional dilection, which is production, has over and above essential intellection. I say, therefore, that this alone is the relation of production (*relatio productionis*). For besides the order which an essential action has to the known or loved object, the notional, which is production, has another respect to

the produced term: for at once it is engaged about the object while producing the term, and it produces the term while understanding the object or loving it, as will be made clearer in the solution of the second argument.

This doctrine is in harmony with St. Thomas in article 5 of this question, when he says that the processions in the divine things are to be taken according to two immanent actions, namely to understand and to will. Some, to whom Scotus's opinion is pleasing, respond that St. Thomas did not of set purpose say that the two processions in the divine things are those two immanent actions, namely to understand and to will; for thus he would prove what we contend: but that the processions in the divine things are to be taken according to those immanent actions, not in any other consideration, except because they presuppose them. But this interpretation seems quite forced. For if the processions did not formally include those immanent actions, but only presupposed them, it would not follow that the number of the processions should be taken according to the number of those immanent actions.

But on the contrary: And rightly is it inferred that there are only two emanations, because emanation itself ought to be an immanent action (*actio immanens*), and there are only two immanent actions. Add that St. Thomas, when from the number of actions he infers the number of emanations, asserts in the body of the article, and in the reply to the third, that one is of the Word, the other of Love; but the emanation of Love cannot be through any other operation than through love; therefore, just as the spiration of the Holy Spirit is through love, so the procession of the Word is through intellection.[53]

It is answered: Some, to whom Scotus's opinion is pleasing, respond that St. Thomas did not of set purpose say that the two processions in the divine things are those two immanent actions, namely to understand and to will; for thus he would prove what we contend: but that the processions in the divine things are to be taken according to those immanent actions, not in any other consideration, except because they presuppose them. But this interpretation seems quite forced. For if the processions did not formally include those immanent actions, but only presupposed them, it would not follow that the number of the emanations should be taken according to the number of those immanent actions.

From these things which were noted in the preceding chapter, those two arguments of Scotus, brought in chapter 2 of the disputation, can easily be dissolved. To the first it must be said that therefore it is not common to the three persons to produce the Word or the Holy Spirit, although it belongs to all to understand and to love: for neither by just any intellection in God is the Word produced, nor by just any love the Holy Spirit; but only by that intellection and that love which at once have the character and respect of production. But this is not in the three persons: rather intellection of this sort is in the Father alone, who alone speaks and begets; and spiration is in the Father and the Son only, who alone spirate. And hence the solution of Durandus's first argument, which we set down in the last chapter of the preceding disputation, remains more fully explained; and we shall also make it clearer by the following solution.

53. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3; and ad 1 (on processions as of the Word and of Love).

To the later argument it is answered that although intellection, as it is intellection, is not a production of anything, but only is conversant about the object by way of an action which they call grammatical - that is, which regards not what is reproduced, but what is known or loved - nevertheless some intellection is so conversant about objects, whether known or loved, as also to produce - not indeed all the things known or loved, but - some term, which it simultaneously regards both as produced and as object; that is, which it so produces that by the same act essentially it either understands or loves. Of this sort are the notional acts in God. For the essential immanent actions in God are only by way of grammatical action, which is conversant about the thing understood or loved; and when the essential acts of intellection or of love are completed, nothing is produced in God. But the notional divine acts have this peculiarity, that at once they both produce the term and, in producing, they understand or love it - something which belongs to no created intellection or love. For in the human intellect and will the case stands far otherwise: although indeed our intellect by its own power produces something within itself, namely the expressed species (*species expressa*) of the thing understood, which we commonly call the word, nevertheless that production itself, or the coming-to-be of the expressed species, is not intellection, nor would I call it diction; rather, in us, to understand is formally nothing else than that the intellect be informed by the expressed species itself, which is the actual and living representation of the thing; and in this way the intellect also is said to be carried to the represented thing by way of an action which they call grammatical. Likewise the expressed species is the diction itself: for to understand and to speak, or to enunciate by the intellect, seems to be the same. It can also be called a word, not because it itself is said by the intellect, but because by it we say the thing which we understand: for the word of the voice also is that by which the thing signified is said; except that sometimes "word" is used for the thing said, sometimes for the diction itself; of which we shall treat more fully in disputation 141, chapter 4.

Wherefore a full likeness cannot be drawn from our intellect so as to understand the production of the eternal Word: for this has that peculiarity, that it is at once the production of the Word and the intellection of that which it produces; whereas our intellection is the very word by which formally we understand and say the thing; but the word itself is in no way understood, unless some cognition be reflected back upon it. We are compelled, therefore, to philosophize in a different way about the Word of God and about our own. For since the Father understands in His Word all the things which He knows by notional intellection, the notional intellection cannot be the Word itself; otherwise already the Father would be wise by a generated wisdom as by a form, which is false, as we shall show in disputation 151, chapter 6. Although each is wise in himself and intelligent even in notional intellection, we posit in the Father an active notional intellection, and we call this active generation. But because the quality of being wise in us inheres, and our word inheres in us, therefore we say that the expressed word by the power of our intellect is the very cognition by which we are wise, without any absurdity. How that quality is intellection we have said in part in disputation 38, chapter 2; but about this again in disputation 141, chapter 3. Wherefore we judge it worthwhile here to do nothing about the production of our word - about which the Canarian treats at length - and to forbear that disputation for now: both because the production of the divine Word

is not altogether similar to this, and also because, although we should grant that a word is produced in us, it would not therefore be proved that it is also produced in God, although we grant to God true intellection; for unless faith taught the contrary, one could - just as before the mystery of the Trinity was revealed - grant intellection in God, but that it is His very essence (*essentia*) itself, not, however, the production of any word.

Disputatio CXIII - Which procession in the divine things is generation

Definition of generation, chapter 1.

The divine Word is truly begotten and Son; but the Holy Spirit not so: the Catholic faith teaches this, chapter 2.

Why the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation: the Fathers vary, chapter 3.

The reasons of St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Scotus, and Aegidius on the same matter, chapter 4.

The reason of Cajetan, the Ferraran, and other Thomists, chapter 5.

The foregoing reason is refuted, chapter 6.

The true reason why the procession of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 7.

The arguments against this latter reason are dissolved, chapter 8.

Caput I - The definition of generation

Among the divine processions which we have thus far assigned, that we may determine which is generation, first the true definition of generation must be explained. We premise that "generation" can be taken in two ways: one way generally, the other specifically. Generally it is any substantial change of matter from one form into another, which belongs as much to living things as to inanimate things; specifically, however, it is that which is found only in living things: this is what is wont to be defined properly. The origin of a living thing from a living thing from a conjoined principle, in a likeness of nature. This definition is given by St. Thomas in article 2 of this question and in Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 11;[54] but let us explain the individual parts.

The first is "from a living thing," whereby it is distinguished from generation in general, which is found in non-living things in the universe. The second is "from a conjoined principle," that is, from some separated part of the nature or substance by which generation is made, as by seed. The third is "in a likeness of nature"; this part is variously explained by the doctors. Some understand that the begotten ought to proceed into the same nature at least specifically, so as to be truly begotten and be called son. Others understand by likeness the image, as we shall explain below in chapter 7.

54. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 2; Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11.

From this definition St. Thomas gathers that hairs and nails are not generated, nor are they sons: because, although they proceed from living beings and from a living being, yet they do not proceed into a likeness of nature. But more truly, both nails and hairs do not live. If, however, they did live, then indeed for another reason they would be called "begotten," yet not "sons," because namely they would be parts of the same living being: and therefore they would not proceed as a living being from a living being from a conjoined principle, that is, from separated seed; but would be produced by a certain extension of its substance and nature. Nor indeed would they be dissimilar in substantial nature, since they would live by the same animal form, although they would differ in the organs and instruments of life, seeing that they would not feel, as bones do not feel. For it can happen that the same rational soul imparts to some part a substantial grade of living, sentient, and rational nature; yet it does not impart the operations of sensing and understanding, that is, it does not impart the instruments for sensing and for arousing the intellect, as we see in bones. Nor indeed can one say that bones live by a different soul than the rational, since they are integral parts of the human being, and in a human being there is but one soul and substantial form. Nor, moreover, can the rational soul impart a substantial grade of living (which is generic) without also imparting the animal and sentient grades, which are inferior, and imparting the human or rational grade, which is in the highest species: because, since form is individual, it imparts the whole substantial grade to the matter of the individual, and the particular grades from the supreme genus down to the lowest species.

Then from that same definition it follows that Eve was not begotten of Adam, nor his daughter - not because in that manner above nature she was produced: for this would not be enough, if otherwise the parts of the definition were found in her; but because she was not produced from a conjoined principle, that is, from separated seed by the power of the living subject itself; but rather from the rib, by God Himself, as it were from matter, into which by His infinite power, without any disposition of another living subject, He infused the soul.

It seems that the aforesaid definition has been compiled by our theologians from various places in Aristotle. For although in Physics V, text 7 he more broadly defines generation, insofar as it is a change from non-subject into subject, nevertheless in Ethics VIII, chapter 12 he says that what is begotten is conjoined to the begetter; whence they gather that part of the definition, "from a conjoined principle"; and in Metaphysics VII, chapter 8, and De generatione animalium I and II, and De anima IV he teaches that the generator is like to the begotten, and conversely. From these places St. Thomas collects the aforesaid definition in Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 11.[55] But whatever may be Aristotle's mind in those places, the definition is deservedly approved by our theologians; for this reason Cajetan and the Canarian, and others his disciples, receive it with St. Thomas in II, article ... and Gabriel in I, dist. 13, q. 1, a. 1, although he delivers it in other words.[56]

55. Aristotle, Physica V, text 7; Ethica Nicomachea VIII, c. 12; Metaphysica VII, c. 8; De generatione animalium I - II; De anima II (IV in some reckonings).

56. Cajetan on Summa theologiae I, q. 27; the Canarian (Francisco Suárez) and his disciples on the same place; Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.

Yet against the aforesaid definition there is an argument of this sort. A horse begets a mule and is the father of it, and yet they are not similar in the same nature; therefore that definition is not good.

The Canarian replies that for our present purpose it is enough if it rightly proves that the Son is begotten, because He proceeds living from a living being in a likeness of nature; for whatever proceeds in this way is a son, although not every son proceeds in this way. But this solution, which he applies to that argument later, is less sufficient. For since here we are investigating the true definition of generation, we ought to assign it in such a way that it belong to every, and only to the, thing defined; otherwise, how would we say that the Word of God is the Son of Him of whom He is a living being from a living being, etc., if that is not a true definition of "son"?

A better reply is given by the same Canarian in an earlier place, namely, that the definition must be understood of generation which is not from accident and beyond nature, or monstrous, but of natural generation which frequently occurs. He gathers this answer from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, chapter 8, text 28, where he says: "Now in certain cases it is manifest that if the father is like to the son, they are not one and the same in number, but one in form, as is the case in natural things; for a man begets a man, unless something happen contrary to nature, as a mare begetting a mule." Others gather the aforesaid solution of the argument, and the meaning of the definition, from De anima II, chapter 4, where he teaches that it is natural to living things to generate a thing like themselves, when the animal is perfect, and is not mutilated in its members, or spontaneously without seed is not born. Therefore, since mule-generation is for the most part beyond nature and monstrous, it is no wonder if it does not agree with the definition of generation.

But Aristotle's mind in those places is not to expound the nature and the definition of generation, but to explain what belongs to animals when they generate, namely, to beget a like to themselves, unless some defect intervenes; whether, however, to those things which are produced thus the ratio of generation and of sonship belongs, he does not define. Therefore we will say to the argument either that that part, "in the likeness of nature," belongs only to perfect and natural generations, not to monstrous ones: and from this let us gather which in God is true generation, and which person is truly Son, since nothing in God can be beyond nature and imperfect or monstrous; or if that be not positable, then that part does not signify the unity of nature even specifically, but the image of the Father's nature: the mule, however, and any animal begotten, even if it proceeds of a different nature, bears some image of the generator, as will be explained in chapter 7; and the greater the expression of the image, the more perfect will be the son and the generation. Wherefore the mule much departs from the nature of sonship, because it expresses the father's nature less perfectly; yet it does express it in some way, and thus it is in some manner his image and a son, even if it be of a different specific nature.

Durandus, however, in the first, distinction 4, question 1, number 8, thus defines generation: "The begotten" (he says) "is that which receives existence (*esse*) and nature from another in the mode of nature"; and he says that the mode of nature is when the one is from one and not from two; which he explains more at length in distinction 6, question 2; and we shall examine this below in chapter 4.[57]

Another definition, which John Major composed in the First Book, distinction 13, question 1, after the middle, it has seemed good to subjoin here: "Generation" (he says) "is a production not from nothing, by a living knowing being, from another of the same nature in number or in species; whether the thing have existence after non-existence, or always have existence - namely thus, that the produced thing, when there is generation, can act in the production, as the generating thing does." A prolix definition; yet he does explain some things which, although not expressed in the prior definition, are easily understood: such as this, "whether the begotten have existence after non-existence, or always have existence." For when the prior definition says, "It is the origin of a living thing from a living thing," it speaks universally, whether the origin be eternal or be in time; so too in this definition it is said, so as to exclude creation, "a production not from nothing"; and the clause "by a living knowing being" marks what is proper in perfect generation, without denying that in imperfect cases the generator may be non-rational. In this way both definitions, each in its own manner, intend the same notion of generation.

It is said, "Of the same nature in number or in species"; this is added on account of the divine generation, which is in the same nature in number. But this too was rightly understood in the former definition, in that part, "In the likeness of nature," as if it were said, "in the same nature, whether in number or in species."

Then Major adds in his definition two other things which do not seem to be contained in the former. One is that generation ought to be not only "of a living [being] from a living [being]," but also "of an animal and knowing [agent]." On this account among other living things, as in plants, there is not a generation of a son; for one tree is not said to be the daughter of another, even if it has been produced from its seed in the same nature. And although in common speech there are called "sons" of a tree, or of a shrub, or even of an herb, the sprouts or small branches which come forth from the same stock, nevertheless properly speaking they are not sons, whether we follow this, or the earlier, definition. For a son as supposit must differ from the father; but those small branches are joined to the same stock.

The other [point] which Major adds in his definition is that a son can be generated by equivocal or by univocal production; that is, in the same nature according to species, or in another: and that [a son], if he is able, likewise can also beget and produce another. By this part he wishes to exclude the Holy Spirit from the notion of a son, because he is so produced that, by personal property, it does not befit him to produce another. Now this part of the definition is taken from Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate VI, chs. 16 - 17, about which we shall also speak below.[58]

57. Durandus, In I Sent. d. 4, q. 1, n. 8; d. 6, q. 2. John Major (Ioannes Maior), In I Sent. d. 13, q. 1.
58. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate VI, chs. 16 - 17.

Objicitur: Yet Major objects to himself by this reasoning: A horse cannot produce another [animal] in the way the mule was produced from a horse, therefore [the mule] is not the son of the horse.

Respondetur: He himself answers that it is enough, in order that there be a son, if according to the propriety of its nature it befits [the animal] to beget, as indeed it befits; although by some accident it does not befit, as sometimes happens among men. Moreover, by experiment it is established that mules have sometimes been fertile for generating: indeed Theophrastus affirms that in Asia they often generate.

Caput II - That the divine Word is truly begotten and Son, but the Holy Spirit is not begotten

No Catholic doubts that the divine Word, the second person of the Trinity, is truly begotten and a son, and that his procession, since it is in the same nature in number, is generation: for this is gathered from certain testimonies of Scripture. In Isaiah 53 it is said, "His generation who shall declare?" - a place which we treated more fully elsewhere.[59] Some also prove it from that Psalm 2, "This day have I begotten thee"; but we showed above that that place is not understood of the eternal generation of the Son, but of Christ's resurrection.[60] It is proved, however, from that Psalm 109: "From the womb before the daystar I begot thee," where there is no doubt that the discourse is about the Messiah: since both Paul to the Hebrews 5 understands that saying of the same Psalm concerning Christ, "Thou art a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek"; and in Matthew 22 Christ adduces that saying of the same Psalm, "The Lord said to my Lord," to prove that in such wise the Messiah is the son of David, that he is also David's God and Lord. Therefore by those words there is not only expressed the generation of the Son, but how properly it is generation is shown, when it is said, "From the womb," which Theologians in the definition of generation call "from a conjoined principle." Moreover in John 1 it is said, "We have seen his glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father": for the particle "as" is not diminishing, nor a mere note of likeness; but the Hebrew phrase signifies the very truth: and so in the same chapter again "Only-begotten" is said without that particle, "The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father," etc. There also that very propriety of generation - namely, to be "from a conjoined principle" - is properly denoted, when it is said that the Son is "in the bosom of the Father." I pass over other places of the Old Testament, in which "wisdom begotten" is said; and what has been alleged thus far is sufficient for us.

But although the Son of God is truly said to be begotten, some nevertheless hold that he cannot be called a geniture (genitura): because St. Basil, in book 2 against Eunomius, in some measure censures him because he called the Son a geniture. I, for my part, do not doubt that the Son cannot be called a "geniture," since geniture does not signify the thing begotten, but the very act of bringing forth and the origin; whereas the Son is not an origin, but is born from the origin which is

59. Vazquez, Disputation 18, ch. 7.
60. Vazquez, Disputation (same), ch. 3.

the Father. Yet from that testimony of Basil nothing is proved. For he, writing in the Greek tongue, was disputing not about the Latin name "genitura," but about the Greek name γεννημα; and he proved that the Word of God ought to be called either by the Greek name υιός, that is, son, or τέκνον, that is, one born; not however by that Greek name γεννημα, which in Latin is rendered fetus, shoot, fruit, progeny. Basil impugns Eunomius, first, because nowhere does Scripture use such a word; secondly, because no mother or father is wont so to call his son, but by one of the other two [terms]; thirdly, because it is a generic name, and is said as much of a fetus not yet formed and of an aborted [offspring], and of any shoot, even non-sentient, as of a son naturally born; in which sense wine is called "the offspring (genimen) of the vine" (Mark 14), where the same Greek name stands. Of animals, however, it is rarely said, unless of those which are reprobate and are taken into the image of depravity, as in Matthew 3 and Luke 3 the Jews are called by John the Baptist "broods (genimina) of vipers," where the aforesaid Greek name is put; wherefore the interpreter of Basil did not rightly render [it] by "geniture."

Nevertheless Gregory Nazianzen, a man of great authority, in Oration 2 on the Son, which is the fourth On Theology and now in the order the 36th, not far from the end, with the Greek name γεννημα calls the Son of the eternal Father; where in the Latin he says, "Let all the house of Israel know that this [man] whom the Lord has made both Lord and Christ." For here "made" is said of the work indeed of him "who is begotten," and of the good will of the begetter. For those words "of him who is begotten" in Greek is γεννημαζος. He also uses the same name in Oration 35 after number 10, where it is said, "and of these the other [is] offspring (soboles)"; but, as Athanasius says, Oration 3 against the Arians, after four leaves, the Arians maliciously confounded these two, γεννημα and ποιημα, that is, begetting and making.[61]

But the same truth has been defined by the Church in all the Councils in which the substantial equality of the Son with the Father is determined; and thus in the Nicene Symbol the Son is said "begotten, not made," and similarly in the Athanasian [Symbol].[62]

The same is clearly gathered from the aforesaid definitions of generation, as we shall show by running through the several parts. For the Son truly proceeds from the Father, a living [being], and knowing, from a living and knowing [one], as is plain; and from a conjoined principle, because he receives the same nature in number from the Father; whereby he surpasses in a wondrous way the other generations of animals, which are effected by some part of the substance - namely, by a seed - cut off and divided from the generator. For the eternal Father so produces the Son and unites him to himself, that he communicates to him his own essence and individual nature. And in this sense they explain that [saying] of Psalm 109, "From the womb before the daystar I begot thee"; St. Augustine there, and Fulgentius to the ninth objection of the Arians. Likewise St. Augustine understands in the same place that of John 1, "The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father."[63]

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61. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 36 (old numbering: Oration 2 On the Son; the fourth On Theology), and Oration 35; St. Athanasius, Oration 3 against the Arians.

62. Symbolum Nicaenum (Nicene Creed); Symbolum Athanasianum (Athanasian Creed).

63. St. Augustine, on Psalm 109; Fulgentius, against the Arians, objection 9; cf. John 1:18.

Likewise that part [of the definition], "in the likeness of nature," befits [the Son], either because he is of the same nature with the Father, or because he is his image - this part indeed remains for us still to be explained, since this disputation will chiefly be about that; yet this is certain to all, that this part, in whatever way it be explained, rightly agrees with the Son.

Note, however, that the name of son and of generation is transferred to God in such a way that it is not metaphorically, as are anger and bodily members; but it is attributed properly, with those imperfections only removed which do not seem essentially to pertain to the formal notion of generation and of son, as that the son should depend on the father as on a higher cause, and that he should receive only a part of his substance, and other things of this sort. But that certain Fathers of the Church say that the name of generation, like many other [names], does not befit God properly, but in a certain likeness: this we have sufficiently explained above.[64]

- Of the Holy Spirit in like manner it is certain that he is not begotten: wherefore his procession is not called generation, but by the common name "procession," and by the proper [name] "spiration." Thus it is expressly defined in the Athanasian Symbol, received by the Church: "The Holy Spirit [is] from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding." And in the Apostles' Symbol, when it is said, "And [I believe] in Jesus Christ, his (namely, the Father's) only Son." And in the Nicene [Symbol] the Son of God is called "Only-begotten," in which way he is so called in Scripture: John 1, "glory as of the Only-begotten," and again, "the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father"; and John 4, "that he might give his Only-begotten Son." For if the procession of the Holy Spirit were generation, and he himself begotten, without doubt the Son of God would not be Only-begotten.[65]

Objicitur: You will object to us Solomon, who in Proverbs 4 says that he is "only-begotten" to his mother: although he had other brothers; and that they were from the same father David is excellently proved by Jansenius on the place cited of Proverbs 4; for in 1 Paralipomenon 3 it is said, "Moreover in Jerusalem were born to him" (namely, to David) "four of Bathsheba," who are said to be David's sons in 2 Kings 5; and thus Lyranus errs when in that chapter of Proverbs 4 he says that these three were Solomon's brothers from the father Uriah.

Solvitur: I answer that Solomon is not said to be his mother's "only-begotten" absolutely, but "before his mother (coram matre sua)"; because by her he was loved as Only-begotten; which the Seventy, attending to this, translated, "beloved before his mother's face." Since therefore in this sense the eternal Son of God cannot be called Only-begotten because he is singly loved by the Father - since the Holy Spirit is loved equally - it follows that "Only-begotten" is used in Scripture of the Son by reason of generation, because he is truly the only one brought forth by his Father by generation; therefore the Holy Spirit is not begotten. The same truth is defined in the Council of Toledo I, which was confirmed by Leo I, in the confession of faith; and in the Council of Toledo II.[66]

64. Vazquez, Disputation 22, ch. 4.
65. Symbolum Apostolorum (Apostles' Creed); Symbolum Nicaenum; John 1:14, 18; John 3:16.
66. Council of Toledo I (confirmed by Pope Leo I) and Council of Toledo II.

But although this is thus confessed by all Catholics, great controversy among them is engaged in the rendering of the reason for this doctrine. The reason for the doubt is this: since the Holy Spirit proceeds as a living [being] from a living principle conjoined [to him], and finally into the likeness of nature with the Father and the Son, because he has the same nature with them, it will come about that his procession seems to be generation, just as is the Son's production. We shall therefore refer the diverse views of the Fathers and of the Scholastics, and finally we shall submit what seems to us more probable.

Caput III - Why the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation; the Fathers vary

The Arians, Macedonians, and Eunomians (who strove to obscure the equality and divinity of the Holy Spirit), as Athanasius writes, in the Epistle on the Holy Spirit to Serapion, use this argument against Catholics and against us: Either the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and so he will be the Son of the Father and the brother of the Son; or he proceeds from the Son alone, and so he will be the Son of the Son and the grandson of the Father; or from both, and then each will be his parent; and since both cannot be Father, the one will be mother, the other Father. They deduced this reasoning from here: because, since the Holy Spirit proceeds in the same nature, he no less ought to be begotten than the Son; but the Son is begotten. Therefore some absurdity follows from these things, as I have said, unless some reason be adduced to mark some difference between the true processions. Abelard reports the same suggestion; and, as Bernard says in Epistle 190, Abelard said that the Holy Spirit is not "of the substance" of the Father, lest he be his Son; and yet he said [the Spirit] is consubstantial with the Father. But these two are not consistent, as Bernard noted, unless he say that the Father and the Son proceed from the substance of the Spirit - which no one has said up to now. Wherefore Bernard says that it is necessary that he either say that the Holy Spirit is of the substance of the Father and the Son; or, with Arius, confess that he proceeds from the Father and the Son, but is not consubstantial with them. For if he is produced by them, and is of the same substance, assuredly he will be of their substance.[67]

Nevertheless, not a few grave Fathers of the Church did not dare to give any reason for this mystery - why the Holy Spirit does not proceed as Only-begotten, as the Word proceeds. Nazianzen, Oration 5 On Theology (which is in the beginning), thus says: "Do you ask, then, what this procession is? Explain to me the generation of the Only-begotten of the Father, and in turn I, as the interpreter of his nature, will expound it to you; and I will open to you the procession of the Spirit - so that we both may be raving as we pry into God's secrets." Damascene likewise confesses his ignorance in this matter, when in book 1 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 10, he says in sum that we agree that generation and procession differ in ratio from each other; but as to the difference itself by what modes, we are not permitted to explain it.[68]

The Arians, Macedonians, and Eunomians, who taught against the equality and divinity of the Holy Spirit, as St. Athanasius writes in the Epistles on the Holy Spirit to Serapion, used this argument against the Catholics: Either the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and thus He

67. St. Athanasius, Epistulae ad Serapionem de Spiritu Sancto; Peter Abelard, as cited by St. Bernard, Epistle 190.

will be the Son of the Father and the brother of the Son, the grandson of the Father; or He proceeds from the Son alone, and then each will be His parent; and since both cannot be Father, one will be mother, the other Father. They drew this reason from here: since the Holy Spirit proceeds in the same nature, He ought no less to be begotten than the Son; but if He is begotten, some absurdity follows from what we said; or else some account must be assigned of a difference between the two processions. By the same line of reasoning Abelard, as is reported by St. Bernard in Epistle 190, said that the Holy Spirit is not of the substance (*substantia*) of the Father, lest He be the Son of that Father, and thus He would be less than the Father - assertions which do not cohere, as St. Bernard noted. Therefore he said either that the Father and the Son are not of one substance, or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them not substantially; which no Catholic admitted.[69]

The same truth is defined in the Council of Toledo I, which was confirmed by Pope Leo I, in a confession of faith, and in the Council of Toledo II.[70] Likewise, since the Son is called Only-begotten (*unigenitus*): some, taking this into account, rendered "beloved" in place of "only-begotten"; but since in that sense the eternal Son of God could not be called Only-begotten because He is loved uniquely by the Father - seeing that the Holy Spirit also is loved equally - it follows that in Scripture He is called Only-begotten not because He alone is loved, but because He alone is truly produced for His Father by generation: therefore the Holy Spirit is not begotten. The same point is also expressed in the creeds and Scriptures.[71]

Yet although this is confessed by all Catholics, nevertheless a great controversy is carried on among them in giving a reason for this doctrine. The doubt has its ground because the Holy Spirit proceeds as living from a living principle conjoined, and finally in likeness of nature (*natura*) with the Father and the Son, since He has the same nature with them: it therefore seems that His procession should be generation (*generatio*), just as the Son's production is generation. We shall then report the diverse opinions of the Fathers and Scholastics, and at last we shall submit what seems to us more probable.

But first, some Fathers were not willing to give a reason for this mystery, why the Holy Spirit is not Only-begotten (*unigenitus*), if He proceeds in the same nature as the Son; and they restrained curiosity. St. Gregory Nazianzen says: "If you ask me what this procession (*processio*) is from the principle, I do not know; the generation, however, I honor by silence."[72] St. John Damascene likewise says: "We have found out that generation and procession differ from each other; but what the mode of this difference is entirely escapes us."[72] St. Augustine says the same. And among the Scholastics, the Master in I Sentences, distinction 13, question unica; Major in I, question 16, article 2; being pressed by the difficulty, affirm that no sufficient reason of this difference can be

68. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 (new numbering; old: Oration 5 On Theology); St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.

69. St. Athanasius, Epistulae ad Serapionem de Spiritu Sancto; Peter Abelard, as cited by St. Bernard, Epistle 190.

70. Council of Toledo I (confirmed by Pope Leo I) and Council of Toledo II.

71. Apostles' Creed; Nicene Creed; John 1:14, 18; John 3:16.

72. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 (new), and Orationes 35 - 36; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.

72. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 (new), and Orationes 35 - 36; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.

assigned, and they think the present remedy is to respond to heretics not so much by reason as by the perpetual tradition of the Church and the testimonies of Scripture - which indeed would be enough for Catholics.

But in very truth, since we ought to be prepared to give a reason for the faith that is in us, if in any way that can be done so that the mouths of heretics may be stopped, some of the ancient Fathers also attempted to present some reasons for this difference. Therefore St. Athanasius, in the place cited, first premised that this mystery is not to be curiously scrutinized - since the Cherubim, oppressed by its majesty, veiled their faces - and after he gathered from Scripture that the Son of God is Only-begotten and unique, he subjoins: "But still, lest our silence give the shameless (namely, the heretics) a pretext, let them in turn hear from us." He therefore immediately gives this reason, responding to the Macedonians' objection which we adduced above.

Among men, he who is called son is the father of another; and he who is father is the son of another; and every son has within himself a part of the father, so that he too may be able to beget and to be the father of another. But in God it does not so happen: for God does not have a divided nature, and the Father is not divided, nor does He beget a divided son, such that He could again beget another son. Therefore, because in the divine the Son is not a part of the Father, He Himself does not beget as He is begotten, but He is whole, the splendor and image (*imago*) of the whole Father. Hence he concludes that in the divine the Father is properly Father, and the Son properly Son: so that the Father is always Father - that is, He is never Son - and the Son is always Son and never Father.

Yet this reason is not effective. For if the eternal Son, receiving from the Father not a part of the nature and substance, but the entire and whole, in turn communicates it whole to the Holy Spirit whom He produces as like to Himself, there seems to be nothing to hinder His being said to beget. For if in human affairs a son, receiving a part of nature, who also communicates a part to another and makes him like to himself in species, is said to beget, why will not the Son of God, communicating His whole nature to the Holy Spirit, also be said to beget Him; just as the Father, because He communicates His whole substance to the Son, is said to beget Him - so that in the divine the Son might not be always Son, but might have the notion of Son and of Father? Surely the reason of Athanasius does not seem to impede this; but another is still to be desired.[73][74]

St. Augustine in De Trinitate V, ch. 14, says that there is, as it were, a contrary ratio of the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: so that the latter is not begotten as the former; for the Word proceeds from the Father as born; but the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as given.[75] But with this reason the intellect does not rest. For when we inquire why the Son is

73. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 (old numbering: Oration 5 On Theology); St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.

74. St. Augustine, on Psalm 109; Fulgentius, against the Arians, objection 9; cf. John 1:18.

75. Vazquez, Disputation 22, ch. 4; St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 53; Peter of Ailly, In I Sentences; Scotus, In I Sentences, dist. 13, q. 1.

generated in the divine, not the Holy Spirit, we also inquire why the Son proceeds as born, not however the Holy Spirit; for to proceed as born and as son is altogether the same: we therefore still desire a reason of this.

Next, in De Trinitate IX, ch. 12, he thinks there is another cause of this difference: namely, that the Son proceeds by the intellect (*intellectus*), the Holy Spirit by the will (*voluntas*); wherefore the Son is a word (*verbum*), and a certain concept, or offspring (partus), but the Holy Spirit not so: because that which is produced through the intellect is preceded by a certain inquiry along with a desire of finding, and therefore the knowledge produced through the intellect is called an offspring or child (proles), since before its production the intellect, as it were, was in labor; which does not befit love, which proceeds from the will without inquiry, since it is occupied with a thing already possessed. But this reason is weak. For in God the intellect is directed toward the thing understood no less without inquiry and without the labor, as it were, of parturition, than the will toward the thing loved. Then also, even if in us the word of the mind would for that reason be said to be, as it were, a certain offspring, it is nevertheless so called metaphorically; for in reality there is neither offspring, nor son, nor child. If, therefore, by the same reason "begotten" and "child" were ascribed to the divine Word only metaphorically and by a certain appropriation, that would be absurd. It remains, then, that we render a reason why the production of the Word is not only said, but truly also is, generation, and the Word itself is truly begotten and Son.[75]

Finally, the same Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 26, answers the difficulty in another way: he says, therefore, that because in God the Word proceeds from one, He is begotten and Son; but because the Spirit proceeds from two, He is therefore neither begotten nor son: for one who proceeds from two - as a son and begotten - proceeds from one as from a father, from the other as from a mother, which cannot be the case in the divine. This reason was also followed by Anselm in the Monologion, ch. 53, and Peter of Ailly in the first book.[75] But it has little weight. First, although among humans whatever proceeds as son proceeds from two - one as father, another as mother - this nevertheless does not seem necessary universally, even in God. For in the divine the second person proceeds as son and begotten from one only, which is singular and without example; why then could not the Holy Spirit proceed from two, just as son and begotten, even if not from one as from a mother and from another as from a father? Then also, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from two supposits, He is nevertheless produced by them as by one principle; and therefore it is not necessary that one be mother and the other father, which are two principles. Moreover, as Scotus noted in I Sentences, distinction 13, question 1, plurality or unity of principle does not vary the nature (*natura*) of the action, which indeed I would judge to be true - whether the action be generation or not - for otherwise plurality of supposits would matter very much, so that the Holy Spirit would proceed with a property of such a kind: we shall argue below against that same Scotus in Disputation 150.[75]

75. Vazquez, Disputation 22, ch. 4; St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 53; Peter of Ailly, In I Sentences; Scotus, In I Sentences, dist. 13, q. 1.

75. Vazquez, Disputation 22, ch. 4; St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 53; Peter of Ailly, In I Sentences; Scotus, In I Sentences, dist. 13, q. 1.

St. Basil, Against Eunomius, On the Holy Spirit, book 5, ch. 12, says therefore that the Holy Spirit is not to be called son, lest in the Trinity there be a son of the Son, and thus we fall under the suspicion that there are infinite sons or sons in great multitude. But I ask of Basil: either the Holy Spirit is truly son, or not. If He is truly son, what cause can there be for His not being so called, and for saying rather that He is not son? For to profess something by words and to hold the contrary in the heart is duplicity. But if He is not son, a cause must be given on account of which the Word of the Father is said to be begotten and Son rather than the Holy Spirit. For taking away from heretics the suspicion, lest they say there are sons in great multitude in the divine, cannot be a cause on account of which the Holy Spirit truly is not begotten or son; but if any suspicion were to occur to someone because of another mode of speaking, the cause could at most be one of speaking rather than of fact; yet not even in that way could anything obstruct the suspicion so as to hinder the Holy Spirit from being called son, if indeed He truly were such, as has been shown above.[72]

St. Bernard in that Epistle 190 thus replies to Abelard as objecting the aforesaid reason: even if the Holy Spirit is of the substance of the Father, for that reason He is not His son; for not everything that is of someone's substance straightway has, on that account, the one from whom it is as its begetter. He brings in the example of worms produced from the rotting of wood; of moths which proceed from the substance of cloth; of lice and nits which proceed from flesh or from human humor; and yet they are not sons. But to tell the truth, this solution does not fully satisfy, if we press the argument of the heretics thus. Not everything that proceeds from the substance of another is the son of that other; but everything that proceeds living and from a living being from the substance of that other - that is, from a conjoined, producing principle, and not merely as from matter - is the son of the one from whom it proceeds; or let something at least be given which is not son and yet proceeds in this way. But the Holy Spirit proceeds in this way: therefore He is a son. The examples of Bernard do not remove the difficulty: for either that which proceeds is not living; or it does not proceed from a living being; or it does not proceed from a conjoined principle and from the substance of the living being as from a principle.

Lastly, among the Fathers, Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, book 6, chs. 18, 19, 20, and 21, assigns this reason: that it belongs to the notion of son to be the image and figure of the father, which is especially considered in this, that the son receives the nature from the father together with the same power and potency of communicating it; and therefore the Word in the divine, by force of His procession, thus receives the nature from the Father that He can communicate it to the Holy Spirit - He is son and begotten; but the Holy Spirit, because He does not so receive it, is neither son nor begotten, but proceeding. This reason was followed among our Scholastics by Alexander of Hales in I, question 42, member 2, solution 1, and in member 3, article 2, to the third; and Major in I, distinction 13, question 1; and the same Major explained the ultimate definitions cited in the first chapter of this disputation.

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75. Vazquez, Disputation 22, ch. 4; St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 53; Peter of Ailly, In I Sentences; Scotus, In I Sentences, dist. 13, q. 1.

72. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 (new), and Orationes 35 - 36; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.

This reason also does not persuade me, although the Son is image and figure of the Father - indeed in this the true ratio of sonship is considered, as we shall say: nevertheless, the ratio of image does not consist in this, that the son be able to communicate his own nature to another as the father does; but the ratio of image, which constitutes the true ratio of son, can very well be preserved without a fecundity of communicating one's own nature to another: wherefore he is no less a son and image of the Father who is unable to beget another son than he who can beget another son. Add that, if the Holy Spirit were to produce another person, by the same reasoning He would not be son and image, as indeed He is not now. Finally, if in human affairs a son produces another by generation, he produces him by that very generation; but in the divine the Son does not produce another by generation: therefore, in the mode of producing, the Son in the divine is not the image of the Father as He is among humans.

But you will say: at least in the divine the Son has the fecundity of producing another person and of communicating his own nature to him; which seems sufficient, that He Himself be son and the image of the Father. I answer: just as in the divine it is peculiar to the Son not to beget another son - although among humans one begets another - why cannot the Holy Spirit be son even if He were to produce no other, so that this would be peculiar in the divine? Thus far let it suffice to have said about the reasons of the Fathers. Nor let it be a wonder to anyone if none of them persuade us, and if we prefer to them the reasons of the Scholastics; for this matter has now been examined and disputed by the Scholastics far more, and much stronger reasons have been discovered by them, which we shall weigh in the following chapters.

Basil's reason is still efficacious. Basil, in book 5 against Eunomius, on the Holy Spirit, ch. 12, therefore says that the Holy Spirit is not to be called Son, lest in the Trinity there be a son of a son, and so we fall under the suspicion that there are either infinitely many sons in the divine, or at least a great multitude of them. But I would ask Basil: either the Holy Spirit truly is a son, or he is not. If he truly is a son, what cause can there be why he should not be so called, and should rather be said not to be a son? For to profess one thing in words and to think another in the heart is deceitful. If, however, he is not a son, a cause is to be given why the Word rather should be said to be generated and to be the Son of the Father than the Holy Spirit. For to remove from heretics the suspicion, lest they say that in the divine there is a large multitude of sons, cannot be a cause for which the Holy Spirit truly should not be begotten or a son; but, if that suspicion had any weight, it could only be a cause for preferring one manner of speaking over another. Yet not even in this way could anything be opposed to the suspicion so as to prevent the Holy Spirit from being called Son, if in reality he were such, as has been shown above.

Bernard's solution. Bernard, in that Epistle 190, thus answers Abelard when he objects the foregoing reason: even if the Holy Spirit is of the substance of the Father, he is not therefore the Father's son; for not everything (he says) that is of some substance immediately has as its begetter him of whom it is. He gives the example of worms that are produced from rotting wood, of moths that come forth from the substance of cloth, and of lice and nits that proceed from flesh or from human moisture - and yet they are not sons. But, to tell the truth, the solution does not fully satisfy, if we press the heretic's argument in this way: not everything that proceeds from the substance of

another is that other's son; but everything that proceeds living and from a living being from its substance - that is, from a conjoined producing principle, and not merely as from matter - is the son of the one from whom it proceeds; or let there be granted something that is not a son and yet proceeds in this way. But the Holy Spirit proceeds in this way: therefore he is a son. Bernard's examples do not remove the difficulty. For either that which proceeds is not living, or it does not proceed from a living being, or not from a conjoined principle, and from the substance of the living being as from a principle.

Lastly, from the Fathers Richard of St. Victor also brings forward a reason in chs. 18 and 19, namely, that it pertains to the ratio of a son to be the image and figure of the Father; and, in that he principally receives the nature from the Father with the same virtue and power of communicating it - so that he can, as it were, communicate - he is a son. But the Holy Spirit was not thus begotten, rather he proceeds; therefore he does not receive the nature with such fecundity of communicating; therefore he is not a son, nor the image of the Father. This reason does not seem sufficient to me: for a son is not an image on this account - that he be able to generate another son; in this, indeed, we will say lies a ratio not of the son but, rather, of what is required so that he be able to communicate further, as in that fecundity which constitutes the power of generating another; yet the reason which saves the image can be had perfectly well without that power of communicating the nature. Add that, if he were to produce another person by generation, he would be a son and an image of the Father; but if he does not produce another, he is not therefore not an image of the Father. Finally, if in the divine the Son does not have a peculiar power of generating another person - as indeed he does not generate - nonetheless he is a son, and an image of the Father.

Objection against this refutation. But in the divine it is peculiar to the Son that, if he were to generate another son, he would then beget another; why, then, is he not called Son, even if he has not that act, since it is enough that he have the same nature, which pertains to the ratio of sonship and image?

Reply. We say that not all reasons please everyone equally; and it is not a wonder if something is not proved to someone by us, and we prefer these reasons to those: since this matter has been much more examined and disputed by the Scholastics, more efficacious reasons have been discovered by them, which we shall weigh in the following chapters.

Caput IV - The reasons of Bonaventure, Durandus, Scotus, and Aegidius on the same question

Bonaventure in I, dist. 13, q. 2, ad 1; Richard, dist. 13, art. 1, q. 3; and Alexander of Hales, part 1, q. 43, memb. 1 near the end, in order to establish the distinction between the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit - why one rather than the other should be called generation - signify that there is a threefold mode of production: first, according to will; second, beyond nature; third, according to nature. The first mode was in the creation of Adam, who was made by the will of God. The second was in the production of Eve, who was formed beyond nature from the rib of Adam. By the third mode Abel was produced from Adam and Eve. They add, then, that generation is the

begetting of a living thing by a living thing in the order of nature, not of will or beyond nature. Hence they gather that the procession of the Son is generation, because it is by the intellect and therefore according to nature; and that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation, because it is by the will, and therefore is neither according to nature nor in a natural mode.[76]

This reason on one side seems to be followed by Durandus, In I, dist. 6, q. 4, n. 16 and following; and on the other side by a reason of St. Augustine which we set out a little above out of De Trinitate XV, ch. 27.[77] Durandus therefore teaches that, although the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed in the mode of nature if they be referred to the producing virtue - because each proceeds necessarily from a principle determined on one side and immutable - yet if they be compared with the supposits from whom they proceed, the Son indeed is produced in the mode of nature, but the Holy Spirit in the mode of will. Therefore, since it belongs to the ratio of son and begotten to proceed in the mode of nature, not of will, as Bonaventure himself teaches, the procession of the Son is generation, not so the procession of the Holy Spirit.[78]

The mode of producing from nature and will, if the producing supposits be considered, Durandus thus explains: to proceed from one and not from several of the same order and of the same grade and perfection, any one of which would of itself be sufficient to produce the effect - then indeed several come together to the same effect by will alone, mutually modifying their power - this is to proceed in the mode of will. Therefore, since the Son proceeds from one, he proceeds in the mode of nature; but to proceed in the mode of will is to proceed from several of the same order, any one of which would of itself be sufficient; therefore, since the Holy Spirit is produced by the Father and the Son, he proceeds in the mode of will, not of nature.[79]

This ratio, however it be explained, does not seem to be embraced. First, because if the ratio of these Doctors were this, namely that the very mode of proceeding both of the Holy Spirit and of the Son is natural - that is, determined to one, according to the mode of nature - and not voluntary, that is, free and indifferent, then nothing on this score would be lacking to the Holy Spirit why he should not be said to be Son and begotten. Wherefore that mode by which the Holy Spirit proceeds by will is far different than that by which Adam was produced by God, who proceeded from God in such a way that, if God had willed, he could not have produced him. From that mode, then, Bonaventure and the others do not rightly conclude that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation; just as the production of Adam was not generation, because the Holy Spirit proceeds by necessity and the immutability of nature.

Next, against Durandus it is argued thus. That two supposits should come together to produce the Holy Spirit, even preserving a likeness taken from human things, does not prove that the procession of the Holy Spirit is in the mode of will rather than of nature. First, because when two

76. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 13, q. 2, ad 1; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., dist. 13, art. 1, q. 3; Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 1, q. 43, memb. 1, near the end.

77. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 4, n. 16 and following; St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 27.

78. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, art. 1, q. 8, that the procession of the Son is generation, not so the Holy Spirit's.

79. Durandus, loc. cit., on the difference of proceeding from one or from several of the same order and perfection, each sufficient of itself for the whole effect.

created agents, being perfect, come together to produce one and the same effect which either could produce of itself, they thus come together freely, that is, indifferently: they do not meet and operate naturally. Rightly, then, they are said to operate by will. But if their coming together were altogether natural and necessary, the mode of operation, too, would be natural. But to produce the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son come together altogether naturally and necessarily; therefore they operate rather in a natural than in a voluntary and indifferent mode. Then also, in the opinion of Durandus, so that two may be said to produce one and the same effect in the mode of will and not of nature, it is necessary that each of them be such as to be able of itself to produce the whole effect entire; for thus, when the two come together at once, as if by their own will, they temper and modify one another's power. But the Holy Spirit is so produced by the Father and by the Son that he cannot of himself proceed from each as from a proper property and character, as we shall show against Scotus in disputation 151. Therefore the mode of producing the Holy Spirit is not made like to agents by will.

Moreover, if for no other reason the mode by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit is likened to the mode of acting by will, than that there are two producing supposits - since in other respects the mode is truly natural - it follows that the Holy Spirit, by a certain likeness alone, does not seem to be not begotten because he is from two, whereas in reality he is begotten; for he proceeds from two in a natural mode.

Scotus' true solution, if it be proved from supposits. Scotus, however, in I, dist. 13, the sole question, toward the end, easily frees himself from this difficulty. He says, therefore, that these processions differ of themselves, and thus that the production of the Son is of itself formally and by its own nature generation; but that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not of itself generation, but is to be distinguished from it. Scotus is not speaking of the distinction of realities - which others rightly say must be taken from opposition, as will be proved in disputation 149 - but of a quasi-specific distinction, by reason of which one is generation, the other not; and the one proceeding by the one is Son, by the other, not. Aegidius adds likewise, In I, dist. 13, art. 2, that these processions are distinguished formally from the termini produced; which, although it is most true, nevertheless one ought to assign some property in the terminus of the one which is not in the terminus of the other, by which one rather than the other be generation. Just as it is not enough to answer with Scotus that these processions differ of themselves; one must explain what the reason is on account of which the one is of itself generation, the other not.[80]

Caput V - The reasoning of Cajetan, Ferrara, and other Thomists

The disciples of St. Thomas come closer to the true solution of this difficulty; among whom Cajetan - whom many later men follow - proposes this reason why the Word is generated and is Son, but not the Holy Spirit: namely, because the procession of the Word is by the intellect; but that which proceeds by the intellect, by the force of its procession, produces a like to the principle producing; whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds by the will, and that which proceeds by will, by the

80. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 13, the sole question, toward the end; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., dist. 13, art. 2.

force of its procession, does not produce a like to the principle producing. Therefore, since to the definition of generation which was set forth above there must be added this part, By the force of its production, it follows that the production of the Word, not of the Holy Spirit, is generation. Moreover, that this clause must be added to the definition is manifest: for although something proceeds living from a living being in the likeness of nature, nevertheless if it does not have this likeness by the force of its production, but from elsewhere, that will not be said to be generated. But the Holy Spirit, even if he proceeds like in nature, does not have that by the force of his production, but from elsewhere, because the very production of his - which is by will - although it is in such a subject, is not, for that reason, generation. But the production of the Son, not only because it is in such a subject, but because it is by the intellect, produces a like; therefore it is generation. St. Thomas touches upon this reason in this question, art. 4, although expressly he does not add that part, By the force of his procession, nor say that it should be added to the definition of generation.[81]

But that this diversity between the procession by intellect and by will may be explained more fully, Cajetan notes, and shows that that which proceeds in God by love does not proceed like by the force of its procession, in that below, q. 35, art. 2, he notes that love in general can be contracted in two ways so that it be such or such a love: in one way, by intrinsic differences, that is, the specific and formal ones within the genus of love; in the other way, by extraneous differences which are outside the genus of that love. Just as color is contracted in the first way by the difference of white and black; in the latter way, by the difference of natural and artificial, which are taken from the subjects themselves. Therefore love in the former way is contracted by the differences of the love of friendship and of concupiscence; in the latter way, however, it is contracted by the differences of such a subject, or even of an object. Hence to be a divine love, or to be about God as object, he says, comes from some extraneous difference, not from a formal and intrinsic one. From this he gathers the discrimination between the procession of the Word and of the Holy Spirit: for the Word, since he proceeds by the intellect, by the force of his procession within the genus of that thing proceeds like and as the image of the Father; for intellection, within its own genus, has this proper quality, that it produces a like to the producing principle. But love, within the genus of love - even when contracted by its proper differences - never produces a like; if, however, insofar as it is divine, it produces a like in the same nature, namely the Holy Spirit, it has that not from its own proper genus, nor from its own proper intrinsic difference, but from an extraneous difference, namely from the subject; for to be divine is not an intrinsic and proper difference, but an extraneous one. The same doctrine Cajetan explains in q. 35, art. 2, on this proposition: The Holy Spirit by the force of his procession proceeds as divine love. Either the sense is: the Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love - that is, as God - by the force of his procession; and this is false, because he does not proceed as God by the force of the procession within the genus of procession, but only by reason of an extraneous difference which comes from the subject. Or the sense is: the Holy Spirit by the force of his procession proceeds as love - that is, specified by its own proper difference - and this is true. In the same way he interprets that proposition which the holy

81. St. Thomas, in this question, art. 4.

Doctor has in the place cited at the end: that love (in that case proceeding like to the principle producing) common to the genus of love, is not proper to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is divine; but insofar as he is divine he proceeds by an extraneous difference, not a proper and intrinsic one. In the same way Ferrara's doctrine is to be looked at, who likewise teaches that intellection and love can be considered in a twofold manner; either as they are divided and determined by the creature and by the uncreated, which are extraneous to the ratio of intellection and of love; and therefore they are called extraneous differences by Cajetan; or as they are divided by perfections and by very perfections, which per se and properly differentiate operations. Therefore, since we are now speaking of the Word inasmuch as he is an intellection which proceeds, he proceeds like in nature, not insofar as he is an intellection which is divine - because then he is not produced in the same nature - but insofar as he is intellection as such; nor does love, insofar as it is divine, constitute that: for here too the Spirit proceeds in the same nature - not insofar as he is divine, but insofar as he is love; insofar as he is most perfect love, he is not to be considered insofar as he is divine; therefore love as such, and the procession of it, produces like to the principle producing, insofar as it is intellection; for insofar as it is perfect intellection, it produces the most perfect like in the same nature. But the true love, not only insofar as love in general, but even insofar as it is most perfect love in the genus of love, does not produce like to the principle of loving; nor does the most perfect love produce the most perfect like. Therefore only love, insofar as it is divine - that is, in such a subject (which of itself does not pertain to the genus of love) - produces a like; which is not sufficient for the ratio of generation: for this, from its own proper power within its genus, ought to produce a like in nature to the principle producing.[82]

Caput VI - Refutation of the preceding reasoning

The aforesaid reason of Cajetan and Ferrara, although at first sight it seems subtle, yet, when more thoroughly considered, has little weight. At length the Canarian impugns it in the second article of this question and in its commentary; and we too shall confute it with some other arguments.[83]

First, I for my part do not see why that part, By the force of its procession, should be added to the definition of generation, when without it the nature of generation and of the begotten is very well explained. For if something should proceed living from a living being in the likeness of nature - sufficing this, when it is a proceeding from a conjoined principle - it is not fitting to add other things: and thus the Son is generated; our addition of that part, By the force of production, seems only in words to overturn the force of the arguments. For whatever in creatures is produced like to a living being from a living being, from a conjoined principle, cannot but so proceed; not by accident, but by the very force of the production and of generation; and thus it could not be that it

82. Cajetan, In I, q. 35, a. 2 (on the twofold contraction of love by intrinsic and by extraneous differences), and on the proposition that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the force of his procession as divine love; Ferrara (Sylvester Ferrariensis), on the same matter, distinguishing intellection and love as divided by creature and uncreated (extraneous) and by perfection (proper).

83. The Canarian (Canariensis), against the second article of this question and its commentary.

should not truly be generated and be a son. Therefore that part, By the force of production, would be sufficiently excluded from the ratio of the begotten by some other part of the definition: since in creatures the aforesaid definition seems to have been taken, it is to be accommodated to God in the same manner (with the imperfection removed), as we noted in ch. 1; nor must some new part be added, namely that which, because of the sole difference which that definition has in the divine - according to Cajetan's second way of philosophizing and of others - is added, a part which in human things was not necessary.

There is no need to add it; this device seems plainly a contrivance and useless.

But come, let us add that part, "by force of the procession," and let us prove still that the reason assigned is not sufficient, namely that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation, as follows. Either the Son proceeds similar in nature by force of a procession, insofar as it is a procession by the intellect, or insofar as it is by such an intellect. Not insofar as it is by the intellect; for then every procession by the intellect would be generation. Therefore insofar as it is by such an intellect. When, then, that part "by force of the procession" is added, it is not to be understood of procession by the intellect in general, but of that procession by which the Word proceeds, namely of the divine intellect. But if we so speak of the procession of the Holy Spirit, in the same way he proceeds similar in nature by a vital procession, namely by the divine will; therefore the Holy Spirit will be no less begotten than the Son.

Some reply that this is peculiar to the procession of the Word: that, through it, insofar as it is a procession by the intellect in general, it proceeds similar to its principle; but insofar as it is by such an intellect, it proceeds similar in nature. Yet the Holy Spirit has both, namely that he proceeds similar and that he proceeds in the same nature by force of such a procession, and he has neither by force of the procession by the will insofar as will is will. But this is frivolous; for that part, "by force of the procession," is so added to the definition and refers to the whole, as to signify that the whole of that, namely that it is similar in nature, comes to the begotten thing by force of the procession by which it proceeds, and not otherwise. Wherefore, if the whole does not belong to the Son of God save by reason of such generation, it matters little if it belongs to him to proceed similar by force of a procession by the intellect, as though rather the definition of generation should fit him than the Holy Spirit; and it seems sufficient that it belong also to the Holy Spirit, if both belong to him, namely to proceed similar and in nature by force of such a procession. Wherefore omitting this solution, let us come to the doctrine of Cajetan and of Ferrariensis.

We must prove against Cajetan that procession both by the divine will and by the divine intellect, according to its specific and proper and intrinsic ratio within the genus of procession, produces something similar in the same nature; and this is shown thus.

First, love in general, both of friendship and of concupiscence, is most aptly divided into created and uncreated; and those two differ more than two differences under the same genus; they differ analogically, since in nothing do they agree univocally; wherefore created love and uncreated love under these notions are essentially first diverse: nor is "created" something that befalls our love, nor "uncreated" love divine; therefore created love within its own genus, down to the ultimate

species, is always essentially an accident, and for that reason it always, by the force of its own genus and nature, produces an accident and only a likeness of representation, not a likeness in the same nature with the principle. Wherefore by that which is within its own genus it never produces a son nor anything properly begotten. But divine love is in another genus altogether diverse, namely in the genus of the uncreated; for all the things that belong to God and to creatures differ more than by genus; but its nature within its own genus is to be uncreated, not dependent on another, not accidental, but substantial; so that the willing of God by its own proper ratio has existence as substance, and thus it is with the very existence (*esse*) of God, although it is conceived by us as an affection of that substance: therefore, by the force of its own nature and specific difference, it has to produce a similar [thing] in nature, because it is substantial love.

Second, this is the proposition "in the fourth mode of saying per se": "divine love produces God"; therefore this belongs to it by force of its principle, not from the subject in which it is received, as it were by accident; just as it is per se for heat to heat, but to harden is not per se but is accidental, because it comes from the subject. For who would say that it is accidental and not per se that there belongs to divine love by its nature to produce God; but that this comes to it by accident by reason of the subject - especially because divine love does not operate upon the divine nature as upon a subject (as heat upon clay), but it operates upon the divine nature in such wise as to have from it the power of producing the Holy Spirit; either because will by its own nature is the same as the divine nature, or because, although it is conceived by us as an affection of the nature, nevertheless it is understood as secondary to that [nature], as to the primary principle, for producing God in the same nature. Wherefore that which is set forth as the proximate principle, will modified in our mode of conceiving by relation (as we shall say in Disputation 164), is as it were even the substance itself modified the primary and chief [principle], by the power of which a person comes forth in the same numerical nature. Therefore it belongs per se to the Holy Spirit to proceed similar in the same nature, insofar as it is referred to the principle of his production; and hence his procession, as it is from such a principle, has per se to produce a similar [thing], not, therefore, by an extraneous and accidental difference, but within its own genus it has that [property] as proper to it.

Third, although intellection in any intellect produces a likeness of representation of the thing understood and of the principle understanding, nevertheless within the created genus it never produces a likeness in substantial nature; wherefore no intellection in that genus is generation, but that intellection alone which is divine and is in the genus of the uncreated. For this is substance and the existence (*esse*) of the intelligent itself; just as uncreated love is the existence of the loving itself. Therefore either to be divine is an extrinsic difference and not proper to intellection in its own genus, or it is proper and intrinsic. If it is extrinsic, as Cajetan said of love, then that which proceeds in God by force of divine intellection does not proceed as begotten in its proper genus and by its proper difference, but by reason of the subject and by an extraneous difference; therefore either neither person is begotten, or both must be begotten. But if to be divine is the proper and intrinsic difference of intellection, it will also be of love; and thus each person will proceed similar by a vital procession; therefore each will be begotten in the same way. There is added that St.

Thomas in the second article of this question shows that the Word in the divine [persons] proceeds in the same nature, because it proceeds by intellection, and the intellection of God is the existence of God himself; and, in the solution to the second [objection] of the same article, he says that therefore the word in us does not proceed similar to the intelligent in substantial nature, because to understand in us is not substance nor the existence of the intelligent; but in God therefore it proceeds similar to the producer in the same nature, because it is substance and the existence of God himself who understands: by which words he undoubtedly assigned the proper and intrinsic difference of the divine intellection, from which it follows that it produces a similar [thing] to the producing principle in substantial nature; but we can in very truth and in the same way say this of love: namely, that in us by it nothing proceeds similar in substantial nature, because it is an accident; but in God, because it is very substance and the existence of God, not otherwise than intellection, by it there proceeds similar in the same nature: therefore there is altogether the same ratio of the divine intellection and of love.[84]

Others have devised a new evasion, fabricated in words alone while in reality they say nothing different from Cajetan: they therefore assert that there is a difference between uncreated will and uncreated intellect; that will, even insofar as it is uncreated and divine, does not, from its proper genus and as it were proper difference (which they call divine and uncreated), produce a similar [thing] in substance; but insofar as it operates in the divine nature, by reason of which the things produced in it are the same with it, since it can admit nothing extraneous with itself. But the uncreated intellect, insofar as it is uncreated, from its proper difference produces a similar [thing] in substantial nature, because, insofar as it is uncreated, it uses the divine essence itself as intelligible species and principle of understanding; which principle, unless there be in the subject in which it operates an impediment (as there is in the blessed creatures), requires that it produce for itself that which is similar in substantial nature. And on that account in God intellection, insofar as it is such, has this as peculiar from its proper genus, that it produce a similar [thing], not so love, save by reason of the subject.

Behold, these fall again into Cajetan's distinction, already sufficiently refuted by us. For although they grant that "created and uncreated," "divine and human," are differences per se of intellect and of will, yet what is "of itself" in the divine nature they think to be extraneous by reason of which they claim, not by reason of the proper difference of divine love, that the Holy Spirit proceeds similar in the same nature; which in my judgment has already been sufficiently impugned.

But finally let us press them first with this reason: to be love is to be divine, just as to be uncreated is; but we call it "divine" not because it is in the divine nature only as in a subject, but because it is from it as from the principle of loving; for love is not from the naked will, except insofar as will is in the divine nature as its affection in our way of understanding, and it is made fruitful by it for loving and for producing God in the same nature; or insofar as it is in reality the same as the divine essence, the same as that having fecundity with it. Therefore in God love, from

84. St. Thomas, I, q. 27, a. 2, the body and ad 2.

its principle and not only from the subject, will produce that which is similar, just as intellection; wherefore for love to be uncreated is the same as to be divine, that is, [to be] from the divine nature as from the principle making the will fecund: to be therefore in the divine nature in this way is the per se difference of love, just as to be uncreated is; and hence precisely by the proper difference and not by reason of the subject, by love in God God proceeds similar in nature.

I say: the Holy Spirit thus proceeds by the will of the Father and the Son, that he proceeds from the principle of love, as from an understood Word; just as in us the word, or the thing understood, is the principle of love; only that in God the Word is not merely the thing known and as object, but is also truly the beloved and at once the lover by the same producing principle; and hence also as a producing principle it loves the Father, from whom it proceeds by intellection. Insofar as, however, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word in God, he is produced similar by his own proper principle in the same nature; and love, because it is produced from the same principle, has to produce a similar [thing]: just as in us the thing understood, which is a substance, conjoined in such wise as to concur with the producing principle, not only as object, produces the love; by the force of its own existence it sufficiently supplies that the ratio "to proceed similar by force of the procession" in its proper species be fulfilled. And in this way the Doctors commonly teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds by his own proper procession. And let the intelligent consider well how felicitously the authorities are harmonized: that the Holy Spirit, by the very reason of love as divine, proceeds simple in the same nature, from which it is clear that no extraneous reason of principle or of subject is required, but the proper ratio of principle which the divine nature has is sufficient, and is, as is proper, that of will. And thus Cajetan's error is cut off.

Additionally, they object that the proximate principle of procession by the intellect is the essence of God, inasmuch as in the procession by the will it looks toward that [essence] as to its own principle, in which it proceeds; which [claim] shows the same thing that we said above: that that which proceeds similar in nature is produced by the proper principle of the producer; that which proceeds by intellection, because it is produced by the most intimate principle of the producer - namely, the proximate principle producing that which is similar in nature - therefore the proximate principle of intellection differs only by our mode of conceiving from the proximate principle of will: both are the same in God, namely the divine essence, which as species to the intellect, as good to the will, is related, yet both are intrinsically the most proximate principle. Hence their difference - "one is as object," "the other as the very faculty" - does not block that either way what proceeds be not generation; for there is no reason why that which proceeds by love should be any less like in nature than that which proceeds by intellection. Consequently what they say about the "remoteness of the principle" is likewise of no moment: for whether that which proceeds similar be said to proceed by nature from a remote principle that secondarily renders a proximate principle fruitful, or by nature from the proximate principle itself, it matters little for its being called "begotten": for no Scholastic has ever demanded for the ratio of generation any more than this, that what proceeds similar in nature proceed by force of the conjoined principle and not otherwise by accident. Now the conjoined principle is the same in both processions, the intellect and the will.

It is added that the proximate principle of procession by the intellect, which is the divine essence, does not produce a similar [thing] in substantial nature because it is proximate principle "in the mode of object," and because it is the same with the intellect itself; in the second [way], because it is immediate: for in the blessed it is a proximate principle, and yet it does not produce a similar [thing] since it is not the same with the intellect. But it is not enough for the will that in God it be the same with the essence and that by it, as by a second [principle], a similar [thing] be produced in nature, that it be called "generated," as they say of intellection. I say, on the contrary, that according to Ferrariensis one must not in any way make this difference; for either he speaks of intellection in its proper genus, insofar as it is the most perfect, and of love in truth also as most perfect; or else, while he thinks he is presenting perfection in creatures alone by intention, or otherwise, he presents an accidental perfection; but intellect is most perfect, that is, uncreated and subsistent in genus, just as the divine essence is. If he speaks in the former way, then it follows that by the most perfect love a similar [thing] in substantial nature is produced; but then what he says of intellection does not differ from what we say of love, namely that love is substantial and that by it what proceeds is per se and not accidental; and that which proceeds by those operations is not an accident but substantial. But if in the latter way he speaks of intellection as most perfect operation insofar as it is such, that is, most perfect by essence, then here again he plainly embraces Cajetan's view, which we have very often impugned: for thus the Holy Spirit in God, just as the Word, proceeds by cognition, namely insofar as both are divine; that is, uncreated; he proceeds similar in substantial nature, and in the same mode.

On the same

The same doctrine explains Cajetan, in I, q. 35, a. 2, on this proposition: "The Holy Spirit proceeds by the force of his procession as divine love." Either the sense is that "the Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love, that is, as God, by the force of his procession," and this is false; because he does not proceed as God by the force of his procession within the genus of procession, but only by reason of an extraneous difference, which comes from the subject. Or the sense is that "the Holy Spirit by the force of his procession proceeds as divine love," that is, specified by his proper difference, and this is true. In the same way he interprets that proposition which St. Thomas has at the end of this second article of the present question: "How much this - namely to proceed similar to the producing principle - belongs to love, which is the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is divine": that this is true only by reason of an extraneous difference, not proper and intrinsic.

To the same outlook seems to tend the doctrine of Ferrariensis, proposed in the fourth contrary, chapter 11, who says that intellection and love can be considered in a twofold way: either insofar as they are divided and determined by "created" and "uncreated," which are outside the ratio and genus of intellection and love, and therefore are called extraneous differences by Cajetan; or insofar as they are divided by "perfect" and "most perfect," which are per se and proper differences of these operations. Therefore, since the divine Word, by the force of the intellection by which he proceeds, is born similar in nature, not indeed insofar as intellection is intellection, for so it is not produced in the same nature, as is clear, nor only insofar as it is divine (for so also from love,

insofar as it is divine, the Spirit proceeds in the same nature), but from intellection insofar as it is most perfect, without considering whether it be divine: for this reason he is Son, and his procession is generation. For if intellection produces a similar [thing] to the principle insofar as it is intellection, that intellection which is most perfect will produce a most perfect similar [thing]; but a most perfect similar [thing] is in the same nature. On the other hand, love, not only as love universally, but also as most perfect in the genus of love, does not produce a similar [thing] in the same nature; because since love does not produce proper differences, it never produces a similar [thing]. But if insofar as it is divine it produces a similar [thing] in the same nature, namely the Holy Spirit, it has that not from its proper genus nor from a proper intrinsic difference, but from an extraneous difference, namely from the subject; for to be divine is not an intrinsic and proper difference, but an extraneous [one].

The Canarian attacks, among other reasons, these very positions of Cajetan and Ferrariensis; and we too shall refute them with some other reasons. First indeed I for my part do not see why that part, "by the force of the procession," should be added to the definition of generation, when without it the common nature and definition of generation and of the begotten are best explained. For if something proceeds living from a living in similarity of nature, as Eve proceeded from Adam, for this very reason it proceeds by generation; because that part, "from the conjoined principle," does not belong to it: if, however, that also belong, as we have explained in chapter 1, then the whole definition and nature of generation would fit it. Finally, whatever proceeds similar in nature from a living and from a principle conjoined cannot proceed so not by accident, but by the force of production and of generation; and thus it cannot but be generated and be a son. Therefore in vain do they add that part "by the force of the production," only that by words they may seem to elude the force of arguments; since whatever in creatures proceeds similar to a living by accident and from elsewhere than by the force of the procession, can sufficiently be excluded from the notion of the begotten by some other part of the definition: and since it seems that the aforesaid definition is taken from the creatures in the same way (the imperfect things being only excluded) to be accommodated to God, as we noted in chapter 1, no new part ought to be added. Wherefore if, because of the sole difficulty which that aforesaid definition has in divine things following the manner of philosophizing of Cajetan and others, that part be added which in human things was not necessary, truly this evasion seems devised and useless.

Caput VII - The truer reason why the procession of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit

Then, moreover, the Holy Spirit thus proceeds by the will (voluntas) of the Father and the Son, that he proceeds from the Son secondarily: just as from the Word understood; in the way that in us the word, or the thing understood, is the principle of love, except that in God his Word not only concurs as object, nor only as the thing loved (though it does not concur as an end), but also as a producing principle, and he also mutually loves the Father, from whom he proceeded through intellection. And inasmuch as from the Word in God the Holy Spirit proceeds, he is produced like; therefore from his own proper principle he comes forth like in the same nature, and the love that is

produced has from that same principle to produce a like: just as if in us the thing understood, which is a substance, were to concur in such a way, as a producing principle, to produce love, that by its own force a substance were to go forth, without doubt what proceeds by the force of such procession would in its proper species be produced like. Those authors, however, were deceived in that they understood the Holy Spirit to proceed as like in the same nature only by reason of the divine nature as subject, whereas in reality he has not only the notion (ratio) of a subject, but also the notion of a principle of the divine nature, as has been proved. And these things are against Cajetan.

Add also that in the procession (processio) by the intellect (intellectus), as in the procession by the will, equal account must be had of the subject, or the nature, in which that which is produced proceeds: because, since it is in the intellect, that which proceeds is produced like in nature, since it is produced by an immanent operation. By this, however, nothing can proceed within God which is an accident, or a substance of another nature: this, however, does not hinder the procession by the intellect from being generation; therefore neither ought it to hinder that that which proceeds by the will be begotten also in the divinity.

But they still reply that there is this difference between that which proceeds by the intellect and that which is produced by the will: that what proceeds by the intellect proceeds like in nature by the force of a proximate principle; for the proximate principle is the divine essence as object, which, along with the intellect, its subject, finds no impediment and produces a like in nature; but the essence is not thus compared with that which proceeds by the will, but as a remote principle. This difference, however, is of no moment: for whether that which proceeds proceed like by nature by the power of a remote principle seconding also the proximate, or by the native power of the proximate principle, it seems to matter little for saying that that which proceeds be called begotten; nor has any Scholastic hitherto required anything else for the notion of generation than that that which proceeds like proceed like in nature by the force of its conjoined principle and not from elsewhere by accident; whereas the remote principle is a conjoined principle. In addition, the proximate principle of production through the intellect, which is the divine essence, does not produce a like in nature because it is a proximate principle in the mode of an object, but because it is the same in reality with the intellect and seconds it by identity: for in the blessed it is a proximate principle, and yet love does not produce a like, because it is not the same as the intellect. Why then will it not suffice that the will in God be the same as the essence and be seconded by it to produce a like in nature, so that it be said to beget as the intellect is said to do?

Truly, against Ferrarienis we can do no business: for when he says that by intellection in its proper genus, inasmuch as it is most perfect, a like in nature is produced; but by love, even most perfect, not so: either he understands "most perfect" in the genus of the created by intensity alone or by some other mode of accidental perfection; or he understands "most perfect," that is, uncreated and infinite in the genus of being, as is the divine essence. If he speaks in the former way, not only by the most perfect love is a like in substantial nature not produced, but neither by intellection; for no created intellection or love is a substance and the existence (esse) of the one acting, but an accident; and thus everything that proceeds by those operations is also an accident,

not a substance. But if in the latter way he understands a most perfect operation, namely, inasmuch as it is most perfect by essence and uncreated, he clearly falls into the sentence of Cajetan, or can very easily be impugned: because both the Holy Spirit in God and the Word, inasmuch as he proceeds by an operation infinite according to essence, that is, divine and uncreated, proceeds like in substantial nature: therefore either each is generated in the same way, or neither. No evasion indeed remains for Ferrariense, except what Cajetan contrives about proper and extraneous differences, which we have more than sufficiently blocked.

A far easier and truer reason is assigned by Canariensis in the commentary, art. 2 of this question, on account of which the procession of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit. The reason is, namely, because the Word not only by the force of his procession proceeds like in nature, that is, has the same nature with the Father, but also as the image (imago) of the Father: but the Spirit proceeds indeed as like in nature to the Father and the Son, from whom he proceeds, but not as their image. For he thinks that that part of the definition, "into the likeness of nature," is to be understood not of the likeness which comes from the unity of nature, but of the likeness which is an image; for not every likeness is an image of that of which it is the likeness. So understood, that part makes all things stand rightly, nor is it necessary to add those other things which the Thomists, on account of those more subtle than true distinctions of Cajetan and Ferrarienis, thought ought to be added, namely, "by the force of production": but whoever has the definition of generation set forth in cap. 1 will truly be a son and begotten, and will have this by the force of his procession and also of his own peculiar mode of proceeding, not from elsewhere.

In confirmation of this opinion and reason two things must be proved for us. One is, that it belongs to the notion of a son, as he is a son, not only to be produced like in nature, but also as the image of the producer. The second is, that in God the Word alone is the image of him from whom he proceeds: for from this it is best inferred that the procession of the Word alone is generation, and that the Word himself alone is the Son. Of these two, the latter will be shown expressly below in disputation 146; wherefore at present let the former alone be proved. And this is gathered from the Fathers.

First, from Athanasius in the Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, a little before the middle, where he thus speaks of the Son: "If you name him image, you show him thereby to be a son: for what is like to God, if not his own offspring?" They understand, then, that by the name alone of image is expressed the property of the Son. Wherefore, when he says "for what is like to God," etc., he does not speak of a likeness which is founded only in unity of nature or of quality: for thus the Holy Spirit is like, and therefore Athanasius's reasoning would prove nothing; but he speaks of that likeness which is proper to an image, of which we shall speak in that disputation 145. [85]

85. St. Athanasius, Epistola de decretis Nicaenae synodi, a little before the middle.

And Nazianzen in Oration 4 on Theology, which is 35 in order, thus says: "A brief, compendious, and easy declaration of the paternal nature is the Son. For everything that is begotten defines by a certain tacit voice its begetter," and hence a little below he says that it is rightly called Logos; for logos is called definition.[86]

Richard of St. Victor also in De Trinitate, book 6, chapters 19, 20, and 21, asserts that for this reason the Holy Spirit is not a son, because he is not the image of the Father: he therefore thinks that it belongs to the notion of a son to be the image of the Father, although he himself explains the reason of image, which he says is found in the Son, not in the Holy Spirit, in another way than we do: for he says that the Son is the image of the Father, because he receives the nature from him in such a way that he can in turn communicate it to another; we, however, will say that the notion of image is in this, that he truly represents the Father, which in no way suits the Holy Spirit, as we shall show below in disputation 145, cap. 5.[87]

Next Anselm in the Monologion, that cap. 53, seems to have followed the same reason: for he proposes the aforesaid difficulty in these words: "What then, since this love equally has to be from the Father and the Son, and so is similar to both, that it in no way is dissimilar to them, but is altogether the same as they are: will it be their son, and offspring proceeding from them?" He answers, however: "But just as the Word, as soon as it is considered, shows itself most manifestly to be the offspring of that one from whom it proceeds, the present image of the parent: so love openly shows itself to be the offspring of its parents; yet, although it is understood to proceed from the Father and the Son, it does not at once display to the one contemplating it so clear a likeness of that from whom it is, although, when itself is considered, reason teaches that it is altogether the same thing that the Father and the Son are." Nothing clearer could have been said for our opinion.[88]

But it must be noted that, when Anselm says that for this reason the Word offers at once that it is a son and generated offspring, because it is an image, he is speaking not of a created intellect seeing God clearly, as if the Son were the image of the Father to the intellect beholding God as he is; for, as we shall say in disputation 145, the Son is the image of the Father to the Father alone: that is, the Father alone contemplates himself in him as in an image. Anselm is therefore speaking of any intellect of a wayfarer: who by that very fact that he knows the divine Word to be the manifest image of the Father, understands that he is truly Son and begotten: not, however, because he understands that he is of the same nature; for we indeed confess that the Holy Spirit is of the same nature with the Father; but because we understand that he himself is not the likeness of the Father, that is, the image, we say he is not Son. Where Anselm, by the name "likeness," which he denies to the Holy Spirit, does not understand that which results from unity of nature, and by which the three persons are said to be equal and like, but that which is of image and

86. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 4 on Theology (35th in order).
87. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, VI, cc. 19 - 21.
88. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 53.

representation: for it cannot be otherwise. But how the likeness which arises from unity of nature alone differs from image, we shall say in the cited disputation: for the present let it suffice to suppose as known to all, that image is not the same as a likeness founded in unity of nature.

St. Thomas also comes in, who in Contra Gentiles IV first proves that the Son of God is the image of the producer, then that he is in the same nature, and from this concludes that he is Son. He gives moreover the reason in these words: "For it is not thus to be someone's image, that one is of the same nature with him, found in any case where one cannot be called son." And, with some things interposed: "But this is the true ratio of generation in living things: that that which is generated proceeds from the generator as his likeness, and of the same nature with him." Where he does not only say that it belongs to the notion of a son to be produced of the same nature, but also to be produced as a likeness: he clearly understands by likeness an image, not the unity of nature alone; for besides this he also requires a notion of likeness, that there be a son. Nor did he say the opposite in the same book, cap. 19, not far from the end, when he gives the reason why the Holy Spirit does not proceed as begotten: nay, he expressed the same thing in these words: "But since it has been shown that the beloved in the lover is not according to a likeness of species, as the understood is in the understanding, and everything which proceeds from another by the mode of genesis proceeds according to a likeness of species from the generator, it remains that the procession of a thing to this, that it be in the will, is not by the mode of generation; as the procession of a thing to this, that it be in the intellect, is according to the ratio of generation." When he speaks of "likeness of species," he is not speaking of unity of nature, but of the species and likeness of representation: otherwise he would falsely say that the understood is in the understanding according to a likeness of species, but the beloved in the lover not so.

By reason, moreover, it is proved that the son by his own notion is the image of the father: for in creatures, from which all these things have been borrowed and extended to signify divine things, every son is the image of his father: which is so true that even in equivocal generations, as is that of the mule, it is found. For every son carries before him some image of the father, so that from the son well known the father may also be known: and although the father in some way represents the son, that is, makes one know the son, nevertheless he is not the image of him, because an image is a likeness having its origin from him whom it represents, as we shall say in the place cited.

Since moreover in the notion of image there is also this, that the likeness be produced to represent that from which it proceeds, that part of the definition, "produced to represent," must be thus understood: either from the expressed intention of an artisan, as appears in painted images, or from the very mode of producing, as in a natural image it happens, that even without such expressed intention the likeness be produced so as to represent. And it is said to be produced to this end and intention of nature whenever something proceeds by the force of its procession, so that by that very fact it may represent him from whom it proceeds: the son, therefore, is a substantial likeness of the father produced to represent him. Wherefore, when anyone is said to be more or less his father's son, it is not because he is a more perfect or less perfect man, but because he represents his father more or less. And so, when someone represents his father but little (for there is no one who does not in some way imitate him), we are wont to say that he is not his father's

son; and when he represents his mother more than his father, we say that he is more his mother's son than his father's. For the name "son" does not signify substance, but a relation to father or mother, which has its foundation in a likeness produced to represent: wherefore the perfection of sonship does not increase from the perfection of substance, but from the perfection of representing likeness.

Accordingly, if in the definition of generation set forth by us in cap. 1 of this disputation that part "in the likeness of nature" be understood in the way we have said, that is, in the substantial image of the same nature, it will have no difficulty: and from it we shall most fitly gather that in divine things the Word alone is generated and is the Son; but the Holy Spirit is not so. It remained over to prove that the divine Word alone is the true image of the Father, but that the Holy Spirit is in no way so, neither by the force of procession by will in general, nor by the force of vital will, nor otherwise: but lest we invert the order, this must be shown in St. Thomas, disputation 146.

Caput VIII - The arguments against this later position are resolved

It remains to resolve certain arguments that can be made against this Canarian position, so that it may remain more fully explained and confirmed.

First argument: If we suppose (what is impossible) that there is no possible human or angelic intellect which, by means of the offspring produced - by way of a word - as by an image, can be led to a knowledge of the begetter; nevertheless a horse begotten from a horse would truly be his son. Therefore, in creatures no one is a son for this reason, that he can represent his father to some intellect. Nor does it matter much that it be the intellect of God, for with respect to that intellect no created son is called an image; since God does not know a created father through the son. Since therefore the formal notion of son would remain saved even if no intellect could exist, and once the intellect is removed in this way, the notion of image is necessarily taken away; it follows that the notion of image and of son are not altogether the same.

It is answered: The notion of image, which in human affairs truly constitutes a son, is not that actual order or relation of the image to an intellect capable through one thing of knowing another, but as it were the foundation of this respect, that is, the thing produced is of such a nature and property as to be apt to lead into the knowledge of the producer, if there is an intellect which can know; and this is the root of representation. We have moreover in divine things a most apposite example of this matter: for "gift" is so constituted the property of the Holy Spirit, that by it he is called "gift" inasmuch as he is Spirit; but truly gift, besides the respect it has to the principle from which it proceeds by will, has another, connoted by the very name, toward creatures to whom it can be given; which surely is a relation of reason, and formally cannot pertain to the personal property: both because it is a relation of reason, and also because it is to creatures, which even if they were not possible, nevertheless the Holy Spirit would have his personal property in himself. Therefore the personal property of the Holy Spirit is the foundation of that respect, that is, he so proceeds from the Father and the Son that of himself he is apt to be given to creatures, if they are possible. Thus also in creatures we do not establish the property of son and begotten in an actual respect of

the image to the intellect which it represents, but in the foundation of this respect. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit neither formally nor fundamentally (as they say) has this notion of image, in no way is he son. Moreover the eternal Son is not the image of the Father because he is born to represent his begetter to a created intellect, but to his own Father (as we shall say in that disputation), whom he not only can represent, but always necessarily represents.

Second argument: It is prior that the son be like the father in nature, that is, of the same nature with him, than that he be his image, that is, than that he represent him. Therefore it is prior that someone be a son, insofar as he is an image, from this alone, that he is like in nature with the begetter.

It is answered: In human affairs someone is said to be a son from this alone, that he has the same nature of the animal as the producer; because in this alone is the foundation of the relation of image, in which the notion of son is sufficiently saved. For from the mere likeness of the nature of the produced with the producer, if there be an intellect to which it can represent, the formal notion of image arises. But in God the mere likeness of the nature of the produced with the producer does not constitute the notion of son; because this mere likeness is not a sufficient foundation of the relation of image: for this in God does not result from identity of nature alone, but from that and from the personal property which is by nature apt to represent; and this is the property of the Word, insofar as it is by the intellect. For the Word represents to the Father not because it has the same nature with him (for thus the Holy Spirit also would represent), but because it is of the same nature and has it conjoined with the Word's property of being produced by the intellect. Hence it is that the divine Word has to be Word, because it proceeds by the intellect; but the Spirit is not Son, because he is produced by the will: for what proceeds by will, even if it have the same nature with the producer, does not proceed as an image in any way; but what proceeds by the intellect, truly is produced as an image.

Third argument: For something to be an image (*imago*), it must be a likeness expressed with an intention of representing; but this intention is not necessary from any act of will of the one expressing, but from the mere natural mode of producing; and such an intention of nature is perceived to be present from this alone, that an effect is produced of the same nature with its producer. Therefore for this reason the Holy Spirit also would be Son.

This first argument, if it has any weight, proves also that the Holy Spirit would be the image of his producer, because by that very fact that he is expressed of the same nature, he is produced with an intention of representing, in which consists the true notion of image; but this adversaries will not grant, since this is the property of the Son alone, as we shall show in the place cited; therefore neither does that argument prove what they contended. Nevertheless I answer, as I said above, that the intention whereby the likeness ought to be expressed for representing is sometimes in the very natural mode of operating; but here it is not attended to in this alone, that it produce one similar in nature, but with such a property also, that it be naturally apt to represent the begetter; but this the Holy Spirit does not have, even if he goes forth like in nature, because he does not receive the

nature with that property with which he can represent. In what way, however, the Son thus receives the nature, that he represent and be image, but not the Holy Spirit, must be deferred to that disputation.

Lastly, the son in brute animals does not seem to be produced by nature with any other end than that propagation be preserved in them, toward which end all agents are borne; but of representation the generating animal, by the very force of its nature, cares nothing; nevertheless the animal begotten is truly a son: therefore image is not of the notion of son. But certainly the argument is frivolous and is easily dissolved from what was said before. For when we say that the son is produced with an intention of representing the begetter, we are not speaking of any other intention than that which is from the very nature itself; and this is attended from the mode of operating: and because a generating animal by the very generation is no less represented by the animal begotten from it than the species is preserved in it, therefore each intention of nature is said to be produced. For just as an animal is said to be begotten with an intention of preserving the nature, because in truth it receives a propagated nature, and consequently preserves it; so also it is said to be produced for representing, because in truth it receives the nature so as to represent the begetter. I grant that many things are produced with the sole intention of preserving the nature, not of representing the begetter; yet those are the things in which there is no image, as non-living things (as we shall say in disputation 145); but in those in which there is a true image and the notion of son, as in animals, without doubt the thing is produced with that intention of nature. Add that the argument proposed, if it has any weight, proves also that in brute animals no son is the image of the father; but if it is not in brutes, neither will it be in human beings, since the son is produced in the same way by the sole intention of propagating the nature; and so it would follow that only when a man, with an express intention of will to represent, generates, which is absurd; or, if among human beings generation takes place by a purely natural intention of representation, why will it not also take place in brutes, in which by means of the son, in the same way as among men, the father is known?

Quaestio XXVIII - On the divine relations, which is the second principal part of this matter

Then there is to be considered the divine relations. And about this four questions are treated.

1. Since the divine persons are distinguished by relations, and, as is the common sentence, are constituted as such - rightly St. Thomas, after he had proved that there are two emanations and consequently three persons in one nature, then treats of relations, in order to explain to us the properties of the persons.

Articulus I - Whether in God there are any real relations

Objicitur primo: It seems that in God there are no real relations. For Boethius, in the book On the Trinity, says that when one turns the predicaments into a divine predication, all are changed into substance which can be predicated; but the relative, to something (ad aliquid), cannot at all be predicated. But whatever is really in God can be predicated of him. Therefore relation is not really in God.

Objicitur secundo: Further, Boethius says in the same book On the Trinity, that the relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Spirit, is like that of what is the same to what is the same. But a relation of this sort is only of reason; for every real relation requires two extremes really existing. Therefore the relations posited in the divine are not real relations, but only of reason.

Objicitur tertio: Further, the relation of paternity is a relation of principle. But when it is said "God is the principle of creatures," no real relation is imported, but only one of reason. Therefore neither is paternity in the divine a real relation; and by the same reasoning neither are the other relations posited there.

Objicitur quarto: Further, generation in the divine is according to the procession of an intelligible word. But relations that follow upon an operation of the intellect are relations of reason. Therefore paternity and filiation which are said in the divine according to generation are relations of reason.

Sed contra: The Father is not called Father except from paternity, and the Son is not called Son except from filiation: if therefore paternity and filiation are not really in God, it follows that God is not really Father or Son, but only according to the conception of the understanding; which is the Sabellian heresy.

Respondetur: I answer that certain relations are really in the divine. For evidence of this, consider that only in those things which are called relative (to something) is there found something according to reason alone and not according to the thing. This is not so in the other genera; for the other genera, like quantity and quality, according to their proper notion signify something inhering in another. But things which are said relatively signify, according to their proper notion, only a respect to another. And such a respect is real when it is in the very nature of things, namely when certain things according to their nature are ordered to one another and have an inclination toward one another; and relations of this sort must be real. Thus in a heavy body there is an inclination and order to the middle place; whence there is a certain respect in the heavy thing itself with respect to the middle place; and similarly it is in other such cases. Sometimes indeed the respect signified by those things which are said relatively exists only in the very apprehension of reason comparing one to another; and then it is a relation of reason only, as when reason compares man to animal as species to genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, it is necessary that both, namely the one proceeding and that from which it proceeds, agree in the

same order; and thus it is necessary that they have real respects to one another. Since therefore the processions in the divine are in an identity of nature, as has been shown, it is necessary that the relations which follow the divine processions be taken to be real relations.

Reply to the first: To the first, therefore, it must be said that "relative" is said to be altogether non-predicable of God according to the proper mode of that which is called relative, inasmuch as the proper notion of that which is called relative is not taken by comparison to that in which the relation inheres, but by respect only to another; nor by this do we wish to exclude that relation is in God, but that it is not predicated properly by the mode of an inhering accident according to the proper notion of relation, but rather by the mode of being-toward another.

Reply to the second: To the second it must be said that the relation which is imported by this name "the same" is a relation of reason only; and "the same" is taken simply so, because a relation of this sort cannot subsist except in a certain order which reason discovers of something to itself.

Articulus II - Whether the relations in God are real relations

It is objected: Therefore relation is not really in God.

1. Moreover, Boethius says in the same book On the Trinity that the relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Spirit, is like that of what is the same to what is the same. But a relation of this sort is only a relation of reason, because every real relation requires two extremes really existing. Therefore the relations which are posited in the divine are not real relations, but only of reason.
2. Moreover, the relation of paternity is a relation of a principle. But when it is said, God is the principle of creatures, no real relation is imported, but only one of reason. Therefore neither is paternity in the divine a real relation. And for the same reason neither are the other relations which are posited there.
3. Moreover, generation in the divine is according to the procession of the intelligible Word. But the relations which follow upon the operation of the intellect are relations of reason. Therefore paternity and filiation, which are said in the divine according to generation, are relations of reason only.

But on the contrary: The Father is not called Father except from paternity, and the Son is not called Son except from filiation. If therefore paternity and filiation are not really in God, it follows that God is not really Father or Son, but only according to the conception of the understanding, which is the Sabellian heresy.

I answer: Certain relations are really in the divine. For the understanding of which, it must be considered that only in those things which are called relative (*ad aliquid*) are some things found to be according to reason alone and not according to reality. Which is not the case in the other genera: for the other genera (as quantity and quality) according to their proper notion signify something inhering in a subject. But those things which are called relative signify, according to their proper

notion, only a respect to another. Now this respect is sometimes in the very nature of things, as when certain things according to their own nature are ordered to each other and have an inclination; and relations of this sort must be real. Thus in a heavy body there is an inclination to the middle place; hence there is a certain respect in the heavy body itself toward the middle; and similarly in other such cases. Sometimes, however, the respect is only in the apprehension of reason, which compares one thing to another; and this is only a relation of reason. Thus reason compares man to species, and species to genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, it is necessary that both, namely the one proceeding and that from which it proceeds, agree in the same genus, and thus it is necessary that they have real respects to each other. If therefore the processions in the divine proceed in identity of nature, as was shown, it is necessary that the relations which follow the divine processions be taken to be real relations.

Reply to the first: To the first, therefore, it must be said that "relative" is said to be altogether non-predicable of God according to the proper mode of that which is called relative, inasmuch as the proper notion of that which is called relative is not taken by comparison to that in which the relation inheres, but by respect only to another; nor by this do we wish to exclude that relation is in God, but that it is not predicated properly by the mode of an inhering accident according to the proper notion of relation, but rather by the mode of being-toward another.

Reply to the second: To the second it must be said that the relation which is imported by this name "the same" is a relation of reason only, if "the same" is taken simply so; because a relation of this sort cannot subsist except in a certain order which reason discovers of something to itself according to two of its considerations. It is otherwise, however, when things are said to be the same not in number but in the nature of the genus or of the species. Boethius therefore assimilates the relations which are in the divine to the relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as to this, that by relations of this sort the substance is not diversified, just as neither is it diversified by the relation of identity.

Reply to the third: As the creature proceeds from God in a diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor is a habitude to creatures of his nature. For he does not produce creatures from the necessity of his nature, but by intellect and by will, as was said above. And therefore in God there is no real relation to creatures, but in the creatures there is a real relation to God, because creatures are contained under the divine order, and in their nature it is that they depend upon God. But the divine processions are in the same nature. Hence the reason is not similar.

Reply to the fourth: It must be said that the relations which follow upon the sole operation of the intellect are relations of reason only in the very things understood, because reason discovers them between two things understood. But the relations which follow upon the operation of the intellect which are between the Word proceeding intellectually and that from which it proceeds are not relations of reason only, but of reality; because both the intellect itself and reason are a certain thing, and really are compared to that which proceeds intelligibly, as a bodily thing to that which proceeds bodily. And thus paternity and filiation are real relations in the divine.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative. Concerning the mind of St. Thomas in this article certain points are worthy of observation, which must be noted in the following disputation. Many other things, however, which Canus notes in his commentary on this article concerning the argument Sed contra, I pass over: for St. Thomas frequently uses such an argument, according to his custom, in order to render the proposed question more difficult on both sides; nor does he always cling to the doctrine suggested by that argument, even if he himself gives no reply to it. He only dissolves it when he so renders the question doubtful that even the definition that he applies in the body of the article is in some way opposed to it. Nevertheless, we shall use those points, as most apt reasons for confirming the Catholic doctrine, with a few additions which St. Thomas seems to suppose, in the following disputation.

Disputatio CXIV - On whether the divine relations are real according to being - toward

Caput I - The common Catholic judgment; and the opinion of Cajetan and the Canarian

Among Catholics it is a confessed matter that the divine relations are truly real, not merely assisting God, but intrinsic. It is defined, moreover, in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and is reported in the chapter Firmiter, On the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith, when it is said: "This holy Trinity, according to the common essence, is undivided, and according to personal properties is distinct: for a personal property is a relation." And in the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith it is said: "In the relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both." We shall also show this more at length elsewhere. Moreover they say - St. Thomas in the following article, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and other Scholastics - that Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers, was in the error of asserting that the divine relations are only assisting God and, as it were, extrinsic. Yet this author, as we shall report, never said that these relations are extrinsic to God, but that they really differ from the essence of God - which, for what reason that opinion is condemned, we shall show in the same place. Nor, in truth, does Alexander in the place cited strive to excuse Gilbert from error, as the summary conclusion of that section indicates, but rather Boethius and other Catholics who seem to concede relations only assisting God and extrinsic; about whom in chapter 3 we must speak.

It is also proved theologically from the principles of faith, that the relations must be intrinsic and really adhering to God: because if in God there were only some extrinsic relative denomination, the persons could not be multiplied and distinguished by relations; and consequently we should fall into the opinion of Sabellius, who professed only one person in God. And this indeed seems to be the reason of St. Thomas in the argument Sed contra. How, however, besides these relations of origin which we say to be real in God among the divine persons, there are not other relations in him to creatures, we have said elsewhere.

Furthermore, since in every created relation, and in like manner in the divine, our thought distinguishes two notions - one which they call "in," the other "to" - because a relation is in a subject as its form, and refers that in which it is to some term - there is controversy among the Scholastics whether the divine relation is real according to both notions, or only according to the prior one. Cajetan and the Canarian in this matter affirm that the notion "to," as referred to the real predicament, is precise from the notion "in," and that the latter, formally, is not real, but common and abstract from real and of reason: yet that nevertheless by it the predicament of relation is sufficiently distinguished from the other absolute real predicaments.

They prove it first by the authority of St. Thomas in the following article, where he says that this is peculiar to the predicament of relation among the other predicaments of accident, that whereas in the others the proper notion of each - which we call the intrinsic mode - is taken with an order to the subject, in relation, however, the notion of the predicament is not signified with an order to the subject, but to an extrinsic term, and therefore it is not signified as inhering. And in this sense Boethius seems to have spoken in the middle of the book On the Trinity, as St. Thomas explains in the solution to the first argument of this article, when he denies that the predicament "relative" is predicated of God, namely, as something inhering, considered according to the sole notion of "to"; yet it is, according to the notion of "in." By reason, moreover, the opinion of Cajetan can be proved in this way. The notion "to," taken in itself, not considered with the notion "in," looks only to the term; but this is common to a real relation and to a relation of reason: therefore it cannot be something real.

How, however, a real predicament of relation can be distinguished from the others by a concept common to the real and to the of reason, Cajetan thus explains: because although it be common to the real and to the of reason, nevertheless it is not found in the other real predicaments; therefore by this it is sufficiently distinguished. As if the heavens were not an animal, they would nevertheless have a rational soul - as certain men taught - although a rational soul is common to man and to something set in a column; yet sufficiently would man be distinguished from other living things, because in no animal except in man would it be found. Hence it follows that the divine relations, if they are considered according to their precise being-toward, abstracted from "in," are not real, but common to the real and to the of reason; which, although neither Cajetan nor the Canarian explicitly assert, yet from their principles seems to be inferred.

Caput II - The contrary view: that the mode "to" (ad) is itself real and intrinsic

It has always pleased me to hold the opposite opinion, namely, that the "to" which belongs to a real relation and is the mode of the third predicament, and which belongs to a divine relation, is neither something of reason nor something common to the of reason and the real, but is truly real and inhering; and that only the word "to" is common to both, namely, to the "to" of reason and to the "to" that is real. We can gather this opinion first from St. Thomas in this article, where he says that only in those things which are said relatively are there found some beings of reason and some real beings, but not in the other predicaments; that is, that there can be a relation real and a

relation of reason, which is the work of the intellect - although it is not a substance, nor a quantity, nor a quality of reason. He renders the reason: because the other genera according to their proper notion denote something inhering in the thing itself, as quantity, quality, etc.; but the genus of relation and those things which are said relatively according to their own notion only signify a respect to another - which sometimes is in the very nature of things, sometimes is only in the apprehension of the intellect. Clearly St. Thomas speaks not of the notion signified, but of the name signifying the real, when he says that it only signifies some respect to another: and sometimes in the nature of things, sometimes only in the intellect; for if, with that separation, the signification did not signify a respect, but, the specific difference remaining, it would specifically signify something else, which is real when it is in the thing, because natures are mutually ordered to each other; therefore that which is between them, because they are mutually ordered, is real, although it be signified by a common name.

It is proved by reason. The reason is proved thus: that the "to" cannot be something common to a real being and to a being of reason. First, because there cannot be some common ratio of a real being and a being of reason as to an object existing in the intellect; for that common ratio must be entirely constructed by the intellect and universal; in neither way, however, can it be common to a real being and to a being of reason, as is evident: therefore no such common concept is given. And thus there is only a common name, whereas the ratio of them is not common: especially if the common sentence is true of those who, with Cajetan, teach concerning analogy that there is not some common conception of analogates, but that the very [things] are signified proximately by the same name - I hold this to be most true. For if some concept were common, it would be in the analogates to which it is common, and would be discerned; and thus one concept, besides many and in many, would accordingly be one as to the necessity of the ratio of relation of reason and of relation real; and so nothing could be common unless under the name; consequently, that ratio of "to" cannot be common to a real being and to a being of reason; and thus that "to" is not of reason, since it is an intrinsic mode of the real predicament: therefore, if that "to" of the real predicament must be something real, the real relation according to that being-toward cannot but be in a subject.

Second, the "to" of the real predicament is so the intrinsic mode of this predicament that from that ratio "in," which is the same in all the predicaments, it cannot be abstracted or separated by cognition: therefore according to that ratio it is something real and inhering. The assumption is proved thus. Either the name "accident" signifies univocally the name of a predicament - as is the more probable opinion - and thus the same ratio signified by the name is common to the predicaments: for in such case, as we were saying above, since that ratio would be one and entire in itself in the inferiors, it would be signified univocally; for this is the definition of univocals according to Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, in the chapter On Univocals. Nor does it hinder, if by reason of differences or of intrinsic modes that common ratio is more perfectly said to be in one inferior than in another: for also by reason it is proved that a common concept cannot be given of substance and accident; because a certain substance and accident are univocal with respect to this name "being." What certain people say, that the ratio of being is not in the same way in substance and in accident - because the ratio of accident, as accident, depends on a subject - does not stand in

the way so that one may not say that accident and substance are univocal in being: for the name and the concept of them are the same, insofar as they are signified by the same voice, indeed the same, nor does it signify the same determination which, as we said, that common concept in one is said in one mode, in another in another mode, if it is common; it will not always be said so in that mode; nor, on the side of the concept, from the common voice will the particular notions be signified by which it is determined - as adversaries grant. How, therefore, can the abstract concept be denied to be common? of the transcendent - this we shall say below in Disputation 12, chapter 2. If, therefore, the name "accident" adds to the common "being" the genus, and does not signify a common ratio of analogates (but, as Cajetan teaches in his little work On Analogy, it denotes the proper ratio of the very analogates), it follows that in all the intrinsic modes of the predicaments, even in that very "to," the intrinsic ratio is included, which, by this name "accident," signifies a sufficient ratio of being in all the differences that are contained under substance; so that no difference can be thought that removes from the ratio of being, which transcends all.

It is proved - First by reason - that that "to" (ad) cannot be something common to real being and being of reason. First, because to real being and to being of reason there cannot be any common notion (ratio) as an objective concept existing in the intellect: for either that common notion must be wholly fabricated by the intellect, or truly real; but in neither way can it be common to real being and to being of reason, as is clear. Therefore no such common concept is given. It is therefore only a common name; the notion of the things, however, cannot be common; especially if the sentence of those is true who, with Cajetan on analogy, teach that there is no common concept of analogates, but that the very analogates themselves are signified proximately by the same name - which I judge to be most true. For if some concept were common, it would be wholly in the analogates to which it is said to be common; therefore there would be one concept beyond many and in many, and hence a universal. Since therefore to a rational relation and to a real relation there cannot be anything common unless there could be something common to real being and being of reason; but that "to" cannot be of reason, since it is an intrinsic mode of the real category; therefore that "to" of the real category must be something real; and consequently a real relation, according to that "to," cannot but be in existence.

It is proved second - Second, that "to" in the real category is so an intrinsic mode of this category that from that notion "in," which is in all the categories, it can by no cognition be abstracted or separated: therefore by that notion it is something real and inherent. The assumption, however, is proved thus. Either the name "accident" signifies analogically the nine categories, as the more probable opinion holds, and thus one notion signified by that name cannot be common to the nine categories: for then, as we said above, since it were one and whole according to itself in the singular inferiors, it would be signified univocally - this indeed is the definition of univocals according to Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, the chapter On Univocals.[89] Nor would anything stand in the way if by reason of differences or of intrinsic modes that common

89. Aristotle, Antepredicaments, chapter On Univocals.

notion were more perfect in one inferior than in another; and by this very reason it is proved that a common concept of being cannot be given to substance and accident, because otherwise substance and accident would be univocal with respect to this name "being."

Solution of an objection - But as to what some say, that the notion of being is not in the same way in substance and in accident, because in the accident it is less, since it depends on substance; this little harms what we assert, namely that accident and substance are univocal in "being": for the name is the same, and the concept of them, as signified by that word, is altogether the same in both; nor indeed is that concept, if it be common, signified by the common word in a different way in the one and in the other: not, I say, in a different way either on the part of the thing directly signified, or on the part of the connotation; for by the common voice there are not signified the peculiar modes by which it is determined, as the adversaries grant. How then could the abstract concept of being not be drawn, if it is transcendent? of this we shall speak below in Disputation 121, chapter 2.[90] If therefore the name "accident" is analogical and does not signify a common notion of the analogates, but (as Cajetan teaches in his little work On Analogy) proximately denotes the very analogates themselves,[91] it follows that in all the intrinsic modes of the categories, even in "to" itself, there is intrinsically included that notion "in," which by this name "accident" is signified; just as also the notion of being is contained in all the differences of substance in such wise that no difference can be thought without the notion of being, which transcends all.

Or let us say that the name "accident" signifies univocally the nine categories, or at least three of the principal among them; or, if you please, let us say that it is a genus to them, as some also not so rightly have thought; nonetheless that notion "to" of the real category could not be thought without another notion "in." For "accident," which is posited as univocal and as a genus to those three or to the nine categories, ought to be a complete notion, besides that there is also given the incomplete notion of accident, which is so predicated of all the differences and intrinsic modes that it belongs to them essentially and does not make composition with them. Therefore that notion "to" always includes the notion "in," which, although it is not expressed by this word "to," nevertheless cannot but be immediately apprehended by the intellect.

Third, the same is evident from experience; for, upon hearing this word "to," the intellect cannot but conceive the order of one to another. Already therefore is apprehended an order, as it is of something, and to another. But, as it is "of something," it has the notion "in": therefore in no way can the notion "to" be thought without the notion "in," or at least, until that "to" be conceived as belonging to something, can that word effect any concept in our intellect, as everyone knows. Although therefore that word "to" does not so expressly signify the notion "in," yet because the notion "to" and the notion "in" are so conjoined that "to" cannot be thought without "in," it follows that upon hearing the word "to" one cannot but apprehend the notion "in." Conversely, upon hearing the word "in," the notion "to" is not immediately apprehended, because the notion "in"

90. Disputation 121, chapter 2.
91. Cajetan, Opuscule On Analogy.

extends more widely, and not every form that is in another is "to" another; whereas, on the contrary, every relation (*relatio*) which is "to" another is also in another; for the notion "in" is included in the notion "to," but not conversely.

Doctrine delivered applied to the divine relations - Thus far it has been proved that the notion "to," which is of the real category, is real, and essentially includes in itself the notion "in." Now let us say the same concerning the divine relations, namely that they are not only real according to their whole notion, but also according to the very notion "to": which can be proved in like proportion by the same reasons. Yet it must be observed, as will be explained in Disputation 121, chapter 2, that the notion "in," which the divine relations include intrinsically in their concept, is not the whole essence (*essentia*) and substance (*substantia*) of God. For if we include the substance and essence of God, there results already the complete person (*persona*); but a relation is not the whole person, but the constituting notion of the person.

Response to the arguments of Cajetan -

To the testimony of St. Thomas which Cajetan alleges for himself, it is answered, that St. Thomas never said that the relation "to," which is peculiar to the real category, is common to the real and to reason; but that he spoke of the word "to" according to its whole analogy; for this does not express the notion "in," nor anything real, since it is common according to the analogy of the real and of reason; and therefore he said that it is peculiar to this real category of relation that its formal notion be signified by a name common to being of reason and real being, which does not befit the other categories. For the names by which the peculiar mode of the others is signified denote only a truly real notion: for there is no quantity nor quality of reason. Hence, however, it does not follow that the peculiar notion of this real category of relation is common to the real relation and to the relation of reason; but that it is itself signified by a common name. Wherefore when the holy Doctor says in article 2 that the category of relation according to its proper notion signifies only an assisting form, he understands that, according to the common name "to," an inhering form is not expressly signified, since it is common to the relation of reason and to the real relation. What the error of Gilbert was will be explained in Disputation 120.[92]

But concerning the mind of Boethius in the book On the Trinity in the middle, when he asserts that "to something" is not predicated of God, I think it must be said otherwise than St. Thomas thought; for St. Thomas says that Boethius considered only relations according to the being "to," which by reason are only assistant, and in this way he denied relations in God, because they are not truly assistant. Yet another sense is plainly gathered from his words. For he is philosophizing about the categories as compared to God. First indeed he asserts that three categories - namely substance, quantity, and quality - truly befit God, yet so that in him they signify only substance, indeed supersubstance: for God is said substantially to be good, wise, and great. Second, he says that the last six categories are to be attributed to God in the same manner as they are said of creatures, namely by the mode of a form extrinsically adjacent, as is to be in a place, to be in time. Third, he subjoins that the category of relation does not befit God as it does creatures: for to

92. Disputation 120.

creatures it can befit from something extrinsic, and as coming upon a foreign nature, and with it even perishing when that perishes; but in God there cannot be a relation coming upon him from something extrinsic, but it arises within the same nature; and on that account he calls the divine relation the relation of identity and of likeness - not because this relation, which we call of likeness and identity, exists only in God, or is real in God; but because real relations, which are according to origin, are in the same and altogether similar nature. About those relations of equality, identity, and likeness which befit God, whether they are real, we shall speak in Disputation 167.[93]

Why St. Thomas said that under the sole genus of relation there is both real being and being of reason - Moreover, why St. Thomas said that it is peculiar to the genus of relation that under it something sometimes have real being, sometimes being by reason alone, and not also to the other genera, such as substance, quantity, and quality, is variously explained by his disciples. Canarien, in the commentary on this article, grants that genera other than relation sometimes have being by reason; this, however, he says is per accidens, namely when substance, quantity, and quality have only objective being in the intellect without real existence; but that some relation can have being by reason in such a way that this belongs to it per se. I do not know, however, why this author calls "being by the intellect," or "being of reason," that objective being of substance, or quantity, or quality, which either at some time really was, or can be. For "being of reason" is commonly said of that which can be only objectively in the intellect, and cannot be in the thing; in which way some relation of reason is found. Now we are inquiring the cause on account of which relation alone can have this sort of being by the intellect, but not substance, quantity, or quality.

Cajetan, however, answers in two ways. First he concedes that not only in the genus of relation are there found some things which have only being of reason, but also in the genus of substance, of quantity, and of quality: for in the genus of substance there is the imaginary man; quantity also or quality can be altogether fabricated. He adds, however, that there is a difference between these beings of reason and relations, namely that relation, even if it be by reason, is called simply relation; but substance, quality, or quantity are not called simply such when they are fabricated only by the intellect. Yet this solution of Cajetan does not please me, because both substance and quality and quantity, fabricated by the intellect as Cajetan posits, that is, only objectively apprehended by the intellect, are truly and simply called such, whenever the proposition does not denote the existence of the thing. For he who apprehends a rose in winter, without any addition, can say that it is truly a rose; and so of quality and of quantity, otherwise indeed than if the propositions were signifying existence. Moreover, beings existing only objectively in the intellect are in no way to be called beings of reason, but things existing only through reason; for that will not be called an ens rationis which has a true possible essence and is apprehended as such, but that whose whole essence is through the intellect alone apprehended, nor can it in reality in any way be. But any man apprehended, and any quality and quantity, is truly possible; therefore it will be called rather a real being than of reason, not indeed existing, but possible.

93. Disputation 167.

But on the contrary:

- Augustine teaches first that substance (*substantia*) and relation (*relatio*) are properly predicated of God, that is, the names of those predicaments are properly said to belong to God, although, as I showed above at length, God is in no predicament at all, nor did I wish to teach the opposite of Augustine in chapter 4 of the same disputation 22, as I demonstrated there: therefore those two names, namely substance and relation, are properly, not metaphorically, said of God, albeit not univocally, as I show at length in the same place; because relation in God, even if it is substance, is rightly and properly called relation. Secondly, Augustine teaches that all the other predicaments are said only in a transferred and metaphorical way of God, except action and passion, of which we shall speak afterward. He proves this indeed by induction. For God is not properly said to be "how much" nor "of what sort," because by His substance He is how much and of what sort. He therefore posits a difference between these two and relation, namely that relation, even if in reality it is substance, is properly called relation; but quantity and quality are not properly said of the substance of God; and thus he says that God is good without quality and great without quantity. Of position and habit, he says, they are said metaphorically, because position is the disposition of a body in place, as to stand and to sit; and therefore God is said to sit upon the Cherubim metaphorically. Habit indeed is to be clothed, which cannot befit God except metaphorically; in which manner He is said to be clothed with light. The same of where and time, although these two are not so openly said metaphorically as the others. Thirdly, he teaches that action is properly predicated of God; but passion in no way, not even metaphorically; because God is properly said to act, but to be made or to suffer in no way. Yet he understands these as to His substance and essence; for the Persons are said to be produced, and the origins of them also are said to be "passive." In what way, however, this doctrine of Augustine is not contrary to the doctrine of Boethius, is clear enough.

It is asked:

- Moreover, why St. Thomas said that it is proper to the genus of relation that under it there is sometimes a real relation, sometimes one by reason alone, but not so in the other genera, as substance, quantity, and quality, his disciples explain in various ways. Canas in his commentary on this article concedes that other genera besides relation sometimes have being by reason, not only relation; he adds, however, that there is a difference between beings of reason and relations, namely that relation, even if it is by reason, is called relation; but substance, quantity, and quality are not simply called such [i.e., substance, quantity, quality], but only are through the intellect composed. This solution of Cajetan does not please me; because both substance and quantity, feigned through the intellect and apprehended by the intellect, are truly predicated as such whenever propositions do not signify existence. For he who apprehends a rose in winter, without any addition, can say that it is truly a rose; and so of quality and of quantity, otherwise indeed than if the propositions were signifying existence. Moreover, beings existing only objectively in the intellect are in no

way to be called beings of reason, but things existing only through reason; for that will not be called an ens rationis which has a true possible essence and is apprehended as such, but that whose whole essence is through the intellect alone apprehended, nor can it in reality in any way be. But any man apprehended, and any quality and quantity, is truly possible; therefore it will be called rather a real being than of reason, not indeed existing, but possible.

Wherefore the response of Cajetan has no firm foundation.

A true solution from Cajetan is alleged otherwise:

- Another solution of Cajetan is proposed to me: for he says that both quantity and quality, and substance apprehended only and not existing, are truly real beings, although they do not actually exist; because they have a real possible essence: but relation by reason is altogether a being of reason, and in no way real; because such a relation can never of itself be in things, nor does it have any real possible essence, but by apprehension alone can be: for this is truly and properly called an ens rationis.

Objicitur.

- But someone will object against this solution in this way. Among beings of reason besides relation are numbered negation and privation, which, since they are in no way real beings, are nevertheless by us thought and apprehended, and for that reason are called beings of reason: negation indeed is an impossible being, like a chimera, which also is understood in the mode of a certain substance compacted from various things: therefore there is likewise some substance of reason, just as relation: privation also is thought in the mode of a form and of a quality affecting a subject: therefore there is also some quality of reason, just as relation. Some reply that there is this difference between relation of reason on the one hand, and negation or privation on the other, that relation is so by reason as to have a foundation in a thing, nor can the intellect feign it at pleasure, but it is thought from the things themselves and is apprehended as a relation in them themselves; but for the intellect to apprehend privation or negation in the mode of a being, it is forced in no way, but feigns it at pleasure.

Rejicitur.

- But this solution does not satisfy me: because, although the intellect is not determined by nature to think negation and privation in the mode of this or that substance or quality rather than another, nevertheless its nature is such that, for our present state, it cannot apprehend these two except in the mode of some substance or quality: one man composes a chimera in one way, another in another way; but all conceive it in the mode of substance: and this has a natural foundation in our mode of knowing, nor is it at pleasure; just as also a relation of reason in the things which it denominates, and from which its denomination is taken, is said to have no other foundation except because our intellect, for this state, cannot name and

apprehend them otherwise than relatively. Add that, although the intellect can at pleasure feign substance and quality, nevertheless it would not at pleasure, but necessarily, be forced to conceive relations; not because St. Thomas ought to have for this reason said that this is peculiar to the genus of relations, that some be through the intellect; since in the genus of substance, in one way or another, substances of reason are found.

I answer, therefore, that St. Thomas said that for a special reason: because, whereas the proper function of the intellect is to compare and to refer one to another, even if the things themselves are not in reality referred among themselves, it is proper to the intellect not only to conceive some things absolute in the mode of things related, but also by its act to relate them, by thinking one with an order to another: yet although it apprehends negation in the mode of a substance, privation in the mode of a quality, and although it philosophizes and speaks about them and there be some opinions, and on that account they are called beings of reason, namely, having being only from the intellect, nevertheless the intellect apprehending them is not said to have any act by which it is said either to "substantify" or to "qualify" (as they say), and for that reason it is not said to make a substance of reason or a quality of reason, as it is said to make a relation, because by its act it refers those things which were not referred. Hence there arises a clear difference between relation and privation or negation: because these two are not called beings, nor substance, nor quality; but they are called beings of reason, which, if they were to be called substance or quality, ought to be called not absolutely, but with the addition "of reason": but a relation of reason is accustomed to be called relation without an addition; because not only is one thing referred to another from itself, but also it is said to be referred by the intellect; and the act of the intellect is named relation and comparison absolutely. And let these things suffice about the testimony of St. Thomas, which Cajetan uses for his opinion; with which also certain other difficult things, which the same holy Doctor set down, have obiter been explained and remain clarified.

To the reason alleged in chapter 1 for Cajetan's position I reply, that "toward" (ad), however abstract and precise, can never be thought without relation; because every relation "toward" is of something to something; although not in such a way as to express the ratio, that very "toward," as we shall explain in chapter 2.

Disputatio CXV - On whether a relation of reason is formed only by the intellect or also by other powers

Caput I - What Scotus thought

Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, thought that Scotus had been of the view that a relation of reason is made not only by the operation of the intellect, but also by the operation of any other faculty comparing one thing with another; and he took this to be the will, insofar as it wills

one thing for the sake of another and refers it to another. Cajetan very well refutes this view by saying that a relation of reason is truly a being of reason; therefore it ought to be made only by the operation of the intellect and of our reason.

But Scotus's opinion is far from that aforesaid view. For in the First, dist. 45, q. 1, to the last argument, in order to show in what way things willed by God from eternity are said to be referred, he says that they are referred either by a relation of reason which the divine intellect forms for itself, or rather by a certain relation arising from the operation of the divine will. Yet Scotus teaches that this relation is neither real, because it does not by its own nature inhere in the extremes, nor a relation of reason, because it is not made by the intellect or by any faculty formally rational; but a certain middle thing between the real and the rational. He therefore affirms that this middle relation arises from the operation of another faculty than the intellect. This position, sanely explained, is most true, as we shall show in the following chapter.

Caput II - Whether a relation of reason is formed solely by the operation of the intellect, or also by that of other powers

It remains to show, after we have demonstrated that relation is of reason and that some relation is by reason and in what way, whether relation is made by reason alone, and whether afterward, before the operation of the intellect, it has any beginning in the thing.

I say first that an extrinsic denomination is not a relation inhering in the things which it denominates.

Secondly, I judge that, before the operation of the intellect, there is no real denomination from some extrinsic thing or form. Because denomination is the appellation of a name, it is also a work of reason; and a thing absolute in itself, if it is denominated relatively, is denominated by the intellect conceiving it relatively: for names have been imposed by us in order that we might signify what we conceive about things. Wherefore to concede that some extrinsic real denomination is made before any intellect implies a contradiction in the subject: for if there is a denomination, there is the expression of some intellection. For this same cause we shall say below in disputation 120, chapter 6, that those things are said to be actually distinct by the intellect which by nature are not distinguished, whenever we think it useful to signify them by different names not synonymous.[94]

Thirdly, nevertheless, before the operation of the intellect there is in things some form or real thing, from which the intellect takes a relative denomination. For when it calls a wall "seen," from the vision which is terminated at the wall, it denominates the wall relatively; and so of all the others. Here, however, it must be observed that sometimes each extreme is denominated from some relative form in the same way, that is, by the same name; one indeed intrinsically, the other extrinsically: as when a wall is called right from the right-hand of an animal. Sometimes, however, in the opposite way; as a wall is said to be "seen" from a vision which indeed denominates the seer,

94. Disputation 120, chapter 6.

in whom it is, but does not denominates the "seen": on the contrary it denominates the wall "seen," not "seeing." Sometimes also a relative denomination is taken from something extrinsic, not relative but absolute: as from goodness and malice in the moral place we shall say below; and the knowledge of God or His will is said to be relative to creatures, and His omnipotence similarly, even if such a relative form be not anywhere intrinsic: as is noted in disputation 104, chapter 4. In this way there is said to be a relative denomination real indeed, though extrinsic; yet the relation itself is of reason, not because the denomination is made in act before the intellect and that it is real, but because the form or thing from which it is taken is real, and by it something is denominated extrinsically. For this cause we then say that the denomination of a relation of reason is, on the side of the thing, before the intellect. From which doctrine I noted above, question 14, article 2, at the end of the commentary, that the divine attributes, which before the ages are, are said to be referred relatively to creatures; not because that relation as such exists from eternity in God as a relation of reason, nor because from future things a foundation could be assigned for such a relative denomination to be attributed to the divine; but because, God and the things to be in time being posited, on the side of the things there would be a foundation from which such a denomination by reason could fittingly be taken and imposed.

How a relation of reason is formed by the intellect.

Fourthly, therefore, by the operation of our reason, when something is said to be understood on account of another, the operation of the will indeed, as having the force of appetite, produces its own proper "toward another": yet from that operation there is not straightway resulted any relation of reason: but only the foundation, and that thing, by reason of which the denomination of relation is accepted; the relation of reason properly is formed only by the action of the intellect; by which a thing is apprehended as related; which is called a comparative or relative notion; which no faculty other than the intellect can have: for the intellect alone can by itself apprehend a thing as related, and compare it to another in act, to which in reality it is not referred nor compared. When, however, the will is said to refer or to order one thing to another, this is not to be understood as if the will were to make a relation in the object; but because by its act it seeks one thing on account of another; that is, it seeks one thing because it is represented to it as ordered toward another. So too the intellect understands one thing on account of another; whence from the knowledge of one we are moved into the cognition of another.

There is also to be noted the reason why the intellect can form and feign something which is not, whereas the will cannot; because, to wit, the intellect has this force, that the quality produced makes for itself objectively present something distinct from the quality; whether that other have true real being or not: but the will does not make for itself anything objectively present; rather it supposes that made by the intellect: it only effects and produces in itself formally the affections, which in themselves can befall only in that which is made objectively present: therefore the intellect is apt to feign. But indeed the intellect also understands and apprehends an order given between things expressly and formally, not only when there is said to be some form of a relation of reason; St. Thomas teaches the same in this very place. Sometimes, however, a respect is signified on the part of the object which moves; but sometimes there is another without the very

apprehension of the relation; we consent that in the very apprehended thing there be the foundation of the relation of reason. In like manner it is to be said when the acts of will are this, namely object of the will; or of the intellect, that is, object of intellection; it is not in that object itself that that relation willed is, or the denomination, but the foundation, and the thing from which it is to be taken and begotten, and the relation of reason is to be known. Therefore theologians rightly and commonly say that the consideration of the universe is taken which is said to agree by the intellect with nature, not by the operation of abstraction alone; but, considering the nature of a thing without many others: for the mind then has the whole as the intellect conceives its foundation, not because the nature itself is conceived as related, but because, abstracting many, and comparing, that is, it is a relation of reason which is said.

Hence it is, God being no way in need, that the relations of reason are in Him according to our defect of cognition, as is distinguished at disputation 118, chapter 2, and 3; we say this not only because God has no cognitions by alien species, and after the manner of another, as we have, which are varied in time and place, and any change or variant is in the same intellect in the same mode as in the objects, which are in themselves: whence the intellect which is not composite does not conceive opposites; but God's is altogether absolute, not intelligible by relation but by the intellect. In Him, in things themselves, and also in His own apprehension there is no relation. When, therefore, we consider what among us is referred relatively and belongs to the mode of relation of reason in the very things formed by us; the opposition withdraws, many things are diminished and defined, which, when we speak by way of definition, are of reason, and some of them are also negations and privations, and relation: which three are the principal of relations of reason; negation, privation, and relation: to these, however, there is not added a third to be confused, as some falsely distinguish them; these they say are per intellectum tantum; those by the intellect with a mode or relation. For they are by the intellect in this one way, to wit, by the intellect alone; and are defined thus: which, when we speak by way of definition, some of them we speak of negatively and by privation, and some by way of relation. For some are formed by the intellect only, and one diminishes and defines another; and in the intellect only they are. For thus indeed the intellect and the apprehended things are understood at one, save for an order expressed and designated between them.

... of reason: not because the denomination actually takes place before the intellect, and that it be real; but because the form or thing from which it is taken is real, and extrinsic to the thing denominated. On this account we say that the foundation of the relation of reason (*relatio rationis*) is on the part of the thing, prior to the intellect.[95]

From this doctrine we noted above, q. 14, a. 15, at the end of the commentary, that the divine attributes, which are eternal, connote a respect of reason: not because there is from eternity an intellective motion which forms relations of this sort - for the divine [intellect], as will presently be proved, does not form them - but because from eternity there is a sufficient foundation in God and in future things, such that such a relative denomination can befit the divine attributes.[96]

95. "... fundamentum relationis rationis esse a parte rei ante intellectum."
96. "... notavimus supra q. 14, a. 15, in fine commentarii ..."

Fourth, even if by the operation of our comparative reason one is said to be understood on account of another, as also by the operation of the will one thing is desired on account of another, nevertheless from this operation there does not yet result a relation of reason: but only the foundation, and that thing from which it receives the denomination of such a relation: but a relation of reason is properly formed only by the operation of the intellect, whereby a thing is apprehended as related, which is called comparative knowledge: and no other faculty than the intellect can have this; for the intellect alone apprehends a thing as related, and actually compares it to another, to which in reality it is not referred nor compared.

And when the will is said to order one thing to others, this is not to be understood as though the will were to form a relation in the object: but because by its act it desires one thing for the sake of another: that is, it desires one thing because it is represented to it as useful to another. So too the intellect understands one thing for the sake of another: because from knowledge of the one it is moved to cognition of the other.

Now the reason must be noted why the intellect can form and feign something that is not, whereas the will cannot: namely, because the intellect has this power, that by a quality produced by itself it makes objectively present to itself something distinct from the quality, whether that have true real existence (*esse reale*) or not; but the will does not make anything objectively present to itself: rather it presupposes that as made by the intellect: and it only elicits and produces in itself a real quality of affection: but fiction can occur only in that which is objectively present: therefore the intellect alone can feign.

These things that we have said are to be understood of negation and privation of an ens of reason (*ens rationis*): for since there are three entia of reason - negation, privation, and relation - the two former are not to be confused with the third, as some have falsely thought: nor are those formed by the intellect in the same way as relation is. For they are brought about by the intellect only in such wise that they are named and defined: that is, therefore we speak of them by way of defining, and we predicate some things of them, as though they were entia, and we signify them by an affirmative name; because we conceive them after the manner of a certain being, and they are presented to our concept as though they were beings, indeed by a simple concept: for we do not assert of them that they are beings. Therefore, since that objective concept of negation and privation is not in the thing, but appears to us as though it were, it is indeed called an ens of reason; but it is by no means to be called a relation of reason: because that is not made by a comparison of the intellect, but by simple apprehension. For who would say that a chimera, or artificial redness, is referred to something by the intellect, and is formed by a relation itself; as the knowable is referred to knowledge, and by the very operation of the intellect that refers and compares, the relation of the knowable is consequent?

Idcirco, and rightly, logicians commonly say that the universal relation, which is said to befit a nature through the intellect, is made only through comparative knowing, not through the abstractive operation: that is, a nature is considered as one without the many: for from this knowledge alone the intellect has a foundation, so that thereafter it conceives this nature as related, abstracted from many, and common; and thus the universal relation of reason is made.

Hence it comes about that God in no way forms these relations of reason: for that arises from the defect of our cognition, as also the distinction of those things which are not distinguished in reality, as we shall say in disputation 118, chapters 2 and 3: not only because God knows nothing through alien species, and after the manner of another thing, but because he conceives things as they are in themselves, nor is anything varied in his intellect: but they are presented in the same way as they are in themselves. Wherefore, those things that are not composite the divine intellect does not conceive as composite: and things that are altogether absolute he does not understand as related, because the intellect of God alters nothing in the things themselves, not even in his own apprehension. Therefore, since he does not compare those which in reality are not referred to one another, he forms in them no relation of reason: and to assert the opposite greatly derogates from the perspicacity and simplicity of the divine intellect. By what account, moreover, his will is said to will one thing for the sake of another, or to another, we have shown in disputation 82, chapter 2.[97]

Quaest. XXVIII

Whether relation in God is the same as His essence

It seems that relation (*relatio*) in God is not the same as His essence (*essentia*). For St. Augustine says in On the Trinity, that not everything said in God is said according to substance. For "to something" (ad aliquid) is said, as "father to son": but these are not said according to substance. Therefore relation is not the divine essence.[98]

1. Furthermore, Augustine says in book 7 On the Trinity: "Every thing which is said relatively is also 'to something' except the relative: as 'man lord,' and 'man servant'." If therefore some relations are in God, there must be in God something other besides the relations. But this other cannot be anything except the essence. Therefore the essence is other than the relations.[99]
2. Furthermore, the being of the relative consists in being ordered to another, as is said in the Categories. If therefore relation is the divine essence itself, it will follow that the being of the divine essence consists in being ordered to another, which is repugnant to the perfection of the divine existence (*esse*): which is most of all absolute and subsists through itself, as was shown above.[100] Therefore relation is not the divine essence itself.

97. "... ut disp. 118, cap. 2, & 3 dicemus ... disput. 82, cap. 2 ostendimus."
98. St. Augustine, De Trinitate: "quod non omne, quod dicitur in Deo, dicitur secundum substantiam ... dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium ..."
99. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 7, cap. 1: "Omnis res quae relative dicitur, est etiam ad aliquid excepto relativo: sicut homo dominus, et homo servus."
100. "... ut supra Q. 3 ostentum est ... et q. 4, art. 2 simul."

But on the contrary: Every thing which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really befits God. If therefore it is not the divine essence, it will be a creature. And thus to it adoration of latria would not be owed. Contrary to which it is sung in the Preface: "So that in persons there is the property, and in the majesty equality is adored...."[101]

I answer: Concerning this it is said that Gilbertus of Poitiers erred, but afterwards revoked his error in the council of Reims. For he said that the relations in the divinity are "assisting," or affixed extrinsically. For the evidence of which, it must be considered that in any of the nine genera of accident there are two things to consider. One of which is being, which belongs to each of them insofar as it is an accident: and this, commonly in all, is "to be in" a subject. For the being of an accident is to be in. Another, which can be considered in each one, is the proper notion of each of those genera. And in the other genera besides relation, for instance quantity and quality, the proper ratio of the genus is also taken according to a comparison to the subject. For quantity is called the measure of substance; quality, the disposition of substance. But the proper ratio of relation is not taken according to comparison to that in which it is, but according to a comparison to something outside. If therefore we consider even in created things relations insofar as they are relations, thus they are found to be assisting, not intrinsically affixed, as signifying a certain respect contingently belonging to the very thing related, insofar as from it it tends into another. But if relation be considered insofar as it is an accident, thus it is inhering in a subject, and has accidental being in it. But Gilbert of Poitiers considered relation only in the first manner.

Now whatever in created things has accidental being, insofar as it is transferred to God, has substantial being: for there is nothing in God as an accident in a subject; but whatever is in God is His essence. Thus, therefore, in that respect in which relation in created things has accidental being in a subject, relation really existing in God has the being of the divine essence, wholly the same with it. But in this, that it is said "to another," there is signified no habit or bearing toward the essence, but rather toward its opposite. And thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to reality, and differs only according to the reason of understanding, insofar as in relation there is imported a respect toward its opposite, which is not imported in the name of essence. It is clear, therefore, that in God there is not one thing which is the being of relation and another which is the being of essence, but one and the same.

Reply to the first: The words of Augustine do not pertain to this - that paternity, or some other relation which is in God according to its own being, is not the same as the divine essence - but that it is not predicated according to the mode of substance, as existing in that of which it is said, but as being ordered to another. And on this account two only are said to be the predicaments in things divine: because the other predicaments import a habitude to that of which they are said, both according to their own being and according to the notion of their proper kind. But nothing which is in God can have a habitude to that in which it is, or of which it is said, except the habitude of identity, on account of the supreme simplicity of God.[102]

101. Preface: "Ut in personis proprietas, et in maiestate adoratur aequalitas."
102. "... propter summam Dei simplicitatem."

Reply to the second: If, as in created things, in that which is said relatively there is not only to be found the respect to another, but also something else absolute; so too in God. But nevertheless in different fashion. For that which is found in the creature, besides that which is contained under the signification of the relative name, is another thing. But in God it is not another thing, but one and the same: which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as though comprehended under the signification of such a name. For it was said above, when treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Whence it does not follow that in God, besides relation, there is something else according to reality; but only if the consideration be of the ratio of names.[103]

Reply to the third: If in the divine perfection nothing more were contained than what the relative name signifies, it would follow that its being would be imperfect, as being ordered to another: just as, if the name "wisdom" signified no more, it would not be something subsistent. But because the perfection of the divine essence is greater than what can be comprehended by the signification of any name, it does not follow, if a relative name, or any other name whatsoever said of God, does not signify something perfect, that therefore the divine essence has imperfect being: because the divine essence comprehends in itself the perfection of all genera, as was said above.[104]

The conclusion is affirmative, about the truth of which we must expressly discourse. But because we must philosophize in the same way about the distinction of the divine attributes among themselves and from His essence, and about the distinction of essence and relation; and that disputation which is treated in this question, article 4, has hitherto been deferred: therefore we must first dispute about those.[105]

Ad primum: It is answered that those words of St. Augustine do not pertain to this - that paternity, or another relation which is in God according to its own existence, is not strictly the same as the divine essence - but that it is not predicated according to the mode of substance, as existing in that of which it is said, but as having reference to another. And on account of this only two predicaments are said to be in the divine things: because the other predicaments import a habitude to that of which they are said, both according to their own existence and according to the proper notion of their genus. But nothing which is in God can have a habitude to that in which it is, or of which it is said, signifying a habitude of non - identity, on account of the highest simplicity of God

Ad secundum: If in created things, in that which is called relation, one finds not only a respect to another, but also something absolute, then in the creature that absolute thing, which is signified under the relative signification, is another thing. In God, however, it is not another thing, but one and the same; which is most perfectly expressed by relation, as though comprehended under such signification. For it was said above, when we were treating of the divine names, that more is

103. "... dictum est enim supra, cum de divinis nominibus agebatur ..."
104. "... quia divina essentia comprehendit in se omnium generum perfectionem, ut supra dictum est."
105. "... disputatio illa, quae tractatur in hoc quaest., articulo 4, amandata est."

contained in the perfection of the divine essence (*essentia divina*) than can be signified by any one name; whence it follows that in God, besides relation, there is nothing else according to reality, if the ratio of the names be considered

Ad tertium: If nothing more were contained in the divine perfection than what the signification of some name can comprehend, it would follow that the divine essence would be imperfect, as having reference to another; and God would not be self - subsisting. But because the divine essence and existence (*esse*) is greater than what the signification of any name can comprehend, it does not follow that, if the name relation, or any other thing said of God, does not signify something absolute and perfect, therefore the divine essence is imperfect: because the divine essence comprehends in itself the perfection of all genera, as was said above

From these it is clear that in God there is not one existence of relation and another of essence, but one and the same.

Disputatio CXVI - Whether the divine attributes are distinguished among themselves, and from the essence, by their own nature, or only by conceiving

Caput I - What is meant by the name "attribute"

That the subject about which the disputation is undertaken may be clearly understood, and that the various significations of words may not be a cause of dissension, it must briefly be explained what we call a divine attribute.

Gregory, therefore, in the first book of the Sentences, distinction 8, question 2, and Marsilius, question 12, article 3, at the beginning, distinguish three things: the attribute, the ratio which they call "attributable," and the perfection called "attributal." They define the attribute thus: it is a name which can be predicated of God, of all the persons together, and of each one, denoting that which it is better to be than not to be. By this rationale names of relations are excluded from the notion of attribute; because they can neither be predicated of each person indifferently; and names which signify an action that befits God in time, as creation - for the act itself is not better than not-creating; that is, it is not better to create than not to create - wherefore the names Father, Son, Holy Spirit, creator, justifier, are not attributes of God. But the ratio, which they call "attributable," they say is the formal concept of the soul which we express concerning God upon hearing the very voice of the attribute; and finally by the "attributal" perfection they teach to be the very thing which we conceive concerning God, namely the objective concept which we have of God.[106]

In almost the same way Gabriel defined attribute in 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, art. 1, notable 3, when he says: it is the mental, or vocal, or written predicable, which is apt to be said of God, and can be supposed for God, signifying some perfection of God, which is investigated by natural reason. By which definition indeed, although he embraces the very notion of creator, nevertheless he does not include the divine personal relations.[107]

106. Gregory (on the Sentences), in 1 Sent., dist. 8, q. 2; Marsilius, quaest. 12, art. 3.

Durandus, however, in 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 3, nums. 6 - 7, thinks that attribute is taken in a twofold way, namely according to a broader and a more proper signification. In the former way, he says, attribute is whatever we ascribe to God by a mode of denomination; and in this way even infinity and immensity are called attributes. In the same way Augustine Niphus in 12 Metaph., disput. 13, cap. 2, at the end, says that an attribute in God is whatever about him is predicated by way of an accident and adjective; in which sense Averroes in 12 Metaph., com. 39, called the attributes of God "dispositions," as though added to the essence. In the latter way, says Durandus, that is called attribute which signifies some perfection common to God and creatures, such as justice, mercy, and others of that kind; in which way eternity, immensity, infinity, and the like are not to be called attributes. Thus, above, Henry of Ghent seemed to take "attribute," Quodlibet 5, q. 1, letters B and H.[108]

Finally, the Bishop of Cambrai, in this article, disput. 1, part 2, asserts that an attribute is a perfection of God which is neither a relation nor contains any relation, whether real or of reason. Nonetheless, he says that intellect, will, to understand, and to will are attributes: because although by a relative voice they are signified, yet in their own concept they have no relation, except consequently.[109]

But the definition of Gabriel which we reported above pleases me, provided that by "definition" one does not define the name "attribute," as he defines it, but the thing signified by the name; that is, any perfection in God which can be investigated by natural reason, and which is signified by us after the mode of some form adjacent to God; such as wisdom (*sapientia*), intellect (*intellectus*), will (*voluntas*), mercy, and so forth - about which the present controversy is how they are distinguished among themselves and from the essence, whether really or only by conceiving. About relations, since afterward a question is to be had for us, at present we will say nothing: wherefore we do not include them under the name "attribute."

Augustine Niphus in 12 Metaph., disput. 13, cap. 3, reports the view of Gualterus, who asserted, together with the highest simplicity of God, a real distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the divine essence. He proves this, because those things which are in diverse predicaments, or as it were in diverse predicaments, are really distinguished; but the attributes of God and the essence are as it were in diverse predicaments: therefore they are really distinguished among themselves. Yet with this distinction he defends the simplicity of God thus: because in order that something be composed out of several things, it is not only required that there be a plurality, but that those plural things which are found in it ought mutually to be compared as parts, so that one have the notion of act (*actus*), the other truly the notion of potency (*potentia*); either among themselves, or with respect to some third which they compose. But in God nothing can have the notion of potency: therefore, although there be several things in him, there is no composition. By

107. Gabriel, 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, art. 1, notab. 3.

108. Durandus, in 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 3, nn. 6 - 7; Augustine Niphus, 12 Metaph., disp. 13, cap. 2 (in fine); Averroes, 12 Metaph., com. 39; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 5, q. 1, litt. B, H.

109. The Bishop of Cambrai, in this article, disput. 1, part 2.

this rationale Scotus afterward made use of that distinction "from the nature of the thing," which he himself devised, to preserve the same simplicity of God; how far his view differs from the present one will be said below.[110]

In this same opinion some think that Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers, was, in his commentary upon Boethius On the Trinity; where, as Bernard relates in sermon 80 on the Song of Songs, he was conceding these propositions thus and not otherwise: "The Father is truth," that is, "true"; "the Son is truth," that is, "true"; "the Holy Spirit is truth," that is, "true"; "the three are one truth," that is, "one true." Thus he used to say that the magnitude of God, or the substance of God, or the truth of God, is not God himself: from which he seemed to distinguish the attributes at least from the essence and from God himself. But it is false that Gilbert ever followed the aforesaid opinion of Gualterus, or a like one, about some distinction of the attributes either among themselves or from the essence. For, as Otto of Freising, an ancient author - and the emperor Frederick's uncle - relates, in book 1 On the Deeds of Frederick, chapters 56 and 57 (whose words we shall report below, disputation 120, chapter 1), Gilbert only used to say that the concrete "God" is sometimes put for a person, sometimes for the nature. When it is put for the nature, he conceded that God is deity itself and unity; but when it is put for a person, he used to say that that proposition, "God is the divine nature," is not to be conceded, in the case of personal supposition, as will be explained in that disputation. Likewise he did not predicate truth, and other abstracta, of a person, nor of God when he was posited for a person; from which he established only a real distinction, or from the nature of the thing, between the person on the one hand and the essence together with the attributes on the other; which he maintained for a special rationale, which even in that disputation we shall adduce when arguing also for the view of Scotus. But he taught nothing of this sort concerning the attributes either among themselves, or compared with the essence; nor in the Council of Reims, where his error was condemned, was anything defined against a distinction of the attributes. Wherefore Gilbert did not deny this proposition, "God is his wisdom," because the abstract is predicated of the concrete (for he granted it, if the concrete "God" were not posited for a person), but because, when "God" is posited for a person, it includes, together with the essence, relation - which he thought for a special rationale to be distinguished from the essence - as we shall see in disputation 120, chapter 1.[111]

This view of Gualterus is a manifest error against the faith. First, because the definition made in the Council of Reims against Gilbert - where it was decreed that the divine nature is not really distinguished from the person - no less militates against Gualterus, who distinguishes the attributes among themselves and from the nature. About that decree of the Council there will be express treatment below, disputation 120. Second, the argument of Bernard, which was used against Gilbert in the Council, and is found in the sermon cited, not less proves that the attributes are not distinguished from the essence, or among themselves, than that the essence is not distinguished from the person, or from relation. The argument is of this sort: Either the goodness

110. See below, disput. 120, cap. 1.

111. Council of Reims against Gilbert; see below, disput. 120; Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Song of Songs; Otto of Freising, De gestis Friderici, lib. 1, cc. 56 - 57.

by which God is good, and the wisdom by which he is wise, is something, or nothing; it cannot be nothing: therefore it is something. Further, if that is something and distinct from the very substance of God, then it is either superior to it, or equal, or inferior: it cannot be superior, as is clear; nothing can be above the essence of God. Therefore it is either equal or inferior. If equal and distinct from the very nature of God, there will be several gods; or, if he himself is one God, it will not be really distinguished from him. But it cannot be inferior, because it would follow that the very thing is a creature; and so God would be wise by some creature, as by a form - which is absurd; for whatever is below the divine nature ought to be some created thing.

Third, Gualterus plainly subverts the simplicity of God and is forced to admit composition in God, which is absurd. Nor does the evasion which he devised avail anything. First, for if wisdom and goodness are in the essence of God really and distinctly, and by these God is rendered good and wise, it follows that these real forms are received in the very divine nature; and then the essence is received in potency so as to be informed, and wisdom, as a form, reduces the essence itself to act - not that that of God is ever potency, or could be, with the privation of a form, but because it is truly informed by wisdom as by a form. For even in those subjects from which accidental forms cannot be separated, if they are really distinguished from the forms themselves, there is truly potency, and the forms themselves are the true acts of that potency. Next, if in God there are several things really distinct from his essence, although he should never have of himself potency in respect of another, a greater absurdity follows, namely that in God there is some sort of aggregate which the logicians call "per accidens," like a heap of stones - something less worthy of simplicity, indeed repugnant to unity. For simplicity and unity are opposed to multiplicity; but where there is multiplicity and a conjunction of several, there cannot be simplicity; and there will be much less unity where those that come together are conjoined per accidens, and the one does not have the notion of act, the other the notion of potency. The Trinity of persons does not oppose this; for since each person, by its very supposit, is altogether the same as the essence, that union excludes all composition. Finally, it is not necessary that, for something to be truly called composite of two, each have the notion of a part, as this author seems to have taught: for it is true, as St. Thomas teaches, in the Third Part, question 2, article 4, proved from many councils and authorities, that the person of Christ is truly composite of two, of which one, namely the divine person, is not a part - although it have in a certain way the notion of act - whereas the human nature has the notion of potency.

The argument of Gualterus is easily dissolved. First, because he assumed a false proposition, namely that things of diverse predicaments differ of themselves: for "to be," and action, and passion are things of diverse predicaments, and yet, from Aristotle, Physics, book 3, they are the same motion. And from the very foundation we shall show that relation is not always a quality, as he took it by his foundation, in distinguishing. Then, the truth of the position in these matters, which are created, must be sought from the very things which are laid down in the sacraments and in the divine: for since in the predicaments there are several things, it does not follow that there must be true and real diversity; whence the diverse divine attributes, which are true though they are one alone, must not on that account be placed in different predicaments.

Caput III - The opinion of Scotus

After the foregoing opinion of Gualterus, and the common one which affirms that the attributes among themselves and from the essence are not really distinguished but only by reason, Scotus devised a certain middle opinion in 1 Sent., distinction 8, question 4 (for which there is also commonly cited distinction 2, question 7, in the Ordinatio), where he does not expressly dispute this point, but about the distinction only of the essence from the relation, that is, the person. He asserts, therefore, that the attributes among themselves are not distinguished really, nor yet by reason alone, but by a certain middle distinction, which he calls "formal," and says is "from the nature of the thing," and prior to every operation of the intellect, both human and divine. Moreover, he divides the aforesaid division of distinction into a distinction "from the nature of the thing" and a "distinction of reason," which is by the intellect. Again he divides the distinction "from the nature of the thing" into the real - by which one thing differs from another as a thing from a thing - and the formal - by which one differs from another by a formal ratio, or definition - which he plainly teaches to be prior to the intellect, as is gathered from the question cited and question 4 in the Ordinatio. And although he does not expressly teach in that place that the attributes are not distinguished from the substance and essence of God in the same way, nevertheless from his principles this is altogether inferred, and his disciples expressly affirm it.[112]

Scotus proves his view in 1 Sent., dist. 8, q. 3, ad quaestionem respondens, first because goodness in genus is distinguished from wisdom in genus "from the nature of the thing"; therefore infinite goodness is to be distinguished from infinite wisdom in the same way. For the addition of infinity to goodness or to wisdom or to another attribute does not destroy the nature and the formal ratio of it. Therefore infinite goodness ought to be distinguished from infinite wisdom in genus; and likewise infinite goodness and infinite wisdom agree also in genus of infinity from the nature of the thing ...

Tertio, Walter plainly subverts the simplicity of God, he is forced to admit what is absurd. Nor does the evasion which he himself contrived avail anything: first, for if wisdom and goodness are in the essence of God really distinct from it, and by these God is rendered good and wise, it follows that these forms are really in the divine nature and are therefore received into it: the essence is therefore in potency so as to be informed, and wisdom as a form reduces the essence itself to act - not that that potency of God is at some time, or could be, with privation of form, but because it is truly informed by wisdom as by a form. For even in those subjects from which accidental forms cannot be separated, if they are really distinguished from the forms themselves, there is truly potency, and the forms themselves are true acts of that potency. Then also, if in God there are several things really distinct from his essence, and neither has of itself potency with respect to the other, a greater absurdity follows, namely that there is in God a certain aggregate which logicians call a per accidens whole, such as a heap of stones, which is no less, indeed far more, repugnant to the divine simplicity. For simplicity and unity are opposed to multiplicity: but where there is multiplicity and a conjunction of several, there cannot be simplicity, and there will be far less unity

112. Scotus, 1 Sent., dist. 8, q. 4 (Ord.); also dist. 2, q. 7 (Ord.).

there where the things that come together are conjoined, and the one has the ratio of act, the other the ratio of potency. The Trinity of persons, however, for this reason does not oppose simplicity, because each person by its very nature is altogether the same as the essence. Finally, it is not necessary, in order that a thing be said to be truly composed of two, that each have the ratio of a part, as this author seemed to have taught: for as we prove with St. Thomas from the Third Part, question 2, article 4, on the basis of many councils and Fathers, the person of Christ is truly composed of two, of which the one, namely the divine person, is not a part, although that has in a certain manner the ratio of act; on the contrary, the human nature has the ratio of potency. Walter's argument is easily dissolved, first indeed, because it assumes a false proposition, namely that things of diverse predicaments differ really: for action and passion are things of different predicaments, and yet, from Aristotle, Physics 3, chapter 3, they are the same motion; and, as we shall show below, relation is not always distinguished from the quality which it has as its foundation. Then also, even if the proposition were true in those things which are truly created and are placed in a predicament; yet in divine things, which truly are not in a category, it ought not to be true from this alone, that various attributes of God are conceived after the fashion of created things which are placed in a predicament.

Scotus's opinion: a "formal" distinction before any intellect

Between the aforesaid opinion of Walter and the common opinion, which affirms that the attributes are distinguished among themselves and formally from the essence only by reason, Scotus devised, in the First Book, distinction 8, question 4 (and for it he is also wont to be cited at distinction 2, question 7 in the Ordinatio), a certain middle opinion, where, on this matter, he does not dispute expressly, but only about the distinction of the essence from the relation, or person. He asserts, therefore, that the attributes are not distinguished among themselves really, nor yet only by reason, but by a certain middle distinction, which he calls formal, and he says that it is from the nature of the thing and prior to every operation of intellect, both human and divine. He divides the distinction, by a prior division, into a distinction from the nature of the thing, and a distinction of reason, which is by the intellect: again he divides the distinction from the nature of the thing into the real, whereby one differs from another as thing from thing, and the formal, whereby one differs from another by formal ratio, or definition, which he plainly esteems to be prior to the intellect, as is gathered from the cited question, and from distinction 2, question 4 in the Ordinatio. And although he does not expressly teach that the attributes are distinguished in this way from the substance and essence of God, yet from his principles it is altogether gathered, and his disciples expressly affirm it.

Scotus proves his opinion in that distinction 8, question 3 or 9. To the question he answers first, because goodness in genus is distinguished from wisdom in genus from the nature of the thing: therefore infinite goodness ought likewise to be distinguished from infinite wisdom in the same way: because infinity, added to goodness, or to wisdom, or to another attribute, does not destroy

the nature and formal ratio of it: therefore infinite goodness and wisdom in genus ought to be distinguished: but that they are in genus distinguished from the nature of the thing is plain, because they differ in definition and in formal ratio: but definition is the nature of the thing itself.

Second foundation. Then those propositions which our intellect forms - "Wisdom is not goodness"; "Intellect is not will" - are not true because the intellect, conceiving thus, bestows truth upon them; but because they are conformable to the thing which they enunciate: they therefore suppose that in the thing itself it is so as is enunciated: therefore they suppose that wisdom by its nature is not goodness before the intellect: but whenever one is not the other before the intellect, it is necessary that before the intellect it differ from it: therefore goodness and wisdom, and similar attributes of God, which are truly denied of one another in a proposition, differ before the intellect by their nature. These are the most powerful reasons by which Scotus confirms his opinion: for the others which the Canariensis piles up in the place to be cited below are reduced to this latter: for all are taken from this, that many things are said of one attribute which cannot be said of another, as of the intellect, that it generates and understands, which cannot be enunciated of the will, and the like. How, however, Scotus with this opinion defends the simplicity of God, we shall see in the following chapter.

Some have thought the foundation of this distinction in Scotus to be other than it is. This opinion of Scotus certain men interpret benignly, as Gregory reports in 1, dist. 8, q. 1, art. 5, thinking that Scotus never conceded a certain formal distinction from the nature of the thing among the attributes in such wise that before every operation of the intellect they be actually distinguished; but only a distinction which is a sufficient foundation for the intellect to distinguish several. They gather, indeed, this interpretation from the same Scotus in 1, dist. 2, q. 7, at the paragraph "Sed hic restat," where he calls this distinction virtual: he also says that it is not really actual: finally he says that it can be called a distinction of reason. I indeed, if the School of this doctor consented to this interpretation, would most gladly admit it too: but I see no one who so understands his teacher, nor do I see how it can be so explained, as Gregory well proves. For the words of Scotus in the place cited do not admit such a sense. There, namely, speaking of the distinction between the divine essence and the relation - which in his opinion is the same as that which he posits between the attributes - he says first that this distinction is before every act of intellect, both created and uncreated, which he, as something new, says he affirms without assertion and prejudice to a better opinion: but if he only conceded that in the thing itself there is a foundation of the distinction by the intellect, he would say nothing new, nor would there be need to submit his opinion thus to the judgment of others. Second, in the same paragraph he says that this distinction is the least of those which precede the operation of the intellect. Third, he asks whether a real distinction can be given; and he answers in these words, "It is not properly really actual," understanding, as it is commonly said, by really actual that which is the difference of things, because of the divine simplicity. And a few lines later: "It can, however, be called a difference of reason," as a certain doctor says (to wit, St. Bonaventure on 1, dist. 15, q. 1), "not that ratio be taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but that ratio be taken for the quidditative aspect of the thing, according as quidditas is the object of the intellect: or in another way it can be called a

virtual difference, because that which has such a distinction does not have in itself thing and thing; but is one thing having virtually, or eminently as it were, two realities, because to each reality, as it is in that thing, there befits that proper feature which belongs to such a reality, as if it itself were a distinct thing. Thus indeed this reality distinguishes, and that does not distinguish (he means the divine essence and the relation), as if this were one thing and that another." Fourth, a little below, about the divine essence and the relation, about the distinction of which he had disputed, he adds these words: "I say that in the divine essence before the act of the intellect there is entity A, and there is entity B, and this is not formally that, such that the paternal intellect considering A and considering B has from the nature of the thing whence this composition is true, A is not formally B, yet not precisely from any act of the intellect about A and B." And in Quodlibet 5, article 2, at the paragraph "Circa tamen," after he reported the opinion of St. Thomas and Henry asserting that Spiration and Paternity differ only by reason, and that this is sufficient for one not to be predicated of the other, he adds these words: "Another says otherwise (to wit, Varro on the First Book, distinction 2), and more reasonably, as it seems, and to the point, that the properties in the same person differ from the nature of the thing, besides the consideration of the intellect: because for this it suffices that there be disparity, although they are not opposed; and on this account the predication of one of the other in the abstract is not true." From which it is clear, first, that this distinction is posited by Scotus before the intellect: and therefore in distinction 8, question 4, at "Ad quaestionem," in the verse "istud non videtur," he called it a distinction on the part of the thing; and at the beginning of the same paragraph he called it a third distinction besides the real and that of reason, which he said is altogether before the intellect: which if it were only the foundation of that before the intellect, it would not be altogether before the intellect; and therefore, at "Circa tamen," he styled it a distinction from the nature of the thing. Second, it is gathered that this is not called by Scotus a distinction of reason, because it is made actually by the intellect. Third, that it is not called virtual, because it is made actually by the intellect, and the foundation alone contains it virtually in the thing itself: but because in the thing there is brought to pass what diverse things sometimes bring about. But when he says that it is not really actual, for that reason he asserts it, because it is not a distinction of thing from thing; but of two formal ratios: and for the same cause he also styled it that of reason. In this sense, therefore, explained, Scotus's opinion is to be attacked in the next chapter, and it is to be proved that no other distinction between the divine attributes and the essence, or between the attributes themselves mutually, can be admitted, than that which is by the intellect.

Caput IV - That the divine attributes are not distinguished among themselves, or from the essence, before the operation of the intellect, is shown by authority

The common opinion of the Scholastics and of the Philosophers is much truer, namely, that these attributes are not distinguished among themselves, or from the essence, in any way from the nature of the thing, that is, before the intellect. This is followed by St. Thomas in De veritate q. 7, art. 6; in Opusculum 9, q. 1, 2, and 3; and on the First Book, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2 and 3; Durandus on the First, dist. 2, q. 2; Gabriel on q. 1 and 2; Gregory, q. 1; Marsilius on the First, q. 12, art. 3;

Capreolus on the First, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 1; Major, q. 1; Henry in Quodlibet 5, q. 1, and Quodlibet 13, q. 1; Averroes on Metaphysics 12, comment 59; Augustine Niphus on Metaphysics 12, disputation 13, chapter 4; the Canariensis in this article, disputation 1, part 1 and 2; Cajetan in the Opuscule De ente et essentia, chapters 6, 9, 12, in order: all of whom conspire against Scotus in this, to teach that the attributes among themselves and from the essence do not differ before the intellect in any way; whether, however, they differ by the intellect, not all think in the same way, as will be evident in the following disputation.[113]

For the perspicuity of this opinion two things must be confirmed and explained by us: one is, that this distinction is not from the nature of the thing before the intellect: the other, how it is made by the intellect: we shall demonstrate the first in this chapter; the second is to be treated more at large in the following disputation.

It is proved from the Fathers. This opinion therefore the ancient Fathers in the first place have handed down to us expressly, among whom most explicitly St. Anselm in the Monologion, chapter 15, where he says thus: "Accordingly, just as whatever is predicated essentially of the supreme substance is one, so it itself is, in one way, not by a different consideration, whatever it is essentially." And when he had shown that man, according to one consideration, is a body; according to another, rational; and according to another, a man; he straightway subjoins: "But that supreme essence is by no means so one thing, that that same thing, according to another way or according to another consideration, is not; because whatever it is essentially in some way, this is the whole that it is." By which words he excludes not only any distinction from the nature of the thing among those things which are in God; but even seems not to admit any distinction of reason; which indeed is to be understood in this way, that we think nothing in God which we do not understand to belong to God equally essentially: since in him we do not conceive something common to him and to other things, and something proper to him, as in man; but all things belong equally to God. Moreover, by the name of consideration he understands not only the operation of the intellect, but the thing itself, when he says that man, according to another consideration, is a body; according to another, rational, that is, according to another part; which is not found in God: since whatever is in him is altogether the same.

St. Augustine also, in book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 5 near the end, says that in God "to be just" is the same as "to be good": which, continuing in chapter 6, after a few words he says, "His wisdom is not one thing, his essence another, to which it is 'to be,' which is 'to be wise'." And in book 5, chapter 8: "It is not one thing for God to be, and another to be great; but the same thing to him is to be that it is to be great." He repeats the same in chapter 10 and 11; and in book 6, chapter 6 and 7; and in book 11, chapter 10. To these adds St. Gregory, book 10 of the Morals, chapter 20

113. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 7, a. 6; Opusc. 9, q. 1 - 3; In 1 Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2 - 3. Durandus, In 1 Sent., d. 2, q. 2. Gabriel, qq. 1 - 2. Gregory, q. prima. Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 12, a. 3. Capreolus, In 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1. Major, q. 1. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 1; Quodl. 13, q. 1. Averroes, In 12 Metaph., com. 59. Augustine Niphus, 12 Metaph., disp. 13, cap. 4. The Bishop of the Canaries, on this article, disp. 1, p. 1 - 2. Cajetan, Opusc. De ente et essentia, cc. 6, 9, 12.

(elsewhere 21) on those words "qui autem noverunt," where he says thus, "God is that which he has: for he has eternity, but he himself is eternity; he has light, but he himself is his light: therefore in him it is not one thing to be, and another to have."

Granted, he called it a distinction on the part of the thing; and at the beginning he called it a third distinction, besides the real and of reason, which he said to be altogether prior to the intellect. But if what is prior to the intellect were only the foundation of that distinction, then it would not at all be prior to the intellect. Yet for all that he styled it a distinction from the nature of the thing. Secondly, it is gathered that this is not called by Scotus a distinction of reason, because it is made actually by the intellect. Thirdly, it is not called virtual, because it is made actually by the intellect, and only the foundation containing it in virtue is in the thing itself; but because in the thing itself there is wont to be supplied that which different things sometimes effect. But when he says that it is not a real actual distinction, for that reason he asserts so, because it is not a distinction of thing from thing, but of two formal notions; for which cause also he called it a distinction of reason. In this sense, therefore, with Scotus's opinion explained, it must be impugned in the following chapter, and it must be proved that no other distinction between the divine attributes and the essence (*essentia*), or between the attributes themselves mutually, can exist except by the intellect (*intellectus*).

That the divine attributes are not distinguished among themselves and from the essence prior to the operation of the intellect is shown by authority.

The common sentence of the Scholastics and of the Philosophers is far truer, namely, that these attributes are not distinguished among themselves, or from the essence, in any way from the nature of the thing, that is, prior to the intellect. This is followed by St. Thomas in De veritate q. 7, a. 6; in Opusc. 9, qq. 1 - 3; and in the First Book of the Sentences, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2 - 3; and by Durandus in the First Book of the Sentences, d. 2, q. 2; by Gabriel [Biel], qq. 1 - 2; by Gregory, q. prima; by Marsilius in the First Book of the Sentences, q. 12, a. 3; by Capreolus on the First Book of the Sentences, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1; by Major, q. 1; by Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 1 and Quodl. 13, q. 1; by the Commentator on Metaphysics 12, com. 59; by Augustine Niphus, Metaphysics 12, disp. 13, c. 4; by the Bishop of the Canaries on this article, disp. 1, p. 1 - 2; and by Cajetan, Opusc. De ente et essentia, cc. 6, 9, 12 - in order: who all conspire in this one point against Scotus, to teach that the attributes do not differ either among themselves or from the essence prior to the intellect in any way; whether, however, they differ by the intellect, not all of them think in the same manner; but this will be plain below.[114]

From St. Augustine also, Book 5 on the Trinity, chapter 5 near the end, where he says that it is the same for God to be just as to be good; and in the following chapter 6, shortly after, that for God it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but that the very being of God is that he be wise; and again in chapter 8: there is not one thing for God to be and another to be good; but this same

114. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 7, a. 6; Opusc. 9, qq. 1 - 3; In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2 - 3. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 2. Gabriel, qq. 1 - 2. Gregory, q. prima. Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 12, a. 3. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1. Major, q. 1. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 1; Quodl. 13, q. 1. Averroes, In XII Metaph., com. 59. Augustine Niphus, XII Metaph., disp. 13, c. 4. The Bishop of the Canaries, on this article, disp. 1, p. 1 - 2. Cajetan, Opusc. De ente et essentia, cc. 6, 9, 12.

thing it is for him to be and to be good. He repeats the same in chapters 10 and 11; and in Book 6, chapters 5 and 7; and in Book 11, chapter 10. To these adds St. Gregory, Book 10 of the Morals, chapter 21 on those words "qui autem noverunt," where he says thus: God is that which he has: for he has eternity, but he himself is eternity; he has light, but he himself is his light: therefore in him it is not one thing to be, and another to have.

Richard of St. Victor, Book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 13, teaches that God is by himself wise and powerful, not by something other by which he is wisdom and power; whence he gathers in these words: it is necessary that those things (namely wisdom and power) be altogether not anything other than he himself, that is, the highest substance. The words "altogether" and "anything other" are to be noted, by which he manifestly denies every distinction prior to the intellect from the nature of the thing. For if the attributes in any way differed from the essence from the nature of the thing, they would not be "altogether not anything other."

The same sentence is had from Marius Victorinus, Book 3 Against Arius, before the middle, in the fifth tome of the Sacred Library, where he proves that in God there is not one thing that lives and another which lives, but that living and the one who lives and understanding are altogether the same.

Boethius taught the same in the short book On the Trinity in these words: The divine nature is form without matter; and therefore it is one: it is that by which it is; for the rest are not that which they are. And below: wherefore this truly one, in which there is no number, in it there is nothing other besides that which it is. But if the attributes were distinguished among themselves or from the essence, there would be number there from the nature of the thing, and something other besides that which it is. For this sentence against Scotus we shall adduce in due place the notable words of St. John Damascene, which we will report below in disputation 129, chapter 4.

Secondly, although Scotus nowhere calls the distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the essence "real," indeed he expressly affirms that they do not differ as several things, but as several formal notions; yet since he teaches that distinction to be from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect, he seems to fall into the sentence of Gilbert, nay to introduce more distinctions in God than Gilbert posited. For Gilbert never called that distinction "real," nor did he assert that the essence and relation are several things; that God, or the Father, and his wisdom are several things; but he only said that God is not his wisdom, and he understood this from the nature of the thing and prior to the intellect. Then he spoke only of essence and person when he said that God is not his wisdom; for by the name of "God" he understood the Father or another person, but by the name of "wisdom" he understood the essence; and of the essence itself he nowhere denied that it is its own wisdom; rather he expressly conceded it, as we reported in chapter 2. But Scotus says not only that the Father, or the divine person, is not from the nature of the thing his essence and wisdom; but also that the essence of God is not his wisdom, and his intellect, etc. What in truth was done against Gilbert in the Council of Reims, and in what manner that proposition "God is not his wisdom" was damned, we shall show in disputation 120, chapter 2; how also in Scotus's sentence the mode of speaking which Gilbert was asserting is followed, we shall show in the same place. For

by the same reasoning we must philosophize about the distinction of relation from the essence, and of the attributes among themselves and from the essence; and the same absurdity follows in both, if we constitute among them more than a distinction of reason.

The same opinion is shown by reason.

Caput V - Against Scotus by reason; and first with Bernard's argument against Gilbert

But now against Scotus let us argue by reason; and first with that by which Bernard used himself in the Council of Reims against Gilbert, and it is had in his own Sermon 80 on the Canticles: for the very same in every way will make against Scotus of its own accord, except that against Gilbert Bernard showed only that God, that is, the divine person, is his wisdom, that is, is the divine nature; but we on the contrary against Scotus must show that the essence of God is his wisdom - which follows by stronger reason, and Bernard would have proved much better, if Gilbert had denied that. The reasoning is of this sort.

If the divine essence is wise, or has wisdom which by its own nature differs from it, and prior to the intellect is not the essence itself, then that wisdom prior to the intellect is either something or nothing. It cannot be nothing; therefore it is something. Again, that something is either, prior to the intellect and by its own nature, superior to the divine essence formally and essentially, or equal to it, or inferior to it. It cannot be superior, as is clear; nor equal: for if it were equal by the nature of the thing to the very essence of God, then what we contend would be proved against Scotus - that what is equal to the essence is the essence itself; or if even then it were distinct, there would be several essences of God and several gods; for what is equal to God is God himself, and what is equal to the essence is the essence itself. Or finally, that something would be inferior to the essence itself; and thus there would be some creature formally, by its nature and prior to the intellect: therefore the divine nature would be made wise by something created, which is absurd. This reasoning must not only be held up for the authority of Bernard, and because it is in itself most efficacious, it must be highly esteemed; but also because Bernard himself was a good part of the definition of the Council of Reims, as will be seen in disputation 120. He himself fashioned this reasoning in order to confute that proposition of Gilbert, "God is not his goodness, or wisdom"; and the same fight very well against another proposition of Scotus, "Deity is not its goodness, or wisdom," from the nature of the thing and prior to the intellect. For although Scotus adds that the essence and wisdom are the same thing; nevertheless, when he says that the one is not the other from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect, he destroys what he had posited; for these two, as we shall say below, manifestly fight with each other; and his proposition agrees with Gilbert's proposition, because he denies the one to be the other from the nature of the thing, and not only according to our mode of understanding, as Gilbert absolutely denied; and in strictness from the nature of the thing, when we say "Deity is truth," we must add, "this is true"; just as Gilbert used to say that it must be added. For this proposition is formal in the sentence of Scotus, "Deity is true, or wise"; but that other, "Deity is wisdom, or truth," is not formal, nor true from the nature of the thing, nor in our mode of understanding; wherefore also in Bernard and in the Council that correction of

Gilbert, which he added, namely, "this is, true or wise," is damned; therefore it must be blamed also in Scotus: because in his sentence, if from the nature of the thing and formally we speak, the same addition must be made.

Secondly, as we shall see in disputation 120, chapter 2, Gilbert never said that God and his wisdom, that is, the essence, are two things, or really differ; but speaking with the distinction of reason alone, he only said that they are distinguished not by another from another, which abstraction is mathematical and makes one thing be abstracted from another; but also by the theological reason: certainly by the theological reason I cannot understand otherwise than that the theologian must concede in the thing itself a formal reason from the nature of the thing: as Scotus admitted.

Thirdly, because against Scotus there follows that which we were inferring against Walter in chapter 2: namely, that in God there is composition, and therefore there would follow a substantial composition of the essence of God. For if prior to the intellect several things agree in the divine essence, whether they be called formal notions, or things otherwise by their nature, they cannot but compose that in which they agree. For if there is some distinction prior to the intellect and from the nature of the thing, there is also something and something prior to the intellect; therefore also the coming together of several and composition. But Scotus, to protect the simplicity of God, answers in the same way as Walter: namely, that those several things agree in such a way that nothing has the notion of a part, nor is the one as potency, the other as act. But in the same way this solution must be confuted against Scotus as against Walter. For if from the nature of the thing there is something and something, and the one is in the other as the formal reason by which that is such - namely, wisdom in the essence, that it may be wise - it follows that there is from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect act and potency: or if Scotus does not admit this, let him concede something worse, namely an inordinate aggregate which the logicians call "per accidens." Moreover, since plurality is repugnant to supreme simplicity, such as is the divine nature, even the least plurality and distinction from the nature of the thing will be repugnant. Why, however, plurality does not repel by the reason of a notion, we shall say in disputation 121.

Moreover, for the confirmation of this let us hear Bernard in the fifth of the Considerations to Eugene, before the middle, disputing against Gilbert, who was saying that the divine person, as the Father, is not the very deity, but by it, as by a form, is God. He says, therefore: Many things are said to be in God, and indeed truly and catholically; but they are many-one; otherwise if we judge them diverse, you will not have unity, but centenity. For example, we say great, good, just, and innumerable things; but unless you consider all to be one in God and with God, you will have a multiple God. He does not understand many gods, but one, not simple, but compacted of multiple variety. The same, therefore, we infer against Scotus in this way: if all those things in God from the nature of the thing are not the same, but several formal reasons mutually diverse, by which God stands, God is adorned and constant with multiple perfection; and so he himself is multiple. Bernard subjoins: For me there is not lacking what I might think of a God of yours of this sort: you seek what simplicity truly is; my judgment prefers simple to multiple. But what do those reply to this (namely Gilbert and his school, against whom he disputes)? Not many, they say, but one only

divinity, by which all those things are in God, we assert to confer. So that man used to answer thus: because he posited no distinction between the attributes and the essence, as we noted above, but between the essence and the person; and therefore he said that all those attributes are one deity, which would not be God himself, but would make God as a form: wherefore Bernard presses him excellently, saying in effect: You assert, therefore, if not a multiple, at least a double God; which is a greater mark of fault; namely as if he were rushing to that, that multiplicity cannot be thought: that is, now God will not consist of various forms, but of two, namely of nature and of property; and so he will not be multiple, but double. It follows in the same place with Bernard, that he is not simple who is made up as one from two, any more than he who is made up from many. You wish, therefore, that simple be that which is not itself that thing which is, but that by a form: therefore if God is wise by a wisdom which by the nature of the thing is not God himself, then that is by the nature of the thing a form by which he is made wise; therefore God by his nature is obnoxious to some form. Finally he concludes: one God the Catholic has, whom he has as this, that he is wise not by this, nor by that which is not he himself. In a word, in God we mark nothing that is by a form, and hence nothing many; and by this we distinguish those things: we say God is that which he is, that is, he himself is; but not that which is in him, as if it were not he himself; for in him there is nothing; since he is not multiple.

In this sense, therefore, we can safely say in the Scotist sentence: from the nature of the thing this is, that God is "all-one," that is, not many in himself; but this, that God is "all-one," if from the nature of the thing he has any distinction, any multiplicity, we cannot safely assert.

By the same reason Isidore teaches, Book 1 On the Highest Good, chapter 1, sentence 6, where he says: God is supremely simple, one admitting nothing to himself as added; lest anyone suppose one thing of him, and another thing which is in him. And Richard of St. Victor, Book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 17, after he taught that God is truly simple and by no means composite, says: Therefore set it down as certain that in that utmost felicity, and true felicity of life there is true and perfect simplicity, and supreme simplicity, where also the most true good is; for supreme simplicity is always conjoined with the supreme good; wherefore God is the most simple of all, to whom nothing can be added or subtracted; lest one think that there is anything which is other than he himself, or other than that which is in him. And elsewhere he concludes that God is truly one, and most one; and that this opinion of Scotus is not explicit, certainly it is not of the divine simplicity, but of some that can be - not in him in act. Therefore if in God there were anything other, that thing would be something added; which is more repugnant to simplicity, and would indicate a greater vice than multiplicity itself, namely that he should have in himself something which is not himself.

Nor does it matter, if you say with Scotus that God is one, although he have many things in himself: for in no way does that unite God. For in the same way a man has many things in himself, yet he is one man; nevertheless Bernard's sentence is not for that: for it is not a unity which he has, and which simple is not, nor one: it will be said that he is one and simple with Bernard, these are the same; otherwise even man would be "most-one," which is absurd; nor do we call one "most-

one"; therefore it is because he has one thing from another. Wherefore Bernard, when he says that God is "most-one," excludes every plurality from the nature of the thing from his essence and nature.

From the same Bernard also we shall prove no less clearly our sentence against Scotus below in disputation 118, chapter 2, when Bernard cites Nicetas in Oration 24, whose words we shall adduce in disputation 118, chapter 4; where, to show the simplicity of God, he says that his essence is one, and is very unity itself and solity; by which word he most excellently expresses the simplicity of God, when he says that he is solity, that is, alone without consortium with others, so that he be solity itself. But if by the nature of the thing he had several perfections, he would not be solity, nor would solity itself stand with those things added from elsewhere.

Add St. Anselm too, On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3 near the end, who, to prove the simplicity of God and against him whom we shall say in disputation 102, chapter 1 to have been in the same error with Gilbert, says to this effect: if all composite things can be dissolved by thought, as we say that God cannot be dissolved by thought, God would be less than that which can be thought, if he could be understood as what Bernard also asserted: he had said just before that greater is that which can neither be taken away nor understood as taken away, than that which can easily be removed: from which in turn thus against Scotus: greater is that which by the nature of the thing cannot be removed, nor be distinguished, than that which by the nature of the thing has several things in itself.

By this reason also Isidore, Book 1 On the Highest Good, chapter 1, sentence 6, says: God is supremely simple, not admitting anything to himself added; lest anyone think one thing of him, and another thing which is in him. And Richard of St. Victor in the same Book 1, chapter 17, after he stated that God is truly simple and least of all composite, says: Constantly set as certain that in that most blessed felicity, and in true felicity there is true and perfect simplicity, and the highest simplicity; where also the most true good is; for the highest simplicity is truly conjoined with the highest good; wherefore God is supremely simple, to whom nothing can be added or taken away; lest one think that there is one thing of him, and another thing which is in him. Therefore it is manifestly a true opinion that God is one, and most one. But according to Scotus's opinion there will be in God, from the nature of the thing, more than one thing; which cannot be. For if there were in the nature one thing and another, that which is in him would be added; but that which from the nature of the thing is more added bears with itself a greater imperfection.

But this cannot even be dissolved by the intellect, whereas that can. For Anselm did not call "to be dissolved by the intellect" to be distinguished only in our concept, but for the intellect to find in the thing itself one thing and another; and this he set in opposition to dissolution in act or in the thing itself - for he judged this to occur whenever one thing exists without another. He therefore wills that in God there be the highest unity, so that not only can one not be without the other, but neither can the intellect find in the thing itself, from the nature of the thing, one thing and another, distinct. From this, however, Anselm does not remove a distinction of concepts which does not touch the thing itself, but remains in our consideration alone; nor does he remove composition in

this way, but any plurality whatsoever in the thing itself: because something greater can be conceived, namely a simplicity in which there is no plurality; but nothing greater than God can be conceived.[115]

From the opinion of Scotus there further follows that, from the nature of the thing, the essence of God in itself is not essentially perfect, but is perfected by some form supervening - which too is absurd. From all of which it follows that the attributes among themselves, and from the essence, are distinguished only by the operation of the intellect; about which mode of distinction there remain more things to be said in the following disputations.

Thus far we have attacked that middle distinction which Scotus fabricates in the divine attributes by peculiar rationes, which they say are proved only in God. It remains to show universally that such a distinction is altogether fictitious, and is found in no things, even created ones; but that every distinction is either real, or of reason. We do not deny that there is latitude in real distinction itself: for some things differ really as two things, each of which can exist per se without the other; others as thing and mode, of which one, namely the mode, cannot exist without the other, but can newly supervene upon it. We only strive to destroy a distinction "from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect," as it were of several formal rationes or definitions, and to show that such a distinction is either real or of reason - something Durandus also proves very well by this single consideration. Every being is sufficiently divided into a being of reason and a real being; therefore every plurality, which is a passion of being, will be sufficiently divided in the same way. But plurality is the same as distinction; therefore every distinction will be either of reason or real. Then, if from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect one formal ratio is not another, it follows that it is something else and another ratio; since therefore each of these is something real, so that before the intellect, from the nature of the thing itself, it may be something, and something real: there will therefore be two things, or two really diverse things. Nor does anything at all stand in the way, that in one and the same composite thing, which has the ratio of a whole, there be found a twofold ratio, as in man, soul and body; for one ratio differs from another really. Thus, even if in the same composite thing, or a thing which has the ratio of a whole, a twofold formal ratio be found, nevertheless if the one is not the other from its own nature and before the intellect, it will be really distinct from it.

Moreover, a real distinction is affirmed not only of those things which can be mutually separated at the same time, but also of those of which the one at least can be without the other, even if not conversely; besides, the ratio itself is openly confirmed by the authority of Aristotle, Topics VII, chapter 1, place 15, with these words: "Further, if one of the two can exist without the other, it will not be the same." By this same argument - that one can remain without the other - St. Augustine proves in book VI On the Trinity, chapter 6, that magnitude is one thing, figure another, and color another. And St. Bernard, sermon 80 on the Canticles, by the same reasoning gathers

115. St. Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, c. 3; cf. the author's Disput. 102, c. 1.

that the soul is not its justice and holiness. It can also be proved manifestly: because whenever two things are diverse only by our reason, while in reality they are altogether the same, they can be separated by thought alone, just as by thought alone they are diverse.[116]

Against Scotus from Bernard, Isidore, Richard, and Anselm

He held thus: because he posited no distinction at all between the attributes and the essence, as we noted above, but between essence and person; and thus he said all those attributes to be one "deity," which would not be God himself, but that by which, as by a form, God would be God; and accordingly he asserted that it confers on God that he be. But on the contrary St. Bernard subjoins: "You assert, therefore, if not a multiple God, at least a double God; and you have not reached simplicity with respect to number; nor to that than which a greater cannot be thought. That is, now God will not consist of various forms, but of two, namely of nature and of property; and thus he will not be multiple, but double." It follows also in the same Bernard (in the text cited above), that he is so simple that he is liable to no form, which neither a virgin nor a woman known by a single man is subject to. Bernard therefore wills that that be not called simple which is not itself by itself, but is some form: if therefore God is wise by a wisdom which from the nature of the thing is not God himself, and that is from the nature of the thing the form by which he is wise, then God is from his nature liable to some form. Finally he concludes: "My God is he who is Catholic, since he does not have this and that, than that other which he does not have; and he is 'he who is,' not 'that by which he is.'" That is: in God it is not permitted to assign in reality this and this, nor many things, so that we distinguish these and those; but God himself is "he who is," that is, he himself there; but not "that by which he is," that is, he is not many things which are in him: because he is not many.[117]

Certainly, according to Scotus's opinion, we could well say: in God from the nature of the thing there is this and this; and God is those many things which are in him. It is better, therefore, to assert that God is altogether, from the nature of the thing, simple without any distinction and multiplicity.

For this reason also Isidore, book 1 On the Highest Good, chapter 1, sentence 6, says: "Therefore God is called simple, either because he does not admit what he has, or because he is not one thing himself and another what is in him." And Richard of St. Victor, book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 17, after he has shown God to be truly simple and in no way composite, says: "Accordingly it is established that in that eternal happiness, and truly happy eternity, there is true immutability, and consequently true and highest simplicity, where, moreover, where there is highest simplicity there is true and highest unity: whatever therefore is in the highest good is truly and supremely one; nor can there be there one thing and another; and the very self is the whole that it is." Therefore he continues in chapters 18 and 19: but if the opinion of Scotus as above explained were true, certainly there would not be in God the highest unity that can be, since in it there would be first in understanding one thing and another by nature of the thing; which, if it were not so, there would

116. Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1, loc. 15; St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 6; St. Bernard, Sermo 80 in Cantica.
117. St. Bernard, De consideratione, l. 5, near the place cited above.

be a greater perfection; hence it would be simplicity and a greater unity, because there would be greater indivision: for one and indivisible are the same. This same thing St. Bernard had said, book 5 of De consideratione, a little after the passage cited above: "God is not composite, he is mere simple; and if you wish to learn what 'simple' I should say, the same as 'one': God is as simple as he is one; he is, moreover, one, and in what way nothing else can be said, he is 'most one' (unissimus)." Therefore Bernard uses "not composite" and "simple" for the same thing, or "one": but he calls one that in which there are not many.

Nor does it matter if you say with Scotus that God is one, although he has many things in himself: because he precludes that each of those many be God. For then by the same reason man has many things in himself which are not man; and yet man, in Bernard's sense, will not be one, because he has many things in himself: and because he is not simple, he will not be called one, since one and simple are the same for Bernard; otherwise man too would be called "most one," which is absurd. Therefore, if man is not called "most one," the reason is that he has this and that. Since therefore Bernard asserts that God is "most one," he excludes all plurality from the nature of the thing from his essence and nature.

From this same Bernard also, against Scotus, we will no less clearly prove our opinion in Disputation 118, chapter 2. With Bernard agrees Nicetas on Oration 24 of Nazianzen, whose words we shall cite below, Disputation 118, chapter 4, where, to show the simplicity of God, he says that his essence is one, and is unity itself and "solitude" (solitas); by which coined word he most aptly expressed the simplicity of God, when he says that it is solitas, that is, so alone without the consort of others, that it is solitude itself. Which, if from the nature of the thing it had several perfections, it would not be alone nor solitude itself, since there would be there one thing and another. St. Anselm also, in the book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3 near the end - who, to prove the simplicity of God against him whom we shall say was in the same error with Gilbert, Disputation 102, chapter 1 - thus says: "Therefore, an incongruity follows, if something composite can be dissolved by thought; for when he says God is composite, he says that something greater than God can be understood." Bernard had also asserted the same thing. But a little before Anselm had said that that is greater which can neither in act nor in the intellect be dissolved, than that which can at least be dissolved in the intellect. From which I thus argue against Scotus: that is greater which is in no way distinguished either in reality or from the nature of the thing, than that which can be dissolved either in reality or by the intellect; therefore, if, by Scotus's opinion, in God from the nature of the thing there be several things in him, that cannot be dissolved by the intellect; but the other can; therefore the one is greater. But nothing can be conceived as greater than God.[118]

To the truth, Scotus's arguments can be dissolved with no trouble; and the first argument, in order to prove anything, ought to have presupposed that there is some common concept of created and uncreated wisdom, and of created and uncreated justice, and similarly for the other attributes. For if that common ratio of wisdom were from the nature of the thing different from the common ratio of justice, it would well follow that such wisdom, namely infinite wisdom, differs from the

118. Isidore, De summo bono, l. 1, c. 1, sent. 6; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, l. 1, c. 17 - 19; St. Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, c. 3; Nicetas on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 24; cf. the author's Disput. 118, cc. 2, 4; Disput. 102, c. 1.

nature of the thing from infinite justice; and so of the others. But since a created and uncreated form can have nothing in common except the name alone, as was proved in Disputation 22, chapter 4, the argument has no force: for the distinction between justice and wisdom is not constituted universally, but in any given genus, either of created wisdom and usefulness, or of uncreated. Moreover, if it is alleged that in genus they formally differ from the nature of the thing, what is assumed is what had to be proved and gathered in the conclusion.

But even if we were to concede a common concept of created and uncreated justice and wisdom, still the argument does not prove the point. For when it is said that wisdom universally differs from the nature of the thing, that must be denied: for since those concepts are merely universals through our intellect, they also ought to differ only through our reason. And only this should be conceded, that in the concept of wisdom the concept of justice is not included; which we not only concede universally, but will also show that it bears upon the divine attributes themselves.

To the second I answer that, on account of a distinction of reason alone, many things are enunciated by us of one attribute which can be predicated of another just as well - just as of the intellect that it generates and understands - while these cannot be said of the will. For this arises from the diversity of concepts which the words immediately signify as apprehended by us: for the attributes of God are conceived by us as they are, and thus are named by us, and by a single most simple concept and by a single word we strive to express whatever there is in God; nevertheless we cannot conceive or name the one without the other. Whether, however, on account of that same diversity of concept and of thought one attribute can be absolutely predicated of another, we shall say in Disputation 119.

Finally, it must be observed that it is in vain that, from this formal distinction which Scotus says to be before the intellect, one tries to gather also a real distinction of the emanations and the proceeding persons, as if that formal distinction were the root of a real and greater distinction than that which he himself posits among the persons.

Note. Whether the intellect of the wayfarer man can distinguish the divine attributes without an order to some things really distinct. Disput. 117.

Note. That the attributes can be distinguished by the intellect is shown against the Nominalists, cap. 1.

Note. That the attributes in God belong without respect to effects and to distinct creatures, cap. ...

On the distinction of the divine attributes

Whether the divine attributes are distinguished; and how

That the attributes can be distinguished by the intellect; a refutation of the Nominalists

The Nominalists, against Scotus, think not only that the attributes in reality, and from the essence, by no manner from the nature of the thing prior to the operation of the intellect, differ; but also, against the Thomists, that neither can they be distinguished by the intellect. So teach Gregory in I, dist. 8, q. 2, arts. 1 and 2; Major, q. 1; Gabriel, in I, dist. ..., q. ..., art. 1.[119] He proves this by the following reason: whatever in itself is indistinct, and without any distinction by its nature, cannot be distinguished and separated by something extrinsic; but our intellect is extrinsic to any thing: therefore by it no thing can be distinguished.

Nevertheless Gregory and Major add that, although the attributes are not in reality distinguished by the intellect, yet they are distinguished in some manner connotatively, by reason of the effects which they, in some way, regard. For since the mercy of God looks to our misery, whereas justice punishes our offences - two effects which surely are distinguished - they are rightly said to be distinguished by distinct connotations; which is nothing other than that the very effects of the attributes differ in reality. But from the distinction of effects no distinction arises in the attributes themselves: this is clear from the same reason. For if the intellect, by reason of something extrinsic, could not distinguish the attributes, neither could it, by reason of the effects, which also are extrinsic, distinguish them. Therefore it is the same thing to distinguish the attributes by connotations and only to distinguish their effects.

But because sometimes effects are ascribed that are not distinguished - as the effects of justice and of mercy, because in every effect of either the ratio of the other is found - commonly the Scholastics teach in I, d. 46, and St. Thomas on the Summa Theologiae, q. 21, art. 4,[120] Gregory and Major subjoined that these attributes differ not by connoted things but by names only; as if they were to say, they are distinguished by name alone.

On the contrary, however, the opposite opinion is most true, namely, that the attributes of God are many - some in creatures are really distinct from others; against Durandus this is proved elsewhere - and in God they can be distinguished by us without respect to effects and to distinct creatures. This we shall establish in what follows

When it is said that, in general, justice and wisdom are not constituted either in the universal, but in any given genus, whether of created wisdom and justice, or of uncreated: further, if, in the genus of the uncreated, it be said that they differ formally from the nature of the thing, the very point to be proved is assumed, and what in the conclusion ought to have been gathered. But come,

119. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1 - 2; William Major (John Mair), q. 1; Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., d. ..., q. ..., a. 1.

120. Commonly taught in I Sent., d. 46; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 21, a. 4; see also Gregory and Major in the places cited.

let us concede a concept common to created and uncreated justice and wisdom; still the argument proves nothing. For when it is said that wisdom in general differs from the nature of the thing, this must be denied: for since there the concepts are only universals according to our intellect, they also must differ only by our reason; and the only thing to be conceded is that in the concept of wisdom the concept of justice is not included, which not only do we concede in general, but also specifically of the divine attributes themselves, as we shall show below.

Reply to the second. On account of a distinction of reason many things can be announced of one attribute which can by no means be predicated of another, as of the intellect, that it generates, that it understands - things which are not said of the will; this, however, comes from a diversity of concepts which the words immediately signify, as they are apprehended by us: for if the attributes of God were conceived by us as they are, and were thus named by us, with a single most simple concept and a single word we should express whatever is in God, nor could we conceive or name one without the other. But whether, by reason of this same diversity of concepts and of thought, one attribute can be predicated absolutely of another, we shall discuss in disputation 119.

Lastly, it must be observed that it is in vain, from this formal distinction which Scotus says is prior to the intellect, to gather from it a real distinction of emanations and of the proceeding persons, as if that formal distinction were the root of a real distinction and of a greater distinction than that which he himself posits among the persons.

Disputatio CXVII - Whether the intellect of the wayfarer can distinguish the divine attributes without an order to things really distinct

The Nominalists against Scotus think not only that the attributes among themselves and from the essence in no way differ from the nature of the thing prior to the operation of the intellect, but also, against the Thomists, that neither can they be distinguished by the intellect; thus teach Gregory in I, dist. 8, q. 2, arts. 1 and 2, Major q. 1, and Gabriel in I, dist. e, q. 1, art. 1.[121] They prove this by the following reason: because what is in itself undivided and, by its nature, without any distinction, cannot be distinguished and separated by something extrinsic; but our intellection is extrinsic to any given thing: therefore by it nothing can be distinguished. Nevertheless Gregory and Major add, even if the attributes are not distinguished among themselves by the intellect, yet they can be distinguished in some way by reason of what is connoted; that is, by reason of the effect which in some way they respect. Since the mercy of God succors our misery, whereas justice punishes our sins - two effects that are really distinct among themselves - rightly they are said to be distinguished by connotations; which is nothing else than that the effects themselves of the attributes really differ: for from the distinction of effects no distinction in the attributes themselves arises, as is manifest from their very nature. For if the intellect, because it is something extrinsic to the attributes, cannot distinguish them, in the same way neither will the effects, which also are

121. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1 - 2; William Major (John Mair), q. 1; Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., d. e, q. 1, a. 1.

extrinsic, distinguish them; therefore it follows that the attributes differ by connotations, and that only their effects differ. But because sometimes the effects of the attributes are not distinguished, as the effects of justice and mercy, in whose every effect the notion of each is found, as the Scholastics commonly teach in I, dist. 46, and St. Thomas above in I, q. 21, a. 4; therefore Gregory and Major subjoin that these attributes do not differ by the connoted things, but only by names; as if they were to say, that they are distinguished by name alone.

But on the contrary, the opposite opinion is most true: namely, that the attributes of God - many of which in creatures are really distinct from others - can be distinguished in God by us without respect to effects and to distinct creatures. This we shall establish in what follows.

As to things which from the nature of the thing in no way differ, that they can be distinguished by reason - so teach St. Thomas, Cajetan, Henry, the Commentator (Averroes), St. Augustine Niphus, cited by us above in the prior disputation, cap. 4; Marsilius, in the first question 12, art. 3, in the second part of the article; Durandus, on I, dist. 2, q. 3, num. 9; Capreolus, on I, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 1, the second conclusion; and the Canarian in this article, disput. 1, part 2, who notes that by the name "reason" is not understood ratiocination, nor syllogism, nor the definition of the thing - all of which also are called ratio - but the intellection, or the concept which the intellect forms for itself of some thing and sets before itself.[122] For in the intellect there is not only the quality which is intellection, but also the thing that we cognize, and by means of that quality it is present to us; and since many things about God are set before us and by cognition become present, of which we cognize one in such a way that we do not think of another, it comes about that in our concept many things about God appear, and these we call the attributes of God, because by our reason and by a distinct conception they are attributed by us to God. whence it comes about that many things are set before us which in truth are not many, but one most simple thing; in the following disputation we shall say. But it must be observed that this diversity of concepts, which we call objective concepts, proceeds from a real plurality of concepts which we call formal: that is, from a plurality of qualities and cognitions which we express in our intellect. For any quality in its own way represents the thing, and because our cognition is imperfect and proceeds little by little, it sets a simple and individual thing before us as it were by parts: wherefore, if the distinction of reason be so called, taking "reason" for the objective concept, or taking it for the intellect itself, which by its operation divides things that are indivisible, it comes to the same. Therefore, since the intellect apprehends in various ways the thing which is most simple, who will deny that it is divided and distinguished by our intellect - not because the thing itself, which is outside, is in itself intrinsically divided, but because from it we elicit for ourselves diverse objective concepts? Whence it becomes that various names that signify the divine perfections are not synonyms; as I noted above in q. 13, art. 4: because names do not signify to us immediately the things as they are in themselves, but as they are set before us, as was said in disput. 75, cap. 3. Wherefore, since to wayfarers God is set before them under various perfections, those names for wayfarers will not be synonymous, because they

122. St. Thomas; Cajetan; Henry of Ghent; Averroes; St. Augustine Niphus, cited above in the prior disputation, cap. 4; Marsilius, in I, q. 12, a. 3, in the second part of the article; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 3, n. 9; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, art. 1, concl. 2; the Canarian, on this article, disput. 1, part 2.

do not signify for them altogether the same, but make them know diverse things in their own concept. Whether, however, they are synonymous for the blessed, we shall see in the following disputation.

From which a second argument against Gregory is derived: for if the attributes of God, as he asserts, do not always differ by connoted things, or effects, but sometimes by names, it follows that sometimes they differ by name alone; but things which are distinguished only in this way are synonyms, as "ensis," which is also called "gladius," and "sword," by exactly the same ratio. Then too, even if the connoted things differ, if the attributes themselves in themselves, which are first and directly signified, do not differ, they will be entirely synonymous: for synonymy is to be taken from that which is per se signified, not from that which is accidental and extrinsic. But it cannot be conceded that the attributes of God are synonymous; for we should then use all the names indifferently for the same thing: therefore on the side of the direct signification some distinction must be assigned.

But the Nominalists' reasoning is frivolous: for although in itself nothing can really be divided and distinguished by something extrinsic, nonetheless rightly by something extrinsic it can be called divided and distinct; for many things are so called from something extrinsic. Add that when we say the attributes are distinguished in God, we speak of them not as they are in God himself, but as they are set before us; and in this way they are divided; for cognition and the quality expressed in the intellect has this power, that, although it does not attain the thing itself external to it, nevertheless it makes it present and to appear in a different mode; and therefore sometimes by its representation it divides and distinguishes what is indivisible in reality: in which way we say that the attributes and the rest that are indivisible in God are distinguished by us. But what Anselm in the Monologion, cap. 16, seems to deny concerning a distinction of reason in God, has already been explained by us in the preceding disputation, cap. 4.[123]

Caput II - That the attributes belong to God without respect to creatures really distinct, is proved against Durandus

Durandus, on I, dist. 1, q. 1, notes that there can be a twofold sense of the proposed question, whether the attributes can be distinguished in God without respect to creatures really distinct: one, whether the perfections which are called attributes belong to God without an order to creatures really distinct; the other, whether they can be distinguished by us without respect to diverse creatures. But as to the prior sense, he answers that all the attributes which belong to God, either by opposition with creatures, or by respect of cause, do not belong without respect to creatures. Perhaps Durandus understands those attributes which belong to God insofar as he is a cause in act, as the attribute "Creator." He himself calls attributes of the prior genus "infinite," "immense," "incorporeal"; while of the latter genus he holds to be "creator," "justifier," and perhaps "omnipotent," although this attribute does not signify a cause in act, but in potency.[124]

123. St. Anselm, Monologion, cap. 16.
124. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1.

But about the attributes of the first genus his opinion does not please: because neither from the formal signification of this name would there not be, if the opposite form and habit were impossible; and thus, if a body were not possible, the negation of body would not be possible; and so in other cases (by which reasoning Durandus was convicted to assert that statement). Yet, since by these names there is signified by us not so much a negation as something positive, which is more known to us - as many other things are signified more clearly - one cannot say that those attributes, insofar as they are perfections in God, would not be in him if otherwise the opposite form (in creatures) were not; for that positive perfection does not depend on the opposite which is found in creatures, although the negation depends.

As to the attributes, however, of the latter genus, we admit that those which signify a cause in act, as "justifier," "creator," do not belong to God except by respect to creatures, which being taken away, on the ground that they would not be possibles, those attributes themselves would not belong to God; yet we say that these are not attributes of God, as is gathered from what we noted in the preceding disputation, cap. 1; or, if these be called attributes, nevertheless they signify in God no perfection in act other than that by which God has, insofar as he is able to do all these things. For to justify in act, to create in act, is no peculiar perfection in God besides the power which we have said.

Let us conclude, therefore, that no attribute which signifies some peculiar perfection of God belongs to God by a real respect to creatures, even possible ones, nor does relation itself constitute omnipotence, or wisdom, or knowledge. For although these are signified by us in relation to creatures, nevertheless in God they are absolute according to the thing, as we proved in disputation 104, cap. 6. Therefore there are in God attributes which are perfections of God without respect to creatures, as St. Thomas at length shows in De potentia, q. 7, art. 6, and Henry in Quodlibet 5, question 1.[125]

Caput III - That the attributes in God cannot be distinguished by us without respect to distinct creatures

The latter sense of the proposed question is whether various attributes can be distinguished by us in God without respect to creatures. Now the doctors, whom I have been able to read on this matter, agree that more than one thing cannot be distinguished by us in God unless our intellect regards creatures really distinct. Thus teach St. Thomas on I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, in the third part thereof, and in Opusc. 9, qq. 1, 2, and 3, and in De potentia, q. 7, art. 6; Durandus on I, dist. 2, q. 3, num. 10 and the following; Capreolus on dist. 8, q. 4, art. 1, concl. 4, and art. 3 at the end, in the solution of a certain argument; St. Augustine Niphus, XII Metaph., disp. 13, cap. 4; Gotfredus, Quodlib. 7, q. 1, as is reported from Scotus in the place cited, disput. 116, cap. 3.[126] Durandus proves this first, because, in order that a distinction of reason not be altogether fictitious, it ought to have

125. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 7, a. 6; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 1.

126. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, in the third part; Opusculum 9, qq. 1 - 3; De potentia, q. 7, a. 6; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 3, n. 10 ff.; Capreolus, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, concl. 4, and art. 3 in fine; St. Augustine Niphus, In XII Metaph., disp. 13, cap. 4; Gotfredus, Quodlibet 7, q. 1; reported by Scotus in the place cited, disput. 116, cap. 3.

some foundation in the thing: but in the divine essence (essentia), since it is most simple, there is no foundation of any distinction: therefore our reason must regard creatures, so that, in imitation of them, it may distinguish in God that which in reality is individual. Secondly, Durandus confirms the same, because those things which seem to have some imperfection, if they are attributed to God, must be attributed by respect to creatures - as that he is now creator who before was not: but plurality includes in itself a certain imperfection; therefore it is not to be granted to God absolutely, unless by respect to creatures. But these reasons proceed from more common principles; wherefore they do not prove much. Thirdly, therefore, it is proved more efficaciously ...

It was being proved: because, as St. Thomas teaches in the question De potentia, from the essence (*essentia*) of God it comes under a twofold head, that the most simple essence is distinguished by us into various perfections; first, from the imperfection of our cognition, because we do not conceive God as He is; then because we conceive Him through the species (*species intelligibilis*) of created things and through the perfections of those things; wherefore we cannot but look to distinct creatures really, or to distinct perfections: and therefore, from diverse effects or from the diverse perfections of creatures, we assign to God various attributes, as justice - because He gives to each what is his and observes what He once promises; mercy - because He takes away our misery; and to understand and to will, from those things that we see in ourselves; for in the likeness of these we consider the perfections of God. The very same entirely happens when, in created things, we distinguish by the intellect certain things which in reality are not distinct. For we would not distinguish by the intellect the notion of genus and the notion of difference, unless we observed many things among themselves to be in part similar, in part different. So too we distinguish action itself and passion by respect to agent and patient. Nay more, the distinction of the same thing from itself, when we predicate the same of itself, which seems the least distinction, is made by us by an ordering to diverse things really: for when the same thing in a proposition is posited on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, the same name being repeated, as when we say, Peter is Peter; we distinguish it into two by an analogy to other propositions in which the predicate and the subject are diverse: although the aforesaid distinction of Peter from himself is not of the thing on the part of the objective concept, but of the name: not because there is a different name on the part of predicate and subject, but because the same is repeated twice: whence it also follows that Peter is conceived twice by us, which indeed is not to distinguish, but to be repeated in our cognition and in voice. In another way indeed can Peter be distinguished from himself: namely, the old man from himself the youth; but if our intellect forms some distinction of him, it certainly derives it from an order to things really distinct; to wit, from an order to the accidents and other things that accompany the various ages.

From what has been said it is inferred that in every distinction of reason there is a twofold foundation, in order that our intellect distinguish in things: one because things are not conceived by their own and distinct concept as they are; the other, because we understand them relative to certain things really distinct. The former foundation is said to be only in the mode of conceiving; the latter indeed also in things, not indeed in those very things which we distinguish, since in them there is no plurality nor any real vestige of that plurality which afterwards we distinguish by the

intellect; but such a foundation is only in the things on looking to which we distinguish by our intellect those things that are simple. Wherefore I do not see how the Thomists can say that the distinction which they call of ratio ratiocinata and of ratio ratiocinans differs: that the latter has no foundation in the thing, but only in our mode of conceiving; but the former both in the thing and in our mode of conceiving. For any distinction of reason has a foundation in both, as has been explained.

But they say that the distinction of ratio ratiocinata has a foundation not only in other things of which we make it after the manner of them by the intellect, but also in the very thing which is distinguished by reason: not because there is in it any plurality, but because its nature is such as to constrain our intellect to capture a distinction, nor does it do this merely at will, whereas to that which is of ratio ratiocinantis the intellect is not constrained, but fashions it at will. But against this there is a manifest reason which is gathered from what has been said: because our intellect never distinguishes many things in the same thing unless when it does not know the thing perfectly, as it is, as we will show more at large in the following disputation. Then also, always when it distinguishes, it attends to certain things really distinct, with respect to which it distinguishes what is undivided; therefore not at will, but from the natural mode of our intellection. Therefore no distinction of reason is made by us without a foundation, but we make all of them as if constrained, because we do not understand the thing perfectly: for if we knew it with perfect knowledge, we could by no means distinguish it into many, as will be evident in the following disputation. But that distinction of the same thing from itself is not a distinction of the thing, as I said above, but a certain distinction of the name, or even a repetition of the same concept: but a repetition of a concept is one thing, a distinction another. What sort of distinction suffices so that one may not be predicated of the other must be explained in disputation 119. Nor does Henry dissent from this our opinion in Quodlibet 5, question 1; for he does not contend that our intellect can, in God, distinguish many which are not distinct in reality without an order to creatures really distinct: but he only teaches that the divine intellect can in its essence distinguish many attributes, even if there were no creatures whose likeness it would use to distinguish them: which, however, is true, as we shall soon see.

Disputatio CXVIII - Whether the intellect of God and of the blessed can in God Himself distinguish various attributes

- Opinion of Henry and the Canarian. Caput I.
- The attributes are not to be distinguished by the divine intellect itself, nor even by the blessed. Caput II.
- That by the divine or blessed intellect the attributes cannot be distinguished by respect to creatures, or to the intellect of one on the way. Caput III.
- Corollaries of the preceding doctrine. Caput IV.
- Replies to the arguments of Henry and the Canarian. Caput V.

Caput I - Opinion of Henry and of the Canarian

The present disputation will treat not only of the divine attributes, but also of any individual thing whatever, namely whether it can be distinguished by the divine intellect and by one understanding it as it is, by a proper and quidditative concept, into several notions, as with us wayfarers God is distinguished: for entirely the same reason holds. Of the intellect, therefore, of God and of the blessed Henry teaches in Quodlibet 5, question 1, that it can distinguish the divine attributes so excellently that for distinguishing them it is not necessary for them to look to any creatures really distinct, as we wayfarers do look. Whence he gathers that, even if there were not possible several creatures really distinct, it would nonetheless be the case that the divine and the blessed intellect would distinguish more attributes in God: which sentence the Canarian embraces on this article, disputation c., doubt 3, at the end.[127] Durandus also and Cajetan favor it, as will be noted below.[128] But in order to explain this sentence Henry notes that the divine essence, even if in itself it is most simple: nevertheless, insofar as it is a truth understood by God Himself and by the blessed, can be considered in a twofold way, first insofar as it is a truth understood by a certain simple intuition: and in this mode neither the blessed man nor God could distinguish many attributes in it: there is, however, he says, in that cognition a multiplicity of attributes virtually. Then the divine essence can be considered as a truth understood, about which the intellect of God or of the blessed is busied (says he), that is, strives to investigate and to compare among themselves the perfections of this essence: and in this way it can distinguish in it several attributes; and he says that the distinction of these is made by the divine and blessed intellect by respect to the intellect and to the will of God Himself: because, to wit, the intellect of God or of the blessed conceives the divine essence, and the will, and the thing willed, as the intelligent and the thing understood. Thus indeed can be distinguished all the attributes of God which pertain to the intellect, as that He is true, wise, provident, etc., and those which pertain to the will, as that He is good, just, merciful, etc. From these he gathers that all the attributes of God, except the absolute existence (*esse*) which they have in God, include also a respect of reason, which the divine or blessed intellect adds.

Durandus in I, distinction 2, question 3, number 20, only denies that the attributes in God can be distinguished by the divine intellect itself without an order to creatures really distinct: wherefore he seems to concede that the attributes can be distinguished by God Himself, not by respect to those things which are within Himself, but by respect to creatures. For this reason I said that Durandus in a certain respect takes Henry's side: he agrees with him in this, that he says the divine attributes can be distinguished by the divine intellect: and by the same reason he ought to affirm this of any intellect seeing God as He is. Finally Cajetan above, on question 13, article 4, around the third solution, seems to teach that diverse concepts of His essence are not distinguished by the divine intellect: yet they are distinguished by any other created intellect, even if it is blessed.

127. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 1; the Canarian (Canisianus) on this article, disputation c., dub. 3, in fine.
128. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 3, n. 20; Cajetan, on I, q. 13, a. 4, solution 3.

Wherefore all these will concede in the same proportion, that by the divine intellect, or by any created intellect knowing a thing as it is, more things can be distinguished in a thing in which there is no distinction before the intellect: whether that be God, or any other created thing.[129]

This sentence is proved first: God and the blessed understand every truth which is in the divine essence: therefore they understand in God the notion (*ratio*) of intellect and of will: the notion of justice and of mercy, because all these are in Him: but these truths are distinct with respect to one understanding them as distinct; and so they themselves truly distinguish the attributes.

But this distinction is not made of necessity by respect to creatures really distinct - Canarius proves this secondly - because even if there were not several possible creatures distinct, there would nonetheless be in God a sufficient foundation for distinguishing the attributes. For if some real distinction were necessary in respect of which the attributes should be distinguished, that is found in God, since in Him the processions are really distinguished.

Thirdly, Henry proves this very point: because the attributes are in God without any respect to creatures; for He is not said to be wise because He is the cause of the wisdom of creatures; thus He would not be formally wise, but from the effect; and so of the others: therefore the attributes can be understood and distinguished without an order to creatures.

Fourthly, the same can be confirmed by this argument of Durandus: in God there is a real distinction of the persons without an order to creatures: therefore there can be a distinction of reason; the sequel relies on the common proposition, he who can the greater, can also the less: and where the greater can be, the less can be: therefore where there can be a real distinction without an order to creatures, there can be a lesser distinction of attributes, which is by the intellect without coordination.[130]

Fifthly, finally, there is another argument of Durandus: the distinction of the persons supposes a distinction of the producing principles; if therefore that distinction which is of the persons and posterior, befits God without respect to creatures, the distinction also of the principles, which is prior, will befit Him, and this is of reason: therefore a distinction of reason can befit God without an order to creatures.

Moreover, it was the express sentence of Bernard in book 5 of De consideratione to Eugene somewhat before the end, where, after he had said that God is length, breadth, height, and depth, and had objected to himself that from this it follows there is a quaternity, he says in these words: "I seem to have put forth many things, but it is one: one God is marked out according to our capacity, not according to His own state. It is different here, not there; the voices are various, the paths many; but one thing is signified by them, one is sought. And after a few things interposed: But for us, because we cannot contend with God in simplicity, while we strive to apprehend one thing, it turns up as it were quadrupled: the mirror does this, the enigma, through which alone it is granted to see: but when we shall see face to face, we shall see as He is. For then indeed the fragile edge of

129. Cajetan, on I, q. 13, a. 4, sol. 3.

130. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 3, n. 20. Capreolus also hints at this mode in In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, art. 3, in fine, in solving a certain argument - although he speaks only of the attributes of God and of the divine and blessed intellect, the same by the same reason ought to be asserted of any intellect seeing a thing as it is.

our mind, no matter how vehemently it strains, will not in any way rebound, or break up into its own plurality: it will gather itself more, will unite, and conform to that unity, or rather to that One, so that one face may answer to one face." These are Bernard's words, by which he has expressed the whole matter so perspicuously that by no one studious of scholastic theology could anything be said more clearly or desired.

Nevertheless Durandus teaches, against Henry, that the attributes cannot be distinguished by the divine intellect without an order to creatures really distinct; and he dissolves the two latter arguments which were brought for Henry's sentence.

Caput II - That the attributes are not distinguished by the divine intellect, which opinion is also more probable as to the blessed

Much more probable seems the opinion which affirms that not only are the divine attributes among themselves, or from the essence (*essentia*), not distinguished by the divine intellect itself, nor even by the blessed.

But in Bernard's words this must be observed first: that this our opinion is confirmed, when he says that that multitude of perfections which we signify by various words about God proceeds from the infirmity of our intellect which is still knowing through an enigma: but that this multitude will not remain in our intellect when we shall see God as He is: which indeed, if it is true of us, must much more be asserted of God Himself, who most perfectly beholds Himself as He is: wherefore neither God, nor the blessed, will distinguish many attributes in God.

Second, note that Bernard not only concedes, with respect to the intellect of one on the way, a distinction in God according to words, as the Nominales cited in the prior disputation used to say, when he says; and con -

Note, that Bernard grants not only a distinction of words, as the Nominales cited in the prior disputation used to say, when he says, and "different voices," but also a distinction of reason, and a concept concerning the same God, when he says, "many paths by which the One is sought": for the "paths" of our intellect seeking God are concepts.

Third, from Bernard's words it is plainly gathered that the divine attributes, which were known as distinct on the way, are to be seen in the fatherland as undivided and without distinction, so that, when one intellect of one seeing God should try to distinguish them, it would not be able: which he signified by those words: "Nor, however vehemently it strain, will it in any way spring back or fly apart into its own plurality"; and by what follows. For if the blessed intellect can distinguish several [things] in God, the consequence is that it can spring back and fly apart into plurality, as into different paths. And hence the doctrine of Henry is refuted, who asserts that the essence of God is distinguished by the intellect of God and of the blessed, not insofar as it is truth known by a simple intuition, but insofar as each intellect can investigate around it.

Fourth, from the same words of Bernard we could prove against Scotus that the attributes are not distinguished in God by the nature of the thing, but only by the intellection of one on the way. For if they were distinguished by the nature of the thing, the Blessed would distinguish them in the same manner as the wayfarer: but Bernard says that in the fatherland the intellect cannot spring back into plurality as it can on the way; therefore they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing: for if they were distinguished by the nature of the thing, the Blessed could not fail to understand those things which in themselves would be distinct by the nature of the thing, just as, even on the way, according to Scotus's opinion, the wayfarer understands several [formalities] in God formally distinct.

How much weight Bernard's authority has in this matter against Scotus is gathered from the things we said in disputation 116, cap. 4; for even in that book 5 of De consideratione he disputes against Gilbert and writes to Eugenius, who condemned Gilbert's error, as we shall see in disputation 120, contending to prove against him, as an undoubted dogma of faith, that in God there is no other plurality and distinction than that of the persons among themselves: for he judges the essence and its perfections to be by their nature altogether the same as the persons.

Then this same position is proved from the authority and reason of St. Thomas, q. 7 de potentia, art. 6, which Bernard also hints at in a few words; because from the infirmity and imperfection of our intellect (*intellectus*), while it knows through an enigma and through alien species, it comes about that it is not able to know the thing integrally, as it is; and therefore it, as it were, apprehends and divides it by parts, or, knowing its nature in various ways from various effects, or understanding it in different ways from the different perfections of creatures: therefore, whenever an intellect apprehends a thing and by its cognition makes it present to itself objectively, just as it is, then it is not set before the intellect in any other way than as it is in itself; if it in itself has no distinction and plurality, it follows that neither in the intellect seeing it as it is can it be distinguished or appear as distinct: but in the intellect of God and of the Blessed, God appears in the same way as he is in himself; therefore, if in himself he has no distinction of attributes by the nature of the thing, he will have none in the intellect of God himself and of the Blessed: and this especially has force in the divine intellect, because by its nature the intellect, the act of understanding, and the things understood are altogether the same: how then do the Thomists, who admit that these three are altogether the same by their very nature and by the nature of the thing, nevertheless affirm that by the divine intellect itself they are distinguished?

Finally, against Henry and the Canarian we can argue thus: either God and the Blessed, by the same intellection by which they know the divine essence simply, distinguish several attributes in it, or by another [intellection]. By the same [intellection] they cannot, as they themselves admit: because, when the essence is apprehended simply, it is not distinguished into many [things]. But another clear cognition neither in God nor in the Blessed can we assign: because all the visions are of the same kind, since they are [of] God as he is: nor has anyone up to now posited several [kinds], especially in God: therefore they ought to say that always, and by whatever cognition, God is apprehended by themselves and by the Blessed with distinction, which they seem to deny.

Caput III - That by the divine intellect, or by the blessed [intellect], the attributes cannot be distinguished by respect to creatures, or to the intellect of one on the way

Up to this point it has been proved universally that the divine intellect, or the blessed [intellect] by the clear vision by which it sees the essence (*essentia*) of God, cannot distinguish several attributes in it: now, however, it remains to show that neither [intellect] can distinguish the attributes even by respect to various creatures, indeed not even by respect to the created intellect of one on the way.

For, without respect to creatures, Durandus said that the attributes cannot be distinguished by the divine intellect, although with that respect he seems to concede that they can be distinguished: but that this is false is clear from the things alleged from the natural [order]: both because, since the attributes of God are in reality absolute and are not referred to creatures, as was shown in disputation 104, cap. 6, the divine and blessed intellect, which sees them as they are in themselves, will not be able to know them by reference to creatures: for to conceive by relation those things which in reality are not referred [to something] is an imperfection; and this is done only by an intellect that does not understand the thing as it is, as will be proved below.

Further, even if the divine and blessed intellect could apprehend the attributes of God by reference to creatures; nonetheless it could not distinguish them by that respect: for a respect to diverse [things] can be a cause of distinction only when the thing is not known as it is, but by analogy to others: but whenever a thing is conceived as it is, and in itself is altogether undivided, it remains in the intellect in the same way, however much it be referred to diverse [things].

Moreover, that the divine intellect cannot distinguish the attributes by respect to our intellect distinguishing them seems more difficult. For if our intellect distinguishes them; and God rightly understands what, and in what manner, our intellect operates around the divine attributes; he will assuredly know that they are distinguished by it: therefore now even God himself, for this reason, will distinguish what he could not distinguish from himself alone. This is what Capreolus seems to have taught in the cited place, when he asserts that, although the divine attributes are not distinguished by God, nevertheless they are very well known by him as distinct through the intellect of the wayfarer.[131]

Yet, that we may prove that not even in this way are the attributes distinguished by the divine or blessed intellect, first it should be noted that from the fact that God knows certain things to be distinguished by our intellect, it does not follow that they also are distinguished by the divine intellect in any way: just as from the fact that God knows our intellect to discourse, it does not follow that God himself also discourses. For he knows perfectly well the discourse and the manner in which we discourse and advance from one thing to another in cognition, and yet he, while he knows these things, does not discourse, nor in his cognition proceed from one thing into another. In like manner he knows that we who are blessed understand spiritual things by material species and by a conversion to phantasm; he himself, however, in his own intellect cannot thus

131. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, art. 3, in fine.

understand, nor form similar conceptions of things: for such an objective concept in our intellect depends upon the formal [concept] which we have, by which alone it can be represented: since such a formal concept does not befit God, he cannot have our objective concept present to himself: just as he does not have the concepts of hearing and of seeing in the mode in which we do, because he does not have vision or audition.

Next, it must be observed that, in order that certain things be distinguished by the intellect, it is necessary that they be set before it as distinct, and that such [distinct] elements be represented to it by its own thought: nor is it enough that it know that they can be distinguished by another intellect understanding in another way: just as, in order that someone understand a thing by discourse and in relation to another, it is necessary to gather one [thing] from another within his own cognition. Therefore, since God does not know in that imperfect manner, he cannot distinguish the attributes: although he very well knows that they are distinguished by our intellect knowing in its own imperfect way: because he himself nevertheless does not in that manner understand. Wherefore, although God sees his attributes distinguished by us and beholds our formal concept, yet never are the attributes in his own cognition set before him as they are represented to our intellect. He knows therefore that they can be distinguished by us in our imperfect way; but he knows this in his most simple and most perfect way: from which there results no distinction in the object: for in order that he distinguish them perfectly, they would have to be represented in his intellect just as in ours: which can in no way be.

Therefore Capreolus spoke very well in saying that the divine attributes are not distinguished by the intellect of God himself; yet are well known by God that, through the intellect of the wayfarer, they are distinct or can be distinguished: which two are diverse.[131]

Finally, the divine essence is now set before his intellect in no other way than it would be set before it if there were no rational creatures; nevertheless God understands himself and has himself present to himself, so that this does not depend on something extrinsic: but if there were no rational creatures who could distinguish the essence of God by intellect, God would not apprehend his attributes as distinct by an order to the created intellect; therefore neither in this way does he himself distinguish.

Caput IV - Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that through the divine intellect, or through any knower who knows things as they are, by a proper and distinct concept there is not made a being of reason (*ens rationis*), nor a distinction. For since the being of reason which we attribute to things does not really belong to them, except only in our apprehension; and God, by his cognition, adds nothing to the things known, but altogether apprehends them as they are in themselves; it follows that, through the divine intellect, or a knower knowing a thing as it is, there cannot be made that one thing be referred to another which in reality is not referred.

131. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, art. 3, in fine.

But some say that God, by his concept, compares one thing with another, composing and dividing in a proposition, and compares even a chimera with those of which he denies it: therefore through the divine intellect there can be a comparing between objects, even if the formal concept (*conceptus formalis*) existing in the divine intellect be most simple; although at the same time they openly admit that through the divine intellect those things cannot be distinguished which by their very nature are indivisible. In my judgment their opinion manifestly conflicts with itself. For if an intellect, either the divine, or one cognizing a thing as it is, could distinguish things which in reality do not differ - because they are objected to it in no other way than as they are in themselves - by the same reasoning it could conceive, through the intellect, as related those things which in reality are not referred: which is proved by the same reason.

But what they assert, that God affirms or denies one of another by composition and division on the side of the objects and things, and not on the side of the formal concepts, is false. First, because without composition and multiplication of formal concepts, neither composition nor any distinction can be understood on the side of objective concepts (*conceptus obiectivi*). Wherefore when St. Thomas, below in question 58, article 4, teaches that angels do not understand things by composing and dividing, he speaks expressly of both concepts, namely formal and objective, as we shall show there.[132] Next, because if God understands things as they are, he cannot compare and compose with one another those which by their very nature do not mutually refer. But how God understands non-beings was said in disputation 61.

Moreover, certain more recent authors, halting on both sides and not plainly following one opinion or the other, teach that a being of reason and the object can indeed be conceived by God and be present to God, but are not made by God - lest they concede an absurdity, namely that the divine intellect should feign something for itself. And so they say that a being of reason is not made by the intellect, because it is not formed primarily by him, but by a created intellect: from which it follows that it is understood by God but is not made by God, because it is already made. But these philosophers trifle with words, that they may not seem to concede anything absurd about God: however they gloss it, they cannot deny that the divine intellect feigns something, and conceives otherwise than the thing is.

First, because if God retains in his mind that which is not, although not primarily, but because it was first made by a created intellect, he truly forms in his intellect a figment and a monster, and by the power of his intellect preserves that which was made and found by another. For the objective being which things have in the intellect of God they have as from an entire cause - from the divine intellect itself, to which they are objected - and the created intellect does not concur to that, insofar as it is in the divine intellect, as is manifest: but this is no less absurd than if that figment were formed primarily by the divine intellect and not on the occasion of any created intellect: for this is to know a thing imperfectly, and not as it is.

Add that, if God now knows a being of reason which has being from the human intellect, he also knows that being from eternity before a created intellect fashions it: therefore God from eternity has actually, objectively in his intellect something which has not yet been formed by a created

intellect; and such objective being depends upon the divine and not upon the created intellect, and is not on the side of the thing, nor can there be on the side of the thing something real: therefore there is something of reason made by the divine intellect alone, the created intellect neither cooperating nor yet operating. Therefore the adversaries ought to confess that a being of reason can be feigned by God, if once they concede that it can be known by God. Nor does it stand in the way that such a being of reason is therefore known by God because it can be feigned by a created intellect in time, so that we might not say, when it is known by God from eternity, that it is formed by him alone: for since from eternity God alone, in his intellect, attributes to it objective being which is not yet attributed by a created intellect, God alone will be said to have feigned it as objectively existing from eternity.

You will object: God knows that which is only in the human intellect; but there there is something made. I answer: these two differ, namely, to know that something is in the human intellect - which indeed can be without an imperfect objective concept - and to know it in the mode in which it is in the human intellect, that is, to have the same thing objectively. For both discourse is known by God without objective discourse; and the concepts of spiritual things, which we have by means of the concepts of bodily things, are known by God without his having such concepts about spiritual things.

Then against the same we can argue in this way. For a being of reason to come to be and to be formed is nothing else than to be objected to the intellect, or to be understood, which is the same: but the divine intellect, according to their opinion, has that thing objectively present to itself: therefore it makes it, and forms it, although not primarily, but on the occasion of our intellect.

A second objection: God knows our formal concept; but the formal concept has a relation and respect to a being of reason: therefore he also knows and has present to himself objectively a being of reason. I answer: that God understands our formal concept, and its relation to the real extremes from which our intellect by conceiving forms the being of reason; and thus he understands by God some real being, from which the denomination is taken: but that our formal concept have a real respect to that figment objectively existing in our mind, and thus that it follow that it is known by God because he knows our formal concept - insofar as it has that present to itself, it ought to have in itself a formal concept, by whose power it is objected to us: but he cannot have that. For an objective concept according to objective being depends formally upon the formal concept, as presentative and representing others.

Secondly, it follows that, through an intellect that knows things as they are, the generic and specific notion, or the individual substantial one of a thing, cannot be distinguished; and therefore, that in such an intellect no thing is composite out of genus and difference and the substantial principle of individuation. For since these notions differ only through the intellect, and if on the side of things they are altogether the same, by no means will they be able to be distinguished through an intellect that knows them as they truly are; but it is manifest that only an imperfect knower distinguishes. For who would say that, in the thing itself which is indivisible, the notion of

132. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4.

animal is one thing in the man and another in the ox? Therefore there is in a man and in an ox only a certain likeness which is found in each, from which an intellect that does not wholly understand each, as if conceiving by parts, abstracts the common notion in which they agree, and the proper in which they differ. Wherefore this composition of genus and difference is rightly called by the Thomists a composition of reason, that is, of the concept.

But you object the authority of Elias of Crete, in the oration on St. Gregory Nazianzen, on those words "Two are the supreme," where he asserts that nothing besides God is simple; he seems, however, to be speaking of the composition of genus and difference which he opposes to simplicity: which, if this composition were only of reason, would not be repugnant to simplicity: therefore he could not conclude that nothing besides God is simple. And indeed I noted above, in disputation 41, chapter 3, and it will be proved more fully in the following disputation, that this composition is in no way repugnant to God, because it would derogate from his simplicity. I answer that Elias is not speaking about composition out of genus and difference, nor does he oppose it to simplicity, but about a composition of essence and accidents, making up a singular and individual thing, by which he asserts that every created thing consists: and therefore he rightly asserts that only in God there is simplicity. For if he were speaking about the specific, generic, and individual notion, from this side no thing in the world would be composite by its own nature, but only by the intellect, and so from this side also everything besides God would be by its nature simple. The words of Elias are: "For this alone is properly simple (namely the essence of God), properly one, and unity, and, so to speak, solitariness: whatever things, however, come after are either double or composite, although they do not appear so at first by the intellect, and are essences constituted from many differences, which one discerns. For whatever has that which pertains at once to the proof of its existence is properly not simple"; by which he is not speaking about the composition of genus and difference, but about the composition of essence and individual difference; he even called the individual difference a "difference," whatever pertains to the demonstration of it.

Moreover, Nicetas concedes such composition even in spiritual things, namely out of essence and accidents, not indeed from extrinsic things, but from a special and singular mode, nor does he deny that there is essence and existence, as we shall prove in part 1, q. 4, art. 2. The third reason: the Blessed [Doctor], when he sees that in God the most simple essence is contained in persons, and one in essence, could in one name of most simple signify anything in God: and so, by the same name said of God, the Blessed [Fathers] would signify synonyms; but the manner, that is, that by one most simple name we might think we achieve God, is not granted; which they themselves saw and said; and it is to be said in our disputation following, chapter 4, that we cannot by a single name express in God individual things; in us, however, they are many in life, as we signify.

The arguments, indeed, of the earlier opinion alleged to us in chapter 1 are easily solved from what has been said. The first, indeed, is that which is to be proved: namely, that God sees and knows in himself many truths, and that he is just, merciful, that he has an intellect, will, and so forth. We say that God knows all these things which we state and, according to our measure, distinguish in God; yet he himself does not in this way distinguish them in his own most simple

cognition; for although he most perfectly knows that we, in our imperfect mode, distinguish and proceed by learning, nevertheless he, while he thus knows, does not distinguish in his cognition, because in his intellect things are never presented to him as they are to our imperfect intellect.

Moreover, those accidental properties peculiar to a thing, which the holy Fathers are wont to put in the place of personality, pertain to its manifestation, as Athanasius in the book of Definitions, Basil in epistle 43, St. Gregory of Nyssa in the book On the Difference of Essence and Hypostasis at the very beginning, St. John Damascene in the First Book of the Institutions, chapter 1, and in his Dialectic, chapters 25 and 26, and likewise Nicetas in book 3 of the Thesaurus, chapters 20 and 34, teach; whose sentence is to be understood in such a way that accidents do not pertain to the substantial constitution of a person or individual, but to the showing-forth of it, as Basil plainly teaches there, and Nicetas insinuated in the cited words; and we will prove this more fully in part three, q. 4, a. 2.[133] Therefore that composition he conceded - namely, as it were, from essence and accidents - yet not from common and special, or singular, reason, nor from existence (*esse*) and essence, as we shall show in part three of St. Thomas, q. 17, a. 1.

Third, it follows that the blessed, when they see God as he is, by the most simple concept know him to be three in persons and one in essence; and, moreover, that by one most simple name they can mutually express to one another whatever is in God: and therefore all the names said of God are to the blessed (as they say) synonymous, as we noted in q. 13, a. 4. But the mode by which the blessed can signify to themselves the essence of God by one most simple name we are not able to conceive: because we do not attain to God himself in the way in which they see; whence it comes about, as we shall say below in the following disputation, chapter 2, that we cannot by one and the same name mutually signify, for ourselves who are wayfarers, the things which in God are undivided.

The arguments, indeed, of the earlier opinion alleged to us in chapter 1 are easily solved from what has been said. The first, indeed, is that which is to be proved: namely, that God sees and knows in himself many truths, and that he is just, merciful, that he has an intellect, will, and so forth. We say that God knows all these things which we state and, according to our measure, distinguish in God; yet he himself does not in this way distinguish them in his own most simple cognition; for although he most perfectly knows that we, in our imperfect mode, distinguish and proceed by learning, nevertheless he, while he thus knows, does not distinguish in his cognition, because in his intellect things are never presented to him as they are to our imperfect intellect. And the Canarian himself grants this; and since it has been shown above, and God understands himself as the thing itself is, nor is he in his thought otherwise set before or represented to himself, it follows that all those truths which we make to be many, and which in reality are one only, are known by God as one simple [truth]. The argument would indeed rightly prove that all these are known by God as distinct, if they were distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing, as Scotus asserts; but since they are not distinguished except by the intellect, how does the Canarian

133. Athanasius, Liber definitionum; St. Basil, Ep. 43; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De differentia essentiae et hypostasis, init.; St. John Damascene, Institutiones, lib. 1, cap. 1; Dialectica, cap. 25 - 26; Nicetas, Thesaurus, lib. 3, cap. 20, 34.

suppose that they are many truths in God and not one? Hence also it follows that God can by no means distinguish the attributes by a respect to his intellect and will: for intellect and will are no less the same in his nature than the other attributes.

Reply to the second, of the same Canarian: I answer, there is indeed in God a real distinction of persons; yet this does not suffice for God, in his essence, to distinguish those things which are individuated from the nature of the thing. For he cannot effect even this: although there are many creatures, by an order to which we distinguish the attributes. But this does not come from a defect of power, but from the highest perfection of intellect. For we, because we cannot understand the thing as it is, apprehend it by parts and as if divided, and we speak of it, as is made manifest from what has been said in the whole disputation. Therefore we do not deny that God can distinguish the attributes in himself because they are in any way really distinct by an order to which God could distinguish them, but because he most perfectly understands himself as he is, and thus he can distinguish nothing in himself which is not distinct in reality. Wherefore Durandus is deceived when he says that God distinguishes the attributes in himself by referring them to creatures really distinct.[134]

The third argument, which was Henry's, proves only this: that there are indeed in God attributes without any respect to creatures; but that they can be distinguished by the divine intellect without respect to creatures, certainly it does not prove: because it is repugnant that, both with a respect and without it, the attributes be distinguished by the divine intellect; and if they could be distinguished by it, it would indeed prove against Durandus that, no comparison being made with creatures, they could be distinguished.

Reply to the fourth: Some answer that the distinction of persons is in a greater distinction than that of the attributes, in that part in which it is real, whereas that [of the attributes] is of reason; yet in another respect there is a greater distinction of attributes than of persons: because the latter is relative, but the former absolute; whereas the absolute simply excels the relative. But this solution does not please me: for when we speak of a distinction so as to say it is greater or lesser, one must attend not to the perfection of the things which are distinguished, but to the mode of distinction; wherefore, if relations are really distinguished, but the absolute only by the intellect, simply speaking the distinction of relations is to be called greater, although absolutes excel relatives. Durandus therefore answers that the proposition, where one can be greater one can be lesser, is to be understood of things which are of the same sort, and the lesser is included in the greater: as if someone can heat to eight, he will also be able to heat to four; but in things which are of a different sort it is not true; for one who can reason cannot fly. The same proposition is understood in the same way by the same Durandus in 3, d. 2, q. 1, num. 10, and by Marsilius in q. 3, art. 2, a little toward the end in the solution of the same second argument.[135] Thus, therefore, even the divine essence is a sufficient foundation of the real distinction of persons without order to creatures; and

134. Durandus, various places; cf. his position that God distinguishes attributes in himself by reference to creatures.
135. Durandus, In III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, n. 10; Marsilius, q. 3, art. 2, in the solution of the second argument.

yet it is not sufficient that by the divine intellect itself the attributes be distinguished, although this is a lesser distinction, because it is of a different sort. And why it can be real, not of reason, is sufficiently manifest.

To the last, Durandus also replies that the distinction of persons does not arise from a distinction of principles, nor does it suppose it. For if the distinction of principles were supposed as prior, it would have to be from the nature of the thing, as we shall prove in disputation 149, c. 1. From the same principle, therefore, according to the thing, that is, the intellect and the will, two persons can arise really distinct, on account of the opposition which they have, as will be explained there. Which distinction of principles by a relation to the production of distinct persons would be unnecessary; for that could not be done by an intellect clearly seeing God as he is, as from what has been said is manifest.

Disputatio CXIX - Whether the divine attributes can be predicated mutually of themselves and of the essence

Caput I - The opinion of the Canarian

It remains that in this disputation we see how the attributes are predicated of the essence (*essentia*), and mutually of themselves, so that from this we may more fully understand what distinction of reason is to be posited between the attributes themselves and the essence. I pass over the opinion of Scotus discussed above in the places cited in disputation 116, chapter 3; since he thinks that the attributes are distinguished among themselves and from the essence from the nature of the thing, he asserts that they are not predicated mutually; rather, in the formal sense, the proposition in which we assert one of another is false. Now the controversy is only with those who teach that the attributes of God are distinguished among themselves and from the essence by reason alone: and the controversy concerns attributes signified not concretely (as they say), but abstractly. For it is certain that concretes are predicated of concretes, as God wise is just; but whether abstracts be said of abstracts, as wisdom of justice, is controverted. The Canarian, therefore, in disputation 2 on this article, in the last doubt, when he had taught that the attributes among themselves and from the essence are distinguished by the intellect, nevertheless affirms that they are predicated mutually of themselves and of the essence. He proves this first by the testimony of St. Augustine, On the Trinity 6, chapter 6, where he says: "The same is his greatness which is also wisdom; and the same goodness which is also wisdom and greatness; the same truth which is all those." The same he teaches in chapter 1 at the end; and in chapter 10 St. Anselm agrees in the Monologion, chapter 16, where he seems to admit only a difference of name between the attributes and the essence, but by no means a distinction of reason; and thus he plainly acknowledges one to be the other in these words: "Therefore the same is any one of those things which all together are, whether severally: so that when 'justice' is said, or 'essence', it signifies the same one thing as the others, whether all together or severally."

The Canarian confirms this by reason, first: If there were in God some attribute in which neither another attribute nor the divine essence were formally included, there would already be in God something which would not be God; wherefore God would be wise by a wisdom which would not be the essence of God: for every being is either from itself or from another; if from itself, it is deity; if from another, it is creature. Then, if the divine essence in its concept did not formally include wisdom nor the other attributes, it would not be infinitely perfect; therefore neither could it be apprehended as the divine essence: for the infinity of the essence is so intrinsic to the divine nature itself that without it it cannot be thought; just as neither can God without deity. The same seems to be said of the individual attributes: for since each is infinite, it ought in its formal notion to include every perfection, and hence every other attribute.

From what has been said the author here infers that the divine essence is included in the concept of any attribute whatsoever. The same he teaches of any attribute with respect to another, that one be included in another, and that it be (as they say) transcendent with respect to another, just as being is compared to all the categories. Wherefore, he says, one cannot define any single attribute unless all the others be included in your definition. Others use the example of being, which transcends all the categories, that thus they may show how the essence is included in any attribute whatsoever, and one attribute in another.

The opposite sentence is approved by me, namely, that the attributes are distinguished by reason among themselves and from the essence in such a way that one is not of the concept of another or of the essence, nor the essence of their concept: wherefore, if the formal sense be observed in propositions, neither is one formally predicated of another or of the essence, nor the essence of them. We speak, however, within the opinion of those who say that the attributes are distinguished by the intellect alone. This sentence was taught by Capreolus in 1, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, in solution 11; by Aureolus against the first conclusion; indeed also by Gregory in 1, d. 8, q. 2, art. 2, when he teaches that the attributes are not distinguished by reason, that is, by connotations in God - which he calls attributal perfections - but that he distinguishes the attributes only by connotates; nevertheless he affirms that one is not formally predicated of another. Blessed Thomas also favors this, whom we shall cite below.[136]

It is proved first by this reason: If in the formal sense one attribute were predicated of the essence, or one of another, then any act of the attributes could also be predicated in the formal sense of any attribute: we would therefore say, the intellect wills, the will understands, justice has mercy, and mercy punishes; God, insofar as he is, acts. This is clearly shown by this syllogism: The divine intellect understands; the divine intellect is the will; therefore the will understands. Likewise, justice punishes; justice is mercy; therefore mercy punishes. The willing of God is his existence (*esse*); but God, insofar as he wills, acts; therefore insofar as he is, he acts; and in other cases in the same way. But this is absurd. Therefore one attribute of another, or of the essence, or conversely, cannot be predicated formally. For which cause St. Thomas below, q. 32, art. 2, ad 2, rightly denies this proposition: "Paternity begets" (although paternity is the same from the nature

136. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, sol. 11; Peter Aureol, against concl. 1; Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 2; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 32, a. 2, ad 2; q. 32, a. 5, ad 3.

of the thing as father) on account of a different mode of signifying. But a different mode of signifying cannot be understood unless there be a different concept of the thing signified; for signification is to be measured from the concept which it generates. Therefore, to deny this proposition on account of a different mode of signifying is the same as to deny it on account of different concepts and a distinction of reason. And in art. 5 of the same question, to the third, he says that the notions of the same person, which are the same really and from the nature of the thing altogether prior to the intellect, are not predicated mutually of themselves on account of a different mode of signifying, because they are signified as different notions and perfections of the same person, such as paternity and spiration; and the same, under a different rational aspect.

The opposite view is proved in this way: namely, that the attributes are distinguished by reason (ratione), so that one is signified as a distinct notion and perfection of the same essence (*essentia*), and therefore they cannot be predicated of one another. The same is to be said of the essence and the attributes (*attributa*); for they are signified as different rationes.

Second, it is proved thus: words immediately signify things as they are in our concept, that is, as they are conceived by us. Therefore, since the same thing, although in itself individual by its nature, is distinct in our concept and is conceived in various ways, one concept is not another; therefore by the word itself one cannot be predicated of another.

Third, the Canarian says that this proposition cannot be granted: "The divine intellect, insofar as it is intellect, is will"; because the particle "insofar as" denotes the formal notion, and it is not true that the formal notion of the divine intellect is the formal notion of will. Therefore, without the particle "insofar as" - without which the proposition can be taken in the formal sense - it must be denied. For, if the sense be that the attributes, by their own nature, are altogether the same among themselves and with the essence, in no way ought it to be denied, as has been established against Scotus.

Fourth and finally, if the essence transcends all the attributes, and each attribute the others, then the distinction of reason is entirely removed and we confound all things into one concept. Yet, first of all, neither does the essence, with respect to the attributes, nor does one attribute, with respect to another, stand as something common transcending particulars; for the essence and each of the attributes convert reciprocally among themselves. How, then, can one transcend another, as being transcends the categories, with which it is not convertible? Moreover, being transcends them, not indeed according to the common concept, but according to several [modes], and by name alone is something common, as the more probable opinion holds, which we set forth briefly in Disputation 114, cap. 2. Therefore, in another way the essence is included in the attributes and the attributes in the essence than being is in the categories.

Some reply that indeed one attribute is included in another, and all in one and in the essence itself, and that the essence is included in the attributes, only confusedly, not distinctly and explicitly. But this solution has no weight: for here we are not treating of the thing itself as it exists outside our intellect; for thus it is manifest that the thing is so simple that it is not one thing and another in any way; wherefore neither is anything said to be included in another; but that in reality

there is one most simple thing. We differ, therefore, about the divine essence and the attributes, as they exist in our thought: whether they are so diverse that the one is not included in the other, but is apprehended as diverse and not included in another. Wherefore, if, when we apprehend the mercy of God, since in our concept it is not expressly justice, it follows that in our concept mercy is not justice, although in reality justice is contained in mercy, or rather is the same; because what is not expressly present in our thought is not concluded in the thing thought, as it is conceived by us. Add that, when we expressly apprehend mercy and justice, intellect and will, we form utterly diverse concepts of them, of which one is in no way in the other: therefore they differ as notions, so that in our concept one attribute does not comprehend another. Moreover, an attribute does not differ from another, or from the essence, in terms of the explicit and implicit, in the way that a definition differs from the defined, as we shall say below in Disputation 121, cap. 2.

Note first, for the fuller explanation of this difficulty, that propositions in which either an attribute is predicated of the essence, or one attribute of another, are frequently to be conceded; because in the common mode of speaking they are taken in the sense which the logicians call "identic," not in the formal; and because almost always we wish rather to state what in God is in reality as it is by its own nature, than what is in our thought. Such are propositions with the substantive verb, in which one attribute is said to be another. Nevertheless, these propositions are sometimes taken in the formal sense, and then they must be denied, as has now been proved. There are also other propositions which cannot be taken in that identic sense, but always in the formal; and therefore they are either always to be denied or always to be conceded. Such are those with the adjective verb, in which the essential acts of the attributes are predicated of the attributes, or notional acts of the personal properties, as "the intellect understands" and "the will wills," "the essence is communicated," "relation is not communicated":[137] in these, therefore, it is not permitted to predicate attributes of one another, that is, to ascribe the act of one to another; but about these likewise we shall see in Disputation 136, cap. 3, and q. 39, art. 5, where we shall also see whether one property or notion is predicated of another, as paternity of spiration.

From what has been said the solution of the arguments for the first view is easily gathered. To the first I answer: in our concept wisdom is distinguished from the essence of God and from His substance; by our manner of understanding it is not apprehended as the Deity, but as something of the Deity. On that account, however, it is not apprehended as a creature, nor as from another, nor as from itself: because the intellect considers only one thing without considering another, that is, the formal notion of wisdom, for example, whether it be from itself or from another; and although it considers it as something of God and an affection of Him, it does not assert that thus it is by its own nature. For this reason the philosophers say: "In the case of those who abstract there is no falsehood" (Abstrahentium non est mendacium); that is, those who consider one thing without another, namely, without considering the other with which in reality it is conjoined, do not speak falsely; because they do not assert that in reality that is abstract which is abstract in consideration. Wisdom, therefore, by its very nature is the Deity; but it is conceived by us as an affection and as

137. "Essence is communicated, relation is not communicated": i.e., in the Trinity, the divine essence is communicated by generation and spiration, but the relations as such are incommunicable.

something of the Deity, which in reality is from itself, although, while it is considered as something of God, it is not apprehended as a being from itself nor as a being from another, because we think nothing of that sort about it. And although, when we distinguish the attributes from the essence, it is denied in a proposition, according to the formal sense, that one is predicated of another, and we say "the essence is not wisdom" and conversely; nevertheless we never assert that wisdom is from another or that it is a creature. For to this it would be necessary that it really be from another - as in the same way about relation we shall say below, Disputation 121, cap. 2, to the second argument.

But someone may say: just as being per se and being in another are transcendent notions, one of which is included in any being, so also being from itself and being from another ought to be transcendent notions; and therefore to any attribute the one or the other of them ought to belong.

I reply: although in reality there cannot be a middle between being from itself and being from another, and thus in reality they are transcendents, nevertheless in our consideration there can be a middle; and thus they are not transcendental notions in our consideration. For a thing can be conceived neither under the one nor under the other notion. For the divine essence itself is conceived as an essence before it is understood to be infinite; for infinitude is an attribute which is formally posited in it, so that it is not from another, but from itself: but the essence of God can be understood without the attributes being expressly understood. And concerning the attribute of infinitude, this is proved: because, in order that a thing be conceived as infinite in the genus of being, it must be expressly conceived as not from another; yet between conceiving a thing as not from another, and conceiving it as from another, there is a middle; namely, to conceive it under another notion and predicate. For between contradictories there can be a middle in our thought, though not in reality. For example, between "to be white" and "not to be white" there is no middle; but between this, which is "to think of something as white," and "to think of it as not white," there is a middle: because it can be thought under other predicates, no mention at all being made of whiteness, neither affirmatively nor negatively. Similarly, we can say that "to be per se" and "to be in another" are transcendental notions, not in our consideration, but in reality, as "good" and "true": for it is not of the ratio of a transcendent that it also be transcendent in consideration; for any thing can be considered without that by which it is true or good, although those are transcendental notions; similarly it can be considered without that by which it is considered as per se or as in another. It is called "transcendent," not because our consideration always apprehends the thing under that notion, but because one can affirm of it such a notion. And thus it happens in the attributes: for although by our consideration they are not apprehended as "from itself" or "from another," we nevertheless say that in reality it is from itself and not from another.

Solution to the second argument. It is to be said to the other argument that the essence, insofar as it is considered as the substance of God and as the foundation of the attributes, does not include in our concept the attributes; nevertheless it is infinite even under this consideration, and perfect in the genus of substance. For substantial infinity is not "to have every perfection of the attributes," as we proved above in Disputation 25, cap. 1, but "not to have a cause of its existence (*esse*)." The essence, then, even without wisdom is in this way infinite: it is also perfect in the genus of substance and of existence, although it is not yet in the genus of operating and of the other

attributes. And because we, according to our capacity, conceive God little by little, it is not surprising if, in our first concept, we understand Him as perfect as to substantial existence, and then as to operations and their faculties: because we can think of Him only by parts. And although the Scholastic Doctors variously explain the notion of the infinitude of the substance of God, as we reported in that disputation, yet no one - unless it be some recent professors of theology - has explained the infinitude of God in such a way that it is infinitude because it has the infinitudes or all the perfections of the attributes. In the same way we say about the attributes that each is apprehended by us as perfect and infinite, not in the genus of substance, but in its own genus: about which infinitude, as it agrees with each attribute, we spoke in Disputation 103, cap. 2. Wherefore it is not necessary that an attribute, in order to be infinite in its own genus, include within itself all [others].

Therefore I do not see how what the Canarian says can be true, namely, that if one attribute is to be perfectly defined, all the others must be included in its definition. If we speak of the definition which the intellect of wayfarers assigns, the contrary rather is the case - as is evident from this whole work of ours - when we dispute about individual attributes, we strive to distinguish the notion of one from another, so that we may be able to understand each perfectly. We grant indeed that, if the definition were by the intellect of the blessed who behold God as He is, there would be one definition only, by which the essence together with the attributes would be most simply comprehended. But the Canarian speaks about the definition of the attributes, insofar as they are defined by us wayfarers. Whether indeed, from the diversity of the attributes, there is in God any composition, we shall discuss in Disputation 121, cap. 3, where we shall also treat of relation (*relatio*) and essence, whether they compose and in some way constitute the person, or not.

Disputatio CXX - Whether the divine relations are distinguished from the essence in the nature of the thing

- The opinion of Gilbert. Caput I.
- What was done against Gilbert in the Council of Reims. Caput II.
- Whether what is the same differs from relation only by a difference in the nature of the thing; that in the persons there are three realities - the opinions of Scotus, the Nominalists, and Durandus. Caput III.
- That relation and essence are in no way distinguished by the nature of the thing, but only by our cogitation - proved by authority. Caput IV.
- The same opinion is confirmed by reason. Caput V.
- Solution of the arguments of Scotus and Durandus. Caput VI.

Caput I - The opinion of Gilbert

It must be treated below in Disputation 138, how the matter now proposed is to be settled; yet the solution of the difficulty at hand is not hard to gather from what has been set forth above. Therefore, after also reviewing the opinions of others, as is our custom we must examine them expressly; and for greater perspicuity, before all things the opinion of Gilbert must be set down, and it must be explained what was defined against him in the Council of Reims.

This Gilbert of Poitiers, author of the Six Principles in the Aristotelian logic, was bishop of Poitiers in the time of Pope Eugene III and of Emperor Conrad III. For in the Council of Reims his doctrine was condemned by Eugene III, and he himself was convicted of error by Bernard, as will appear below. Of Gilbert's error there is recollection among the Scholastics, Alexander and St. Bonaventure, cited by us above in Disputation 114, cap. 1; and St. Thomas, in this second article, thought that he had held the opinion that the relations are, as it were, fastened on from without, not inhering in the divine essence; but he taught nothing of the sort. Nor in truth did he assert anything amiss about the distinction of the attributes among themselves or from the essence, as we noted in Disputation 116, cap. 2. For although he said that God is not his wisdom, but is wise, nevertheless by the name of God he understood not the divine nature, but the person; and from the person, as he said, the essence differs, so also, he thought, the attributes differ; indeed, between the attributes and the essence he established no distinction by the nature of the thing.

For as Otto of Freising writes - an ancient bishop and author who flourished more than a hundred years after Bernard, during the interregnum in the year 1260, in the book De gestis Friderici Imperatoris I, of whom he himself was the nephew, chapters 16 and 57 - Gilbert used to say that the name "God" is sometimes put for the person, sometimes for the nature. When it is put for the nature, he conceded that God is his deity, his wisdom, etc. From which we gathered in that Disputation 116, cap. 2, that Gilbert established no distinction by the nature of the thing between the essence and the attributes. But when God is put for the divine person, he said that God is not his deity or his truth, unless at once one add by way of explanation, "that is, God, that is, true," and so of the others - an explanation of which Bernard makes mention in Sermon 80 on the Canticles, and he affirms that it was condemned as perverse and suspect by Eugene and by the fathers of the Council of Reims; whose acts we shall recite in the next chapter.

And since the same Gilbert used to say - as will be clear from what we shall report - that God is not his essence, but is by his essence, therefore this proposition, "God is the divine essence," he said must be conceded only if the divine essence were put in the ablative of instrument for forming (a case of expressing the manner of having), not in the nominative for naming; as if he were saying, God is not deity, but is God by deity; just as he is not eternity, but is eternal by eternity. Hence Bernard, in that Sermon 80, rehearsing the error of Gilbert and his disciples, says: "By the divinity (so they assert) God is, but the divinity is not God." Therefore, whenever Bernard proves against him that God is the very deity and wisdom and the other attributes, as in that sermon and in book 5 of De consideratione, he takes "God" for the person, not for the divine nature.

In the same manner the author of the commentary on the book of Boethius On the Trinity, among the works of Bede, tome 8, column 1113, when he mentions this Council and the error of Gilbert, says that Gilbert asserted "God is God by deity, or good by goodness," so that the construction would be transitive - a construction which seems to have place with a merely formal distinction by the nature of the thing. Now the construction is called intransitive, when there is no distinction; as when we say "filiation is the property of the person or of the related," that is, the property which is the relation itself. Nor did Gilbert grant only a transitive construction according to our way of conceiving, as we grant when we say that paternity is the property of the person - although the person is not distinguished from the person by the nature of the thing; rather, he conceded a transitive construction by the nature of the thing. But that the author of that commentary whom we alleged was not Bede is manifest also from this, that he makes mention of the Council of Reims against Gilbert, which was celebrated long after Bede, in the time of Bernard.

The reason of Gilbert is reported to us by Otto in these words, "Lest, namely, if he professed without determination that God is by divinity - that is, as if he posited the person - he would be forced, without determination, to concede whatever is said of any of the persons and of the essence; and thus he would fall into this absurdity: that just as he would concede simply that God is by his deity, that is, God is by truth, and similarly of the rest; so too, by the same indetermination, he would concede the divine essence to be incarnate and to have suffered; whence from this absurdity the heretical sense, near to Sabellius, would easily emerge; and the same thing would be said both to be begetting and begotten; the same would have begotten itself." But that he by "nature of the thing" did not understand a mathematical abstraction, but a theological consideration, he also seemed to intimate there, when he tried to prove alike "by reason and by the nature of the thing." For he did not mean that they are distinguished by our way of understanding; for the mathematician, by his consideration alone, separates from matter those things which truly are in matter; thus they are distinguished only by mathematical reason which are conceived as distinct by our intellect alone; but by theological reason he said those things differ which, according to true Theology, differ among themselves - that is, which true Theology asserts to differ. He understands, moreover, "by the nature of the thing," not by mere consideration; otherwise there would not be one thing to differ by mathematical reason and by the consideration of the Theologian. These are the things which of Gilbert's opinion I have been able to gather from the aforesaid doctor (Otto), in whose works I found mention of him, and perhaps nowhere else can it be found; for in Bernard there is nothing else except that he tries to establish that proposition which Gilbert denied.

Concerning this same error, with the author unnamed, St. Anselm also makes mention, in the book De Incarnatione Verbi, chapter 1, in these words: "When I was still in the monastery of Bec, there was broached by a certain cleric in France this assertion: If in God (said he) there are three persons, there is only one thing, and not three things, as if each were by itself separately, like three angels or three souls, and yet by power and will they are altogether the same: therefore the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnate with the Son." Thus far Anselm. Yet there are some later Scholastics who have understood this error otherwise. Some think that this cleric asserted that

there are three Gods of different natures, to defend that one without another was incarnate. Others think that he taught that three persons were incarnate, because they are one God, and for that reason one without another cannot be incarnate. But in truth the error of the aforesaid cleric was another, which afterward, in the time of Bernard, Gilbert followed. For in that assertion which we have reproduced, he used a reason to prove that the three persons are not one thing, as Gilbert contended - that is, that they are not the same as the essence, but are distinguished from it in some way in reality; so that the persons and the essence are not the same altogether according to the thing; lest we be forced to say either that there are three Gods (so that one without another could be incarnate), or, if they were the same as the essence and as power, that the divine nature itself - and whatever is the same with it, namely, each person - would be incarnate; which indeed was the very line of reasoning which Gilbert employed, as we have seen above. This very thing is gathered from the condition which Anselm recounts as the medium for the aforesaid error in these words: "For he (namely, that cleric) thus reasons with himself: If there is one and the same thing numerically which is God, and the very same is the Father and the Son: since the Son is incarnate, how is not the Father also incarnate? For of one and the same [thing] there is not at once a true affirmation and its negation." Which line of reasoning is altogether the same as Gilbert's, indeed even as Scotus's.

Nor does it stand in the way that that cleric said that to call two persons two "things" is to call them two things differing in a common notion, as two angels are, so that the absurdity would not follow - as though he had thought they must also differ in nature; to which absurdity Anselm contends that this very position leads. For since Anselm himself, in that same chapter, speaking about the middle, says that perhaps that cleric really did not posit the likeness of three angels, but that the monks who wrote to Anselm had added it from themselves; I think that the cleric did not wish to assert three Gods, but denied the distinction by the nature of the thing between essence and person. Thus, as it seemed to him, Gilbert too felt, so that the person might be sufficient for sustaining that difficulty, namely, how the person is incarnate and suffers, while the essence is not, and is not another than the person, but the very same one essence. I confess that Anselm never attacked Gilbert himself in this sense under the name of that cleric; for Gilbert's error is touched upon only in the letters of the monks, as he himself there says, and it is not plainly intelligible from that alone. Yet I am persuaded that the same error which the said cleric had, Gilbert himself had a few years later in the time of Bernard in France, and that he taught it publicly with the same line of reasoning and aim, namely, that the three persons are not the very same common thing, so that thus one person would be incarnate without another; which indeed seemed to be sufficiently defended, if one posited not three divine natures, but one common to the three, yet really distinct from them. Therefore the cleric was not forced to assert three Gods, but only a distinction between essence and persons.

Caput II - What was done against Gilbert in the Council of Reims

A council was convoked against Gilbert, the reigning Pontiff Eugene III being present, and many Cardinals and bishops, and Blessed Bernard the Abbot. Otto, in the place alleged above, narrates it thus. The same Council is also commemorated as celebrated in the time of Bernard in Sermon 80 on the Canticles. And as far as to a certain point some acts were recited there against Gilbert; what things Gilbert asserted is reported according to a certain codex which I found in a certain little library of the aforesaid Council in Gaul, and Gregory XIII, by James Amiot, bishop of Auxerre, from which, when I was at Rome in the year 1590, I obtained transcribed all the acts against Gilbert from the Lord Antonio Aquinas, a man not only illustrious but also in every kind of virtue and of letters most accomplished and of oratory; although since they were not had in the Vatican codex of that Council, nothing great is to be made of them. What was the cause why in the Vatican they are not had, it is not ours now to say.

First, therefore, these propositions were there alleged and assertions of Gilbert, which were written in the same codex:

- That of the divine nature, which is called deity, God is not, but [it is] the form by which God is; just as humanity is not man, but [is] the form by which he is man.
- That when the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are said to be one, they are understood to be one only by one deity, nor can it be converted so that one God, or one substance, or one thing, are said to be the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
- That the three persons, by three unities, are three, and by three distinct properties - which are not the persons themselves - are three eternal things, and, both from one another and from the divine substance, numerically different.[138]

Nor does it stand in the way that that clerk said that two persons ought to be two realities altogether diverse, as two angels are, lest that absurdity should follow; as if he had thought that they ought also to be diverse in nature, to which absurdity St. Anselm contends he himself is driving him. For, since St. Anselm himself says a little later that perhaps that clerk in truth did not posit the likeness of three angels, but that the monks who wrote to Anselm reported him thus; I think that clerk did not wish to assert three Gods, but to establish a distinction from the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*) between essence (*essentia*) and person (*persona*). For thus it seemed to him, as also to Gilbert, that that difficulty was sufficiently removed, why one person was incarnate and not another, if they were not the same as the one essence; which indeed seemed to be sufficiently defended, if we posited not three divine natures, but one common to the three, yet really distinct from them. Therefore that clerk was not compelled to assert three Gods, but only a distinction between essence and persons.

138. Alexander of Hales; St. Bonaventure; cited above, Disp. 114, cap. 1. - St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 1 - 2. - Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici imperatoris I, lib. 1, cc. 16, 57. - Bernard, Sermones super Cantica canticorum, sermo 80; idem, De consideratione, lib. 5. - Commentator in Boethius, De Trinitate, apud Bedae opera, tom. 8, col. 1113. - St. Anselm, De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 1 - 3.

Next Anselm relates that that clerk, upon retractation, called his opinion in the Council of Reims, under Archbishop Renaud; but this Council was in the time of Anselm, earlier indeed than the other Council of Reims under Eugenius III in the time of Bernard; just as Anselm himself is also earlier than Bernard. We were constrained to hold a Council against Gilbert in the presence of Pope Eugenius III and the Cardinals, and many other bishops, and the blessed Bernard abbot was there, as Otto relates in the place cited. The same Council, held in the same place, is mentioned also by Bernard himself in Sermon 80 on the Canticles a little from the end. And its acts against Gilbert, it pleased me here to report verbatim, from a certain manuscript codex of that Council sent from Gaul to Gregory XIII, by Jacques Amyot, bishop of Auxerre, from which, while I was in Rome in the year 1590, I obtained all the things transcribed against Gilbert from the Lord Antonio Aquinate, a man not only illustrious by birth, but also most adorned by every kind of virtues and letters; which, although they are not had in the Vatican codex of the same Council, nevertheless entire credence is to be given to them. Why indeed they are not had in the Vatican we shall say below.

First, therefore, these were the dogmas and assertions of Gilbert which were written in the same codex.

- That the divine nature, which is called "divinity," is not God, but a form, by which God is: just as humanity is not man, but the form by which he is man.
- That when the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be one, they are understood to be one only by one divinity; nor can it be converted, that one God, or one substance, or one thing, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be.
- That the three persons by three unities are three, and the distinct properties to the three - which are not the persons themselves - are three eternal things, and numerically different from one another and from the divine substance.
- That the divine nature is not incarnate.

Then there follows in the same Council:

In the year of the Lord 1148 this symbol was established under Pope Eugenius III in the Council of Reims by the Fathers of the provinces:

We hold and confess that the simple nature of the divinity is God, nor can it in any Catholic sense be denied that the divinity is God, and God divinity. But wherever the Wisdom of the Lord says that the Lord is wise by wisdom, great by greatness, God by divinity, and other things of this sort, we believe that it is only by that wisdom which is God himself that he is wise; only by that greatness which is God himself that he is great; only by that eternity which is God himself that he is eternal; only by that unity which is he himself that he is one; only by that divinity that he is God, which is he himself; that is, by himself wise, great, eternal, one God.

When we speak of the three persons, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we confess them to be one God, one divine substance: and conversely, when we speak of one God, one divine substance, we confess that this one God, one divine substance, is three persons.

We believe and confess that only God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are eternal, and that there are not at all any things - whether they be called relations (*relationes*), or properties, or singularities, or unities, or other things of this sort - present to God which are from eternity and are not God.

We believe and confess that the divinity itself, whether you call it the divine substance or the divine nature, is incarnate, but in the Son.

Thus far in that codex of the Council of Reims was written against Gilbert's propositions.

Moreover Otto writes in that chapter 57 that Bernard privately met with the bishops of the provinces and issued canons against Gilbert, which in my judgment are contained in the aforesaid symbol; and therefore in the title it is said to be composed by the Fathers of the provinces, that is, by the bishops. This the Cardinals who were then with Eugenius at Reims took ill; because, without consulting them, Bernard with the bishops had dared to define anything against Gilbert. He himself, however, with his wonted modesty excused himself and the bishops before the Pontiff and the Cardinals, that they had done that, not in order that, without the consent of the Cardinals and the Pontiff, they might define something and decide by a final judgment; but because Gilbert had asked of them that Bernard himself, together with what he had disputed, and the other Gallic bishops might explain their faith. Nevertheless Eugenius decreed that that symbol and the canons should not be held as a rule of faith. But, with the last three set aside, the first - on which the whole controversy turned - Eugenius with the Cardinals and the whole Council defined against Gilbert in this way, as Otto writes in that chapter 57: that no distinction should be made between nature (*natura*) and person; and that God should not be said to be "by the divine essence" only in the sense of the ablative, but also nominatively; that is, not only should it be said, "the Father, by deity, is God," but, "he is Deity itself." Where plainly Gilbert's unusual exposition is condemned: "The Father is wisdom, that is, wise"; because he did not wish to concede that predication in the case of naming, so as to show that God is wise by his wisdom, but is not wisdom itself.[139]

Then Otto subjoins: Whence even now it is held by the more approved hearers of the same bishop (namely, of Gilbert), that reason there should not distinguish in understanding, but in speaking. And this perhaps was the cause why in the Vatican codex there were only the canons which pertain to morals, but nothing truly against Gilbert's doctrine; because the Pontiff did not wish that whole symbol to be held as a rule of faith; while that proposition which he defined, those who wrote the Vatican codex did not bother to set down, because that was not the principal cause of calling the Council; and there with Gilbert all matters had been well composed, since he himself retracted his view in the Council.

From all these things it is rightly gathered what was defined against Gilbert, namely, that the distinction between the divine nature and the persons is not from the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*), but only a mathematical consideration and a definition of reason, as we said above; whether, however, it has force against Scotus's view we shall say in chapter 4. Furthermore, one thing is to be observed concerning the words of Otto which we have just reported; when he says

139. Otto of Freising, De gestis Friderici, cap. 57; cf. the account of the Reims Council under Eugenius III.

that among Gilbert's disciples the more approved later held in common the opinion that reason should not distinguish between person and divine nature in understanding, but that in speaking it does. This is not to be taken as if Otto judged that Gilbert's disciples had followed a better opinion, and said that between person and nature there is only a difference of names, and none at all, not even in the understanding before the thing is considered; which the Nominalists afterwards asserted about the attributes and the essence, as was said above in Disputation 117, chapter 1; but only that they said there is no distinction in the thing itself before the understanding, which true theological reason finds and affirms to be there; but that distinction to be a mathematical cogitation only, as we were saying above in chapter 1; on account of which they said that it is only "in speaking," which does not touch the thing as it is in itself. Yet because names are for expressing the thing as it is in the mind and concept, it is altogether the same to distinguish there a relation in speaking as to apprehend as distinct the concepts which we name as distinct.

Caput III - Whether what is the same differs from relation only by a difference in the nature of the thing, and whether in the persons there are three realities

Among our Scholastics there were not lacking those who would say that between essence and relation (*relatio*), and hence between essence and person, there is a distinction from the nature of the thing and prior to the intellect. Chief among these was Scotus in 1 Sentences, dist. 4, q. 4, in the Order.[140] But to this view - whose mind we have expressly explained in Disputation 116, chapter 4, concerning the distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the essence, which we showed even from his own sentence to be a distinction from the nature of the thing before the intellect - he proves by the same reasoning which we reported above in the first chapter of this disputation as urged by Gilbert and which is Theological reason, as we were saying above; namely, because it is impossible that there be two things altogether the same according to the thing, and that one be communicated according to the thing and the other not be communicated according to the thing. But the essence is communicated according to the thing to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, either by generation or by spiration; relation, however, is not communicated: therefore they cannot be altogether the same according to the thing.

Those who agree are Gabriel in 1, dist. 29, a. 3 and 4, and art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius in 1, q. 6, art. 2, concl. 4, and in the same; and Ockham. These differ only from Scotus, because he judged the same formal distinction (*distinctio formalis*) to obtain also between the attributes themselves and from the essence, and among the attributes themselves; these, however, only between the divine nature and the relations or persons.[141] Besides, he thought that this distinction exists not only in God but also in created things; these, however, concede it only in God by this special reason: for whenever something is the same with two things really distinct, it must necessarily be distinguished from each of those formally from the nature of the thing; because it is not the same with each; but in God thus do essence and relations stand: therefore they are distinguished

140. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 4 (in the Ordinatio).

141. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 29, a. 3 - 4; art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 6, a. 2, concl. 4; William of Ockham, loc. cit.

formally from the nature of the thing. And Gabriel, Ockham, and Marsilius think this kind of distinction so difficult that the very mystery of the Trinity, and in no other thing in the world, can it be found.

This reasoning also, if it be rightly considered, seems the same as the reasoning of Scotus and Gilbert; for the major proposition cannot be proved otherwise than in the manner in which Scotus and Gilbert use it, namely, that contradictory predicates are said of those things in the thing itself.

Finally, together with the aforesaid concurs Durandus in 1, dist. 33, q. 1, except that the distinction between essence and relations he says to be not only from the nature of the thing, but also not to be a middle between real and of reason: he therefore calls it real, not of any sort, but such as is between a thing and a mode of the thing. First, indeed, he proves that there is no middle distinction between real and of reason by the argument which we reported above from the same in Disputation 116, chapter 4, at the end. Second, that that distinction is not real in the way that is between thing and thing, he infers thus: otherwise it would follow that relations in God are something created, or that there are many Gods. Third, he confirms that the aforesaid distinction is before the intellect by the same reasoning which Scotus and the Nominalists used: because, namely, the divine essence formally and from the nature of the thing is in one in whom there is not the relation: for it is essence in the Father, in whom there is not filiation; and it is in the Son in whom there is not paternity; and it is also in the Holy Spirit, in whom there is not paternity and filiation: therefore it is distinguished from each really, that is, from the nature of the thing, which with him is the same.

Relation and essence in no way to differ from the nature of the thing, but only by our cogitation, is proved by authority.

Caput IV - That relation and essence differ in no way from the nature of the thing, but by our cogitation only

I for my part judge the same about the relations and the essence as I judge about the attributes themselves and the divine essence: namely, that in no way, or in the least kind, is there a distinction from the nature of the thing prior to the intellect, but that they are distinguished by our cogitation alone. This sentence was handed down by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent theologians in this article 2; by Henry in Quodlibet 5, q. 6; by St. Bonaventure in 1, dist. 33, art. 2, q. 1; by Richard, a. 2, q. 1; by Gregory, q. 1, 2, 2; by Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 1, 2, 3, and 4; and by Cano on this article, disputation 3, part 2.[142]

In confirmation of this very position two things must be shown: one is, that relation and essence in God are not distinguished by the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*), but by our thought; the other is, in what manner they are distinguished by the operation of our intellect. The former will be

142. St. Thomas, this article 2; Cajetan, ad loc.; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 6; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 33, a. 2, q. 1; Richard of St. Victor, a. 2, q. 1; Gregory of Rimini, q. 1, 2, 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1 - 4; Melchior Cano, in hunc art., disp. 3, p. 2.

established in this chapter; the latter will be demonstrated in the following disputation. Whether the opinion of Scotus and of others has any probability, let judgment be given; in this chapter we shall put forward only what will seem to confirm our position and to refute Scotus.

First, then, against Scotus stand all the testimonies alleged by us in general in Disputation 116, cap. 4, by which it is proved that in God nothing is distinguished by the nature of the thing except the persons among themselves. This Bernard also makes plain when he teaches the same thing about the attributes, and especially about relation and essence, on account of the supreme simplicity of God, which it is not necessary here to rehearse.

Now, with respect to relation and essence it is proved, first, by the authority of St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1, cap. 11, where he says thus: For each of them (namely, of the persons) has no less with respect to the others what it has with respect to itself; that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are wholly one and the same, except that the Father is not begotten, the Son is begotten, the Spirit proceeded; but what in it (namely, in the essence) is said, is distinguished by thought alone. When he says, "distinguished by thought alone," he plainly excludes every other distinction by the nature of the thing; and when he says, "in it, that is, in the essence," he does not only assert that the attributes previously enumerated are not distinct from it, but moreover that the common essence, power, goodness, and the other things enumerated there are so the same in the three persons that they do not differ from them save by our thought alone. He also calls the properties "modes of existing of the nature." Therefore, if they differ by the nature of the thing from the essence (as some pretend), the difference will not be as between thing and thing, but as between a thing and a mode of a thing.

And this genus of distinction he explains thus: although every mode of a thing, prior to any intellect, has a different essence and nature from the very thing of which it is the mode; nevertheless its essence is this, that it be of another - not as an accident, to wit, a quality or quantity or other complete accidental form; for such forms have an absolute nature altogether, and in no way depend upon a subject: that is, their entire nature can be and remain intact without depending upon that of which they are the subject, as we see in the accidents of the altar. But if now the other accidents in act depend upon a subject and are of another, this is not of their essence, but only accompanies it; whereas a mode of a thing depends upon that of which it is the mode in such a way that its essence and nature directly connote that very thing; and therefore, without the thing of which it is the mode, it can neither actually be nor be understood. Such is the contact of two bodies, which without the bodies can neither be nor be understood; for that is not a thing nor any existing reality, but a mode of existing of bodies. So also is the mode which separated accidents have from a subject, by which they are also said to be per se.

Relation and essence in no way differ by the nature of the thing, but only by the thought of our intellect: this is proved by authority; and whether the opinion of Scotus has anything of probability, let others judge; we will propose only those points which will seem to confirm our opinion and refute Scotus.

On the same subject

Whether relation and essence are distinct in God

Second, it is confirmed from the Council of Florence, session 18, a little past the middle, in the disputation between John and Mark; where John, speaking from the Latin Church, says as follows: Divine substance and persons are indeed the same, and seem to differ according only to the mode of our understanding. To which position Mark, on behalf of the Greek Church, consented throughout the whole council. Likewise Andrew, archbishop of Colossae, in the same council, session 17, wishing to reconcile the disputation of the same John and Mark, thus spoke: It greatly matters (implicitly to profess the divine substance, or the substance of the Father and of the Son); but we must by no means think that they truly differ, since they are said to differ only by reason or understanding, etc. Therefore, if the essence of the Father or the essence of the Son differs by reason alone from the essence taken absolutely above; it follows that relation also differs by reason alone from the essence simply taken; otherwise, the essence of the Father, which adds relation, would not differ by reason alone from the essence simply.

And the principal point is this, that in the same council, in the last session, in a certain confession of faith sent by the Latins to the Greeks, it is said thus: Moreover, lest we seem to hold the identity and conjunction of the divine substance to be divided, and to believe that the substance itself differs from the hypostases and persons by anything other than reason alone, etc.; where the council and the whole Latin party judge it an inconvenience to suppose a distinction between person and essence greater than that of reason and intellect.

Third, it is gathered still more strongly against Scotus from the celebrated definition of the Council of Reims, which we related out of Otto; first, because, as Eugenius defined, reason ought not to distinguish between relations and essence; it follows that formally they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing. For when Eugenius defined that reason should not distinguish, he understood, according to Gilbert's phrase, as we set forth in cap. 2, not a mathematical reason and consideration, but a theological one, which is from the nature of the thing and prior to our consideration.[143] Second, because if, as Bernard grants, that mode of speaking of Gilbert is correct - "deitas, that is, Deus; bonitas, that is, bonus" - then, since Gilbert thought it necessary to add those explanations in order that the proposition might be true, that is, "Deus, id est bonus," that distinction also would be displeasing to him which Scotus posits between person and the divine essence. For from Scotus's position in like manner it follows that the same explanation must be added, that is, "Deus," in order that the proposition, "the Father is Deity," be formally true. For according to Scotus the Father by the nature of the thing is rather "God" than "deity": and since he differs from deity by the nature of the thing and formally, that proposition without the explanation is not true in the formal sense and by the nature of the thing. Third, if Gilberti's more approved disciples, after the council's definition, said that between relation (or person) and essence there is no distinction in understanding, but in naming, as we explained in cap. 2; it follows that it is

143. Otto of Freising, De gestis Friderici, cap. 57; cf. the account of the Reims Council under Eugenius III.

known only according to our mode, which uses various names, and not according to a theological consideration which tends to the thing itself as it is in itself, that any distinction could be found there.

Moreover, against Durandus's opinion can be alleged the decree of the Lateran Council under Innocent, which is reported in cap. Damnamus de summa Trinitate et fide catholica: for in that chapter is contained the opinion of Joachim, abbot of Fiore, who imputed to the Master of the Sentences an error, because he had asserted that in God there was a quaternity - namely, three persons really distinct from one essence; and from this Joachim inferred that, since the Master said that in the divinity the Father generates but the essence does not generate; the Son is generated but the essence is not generated; for if the essence neither generates nor is generated, and the Father generates and the Son is generated, and the divine essence is a certain thing, it follows that it is a certain thing which is neither Father nor Son; therefore there will be a quaternity. Joachim himself, to avoid this absurdity, fell into another no less one: for he said that in God there are three persons not by unity of essence, but by a collective unity, by which he seemed to assert three Gods; and both of them are there condemned, both what he asserted and what he imputed to the Master; and the Master is vindicated from this charge. But Scotus and Durandus, and those who assert that relations are distinguished by the nature of the thing from the essence, even though they add that they do not differ as thing and thing, but as two formal rationes (as Scotus says), or as a thing and a mode of a thing (as Durandus says), cannot deny plurality and number between relation and person by the nature of the thing, since they establish a distinction. But if a real plurality is conceded, we fall into some quaternity of the essence - namely, of the three persons and of the essence - just as Bernard, book 5 of De consideratione, a little before the middle, infers against Gilbert. For after he had adduced the testimony of Boethius, in the book On the Trinity, "That truly one in which there is no number," which we explained above, Disputation 116, cap. 4, he proves that in God there is number only of persons, not of nature; and he subjoins thereafter: Or if one should try either to divide the persons from the substance, or the properties from the persons, I do not know how he could profess himself a servant of the Trinity, who would have proceeded into so great a multitude of things. Therefore, if Scotus, Durandus, and others distinguish properties from the nature by the nature of the thing, it follows that they introduce more than a ternary of persons and truly concede a quaternity by the nature of the thing.

You will say: Bernard condemned only that multiplicity beyond the ternary of persons, if it were of things; but the aforesaid doctors do not say there are four things, but four formal rationes (as Scotus says), or three real modes and one thing (as Durandus speaks). But certainly Bernard would have cared not at all whether number were introduced in this way or that, provided it were number in the thing itself prior to intellect, and not solely in name or in intellect: but if there were more rationes by the nature of the thing, there would be a true number beyond the ternary of persons. And Bernard himself strove so much to defend the unity of God in the essence and the Trinity only in the persons without a quaternity, that much later in the same book, when he had said that God is length, breadth, height, and depth - whereby he seemed to introduce the very quaternity which he had previously attacked - he excused what he had said, not indeed by saying that those were four

formal rationes and not four things, but by these words: "Different voices, many ways; but through them one and the same is signified." Of which testimony we said many things that serve our present purpose, in Disputation 118, cap. 2, and earlier in the same book 5 against Gilbert, where he thus says: "Quaternity sets a boundary to the world, not a sign of deity. God is Trinity: God is of the three single persons; if it pleases to add a fourth by divinity, in the meantime I, persuaded that this by which God is not God, am not to be adored." Gilbert was saying that God, taken for the person, is not his deity; therefore it is gathered that a quaternity is introduced, in which that deity, which is not God, as Bernard says, is not to be adored, because God is not it. But Gilbert introduced a quaternity in such a way that the theological reason would in no way distinguish there, as we related above out of Otto.[143] Wherefore, whoever would concede any distinction by the nature of the thing, even if he called it of "thing and mode" or of "formal rationes," would introduce that quaternity which Bernard impugns in Gilbert, since in some way a theological reason would be distinguishing there.

The same opinion is confirmed by reason.

Caput V - Further rational confirmation; refutation of Scotus and Durandus

Finally, by the same reasons can the position of Scotus and of Durandus be impugned, by which above, Disputation 116, cap. 4, we refuted Scotus's opinion about a distinction of the attributes by the nature of the thing; which it will be enough to recall under the main heads.

- First reason is that of Bernard, sermon 80 on the Canticles, which he used against Gilbert: because if God is not his essence and wisdom, it follows either that that [essence or wisdom] is a creature, or that there are several Gods, etc.
- Second reason: because Scotus's opinion plainly derogates from the simplicity and the greatest unity of God, since between essence and relation some number comes in. From which it also follows that some composition is made. What Scotus answers about the attributes, we have already seen in that cap. 4 and impugned; and the same he answers about relations and essence; therefore in the same way his reply ought to be refuted.

Now then, what does Durandus say, who in a peculiar way defends this distinction, for he does not concede any composition between relation and essence, even if they are distinguished by the nature of the thing? He answers: no composition is made from relation and essence, because a mode does not compose with the thing of which it is the mode; but relation is a mode of the essence: and the things which compose something must be things and differ from each other as things; because that which composes with another ought to have an essence of its own entirely diverse from that with which it composes; but a mode, although it differ from the thing of which it is, nevertheless does not have an essence of its own, because its whole nature is to be of another.

143. Otto of Freising, De gestis Friderici, cap. 57; cf. the account of the Reims Council under Eugenius III.

However, this reply is frivolous: for Durandus assumes what he ought to have proved, and infers that a mode, which really differs from the thing of which it is the mode, therefore does not compose with it, because it does not have an essence to itself - precisely the point that needed proof - and he concludes that it does not compose with that other because it has no essence of its own, since its whole nature is to be of another.

He says that it has an essence to, not of, itself; just as this is gratuitously asserted, so also it is rejected without any reason. But we can still press Durandus in this way: If truly a mode really differs from the thing of which it is, and has a nature and formal notion (*ratio formalis*) diverse from it, then already there is some number there; and consequently a plurality or duplicity: and this we rightly call composition, which is opposed to unity and simplicity, as is manifest. But to the unity and simplicity of God any such multitude or duplicity derogates, as is clear from disputation 116, cap. 4.

Finally, against Scotus, who thinks that this distinction is a mean between the real and the distinction of reason, we can employ Durandus's argument, which we adduced in that cap. 4; yet it proves nothing against Durandus, since he plainly teaches that between essence (*essentia*) and relation (*relatio*) there is a real distinction.

1. Solution of the arguments of Scotus and Durandus.

The principal reason on which the opinion of Scotus and of others rests (and which, as we noted in caps. 1 and 3 of this disputation, Gilbert also used) is taken from the various and contrary predications that are made about essence and about relation: for example, that essence is communicated in the thing itself, but relation is not communicated, etc. To these Cajetan replies (below, q. 30, art. 1)[144] that the divine essence is not only communicable, nor only incommunicable, but contains eminently, without any composition, both under the same adequate notion by reason of its infinity. Whence, says he, one may understand essence and relation, not as two formal objects by nature, but as one formally and many in power; as if he said that the divine essence and relation are not by nature mutually actually distinct, but are so disposed that by the intellect they can actually be distinguished.

But this solution of Cajetan does not satisfy the argument, because it does not render the reason why, when so diverse and contrary predicates are affirmed of essence and of relation, with that addition "by nature of the thing" (ex natura rei), nevertheless they are not actually distinct but only virtually. For how can it be that in a most simple reality we find something that is communicated, not by an operation of the intellect, but by the thing itself; and something that, in the same way, namely by the thing itself, is not communicated?

Others reply that of the same thing two contradictories, namely "to be communicated" and "not to be communicated," are not truly enunciated: because the affirmative proposition is true - namely, the thing which is essence is communicated; and the negative is false - namely, "the thing which is essence is not communicated": for that negation denotes that that thing is in no way

144. Cajetan, below, q. 30, art. 1.

communicated, namely neither insofar as it is essence nor insofar as it is relation, since negation universally denies all. But in this way the argument is not dissolved. For it does not assume that proposition, "Of the same thing contradictories cannot be enunciated"; rather the argument proceeds thus: It is impossible that any two, of which contradictories are enunciated with that addition "according to the thing" (secundum rem), be really the same. But such are enunciated of essence and relation, namely "to be communicated according to the thing" and "not to be communicated according to the thing": therefore they cannot be the same according to the thing.

Next, the Canariensis responds, disput. 3 in this article, part 3,[145] that a mere distinction of reason between essence and relation suffices for contradictories to be truly enunciated of them, whether that distinction has actually been made by the intellect or can only be made. I, indeed, with that author judge that a mere distinction of reason suffices for things so diverse - nay, even for contradictories - to be predicated of essence and relation, not only simply, but also with that addition "by nature of the thing," by which Scotus and the authors of the prior opinion press us much; yet he himself did not explain this sufficiently. Before we explain it, it must be premised that we never enunciate contradictories of essence and relation with the mere distinction of reason which can be made between them as opposites, but with the distinction actually applied. For since we use various names of essence and of relation, and names in us answer to concepts, we cannot but conceive as distinct what we also name as distinct: for thus do we conceive our concepts first as they are in us, and thus do we deliver them to other wayfarers to be understood. For the same reason we said in disput. 115, cap. c, that there is in things no extrinsic denomination actually, unless a prior operation of the intellect conceiving a relation in it has been posited, as is signified by the very name. Wherefore the Canariensis ought not to have asserted that, by a mere distinction of reason which can exist, even if it has not actually been made, contradictories can actually be enunciated of those things.

This being supposed, that a mere distinction of reason suffices for contradictories to be predicated by us of the same most simple thing, I show thus. Since the things themselves cannot be signified by us and by other wayfarers except by names also imposed by us, and the names about God are therefore diverse because we have diverse concepts about God and are not able to understand him otherwise, it follows that however much we add that "by nature of the thing," when we affirm "to be communicated" or "not to be communicated" and the like, there is always included in our predications some distinction and order of reason, on account of which, about the same thing which is by nature of the thing altogether individual, yet distinct by us through the intellect and through diverse names, we not only can but even ought to affirm one and deny the other.

But if we were to name and understand God as he is, if by one most simple concept we were to see whatever is in him, so too by one word or name we would express to others the blessed, in which there would be no contradictory terms. What sort of expression that would be, we cannot now explain further: it is enough to know that in it there would not be various enunciations in the way now spoken of. Therefore, from the diverse - nay, contrary - predicates which are said of the

145. Canariensis, disput. 3, in this article, part 3.

same most simple thing, namely of God, no distinction by nature of the thing can be gathered. For by nature of the thing, in all predications, however much the particle "by nature of the thing" or "really" be added, there is an order to the various concepts which we have of the same most simple thing, about which we do not enunciate the same. But when the aforesaid particles are added, we wish to signify nothing else than that what is in reality is to be enunciated and conceived insofar as it can be explained by us according to our measure, lest something absurd follow. Wherefore in that way the distinction of reason, which all those propositions necessarily include in themselves, is not taken away.

This doctrine can be gathered from Capreolus in 1. 4. 2. 9. 3. art. 3, ad 1, where he teaches that contradictories are never predicated of God unless by the operation of our intellect, which makes the predications - a point he himself pursues at length.[146]

From this same doctrine not only can the reasons of Gabriel, Durandus, and Gilbert be dissolved - which all are drawn from the various predications that we enunciate about essence and relations - but also responses can be made to the testimonies of St. Augustine which Scotus adduces for himself: such as that in De Trinitate VII, cap. 2, "Since both the Word is wisdom, but not conversely the word what wisdom is; for 'word' is understood relatively, 'wisdom' essentially": let us take that to be said, "the word," as if it were said, "born wisdom"; and in the same book, cap. 4, where he says, "It is one thing for God to be, another to be Father" - in which fashion St. Anselm also speaks in the book De processione Spiritus sancti, cap. 2. We say, then, that Augustine and Anselm wished to assign a distinction of reason between those, so as to show that they are signified in another way.[147] Finally, what Durandus adduces from St. John Damascene favors his opinion not at all: for we maintain that relation is a mode of existing, not a new existence, as we said in disput. 126; yet for that reason Damascene does not think that it is a mode of the essence really diverse from it: for although it does not differ from it by nature of the thing, nevertheless it can be conceived not as a thing, but as a mode of the essence. It remained here to dispute whether relation and essence can in God differ through the created intellect of the wayfarer only, or also through the divine intellect and of the Blessed who see God; but about this controversy the very same must be asserted as we said about the attributes in disput. 118.

An relation so differ from the essence of God that it nevertheless includes it in its concept.

What Henry and the Canariensis think; the chapters.

The divine essence and relation so differ by reason that the concept of essence is not included in the concept of relation - the truer opinion maintains this (cap. 2). The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved (cap. 3). The concept of relation does not pertain to the concept of essence (cap. 4). Essence is distinguished from relation and from the attributes more than relation from the person (cap. 5).

146. Capreolus, in 1. 4. 2. 9. 3. art. 3, ad 1.

147. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, cap. 2 and cap. 4; St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus sancti, cap. 2; St. John Damascene (as cited by Durandus).

What Henry and the Canariensis think

Having set aside the opinion of Scotus and of others who affirm that relations are distinguished from essence by nature of the thing - and who consequently ought to assert that essence is not included formally in the concept of relation - our controversy will be only with those who teach that they are distinguished merely by the intellect, namely whether they are thus distinguished that nevertheless relation includes essence in its concept: for that some things can be distinguished by the intellect, there is no doubt. Henry therefore, Quodlibet 5, q. 6, asserts that relation differs from essence in such a way as to include essence essentially in its very concept.[148] To explain this, he notes that a thing can be distinguished in two ways by reason: in one way according to "intention" (so he speaks), when evidently the one does not include the other, as genus and difference, of which one is outside the notion and concept of the other; in another way, when the concept of the one includes the concept of the other, but adds something peculiar, as species and genus: therefore, in this latter way, he says, relation and essence in God differ by reason alone.

The same opinion was followed by the Canariensis in this article, disput. 3: he affirms that the concept of essence is thus intrinsically included in the concept of paternity as "being" (ens) is in the concept of any predicament, which above the common notion of being adds a particular one by which it is distinguished from the others; so that in that very particular the notion of being is also contained. And this is proved first by Henry's reason: No relation refers something to another except by reason of something absolute, by reason of which the relation inheres in the subject, so that relation adds no reality above that absolute; but the divine relation refers one person to another: therefore by reason of some absolute, from which it has its notion, it inheres; but there is nothing absolute in God besides essence: therefore relation includes that in its concept.

Then it is proved thus: Since the divine relation is a certain being, and every being is rightly divided by this, that it is to be "from itself" or "from another," it follows that, according to its formal notion, it must be from itself or from another. If it were understood to be from another, it would be a creature, which is absurd; but if it were understood to be from itself, it would be deity, whose proper notion is to have no cause: therefore there would be a twofold divinity, unless relation in its proper concept were to include the very nature of the one divinity. We adduced this same reason in disputation 119, cap. 1, for the opinion of that same Canariensis, who teaches that the divine essence pertains to the formal concept of any attribute.

Finally, unless the divine essence were included in the concept of relation, it would follow that a divine person is composite, at least by the intellect: but any composition is repugnant to the divine simplicity. Therefore it is necessary that the divine essence be formally included in the concept of relation: for thus it will not compose with it even in our intellect, just as neither does "being" compose with the particular notions of the predicaments, because in all it is necessarily included. But if the essence were not contained in relation, not only would they be two distinct things, but also, because the one would not be included in the other, it would necessarily compose with it some third thing.

148. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 6.

That the divine essence and relation so differ by reason that the concept of essence is not included in the concept of relation

I for my part do not doubt that the divine relation is distinguished from the essence by our reason in such a way that the concept of essence is in no way included in the concept of relation; but relation is apprehended by us as some mode or affection supervening upon the essence. Wherefore I judge precisely the same about this proposition, "Paternity is the essence," as I said about that, "Intellect is will," in disputation 119, cap. 2 - namely that in the formal sense it is false and is to be conceded only in the (so they say) identical sense. This opinion must be proved almost in the same way as that about the attributes. First of all, the divine essence cannot be compared with relation as the notion of being is with a particular notion. For, as we said in disputation 114, cap. 2, the notion of being is not one common to all particular beings: for then it would be universal and univocal; but only the word is common, proximate to signifying the ten particular notions of the predicaments: substance indeed simply, but others with an addition - because they are not simply beings, but beings-of-being, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics VII, cap. 1, and IX, cap. 1, and likewise in Metaphysics IV, cap. 2, that "being" is said in the same way of all beings...[149]

Disputatio CXXI - On whether the divine essence is formally included in the concept of relation

On the concept of relation in God

Whether the divine essence is included in the concept of relation

Caput I - The position of Henry of Ghent and of the Canarian, with their reasons

It is objected: Henry notes that things can be distinguished in two ways, so that one may prove that relation includes essence in its concept. For it is not doubtful that some things can be distinguished by the intellect. Henry, therefore, in Quodlibet 5, q. 6, asserts that relation differs from essence in such a way that it includes essence essentially in its own concept.[150] In developing this claim he notes that things can be distinguished in a twofold manner: one way, according to reason (as he himself speaks), when, although the one does not include the other, nevertheless genus and difference are thus distinguished, of which the one is of the ratio and concept of the other; the other way, when the concept of the one includes the concept of the other, but adds something beyond, as species adds beyond genus. In this latter way, he says, relation and essence in God differ only by reason.

149. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, cap. 1; IX, cap. 1; and IV, cap. 2.
150. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 6.

The same view is followed by the Canarian in this article, disputation 3, who asserts that the concept of essence is intrinsically included in the concept of paternity, just as "being" includes in a common way the notions of any predicament, and then adds the particular note by which a thing is primarily distinguished from other things of the same genus; so that even the ratio of "being" contains what is common, and with it adds the particular by which it is distinguished from others.[151]

It is proved first by Henry's reason: relation refers something to something else, not by the notion of something absolute on account of which it is a subject, in such wise that relation has no reality over and above that absolute. But in God, relation refers one person to another: therefore, by the notion of something absolute to which it has the reference; and there is nothing absolute in God besides essence: therefore relation includes essence in its concept.

Second reason: since relation is a certain being, and every being is rightly said on account of this, that it has existence from itself or from another, it follows that formally, according to its ratio, it must be either from itself or from another. If it were understood to be from another, it would have a cause, which is absurd; if it were understood to be from itself, it would be deity, whose proper note is to have no cause: there would thus be a duplicity of divinity, unless relation in its own concept included the very nature of the one divinity. We set out this same reasoning above in Disputation 119, cap. 1, on the authority of the same Canarian, who teaches that the divine essence pertains to the formal concept of any attribute whatever.[152]

Finally, unless the divine essence were included in the concept of relation, it would follow that the divine person is composite, at least in our intellect; and every composition clashes with divine simplicity: therefore the divine essence must of necessity be formally included in the concept of relation: thus, with that [essence] it would not compose even in our intellect; in the same way as "being" with the particular notions of the predicaments, because in all of them it is necessarily included. But if essence were not contained in relation, not only would they be two distinct [concepts]; indeed also, since the one would not be included in the other, together with them some third common [thing] would of necessity be posited, by which they would be composed.

Caput II - The truer opinion

I for my part do not doubt that the divine relation is distinguished from essence by our reason in such a way that the concept of essence is in no way included in the concept of relation; but relation is apprehended by us as some mode or affection supervening upon the essence. Wherefore I hold exactly the same regarding this proposition, "Paternity is essence," as I said about that proposition, "Intellect is will," in Disputation 119, cap. 2: namely, that in the formal sense it is false, and only in the sense (as they say) of identity is it to be conceded.

This position must be proved almost in the same manner as that concerning the attributes. And first of all, the divine essence cannot be compared with relation as the ratio of being (*ens*) with a particular ratio. For, as we said in Disputation 114, cap. 2, the ratio of being is not one common to

151. Canariensis (Franciscus de Sylvestris), Disputation 3 on this article.

all particular beings, universal and univocal; only the word is common, proximate to signifying the ten particular notions of the predicaments: substance indeed simply, but others with an addition - because they are not simply beings, but beings-of-being - as the Philosopher teaches, Metaphysics VII, cap. 1, and IX, cap. 1, and in like manner IV, cap. 2, that "being" is said in the same way of all beings, as "healthy" is said of all the healthy.[153] Moreover, he also numbers among beings privation: yet who would say there is one common ratio for all healthy [things], and for being and privation? Wherefore "being - substance" signifies nothing more expressly than "substance": but if the ratio of being were a common [ratio] abstracted from many, without doubt there would remain the particular notions of beings, in which the ratio of being would not be included, just as there remain in animals the particular notions, when the common ratio of animal is abstracted. For if no particular ratio remained apart from being, in what way could something be abstracted from inferiors? For this is the very reason why something is abstracted, because something inferior remains, as difference apart from that common ratio. For just as in real abstraction the one is taken apart from the other so that the one remain without the other; so also in abstraction by reason the one must remain without the other. If, therefore, the ratio of being were thus distinguished from the particular ratios, as animal from rational, so as not to be included in their concept, it would follow that we should not say "animal" is abstracted from man and horse; because in them it always remains, even by reason; but [it is abstracted] from something of man and horse, namely from their differences: so that, by abstraction being dissolved, horse and man are dissolved. And whenever there is abstraction of one common [ratio] from many particulars, in this manner it ought to be done. Wherefore, since no common ratio of being or of accident can be abstracted which does not remain in the intrinsic modes of inferiors, it follows that analogical names do not signify one common concept, but are analogates proximate to themselves, as Cajetan has excellently taught in the third tome of the Opuscula, treatise 5.[154] Therefore the divine essence cannot be compared with relations as a ratio analogically signified with particulars, because it is truly one in many, not indeed common by one ratio and concept, as animal is, but one thing in reality; yet it is impossible to conceive the same common essence to three, without at the same time conceiving in each of the particulars a certain ratio which, in its own concept, does not include essence; just as we cannot think a common ratio of genus without at once understanding the particular specific ratios by which it is common, in whose concept [the genus] is not included, as differences. Therefore essence does not stand to relations as being stands to particular beings.

Second reason: Paternity - and any relation whatever - is conceived by us as something supervening upon the deity: therefore it is not understood as formally including it in its concept: for in that case it would not be said, nor would it be understood, as an accidence supervening [to it], but as taking it to itself indivisibly.

Third reason: Relation is conceived as adventitious to the essence, so as to determine it; and it is impossible for relation to be understood after the manner of what determines essence, if it includes it in its concept; for that which determines is not contained in the concept of the thing determined,

152. Canariensis, as cited above; cf. Disputatio 119, cap. 1.
153. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, cap. 1; IX, cap. 1; and IV, cap. 2.

as by induction is evident in created things: and since the divine relation is apprehended by us after the manner of other forms which in created things determine that which is common, it comes about that it ought to be conceived as outside that which is determined by it. But this is essence: therefore relation does not embrace essence in its own concept. The adversaries bring forward the example of being and of the intrinsic modes by which it is determined, in which nevertheless it is essentially included. But, as I noted above, this example is futile, because "being" does not signify a common ratio which is determined by particulars, but only a common name: in the present case, however, the essence is truly common, and relations are particulars by which, in our way of understanding, it is determined.

Fourth reason: If essence were formally included in the concept of relation, this proposition would be formally true, "Paternity is essence," or "is divinity," just as that, "Substance is being," as the adversaries concede: it would rightly follow, therefore: "God understands by paternity," and the like in this mode; "The Father understands essence: paternity is essence: therefore the Father understands by paternity." Then, further: "The Father is wise by that by which he understands; but he understands by paternity: therefore he is wise by paternity." We should say the same of the Word, namely, that it is wisdom by that by which it is Word, which is contrary to the doctrine of St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, cap. 2.[155] Moreover, if essence is of the concept of relation, the attributes will be too: wherefore in the same way this proposition will be formally true, "Paternity is intellect," just as that, "Paternity is essence"; whence altogether it would follow. Nor does it matter that "essence" is a common term and cannot be a middle term in an expository syllogism; for in truth the syllogism just set out is not expository, nor is the term "essence" taken as altogether singular, but as common; and as if it were distributed in the major proposition, so that the sense be: "Essence is in any person, and in whatever mode it is had, it understands"; then in the minor it is taken particularly, and thus the syllogistic form is preserved, which cannot be denied.

Fifth reason: If relation formally includes essence, it would follow that the person is not constituted by relation; since person is nothing other than essence determined and contracted by relation. But that very thing would be relation, if indeed it included essence; yet person is not constituted by person: therefore neither by relation. And thus the Father, who is a person, would not be constituted by paternity - unless we were to say that something is signified by the name "Father," and is included in its concept, which is not included in "paternity."

The adversaries reply: Some nevertheless answer that Father and paternity do not on that account differ, because something is contained in the concept of the one which is not included in the concept of the other; but because they are signified in a different mode by the concrete and the abstract name. On account of this diversity of signifying, "Father" and "paternity" are not synonyms. The different mode of signifying consists in this: first, that by the concrete name "Father" paternity is signified, not as any [form whatever], but with the formal effect of making to subsist incommunicably; which is not signified by the abstract name "paternity." Then also, because by the concrete name the essence with relations is more expressly signified than by the

154. Cajetan, Opuscula, tome 3, treatise 5.
155. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, cap. 2.

abstract name: therefore, just as "definition" and "definitum" are not synonyms, because the name of definition signifies more distinctly than the name of the definitum; so likewise "Father" and "paternity" will not be synonyms, if indeed by the concrete name the essence is signified more distinctly.

This reply is rejected as trifling: But it is not difficult to shut off these evasions. First indeed, if paternity directly and essentially contains essence in its own concept, it cannot fail to include also the addition of the peculiar mode of subsisting incommunicably; because paternity itself is the ratio of the person, and the property by which one subsists incommunicably and is ultimately terminated: therefore, the essence thus completed and, as it were, defined is understood as already subsisting incommunicably; wherefore, by both the abstract and the concrete name, the relation itself will be conceived, and the property with the formal effect of subsisting incommunicably. Then again, even though by the concrete name the same thing is more distinctly signified than by the abstract name, just as by the definition the same thing is more expressed than by the name of the definitum; nevertheless, if in no other way "Father" and "paternity" differed - although they would not be synonyms, as in truth "definition" and "definitum" are not - still no one could say that the father is constituted by paternity, just as neither is a definition said to be constituted by the definitum, nor conversely. One must therefore assign in our concept a greater distinction; which can in no way be done unless we say that in the concept of paternity the concept of essence is not contained.

Moreover, as we were saying above, in Disputation 119, cap. 2, about the attributes, so too one must philosophize about relation and person: namely, that relation signifies the same confusedly as the definition does, but person distinctly as the definitum does: it follows that when we apprehend the person, whose concept is more distinct, we apprehend relation and essence as two distinct [things], and each [is] of the ratio of person. From this it follows that we conceive relation distinctly as one part of person, and essence as another: therefore relation and person, by our reason, differ more than definition and definitum; nor is essence included in the concept of relation, if the same relation together with essence are apprehended as two [things] for the constitution of the person. If therefore both are conceived distinctly - and person and relation are also diverse in our concept - and person includes essence, which relation does not include: let us conclude, therefore, that in the concept of the divine relation the essence of God is not comprehended, even if relation, besides the reference "to," were also to have the reference "in." For that "in" is not something absolute, as essence is, as we shall say in solving the arguments.

Caput III - The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved

Reply to the first argument of Henry: I answer that relation primarily needs a subject, as we see in creatures; in God, however, it is conceived after the manner of something inhering; and thus to each relation in its way there belongs the ratio "in," and the ratio "to," that is, either really or in our mode of conceiving. But that ratio "in" is not absolute, as Henry falsely supposes, but is abstracted from the absolute and from the respective - if the opinion is true which affirms that there is a

concept common to all the predicaments; or, what can more truly be put, there is the same foundation of reason on account of which the word is predicated analogically of the nine predicaments: and by this account, in the first intention, the common reasons of the predicaments are signified, as we said in Disputation 114, cap. 2. Thus the cause is distinct, and the reason "to," without doubt, is not to be thought of as absolute. Therefore, although relation is conceived by our intellect as inhering in the essence, and is said to have a subject; still, when it is understood as inhering, it cannot on that account include in its own concept the concept of the essence, as was proved above: nor does it follow that the ratio "in" of the divine relation is the essence itself; but it is a ratio, in our way of conceiving, which can stand with the divine essence, and yet the concept of relation does not include the concept of the divine essence, but rather, besides the divine relation, something else also can be formed in our thought, as we shall say when we treat of the remaining attributes.

To the second reason, some intended to prove in that way that in the concept of the attributes the essence of God is comprehended, as we saw in Disputation 119, cap. 1; and to that indeed we have already responded, as also in Disputation 73, cap. 3: neither is relation conceived by us as being from itself, nor as from another, nor as a thing caused; nor do we reduce deity to the mode either of something caused or of something causing; but we say that it subsists of itself, and itself is God; and it is not thought by us as "from" or "of" another, nor as if God, by the reason of deity, were distinguished from the essence. And if anyone should formally, in speaking thus, not perceive what is said, let him not imagine that we say that God himself is a thing caused; nor that we posit in him deity as something non-existent or as affirmed; nor let him think we can posit in God himself anything caused, unless we consider it after the manner of our understanding; which we do not affirm sufficiently, nor think rightly enough, unless we say that, if it should be granted that it is the essence itself, it is so by reason alone; as is clear in the proposition that signifies.

To the third argument, that a person would of necessity be composite, we say: the divine person is indeed composite, not by nature, but by intellect: for also in the intellect of one who constructs, the constitution is composite, not the thing itself; nor does anything derogate from its simplicity. In the same way is repudiated the composition of the divine simplicity by the notion of constitution, by which is repugnant multitude and distinction: for with the very account of unity and simplicity that excludes distinction and multitude by the account we have already cited from St. Thomas.[156] And therefore, because what is named composite does not on that account denote something opposed to simplicity; rather we say, by intellect, that nothing derogates from simplicity, when we speak of constitution now by human mode; since by usage we understand separately; and by will we signify; and we call absolute what we say from the intellect; therefore we are accustomed to speak after this manner: that man is constituted by reason; just as a human being is constituted by memory, intellect, and will, not in real states, but by rational positions. Further, whether constitution in divinis is real, or of reason, we will discuss in Disputation 158. Moreover, when we

156. St. Thomas, e.g., Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 11, a. 3.

attribute constitution to God, we do not intend to signify an opposition to simplicity; for we do not call constitution that which is opposed to simplicity; but we name by reason that there is no composition of the kind in God; nor do we will that it be called absolute.

There are, however, some who deny that in God there is composition of reason, so that our reason cannot in any way apprehend a multiplicity of rationes; for they say that reason divides, and separates, which taken together composes. But nevertheless, since from all compositions of reason there ought to be some real composition; yet there is no composition, they contend, in God, by any intrinsic mode; we, however, attribute to God, not composition, but multiplicity of intelligible notions in our thought itself: for the Holy Spirit is called sevenfold; and similar things Capreolus concedes.[157] Which, however, truly -

Refutation. But indeed the things adduced to prove that in God there is not even a composition of reason are of no moment. For although our reason, distinguishing in God the attributes, or the relation, from the essence, seems to divide and to separate them; yet because it conceives them as united in the same subject, it does not so distinguish as not to compose: for it thus distinguishes relation from essence, that nonetheless from each it constitutes the person. Next, it is false that every composition of genus and difference, or composition of reason, has its origin from some real composition, just as it is false that genus is taken from matter and difference from form, or from other things distinct, as we shall say below in disputation 180: wherefore on this score a composition of genus and difference, which is solely by reason, would not have repugned to God; by what other account it does repugn, we said above in disputation 22. But how Anselm neither denies in God a distinction of reason nor a composition by our intellect, we noted above disputation 116, chapter 4.

Caput IV - That the concept of relation does not pertain to the concept of essence

It is assured with all the more certainty that the concept of relations does not pertain to the concept of essence (*essentia*), than that essence is not of the concept of relations: which is gathered not obscurely from St. Augustine in many places; but especially in On the Trinity VII, chapter 2, where he says that the Word is not the Word by that by which it is wisdom: because the Word is understood relatively, but wisdom essentially; and in chapter 4, when he says, it is one thing for God to be, another for him to be Father; and from Anselm, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 2, who uses the same manner of speaking.[158] For if the relation of the Word does not pertain to wisdom, then neither does a personal relation, such as is the relation of the Word, pertain to essence. But if the relation of the begotten, or of the Word, were included in the notion of wisdom and essence, there would be no need, as Augustine says, to say "begotten wisdom" to signify the Word; therefore Augustine judges that that word "begotten" must be added, so that

157. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 3, art. 3, ad 2.
158. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, cc. 2, 4; Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, c. 2.

wisdom may signify the person (*persona*) of the Word: because without it the name "wisdom," and any other essential name, does not express the relation whereby the person is constituted, since that is not of the concept of essence.

The same is proved by reason. First, because essence, and whatever pertains to it, is common to the three persons, as is determined in the chapter Firmiter, and in the chapter Damnamus de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica;[159] but relations cannot be common to the three persons: therefore they cannot be of the essence. Next, this syllogism is sound: deity is relation; deity is common; therefore relation is common. Nor does it hinder that the middle be a common term, because in a true proposition it is universally so in its own way: for if relation be of the concept of essence, it ought to agree with deity in the whole of its community; and so the formal syllogism will be good. Moreover, since, from the doctrine of Augustine, De Trinitate VII, chapter 2, and of the Council of Toledo XI, in its profession of faith, deity is to itself and not to another, it will not be able in its concept to include personal relation: for thus it would be to another, as the Father is.[160]

But although these things are so, relations nevertheless are not to be called accidental to the essence itself, or to be predicated of it per accidens; but truly to be enunciated per se in the concrete: in which manner this proposition, "God is Father," is a per se proposition. Furthermore, how it may be lawful to add to it the particle "insofar as," which is the note of per se-ness, we shall say at q. 39, art. 6; now, however, let this suffice. Finally, although relation is of the intrinsic and formal concept of person, we say that it is not of the essence of person: for of the essence of person is not said whatever pertains to its formal notion, but what is of the concept of the nature which the person has: for a person is constituted by two things, namely, by essence or nature, and by personality, of which each is said to belong to the formal notion of that; but only the former is called its nature and essence.

Caput V - That essence is more distinct from relation (and from the attributes) than relation from person

Since thus far we have said that there is only a distinction between relation and essence; between essence and the attributes; and between the attributes themselves, and that the same distinction is between relation and person, as between paternity and father, and universally between abstracts and concretes, which no one denies; it remains that we explain which of these differ more among themselves: this, however, we inquire about in the school of the Thomists, who concede no other distinction between these than by the intellect (*intellectus*). For Scotus and others, who admit a distinction from the nature of the thing, equally distinguish all things which differ in this way. But all the Thomists grant that relation differs more by the intellect from essence, essence from the attributes, and the attributes among themselves, than relation differs from person, as paternity from father: yet they do not agree upon this view by the same account. Canariensis, in this article, disputation 3, part 2, after the third conclusion, in order to assign the

159. Cap. Firmiter; and cap. Damnamus de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica.
160. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 2; Council of Toledo XI, profession of faith.

reason of this, notes two things. One is, that the very same thing absolutely from the nature of the thing, indeed the same according to definition, can be distinguished by our intellect, just as Peter is distinguished from himself, inasmuch as the same thing is predicated of himself, and is put in a proposition as subject and as predicate in the manner of other things which differ more among themselves, and one is predicated of the other. In this way he thinks the abstract and the concrete differ, as humanity and man, not indeed by definition, but by the sole operation of the intellect: because, since it is the same thing from its nature, and the same definition is that of each, the intellect conceives one as in a supposit, the other as abstracted from it. Then Canariensis notes that some things are distinguished by the intellect in a twofold way: some, with some foundation existing in the thing itself; and this distinction (says he) is by diverse cognitions of the same thing, which indeed are so in being as the cognitions are in signifying. But the other distinction is made when no foundation exists in the thing itself, but only in the intellect, and it is by diverse cognitions of a thing which is not so in being as the cognitions are in signifying.[161]

He proves, therefore, that relation differs less from person than the rest which we said differ among themselves: because relation differs from person in that latter mode, without any foundation in the thing itself; but the rest differ in the former mode, with a foundation existing in the thing, in that the rest differ by definition: whereas relation and person do not differ by definition, because the definition is the same for each; but by a different mode of signifying, and therefore by our mode alone of conceiving.

For my part, although I judge that relation is less distant from person than the others which we enumerated as mutually different; nevertheless I think there is another account of that lesser difference. For that division of distinction has always displeased me, as I noted in disputation 117, last chapter: first, because, as I proved there, every distinction of reason has a foundation in the things, and in our mode of conceiving in the things, not because in the very thing which we distinguish by the intellect there precedes some multitude or distinction, but because whatever things we distinguish, we distinguish by an ordination to some diverse things: for Peter is not distinguished from himself even by reason, but the same name, or even the same concept, is repeated wholly the same, which is not properly to be distinguished, even by the intellect, as was noted there.

Second, it is false what Canariensis says about a distinction of reason which has a foundation in the thing. For cognitions of a thing which bring about a distinction of reason are so diverse in the intellect that in the thing itself there is no diversity: wherefore the intellect does not bear itself in understanding as the thing itself does in being. For if the things which are distinct in the intellect were thus in themselves as they are in the intellect, their distinction would be from the nature of the thing, and would not depend on the intellect: therefore Canariensis has ill defined a distinction of reason which has a foundation in the thing.

Third, the aforesaid doctrine concerning a distinction having a foundation, and concerning that which has not, he does not rightly apply to the present difficulty. For if we have regard to that which is in very reality in God, essence does not differ more from relation, and essence from the

attributes, than the abstract from the concrete: for all these things in very reality are individual and without any distinction, as remains proved: therefore there is not a distinction which has a foundation in the thing among these rather than among those, but the account of each pair will be equal.

I confess, therefore, that between relation and person, the concrete and the abstract, there is in God a lesser distinction of reason than between essence and relation, essence and the attributes. For the explication of which it is to be noted, as we began to say in disputation 119, chapter 2, that although every distinction has a foundation in our mode of understanding, and in the things, after the manner of which we conceive distinctly, not however in the very thing which we distinguish; nonetheless one distinction of reason can be greater than another, and sometimes of such a nature as to prevent one being predicated of the other: for some things differ after the mode of diverse forms, of which one is not included in the other, as the common in the particular; and this is a distinction which cannot be greater, and it is between the attributes themselves ...

Omnes autem Thomistae, qui non aliam distinctionem inter haec concedunt quam per intellectum, fatentur, magis differre per intellectum relationem a persona (ut paternitas a patre), essentiam ab attributis, et attributa inter se, quam differat relatio a persona; sed in hanc suam sententiam non eadem ratione conveniunt. Canariensis, in hunc articulum, disputatione 3, parte 2, post tertiam conclusionem, ut huius rationem assignet, notat duo: alterum est, eandem rem omnino ex natura rei, imo eandem secundum definitionem, posse distingui per nostrum intellectum, sicut Petrus distinguitur a se ipso, quatenus idem de se ipso praedicatur, et ponitur in propositione ut subiectum et ut praedicatum, instar aliorum, quae inter se magis differunt, et unum de alio praedicatur. Hoc modo putat differre abstractum et concretum, ut humanitatem et hominem, non quidem definitione, sed sola operatione intellectus: quia, cum sit eadem res ex natura sua, et eadem definitio utriusque, intellectus alterum concipit ut in supposito, alterum ut abstractum ab eo. Deinde notat Canariensis dupliciter aliqua distingui per intellectum: quaedam, existente aliquo in re ipsa fundamento; et haec distinctio (inquit ille) fit per diversas notitias de eadem re, quae quidem ita se habet in essendo, sicut notitiae in significando. Altera vero distinctio fit, nullo existente fundamento in re ipsa, sed solum in intellectu; et fit per diversas notitias de re, quae non ita se habet in essendo, sicut notitiae in significando.

Probat ergo minus differre relationem a persona, quam cetera quae diximus inter se: quia relatio a persona differt posteriori illo modo, sine ullo fundamento in re ipsa; cetera vero priori modo, existente fundamento in re, eo quod cetera differunt definitione, relatio vero et persona non definitione, quia eadem est utriusque; sed diverso modo significandi, et ideo solo nostro modo concipiendi.

Ego vero, quamvis existimem minus distare relationem a persona quam cetera, quae enumeravimus inter se, aliam tamen puto esse rationem minoris differentiae: displicet enim mihi - semperque displicuit - illa divisio distinctionis rationis, ut notavi disputatione illa in particulari capite ultimo, primo; quia vix habet fundamentum in rebus et in nostro modo concipiendi res; non

161. Canariensis, in this article, disputation 3, part 2, after the third conclusion.

quia in ipsa re multitudo aut distinctio, sed quia quae distinguimus, per ordinem ad diversa distinguimus: nam in ipso nec ratione distinguitur idem, vel etiam idem conceptum iterum repetitur, quod non est distinguere, etiam per intellectum, ut notatum est.

Falsum est, quod ait Canariensis, distinctione rationis, quae habet fundamentum in re, notitias de re, quae causant distinctionem rationis, ita esse in intellectu, ut in re ipsa nulla sit distinctio, quare non ita se habeat in intelligendo, sicut res ipsa in essendo: si enim ea, quae intellectu sunt distincta, sic essent in seipsis, sicuti sunt in intellectu, eorum distinctio esset ex natura rei, non penderet ex intellectu: male igitur dixit Canariensis distinctione rationis, quae habet fundamentum in re. Etiam doctrina praedicta de distinctione cum fundamento, et de ea quae non habet fundamentum, perfecte applicat ad praesentem difficultatem, si respiciamus id quod est in Deo: non magis differt essentia et attributa, quam a concreto; haec enim omnia indivisa sunt, et absque ulla distinctione, quae habet fundamentum, ut probatum manet: ergo non est distinctio, quae habet fundamentum; sed utrorumque ratio. Igitur inter relationem et personam minor est distinctio rationis, quam inter essentiam et relationem et attributa. Pro cuius explanatione est id, quod dicere coepimus, cap. 2: quamvis omnis distinctio habeat in nostro modo intelligendi fundamentum, nihilominus una distinctio potest esse maiore quam alia, et talis naturae, ut impediat unum de altero praedicari: quaedam enim differunt ad modum diversarum formarum, quarum una non includitur in alia, sicut commune in particulari, et haec est distinctio quae non potest esse maior; estque inter attributa ipsa inter se, et inter essentiam et attributa, inter essentiam etiam et relationes. Haec differunt omnino definitione, nec unum de alio formaliter praedicatur, ut disputatione citata praedictum est: differunt autem ex parte directi significati, quia directe significata sunt velut duae formae diversae, quarum una non est de ratione alterius. Alia vero differunt quidem ratione, sed minus, sicut superius et inferius, commune et particulare, eo quod unum includitur in alio; et haec distinctio non impedit praedicationem unius de alio. At concretum et abstractum alio modo differunt in Deo secundum rationem, non quia ex parte directi significati aliquid sit de conceptu unius, quod non sit de conceptu alterius, sed quia ex parte connotati aliquid connotatur ab uno, quod non ab alio, tametsi ex parte directi significati non differant. Nam Pater directe significat relationem paternitatis; Paternitas similiter: sed Pater connotat etiam naturam divinam, in qua relatio subsistit, quam Paternitas non connotat. Divinitas vero et paternitas ex parte directi significati, et nullo modo ex parte connotati, differunt; quia utraque significatur ut forma diversa. Idem de attributis inter se collatis, et cum essentia, dicendum est. Ceterum, quamvis minor sit distinctio rationis inter abstracta et concreta, quam inter essentiam et relationes; illa tamen sufficiens est, ut abstractum de concreto in sensu formali non praedicetur: quia, si praedicaretur, multa essent concludenda absurda in sensu formali, ut quod paternitas intelligeret, generaret, si Pater esset paternitas: sed de concretis et abstractis iterum, quaestione 39, articulo 5. Quare vero distinctio eiusdem a se ipso non efficiat falsam propositionem, et utrum vere ibi sit distinctio rationis et conceptus, an eiusdem solum conceptus, sicut et nominis repetitio, diximus disputatione illa 119, cap. 2.

An relatio divina, ut concipitur diversa ab essentia, sit aliqua perfectio.

On the divine relations as perfections

Whether the divine relation is any perfection

Relationem in Deo nullam esse perfectionem sentiunt Scotus, Durandus, Capreolus, et Caietanus.[162]

Refellitur praedicta sententia.

Relationem personalem in Deo esse perfectionem, ac proinde tres perfectiones relativas in eo concedendas esse putavere Gabriel et alii.[163]

Praedicta opinio impugnatur.

Quomodo una persona dici possit maior alia, non dignior aut perfectior.

Verior sententia.

The opinion of those who deny that relation in God is a perfection

Proposita quaestio non solum difficultatem habet in opinione Thomistarum, qui dicunt relationes ab essentia sola ratione distingui; verum etiam in sententia Scoti, qui docet distingui ex natura rei: cum enim utroque modo relatio sit quaedam entitas, et quaelibet entitas sit perfectio, videtur in Deo esse tres perfectiones, sicut tres sunt relationes: quod sane ali quibus falsum, aliis autem verum videri potest. Referamus ergo aliorum placita, ut quod nobis videatur, distincte definiamus.

Prima igitur opinio sit, relationes in Deo secundum rationem formalem non esse perfectiones, neque imperfectiones aliquas. Quam tradiderunt Scotus in 3, dist. 1 et 4, q. 1 et 4, et ex professo Quodlibet, quaest. 1; Durandus in 3, dist. 1, q. 3, num. 13; Capreolus in 1, dist. 7, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3, contra primam conclusionem; Caietanus in hoc articulo, circa solutionem 3.[164] Nec oppositum docet 3a, q. 3, art. 1, cum ait personalitates esse infinite perfectas: quia, ut ibidem ipse notat, non debemus metiri personalitates divinas cum relationibus, ut relationes reales sunt. Nam relationes reales non sunt infinite perfectae formaliter, quatenus relationes sunt, sed quatenus sunt subsistentes: sic enim subeunt rationem personalitatis; quam quidem subsistentiam putat Caietanus relationibus provenire ab essentia, et ratione illius potentiae terminare alienam naturam.

Prima ratio pro hac sententia probari potest primo hac ratione: quia si relatio divina formaliter esset perfectio, sicut in Deo sunt tres reales relationes, sic etiam essent tres reales perfectiones: ex hoc autem duo sequerentur absurda. Unum esset, in Patre fore aliquam perfectionem, quae non esset in aliis personis; sicut in Patre est aliqua relatio, quae non est in aliis: quare quaelibet persona careret aliqua perfectione. Alterum est, aliquam personam fore perfectiorem alia, quia tres illae

162. Scotus, In Sententias 3, d. 1 et 4, q. 1 et 4; Quodlibet, q. 1. Durandus, In Sent. 3, d. 1, q. 3, n. 13. Capreolus, In Sent. 1, d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3. Caietanus, In S. Th., I, q. 28, a. 1, ad 3 circa solutionem 3.

163. Gabriel (Biel), In Sententias 1, d. 7, q. 3, a. 3; alii eiusdem scholae.

164. See previous note for places; and St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 3, a. 1.

perfectiones non essent quasi eiusdem speciei, sed omnino quasi diversae et contrariae: non ergo essent aequalis perfectionis; quia inaequalitas fundatur in diversitate quantitatis, sicut dissimilitudo in diversitate qualitatis: quare altera esset maior, quod est absurdum. Secundo probatur: si paternitas in Deo esset perfectio, esset infinita perfectio; includeret igitur omnem perfectionem, ac proinde filiationem, quae est altera perfectio, quod est impossibile.

His fere rationibus utuntur Scotus et Durandus. Caietanus autem et Capreolus alio tertio modo confirmant. Quia nimirum relatio, ut relatio, abstrahitur a perfectione et imperfectione: forsitan quia existimant, secundum propriam rationem non inesse subiecto. Porro relationem non esse imperfectionem aliquam, facile probant, quia relatio est in Deo; in Deo autem nulla potest esse imperfectio: ergo relatio non est imperfectio.

Refutation of the foregoing opinion: reasons proving that relation is a perfection

Haec opinio mihi non probatur: existimo namque ad Dei perfectionem non minus pertinere relationes quam attributa, primo; quia sicut Deus ob suam infinitam perfectionem postulat esse sapientem, sic etiam ob eandem foecundus est, ut sit Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus: negari ergo non potest, paternitatem esse aliquam Dei perfectionem, sicut sunt attributa. Porro foecunditatem et relationes ad Dei perfectionem pertinere, non minus quam attributa, quamvis non eodem modo, hac ratione probatur. Quia sicut melius est Deo esse sapientem, quam non sapientem, ita melius est Deo esse Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, quam non esse illud: autem quod melius est alicui rei, quam negatio illius, non potest non esse perfectio rei; quod enim alicui melius est, illi perfectius est; melius enim et perfectius idem sunt, bonum et perfectum. Ex quo inferemus, relationes non solum ad perfectionem Dei pertinere, sed etiam esse perfectiones simpliciter simplices ipsius Dei.

Tertio: si relatio in Deo non esset perfectio, esset quidem imperfectio: nam perfectio et imperfectio contradictorie opponuntur; perfectum enim est cui nihil deest, imperfectum contra est cui aliquid deest: si ergo paternitas non esset perfectio, sequeretur illi aliquid deesse, defectu cuius esset non perfecta, et ita imperfecta: vel sequeretur ipsam esse Dei imperfectionem, quia propter illam Deo aliquid deesset. Quare si in creaturis relatio nulla esset perfectio, imperfectio sane diceretur: at in divinis non potest esse aliqua imperfectio: ergo, cum relatio sit in divinis, debet esse perfectio.

Quarto probatur: relationes divinae sunt personalitates, quibus personae subsistunt et constituuntur: subsistere autem, et terminari naturam, ut sit persona, est perfectio: ergo et ipsa relatio, quae est ultimus terminus, est perfectio.

Denique St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1, cap. 11, id verbis docuit: "Unum quippe Deum agnoscimus, in solis autem proprietatibus, nimirum paternitatis, filiationis, et processionis, atque quantum ad causam, et ea quae causa proficiscuntur, ac persona perfectionem, hoc est, existendi modum, discrimen animadvertimus"; ubi appellat personalem perfectionem ipsam paternitatem, et quamlibet relationem.[165]

Relationem personalem in Deo esse perfectionem, ac proinde tres perfectiones relativas in eo concedendas esse putaverunt Gabriel et alii.

The opinion that there are three relative perfections in God

Alii non solum docent, relationes divinas esse perfectiones Dei secundum propriam rationem relationis; sed etiam tres esse perfectiones relativas rectius accipiendas. Quam sententiam recensent nonnulli et aperte docet Gabriel in 1, dist. 7, q. 3, art. 3, qui, ut explicet suam sententiam, more suae scholae varias affert acceptiones perfectionis, non quia revera vocabula apud Latinos tot modis usurpentur, sed quia Nominales, ut aliquas fugiant difficultates, vocabulis ipsis ludere videntur. Inquit ergo duobus modis dici perfectionem: priori modo dicitur ea, quae est simpliciter summa et infinita, cui impossibilis est aliqua imperfectio; et hoc modo tres relationes divinae sunt tres simpliciter perfectiones. Posteriori modo dicitur perfectio simpliciter, quae convenit omni supposito divino; et ita relationes in Deo sunt perfectiones simpliciter: quia quaelibet illarum non convenit omni supposito; ac postulat: illarum non concursum omni supposito; ac hoc pacto una perfectio est in Patre, quae non est in Filio; sed eodem fine tamen non sequitur, Filium esse imperfectum, quia dicit illi perfectio Patris: nam imperfectum non eo dicitur, quod ei deest aliqua perfectio, sed quia non sit summum et infinitum. Dictum est autem relationem quamlibet esse perfectionem priori illo modo, quia est summa et infinita: quare hoc auctor plane concedit, aliquam perfectionem summam et infinitam esse in Patre, quae non est in Filio, et contra.

Fundamenti praecipui huius sententiae est huiusmodi: Relatio, ut distinguitur ab essentia, est vere ens reale: perfectio autem consequitur rationem entis; est enim passio illius, quae dicitur bonitas, sicut etiam consequitur veritas: ergo in Deo sunt tres perfectiones relativa: multiplicatio enim inferioris, necesse est multiplicari superioris, ut multiplicato homine, necesse est multiplicari animal: ergo multiplicata relatione, necesse est multiplicari etiam veritas et bonum, seu perfectionem, quae statuunt superiorem. Et sane est Anselmus: in Deo tres res modo esse. Anselmus, lib. de incarnatione Verbi, cap. 3: "Solemni" (inquit) "usu verborum agnoscimus, quod aliquando potest dici de aliquo, qui ante dicit De Deo Patrem; immo Filium aliquid Deo deest; et omnes sunt: De Deo Patrem non esse Filium, et Filium non esse Patrem." Et paucis interiectis: "Hoc ergo modo nihil prohibet dicere duas personas, Patrem et Filium, esse duas res: sit tamen intelligatur cuiusmodi sunt res." Idipsum indicat Concilium Remense verbis quae referemus; et St. Thomas infra q. 30, art. 1, concedit in Deo tres res cum additamento hoc, "subsistentes"; et in d. 29, q. 1, art. 4, concedit tres res sine illo additamento.[166] Pro hac sententia refertur Clichtoveus, lib. 1, De fide, cap. 11; sed ille longe aliter sensisse, ut infra sequenti capite referemus.

Some answer that it is not to be conceded that there is some perfection in one person which is not in another; because the whole perfection of the relations is contained eminently in the essence on account of its infinity and fecundity. Yet this solution is weak; for, however much we concede

165. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 11.

166. Council of Rheims; St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 30, a. 1; I, d. 29, q. 1, a. 4 (as cited in the scholastic tradition).

that the perfection of the relation is eminently in the essence, and thus that in any person whatsoever there is eminently the perfection of another; nevertheless the argument contends that the perfection which is formally in one does not formally belong to another: but the syllogistic form cannot be denied, as is manifest; and the antecedent of that syllogism, in both the major and the minor, speaks of perfection formally, not only virtually and eminently, as is clear; therefore it is inferred in the conclusion that there is some perfection in one person formally, and that it formally belongs to that person, which does not belong to another, nor is formally in it.

Others, granting that there is some relation in one person which is not in another, and that there are three relative perfections, nonetheless say that by no means can it be conceded that there is one perfection in one person which is not in another: because this proposition is negative, and therefore universal; it therefore denies that the perfection of one relation is thus in one person that in no way it is in another, which is manifestly false: for the perfection which is in the Father is also in the Son, not respectively, but absolutely, by the very fact that in the Son there is the very same essence and nature of the Father: therefore in some way the Father's relative perfection is also in the Son. But these doctors, not mindful as they ought, seem in a few words to destroy what they had posited. For when they say that there are in God three real relative perfections, they are not speaking of the perfection of God inasmuch as it is absolute, but under the formal notion of relation and respect: otherwise, if they are speaking of that which is in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit together, it is not relative but absolute; and not three perfections, but one, ought to be said. Therefore when they say that out of three relative perfections one is paternity, another filiation, another passive spiration, they ought consequently to concede that the perfection of paternity is thus in the Father that it is not in the Son, inasmuch as it is constituted as a perfection distinct from the others, and so with the rest: lest, if they say that all are in the individual persons, they be forced to concede that there is one, not three, perfections, contrary to what they had posited. Moreover, the syllogism is legitimate, and the conclusion is a negation: Therefore some perfection is not in the Son, which is not universal but particular, as is evident; wherefore it does not deny every perfection, nor in every way, but it denies that some perfection is in the Son, which indeed is legitimately inferred.

Still others, constrained by the aforesaid argument, plainly concede that there is some perfection in one person which is not in another: but they say that this is relative, and thus it is not to be said absolutely that some perfection is not in some person, but with the additum, Relative. Yet this can no less manifestly be refuted; first, because, as we proved above, if we concede three relative perfections, there can also be conceded, the scandal being set aside, three perfections absolutely according to the propriety of speech: therefore in the same way it must not only be said that there is one relative perfection in one person which is not in another, but even absolutely according to the propriety of speech. And indeed the syllogism which we formed above, absolutely and without additum, gathers the conclusion in this way: paternity is not in the Son; paternity is a perfection; therefore some perfection is not in the Son. Now it is clear that in the conclusion "Relative" is not to be added, because it is added in none of the premises: yet all shrink from conceding without that additum that some perfection is not in some person: therefore it is

necessary that we say there are not three perfections: for if we say that all the relations are the same perfection, it is not rightly inferred from the fact that paternity is not in the Son, that some perfection is not in him.

But some reply that that relative perfection is not, simply speaking, simple, according to the definition of Anselm in the Proslogion, ch. 3, "which is better as itself than as not itself": for relation is not better as itself than as not itself; otherwise paternity would be better than not-paternity, and therefore than filiation: but this kind of perfection to concede in one person and not in another is not an inconvenience. But surely Anselm's definition ought not to be understood with respect to any person whatsoever, as if in each one the "itself" were better than "not itself": but with respect to the individual nature, of which it is the perfection: and in respect of the divine essence, which is perfected by the relations, paternity is better than not-paternity; and filiation than not-filiation; and spiration than not-spiration; that is, it is better to be in the three persons than not to be; and it is better to be in the Father than not to be in the Father: I do not say, than to be in the Son, but than not to be in the Father: moreover, from the fact that it is in the Son it does not follow that it is not in the Father: therefore every relation in God is a perfection simply simple. And indeed it is not worthy to attribute to God another kind of perfection: because whatever God is, it is better to be than not to be: but to concede a perfection simply simple to be in one person which is not in another, seems an inconvenience.

Secondly, from the opposite opinion it follows that the Father is not perfect, because, according to Aristotle, Physics III, ch. 3, and Metaphysics V, ch. 16, the perfect is that outside of which there is nothing, that is, to which nothing is lacking, and this is understood in its own genus: for wisdom is said to be formally perfect to which in the genus of wisdom nothing is lacking, even if the notion of mercy does not belong to it: wherefore, if to the eternal Father some divine perfection be lacking, he will not be perfect: but filiation is a divine perfection distinct from paternity: therefore, since filiation is lacking to the Father, some divine perfection will be lacking to him, and God will be imperfect.

It is impugned thirdly. Third, if the relations were three perfections in God, they could not be equal formally: therefore one would be greater than another. For since between equal and unequal there is no middle, that which is not equal must be unequal; but that which is unequal to another is by that very fact greater or lesser than it: therefore one person would be greater and more perfect than another, which is absurd. Furthermore, that those relative perfections cannot be equal is proved: because they differ, as it were, by species, and are contraries: therefore their diversity is, as it were, in nature and in formal notion: but as diversity in quantity makes unequal, so also diversity in substance or quiddity makes inequality in the same genus: therefore, since the relations are contraries and, as it were, of diverse species, they will be of diverse natures and consequently unequal: wherefore the three persons, with three relative perfections, will be something greater than any one of them; in that in the three there are three perfections, and one of them is greater: but the consequent is absurd, and is against the doctrine of St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum III, ch. 10, and Sermon 38 De tempore, where he says that in God there is not something greater, the three persons together, than any one of them; because in all there is the same essence and nature;

by which reason he seems to constitute all their perfection in the nature and essence. He teaches the same in De Trinitate VI, chs. 8 and 10, and VIII, ch. 1; and therefore Anselm in the Monologion, ch. 53, says: "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are among themselves with such mutual equality that none surpasses another." He gives the reason, because each one of them is the perfect and highest essence. And in the Proslogion, ch. 23: "What each single one is, this is the whole Trinity, because each single one is nothing other than supremely simple unity."[167]

The first solution to this last argument is refuted. Some reply that therefore one relation is not more perfect, or has a greater perfection, than another, because each of them formally includes the essence in its concept. But against this the first point is that which above, Disputation 121, ch. 2, we said, namely, that the essence is not included formally in the concept of relation. Then, even if it were included, nonetheless, since three perfections are said to be in God, diverse among themselves and contraries, they will not be able not to be unequal, and one greater than another, insofar as they are diverse and opposed among themselves: for for this reason they cannot have unity in the quantity of perfection which makes equals.

The second solution of others. Others reply: there is no need that things which differ in species and in formal notion be always unequal; nor do they think it absurd that the species of things which differ among themselves should be of equal perfection. But since every equal is commensurable to another equal in the mode in which it is equal, and things which are of diverse rational notion cannot be commensurated, it is false to assert that things specifically distinct can be of equal perfection: especially because by the very fact that they are of diverse rational notion, they have a diverse quantity of perfection; and hence they ought to have inequality of perfection. Wherefore Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, ch. 8, text 18, showing that among false things one is more, another less, says: "If, therefore, it is not similarly said to err less - this is, if he who says that four are five does not lie in the same way as he who says that four are a thousand - then it follows that the one is less false." By this same form of arguing we can use in the present case in this way: paternity is not of the same notion as filiation, therefore it is not like it: therefore one is greater.

On the same matter

...than filiation; and spiration than non-spiration; that is, it is better to be in three persons than not to be; and it is better to be in the Father than not to be in the Father: I do not say, than to be in the Son, but than not to be in the Father: moreover, from the fact that it is in the Son it does not follow that it is not in the Father: therefore every relation in God is a perfection simply simple. And indeed it is not worthy to attribute to God another kind of perfection: because whatever God is, it is better to be than not to be: but to concede a perfection simply simple in one person which is not in another, seems an inconvenience.

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the same way as he who says that four are a thousand - then it follows that the one is less false." By this same form of arguing we can use in the present case in this way: paternity is not of the same notion as filiation, therefore it is not like it: therefore one is greater.

From what has been said it follows that Clichtovaeus slipped in cap. 11 of book 1 De fide of Damascene, when he says in these words: "And on account of such different properties, a personal perfection is engendered in the divine things; not indeed according to nature, but according to the notion of origin. For the mode of existing of the Father, who is from no one, is more principal than that of the other two, who take their origin from him." Here he does not contend, as some recent writers suppose, to establish in God three relative perfections, but, following the phrase of the Greek Fathers, to concede some kind of excellence according to origin, whereby one person may excel another. In this sense the Greek Fathers call the Father "greater" than Christ, in keeping with John 14: "The Father is greater than I": for according to essence (*essentia*) they say they are equal, in which sense they understand that statement to the Philippians 2, concerning Christ, "to be equal to God." Thus they interpret that passage of John 14 - St. Gregory Nazianzen oration 35, which is the third On Theology, from number 57; St. Athanasius, oration 2 against the Arians, far toward the end; St. Basil, book 4 against Eunomius, the chapter on this saying of the Gospel; Origen, the homily on various texts, which is held in tome 2; and indeed also St. John Damascene, book 1 De fide, cap. 4 - who say that the Father is called "greater," not by nature, but by property. Moreover Athanasius notes: we do not say "better," but "greater": for "better" is referred to essence, but "greater" denotes priority of origin and of cause, together with identity of nature and equality. Therefore St. Hilary, who among the Latins in book 9 On the Trinity follows at some length the opinion of the Greeks, says thus: "Assuredly the Father is greater, inasmuch as he is Father; but the Son is not lesser. The nativity of the Son constitutes the Father greater; but for the Son to be lesser, the nature of nativity does not permit." As if he were to say: by reason of property, not of nature, the Father is greater; which he expressed when he said, "The nativity (that is, the origin) of the Son constitutes the Father greater." And by the same reasoning Hilary ought to concede that the Son is lesser: because "greater" and "lesser" are said relatively and mutually; but because the Son is not lesser in essence and nature, he subjoins: "For the Son to be lesser, the nature of nativity does not permit." He did not say, "nativity does not permit," but "the nature of nativity does not permit": for since he had said that the Father is constituted greater by the nativity of the Son, he was compelled to concede that by the same nativity the Son is constituted lesser; because these are reciprocal. He therefore said "the nature of nativity," to indicate that neither is the Son lesser, nor the Father greater, in nature and substance, but only in respect of nativity; and for this reason of a first principle - because he is an author without an author - Phabadius calls the Father "greater."[1] I for my part think the Greek Fathers, and Hilary, by the name "greater" signified nothing else than "prior"; so that by reason of origin, or of cause, as they speak, they would call the Father greater, that is, prior; and the Son lesser, that is, posterior. In what way, however, that testimony of John 14, "The Father is greater than I," is referred to the humanity of Christ, and which Fathers understood it so, we shall say in part 3, question c., article 1. In this same sense Novatian in the book De Trinitate at the end says that the eternal Son is subject to the Father, and that therefore

the Son receives from the Father all things subject to himself. And for the same reason not a few Greek and Latin Fathers, whom we shall report below in question 45, article 6, say that the Son was the minister of the Father in the creation of things, and other such matters, by which they wished to denote in the Father priority and dignity of origin alone.

But in very truth, on account of this mode of speaking of the Greek Fathers, Clichtovaeus ought not to have asserted that there is dignity - that is, excellence - among the persons: for thus one would seem to be made worthier and of greater authority than another; which can by no means be conceded: since this mode of speaking signifies not only priority of origin, but also a greater dignity of nature. For although Damascene, book 1 De fide, cap. 11, says that in God there is a personal perfection, nevertheless he does not assert this comparatively among the persons, as if one were more perfect, or more worthy, than another, as Clichtovaeus thought; but because the divine nature is understood to be perfect by its personal properties (*personalitas*), as was shown above in chapter 2. Wherefore the same Damascene, in the same book 1, cap. 9, thus says: "Whence it is that all things which the Father has are the Son's, this one excepted, that he is not only-begotten [unigenitus]": which word indicates not a difference of nature, nor dignity and authority, but a mode of existing. By which words he shows the property of being unbegotten, by reason of which he later in the same chapter teaches that to say "the Father is greater than the Son" does not signify dignity or authority; he understands, however, that, as he had just said, it does not signify a difference of nature. And therefore none of the Fathers uses this way of speaking, "The Father is more worthy," or "more excellent than the Son," or, "has more authority than the Son"; although some say that one person is prior in dignity to another, as we shall see below in disputation 168. Therefore Clichtovaeus ought not to have conceded that there is a more principal, or more perfect, mode of subsisting of one person than of another: because these words signify not priority of origin, but greater dignity and excellence of the person. From which it also is evident that by that testimony of Damascene, De fide, cap. 9, nothing is proved against what in cap. 2 we said - namely, that the personal relations (*relationes personales*) pertain to the perfection (*perfectio*) of God.[2]

It does not follow, however, that there is some perfection in one person which is not in another; which, that it may be made more perspicuous, the argument which seems to press more on the contrary is to be proposed in this way. Every relation (*relatio*), insofar as it is distinguished from the essence (*essentia*), is a real relation, and therefore a real being; and when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is multiplied: therefore, if there are three real relations really distinct, there will also be three things, or three entities, or three entitites; but perfection, or goodness, is likewise a higher predicate; therefore that too will be triple. Hence it clearly follows that there is some perfection in one person which is not in another, as we said above in chapter 4.

To this difficulty the Canarian and Maior, in the place alleged, answer that indeed in God there are three real relations really distinct, yet not three perfections: because multiplication in God is only by relative opposition; but "perfection" is not a relative name, but an absolute one, like "goodness": therefore it ought not to be multiplied when the relations are multiplied. Hence Canarienfis infers that the three relations in God are one unique real perfection, just as they are one essence; which, however, does not seem more difficult than to concede three relations really

distinct in the same numerically one nature, and to be multiplied relations without multiplying the nature: because in relations there is opposition, which alone is the cause of multiplication; in essence, however, there is none, nor in goodness and perfection. If, therefore, in this way it is rightly shown that the three relations are one sole perfection, it follows plainly that there is none in one person which is not in another. In the same way Caietan philosophizes in 3a, q. 3, art. 1, about the divine personalities, which he thinks are not altogether the same as the relations, as we noted in cap. 1 of this disputation, when he says that they indeed are infinitely perfect, as the persons are, because they are subsistent, but that there is only one perfection in them, namely of essence; and thus it does not follow, as Scotus contended, that there is one perfection in one person which is not in another.[3]

Nevertheless, this explanation and doctrine do not remove the proposed difficulty: for if a relation, insofar as it is distinct from the essence - and especially in our opinion, which says that the concept of essence is not included in the concept of relation, as we said in the preceding disputation - is a certain thing and entity; and just as we say that three relations really distinct are three things, so too, for this same reason, a relation conjoined with perfection distinct from essence; therefore, just as we say three relations, we must say three perfections. Especially since for that very reason, that they are of diverse rational notion, they have a diverse quantity of perfection; and hence they ought to have inequality of perfection.

Caput VI - The truer opinion

The truer opinion is that the personal relation is indeed a perfection of God, and that the three relations really distinct pertain to his perfection, as was proved in cap. 2; yet that they are not three real perfections, even relative ones, nor that there is some real perfection in one person which is not in another. A position which, if it be rightly explained by us and some of its difficulties be set out, speaks much more sincerely and worthily about the perfection and equality of the persons than the preceding positions. This position is followed by the Canarian in this article, disputation 3, part 2, in 4, the argument after the fourth conclusion; and by Maior in report d. 33, q. 1, ad 2; and in part by Caietan, as we shall mention below.[4] It has two parts. One is that the personal relation pertains to the perfection of God: but this has been sufficiently proved against the first opinion in cap. 2 of this disputation, in which, with Gabriel and others who follow the second, we shall agree. The other part is that these three real relations in God are not three perfections; and consequently it does not follow that there is some perfection in one person which is not in another.

But this explanation and doctrine do not take away the proposed difficulty: for if a relation, insofar as it is distinct from the essence, in our present opinion, which says that the concept of essence is not of the concept of relation, as we said in the preceding disputation, is a certain thing and an entity; and just as three relations are said to be really distinct, three things; so even for this reason a relation conjoined with a perfection distinct from the essence will be a thing: therefore, just as three relations are said, three perfections will be said; and likewise three goodnesses; since "perfection" and "goodness" are also predicated more generally than "relation," which is a passion

of being and of a thing. Wherefore, because these relations are things in reality distinct from the essence, and from one another; since each has perfection, although, since they are accidents, nothing prevents our saying that in God there are three things, or three entities, since "perfection" is no less abstracted from relation and the absolute than "being" and "thing," which are passions of being and thing itself.

Accordingly, to explain this difficulty, observe first that "perfection" can be used in a twofold way. In one way, for the integrity of a thing; in which the formal notion of goodness consists, which is constituted as a passion of being, so that a thing is called perfect and good because it is entire and has nothing wanting to it, as we said elsewhere. In another way, "perfection" is said of whatever pertains to the integrity of anything and makes it whole and complete, or is fitting and consonant to it; this, however, is not posited to be a passion of being, as was shown there; for it does not belong to all things with respect to all things: nevertheless, since there is nothing in God which is not most fitting to him, nothing there will be which is not a perfection of him in this latter way.

Second, with respect to this, that something be a perfection of a thing in the first way, it is necessary that the whole which is perfected be entire and that nothing be wanting to it; and this is not constituted by adding something really distinct to it, but by the completeness of that very thing which is perfected. Wherefore, if something be distinct from our account alone and our way of understanding - and not really - then also it will only be a perfection of it in that latter way. But you will say: that which is distinguished from another can perfect it; much more, then, can that which is more intrinsic to it and differs least from it perfect it. I answer: this only proves that that which is distinguished in reason alone more participates the integrity of that thing and its perfection in the first way: yet it is not for that reason a "perfection" in the latter way, because, to be a perfection in that latter way, it must add something which perfects; and to that pertains the work of differing from that which it perfects.

Third, it is presupposed that in whatever is perfect there are both integrity and what is fitting and perfecting; for integrity is only integrity, and perfection which is a passion of being is only such as in many ways is conceived in the thing, as in several parts of one whole, as is clear from the integrity which is the wholeness of anything.

From these it is evident that in God there is one perfection, which is the passion of being; and yet many relations are not many perfections. First, in respect of that perfection which is the passion of being, which is what we called "integrity": it follows that in God there is one such perfection, because there is one integrity; for all things which are in God - our mode of conceiving distinguishing the attributes, whether of essence or of relation - belong to this integrity and perfection, that is, to goodness. Wherefore, as we said in disputation 21, cap. 2, not only is there in God the attribute of moral goodness, in right and just operation, but there is also the attribute of that goodness which answers to the goodness of being in common; and this is one: although whatever you like may be called a relation, or a person, or three relations, or three things be said in God, nevertheless we do not therefore say three goodnesses and three perfections: because all of them integrate God and perfect him, whence there results only one integrity; although in created

composite things, from several things distinct there are several perfections, which are integrities that they call partial; but in God these cannot be: because all things, together with the essence, are one.

It is objected that since three relations are said to be really distinct, three things; it follows that also for this reason any relation whatsoever is a perfection distinct from the essence: therefore, just as three relations are said, three perfections and goodnesses are likewise said; if indeed, when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is multiplied too; and just as a thing is superior to a relation, so also goodness, or perfection, which is a passion of being and of the thing. Wherefore, although the three relations are the same according to the thing with the essence, and have the same perfection according to the thing with it; nevertheless, since this identity does not hinder their being called three relations really distinct, it will not hinder their being called three perfections also; since formally each is a perfection and does not include the perfection of the essence. Moreover, the argument of the Canarian has little strength - namely, that there are three relations really distinct because multiplication is according to relative opposition; but that there are not three perfections because perfection is something absolute, and according to the absolute there is no multiplication. This reasoning is weak: for perfection is something absolute, not as a thing or being, but as something common both to the absolute and the relative, which I call a transcendental; and it can be multiplied when the inferior is multiplied. Otherwise we could say that in God there are three things or three beings; for perfection and goodness, which are passions of being and of the thing, are no less abstracted from the relative and the absolute than being itself and the thing.

In order therefore to explain this difficulty, note first that the name of perfection is used in a twofold way. In one way, for the integrity of a thing, in which the formal notion of goodness consists, which is constituted as a passion of being, as we have established elsewhere; just as a thing is said to be perfect and good which is whole or entire, about which we have treated many matters in that disputation.[168] In another way, perfection is said of whatever pertains to the integrity of something and integrates and perfects it, as something befitting and congruous; but this latter is not posited as a passion of being, as was shown there in cap. 2: for it does not befit all things with respect to all things. Nonetheless, since there is nothing in God that does not most of all befit him, there will be nothing that is not a perfection of his in this latter mode according to our way of understanding.

As to perfection taken in the former way: for something to be a real perfection in the former mode, it is enough that it be the integrity of some existing thing; it is not necessary that, that of which it is the integrity, be distinguished by nature from it: for goodness, which is a passion of being, differs from being only according to reason, as was explained there.[168]

As to the latter: for something to be a real perfection of anything in the latter mode, it must of necessity be distinguished by its very nature from that which it perfects: for it is the perfection of that which it completes and integrates; but nothing really perfects itself, just as nothing really

168. See the earlier treatment, disputatio 23, cap. 4.
168. See the earlier treatment, disputatio 23, cap. 4.

constitutes itself. Therefore that which perfects and integrates must, by its own nature, be distinguished from that which is perfected and integrated. Wherefore, if something is only distinguished by the intellect according to our way of understanding, it will also be a perfection of that thing only in that same way.

Objection: But you will say, if what is distinct from another can perfect it, much more will that which is more intimate to something and differs least from it be able to perfect it.

Response: This proves only that what is distinguished from another by reason alone more participates in its integrity and in its perfection in the former mode; yet, in the latter mode, not at all: for in order that it be a perfection in that mode, it must actually perfect; but for this, it is necessary to differ from that which it perfects.

Thirdly, it must be premised that of every thing, however much it be integrated and perfected out of diverse elements, there is only one integrity and perfection which is posited as a passion of that thing: for, just as from many there is made one whole, so also there is made one integrity of it.

From these points it is clear in what way there is one perfection in God, and in what way there are many, and whether the relations are many or the perfection is one. First, if we speak of perfection which is a passion of being, and is the same thing as the integrity of a thing, it follows that in God there is only one perfection, because there is only one integrity. For all the things that are in God, according to our way of understanding - whether attributes or the essence or the relations - pertain to this integrity and perfection, or goodness. Wherefore, as we said in that second disputation, cap. 8, not only is there in God the attribute of moral goodness, that is, of right and just operation, but there is also the attribute of goodness which answers to the most common goodness of being; and both this and that are one.[169] And although any relation, or person, is said to be a thing, and the three relations, three things, are said to be in God, nevertheless three goodnesses and perfections are not said: because all these are the same with the one essence, with which they integrate and perfect God; whence there results only one integrity. And although in created things composed out of many distinct things there are several perfections, as also several integrities which they call partials, yet in God there cannot be such: because all things, together with the essence, are one.

Reason is proved about the latter point. The essence and the relations, which are modes of existing, are the same by nature according to the thing, and are so distinguished among themselves that they are the same with the essence; and therefore they have no integrity other than that which they constitute with it.

Then, if we speak of perfection in the latter mode, as in the first notation it was said, there are not in God three real perfections, but three perfections only according to reason, even though three real relations must necessarily be conceded as really distinct. This plainly follows from the second notation: for, in order that something be a real perfection of another, it must be distinguished from it by nature according to the thing; but relation is not distinguished in this way from the essence: therefore it is not a real perfection of it in the latter mode.

169. See that second disputation, cap. 8.

Indeed, in the opinion of Scotus, who posits between the relations and the essence a distinction by nature according to the thing, three real perfections of the divine essence could not be denied: for the relations would really perfect the essence, if they were distinguished from it in that way. But in our opinion, which said that they differ only according to reason, it would necessarily follow that there are not three real perfections of the divine essence, but only perfections according to reason: because they are conceived by our reason alone, as if they perfected the essence in which they are, whereas in reality they do not perfect it, but are the same with it.[170]

Nor is it rightly inferred thus: there are three real relations really distinct; therefore there are three real perfections in this latter mode, even if, when the inferior is multiplied, the superior be multiplied. First, because perfection in this mode is not a passion of being and something superior to relations, as was said in the first notation. Next, because, in order that three real relations be said to be really distinct, it is enough if they are mutually opposed among themselves and referred by their nature; for from this respect relation is said to be multiplied, even if together with the one essence they are altogether the same by nature according to the thing. But, in order that real perfections be said to be multiplied, it is necessary that they themselves be really distinguished from the thing which they are said to perfect; for from that fact perfection is said to be real in this latter mode.

Objection: But if you say, at least there will be three perfections in the former mode, insofar as perfection and goodness is a passion of being; and then rightly it will be inferred, since, when the inferior is multiplied, the superior ought to be multiplied.

It is answered: It still does not follow; because, although perfection in the former mode is superior to relation, nevertheless something else is required for perfection to be said to be multiplied than for relation. For the latter is said to be real, not because the name is varied, as the Logicians say, but because by its nature it is referred to a real terminus, and on that account it is said to be multiplied. But perfection cannot be multiplied, neither in the former nor in the latter mode, when those relations, or those three things, are the same with some other reality, as the divine relations are with the essence - which indeed is a marvelous and most singular thing. For perfection in the former mode, which is a passion of being, is the integrity of a thing; but where three are really the same with some third, they are not said to have three real integrities, but to constitute one.

If someone press us with that form of arguing, "When the inferior is multiplied, the superior ought to be multiplied," we respond that it is a good form of arguing when the appellation is not varied, as the Logicians say; but here it is varied. For when we say that three real relations are really distinct, the word "real" so affects relation that it is said to be real and really distinct from the fact alone that by its nature it is referred to a real terminus. But when we say "real perfection," surely that word "real" denotes that that perfection is an integrity of that thing per se and distinct from any other - which does not obtain in the divine relations, which, since by their nature they are the same with the essence, constitute with it one integrity according to the thing.

170. See above, disputatio 120, where it was said that the relations differ only according to reason.

About perfection in the latter mode, this is sufficiently clear: for when "real perfection" is said, a distinction from the very thing which it perfects is signified - a distinction that is not found in the divine relations with respect to the essence. But when "real relation" is said, only a real reference to a real terminus is denoted, not a distinction from that in which the relation is: and therefore, when relation is multiplied, the thing is said to be multiplied, not however perfection.

But it must be observed that, although relation is not a real perfection of the essence, as the essence is, nor are the three relations said in any way to be three real perfections, nevertheless relations pertain to the perfection of God as subsisting in a person, just as the attributes pertain to the perfection of the essence according to itself, as was said in cap. 2 - not for any other reason, except that thus it pertains to the perfection of God "to be according to," just as "to be wise." Yet the Trinity of persons, in which fecundity is attended to, does not make a trinity of perfections, whence it also comes about that the perfection and integrity which is considered on the part of the essence according to itself is presupposed to the persons; but that which is considered in God as subsisting in persons is not understood before the persons.

Caput VII - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

From the preceding doctrine it is gathered, first, that there is not in one person any real perfection, neither in the former nor in the latter mode, which is not in another; although there is in one person a certain relation which is not in another, nevertheless that is not a real perfection, neither in the former nor in the latter mode; but it is only a perfection according to reason in that latter mode: because, according to our way of understanding, just as it is understood as distinct from the essence, so also it is conceived as a perfection of it, as has been proved. Next, it is not the perfection of God in the former mode taken for integrity, but is something pertaining to that integrity, according to our way of understanding: I say, according to our way of understanding, because, since it is the essence itself, it is not something pertaining to its integrity as something distinct from it.

Second, it follows that one person is not to be called more perfect, nor more worthy, than another by reason of personality: I do not say "prior," even in the sense of the Greek Fathers; but I say "more worthy," or "more perfect." For there is among them a perfect equality of dignity: because, if one were more worthy in reality than another, it ought to have in itself some real perfection greater than another; but this does not occur, as has been proved: therefore one is not more perfect than another. Since, however, there is in one some perfection of reason which is not in another, it thereby only comes about that it is conceived by us as more worthy than another; but we should not assert that one is more perfect than another: because what befits it only by apprehension of the intellect ought not to be simply predicated of it.

Third, it follows what should be said about unity and truth, which also are passions of being: whether in God three unities and three truths ought to be said, just as three relations are said. For about goodness, which is posited as a passion of being, the same must be said as about perfection, as we proved in the preceding chapter. Richard, on the First Book, dist. 34, art. 1, q. 3, ad primum,

thinks that three truths or three unities are not to be conceded. I, however, judge that - if scandal be absent and what is said be rightly understood - according to the propriety of speech it can be said that there are in God three unities, just as it is said that there is a ternary number; yet one must speak cautiously, as Bernard admonishes, book 5 On Consideration, before the middle, where he says thus: "There are three persons - who will deny the number? For they are truly three. But who will count them? And they are truly one." And with some things interposed, by which he teaches that persons who are not one nature and essence ought not to be numbered, he adds: "Let us say three, but not to the prejudice of unity; let us say one, but not to the confusion of the Trinity." And in the Council of Rheims, at which Bernard was present, in its decrees which we reported above, it is said thus: "We believe that only God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are eternal; nor let any things at all - whether relations, or properties, or singularities, or unities - be said to be present in God, which are from eternity and are not God." Where the Council does not shrink from conceding three things, three singularities, three unities, provided we say that these are altogether the same with the essence and with God himself; just as by the testimony lately cited Bernard said that persons which are not God himself are not to be numbered. And indeed that number is to be posited in God will be proved in the following article in the explanation of it.[171]

About truth, however, a distinction must be made. For there is a certain truth in saying, and this is one in God: for it is an essential attribute, just as wisdom is. There is another truth which is posited as a passion of being, and it befits any thing; and this I think is multiplied as things are multiplied. Therefore paternity, insofar as it is an entity, has its own truth, which is nothing other than an extrinsic denomination by respect to the intellect being able to judge truly about it, as we noted in disputation 77, cap. 4. Therefore, since the intellect can judge truly that in God there are three real relations - paternity, filiation, and procession - and that these are really distinct, for that reason there are three truths in the three relations.[172]

Fourth, from what has been said it is inferred what should be said about infinity: for this is not a passion of being, as is clear, but it seems to be proper to God. I say, therefore, that three infinities in God are not to be conceded, because infinity can befit God in many ways. The first infinity is in the genus of being, which is posited as a proper attribute of the essence distinct from the others, about which we said enough and more than enough in disputation 23, cap. 5; and this is only one in the three persons: for the infinite in this way is the same as "not having a cause according to existence (*esse*)." But the persons are infinite in this way by reason of the essence, which by its nature is not distinguished; for "not to have a cause" is not considered formally on the part of the property, but on the part of the essence. Indeed, as we were saying in disputation 119, cap. ...[173]

From the foregoing doctrine it is gathered, first, that in one person there is not any real perfection which is not in another, neither in the prior nor in the posterior way. For although in one person there is a certain relation (*relatio*), which is not in another, yet that is not a real perfection, neither in the prior nor in the posterior way; it is only a perfection according to reason

171. Council of Rheims; Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione, lib. 5, ante medium.
172. See disputatio 77, cap. 4.
173. See disputatio 23, cap. 5; and below, disputatio 119, cap. (continued).

in that latter way: because, in our mode of understanding, as it is understood as distinct from the essence (*essentia*), so too it is conceived as a perfection of it, as has been proved. Next, it is not a perfection of God taken in that prior way for integrity, but it is something pertaining to that integrity, in our mode of understanding. I say "in our mode of understanding," because, since it is the essence itself, it is not something pertaining to its integrity as a thing distinct from it.

Second, it follows that one person is not to be called more perfect or more worthy than another in reason of personality; I do not speak in the other sense of the Greek Fathers, that is, of priority; but I say "more worthy," or "more perfect." For there is a perfect equality of dignity among them: because, if one were more worthy in reality than another, it ought to have in itself some greater real perfection than another; but this does not occur, as has been proved: therefore one is not more perfect than another. Because, however, in one there is some perfection of reason, which is not in another, hence only it comes about that to us it is conceived as more worthy than another; but let us not assert that one is more perfect than another: because what befits it only through the apprehension of the intellect ought not to be predicated of it simply.

Third, it follows what should be said about unity and truth, which also are passions of being: whether in God there ought to be said three unities and three truths, as three relations are said. I say, therefore, that three unities and three truths can be said in God, as three relations are said. For about goodness, which is posited as a passion of being, the same must be said as about perfection, as we proved in the preceding chapter. Richard, in the first book, dist. 34, art. 1, q. 3, to the first, thinks that three truths or three unities are not to be conceded. I, however, judge that, if scandal be absent and what is said be rightly understood, then, according to the propriety of speech, it can be said that there are in God three unities, as it is said that there is a ternary number; yet one must speak cautiously, as Bernard admonishes in book 5 of De consideratione, before the middle, where he says thus: let us beware lest we say things which the Council of Rheims, at which Bernard was present, by its decrees, which were cited above, forbids: "We believe that only God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are eternal; nor that there are any properties, or relations, or singularities, or unities, or other things of this sort said to be in God from eternity," where the Council does not shrink from conceding "singularities," "three unities," and the like, provided they be said to be absolutely the same as God himself; as the testimony of the same shows; we will treat of the numbering of those more fittingly in the following article in explaining that proposition.[174]

About infinity, however, which is also said in many ways, it seems that in God three infinities should not be conceded, because infinity in general is a primary attribute, about which we spoke enough in disputation 23, chapter 5, and also in disputation 119, chapter 3, and 121, chapter 3; properties and attributes are not considered as finite nor as infinite in this way, insofar as they are distinguished by us from the essence with which they are the same; they are only said to be infinite by reason of the essence, with which they are identical: formally, however, in themselves, they are considered neither as finite nor as infinite; on that account we do not assert that they are finite, as we noted there.[175]

174. Council of Rheims; Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione, lib. 5, ante medium.
175. See disputatio 23, cap. 5; disputatio 119, cap. 3; disputatio 121, cap. 3.

The second kind of infinity is, not in the genus of being, but in a proper and peculiar genus, as wisdom is called infinite because it is engaged with an infinite object, and similarly mercy because it can be engaged with an infinite [object], and in like manner power. Of this kind of infinity, which befits many attributes, we spoke in disputation 103, chapter 2; and this does not befit relations formally: because we do not see what infinity they would have on the part of the terminus to which they are referred, except the infinity of being, of which we first spoke: but this befits relations on the part of the essence, with which they are the same, not otherwise, nor formally from themselves in our mode of conceiving: wherefore, neither in this second way will there be said three infinities.

The third infinity of God is immensity with an order to place; and this does befit relations in reality, because they fill every place; but it befits them by reason of the essence, whose proper attribute is immensity; and therefore they are and are understood to be everywhere, because they are the same as the essence: for that reason, neither in this third way should three infinities be said; otherwise three immensities would be said, which is against the Athanasian Symbol, when it says, "not three immensities, but one immense." Although indeed as adjectives they could be said "three immense" (as we will show in disputation 155, chapter 8), nevertheless substantively they cannot be said, in the sense in which Athanasius speaks; and because the substantive is numbered according to the number of forms, as we shall say there, three immensities are not to be said.

The fourth infinity is of eternity, or duration, about which we must dispute in disputation 126, chapters 2 and 3. The fifth infinity is of incomprehensibility, and this too is only one in God: for God is called incomprehensible to our thought, either because he cannot be seen as he is by the proper virtue of the intellect, or because, although he is seen clearly as he is, he is still not comprehended, as we explained in disputation 3, chapter 4: and in either way there is not one incomprehensibility of the relation and another of the essence; because the one cannot be seen without the other, and when it is seen, it appears as something undivided and simple. Therefore there is one reason of invisibility and incomprehensibility, not several. From which it is clear that in no kind of infinity that befits God can it be said that there are in God three infinities: whether, however, three existences and three eternities - at least relatively - can be said, we shall see below in disputation 136, chapters 2 and 3. But that they can be called "three things," we said in this disputation, chapter 3; and in the same way some think that, if scandal were absent, they could be called "three beings" (tria entia), with the propriety of the word nonetheless preserved. And they understand this not only adjectivally, as "things," which even St. Thomas concedes in the First Book of the Sentences, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 4, but even substantively (which he in that place denies), because, when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is also multiplied, as we showed above. He nevertheless assigns a difference between these two transcendent names, ens and res, to wit, that res signifies the very quiddity and form without respect to existence (*esse*); and therefore, since there are in God three relations, as it were three forms, there are also three res; but ens signifies quiddity under existence; and because in God there is only one existence of existing, therefore only one ens is said to be in God, not three. Others, however, by a not-to-be-disapproved reason judge that ens and res denote the form in the same way, because each is in the same way transcendent: whether, however, three individuals can be said, or not, we shall say below, q. 29, art. 1.

Finally, it is gathered that not every reality or entity of the Father is communicated to the Son, nor is every reality of the Father and the Son communicated to the Holy Spirit: for the personal properties are true realities and entities, and they are not communicated. Wherefore that saying of Matt. 11: "All things have been delivered to me by my Father," and of John 17: "All mine are thine, and thine are mine," and the like, are to be understood of the essential [things], not of the personal. For in the Council of Florence, last session, in the letter of union, it is said, "All things that are the Father's, the only-begotten Son received from his Father by being begotten, except to be Father." And Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter "Quod sit," [says] that all that the Father has are the Son's, this alone excepted, that he is not unbegotten: which, indeed, indicates neither a difference of nature, nor of dignity and authority, but a mode of existing. But to be Father, or paternity itself, or that mode of existing, is some entity: for we say that there are three realities in God, or three entities, which are three relations and three modes of existing: therefore some entity of one person is not communicated to another. And thus Hilary, book 3 On the Trinity, Cyril, book 1 on John, and Isidore, book On the Supreme Good, chapter "Iesu," are to be understood, when they assert that all things that are the Father's are the Son's; but about this again below in disputation 159, chapter 3, we shall treat.[176]

Articulus III - Whether the relations that are in God are really distinguished from each other

To the third [article] thus one proceeds. It seems that the relations which are in God are not really distinguished from each other.

1. For whatsoever things are the same to one and the same, are the same to each other. But every relation existing in God is the same, according to the thing, with the divine essence. Therefore the relations, according to the thing, are not distinguished from each other.
2. Further, as paternity and filiation are, according to the notion of the name, distinguished from the divine essence, so also are goodness and power. But on account of a distinction of this sort of reason there is not any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither [is there] of paternity and filiation.
3. Further, in the divine [things] there is no real distinction except according to origin; but one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

But on the contrary is what Boethius says in the book On the Trinity, that substance in the divine retains unity, relation multiplies trinity: if therefore the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would not be in the divine a real Trinity, but only of reason, which is the error of Sabellius.[177]

176. See below, disputatio 159, cap. 3. See also St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 1, cap. "Quod sit."

I answer that, from the fact that something is attributed to another, it must be that all the things which belong to the notion of that [something] be attributed to it. Thus, to whomever "man" is attributed, it must be attributed to him to be rational. But of the notion of relation is the respect of one to another, according to which a thing is opposed to another relatively. Therefore, since in God there is really relation (as has been said), it must be that there be really in him opposition. But relative opposition includes in its notion distinction. Whence it must be that in God there be real distinction, not indeed according to the absolute thing, which is the essence, in which is highest unity and simplicity, but according to the relative thing.

Reply to the first: According to the Philosopher in the third book of the Physics, that argument holds which says that whatever things are the same to one and the same are the same to each other, in those things which are the same in thing and in reason, as a tunic and a garment; but not in those which differ in reason. Whence, in the same place, he says that although action be the same as motion, and similarly passion, nevertheless it does not follow that action and passion are the same: because in action there is imported the respect as that from which the motion is in the movable; but in passion, as that which is from another. And similarly, although paternity is the same according to the thing with the divine essence, and likewise filiation, nevertheless these two, in their proper notions, import opposed respects. Whence they are distinguished from each other.

Reply to the second: Power and goodness do not import in their notions any opposition. Whence the reason is not similar.

Reply to the third: Although relations, properly speaking, are not generated or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are taken by opposition according to the procession of one from another.

Explication and confirmation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion of the article is: In God there is a real distinction, not according to the absolute thing which is the essence, but according to relation; and this is of faith. For, in the chapter Firmiter, "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," it is said: This is the Trinity, one according to the common essence, distinct according to the personal properties; now in the opinion of all, the personal properties are relations.[178] And in the Council of Toledo, in the profession of faith, it is said: "Therefore this holy Trinity, which is one God, neither has number added, nor is taken by numbers; relation alone is attributed to the persons; for the properties by which the persons are numbered are relations; things truly distinct are not substances so that they be numbered by them;" in which sense St. Thomas is wont to speak, that number is taken from the relations themselves; whence Boethius, in the book On the Trinity, near the end, says that substance retains unity, but relation multiplies Trinity.[177]

177. Boethius, De Trinitate.
178. Fourth Lateran Council, cap. Firmiter: De summa Trinitate et fide catholica.
177. Boethius, De Trinitate.

But it must be observed with Cajetan in this article that St. Thomas asked indefinitely whether the relations in God are really distinguished; and in the end he answers that they are really distinguished; that is, some of them are distinguished really: for the respect of spiration from paternity, and filiation, are not said by St. Thomas to be distinguished really one from another, but only the relations opposed by opposition; all, however, are not set one against another.

Nevertheless, in order to prove his conclusion, he assumes into the reasoning this proposition: "When something is attributed to anything, it is necessary that all things which are of the notion of that thing be attributed thereto." But Cajetan objects in this way. Wisdom is attributed to God, of which the notion is to be an accidental form, and yet to God it is not attributed under that notion: therefore, likewise, although relation be attributed to God, it is not necessary that there be attributed to him that which is of the notion of it, namely relative opposition. We respond that to the notion of wisdom there does not belong to be an accidental form, as to the notion of relation there belongs opposition. Which solution is rightly judged the truer: for if we consider wisdom according to its whole formal constitution and analogy, as it is in the creature, we shall find that that of it which is accidental is not of its notion: wherefore, if it be attributed to God, it does not follow that it be attributed as accidental by reason of its notion. But relative opposition by its very notion, since it is relation, is always repugnant to identity with that to which it is opposed: therefore to God relation is attributed, of which there is always the notion of opposition; and it follows that in God there is opposition of relations, not indeed accidental, but according to reason. And the relative opposition, inasmuch as it were, is always relative: therefore it is always opposed to the other extreme. And thus, if we say that in God there is opposition, it is not of relations to something outside himself, but of relations among themselves; because relation in God regards itself, since within himself he produces another person, and thus opposition of relation arises within himself: and therefore the relations, since they are opposed, are distinguished from each other and are really distinct. And let this suffice about the text of the article.

Quomodo mysterium Trinitatis not be thought to be opposed to any principle: "Things which are the same to a third are the same among themselves."

The principle that this is not against the mystery of the Trinity is defended in various ways by the Scholastics.

Caput I - The principle that the mystery of the Trinity is not contrary to reason, variously defended by the Scholastics

Since the mysteries of our faith are above the grasp of natural understanding, nevertheless they are not opposed to natural reason: and thus the Scholastics are accustomed to defend that principle, that "things which are the same to a third are the same among themselves," does not clash with the mystery of the Trinity. For although we see there to be three persons really distinct, who are each the same with the one divine essence by nature, nevertheless it does not follow that

the persons are the same among themselves; and in this mystery of the Trinity the persons are really distinct among themselves, while the essence is one and the same; and so the attempts of some to oppose, by reason alone, this mystery by that principle do not succeed, as the Scholastics endeavor to show in diverse ways; and likewise philosophers devoted to piety do not think this principle is opposed to the mystery.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the article is: In God there is a real distinction, not according to the absolute thing, which is most simple, but according to relation (*relatio*). And this is of faith; for in the chapter Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, it is said: This holy Trinity, according to the common essence (*essentia*), is undivided; according to the personal properties, it is distinguished; and, in the sentence of all, the personal properties are relations. And in the Council of Toledo XI, in the confession of faith it is said: "This holy Trinity, which is also wholly true God, neither recedes from number nor admits number: for in the relation of the persons the number is discerned; but in the substance of the divinity what is to be numbered is not comprehended: therefore they insinuate number only in this, that they are toward one another; and in this they lack number, that they are within." Therefore Boethius, in the book De Trinitate near the end, says: "Substance contains unity; but relation multiplies the Trinity." Hence also the common axiom of the Theologians, taken from Anselm, as we shall report below in Disputation 147, chapter 4, had its origin: "In the divine things all are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand against it."[179]

It is not to be understood of every relation

But it must be observed with Cajetan in this article, that St. Thomas asked indefinitely whether the relations in God are really distinguished among themselves; and in the end he answered that they are really distinguished, that is, that some of them are really distinguished: for active spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation. And indeed St. Thomas only insinuated a real distinction among the opposed relations; yet not all are opposed among themselves.

Cajetan's objection against the reasoning of the conclusion

Moreover, to prove his conclusion, he assumes in the reasoning this proposition: Whenever something is attributed to anyone, there are attributed all things which belong to the notion of that thing. But Cajetan objects in this way. Wisdom is attributed to God, of which it is of the notion to be an accidental form; and yet it is not attributed to God under this account: therefore likewise, although relation is attributed to God, it is not necessary that that which is of the notion of relation, namely relative opposition, be also attributed. It is answered that it does not belong to the notion of wisdom that it be an accidental form, as it belongs to the notion of relation to have opposition. Which solution, if rightly understood, is best: for if wisdom be considered according to its whole community and analogy, as it encompasses the created and the uncreated, it does not, of its notion, include being a form; wherefore, if it be attributed to God, it does not follow that it must be attributed under that lowly account by which it is an accidental form, but under a higher account.

179. Lateran IV, cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica; Council of Toledo XI, Confession of Faith; Boethius, De Trinitate; see also Anselm as cited below in Disputation 147, ch. 4.

But as to relation, however universally it be considered, there is of its very notion relative opposition, that is, that which necessarily always entails opposition; therefore, if relation be attributed to God, relative opposition must necessarily also befit Him.

A second objection of Cajetan

He objects next: To one whiteness there belongs a relation of likeness to another, and yet to it within itself relative opposition does not belong; but to the one there belongs respect toward another outside itself: therefore it is enough if we say that relative opposition befits God, but with respect to another outside Himself. Cajetan answers well that to every relation which has its correlate in another extreme there always belongs relative opposition with respect to the other: but to God, because relation befits Him within Himself, for within Himself He produces another person, relative opposition befits Him within Himself; and therefore some relations intrinsic to Him are mutually opposed and are really distinguished. And so much concerning the text of the article.

Disputatio CXXIII - How the mystery of the Trinity does not conflict with the principle, "Things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves"

Caput I - That this principle is not against the mystery of the Trinity is variously defended by the Scholastics

Since the mysteries of our faith are of such a sort that, although they surpass the grasp of natural understanding, nevertheless they do not conflict with natural consideration, all the Scholastics concede that common and rather hackneyed principle, Things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves, not to be opposed to the mystery of the Trinity. For since we see there are three persons really distinct, which we proved are not distinguished from the essence by the nature of the thing,[180] and so in this mystery of the Trinity the relations and persons are the same with the essence, which nevertheless are not the same among themselves, the Scholastics in various ways attempt to show, by natural reason and by the principles of true philosophy, that this mystery is not contrary.

And first, indeed, Durandus in I, dist. 2, q. 4, easily frees himself from this difficulty, since, as we saw in Disputation 110, chapter ..., conceding that the relations are distinguished really from the essence may rightly stand together with that principle according to his opinion: for thus it would not be true that the three divine persons are the same with one third, namely with the essence. But since that opinion is condemned, as we showed there against Gilbert, that principle cannot be saved in that way.[181]

180. See Disputation 120.
181. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 4; cf. the condemnation against Gilbert of Poitiers.

Secondly, Scotus, in I, dist. 2, q. 4, in order to the first principal question, answers thus: since the relations and persons are distinguished from the essence at least formally by the nature of the thing, it cannot be gathered that they are among themselves also formally the same: because they are not formally the same with one third. But if anyone should insist (he says there) and strive to infer that the relations are really the same among themselves, although not formally, because at least they are said to be really the same with the essence, the answer must be given in this way: The divine relations, insofar as they are the same with the divine essence, are not the same in any personality and subsistence, but only in the essence: whence it does not follow that they have among themselves identity of subsistence, but only of essence, in which they are united and with which they are the same: and hence it is only inferred that they are really the same, not absolutely, but only essentially. Therefore he understands that principle in this way: things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves in the same manner in which they are the same with that third, not otherwise.[182]

The same solution to the difficulty at hand is applied by Capreolus in I, dist. 2, q. 3, a. 1, at the end; by Cajetan in this article, if he be read attentively; by the Ferraran in II Contra gentes, cap. 9, at the beginning.[183]

But this exposition of that principle seems useless: for it is just as if we were to say: things which are the same with one third are the same in that third; that is, they are united in that third. But who is ignorant of this? For if we suppose that they are the same with one third, they are without doubt the same with it and in it. But the aforesaid principle signifies something else: for it gathers from this, that some things are the same with one third, that those things are the same among themselves in the same way: that is, if they are formally the same with one third, they are formally the same among themselves; if they are really the same, they are also really the same among themselves. And if that principle were the foundation of syllogistic form, we should not only infer that the two things which are the same with one third are the same inasmuch as they are united in it, but also that they are the same among themselves: because the two extremes which in the premises are compared with one middle, are the same with it; then in the conclusion they are compared among themselves, and are inferred to be the same among themselves.

Thirdly, the same Capreolus in the place cited responds that that principle is to be understood when two are the same with one third adequately; but the divine relations are not the same with the essence adequately, because the essence is something common. But this interpretation does not please me: for if it were true, that principle would have place only in definition and the defined, and in those things that are synonyms; wherefore in created things we should not rightly infer that action and passion are really the same among themselves, because they are really the same with one and the same motion. But if Capreolus posits this principle as the foundation of syllogisms, he ought to admit it not only in those things which are the same adequately with one third, but also in many other cases, as is manifest.

182. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 4.
183. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 3, a. 1; Cajetan, on this article; the Ferraran, In Contra gentiles, II, cap. 9.

Fourthly, St. Thomas, in this article, in the reply to the first, thinks that proposition has place only in synonyms, which are altogether the same in reality and notion with one third; which he judges to be according to the mind of Aristotle: for in Physics, book 3, text 21, he teaches that action and passion differ, even if they are the same with one and the same motion. The Canariensis taught the same with St. Thomas in this article. But against this interpretation, in the first place, is that same Doctor himself, who, in Contra gentiles II, chapter 9, proves that the power of God and His operation are the same according to reality, as they are the same with the essence: yet the operation of God and His power differ in notion and are not synonyms, as is gathered from what has been said in Disputation 118, chapter 4, toward the beginning. The Ferraran, in the same chapter, tries to defend St. Thomas and to vindicate him from contradiction in this way: that certain things are to be understood to be the same with one third, not only when they are synonyms, but also when they are the same with one third according to reality and do not differ from it by a distinction of reason having a foundation in the thing, of which sort, he says, are power and action in God: but if certain things differ from that third according to a distinction of reason that has a foundation in the thing, then, although they are really the same with it, it does not follow that they are the same among themselves in reality and in notion.[184]

Yet I do not see how St. Thomas can thus be reconciled. First, since here he plainly asserts that the proposition is to be understood in synonyms, he openly excluded all those which are not synonyms; and such are power and operation: for that these be distinguished without any foundation in the thing, but only in our mode of knowing, matters little: because nonetheless they are not synonyms. Then too Aristotle, Physics 3, whom St. Thomas alleges in the reply to the first, does not prove by that proposition that action and passion differ in notion among themselves: because they are not the same with one third, namely with the motion, in reality and in notion: he only asserts that there is nothing to prevent action and passion from differing in notion, although they are in reality the same motion. Wherefore, in order that from the identity of two things with some third according to reality there be inferred the identity of those two among themselves according to reality, Aristotle did not say it is necessary that those two be the same with the third in reality and in notion: indeed, one could assert that the identity of two with a third in reality and in notion is necessary, and it would follow that their identity among themselves in reality and in notion; yet, in order that real identity follow, that double identity with the third does not seem necessary in created and natural things which Aristotle alone knew.

Moreover, the true exposition of that proposition, Things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves, is not that it be the principle of syllogisms, nor that it was ever posited by Aristotle as a foundation; rather, in Prior Analytics I, chapter 1, from another principle he deduced the syllogistic form and its force, which he called "to be said of every" and "to be said of none": that is, whatever is predicated of every subject is predicated of anything contained under it; and whatever is denied of every subject is denied of anything contained under it: which propositions are so true and certain, that in any matter whatsoever, even in divine matters, they

184. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 1 ad 1 (as commonly cited); Aristotle, Physics, book 3, text 21; St. Thomas, Contra gentiles II, c. 9; Ferrariense, loc. cit.; see also Disputation 118, ch. 4.

cannot be false. Whence it is that the syllogistic form, which in the conclusion predicates the greater extreme of the lesser, because the lesser is said of the middle, of which also the greater is predicated, is most certain and so efficacious that it can fail in no matter. To this form, which is universal and of the first figure, all universal forms of the other figures are reduced: there is also reduced the form of the expository syllogism, whose middle is singular: for if, of Peter, for example, animal is predicated, and Peter of some man, therefore also animal is predicated of man. Thus the expository syllogism is formed in the first figure, in which the middle is the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor. And when the syllogism is in another figure, the reasoning is altogether the same: because to this it must be reduced.

Further, it is easily proved that the foundation of syllogisms is not that proposition, things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves: for either it is understood of identity according to reality alone, and thus it would have no place in divine matters; yet the syllogistic form has force everywhere, as we shall say in the following chapter: therefore that foundation cannot be employed. Or it is understood of identity in reality and in notion, such that those which are the same with one third in reality and in notion are the same among themselves in reality and in notion: and thus the syllogistic form could hold only in synonyms, which in reality and in notion are the same with some third. Wherefore this syllogism would not be good: "the rational is risible; man is rational; therefore man is risible": because the two extremes are not in reality and in notion the same with man, but differ in notion; nay, risible differs more than in notion from man, if risibility really differs from man, as the faculty and potency thereof. Many conclusions too can be inferred in legitimate syllogistic form in which the predicate differs from the subject ...[185]

Caput II - The true exposition of the aforesaid proposition is not opposed to the mystery of the Trinity

Let us explain the true sense of the aforesaid proposition and show that it is not opposed to the mystery of the Trinity. Two preliminaries must be made: first, that proposition, Things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves, is not the principle of syllogisms, nor was it ever posited by Aristotle as a foundation; rather, as was said, in Prior Analytics I, chapter 1, from another principle he deduced the syllogistic form and its force, which he called "to be said of every" and "to be said of none": that is, whatever is predicated of every subject is predicated of anything contained under it; and whatever is denied of every subject is denied of anything contained under it; which propositions are so true and certain that in any matter, even in divine things, they cannot be false. Whence it is that the syllogistic form, which in the conclusion predicates the greater extreme of the lesser, because the lesser is said of the middle, of which also the greater is predicated, is most certain and so efficacious that it can fail in no matter. To this form, which is universal and of the first figure, all universal forms of the other figures are reduced: there is also

185. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 1; on expository syllogisms and reduction of figures; the example "the rational is risible..." is standard in the logical schools.

reduced the form of the expository syllogism, whose middle is singular: for if, of Peter, for example, animal is predicated, and Peter of some man, therefore also animal is predicated of man. Thus the expository syllogism is formed in the first figure, in which the middle is the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor. And when the syllogism is in another figure, the reasoning is altogether the same: because to this it must be reduced.

Further, it is easily proved that the foundation of syllogisms is not that proposition, things which are the same with one third are the same among themselves: for either it is understood of identity according to reality alone, and thus it would have no place in divine matters; yet the syllogistic form has force everywhere, as we shall say in the following chapter: therefore that foundation cannot be employed. Or it is understood of identity in reality and in notion, such that those which are the same with one third in reality and in notion are the same among themselves in reality and in notion: and thus the syllogistic form could hold only in synonyms, which in reality and in notion are the same with some third. Wherefore this syllogism would not be good: "the rational is risible; man is rational; therefore man is risible": because the two extremes are not in reality and in notion the same with man, but differ in notion; nay, risible differs more than in notion from man, if risibility really differs from man, as the faculty and potency thereof. Many conclusions too can be inferred in legitimate syllogistic form in which the predicate differs from the subject ...

Proposition: That proposition is true and is in some way a principle of syllogisms.

Nevertheless this principle is most true, and it can be the foundation of syllogisms in this sense: Those things which are the same to a third by predication are the same among themselves also by predication; that is, those things which are said of some third are said reciprocally of themselves, as we see in the expository syllogism. But that principle, understood in this way, is reduced to, or rather is the same as, the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo, as was explained above by us; and in this sense the proposition is not understood of identity with some third according to the thing (*secundum rem*), or according to reason (*secundum rationem*), or in both ways; because it happens that one thing is predicated of another which is distinguished from it in reality, or at least by reason - as risible is of man, which differs from him really; and animal also of man, which is at least distinguished from him by reason. From this principle, however, nothing absurd follows in the mystery of the Trinity, as will be established in the following chapter; for there the syllogistic form obtains, with all the rules assigned by the logicians preserved, and nothing absurd can be inferred. Only that principle, understood of the real identity of the relations with the essence, makes difficulty against this mystery; in which way, to be sure, they are not the same among themselves according to reality.

A further note prior to explaining the difficulty.

Next it must be noted that there is a certain principle familiar to the mathematicians, namely: Things which are equal to one and the same third are equal among themselves; which is universally most true, but it holds its place only in quantitative things: and accordingly, nothing can be inferred from it against the mystery of the Trinity.

A true unfolding of the difficulty proposed, in divine matters.

I answer, therefore, to the difficulty proposed, that the proposition, Those things which are the same to one and the same third according to the thing are the same among themselves according to the thing, is not universally true, not because it is sometimes false in created things - for the contrary can indeed occur - but because it does not universally exclude that some things be the same in reality with one third and differ really among themselves, as faith teaches in the mystery of the Trinity. We say, therefore, that although it is repugnant in finite and created things that some two be the same with a third according to the thing and differ really among themselves, nevertheless this is not repugnant in an infinite being, namely God, to wit, that there be at once one essence (*essentia*), and that the relations (*relationes*) are not distinguished from it by the nature of the thing, but are joined with the essence in supreme simplicity; and nonetheless that among themselves they really differ. But this is peculiar in God, which neither Aristotle nor any other philosopher instructed only by natural light could know: and therefore among the commonplaces of arguments Aristotle enumerated this one in Topics VII, chapter 1, place 4, as we recalled above, which he could understand, first of identity according to the thing, second of identity according to reason, third of identity according to predication; and in the first way alone it has place in created things; but in the second and third in all things, even in God, as is manifest. From which it is clear that nothing can be deduced from that principle against the real distinction of the relations among themselves, together with that highest identity which they have with the essence.

Others understand the aforesaid proposition in another way, namely, that those things are said to be the same among themselves really which are the same to one and the same third really and adequately, not however inadequately; but this comes to the same thing, because only in divine things is it found that some things are the same in reality to one and the same third inadequately, and therefore are not the same among themselves.

Caput III - That the syllogistic form, as assigned by the logicians, is no less legitimate in divine things than in human

Against the same mystery of the Trinity the difficulty of the syllogistic form also seems to fight in this manner, from the syllogistic form:

This divine essence is the Father; this divine essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father, in divine things.

To this syllogism also, as to the aforesaid principle, theologians variously respond.

Response of St. Thomas.

First, St. Thomas says in On the Power of God, q. 2, that the major and minor proposition are true only if the divine essence is taken absolutely in itself, and, he says, they are only true if the divine essence is taken as contracted and modified by the relation: but in this way one or the other of the premises will be false, if in each the essence be taken modified by the same relation, namely by paternity or by filiation, as is manifest: or, if it be modified by a different relation, the form of

arguing will not be legitimate, because the middle will not be the same in each, as is evident. Yet I do not see why the divine essence, speaking absolutely, as it is common to the three, cannot be predicated of any person, since each is one most simple nature and a common essence.

Scotus's solution.

Second, Scotus replies in the first book, distinction 2, question 4, after the solution of the first argument, that just as in created things that which is common is a what-sort (*quale quid*), but the individual is a this-something (*hoc aliquid*), so also in God the divine essence, since it is common, is a what-sort, but the person, which is individual, is a this-something: wherefore in the proposed syllogism what is a what-sort is assumed as the middle, namely the divine essence, from which the identity of the supposit (*suppositum*) cannot be inferred in the conclusion between the Father and the Son, but only identity in essence, which is assumed as the middle. Scotus plainly alludes to that solution which we reported in the first chapter, so that he might answer the difficulty proposed there, which is similar: which solution could indeed be refuted here in the same way: but since now the point at issue is the syllogistic form, against Scotus we can argue thus. Either that syllogistic form is good or bad: if good, then the conclusion follows rightly, the antecedent is true, therefore so is the conclusion. But that conclusion cannot be true if we grant that the Father and the Son really differ, and are opposed to one another. If, however, that syllogistic form is not good, it is necessary, according to the laws of syllogisms, to assign some defect: for Scotus showed no defect in the form.

The first defect of the syllogism, which deals with individuals in divine things.

I indeed detect two manifest defects in this syllogism. One is that the premises are taken in the so-called identical sense, not in the formal. For as we showed in Disputation 119, chapter 2, and Disputation 121, chapter 2, essence is not predicated of relation, nor conversely, in the formal sense: but thus the syllogism seems to proceed in four terms: for it is as if you were to say, The divine essence is the same as the Father; the divine essence is the same as the Son; therefore the Son is the same as the Father; whereas what ought to be inferred is, Therefore the same who is the Son is the same as the Father; for thus the extremes of the major and the minor are preserved in the conclusion, which is a necessary law of syllogisms. But when it is inferred, Therefore the Son is the Father, which is the same as to say, Therefore the Son is the same as the Father, a new term is added in the conclusion, since its subject, which is the Son alone, was not only in the minor extreme - for the minor extreme was, The same as the Son - but, the extreme having been changed into the Son, a new term is added, and thus there are four terms in the syllogism. This defect, however, is removed by putting in the place of the middle, not the divine essence, but deity in the abstract; for thus the aforesaid defect is not removed: but by putting the concrete of deity, namely God, in this way: God is the Father; God is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father. In this manner the propositions, both the premises and the conclusion, are taken in the formal sense, and thus the aforesaid defect is not present.

The second defect of the aforesaid syllogism, noted by Marsilius.

But this syllogism has another manifest defect, which Marsilius very well noted on the first book, question 6, article 3, to the fourth objection: because since it is expository, whose nature is that it have a singular term for the middle, it has a common term, namely God; which defect was also present in the former syllogism, when the essence in the abstract was the middle. The term, God, is common not by abstraction and through the intellect, as is the concept of a genus or a species or another universal, but by community according to the thing: because one and the same in number essence and the same God is common to three persons: wherefore although each of them is predicated of it, it does not follow that they are predicated of each other: because the middle is not altogether singular. To this also seems to look what the Canariensis says, namely that the aforesaid syllogism is therefore not legitimate, because it has an undistributed middle, which is indeed a manifest defect, whenever a term is not altogether singular and can be distributed by reason of the community which it has. Although the divine essence, or God, is a singular term according to itself, that is, not universal, and therefore cannot be distributed in that respect; nevertheless, because it is common to the three persons according to the thing, on the part of them it can in a certain manner be distributed: as if one were to say, God, as He is in the three persons, is Father; God, as He is in the three, is Son: therefore the Son is Father: then, however, the premises are false: because God is Father only insofar as He is the divine essence contracted by paternity, not by the other properties.

Marsilius's addition and its refutation.

Marsilius nevertheless adds that an expository syllogism can be made in this way: This God is the Father; this God is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father: and then the form is legitimate; but that not both premises are true, because either This God points out the Father, or it points out the Son (for it cannot point out both, because there would not be one middle); and thus both cannot be true; wherefore neither will the conclusion be true.

Moreover, as we shall say in Disputation 156, chapter 4, even if the pronoun This be added to the term God, it does not thereby become altogether singular, but community will still remain; This does not point out a person, but the essence, as we shall show there; and even with the addition of the pronoun, it is not a term suitable for a syllogism, in the same way as if some name were added; of this in its own place.

From this it follows that this syllogism is not good: This essence is God; the Father is not the Son; therefore the Son is not God. For the defect is manifest, because the term God, which is common, as we were saying above, by reason of the persons which it connotes, is undistributed in the major, whereas in the negative conclusion it is distributed (which distribution in the first figure follows upon a negative), therefore it is not a legitimate form of arguing, on account of this defect from the side of the major extreme; as is plainly shown by the examples.

From these things it is gathered that the syllogistic form in no way is opposed to the mystery of the Trinity according to the rules of logic; and hence nothing absurd can be deduced against our faith from the syllogistic form. If at any time certain theologians ill-advisedly admit the syllogistic form in such a way that, in divine matters, it should have force only in created things, but in divine

things there should be another ratio: they are ill-expounding; for one and the same form, necessary in itself, holds in whatever matter human reason deals with. For if it is legitimate in human matters, and the same is observed in divine matters, it cannot but be legitimate; and if the same were not legitimate in divine matters, nothing absurd would everywhere follow against the rules of logic from what we have said. And thus these things suffice for what pertains to the doctrine of this article, in which some disputations were treated that pertained to question 39, article 4, and we shall pursue the same principles more fully below.

Articulus IV - Whether in God there are only four real relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession

Objicitur quarto sic proceditur. It seems that in God there are not only four real relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. For there are to be considered in God the relations of the understanding to the thing understood, and of willing to the thing willed; which seem to be real relations, nor are they contained under the aforesaid. Therefore there are not only four relations in God.

1. Moreover: Real relations are taken in God according to the procession of the intelligible or of the willed; but intelligible relations are multiplied to infinity, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there are infinite real relations.
2. Moreover: Ideas are in God from eternity, as was said above; nor, however, are they distinguished among themselves except according to a respect to things, as was said above: therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.
3. Moreover: Equality, similarity, and identity are certain relations, and they are in God from eternity. Therefore there are more relations from eternity in God than the four which were said.

But on the contrary: It seems there are fewer: for according to the Philosopher in Physics III, the way is the same from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens; therefore it seems by equal reason that the same be the relation from the Father to the Son, which is called paternity, and from the Son to the Father, which is called filiation. And thus there are not four relations in God.

I answer: It must be said that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics V, every relation is founded either upon quantity - as double and half - or upon action and passion - as the maker and the made, father and son, lord and servant, and the like. But since quantity is not in God (for He is great without quantity, as St. Augustine says), it remains therefore that relation in God cannot be except...[186]

186. St. Thomas, De potentia q. 2; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 6, a. 3 ad 4; Canariensis, loc. cit.; Avicenna as cited on the multiplication of intelligible relations; Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1, locus 4; Metaphysics V; Physics III; see also Disputationes 119, c. 2; 121, c. 2; and 156, c. 4.

Hither, even if one add the pronoun "This" to the term "God," it does not become altogether singular, but will still remain common: because "This" does not point out the person, but the essence, as we will show in that place; and thus, even with the pronoun added, it is not a term suitable for a syllogism, in the same way as if it were not added. But of this more fully in that place.

Hence it follows that this syllogism is not good: "The Father is God; the Father is not the Son; therefore the Son is not God." For the defect is manifest, because the term "God," which is common, as we said above, by reason of the persons which it connotes, is in the conclusion affected by a negation, which has the force of distributing; whereas in the premises it was not so affected. Now it is a manifest defect whenever one argues from a term not negated to a term negated: it is, as it were, to argue from an undistributed to a distributed term; and therefore a minor negative in the first figure is not a legitimate form of arguing on account of this kind of defect on the part of the major extreme, which in the major premise is not affected by negation, and accordingly is not distributed; whereas in the conclusion it is affected, and accordingly is distributed, as is evident from examples.

From which it is gathered that syllogistic form in no wise opposes the mystery of the Trinity; and with it preserved, according to the rules of logic, nothing absurd can be deduced against our faith. Wherefore certain Theologians act amiss who so admit syllogistic form as to have force only in created things, but in divine things to play with our faith: for these men expose our faith to mockery, when they restrict to human matters the necessary form which has place in any material subject. For if in human matters it is legitimate, and the same is preserved in divine matters, it cannot but be legitimate; but if the same is not preserved in divine matters, nothing absurd against the rules of logic follows therefrom. And let these remarks suffice concerning the doctrine of Article 3, in which also some things were disputed that pertained to Question 39, Article 4, lest we be compelled to repeat the same principles too often.

Whether in God there are only four real relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession

To the fourth, thus one proceeds. It seems that in God there are not only four real relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. For it is also fitting to posit in God the relations of the knower to the known and of the willer to the willed; which seem to be real relations and are not contained under the aforesaid. Therefore there are not only four relations in God.

1. Further, real relations are taken in God according to the procession of the intelligible word. But intelligible relations are multiplied to infinity, as Avicenna says. Therefore there are in God infinite real relations.
2. Further, ideas are in God from eternity, as was said above, nor are they distinguished among themselves except according to a respect to things, as was said above. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.

3. Further, equality, likeness, and identity are certain relations, and they are in God from eternity. Therefore there are more relations from eternity in God than those that were said.

But on the contrary, it seems that they are fewer: because, according to the Philosopher in Physics III, the same way is from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens. Therefore it seems that by a like reason the same is the relation from the Father to the Son, which is called paternity, and from the Son to the Father, which is called filiation. And thus there are not four relations in God.[187]

I answer: It must be said that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, every relation (relatio) is founded either upon quantity - as double and half - or upon action and passion - as the maker and the made, father and son, lord and servant, and the like. But since quantity is not in God (for He is great without quantity, as St. Augustine says), it remains therefore that real relation in God cannot be except founded upon an end and upon action; not, however, upon actions according to which something proceeds from God extrinsically, because the relations of God to creatures are not really in Him, as was said above. Whence it remains that real relations in God cannot be taken except according to actions according to which there is a procession in God, not outwardly but inwardly. Now processions of this kind are two only, as was said above. Of which one is chiefly taken according to the action of the intellect (intellectus), which is the procession of the word (verbum); the other according to the action of the will (voluntas), which is the procession of love. But according to each procession it is necessary to take two opposite relations, of which one is of the proceeding from a principle, and the other is of the very principle. Now the procession of the word is called generation according to its proper notion, which befits living things: but the relation of the principle of generation among perfect living things is called paternity; while the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of love does not have a proper name, as was said above. Whence neither do the relations which are taken according to it. But the relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; the relation, however, of the one proceeding, procession: although these two names pertain to the very processions or origins, and not to the relations themselves.[188]

Reply to the first: In those in which the intellect and the intelligible differ, and the willer and the willed, there can be a real relation of knowledge to the thing known, and of the willer to the thing willed. But in God the intellect and the intelligible are altogether the same: for by understanding Himself He understands all other things, and by the same ratio the will and the willed. Whence in God relations of this kind are not real, just as neither is there a relation of the same to the same. Yet, however, the relation to the Word is real: because the Word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action, not, however, as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood is called "word."

187. Li.g. Phys., in 3. Physicae, text. 21, tom. 2.
188. Li.g. Metaph., 10. com. 3; Aug., l. 1 De Trinit.; Q. 13, a. 7; Q. 27, a. 3; Q. 27, a. 4.

Reply to the second: In us, intelligible relations are multiplied to infinity, because by one act a man understands a stone, and by another act he understands himself to understand a stone, and by another also he understands that he understands this, and so on infinitely the acts of understanding are multiplied, and consequently the relations understood. But this does not have place in God, because by one act only He understands all things.

Reply to the third: Ideal respects are understood in God. Whence from their plurality it does not follow that there are more relations in God, but that God knows more relations.

Reply to the fourth: Equality and likeness in God are not real relations, but only of reason, as will be plain below.

Reply to the fifth: The way is the same from one term to another, and conversely; yet the respects are diverse. Whence from this it cannot be concluded that the relation of the Father to the Son is the same, and conversely. But this could be concluded of something absolute, if there were a mean between them.

Dubitation concerning the text of the article.

The conclusion is: In God there are only four real relations, paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession: but the latter two are signified by the name of origin on account of paucity of words, although by our reason they are distinguished from the origins, as we shall say in Disputation 159. The conclusion indeed is certain among all, and is gathered manifestly from the preceding. For if in God there are only two processions, one by the intellect, the other by the will, and relations are taken according to the origins, they will not be able to be more than four. But for the explanation of the conclusion, observe that one must not therefore say there are four real relations because they are really distinguished among themselves: for it is evident that active spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation, as is gathered from the doctrine of Disputation 120; but they are called real only because by their very nature they refer to a real term, not by the intellect. Whence it is not lawful to infer: there are four real relations in God; therefore four things. For when we say "four things," we denote a mutual distinction of one from another; but when we say "four real relations," we do not signify this, but a respect to a real term by their very nature, not by the intellect. From which it is plain how it is not rightly inferred, from the multiplication of an inferior, the multiplication of a superior, when the appellation is varied (as the Logicians say), as we noted in Disputation 122, cap. 6, at the end.

But Cajetan doubts touching the reason of St. Thomas, why he did not enumerate every genus of relation, that he might gather what genus of relation is in God. For he only made mention of the first genus, namely, identity, which is founded upon unity of quantity according to the thing, whereas there is also a relation of likeness in quantity according to mode.

Cajetan answers that St. Thomas summarily enumerated the genera of relations, nor did he make mention of the relation that is founded upon quantity according to mode, because he was about to make mention of that kind in the solution of the fourth article and expressly below in Question 42, Article 4, where we also expressly will dispute whether in God it is real or only of reason. There also we will say why the relations of distinction and of identity are not real in God.

Further it is to be noted that the holy Doctor did not make mention of the relations of the third genus in order to prove which relations are real in God: because relations of this genus are only by extrinsic denomination, and are of reason. For of these Aristotle says: "Measurable and intelligible are said inasmuch as something else is referred to them according to the thing, whereas they themselves are referred to another only according to the name": by which words he signified that those which are of the third genus are referred to another only by name from the fact that something else is referred to them according to the thing.[189]

It will yet be doubted by someone whether in God there is a real relation of the intellect to the thing understood, since Aristotle said that "the intelligible is by its very name referred to the intellect, because the intellect by its nature is referred to it."

I answer: This relation is not real in God - first indeed, not to His own essence as understood, because from it the intellect is not distinguished; nor to a creature understood, because to no creature is God in any way really referred, as we proved in Disputation 104, cap. 6. The only real relation is of the Father to the Son and to His Word, not as to the intellect alone, but also as to a product and at the same time to the intellect by intellection - and this is paternity, one relation out of the four enumerated.

Quaestio XXIX - On the persons

The foregoing having been premised, those things which seemed necessary to be previously known about processions and relations, it is necessary to proceed to the persons.

And first according to an absolute consideration, and then according to a comparative consideration. But absolutely about persons one ought first to consider in common, then about the individual persons.

To the common consideration of the persons four things seem to pertain: first, indeed, the signification of this name "person"; second, the number of the persons; third, those things which follow the number of the persons or are opposed to it, as diversity and likeness and the like; fourth, those things which pertain to the knowledge of the persons.

Concerning the first, four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the following is a fitting definition of person, namely: "Person is an individual substance of a rational nature"

Objection 1. It seems that the definition of person which Boethius assigns in the book On the two natures is unfitting, namely, "Person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For no singular is defined. But "person" signifies a certain singular. Therefore "person" is unfittingly defined.[190]

189. Arist., f. Met., ca. 15: "Mensurabile, et sensibilis, et intelligibile eo quod aliud ad illud dicitur."
190. Boethius, De duabus naturis.

Objection 2. Further, "substance" (as it is posited in the definition of person) is taken either for first substance, or for second substance. If for first substance, "individual" is added superfluously, because first substance is individual substance. But if it is taken for second substance, a falsehood is added and there is also opposition in the addition. For second substances are called genera and species. Therefore the definition is bad and inaptly assigned.

Objection 3. Further, a name of second intention ought not to be posited in the definition of a thing. For it is not a good assignment if someone were to say "man is a species of animal." For the name of species is a name of intention. But "individual" is a name of intention. Therefore "person" is unfittingly defined.

Objection 4. Further, "nature is the principle of motion and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se, and not according to an accident," as is taught in Physics II. But "person" is among immovables, as in God and in Angels. Therefore the name of "nature" ought not to be posited in the definition of person, but rather of "essence."[191]

Objection 5. Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature, and yet it is not a person. Therefore "person" is unfittingly defined.

I answer: One must say that although the universal and the particular are found in all the genera, nevertheless in a special mode the individual is found in the genus of substance (substantia). For substance is individuated by itself; but accidents are individuated by their subject, which is substance. For this whiteness is said to be such insofar as it is in this subject. Whence also it is fitting that individual substances have a certain special name before the others. For substances are called "hypostases" or "persons." But yet in a somewhat more special and more perfect mode, the particular and individuation are found in rational substances, which have dominion of their act; for they are not only acted upon, as others are, but act of themselves; now actions are in singulars. And therefore also among the rest of substances the singulars of a rational nature have a certain special name; and this name is "person." And therefore in the aforesaid definition of person is posited "substance, individual," insofar as it signifies a singular in the genus of substance; but "of a rational nature" is added insofar as it signifies a singular in rational substances.

Reply to the first: Although this singular or that cannot be defined, nevertheless that which pertains to the common notion of singularity can be defined. And thus the Philosopher defined first substance; and in this way Boethius defines "person."

Reply to the second: In a certain way, "substance" is posited in the definition of person for first substance, which is hypostasis; nor, however, is "individual" added superfluously, because by the name "hypostasis" or "first substance" the notion of the universal is excluded, and also of the part: for we do not say that "common man" is a hypostasis, nor yet that a "hand" is a person. But by the fact that "individual" is added, the notion of "assumptibility" is excluded: for human nature in Christ is not a person, because it is assumed by a more dignified [supposit], namely, by the Word of

191. Lib. 2 Phys., c. 1.

God. But it is better to say that "substance" is taken commonly in the definition - according to which it is divided into first and second - and by the fact that "individual" is added, it is drawn to the first; and in this mode Boethius defines "person."

Reply to the third: Although "individual" signifies an intention, nevertheless it is not posited in the definition of person as a part of the thing defined from the side of genus or species, but in order to express that incommunicability which belongs to the signification of "person."

Reply to the fourth: The name "nature" in the definition of person is taken for "essence" (essentia). And although "person" in God and in the Angels is among immovables, nevertheless "nature" is fittingly said there according to the more common signification which imports essence.

Reply to the fifth: The separated soul is indeed an individual substance of a rational nature; yet it is not a person, because it is a part of human nature. For "person" requires an individual subsistence in a complete rational nature.

Objicitur 1: No singular is defined. But "person" signifies a certain singular. Therefore "person" is inappropriately defined.

Objicitur 2: Furthermore, "substance" (as it is placed in the definition of person) is taken either for first substance or for second substance. If for first substance, "individual" is added superfluously, because first substance is individual substance; but if it stands for second substance, it is added falsely and there is a contradiction in the adjunct. For second substances are called genera or species. Therefore the definition is badly assigned.

Objicitur 3: Furthermore, a name of an intention ought not to be placed in the definition of a thing. For the assignment would not be good if someone were to say: "Man is a species of animal." For "man" is the name of a thing, and "species" is the name of an intention. Since, therefore, "person" is the name of a thing - for it signifies a certain substance of a rational nature - "individual" (which is the name of an intention) is inappropriately placed in its definition.

Objicitur 4: Furthermore, nature is the principle of motion and rest in that which is per se and not per accidens, as is said in the second book of the Physics. But "person" is in immovable realities, as in God and in the Angels. Therefore in the definition of person "nature" ought not to have been placed, but rather "essence" (*essentia*).

Objicitur 5: Furthermore, the separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature; yet it is not a person. Therefore "person" is inappropriately thus defined.

Respondeo: I answer that, although the universal and the particular are found in all genera, nevertheless the individual is found in a certain special way in the genus of substance. For substance is individuated through itself, but accidents are individuated through a subject, which is said "this whiteness" insofar as it is in this subject. Whence also individual substances fittingly have some special name above others; for they are called hypostases or first substances. But in a certain more special and more perfect mode, the particular and the individual are found in rational substances, which have dominion of their acts, and are not only acted upon like others, but act

through themselves; actions, moreover, are in singulars. And therefore, even among other substances, singulars of rational nature also have a certain special name, and this name is "person." And therefore in the aforesaid definition, "individual substance" is placed for person, insofar as it signifies a singular in the genus of substance; but "of a rational nature" is added insofar as it signifies a singular among rational substances.

Ad primum: Reply to the first: Although this singular or that cannot be defined, nevertheless that which pertains to the common notion of singularity can be defined. And thus the Philosopher defines first substance, and in this way Boethius defines person

Ad secundum: Reply to the second: According to some, "substance" in the definition of person is placed for first substance, which is hypostasis; nor is "individual" added superfluously, because by the name of hypostasis or first substance the notion of the universal and of the part is excluded. For we do not say that common "man" is a hypostasis, nor hand, since it is a part. But by this, that "individual" is added, the notion of assumptibility is excluded from person. For human nature in Christ is not a person, because it is assumed by a more dignified one, namely by the Word of God. But it is better to say that "substance" is taken commonly, as divided by first and second; and by this, that "individual" is added, it is drawn to stand for first substance

Ad tertium: Reply to the third: Because substantial differences are not known, or even, if they are known, are not named, at times it is necessary to use accidental differences in place of substantial ones; for example, if someone were to say: "Fire is a simple body, hot and dry." For proper accidents are effects of substantial forms and manifest them. And in like manner, names of intentions can be taken for defining things, insofar as they are taken for some names of things which are not set down. And thus this name "individual" is placed in the definition of person to designate the mode of subsisting which befits particular substances

Ad quartum: Reply to the fourth: According to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, the name "nature" was first imposed to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity." And because this kind of generation is from an intrinsic principle, this name has been extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any motion whatever; and thus nature is defined in the second book of the Physics. And because this sort of principle is formal or material, commonly both matter and form are called "nature." And because by form the essence (*essentia*) of each thing is completed, commonly the essence of each thing, which its definition signifies, is called "nature." And thus "nature" is taken here. Whence Boethius, in the same book De duabus naturis at the beginning of the book, says that nature is each thing informing by a specific difference; for the specific difference is that which completes the definition and is taken from the proper form of the thing. And therefore it was more fitting that, in the definition of person - which is the singular of some determinate genus - he should use the name "nature" rather than "essence," which is taken from existence (*esse*), which is most common

Ad quintum: Reply to the fifth: The soul is a part of the human species. And therefore, although it be separated, yet because it retains the nature of unibility, it cannot be said to be an individual substance, which is a hypostasis or first substance, just as neither hand nor any other of the parts of man is. And thus neither the definition of person nor the name befits it

Explanation of the article and of the definition of person.

St. Thomas in this article proves Boethius's definition in the book De duabus naturis, page 3: "Person is an individual substance of a rational nature." By the name "substance" Boethius understands what others call "subsistence"; by "individual" he denotes what others call "incommunicable": accordingly, by that name he understands a complete individual, which is neither a part, nor can it be communicated to another as a supposit. This the Greeks signify by the word hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), concerning which we shall dispute in the following article. The addition in the definition, "of a rational nature," is because an individual substance of an irrational nature is called only a hypostasis or supposit, not a person. And since here we are not to discuss the human person, namely by what it is rendered incommunicable (for we shall dispute of this in the Third Part, question 4, article 2), let it suffice for now to note universally what a person is; yet it should be observed in passing that the Greek Fathers distinguish person from nature as singular from common, for no other reason than that person is an individual which can no further be communicated.

Scotus rejects this definition in the First Book, distinction 23, question 1, section 5; his attack is that from it there would follow that the rational soul is a person (which no one has hitherto said), for it is "individual," that is, a singular substance of rational nature. But Scotus's objection is trifling, because by the name "individual" there is not signified "singular," but "incommunicable," as we have already explained. Thus also understood Otto, Bishop of Freising, in the first book De gestis Frederici, chapter 5, of whom we made mention in disputation 120, chapter 1; for he says in these words: "For we are not wont to call 'individual substance' a singular thing which can, together with another, again and again be re-singularized so as to concur to constitute some whole; such a thing is not a person." From which he himself infers that the rational soul is not a person. Therefore the Canarian [author] marks wrongly this article as if Scotus had said that the rational soul is a person, whereas he expressly denied it, indeed deducing it as absurd against Boethius's definition. Yet the Canarian seems to have been deceived by these words of Cajetan in the commentary on this article, around the solution to the fifth reply, namely: "From this you have, that from this definition the separated soul is not a person, as Scotus wanted in I, dist. 23," not penetrating what "first substance" imports; by which indeed he does not reprehend Scotus for having asserted that the separated soul is a person. For Cajetan himself had read Scotus well, but he thought that from Boethius's definition there followed that the rational soul is a person - which no one has hitherto taught.

Richard of St. Victor also attacks the aforesaid definition of Boethius, book 4 De Trinitate, chapter 21, because it seems to fit others than the person. For the divine nature is an individual substance of rational nature, and yet it is not a person; wherefore he himself, chapter 22, hands down the definition of the divine person in this way: "The divine nature is incommunicable

existence"; and he uses the name "incommunicable" to show that person not only ought to be singular and not capable of being distributed into many natures, but also cannot be common to several persons. Wherefore, chapter 23, he concludes that Boethius's definition can also be proved, if "individual substance" be said in the sense that it can be distributed neither into many natures nor into many persons, that is, which is common neither to several natures nor to several persons; in which sense the name "individual" is truly taken by Boethius, as we noted above. What Richard understands by that name "existence" will be explained below in disputation 126, chapter 2.

There is also another definition of any person, even created, which is gathered from Richard in the same book 4, chapter 23, in this way: "Rational nature with incommunicable existence." This indeed was used by John, the Theologian of the Latin Church, in the Council of Florence, session 19, after the middle; and Scotus greatly commends this and prefers it to the definition which Boethius assigned, because by the word "incommunicable" the rational soul is excluded, and any part which, together with another, composes a whole, is also excluded; likewise the singular nature of humanity, as that of Christ, is excluded, which, since it lacks the complement of its supposit - that is, that mode of existing per se - is communicated to another person, namely to the Word of God, which is not said to have assumed a person, but a nature, though it assumed it individual, that is, singular.

Yet there is a difficulty, whether any part of some whole, separated - e.g., a severed hand - is a person, or at least a supposit. The reason for doubting is that St. Thomas, in the reply to the fifth objection, teaches that a hand or a part of a substance is not first substance; whence it seems to follow that it is not a supposit; for first substance and hypostasis, or supposit, are the same. The Canarian in the commentary on this article answers that a hand and parts even when cut off are not supposits; into which view he has been led by St. Thomas's words alone in that reply. I, however, would understand him to speak of integral parts which are either actually in the whole supposit - as of the hand joined - or even of separated [parts] which by their nature can be communicated, such as essential parts, namely matter and soul; for these are not "individuals," that is, incommunicable, as has been explained. But of integral parts divided and cut off from the whole, as of the hand, I think otherwise, namely, that they are supposits, not persons: supposits indeed, because they are so per se that by their nature under that form and existence which they have they cannot be communicated to another; but not persons, because they are not of a rational nature.

Finally observe that these three names - individual, supposit, person - are to be compared with one another as inferior and superior. Of these, "individual" is common, for it is said both of accidents and of substances, unless by the name "individual" we understand "incommunicable," as Boethius truly understood. Next, "supposit" is broader than "person," because it is said also of things devoid of reason. From which it is also gathered whether three individuals can be conceded in God, as we said above in disputation 122, chapter 3; and in the end, whether there are three "things": namely, if "individual" be taken as Boethius takes it, for "incommunicable," without doubt it can and ought to be conceded that there are in God three individuals; and similarly if there

be added "substance of a rational nature." Since it is the definition of person, as there are three persons, there ought to be conceded three individual substances of a rational nature. But since now commonly the name...

Also excluded is the singular nature of humanity, such as that of Christ, which, with the complement of its supposit, namely existing per se, is communicated to the person, that is, to the Word of God, which did not assume a person but a nature - an individual, that is, a singular.

A small difficulty is whether any part separated from the whole, as a cut-off hand, is thus a supposit; or at least a suppositum. The reason of doubting is that St. Thomas in the solution teaches that the hand, or a part, is not first substance; and therefore it seems not to be a supposit; for substance and hypostasis, that is, suppositum, are the same. The Canariensis, in the solution of this article, answers that the hand and cut-off parts are not supposita; he was led to this by the very words of St. Thomas in that solution. Yet I would distinguish about integral parts, as they are in act in the whole supposit while joined, or even when separated. As to essential parts - namely matter and form - because these are not individual nor communicable, as has been explained, they are excluded. But as to integral parts divided and removed from the whole, as a hand, I judge otherwise: that they are supposita - not indeed persons, because they are thus per se, with a nature under that form and existence, such that they can be communicated to another; but not persons, because they are not of rational nature.

Note these three names: individual (individuum), supposit (suppositum), person (persona). They can be compared, as above. Of these, individual is the most common: it is said both of accidents and of substances, unless by the name "individual" we understand "incommunicable," as Boethius remarks. Next, supposit is more general than person, because it is said of things lacking reason. From which it is gathered whether in God there can be conceded three individuals, as we said above in disputation 122, chapter 3; and in the end, whether there are three "things": namely, if "individual" be taken as Boethius takes it, for "incommunicable," without doubt it can and ought to be conceded that there are in God three individuals; and similarly if there be added "substance of a rational nature." Since it is the definition of person, as there are three persons, there ought to be conceded three individual substances of a rational nature. But since now commonly by the name "individual" we do not signify "incommunicable," but a singular of a nature, without absolute explanation it ought not be said "three individuals" in God.[194]

Articulus II - Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence

Objicitur. It seems that person is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence.

1) For Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures, that the Greeks called the individual substance of a rational nature by the name "hypostasis." But this is also what among us the name "person" signifies. Therefore person is altogether the same as hypostasis.[195]

194. Aristotle, Physics II; Metaphysics V. Boethius, De duabus naturis (beginning). See also Otto of Freising, De gestis Frederici I, c. 5; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV, 21 - 23; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, s. 5; Council of Florence, session 19.

2) Further, as in the divine things we say three persons, so in the divine things we say three subsistences. Which would not be, unless person and subsistence signified the same. Therefore person and subsistence signify the same.

3) Further, Boethius says in the Commentary on the Predicaments, that ousia (which is the same as essence) signifies the composite of matter and form. But that which is composed of matter and form is an individual of substance, which is also called hypostasis and person. Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to signify the same.[196]

But on the contrary: Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures that genera and species only subsist, whereas individuals not only subsist but also are substances. But from subsisting they are called subsistences, as from "standing under" they are called substances or hypostases. Since therefore to be hypostases or persons does not belong to genera and species, hypostases or persons are not the same as subsistences.[195]

I answer: It must be said that according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics V, substance is said in two ways. In one way, substance is said to be the quiddity of a thing, which the definition signifies, whence we say that the definition signifies the substance of the thing. This substance the Greeks call ousia, which we can call essence (*essentia*). In another way, substance is said to be the subject or supposit (*suppositum*), which subsists in the genus of substance. And this, taken commonly, can be named also by a name signifying an intention; and thus it is called supposit. It is also named by three names signifying the thing: namely, res naturae ("thing of a nature"), subsistentia ("subsistence"), and hypostasis, according to a threefold consideration of substance so called. For according as it exists per se and not in another, it is called subsistence; for we say those things subsist which exist not in another but in themselves. But according as it is "subjected" under some common nature, thus it is called "thing of a nature," as this man is a "thing of human nature." But according as it is "subjected" under accidents, it is called hypostasis or substantia. Now that these three names signify commonly in the whole genus of substances, person signifies in the genus of rational substances.

Reply to the first: "Hypostasis" among the Greeks, from the proper signification of the name, has that it signifies any individual of substance; but from use of speech it has that it is taken for an individual of rational nature on account of its excellence.

Reply to the second: As we say in the divine things in the plural "three persons" and "three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the name "subsistence," according to the property of its signification, corresponds to what the Greeks call hypostasis, while among us "substantia" sometimes signifies essence and sometimes hypostasis, lest there be occasion for error, they preferred to transfer for "hypostasis" the word "subsistentia" rather than "substantia."

Reply to the third: Essence is properly that which is signified by the definition. But a definition comprises the principles of the species, not, however, the individual principles. Whence in things composed of matter and form, essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but the

195. Boethius, De duabus naturis.
196. Boethius, In Praedicamenta (Commentary on the Categories).

composite from matter and form in common, insofar as they are the principles of the species. But the composite of this matter and this form has the ratio of hypostasis and of person: for the soul, the flesh, and the bones are of the ratio of man; but this soul, this flesh, and these bones are of the ratio of this man. And therefore hypostasis and person add above the ratio of essence the individual principles, which are the same as the essence in composed things from matter and form; as was said above when we were treating of the divine simplicity.

Reply to the fourth: Boethius says that genera and species "subsist," inasmuch as to certain individuals it belongs to subsist by the fact that they are contained under genera and species in the predicament of substance; not that the species or the genera themselves subsist - unless according to the opinion of Plato, who posited the species of things to subsist separately from singulars. But "to stand under" belongs to the same individuals in their order to accidents, which are beyond the ratio of genera and species.

Reply to the fifth: In an individual composed of matter and form, it has that it "stands under" accidents from the propriety of matter. Whence also Boethius says in the book On the Trinity: "A simple form cannot be a subject. But that which subsists per se has it from the propriety of its form, which does not accrue to the subsisting thing, but gives actual being to the matter, so that thus an individual can subsist." For this reason, therefore, he attributes hypostasis to matter, and ousiosis or subsistence to form; because matter is the principle of sub-standing, and form is the principle of subsisting.[197]

Conclusion: What the terms "thing of a nature," "supposit," "hypostasis" signify in the whole genus of substance, the name "person" signifies in the rational nature. Concerning the text of this article I see nothing which needs a peculiar explanation; but the doctrine of it will have to be examined in the customary disputations.

What is the difference between these Greek words, Hypostasis (Υπόστασις) and Ousia (Ουσία): Disputation 124.

Where contention arose in the Church about the word Hypostasis, chapter 1. On the antiquity of the word hypostasis, chapter 2. Who thought hypostasis and ousia to be the same, chapter 3. The true difference between hypostasis and ousia, chapter 4. According to the primary signification of "substantia" in Latin, it is the same as what the Greeks mean by hypostasis; but by ecclesiastical use, not so, chapter 5.

195. Boethius, De duabus naturis.
197. Boethius, De Trinitate: "Forma simplex subiectum esse non potest ..."

Disputatio CXXIV - On the difference between the Greek words Hypostasis and Ousia

Caput I - Where contention arose in the Church about the word Hypostasis

There are three names, as Georgius Cassander says in the commentary On the Two Natures in Christ: physis, and ousia - which, according to St. John Damascene in the book of the first Institutions, chapter 1, without any controversy signify "substance" or "essence" - and a third, hypostasis, about which there was great dissension of old in the Church of God. Nicephorus, book 10, History, chapter 15, and Socrates, book 3, chapter 7, write that perhaps Hosius of Cordoba first gave the occasion of this controversy, who, sent to Alexandria by the Emperor Constantine to calm the disturbance raised by Arius, was the first to make mention of "substantia" and "subsistentia," that is, ousia and hypostasis, and to ask whether they signified altogether the same. Later, as the same Nicephorus affirms, the Nicene Synod judged that question unworthy to be handled there; but a little later, in the Council of Alexandria, as Rufinus testifies, book 1 of the History, chapter 29, the controversy was again stirred up among the Fathers. For some were saying that "substantia" and "subsistentia" (for thus Rufinus interprets those two Greek names, ousia and hypostasis) are the same; but others on the contrary were affirming that they are not the same, because they said "substantia" is "nature," but "subsistentia" is "person" or "supposit."

Moreover, Nicephorus, book 10, History, chapter 15, and Socrates, book 3, chapter 7, relate that in the same Council of Alexandria it was defined that the name "hypostasis" might be used in common, since it is not contained in the sacred Scriptures, and Paul, compelled by the necessity of teaching, used such a word; yet nevertheless in the same Council it was conceded that meanwhile, because of the poverty of names, that word might be used against Sabellius to establish the Trinity of persons, lest we seem to confess the Trinity by name alone. Thus, therefore, as Rufinus says, with the dispute prudently and moderately composed, each one continued on his way.

Hence the Sirmian and Ariminian Councils took occasion to decree that these names ousia and hypostasis must not be used, so that more freely they might reject the name homoousion and confirm the Arian heresy which they followed; as we noted from the view of Athanasius and Epiphanius, disputation 110, chapter 5; the same is taught by Nicephorus, book 9, History, chapters 39 and 44.[198]

But it seems that the great Athanasius settled that quarrel which was stirred in the Council of Alexandria; for, as Nicephorus reports, book 10, chapter 16, he took part in that Council. For speaking of Athanasius, St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 21, which is in praise of Athanasius, thus says: "By gentleness on both sides, and with humaneness invited, and with the import of the words diligently and accurately weighed, after he found them in concord, without any detriment to doctrine and the truth of nature, and without forcing the business upon them by peremptory command, he transacted it by conceding the very use of words and obliging them to the things."

198. Nicephorus, Historia ecclesiastica IX, 39, 44; X, 15 - 16. Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica III, 7. Rufinus, Historia ecclesiastica I, 29. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orationes 21, 32. Athanasius; Epiphanius, Disput. 110, c. 5.

The same Gregory did the very same thing at Constantinople, as he himself testifies in the Oration to 150 Bishops, which is Oration 32. For when they had been convoked by Theodosius and a like controversy had arisen among them, Gregory of Nazianzus made good that there was no dissension about the things between those who say "three hypostases" and those who confess "one"; wherefore, that he might reconcile both parties, he concludes: "Can it be brought about that they agree more with each other, and say the same, than when they think that they differ, though they disagree only in syllables," etc. Therefore, down to those times it seemed free for each to use the word "hypostasis" in the Catholic sense, either for "nature" and "essence," which is called ousia, or for "person"; nor was the signification of this name "hypostasis" to those times made sufficiently manifest.

Caput II - On the antiquity of the word Hypostasis

Do Nicephorus, book 10, History, chapter 15, and Socrates, book 3, chapter 7, rightly show that the word hypostasis, in the signification in which the ecclesiastical grammarians use it, is not found among profane authors? They prove it by the authority of Irenaeus the grammarian: for if it be found among profane authors, it is altogether in a different signification. Sophocles in the Phoenissae uses it for "ambushes"; Menander for a "law-maker"; sometimes also it is put for the "sediment of wine" poured from the jar. Therefore the ancients (so says he) used this name in other significations than the more recent; for the latter frequently use subsistentia for substantia.

Yet not only at the time of Athanasius do ecclesiastical writers frequently use that name to signify the mystery of the Trinity, as we shall see below; but also Budé has shown that it is of more ancient origin in the Greek language. For the name "hypostasis" is found even in Aristotle, in the book De Mundo to Alexander, to signify individual substance or a subsisting nature; or rather, as I think, to signify the truth of a nature and not merely an apparent species. For he says "far before the middle ..."[199]

Caput III - On those who thought hypostasis and ousia are the same, and on the Latin suspicion of the name

Essence (essentia), three substances (substantia): among the Latins, one essence, or substance, three persons; which, as we have already said, in our speech, that is, in Latin, essence is not otherwise understood than substance. From which it is clear that St. Augustine held the said word "hypostasis" as suspect among the Latins in the same way as St. Jerome did; except that at last, in book seven On the Trinity, chapter six, he grants that it can be said in Latin "three substances" in God, just as in Greek they say "three hypostases," where there would be no scandal and the Catholic sense were clear. But Jerome more sternly rejects the aforesaid mode of speaking. Richard

199. Budé, Commentarii linguae Graecae; Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alexandrum.

of St. Victor, however, in book four On the Trinity, chapter twenty, knew this difference of words between the Latins and the Greeks, and affirmed that each party both spoke rightly in its own language and thought rightly.

From among the Greeks also there was Paulinus, bishop of Thessalonica, of whom Acacius, bishop of Beroea, in the letter to Cyril, which is the fifteenth among Cyril's Letters, writes in this way: He refused to say "three hypostases," while thinking and handling the same [truth]. And below: He clung, however, to the Western bishops beloved of God, because the Roman language is narrower than that which, according to our Greek phrase, can say "three hypostases." For which reason I suppose there was even among the Greeks a dissension in the Alexandrian Council, which perhaps the Latins together with Hosius stirred up, because that word seemed suspect for signifying persons. From the Greeks, therefore, there were not lacking those who followed the sense of the Latins. Wherefore our interpreter of the Council of Ephesus, Peltanus, when he translated this letter of Acacius, in the first volume, chapter twenty-three, ought not to have written: "Here the most pious bishops of the East were supported," but "of the West," as from what has been said is clear. But the same Acacius, in the same letter, admonishes Cyril that, although the Orientals, both laity and clergy, favor the opinion of those who say that there are three hypostases in God, nevertheless he should restrain this mode of speaking, lest the novelty of the word be a cause of division in the Church.

In the same opinion was the great Athanasius in the Letter to the Bishops in Africa, where he says that "hyparxis" signifies rather nature and the substance of a thing; as Budé testifies in Greek, saying that hyparxis differs little from hypostasis.[200] And, what is capital, the general Council of Sardica, at which there were present with Hosius, bishop of Corduba, about three hundred Latin bishops, as Nicephorus relates, in the letter to the bishops, after the middle of it, speaks thus: "Now the cohort of the heretics strives to pronounce that the substances of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are diverse, and that they are divided; but we have received this, and have been taught this, we have this Catholic, Apostolic tradition, and faith, and confession: that there is one substance of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Where what is said in Latin, "substance," is in Greek "hypostasis." This same letter, reporting it, Theodoret, book two, chapter eight, says thus: "Now the cohort of the heretics strives to pronounce that the subsistences of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are diverse, and divided; but we have received this doctrine, thus we have learned, thus we hold the Catholic tradition, namely, that there is one hypostasis (which the heretics call, or use for, 'ousia') of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." And in the Greek copy of Theodoret it reads thus: μιᾶν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν (οἱ αἱρετικοὶ οὐσίαν προσαγορεύουσι) τοῦ πατρός, etc., as if you were to say in Latin: that there is one hypostasis (which the heretics call, or use for, "ousia") of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Rusticus also, in the book On the Incarnation against the Acephali, so writes: "Most clearly the name 'subsistence' sometimes signifies 'person,' sometimes truly 'nature' and 'essence.'" In which sense he strives to explain a certain opinion of Cyril, about which we shall expressly dispute in part three, question two, article one.[201]

200. Budé, Commentarii linguae Graecae.

The true difference between hypostasis and ousia according to the Fathers.

Caput IV - The true difference between hypostasis and ousia according to the Fathers

Furthermore, at last a manifest discrimination has been established concerning those two names, not only among the Greek Fathers, but also among the Latins, as is most excellently explained by Basil in letter 43, which is to Gregory of Nyssa, and by the same Nyssen in the little book On the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis; by St. John Damascene, On the Faith, book three, chapters 3, 4, and 6; and in the first chapter of the Institutes, by Anastasius the Patriarch in the explanation of the faith, which is contained in volume five of the Sacred Library; and by John Maxentius in the profession of faith, which is in volume five of the Sacred Library; and indeed by the more ancient Athanasius in the treatise On the Definitions: whom among the Latins Boethius follows in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ; namely, that the name "ousia" among the Greeks signifies the same thing which the Latins call "nature" and "essence" (essentia); as to the name "substance," we shall speak below: but the name "hypostasis," the same as "supposit" (suppositum) or "person." Wherefore, since in God one "ousia," that is, essence, and three hypostases, that is, persons, ought to be conceded, indeed that Paulinus of Thessalonica, whom Acacius in the fifteenth letter to Cyril reports to have said, "that there is only one hypostasis in God," because it seemed to him that this name signified "essence," afterwards, in the confession of faith which Epiphanius reports from him in heresy seventy-seven, judged that to confess three hypostases is pious and necessary for all. And that the authority of this Paulinus was alleged to Jerome, so that he might concede "three hypostases," is gathered from the fact that Jerome himself says in that fifty-seventh letter, "I do not know Paulinus," etc.

In this signification many Greek Councils use this word "hypostasis," the Council of Chalcedon, act five, in the second confession of faith which is at the end of the session: for what in one translation reads, "in one concurrent person," another has, "into one person, and into one subsistence (subsistentia) concurrent." And "subsistence" among the Latins is the same as among the Greeks "hypostasis." In the same way the Council of Alexandria and the Council of Ephesus use this word "hypostasis," in anathema two and four which are contained in Cyril's tenth letter; and the Fifth Council of Constantinople in the eighth conference, canons five and eight; and the sixth general synod, session four in the letter of Pope Agatho, and session eleven in the letter of Sophronius, and in session eighteen in the confession of faith; and the first Council of Constantinople in the letter to Damasus. Wherefore, by ecclesiastical usage, the word "hypostasis" is now so employed in this signification that no one now uses it for "essence."

Accordingly the emperor Justinian himself, a Greek, in the edict of faith to Pope John II, column nine (it is, moreover, in the second volume of the Councils), says: "All the holy Fathers agree in teaching us that nature, that is, substance and form, is one thing, and subsistence (subsistentia), or person, is another; that is, the latter is more special, the former more general."

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201. Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History II, 8; Rusticus, De incarnatione contra Acephalos; cf. the Sardican letter as narrated by Nicephorus, Ecclesiastical History IX, 12.

And thus in this edict he uses for the same thing the name "subsistence" and "person"; in Greek, however, for "subsistence" he uses the name "hypostasis." The Fathers adduced in chapter two also used this word in the same way; indeed Jerome, in the exposition of faith to Damasus, renders it in Latin as "subsistence"; we shall quote his words in Disputation 158, chapter one.[202] Wherefore in our time the matter is so beyond doubt that one who now either denies three subsistences in God in Latin, or in Greek denies three "hypostases," or confesses only one hypostasis, is worthy of the note of error. Whether, however, it can be conceded in Latin discourse that there is one absolute common subsistence besides the three relative ones, we shall see in the following disputation.

But if some of the Fathers, as we saw in the preceding chapter, said that there is one hypostasis in God, it is no wonder; for the signification of this name had not yet been sufficiently ascertained for them. Wherefore Epiphanius the Deacon, in the seventh general synod, session six, volume three, about the middle, says that the Eutychians erred because they were unwilling to distinguish "nature" from "hypostasis."[203]

Yet there is among the ancient Fathers a dissension concerning that place of Paul in Hebrews 1: "Who being the splendor of [his] glory and the figure of his substance"; for in Greek "substance" is hypostasis - whether in that place it signifies "essence," or "person." Athanasius in the Letter to the Bishops of Africa, and Epiphanius in heresy 69 take hypostasis for "essence"; which sense Theodoret seems to have followed in that passage; nor is St. John Chrysostom far from it. But Gregory of Nyssa, in that little book On the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis, by that name understands "person," whom Theophylact follows, so that the sense is: that the Son is the image and character of the person of the Father.

But Francis David, a heretic of our times, contends that in that place the name "hypostasis" does not signify "person," because Paul used the same name in Hebrews 3, when he says, "We become partakers of Christ, if indeed we..."

Caput V - On the ecclesiastical and scholastic use of the names "hypostasis," "substance," and "subsistence"

By the common use of the Greeks this name Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) signifies what the Latins call supposit or person; while that which the Greeks call Ousia (οὐσία) and Physis (φύσις) the Latins are wont to render "essence" (*essentia*) and "nature" (*natura*). Thus in God one ousia - that is, essence - is confessed, and three hypostases - that is, persons - are to be admitted. So teach, among the Greeks, Anastasius the Patriarch, in his Exposition of the Faith, contained in the fifth tome of the Sacred Library; John Maxentius, in the Profession of Faith, found likewise in the fifth tome of the same Library; and, more anciently still, Athanasius in the tract On Definitions; and among the Latins, Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, expressly using subsistence (*subsistentia*) and hypostasis as corresponding terms, and declaring that the

202. Jerome, Expositio fidei ad Damasum.
203. Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II), actio 6.

Greek name ousia signifies what the Latins call nature or essence; whereas the name hypostasis signifies what the Latins call supposit or person. Accordingly, around God one ousia, that is, one essence, and three hypostases, that is, persons, are to be conceded.[204]

Indeed, Paulinus of Thessalonica - whom Acacius, in the fifteenth letter recorded by St. Cyril, relates to have said there is but one hypostasis in God (for he thought this name signified essence) - afterwards, in the profession of faith which Epiphanius reports under heresy seventy-seven, judged it pious and necessary for all to confess three hypostases; whose authority was then alleged to St. Jerome, that he might concede three hypostases, as is gathered from his own letter fifty-seven where he says: "I do not know Paulinus," and so forth. In this signification many Greek Councils employ the term Hypostasis, such as Chalcedon (act 5) in the second confession of faith appended at the end of the act, where, according to one translation, it is said "in one hypostasis," while another has "in one person," and still another "in one subsistence," these converging in sense; for to the Latins subsistence (*subsistentia*) is the same as to the Greeks hypostasis (*ὑπόστασις*). Likewise the Council of Alexandria and the Council of Ephesus in the second and fourth anathemas (as preserved in Cyril's tenth letter), the Second Council of Constantinople in coll. 8, can. 5 and 8, the Sixth Ecumenical Council in act 4 (the letter of Agatho the Pope), in act 11 (the letter of Sophronius), and in act 18 in the confession of faith, and the First Council of Constantinople in the letter to Damasus - all use hypostasis in this sense. Wherefore, by ecclesiastical usage the term Hypostasis is so used that the very Greek in the letter to Damasus, and afterward in the second letter to Pope Damasus, expressly says: "All the holy Fathers teach that nature is one thing, subsistence another, person another, that is, this or that," and to the same effect: "one subsistence and hypostasis." And so, in present disputation 158, at this time the matter is so well settled that anyone who should now deny either in Latin or in Greek three hypostases, or should confess only one, would be judged notably at fault. For if in the Latin tongue "one hypostasis in God" were a manner of speaking common beyond the three Persons, we shall see in disputation that some would have said there is one hypostasis in God absolutely; but as of yet that signification had not arisen. Epiphanius the deacon in the sixth action of the same general synod says: "Therefore Eutyches refused to distinguish hypostasis." The ancient Fathers differ around Hebrews 1:3 - "the splendor of glory and figure of his substance": for "substance" there in Greek is ὑπόστασις; yet in that passage they take it to signify essence, as Athanasius in the Epistle to the Bishops of Africa and Epiphanius (her. 69); Theodoret in his Ecclesiastical History follows them; and far from Chrysostom, who in the little treatise On Hypostasis uses that name to signify person, Theophylact also follows him, saying the Son is the image of the hypostasis of the Father.[205]

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204. Anastasius Patriarcha, Expositio fidei (Bibl. sacra, tom. 5); John Maxentius, Professio fidei (ibid.); Athanasius, Tractatus de definitionibus; Boethius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi.

205. St. Jerome, Epist. 57 ad Damasum; Epiphanius, Panarion, her. 77; Council of Chalcedon, act 5 (secunda confessio fidei); Council of Alexandria; Council of Ephesus, anathemas 2 and 4 in Cyril's Ep. 10; Second Council of Constantinople, coll. 8, can. 5, 8; Third Council of Constantinople (Sixth Ecumenical), act 4 (Ep. Agathonis), act 11 (Ep. Sophronii), act 18 (professio fidei); First Council of Constantinople, Ep. ad Damasum. On Heb. 1:3 see Athanasius, Ep. ad episcopos Africae; Epiphanius, her. 69; Theodoret, Hist. eccl.; Chrysostom, De hypostasi; Theophylact, ad loc.

But David of our times, a heretic, contends that in that place Hypostasis signifies person, because Paul says to the Hebrews 3: "If, however, we hold firm the hypostasis of Him unto the end." And at Hebrews 11:1: "Faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for." From which passages it is manifest that hypostasis does not there signify person. I answer: in those places it is not taken for essence (*essentia*), but for the subsistence (*subsistentia*) or foundation of a thing; wherefore in that place (Heb. 3) he calls living faith the principle of subsistence, that is, of subsistence not of God but of us, because by it we subsist and are founded in the spiritual life. The Greeks so explain that place. Similarly at Hebrews 11 faith is called the hypostasis of things hoped for, that is, their subsistence, because the things to come which we hope for have no subsistence then except that they are apprehended by our thought through faith - namely, that we shall be blessed - as likewise all the Greeks interpret. Therefore in that place to the Hebrews 1 "hypostasis" signifies the very subsistence of the Father, which is nothing other than person. In the same way Paul takes it for subsistence or foundation, 2 Corinthians 9 and 11, when he says "the foundation of glory" - in Greek ὑπόστασις τῆς καυχήσεως - for since person stands under all, it is very well called foundation and subsistence.

According to primary signification, Substance (*substantia*) to the Latins is the same as Hypostasis (*ὑπόστασις*) to the Greeks, according to ecclesiastical usage, not otherwise. Wherefore we can interpret the Greek word Hypostasis no less by the Latin Substantia than by Subsistentia; for which reason St. Hilary, in the book De Synodis concerning the Fathers of the Council of Antioch, says thus: "Therefore they said there are three substances of the subsisting persons," teaching by "substances" the subsisting persons, not separating by a diversity of essence the substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; whence it is clear that Hilary rendered the Greek word Hypostasis (which the Greek Fathers of that Council used) by the Latin name Substantia, and so conceded three substances in God, as the Greeks confess three hypostases.[206]

St. Thomas also teaches in this article, in reply to the second, that the Latin name Substantia answers to the Greek word Hypostasis. In the same way St. Augustine teaches in De Trinitate VII, c. 6, where he says there was no scandal in conceding three "substances" in God in the Latin tongue, since among the Greeks three "substances" are conceded in God; for in De Trinitate IV, c. 9, and VI, c. 3 - 5, and VII, c. 4 - 6, he affirms that among the Greeks three "substances" are conceded in God. And Pope John, in the book On the Two Natures against Eutyches, admits that the name Substantia can be taken in that sense with these words: "We are enlightened by one Light, and at the same time by three: by three indeed according to the property of each, either substance, as some like to say, or person. For there should be no contention about the diversity of words, since the diversity of names brings us to one and the same sense and understanding." Lastly, Boethius, in that book On the Two Natures, says there are three Greek names: Ousia, which he interprets in Latin as "essence"; and Physis, which he renders "subsistence" in Latin, and says there is one only in God - though he would have done better to render it "existence" (*esse* as act), as if the act of the very essence; thirdly, Hypostasis, which he translates into Latin as "substance," and

206. St. Hilary, De synodis, on the Antiochene Fathers.

thus defines "person" as "an individual substance of rational nature," as if he were using the Greek word Hypostasis for the Latin Substantia; but then again he defines thus: "an individual subsistence of rational nature," by which name "subsistence" he more frequently uses for "hypostasis." From which it is manifest that, if we attend to the force of the word and its primary signification, the same thing is to the Latins "substance" as to the Greeks "hypostasis," and thus that three "substances" could be conceded in God, just as three "hypostases."[207]

But by ecclesiastical usage the name Substantia has been so accommodated as to denote essence alone, or form (*forma*), and therefore three "substances" cannot be conceded in God. Thus in the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in its confession of faith, it is defined that there is one only "substance" in God. This custom to prevail in the Church - namely that the name Substantia signify essence - is attested by Augustine, De Trinitate IV, c. 9, and VI, c. 4; and hence he says that three "substances" are not to be conceded in God. However, John the Theologian of the Latin Church, in the Council of Florence (definition 19, after the middle), teaches that Substantia is used in a twofold way: sometimes for "nature" and the "definition" of a thing, sometimes for "supposit." Which, in my judgment, is not now in common use, unless when we signify a supposit we add something, namely "individual" or "incommunicable."

But to Hebrews 3:14, "if, however, we hold firm the hypostasis of Him unto the end," and Hebrews 11:1, "faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for": in those places it is manifest that "hypostasis" does not signify "person." I answer: in those places it is not taken for "essence," but for the subsistence of the thing, that is, its foundation; wherefore in that place to the Hebrews 3 he calls living faith "the principle of substance," that is, of subsistence - not of God, but of ourselves - because by it we subsist and are founded in the spiritual life. The Greeks so explain that place. Similarly at Hebrews 11 faith is said to be the "hypostasis" of things hoped for, that is, their "subsistence," because the things to come which are hoped for by us (namely, that we shall be blessed), then have no other subsistence than that they are apprehended by our thought through faith, as likewise all the Greeks interpret. Therefore in that place to the Hebrews 1 "hypostasis" signifies the very subsistence of the Father, which is nothing other than "person." In like manner for subsistence, or foundation, Paul uses it 2 Corinthians 9 and 11 when he says "foundation of glory," in Greek ὑπόστασις τῆς καυχήσεως; for since "person" stands under all, "foundation" and "subsistence" are most aptly said.[208]

207. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 39, a. 1 ad 2; St. Augustine, De Trinitate IV.9; VI.3 - 5; VII.4 - 6; Pope John (probably John II or Hormisdas in the collections), De duabus naturis contra Eutychen; Boethius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi.

208. Heb. 3:14; 11:1; 2 Cor. 9; 11; the Vulgate uses "substantia" where the Greek has ὑπόστασις.

Disputatio CXXV

Caput I - What the Scholastics understand by "subsistence," and what the Fathers

"Subsistence" (*subsistentia*) is used by the Scholastic Theologians in another way, as we shall say below, than by the Councils and the holy Fathers. For among the Fathers and the Councils "subsistence" is taken for the very supposit that subsists; but the Scholastics by the name "subsistence" signify not that which subsists, but the formal ratio and act (*actus*) of subsisting; and about this "subsistence," thus understood, the controversy has arisen. The opinions of the Scholastics are various, which it will be necessary to recount.

First opinion: that there is, in God, besides the three relations which are the personal properties and complete the persons, some absolute subsistence common to the three persons; and that, over and above these, there are not three relative subsistences, but rather that the personal relations alone are the complements of the nature, or three "personalities," or three modes of incommunicability, as Scotus says, by which the person is constituted and the nature is contracted to the notion of person. This opinion was expressly taught by Scotus in III, d. 1, q. 2, a.; and to the same question it is referred in other places, in which I could find nothing alleged against this opinion. Durandus follows it more clearly in I, d. 26, q. 1, n. 6, and in III, d. 1, q. 2, where he establishes this difference between a divine and a created supposit: that for the divine supposit one thing is the ratio of subsisting, namely an absolute act of subsisting; but another is the ratio of supposit, namely a relative property by which it is rendered incommunicable; whereas for a created supposit the ratio of subsisting and of supposit is the same, namely subsistence per se. With these agree Paludanus on III, d. 1, q. 2 at the end; Capreolus, q. 1, art. 3, replying to Durandus's argument against the fourth conclusion of Aegidius; Aegidius on I, d. 23, q. 2, art. 3, ad quartum; Argentina on d. 26, q. 1; Albertus, I pars Summae, tract. 10, q. 43. The principal foundation of this opinion is: because "to subsist" is a perfection simply simple - that is, better than that which is not itself; for it is better that the divine nature subsist than that it not subsist. But no relation is a perfection simply simple; otherwise some perfection simply simple would be in one person which is not in another. Therefore "subsistence" is something absolute, not relation.

Augustine also seems to favor this, who in De Trinitate VII, c. 4, at the end, proves that God insinuates Himself as subsisting, not as ordered to another; therefore the act of subsisting in God is absolute, not relative. Augustine's reason is of this sort: for if this is God's "to be" (*esse*), namely "to subsist," then the three "substances" would not be said, just as three "essences" are not said; for as, because this is God's "to be," "to be wise," we do not say three essences, so neither three wisdoms do we say. For thus, because this is His "to be," which is essence, three essences would be as three Gods - which is not lawful to say. But if it is one thing for God "to be," another "to subsist," just as it is one thing for God "to be," another "to be Father" or "Lord" (for that which "is" is said in reference to Himself; but "Father" is said in reference to the Son, and "Lord" to the serving creature), then God "subsists" relatively, just as He relatively begets and relatively rules: and thus "substance" will not be "substance," because it will be relative. For just as from that which "is" we

say "essence," so from that which "subsists" we would say "subsistence"; but it is absurd that "substance" be said relatively, for every thing subsists in reference to itself, how much more God. So far Augustine, who thus proves that "to subsist" in God is absolute, so that none of it be relative - which is the express sentence of the Scholastics whom we alleged. Some heap up also innumerable places of St. Thomas for this opinion, which I intentionally pass over, because he everywhere speaks of the act of existing (*existentia*), which he calls existence or esse.

Refutation of the foregoing opinion. Besides that this opinion clashes with the common way of speaking of the Fathers and Councils, who call "subsistence" the supposit, in Greek Hypostasis, it can easily be refuted by that which seems to follow from it - namely, that the union of the human nature was made not only with the Person of the Word, but with all the persons. For if the humanity is said to "subsist," not by its own subsistence but by the divine, and this is something absolute, it follows that it was united by reason of a common term, and absolute, with all the persons. But on this matter it is to be discussed more at large against the aforesaid doctors on III, q. 3, art. 1; for they philosophize in various ways when they speak of the union of the humanity, even if they agree in that opinion which we have related about a common absolute subsistence.

Caput II - What Caietan and others have held

Caietan, in this question (on I, q. 4, a. 4; above on q. 2, a. 2; and at the end of q. 39, a. 4; and in III, q. 2, a. ... around solution 3, and III, a. 2 and 3), does not dare to deny three relative subsistences; but besides these, he thinks there is a fourth, another absolute subsistence common to the three, and he calls it "essential," while he calls the three relatives "personal." For that common one is proper to the essence; but the other three constitute the persons. This sentence is followed by Bartholomaeus Miranda in the Summa of the Councils, in the annotations on the Sixth Synod, act 4, and by certain more recent writers who, by inaccurately reporting the authors cited in the preceding chapter as if absolutely favorable to this foundation, assert that these authorities agree; whereas in truth no one follows it except Caietan and Miranda: for the authors alleged in the preceding chapter taught a quite different doctrine, as I have related. They also allege for this Richard in III, dist. 1, art. 1, q. 4; Ockham in III, q. 1, art. 3; Gabriel in III, dist. 1, q., art. 3, dub. 4; Almain in dist. 1, q. 1, art. 3, dub. ultimo. But in truth these Doctors do not concede some common act in the three divine persons to which the name "subsistence" should be said to agree; but a common existence (*existentia*), by reason of which a created nature can be assumed by God and terminated first, not terminatively by some personality - about which mode we are not disputing.

This sentence of Caietan, besides the testimony of Augustine cited in the preceding chapter, who seems to concede one only absolute subsistence, can also be proved first by the authority of Agatho in the Epistle which is found in the Sixth Synod, act 4, where a little from the beginning he says thus: "We confess God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit: not three Gods, but one God; not the subsistence of three names, but one subsistence of three subsistences, that is, of persons." Thus has the more ancient edition of the Councils: not "substance"; therefore now he concedes one subsistence common to the three subsistences; which words, since they are written in Latin, ought

to be of greater weight for this sentence: for nowhere among the Latins does the name "subsistence" signify "essence," as Hypostasis sometimes among the Greeks is used for "essence." Secondly, it is proved from St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII at the end, where, treating of the Father and the Son, because "the one is said to be in the other," he says in another place: "It is not the condition of corporeal natures that they be mutually in one another, or that by subsistence they have perfect unity; but He does not unite Himself to another; rather, in His own property of deity, He co-subsists (consistit)..."; and soon after: "Not of a corporeal nature is the condition that they be joined into one; but by subsistence they have perfect unity." From which it is clear that Hilary calls the "subsistence of nature" prior to personal words, as if subsistence of the nature, and afterward with it unites: "God, subsisting, generates; and the Holy Spirit is the subsistence of deity"; and elsewhere he says: "The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, not as a body in a body, but as deity in deity"; and finally: "One subsistence is in the other, because one nature subsists." Thirdly, in the Epistle to Cyrillus we read: "Of God (who is of one nature), what is, is: for in Him there is subsistence, not having beginning; for He is God." This sentence is also referred to the Greeks: Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, cap. 1 of De Divinis Nominibus, a little before the end, says ... [text curtailed in the copy].[209]

Caietan, in this question, above in the fourth article, and above in question 2, article 2, and below in question 39, article 4, and in the Third Part, question 2, about the solution of article 3, article 2 and 3, does not dare to deny three relative subsistences; but besides these, he judges that there is a fourth, another absolute subsistence, common to the three; and he calls it essential, while the three relative ones he calls personal. For that common one is proper to the essence (*essentia*), but the other three constitute the persons. This position is followed by Bartholomaeus Miranda in the Summa of the Councils, in the annotations on the Sixth Synod, action 11, and by some moderns, who, by carelessly citing authors set down in the preceding chapter, without any foundation, assert that these things are the common opinion: whereas in truth no one follows it except Caietan and Miranda; for the authors alleged in the preceding chapter taught a quite different doctrine, as I have reported.

They also allege for this Richard in III, distinction 1, article 1, question 4; Ockham in III, question 1, article 3; Gabriel in III, distinction 1, question, article 3, doubt 4; Almain in distinction 1, question 1, article 3, last doubt: but in reality these Doctors do not concede some common act in the three divine persons to which they would say the name "subsistence" (*subsistentia*) is fitting; rather, a common existence (*existentia*), by reason of which a created nature could be assumed by God and first be terminated not by some personality - of which mode we are not disputing.

This opinion of Caietan, besides the testimony of Augustine cited in the preceding chapter, who seems able to concede only one absolute subsistence, can be proved, first, by the authority of Agatho in the Epistle which is had in the Sixth Synod, action 4, where a little from the beginning he

says thus: "We confess God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit: not three Gods, but one God: not the subsistence of three names, but one subsistence of three subsistences, that is, of persons." For thus the older edition of the Councils has it, not "substance"; therefore he already concedes one subsistence common to the three subsistences. And since these words are written in Latin, they ought to be of greater moment for this opinion; for nowhere among the Latins does the name "subsistence" signify "essence," as ὑπόστασις sometimes does among the Greeks, and as "essence" is used by Hilary.

Secondly, it is proved from St. Hilary, at the end of De Trinitate, where, concerning the Father and the Son, of whom the one is said to be in the other, he writes: "This is not the condition of corporeal natures, that they be in each other, so that the subsistent nature have perfect unity." And after a few interposed words: "To be in, however, is not this, that the one be in the other as a body in a body; but so to be and to subsist, that in the subsistent it be; and so to be in, that it also subsist." Therefore Hilary concedes a subsistence of nature; by his earlier words, when he says "so that the subsistent nature," and by the later, when he says "that it also subsist," namely, the divine nature.[210]

Thirdly, Jerome in that Epistle 57 says: "In the witness of God and the sole nature, which truly is: for that which subsists has not from another, but is its own." For the same opinion there is reported from the Greeks Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, in the first chapter of the Divine Names a little before the end, when he says, the subsistence of goodness through its own existence is the cause of the existence of all subsistents. Finally, St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Life of Moses, col. 13, says that none of those things which are either apprehended by sense or clearly seen by the mind, besides the supreme essence which is the cause of all and on which all depend, truly subsist; as if he said that it alone truly subsists, and nothing else.[211]

Caietan moreover proves the same opinion by reason: because it is necessary to admit one God in the concrete, pre-understood to the three persons, who is called "creating"; but the concrete always signifies or connotes subsistence (*subsistentia*): therefore it is necessary to concede one subsistence pre-understood to the persons; this individual Caietan calls a "semiperson" (*semipersona*) below, q. 39, a. 4. Furthermore, since no one can deny that there is in God a certain existence common to the three persons and substantial, the moderns who defend Caietan's opinion explain in what way this common substantial existence is called subsistence, although the created existence of the humanity, which they think was assumed by the Word together with the humanity, because it is not distinguished from it, cannot be called subsistence.

Therefore they say it is manifest to distinguish between a created nature and the divine: for although each has an act of existence (*existentia*), nevertheless a created nature so has existence that it is not distinguished, so as of itself to be imperfect, and without some distinct mode - what

209. Caietan (Tommaso de Vio), on ST I, q. 4, a. 4; q. 2, a. 2; q. 39, a. 4; and on ST III, q. 2; Bartholomaeus Miranda, Summa Conciliorum on the Sixth Synod; Pope Agatho, Ep. in Third Council of Constantinople (act 4); St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus I.

210. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, at the end.

211. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus I; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De vita Moysis, col. 13; St. Jerome, Ep. 57.

they call the mode of perfection - it cannot subsist and be per se; and thus in Christ indeed the humanity exists by its proper existence, as the more probable opinion holds; but because it lacks the mode by which it ought to be completed per se, it is not per se but is sustained by another, and therefore its existence is not subsistence without that mode. The divine nature, however, is of itself perfectly infinite, and it demands not only to exist, but also to exist perfectly and per se, that is, it does not need another, distinct by a distinct mode, in order to subsist and be complete and perfect; wherefore, although it differ from its personalities by reason alone, yet insofar as it is distinguished from them in our mode of understanding, it is conceived so perfect that without another it is understood apt to subsist per se and to be complete, for which reason even in the concrete it can be signified without the persons. This perfect existence the recent theologians together with Caietan call in common a subsistence. They add that subsistence (as they say) is in the abstract, and they call the divine essence with that "subsistence" in the concrete, that is, "subsistent"; they deny, however, that that common thing is a person, and that the common subsistence is personality, because even if it were sufficient of itself to subsist and were complete and perfect for this, nevertheless it can be communicated to three supposits. For the notion of person and of personality is not just any subsistence by itself, but such as cannot be communicated.

This opinion, thus explained, some moderns think differs from the common opinion only in word, not in reality: because all ought to concede a perfect existence, in the way in which we have explained, proper to the divine nature, which belongs to no other nature; and they think it no inconvenience that it be able to be called a certain subsistence common to the three persons. Others finally explain in another way why that common existence of the divine nature has the notion of subsistence, of which we shall speak in the following chapter.

Nihil in God is common to the three persons that has the notion of subsistence (*subsistentia*): the truer opinion.

Caput III - That nothing in God common to the three persons has the notion of subsistence; only relative subsistences in God, none absolute

The opinion approved by the tradition of the ancient Scholastics is that there is in God nothing common to the three supposits which has the notion or the name of subsistence; but that the subsistences in God are relative (*relatio*), and there is no absolute one. This opinion was handed down by Alexander (III, q. 1, memb. 3; and q. 7, member one, article 3); St. Bonaventure in III, distinction 1, article 1, question 3; Richard in the First Book, distinction 26, article 1, question 1; Marsilius in III, question 2, article 3, doubt 2 near the end; Henry in Quodlibet 5, question 8 near the end; Genebrard, book 2 On the Trinity, p. 85.[212]

This opinion must be confirmed by us in a twofold way: first, we must show in this chapter that the essence (*essentia*) of God by that common existence is not yet completed according to our mode of understanding, so as to be per se terminated (just as neither is the humanity completed by

its own existence) until there be added to it that mode of relation (*relatio*), by which the supposit is constituted. Then in the following chapter we shall show that the name "subsisting" in no way agrees with that common existence; but that the Scholastics, who did not hesitate so to call it, were continually abusing in this matter the phraseology of the Councils and of the Fathers under that name, for which reason, when in the year 1578 I was publicly teaching and was led to that opinion, I came to think that there is nothing in God common that could be signified by the name "subsistence," which seems to be the common mode of speaking of the Councils and Fathers, to the contrary of those Scholastics who conceive some common and absolute subsistence in God. In that opinion indeed I rested much more, after in the year 1583, when again publicly teaching this matter, I carefully examined the opinions and the manner of speech of the Greek and Latin Fathers, of which I have treated sufficiently in the preceding disputation.

Therefore, as to the first point, in which there seems to be no controversy about the thing itself, we can by easy reasoning commend our opinion. First, although we must concede in God a common existence, which is so individuated with the essence of God that without it the divine essence cannot be considered under possible being (as other essences can), nevertheless by that existence alone the divine essence is not completed according to our mode of understanding, so as to be per se able to be without something else. I said "according to our mode of understanding"; for according to the thing, since it is not distinguished from the relation by which it is ultimately terminated and contracted to the notion of supposit and of person, it does not in any way need another distinct from itself, by nature of the thing, in order to be completed and to subsist per se; as humanity requires, which, besides the existence which it has, needs that mode "per se" by which it is ultimately constituted in the notion of supposit, and is distinguished from its existence, since it can be separated from it, as we see in Christ, in whom there was true humanity with its own existence (as we shall say in the Third Part, question 17, article 2), without that mode by which it is ultimately terminated and completed. Therefore the divine essence has with itself so individuated an existence that not only is it communicated with it to the three supposits, but also, according to our mode of understanding, it is said to be in them; yet not per se. Therefore that existence alone, considered without relation, does not yet make the divine nature to be per se according to our mode of understanding, but leaves it still apt to be terminated in another way, and to be said to be per se, namely, by relation. Nor does it at all matter that relation is not distinguished from that common existence, so that nevertheless that existence itself be said to be per se; because although in truth it itself is that which makes the divine nature to be per se, since it is the same as relation, nevertheless in our concept it is not yet conceived as per se existence, until it be completed by relation.

But it must be observed that when we say that existence without relation does not yet have the complete per se mode, it must be understood insofar as that "per se" is opposed to existence "in another," not as in a subject, but as in a supposit (*suppositum*). For if we speak of it insofar as it is

212. Alexander of Hales, III, q. 1, memb. 3; q. 7, memb. 1, art. 3; St. Bonaventure, III, dist. 1, art. 1, q. 3; Richard of St. Victor, I, dist. 26, art. 1, q. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, III, q. 2, art. 3, dub. 2; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 8; Genebrard, De Trinitate, bk. 2, p. 85.

opposed to existence in another as in a subject, then even the existence proper to the humanity in the Word is called existence per se, which nevertheless does not yet deserve the name of subsistence; otherwise the human nature in the Word, retaining its proper existence, would also have its proper subsistence, which cannot be said.

Then the same opinion is confirmed, because if that common existence, considered without relation, formally made the divine nature to subsist per se, the divine nature could not fail to be considered in the concrete whenever that existence were considered without any connotate; wherefore, if we were to conceive it abstractly, it ought to be thought without that existence; but however abstract we consider the divine nature, we always consider it with existence: therefore such an existence does not make per se being, nor does it constitute the concrete of the Godhead, on account of which by the authors of the contrary opinion that common subsistence is asserted, which to them seems that otherwise the common concrete, pre-understood to the three persons, cannot be apprehended. Therefore the concrete of the Godhead must be assigned in another way.

But some among those who defend the opposite opinion say that the divine existence common to the three persons for this reason has the notion of subsistence, because of itself it is so perfect that, although under the notion of existence, which is common...[213]

...when we say that that existence without relation does not yet have the complete mode of being through itself, it must be understood insofar as that phrase, through itself, is opposed to existence in another, not as in a subject, but as in a supposit. For if we speak of it insofar as it is opposed to existence in another as in a subject, even the proper existence of the humanity in the Word is called an existence through itself, which nonetheless does not yet deserve the name subsistence; otherwise the human nature in the Word, retaining its own existence, would also have its own subsistence, which cannot be said.

Then the same position is confirmed, because if that common existence, considered without relation, were to make the divine nature formally subsist through itself, it could not be the case that the divine nature would not be considered in the concrete whenever that existence were considered without any other connotation; wherefore, in order that it be conceived abstractly, it would have to be thought without that existence. But however abstractly we consider the divine nature, we always consider it with existence. Therefore such an existence does not make for being through itself, nor does it constitute the concrete of the Godhead, on account of which the authors of the contrary opinion assert that common subsistence; this seems to them otherwise not able to apprehend the common concrete, pre-understood of the three persons. Therefore the concrete of the Godhead must be assigned in another way.

But some, of those who defend the opposite opinion, say that the divine existence common to the three persons has for this reason the notion of subsistence, because in itself it is so perfect that, although under the aspect of existence, which is common, it can be communicated to its own supposit, and completed in our mode of understanding by relation, nevertheless, because in itself it

213. Caietan, on ST I, q. 39, a. 4; cf. also his language of "semiperson." Pope Agatho, Epistle in the Third Council of Constantinople, act 4 (older edition: "subsistentiam"); cf. the discussion of Greek hypostasis versus Latin subsistentia.

is infinite and so perfect that it cannot be united to or communicated to an alien supposit and depend on it, therefore it has the notion of a subsistence not incommunicable to its own supposit, but to an alien supposit, which created existence does not have.

Their reply is rejected; it does not suffice. I grant indeed this perfection of the divine existence; nevertheless that does not suffice for us to say that in God there is a common absolute subsistence. For the fact that the divine nature cannot be communicated to an alien supposit, or depend upon it, it does not have from the fact that it subsists and is signified in the concrete; for however abstractly it be considered in its concept, by that very fact, that it is infinite, it has that it cannot be communicated to an alien supposit and be terminated by it. Wherefore the very existence of the divinity, insofar as it is existence, would be said to be subsistence, if on this ground an absolute subsistence in God were to be conceded; but in everyone's judgment the divine existence, insofar as it is considered only as existence, is not yet subsistence, even absolute, because existence also belongs to the concept of nature considered abstractly; and since no other ground of distinction can be assigned between existence and absolute subsistence in God, such a subsistence beyond the relative ones is posited in vain.

There is nothing in God common to the persons to which the Latin name Subsistence would be suitable.

Caput IV - How much we ought in this matter or in this name not to dissent from the Fathers

However, as regards the mode of speaking, let us establish our position: since in the mysteries of our faith that mode of speaking must altogether be maintained which the Fathers and the Councils use; but on the contrary, the mode which is at odds with the phrasing of the Fathers and the Councils must by all be rejected; from that we ought to pass judgment in this matter. And although that common existence so completed the divine nature that without any other it would make it exist through itself, as the earlier opinion maintained; nevertheless this would not suffice that it be called a subsistence common and absolute, if this mode of speaking were at odds with the phrasing of the Councils and the Fathers. For, as we saw in the preceding disputation, many Fathers long and greatly feared to concede three hypostases in God, although the Catholic sense was clear to them: because, as St. Jerome said, the name hypostasis did not seem to them of good suspicion.

Now I show that the mode of speaking of the former opinion is contrary to the phrasing of the Councils and the Fathers. For it is certain that the Fathers and the Councils celebrated in the Greek Church, after that controversy already mentioned about the word hypostasis had been settled and the true signification of this name had been explained, whenever they employed that word, plainly conceded three hypostases in God, and declared that the union of the humanity with the Word was made not in nature, but in hypostasis, as we saw in the preceding disputation: because they judged that Hypostasis in Greek, in a rational nature, is altogether the same as Person in Latin, or supposit. Therefore whoever would now concede one absolute hypostasis in God, although at the

same time he conceded three relative [hypostases], could be no less censured from his words - however he might interpret them in a good sense - than one who in Latin would say that in God, besides the three relative persons or supposits, there is some absolute person or some absolute supposit, even if he were to add that this absolute supposit is not really distinct from the three relative [ones].

Cajetan indeed, in the places cited above, while he concedes a semi-supposit or a semi-person absolute, and does not dare, without some addition, to assert a person or an absolute supposit, does not so much oppose the phrasing of the Councils and the Fathers; yet he is worthy of reprehension, because he first introduced into the Schools a new and rather discordant mode of speaking.[214]

Since therefore Subsistent, in Latin, is the same as Hypostasis in Greek, as I said, I do not know by what reasoning it is lawful, against the mode of speaking of the Councils, to assert an absolute subsistence in God, even if besides that one someone were to admit three relative [subsistences], and not really distinct from the absolute. And that the name Subsistence in Latin signifies the same as Hypostasis in Greek is not in doubt. For first among the Greeks, John Maxentius, in his confession of faith, which is found in s. tom. of the Sacred Library, confesses that it is altogether the same as what in Latin is person and subsistence; to be understood in a rational nature: therefore he judges it the same to subsist, subsistence, and hypostasis; for the Fathers use Hypostasis and person interchangeably for the same thing, namely in a rational nature; and Maxentius says that person and subsistence are the same.[215] For Pope Agatho, himself a Latin, in the letter which is found in the Sixth Synod, act 4, uses without distinction the name Hypostasis and person. Then also Martin the Fifth, in the Lateran Council, in the fifth consultation, can. 1, defines that God is unity in Trinity; and explains one God in three subsistences, as if in Greek one were to say Hypostases.[216] Moreover no other Latin name than Subsistence can be devised which could be better substituted for the Greek name Hypostasis, or even for the same reason, because already by ecclesiastical usage it has been accommodated by the Fathers and Councils to signify that.

But among the Greeks, the very same thing has been taught by the Fathers adduced by us in the preceding disputation, chapter four, since they always put Hypostasis for person, which we interpret in Latin as subsistence. Nor anywhere will you find among the Greek Fathers the name Hypostasis, nor among the Latins the name subsistence, for essence or for anything essential and common, after that ancient controversy in the Church of God was explained and defined. Therefore rightly did the emperor Justinian, himself writing in Latin to Pope John the Second in the edict, or confession sent to him, which is contained in the tomes of the Councils after the Second Council of Toledo, column 9, understanding here the common sense of the Fathers, write thus: "Since nature

214. Cajetan, in the places cited above (see below, q. 39, a. 4), while conceding a "semi-supposit" or "semi-person," refrained from asserting an absolute person or absolute supposit.

215. Maxentius, in his confession of faith, found in s. tom. of the Bibliotheca sacra, affirms that "person" and "subsistence" are the same, to be understood in a rational nature.

216. Agatho, Pope: Epistle found in the Sixth Synod, act 4; and Martin the Fifth, Lateran Council, fifth consultation, can. 1: one God in three subsistences, as if in Greek one were to say "in three hypostases."

and subsistence are not the same. For all the holy Fathers with one accord teach us that nature, that is, substance and form, is one thing; subsistence or person is another: nature indeed, or substance and form, signifies that which is common; but subsistence or person, that which is special." And there is none of the holy Fathers, as well Latins as Greeks, who after the settlement of the dispute which we mentioned, concedes in God some absolute subsistence or hypostasis. For, as we shall say below, Jerome and Augustine, who conceded it, did not sufficiently understand the signification of the name Hypostasis, which later by common consent was received also in the Latin Church, and previously in the Greek was already sufficiently frequent among the Fathers. Wherefore it is not in doubt that the Scholastics, who in our time, on the testimonies of Jerome and Augustine, concede in God a common and absolute subsistence, have lapsed through ignorance of the word. Yet it is wonderful that they were ignorant of that which had been received without controversy both by the Greek and by the Latin Church for a long time already: namely, that subsistence is the same as supposit and person. For that Jerome and Augustine were ignorant of this is not a wonder, because as yet the force of the Greek name among the Greeks themselves was not sufficiently well known, as we shall say below.

But some reply that the councils and the Pontiffs have always used subsistence concretely, as it is said, for person or supposit; and therefore that it is not lawful, according to the phrasing of the councils and the Fathers, to concede in God an absolute subsistence: but that Scholastics, who teach that there is in God a certain absolute subsistence, use subsistence not for the supposit in the concrete, but for a certain abstract account of perfect and per se existing.

But this evasion can easily be cut off. For since ecclesiastical usage has obtained that the name Subsistence be to the Latins the same as Hypostasis to the Greeks, namely that it signify a supposit or person; it will be lawful only for the sake of disputation for the Scholastics, as we shall say below, to use the name subsistence abstractly, to signify the form and account, by which a person or supposit is ultimately constituted; but to signify another account altogether different from and contrary to the supposit, such as the aforesaid theologians attempt to defend, to use such a word, whether abstractly or concretely, and thus by the same word to concede in God that which the Fathers and the councils denied, namely an absolute subsistence - by what, I ask, reasoning would it be lawful? Otherwise it would be lawful even now for Greek theologians to use the name Hypostasis in the very same sense in which the aforesaid Latin Scholastics use the name subsistence, and to say that in God there is one absolute Hypostasis. But who would concede this? I certainly know that the Greeks are more skilled in their own language, that they may not approve this mode of speaking as contrary to the Fathers; and that some Latin Scholastics have lapsed through ignorance of the word, because they saw Jerome and Augustine concede one absolute subsistence in God. But they ought to have considered that in the time of Augustine and Jerome the ecclesiastical signification of this word was not sufficiently explained, so that those Fathers would not dare to concede three subsistences in God, but only one, as we shall see in the following chapter. Moreover the Scholastics in truth, while with those Fathers they wish to concede one absolute [subsistence], and with those same Fathers do not dare to deny three; with the Greeks

they concede three; with Jerome and Augustine they add one absolute; and thus out of two opinions altogether contrary, they themselves put together one sentence; which how it can stand with itself - as being compacted altogether out of contraries - will appear below.

Therefore no less is the mode of speaking of Durandus and others to be reproved, who say that in God there is only one absolute subsistence, from which it would follow that there is only one person in God; than of others who, besides the three relative [subsistences], concede also one absolute; for thus they seem to introduce a quaternity into the Godhead. But what certain ones add, that that absolute subsistence is not distinct from the three relatives, but is the same, excuses them little. For if they concede an absolute subsistence or hypostasis, they must say that there is one absolute and three relative; a mode of speaking which no Father would admire.

Yet let us look more mildly on our Scholastics, who also say that there are only three subsistences in God; they commonly use the name Subsistence in another signification than the Fathers and Greek Councils: namely for the complement of the person, which they call personality. For since, for the sake of teaching, we use the concrete and the abstract, by which that which constitutes a thing and the formal account by which it is constituted are set forth; and since the name subsistence seems to them abstract, therefore they use it to signify the relations themselves which in God we call personalities; and abstractly it is better signified by us. I except Durandus and those who follow him, who, since they do not concede in God more than one subsistence, use it for the very act of existing. But those who think that subsistence is personality itself, although they do not use the name in that signification in which the Fathers and Councils use it, yet they do not stray from ecclesiastical speech: for there seems to be little difference between the content in the abstract and the concrete, just as there is little distance between person and personality; wherefore in our Scholastic disputations it is more convenient to embrace the Scholastic mode of speaking; sometimes the note is not unworthy.

But some think that the name subsistence sometimes even in the Councils signifies abstractly the personation, that is, the action of the supposit, and its complement, as in the Epistle of Sophronius, which is contained in the Sixth Synod, act 11, in which, much earlier at the beginning, it is said: "Therefore since the holy Trinity is substance and perhalanus itself is subsistence," etc.; for when "personal subsistence" is said, it does not seem to signify the concrete "personal," but the abstract; for the concrete is the person itself; the abstract, however, is not called "personal."

But this reasoning is false. For since Sophronius in that epistle frequently uses the Greek name Hypostasis, which we translate into Latin as subsistence, and always in other places it signifies the person itself in the concrete, it is not to be believed that, from one place, he took the name in the abstract; since with the Greek word Hypostasis we never use it either in Greek or in Latin for the abstract. And when Sophronius says "personal subsistence," it is certain that he does not thus distinguish "personal" as if in the abstract, but [indicates] the supposit, "personal," which at length is properly expressed in the concrete. For indeed a supposit in the concrete cannot be found in a rational and in an irrational nature; and when it is in a rational [nature], "personal" is most aptly added, to denote what sort of supposit that is. That "subsistence" there is the same as "personality" in the abstract is also a useless repetition, since one would be saying "personal personality."

From this doctrine there is a reference to IIIa, q. 4, a. 6; and how badly some more recent authors, abusing even the very name "subsistence," have introduced into other hypostases and supposits, as it were, many partial subsistences - indeed, that wherever there are parts, there are partial subsistences. But "partial subsistence" is an inadmissible way of speaking, just as no one should say "partial person" or "partial hypostasis." Therefore the name "subsistence" ought not to be extended in that manner.

The foundations of the first and of the second opinion can be overthrown with no trouble. But first of all, the testimonies which have been brought forward for each must be dealt with, and it must be shown how weak they are.

They think, indeed, that some would not dare to concede three subsistences in God, but only one, as we shall see in the following chapter. Those Scholastics just mentioned, however, and with them certain Fathers, are willing to concede one absolute [subsistence]; and, since with those same Fathers they do not dare to deny the three, they concede three with the Greeks; with St. Jerome and St. Augustine, moreover, they add one absolute; and thus, from two opinions wholly contrary, they themselves fashion one single position - a position which cannot stand with itself, as being cobbled together from elements altogether contrary, as will appear below.

Wherefore the manner of speaking of Durandus and others ought no less to be rejected, who say that in God there is only one subsistence - one absolute mode - which is that there is in God only one absolute [subsistence] besides the three relative [ones], which they grant: for in this way they seem to introduce a quaternity. And what certain men add, namely, that this absolute subsistence is not distinguished from the three relatives, scarcely excuses them. For if they concede an absolute subsistence or hypostasis, they ought to say that there is one absolute and three relative [subsistences]: which manner of speaking no Father would condemn.

But indeed our own Scholastics, who also say that there are only three subsistences in God, commonly use the name Subsistence in a signification other than that of the Fathers and the Greek Councils, namely, for what they call the complement of the person, which they call personality. For in teaching they employ concretes and abstracts, by which they show both that which is constituted and the formal reason by which it is constituted; and since to them the name subsistence seems abstract, therefore they use it to signify the relations themselves, which in God we call personalities, and which are better expressed by us in the abstract. I except Durandus and others who follow him, who, because they concede in God only one subsistence, use this term for the very act of existing. But those who think that subsistence is personality itself, although they use the name in a signification other than that used by the Fathers and Councils, nevertheless they do not on that account depart from an ecclesiastical manner of speaking: for the concrete seems to differ little from the abstract, just as person differs little from personality. Wherefore, in our Scholastic disputations, to embrace the common mode of speaking of the Scholastics is not something to be censured.

Certain others think that the name subsistence is sometimes also used abstractly in the Councils to signify personality, that is, the rational character, mode of a supposit, and its complement, as in the Epistle of Sophronius contained in the Sixth Synod, act 11, where, far from the beginning, it is said: "If, therefore, the Holy Trinity is to be counted by personal subsistences," etc. For when "personal subsistence" is said, it does not seem that a concrete is signified, but an abstract: for the concrete is the very person; this, however, is not called "personal." But this reason is trifling. For since Sophronius in that Epistle frequently uses the Greek name Hypostasis, which we render in Latin subsistence, and everywhere else signifies the very person in the concrete, it is not to be believed that in that passage he used that name for an abstract, since we never use the Greek word hypostasis, either in Greek or in Latin, for an abstract. And when Sophronius says "personal subsistence," this is not the same as if he had said "personal person," but [he means] "personal supposit," which can very well be said also in the concrete. For since a supposit can be found in the concrete in a rational and an irrational nature, and when it is in a rational [nature] it is a person, it is very well added, "personal," to denote of what sort that supposit is. And if subsistence there were the same as what is personality in the abstract, it would be an idle repetition to say "personal personality." From this very doctrine we shall bring forward later how poorly some recent writers, abusing even the name subsistence, introduce in any given hypostasis and supposit a thousand partial subsistences; indeed, they say as many partial subsistences as there are parts: whereas it is no less inept to speak of a "partial subsistence" than of a "partial person" or a "partial hypostasis," as we shall say there.

Ad Augustinum respondetur. To the first testimony from St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 4, where he concedes only an absolute subsistence, proving that God subsists toward Himself, not toward another - a point on which our adversaries think to triumph over us - I answer that it has no weight for the first or the second opinion. Add that, even if it had any strength, it would not favor the second opinion at all: for this latter does not dare, as the first does, to concede in God only one absolute subsistence, but affirms that there are three relative [subsistences]; yet Augustine certainly denies any relative subsistence and asserts only one absolute, when he says that God subsists not relatively but toward Himself. Nor, indeed, do I grant that this testimony supports the first opinion, as I now show

I presuppose, first, that Augustine never used the Latin name subsistence, but that, whenever he treats of the Greek word hypostasis, he always rendered it in Latin as substance, as in the places cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 5.[217] Wherefore, when he proves that God subsists toward Himself, not relatively, he is speaking solely of the act of subsisting, which we can call substantial existence, not of subsistence, neither in the concrete nor in the abstract - the very point now in dispute among us. Next, I also presuppose that Augustine, in the aforementioned places, had the Greek name hypostasis in suspicion, if we wish to use it translated into Latin as the Greeks use it. For he never translated it as subsistence, as Jerome does in Ep. 57 and the earlier Latin Fathers; but always as substance. And because substance, among the Latins, commonly signified essence, and it is not permitted to concede three essences in God, therefore Augustine also does not dare to

217. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 4 - 5; VIII, c. 8 - 9.

concede three hypostases in Latin, nor is he compelled to say, in Latin, three substances in God; although he says, in De Trinitate VII, c. 6, that where there would be no scandal, it could be said that three substances are conceded in God, as the Greeks said three hypostases.[218]

Accordingly, since Augustine, while he still feared, as is gathered from the places already cited, to concede three hypostases or substances in Latin, rightly said that God subsists toward Himself, not toward another - just as substance and essence are "toward themselves," not "toward another." But if he himself had admitted three subsistences - as, given the foregoing disputation and as I have proved also in this one, it is necessary to admit three subsistences - then, as he would not deny that God subsists incommunicably (which comes from relation), he would also say that God subsists relatively, just as now in God relative subsistence is spoken of; and thus he would not assert that there is one absolute subsistence in God, but he would admit three relative [subsistences]. We, however, who now, by ecclesiastical usage, employ the Latin name subsistence for the Greek hypostasis, and likewise say in Greek that in God there are three relative hypostases, so that we do not dare to concede any absolute [subsistence], in the same way pronounce that there is nothing in God absolute and common to which the Latin name subsistence could fit.

Ad Hieronymum respondetur eodem prorsus modo. I answer St. Jerome in precisely the same way: for he too more severely rejected "three hypostases," so that by no means ought this way of speaking to be admitted. He interpreted the Greek name hypostasis, as Augustine did, not as subsistence, but as substance; and therefore it is not surprising if he would say that the divine nature subsists from itself and not from another, conceding that it subsists absolutely and toward itself, as Augustine [said]; although this mode of speaking sufficiently indicates that he is speaking of some absolute subsisting, as we shall reply to St. Gregory of Nyssa below - unless from elsewhere the mind of Jerome were evident to us. Wherefore I cannot but be amazed that men otherwise learned and erudite, with these testimonies of Jerome and Augustine adduced, should be deceived into believing that one absolute subsistence is conceded in God; since the manner of speaking of those Fathers, after the quarrel over the name subsistence and hypostasis has been settled, ought not to be approved without explanation. Deceived, to be sure, those Theologians seem to me, in that they had only the words of these Fathers but not a clear grasp of their mind; or if the aforesaid Scholastics wish to follow Augustine and Jerome, let them say with them that there is in God one absolute subsistence, and let them deny with them the three relatives - which in no wise will now be permitted them. But to assert in God one absolute and three relative subsistences is the same as to fashion from two opinions utterly contrary one single position, which cannot stand with itself, as we noted above

Other testimonies of the Fathers alleged in the second chapter can also easily be dissolved by another route.

218. St. Jerome, Ep. 57; cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 6.

Caput VI - Dissolution of the reasons for the first and second opinions

It remains for us to dissolve the reasons which we brought forward for the first and second opinions in cap. 7 and 8. To Durandus's argument, which you have in the first chapter, we answer that it is indeed a perfection, simply and without qualification, to subsist - whether it be taken for substantial existence; and this belongs to the essence absolutely and is common to the three Persons, and is better than not to subsist; or whether it be taken for the act of existing incommunicably, which is proper to the person, or hypostasis.

As to the first [sense], if it be taken in general, because it is better to subsist incommunicably than not to subsist, this perfection does not belong by reason of the nature, but by reason of the person; and it is common, not according to the thing (for there is not one subsistence really common), but according to that universality which is of predication. Then, too, it is a perfection, simply and without qualification, to subsist particularly; that is, to subsist by paternity and by filiation, which is something relative and toward another: but this also does not belong by reason of the essence, but by reason of the person. If you say that, by reason of the divine nature, that is, considered as essence, every perfection belongs to it, because it is infinite; I reply: the infinity of the essence consists in this, that it is not from any cause, as was explained above in Disput. 25, cap. 1 and the following; not in this, that distinct infinite perfections, or every perfection - both personal and essential - formally belongs to it by reason of itself: for by reason of itself there belongs to it only essential perfection, that is, essential [perfection].

Ad testimonia. The testimonies can be dissolved. To that of Pope Agatho we reply that the text is corrupt, since it is read, "Of three subsistences, or persons, one subsistence," whereas it ought to be read, "one substance," as is found in many Latin copies; nor is it credible that in so few words Agatho used the same word in so diverse a sense

Ad Hilarium. I say that his words are also cited carelessly. For in the earlier words alleged he does not say, "that the subsistence of nature have perfect unity," but, "that the substances of nature have perfect unity"; and the sense is that in corporeal things one is not so in another, as to have the same nature subsisting: he does not say "the same common subsistence," but "the same nature," to which it befits to subsist by reason of a supposit; and therefore he says "supposit in nature." Then, in the later words, he does not say, "And so let it be in such a way as that even it (scil., the divine nature) subsist," but, "in such a way that He Himself (scil., God) subsist": the meaning is rather this, that thus in divine things one subsistent is in another subsistent, so that He Himself subsists. But, granted - let us concede - the words be referred to the nature, so that it be said, "And that very (scil., divine nature) subsist": nevertheless nothing can be concluded therefrom. For neither do we deny, nor can anyone deny, that the divine nature subsists; but we say with St. John Damascene that the divine essence indeed subsists, yet in three persons

Ad Dionysium respondeo. I answer to the testimonies of Pseudo - Dionysius that he did not say "the subsistence of goodness" in Greek hypostasis, but "the essence" in Greek ousia; and thus Perionius also translates "essence." But if he had used the Greek name hypostasis, he would have used it for "essence"; which now is not permitted, as I noted in the preceding disputation, to

concede in God one common and absolute hypostasis. In vain, therefore, do the adversaries employ the authority of the Greek Fathers in this matter, since they use no other Greek name than hypostasis for the Latin subsistence; and no one now dares - Gregory of Nyssa included - to concede in God any absolute hypostasis

Demum ad Nyssenum dicimus. Finally, to St. Gregory of Nyssa we say that it cannot be denied that the supreme essence truly subsists from itself, and not from another, as creatures do which depend upon another as upon a cause: yet on that account no common subsistence is conceded. For, as we said above, the divine nature truly has in the persons, from itself and not from another as from a cause, that it subsists. Then, too, since Nyssa, as we saw, in the preceding disputation, cap. 4, clearly holds that hypostasis is the same as person in a rational nature, and since he cannot use another Greek name to signify a common subsistence than the name hypostasis, from neither that author nor any other Greek author can a common subsistence be proved, since none concede a common hypostasis, unless "hypostasis" be used for "essence," as some of the more ancient [writers] took it.[222]

To Agatho we answer that the text is corrupt where one reads: "Of the three subsistences, or persons, one could not [serve] to signify subsistence"; instead it should be read "one substance," as is found in many Latin copies. Nor is it credible that in so few words Agatho used the same term in so diverse a sense.

To St. Hilary I say that his words are cited badly and awkwardly. For in the earlier words alleged, Hilary does not say: "That subsistences should have the nature perfect by unity," but: "That the subsisting nature should have perfect unity." The sense is that in corporeal things there is not thus one [thing] in another so as to have the same subsisting nature; he does not say "the same common subsistence," but "the same nature," to which it rightly belongs to subsist by reason of the supposit; and therefore he says "subsisting nature." Then in the latter words he does not say: "So indeed in being, that even it (namely, the divine nature) may subsist," but thus: "that even he (namely, God) may subsist." The sense is that in divine things the one subsisting is in another subsisting, so that he himself too subsists. But come, grant that those words be referred to the nature, so that it be said, "And it (namely, the divine nature) subsists": nevertheless nothing can be inferred therefrom. For neither do we deny, nor can anyone deny, that the divine nature subsists - far from it; but we say with St. John Damascene that the divine essence indeed subsists, yet in three persons.[223]

To the testimonies of Dionysius I reply that Dionysius did not say in Greek "the subsistence of goodness," hypostasis, but "essence," ousia; and thus Perionius translates "essentia." If he were using the Greek name hypostasis, he would be using it for essence; but for us now, as I noted in the preceding disputation, it is not permitted to concede in God one common and absolute hypostasis.[224] In vain, then, do our adversaries employ the authority of the Greek Fathers in this matter, since they use no other Greek term than hypostasis for the Latin subsistence; and now no one - whether

222. See the preceding disputation, cap. 4, on St. Gregory of Nyssa's usage of hypostasis and person.
223. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3.
224. Pseudo-Dionysius; in the Greek text "ousia" (essence) is read, and Perionius translates "essentia."

St. Gregory of Nyssa or any other - would dare to concede some absolute hypostasis in God, unless hypostasis be taken for essence, as some of the ancients took it. Finally, as to Nyssa we say that it cannot be denied that the supreme essence truly subsists of itself and not from another, as creatures do, which depend on another as on a cause; yet for that reason some common subsistence is not granted. For, as we said above, the divine nature truly has in the persons from itself, and not from another as from a cause, that it subsists.

The arguments for the first and for the second opinion are dissolved

They say: "No perfection simply simple is a relation proper to one person and not to another." I answer that this is false. For we showed in Disputation 122, chapter 4, that relations are perfections taken simply. That is, as St. Anselm explains, "they themselves are better than not-themselves"; but we said that they are not to be compared with the person, as if it were better for the person to be Father than not to be Father, but with the divine nature, which the relations modify and contract so that there be a person. To this [nature] indeed it is better to be Father than not to be Father - I do not say than to be Son, but than not to be Father - a point no one doubts. How from this it does not follow that one real perfection, simply simple, is in one person which is not in another, is gathered from what was said in that disputation, chapters 6 and 7.

To the second argument, which was adduced earlier, in chapter 2, for the second opinion, it is answered: one can very well assign the concrete understanding of the nature before the persons and common to them, namely, "this God," without any common subsistence; how this can be understood will be explained below in Disputation 156, chapter 2. Therefore a certain common subsistence is not necessary in order that the concrete of deity be constituted; rather, as we noted in chapter 3, any substantial act which the adversaries wish to call "subsistence" is included in the concept of deity itself, however abstractly taken, and therefore by reason of that [deity] God is not constituted in the concrete, as they contend.

To the third argument, from the same second chapter and in favor of the same opinion, I reply that the difference between created and uncreated nature lies only in this: a created nature, in order to subsist per se, needs a certain mode which we call the supposit, really distinct from its existence; whereas the uncreated nature requires, over and above its existence, a personal mode, namely, relation, which is distinct from it and from its real existence only by our intellect. Nevertheless, according to our way of understanding, without that personal mode it is not yet understood to subsist per se, unless we conceive the uncreated nature according to a very absolute mode and that of one only supposit, as the ancients understood it, before the mystery of the Trinity was revealed. Now therefore, since we know that the Godhead subsists in three supposits and is ultimately terminated by three relations, we must never, in a true and theological concept, think of it as apprehended abstracted from the three persons.

Objection: But someone will object in this way. The divine essence, as it is understood before the persons, is of itself perfect with every perfection, because it is infinite: therefore by the same reason it ought to be conceived as subsisting; for subsistence is a certain perfection. And they think

this to be the difference between created and uncreated nature, that a created nature does not of necessity require in its concept every perfection, as the uncreated nature does, and hence does not demand to subsist except by reason of the supposit, which is distinguished from it.

It is answered: This objection is easily dissolved. For although the divine essence differs from the created one in that the divine does not subsist by something added to it that is really distinct, but only by relation, which is the same with it in reality; and though a created nature always subsists with a personalitas really distinct added to it; nonetheless the divine essence, in so far as it is conceived as common and as distinct from the personalities, does not have in this its concept that perfection whereby it is ultimately completed so as to subsist, just as it does not include that perfection and personal complement which modifies and contracts the same so that there be a person - just as humanity, too, in reality does not have that perfection of supposit. They only differ in this: that that complement of the divine nature is distinguished from it only by reason; the complement of a created nature is distinguished according to reality.

Nor indeed is it of the notion of the essence, in so far as it is understood as common to the persons, to contain actually and formally every perfection, even that of subsistence, just as neither is it to include every perfection and the personal complement, which no one denies; but only those perfections which are in reality common and properly follow upon the essence itself. This in no way derogates from the infinity of the divine essence, which is constituted as its peculiar attribute. For this [infinity] does not consist in the essence of God being infinite as if it contained perfections in itself, but in its being from no other, as from a cause, and in its having from itself whatever it is - just as I more copiously proved in Disputation 25, chapters 1 and 5. Nothing, therefore, follows that is inconvenient, if some perfection, to wit, a personal one, which the Scholastics call "subsistence," be adventitious to the divine nature from the person, which is distinguished by reason from the essence, and which the essence, as essence and as common to the three persons, does not formally include in itself; for of personal perfections no one can deny this.

But what certain recent authors make to be a perfection of the divine nature - by reason of which they say that it "subsists before the persons" so that it cannot be terminated by an alien supposit - is futile and vain, as I showed above in chapter 2.

Disputatio CXXVI - Whether there are three existences in God

Caput I - Some later writers affirm that there are three existences in God, and relative eternities

Some later writers, just as they do not hesitate, as we noted in Disputation 122, chapter 3, to affirm that in God there are not only three persons or subsistences but even three realities, likewise dare to affirm that in God there are three existences, or three acts of being. For the Scholastics take "existence" for the very act of existing, which they also call "esse" or "to exist."

Into this opinion Scotus seems to have fallen in the first book, distinction 11, question 2, where, responding to the first argument, he asserts that one person is distinguished from another by a relation even disparate and not opposed, not only according to the quiddity of the relation, but also according to "esse": he clearly understands by "esse" the "existence," for the "esse of the essence" is altogether the same as the quiddity.[225] The same he taught in Quodlibet 4, article 3, to the principal argument.

To the same opinion is referred Richard of St. Victor, book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 16, where he teaches that in the divine there is one common existence and three incommunicable existences.[226] Others cite in favor of the same opinion Cajetan in the places alleged by us in the preceding disputation; there, however, Cajetan concedes only three relative subsistences, which is far different.[227] They also cite Richard in III, distinction 1, article 1, question 2, to the first, as saying that one thing is to exist to the essence, another to the person. But he only asserts that the absolute existing is one in the three persons; whereas "to exist the person of the Father" is not "to exist the person of the Son" or "of the Holy Spirit." He did not say "to exist the person" (existere persona), but "to exist the person [of...]" (existere personam), which are two different things.

By reason the case is proved thus. Each relation has its own actual entity, distinct by reason from the divine essence and really distinct from its opposite relation; therefore, just as we say that the three relations are three realities, so we shall say that they have three actual entities; but existence is nothing other than the actual entity of a thing; therefore there will be three existences. Hence, just as the relations are called three realities, so also they will be called three actual entities and existences, because they are distinguished among themselves, even if they are the same as the essence.

They add, second, that three existences are not to be conceded in God absolutely, but with this addition, "relative," because "existence" absolutely signifies the being of a thing, which follows upon essence rather than upon relations; and in this sense, they say, the Fathers are to be understood, who attribute to God one "esse," and affirm that all things which are in God have one "esse." They explain this thus: since in their opinion the divine essence, as a transcending ratio, is included in the relations, existence also ought to be included, so that there be one existence of all the relations, only multiplied according to the determinate mode of incommunicability which is that of relation. Wherefore, in order to say that existence is multiplied, relation ought to be signified by a peculiar name. For if it be said absolutely, there is signified only that common existence in the three relations, as a transcending form included; therefore only "three relative existences" can be conceded, but not three absolute existences with that addition.

225. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 2; and Quodlibet 4, art. 3.
226. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV, c. 16 - 17.
227. Cajetan, in the loci cited in the preceding disputation, where he concedes three relative subsistences.

Third, they teach that in God there are not only three relative existences, but also three durations, because duration is as it were a passion of existence, which in no way can be separated from it, since it differs from it only by reason and, according to our mode of understanding, always accompanies it. But they admonish that one cannot say "three durations" simply and without addition, just as for the same reason one does not say "three existences."

Caput II - That in God there is only one existence, and only one duration, is proved from authority

You will never find among the Saints that there are in God several existences, or several "esses" - I say "existences" for the very act of existing. For what our adversaries report from Richard of St. Victor favors nothing of their opinion; rather, from those words our view can be confirmed, and theirs manifestly refuted. Although in book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 16, he concedes a common existence, and in chapter 17 incommunicable existences, yet by the name "existence" in those two chapters, and in the following, he does not understand what the Scholastics do, namely the act of existing, or "esse," but the whole substance itself, or person, which is said to have "esse." By the word which the Scholastics now call "existence," he uses "esse"; and in those places he always assigns one "esse" of the three persons and nowhere three, not even with the addition "relative." And the same we saw in the preceding disputation, chapter 5, where they prove that God's "esse" is absolute and one.[228]

Here a far more probable opinion seems to be the one which teaches that in God there is only one existence, that is, one existence (esse), although there are three modes and relations of this existence and of existence. St. Thomas set forth this opinion expressly, in the Third Part, question 17, article 2, reply to the third, where he says that the three persons have one existence, and wherever he speaks of God's existence, he calls it absolute, as in De potentia, question 2, article 6, and question 8, article 2, reply to the eleventh, where he plainly teaches that nothing befits God save an absolute existence, in which even the relations exist, and that to them no relative existence befits.[229][230] Capreolus also clearly teaches this opinion, In III Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, article 3, to the second, against the second conclusion; and Cajetan above, on question 28, article 2, corollary 6.[231][232] And in favor of this opinion can also be mustered St. Jerome in that Epistle 57, and St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 7, chapter 4, as we saw in the preceding disputation, chapter 5, where they prove that God's existence subsists as absolute and one.[233][234]

Nowhere, however, will you find among the Saints that in God there are many existences, or many esse. By "existences" I mean the very act of existing. For what the adversaries allege from Richard of St. Victor favors their opinion in nothing; rather, from his words our view can be

228. See above, the preceding disputation, cap. 5.

229. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3; wherever he speaks of the divine esse he calls it "absolute."

230. St. Thomas, De potentia q. 2, a. 6; q. 8, a. 2, ad 11: only an absolute esse befits God, in which even the relations exist, and to them no relative esse befits.

231. Capreolus, In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, against the second conclusion.

232. Cajetan, on the place cited above, q. 28, a. 2, corollary 6.

233. St. Jerome, Epistle 57.

confirmed and theirs manifestly refuted. For although in book 4 of De Trinitate, in that chapter 16, he concedes a common existence, and in chapter 17 incommunicable existences, nevertheless by the name "existence," in these two chapters and the ones that follow, he does not understand what the Scholastics do, namely the act of existing, that is, the esse; but the whole substance itself, or person, which is said to have esse. And what the Scholastics now call "existence," he calls "esse"; and in those places he always assigns one esse of the three persons, and nowhere three, not even with the addition "relative." In the same way, in book 5 of De Trinitate, chapter 1, he concedes one esse of the three persons, but a discrete existere. For with him, as Alexander very well explains, Part 1, question 44, in the body and to the fifth, "to exist" (existere) is not merely "to be" (esse), but "to be from another" (ex alio esse), in which personal property is already included.[235][236][237]

Moreover, that "existence" in Richard is not the same as in the Scholastics will be manifest to anyone reading him from chapter 12 to chapter 20; so that it would seem superfluous to report some of his words now; yet lest we seem to mislead the reader, we shall subjoin some of his testimonies.

Accordingly, in chapter 12, on the Etymology of the name, he speaks thus: "The name 'existentia' is drawn from the verb 'existere': in the verb 'sistere' there can be noted what pertains to one consideration; likewise by the addition from the preposition 'ex' there can be noted what pertains to another. By what is said to 'make something stand' (sistere) are first denoted those things which do not so much have being in themselves as being-in (inesse), not so much 'to stand' (sistere), so to speak, as 'to stand in' (insistere), that is, to inhere in some subject; and, after a few words: 'For what is existentia, if not to stand forth from something (ex aliquo sistere)?'" In which words he marks that "existentia" is that which "stands forth from something." Then, in chapter 15: "We find, namely, that there are several persons in the divinity, although they have one and the same existence, and by all accounts indifferently the same, which pertains to the identity of substance: yet they can, according to the original cause, have mutual difference." There he concedes that the three persons have the same esse, and he understands "existence" as the Scholastics speak.

And in chapter 16: "Existence, as was shown above, signifies substance, yet not simply, but with the denotation of some property"; where he calls "existence" not the act of existing, namely the esse, but the very substance which is said "to be." And below: "We call it a common existence when there is understood an esse having from a common property; but 'incommunicable' when there is understood an esse having from an incommunicable property." Therefore in Richard "existence" is the same as "that which has esse," not the very esse and act of existing. And in chapter 17: "If therefore the persons differ by incommunicable properties, and likewise by incommunicable existences they differ: it must be that there be an incommunicable existence to which there belongs an incommunicable difference." What, I ask, could he have said more clearly? For since he asserts

234. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 4.
235. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV, cc. 16 - 17.
236. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate V, c. 1.
237. Alexander (of Hales), Summa, Part I, q. 44, in the body and ad 5: existere is ex alio esse.

that the existences themselves differ by properties which are in the existences themselves, and these are the relations, consequently he teaches that "existence" is the hypostasis itself, which is rendered incommunicable by a property and in which relation inheres. If he thought that "incommunicable existence" were the act of existing belonging to a relation, he would not say that it is rendered incommunicable by relation or property; nor that the property or relation is in the existence itself. And in chapter 19 he concedes in God one only esse, and he expressly proves it; nowhere, however, does he attribute to God several esse, but he affirms there that there are only several who have one esse from a differing property; and he adds these words: "Unity there is according to the mode of being (essendi); plurality according to the mode of existing (existendi): one esse, because one and indifferent; several persons, because several existences." He calls "several existences" not acts of being, but the very substance existing, or hypostasis; but the "mode of existing" he calls the property; and from this side he concedes a plurality in God. And in chapter 20: "We say indeed that properties are in the persons; but their inhering (if we duly weigh it) does not give subsisting, but existing: and therefore persons are more rightly called 'existences' than 'subsistences' or 'substances'." He says, however, that properties do not give subsisting, because a little before, in the same chapter, asking how "subsistence" or "substance" is said in God, he says: "On account of properties of this sort, which seem to be in the divine persons, by which they are distinguished from one another, according to some likeness of those things which truly inhere in their subjects (though less properly), they can be called 'substances' or 'subsistences'." There he refuses to concede in God "substance" or "subsistence": for these are said from the fact that they "stand under" others; following namely the doctrine of St. Augustine, who in De Trinitate 7, chapter 4, for the same reason teaches that in God "substance" is said abusively, and is rather to be called "essence." He therefore said that properties do not give to persons "subsisting" but "existing," because they make the persons to exist incommunicably, that is, to be "from another." But when he subjoins that persons are more rightly called "existences" than "subsistences" or "substances," he plainly indicates that "existence" itself is the person, and not the act of existing, which the adversaries attribute to relation: just as "substance" or "subsistence" is not taken for the act itself, but for the subsisting thing. For these abstract terms denote, in their primary signification, not an act or a form, but the very thing itself, as we said in the preceding disputation.

However, "existence" differs from "person" in Richard's view, even if you add "incommunicable," as genus differs from species. For not every incommunicable existence is a person, but only in a rational nature. Wherefore the same Richard thus defines a divine person in chapter 22: "An incommunicable existence of the divine nature." And thereafter, after he had said in chapter 22 that it can also be defined by the word "individual," as Boethius defined it - if by "individual" be understood "that which cannot be distributed through many," which is what we call "incommunicable" - finally in chapter 23 he begins thus: "Perhaps it will be clearer and more expedient for understanding, if we say that a person is one existing per se only, according to a certain singular mode of rational existence." And as to how what is called "existing" ought to be taken, that is sufficiently made known from the foregoing; he says that this is clearer than if it be said that a person is an "individual substance," as Boethius defined it. But when he defined by

"existing," he took "Existing" and "existence" for the same thing, and therefore he said that how it is to be taken is evident from what preceded; for before he had spoken not of "existing," but of "existence."

Richard's mind was followed by John, the Theologian of the Latin Church, at the Council of Florence, session 19, far better than some theologians of our age, when he asserts that "substance" is understood by the Doctors in two ways, one way for the account and definition of the thing, another way for the supposit. For he immediately subjoins: "Which in another name is wont to be called 'hypostasis,' or 'existence,' or 'thing of nature'; and in the human genus the same 'substance' signifies 'person,' since 'person' is said to be 'an existence of a nature capable of reason, incommunicable'; and thus, in the rational species, 'substance,' taken for 'supposit,' makes up 'existence' as well as 'person' among all those Doctors who wrote against Arius and Macedonius." From which it appears that John uses for the same thing these three - existence, hypostasis, and substance - namely the very supposit in a rational nature, which is "person": therefore he does not take it for the act of existing, which the Scholastics call existere or esse. And since he affirms the definition of "person" handed down by Richard, he very well knew this to be Richard's mind.[238]

It has pleased us to report these things at such length; forgive us, reader, for we have done this to show that one must not trust citations which are brought in haste and without mature examination; for by them the disputation is sometimes wont to be made more prolix, not without loss of time.

The true opinion is then proved by the authority of St. John Damascene, book 1 De fide, chapter 1; and the same Damascene, book 3, chapter 5, at the beginning, assigns the difference among the divine persons in respect of cause and caused and the properties of origins; and "in respect of personal perfection," that is, in respect of mode of existing. He did not say "in respect of personal existences," but "in respect of mode of existing." And by "mode of existence" he calls the very properties in the same place, book 3, chapter 5, at the beginning.[239]

The same opinion is confirmed by reason.

Caput III - The first reason for our opinion

From the aforesaid testimony of Damascene the first reason for our opinion is drawn. For if "humanity," and any created nature whatsoever, is said to have one only existence, that is, one act of existing, whether it be in another or subsist per se; and from the sole fact that it exists per se it is not said to have a new act of existing nor a new existence, even a personal one, but a new mode of existing - although the mode of existence per se really differs from substantial existence when it can be separated from it - much more does it follow that one divine person, from the fact that it exists by the substantial existence of the essence and, besides it, has a personal property which is a

238. John, "Theologian of the Latin Church," at the Council of Florence, session 19: on the twofold acceptation of "substance" and the identification of "existence," "hypostasis," and "substance" with the supposit, i.e., the person, in a rational nature.

239. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 1; and III, c. 5, at the beginning: the distinction of persons according to mode of existing; and "mode of existence" is the name he uses for the personal properties.

mode of existing and is distinguished from it only by reason, does not have a double existence, even according to our mode of understanding, but the same one which another person has, though in another mode. Moreover a mode of existing per se would not add to a thing a new existence, but a new mode of existing; this is plain in human nature both existing per se and existing in another, as in Christ; and in accidents existing in a subject and then per se, when in the Sacrament of the Altar they are left without a subject. For one existence does not modify another, nor is one added to another as a mode of it. Therefore any mode of existing in the universe is not a new existence, even if it really differs from existence - although about other modes one must judge otherwise.

A second reason against the former opinion, and in confirmation of ours, can be of this sort. If in God there were three relative existences, that is, three acts of existing, there would also be three relative durations, as the adversaries boldly concede: therefore absolutely, without that addition "relative," three durations ought to be conceded. For just as we concede three things (res), without any limitation, because "thing" is a transcendental, as we proved in disputation 12, chapters 3 and 7, in the same way three existences and durations ought to be conceded without any addition. For since "existence," according to the adversaries' view, is nothing other than some actual entity, and "entity" is the same as "thing in act," it follows that there are three durations...

Following Richard's mind, John, the Theologian of the Latin Church at the Council of Florence, session 19, much better than some theologians of our age, teaches the same thing, when he asserts that "substance" is understood by Doctors in two ways: in one way, according to the account and definition of the thing; in another way, for the supposit. For he immediately subjoins: "Which also by another name is wont to be called hypostasis, or existence, or the thing of a nature; and, in the human kind, the same 'substance' signifies 'person,' since a person is said to be that which is capable of a rational nature, with incommunicable existence; thus, in the rational species, 'substance,' taken for a supposit, perfects existence and person among all those Doctors who wrote against Arius and Macedonius." From which it appears that John uses these three - existence, hypostasis, and substance - for the same thing, namely the supposit in a rational nature, which is the person; therefore he does not take it for the act of existing, which the Schoolmen call "to exist" or "existence" (*esse*). And since he asserts the definition of person handed down by Richard, he very well knew that author's mind.[240][241]

It pleased me to recount these things at such length - pardon me, reader - for we did it to show that little trust should be placed in allegations which are wont to be brought forward hastily and without mature examination; to satisfy which there sometimes, not without loss of time, a disputation is made more prolix.

Our true position is then proved by the authority of St. John Damascene, book 1, On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 1, where, assigning the difference among the divine persons in respect of cause and caused, and of the properties of origin, he writes in these words: "And in respect of

240. John, "Theologian of the Latin Church," at the Council of Florence, session 19: on the twofold acceptation of "substance" and the identification of "existence," "hypostasis," and "substance" with the supposit, i.e., the person, in a rational nature.

241. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate V, c. 1.

personal perfection, that is, the mode of existing." He did not say "in respect of personal existences," but "in respect of the mode of existing." For who ever called existence, that is, the act of existing, the "mode of existence"? In the same way he named the properties themselves at the beginning of book 3, chapter 5.[242]

The same position is confirmed by reason.

First reason. From likeness. Any one nature has only one act of existing (*existentia*), by which it subsists of itself and exists. A mode of existing is not said to be an existence, nor a personal one, although it follows upon personal subsistence. For that which adds only a mode of existing to an already actually existing entity does not add a new existence, but a new mode of existing. Thus, in things where a new mode of existing is superadded, a new existence is not for that reason posited: as in Christ there is added to the human nature the mode of existing in the divine supposit; and in accidents there is sometimes the mode of existing in a subject and then per se, as happens in the sacrament of the altar without a subject; yet one and the same existence remains, and not another added to another.

Second reason. Against the adversaries' position and in confirmation of ours there can be such a reason: if in God there were three relative existences, that is, three modes of existing that are also relative, as the adversaries maintain, then there would be conceded three durations corresponding to those relatives; but then, absolutely and without that restriction, three durations could be conceded, as we grant three things, without any multiplication of existences. For if the one existence which transcends the three properties is multiplied inasmuch as it is conjoined with them, so that there are several relative durations and existences, why should not several existences and durations be conceded simply, if existence and duration are transcendent, like "thing" and "being"? Yet it is better to say that existence and duration are not transcendent, as "thing" and "being" are; for these names are also said of the modes of a thing. But since existence admits various modes, and one and the same existence is not thereby transmuted into another, the mode of existing is not called "existence," but is said to accrue to the existence of the thing; and by one and the same existence the thing is said to exist. For this is such a mode that it is said only of another. From these points that argument is solved which in the first chapter we adduced for this position: we say, therefore, that existence is some entity or thing, not just any, but such as follows upon some actual existence or entity as its mode; for the entity which follows upon existence and itself modifies it is not called "existence," but "mode of existence." To existence, indeed, there does not accrue another existence, nor does one existence accrue to another, although existence makes the thing to exist in such or such a mode, according as such and such a mode accrues to it.

But you will object to us in this way. In God there is the production of a person; but every production, just as it terminates at something produced, so also produces some existence; therefore, since a distinct person is produced, it follows that a distinct existence is produced. I reply that, if this argument had any force, it would in the same way prove that in the proceeding person a

242. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 1; and III, c. 5, at the beginning: the distinction of persons according to mode of existing; and "mode of existence" is the name he uses for the personal properties.

new nature and essence are produced. For if the production terminates at an existence produced, it must also terminate at an essence produced. But just as in the divine realities we say that there is another kind of production, by which, to wit, nature and essence are not produced, but the same essence of the producing person is communicated to the produced person, so also must it be said about existence and "to be," which are altogether the same: namely, that the production of a divine person is indeed a production of a person distinct from the producer; but by it there is communicated to the produced person the same "to be," and existence, and the same nature. Nor must it be said that what is produced is solely personality; but rather a person, which, according to our mode of understanding, consists of essence and personality. Thus the same essence of the producing person is communicated to the produced person, and another person is constituted inasmuch as it subsists under a different relation, which relation modifies and determines the same essence and existence as present to the new person; not, however, because generation produces only the mode of this existence, namely the relation. In the generation of a created person it falls out otherwise: because the nature of the begotten is produced with the mode of existing per se; and that mode is not made by a different production, since it does not have a different existence from the existence of the nature, but it modifies and determines it.

Third reason. Because from the opposite opinion it would follow that three eternities must be conceded in God, which is against the Athanasian Symbol: "Not three eternals, but one eternal," where the name is plainly taken not adjectively but substantively, namely for eternity. For if there are three durations without beginning and without end and without succession, it follows that there are three eternities; for this is the definition of eternity. But if you say that three relative eternities can be conceded, not, however, without the aforesaid restriction - against this is what we said above about existence and duration.[243]

Some reply that three eternities cannot in any way, not even with that limitation "relative," be conceded as three durations are conceded; and they assign the reason for the difference: because the notion of eternity is not only duration without beginning and end and all at once, but also the most perfect duration; which no relation has from itself, but from the nature which it includes in itself; and it connotes, as its foundation, the immutability of the nature.

I indeed hold as most true that eternity is the most perfect duration, which notion of nature befits God, distinct from immutability according to notion, as I noted above; wherefore, if eternity in its notion does not include the immutability of the nature but presupposes it, there is no reason why it should not also befit relations according to the notion of relations, if also a proper duration befits them. From this, however, which is said - that the duration of relations is not most perfect, such as is that of the nature - there follows a greater absurdity: namely, that there is in God one most perfect duration and three less perfect ones. Then, if those three relative durations are not eternities, since they are durations without beginning and without end, either they will be time discretely, or "aeon" as the durations of angels; or participated eternities; or finally some new genus of durations - which consequences follow from once conceding in God several existences and

243. Symbolum Athanasii: "Non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus."

several durations. Let, then, the contrary opinion go; and with the Fathers let us assert that the three persons have one existence, one duration, one eternity. And this is enough concerning the doctrine of this article.

Articulus III - Whether the name "Person" ought to be posited in the divine

It is asked:

Objicitur: 1. Pseudo-Dionysius says in the beginning of On the Divine Names: "Universally, it is not to be dared to say or to think anything concerning the supersubstantial hidden divinity, beyond those things which have been divinely expressed to us from the holy oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in sacred Scripture of the New or Old Testament. Therefore the name "person" is not to be used in divine matters.[244]

1. Moreover, Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures, at the beginning of chapter 3: the name "person" seems to be transferred from those masks (personae) which in comedies and tragedies represented men. For "persona" is said from "personare," because by its hollowness the sound must needs be made louder. But the Greeks call these masks "prosopa," from the fact that they are put on the face and cover the countenance before the eyes. But this cannot befit divine realities, unless perhaps metaphorically. Therefore the name "person" is not said of God except metaphorically.[245]
2. Moreover, every person is a hypostasis. But the name "hypostasis" does not seem to befit God; since, according to Boethius, it signifies that which is subjected to accidents, which are not in God. Jerome also says that, under this name hypostasis, "venom lies hidden beneath honey." Therefore this name "person" is not to be said of God.[245][246]
3. Moreover, from whatever a definition is removed, from that the definiendum is removed. But the definition of person set down above does not seem to befit God. First, because "reason" imports discursive cognition, which does not befit God, as was shown above; and thus God cannot be said to be of rational nature. Next also because God cannot be called an "individual substance," since the principle of individuation is matter, but God is immaterial; nor does He subsist in accidents, so as to be able to be called "substance." Therefore the name "person" ought not to be attributed to God.

But on the contrary: it is said in the Athanasian Symbol: "Other is the person of the Father, other of the Son, other of the Holy Spirit."[243]

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244. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, at the beginning.
245. Boethius, De duabus naturis, c. 3, at the beginning (as cited).
245. Boethius, De duabus naturis, c. 3, at the beginning (as cited).
246. St. Jerome, Epistle to Damasus, which begins "Quoniam vetusto."
243. Symbolum Athanasii: "Non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus."

I answer: "Person" signifies that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely that which subsists (*subsistit*) in a rational nature. Hence, since everything which pertains to perfection is to be attributed to God, because His essence contains in itself every perfection, it is fitting that this name "person" be said of God. Yet not in the same mode in which it is said of creatures, but in a more excellent mode: just as other names too, which are imposed by us from creatures, are attributed to God, as was shown above when treating of the divine names.

Reply to the first: Although the name "person" is not found said of God in the Scripture of the Old or New Testament, nevertheless that which the name signifies is found asserted of God in many ways in sacred Scripture: namely, that He is the most "per se" being and most perfectly intelligent. But if one had to say of God only those things according to the sound of the words which sacred Scripture hands down of God, it would follow that no one could ever speak about God except in that very language in which the Scripture of the Old or New Testament was first delivered. But the necessity of disputing with heretics compelled the inventing of new names signifying the ancient faith about God. Nor must this novelty be shunned, since it is not profane - inasmuch as it does not disagree with the sense of Scripture. But the Apostle teaches us to avoid profane novelties of words (1 Tim 6:20).[247]

Reply to the second: Although this name "person" does not befit God according to that from which the name was imposed - since in comedies and tragedies certain famous men were represented, and thus this name "persona" was imposed to signify those possessed of some dignity - yet it most of all befits God according to that which it was imposed to signify. For those who have some dignity are wont to be called "persons" in the Churches. Wherefore some define "person" saying that a person is "a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to dignity." And because it is of great dignity to subsist in a rational nature, therefore every individual of rational nature is called a person, as is well known. But the dignity of the divine nature exceeds every dignity. And according to this the name "person" most befits God.

Reply to the third: The name "hypostasis" does not befit God as to that on account of which the name was imposed, since He is not subject to accidents; it does befit Him, however, as to that for which it is imposed, namely to signify a subsistent thing. Jerome, moreover, says that under this name "venom lies hidden," because, before the signification of this name was fully known among Latins, the heretics by this name deceived the simple, so that they would confess several essences, just as they confess several hypostases; because the name "substance" (to which the Greek name "hypostasis" corresponds) is commonly taken among us for "essence."

Reply to the fourth: God can be said to be of rational nature, inasmuch as "reason" does not import discursus, but universally an intelligible nature. "Individual," moreover, does not befit God inasmuch as the principle of individuation is matter, but only inasmuch as it imports incommunicability. "Substance," indeed, befits God inasmuch as it signifies that which subsists per se. Certain men, however, say that the above definition of person does not befit God, but that the

247. 1 Tim 6:20. "Devitans profanas vocum novitates."

definition of person in God is different. Wherefore Richard of St. Victor, wishing to correct this definition, said that "person," according to which it is defined in God, is "the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature."[241]

Disputatio CXXVII

[on the name "person" in God]

What is said of God is the incommunicable existence (*existentia*) of the divine nature.

Observations concerning the doctrine of the Article.

Conclusion of the article is affirmative, and most certain according to the faith: for it is said in the Athanasian Symbol, "For one is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit."[248] Also in the Council of Toledo XI and in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith, the Fathers use the name "person" to explain the mystery of the Trinity; this is familiar to all the Fathers and Councils, who explain this mystery by the name "hypostasis," as is seen in those things we cited in Disputation 124.[249] Moreover, in Greek person is called prosopon; and, as is clear from what was said in the exposition of the letter of the preceding article and in Disputation 126, hypostasis or subsistence (*subsistentia*) is broader than person: for the latter is only in a rational nature, whereas the former is in any substance.

But Laurentius Valla, in book 6 of the Elegantiae, chapter 34, with his usual liberty of speech, says these words: "Person is no more in man than in a brute: and further, if it must be said of God, it will no more signify substance than quality; for as much in God as in man the name 'person' signifies the quality of some substance, whereby it differs from another: the quality, I say, as well of soul as of body; as much external as internal - internal quality of soul, for example, that one studies assiduously, that he is a physician or a theologian; internal quality of body, for example, that he is a young man or an old man; and external, whether he is a husband or a bachelor. In the same way he thinks that in God three persons are said, because in Him three qualities are signified - paternity, filiation, and spiration; except that in God the qualities cannot be separated from Him, as the qualities of men can from them." Truly this author is manifestly in error, when, contrary to the common usage of the Councils and the Fathers, he refers the name "person" to quality alone, and not to substance, and does not concede that person is said only of a rational nature, as from the foregoing stands established. Moreover, that this name does not signify quality is proved, because we do not say that the person of the same man is different if he is a young man, or an old man, or a physician, or a theologian; for, if it signified quality only, the person would have to be said diverse in a youth and an old man, and so on.

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241. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate V, c. 1.

248. Athanasian Creed: "Non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus."

249. Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter Firmiter, "De summa Trinitate et fide catholica" (and cf. Council of Toledo XI).

Nor does it stand in the way that, when asked "What person is Peter?", we are wont to answer by qualities: "he is a young man," "he is a theologian," and the like. For we do this when we explain his substance by qualities; or certainly because by that form of asking inquiry is wont to be made about the quality of the person himself. But when we say that the same man is a multiple person, both because he is a private person and because he carries the person of the magistrate, we speak so because he is substantially one person, and he represents another, namely the person of the prince, or some fictive person of the commonwealth, as St. Thomas observed in the second solution.

Cajetan proposes two doubts concerning the text of St. Thomas. The first is about that which he assumes in his reasoning, namely, that the most perfect thing in nature is person. The reason for doubting is that nature is by far more perfect than person. He himself answers that in God person is said to be the most perfect in nature, not because personality, that is, the ultimate terminus of person, is more perfect than nature itself, but because then nature is said to be in a more perfect mode when it is complete of itself by personality: for person includes nature itself, but adds the complement, namely personality. But he objects to himself: material individuals are less perfect than nature itself, because individuals are said to be by reason of nature, as by the most perfect; therefore nature is not in the most perfect mode when it is per se and constituted in the notion of person. He himself answers that nature is included in the individual, so as to show that the individual is not less perfect. Then he answers that here the discourse is about person not only as it is material, but universally, as it is common both to material and to spiritual. I, however, would say absolutely that even a material individual, subsisting per se, is in a more perfect mode than nature itself without that mode, and thus person is something most perfect in nature.

The second doubt is this: If it is true, as St. Thomas says, that person is something most perfect in nature and contains dignity (*dignitas*) insofar as it is person, it follows that in God there are three dignities, which are the three persons. Cajetan replies that person includes something of perfection in God, namely nature, and something abstracted from perfection and imperfection, namely relation (*relatio*). But against him we proved in Disputation 122, chapter 2, that relation also pertains to the perfection of God; and in what way it does not follow therefrom that there are in God three perfections real, and one in one person which is not in another, we also explained there in chapter 6.

Whether "person" signifies relation.

Objicitur: It seems that this name "person" does not signify relation, but substance in God. For Augustine says in book 7 On the Trinity: "When we say 'the person of the Father,' we say nothing else than the substance of the Father; for 'person' is said of Him with respect to Himself, not with respect to the Son."[250] Therefore this name "person" signifies substance.

1. Moreover: The question "who?" seeks the essence. But, as Augustine says in the same place, when it is said: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit," and it is asked, "who three?", it is answered, "three persons." Therefore this name "person" signifies essence.[250]
2. Moreover: According to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV, a name is that which is signified through its definition; but the definition of person is "an individual substance of a rational nature," as was said. Therefore this name "person" signifies substance.[251]
3. Moreover: Person in men and in angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. If therefore in God it signified relation, it would be said equivocally of God and of men and angels.

But on the contrary is what Boethius says in the book On the Trinity, that every name pertaining to persons signifies relation. But no name pertains to person more than this name "person." Therefore this name "person" signifies relation.[252]

I answer: Concerning the signification of this name "person" in divine matters, a difficulty arises from the fact that it is predicated in the plural of three, contrary to the nature of essential names; nor is it said "to something," as are the names which signify relation. Hence it seemed to some that this name "person" simply, by the force of the word, signifies essence in the divine, as do this name "God" and this name "wise"; but on account of the urgency of the heretics it has been accommodated by ordinance of the Council, so that it can stand for relatives, and especially in the plural, or with a partitive name, as when we say "three persons," or "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son." In the singular, however, it can be taken for an absolute and for a relative. But this does not seem a sufficient reason. For if this name "person," by force of its signification, has not what it signifies except essence in the divine, from the fact that it is said "three persons," occasion would have been given them not merely for a heretical quibble, but for a greater calumny. And therefore others have said that this name "person" in divine matters signifies essence and relation at once. Of these some said that it signifies essence in the direct case, and relation in the oblique: because person is said as if "by itself one." But unity pertains to essence; what however is said "by itself" implies relation obliquely. For the Father is understood to be "by Himself" as if by a relation distinguished from the Son. Others, however, said conversely, that it

250. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII; cf. also VI, c. 4; and V, c. 9 (at the end).
250. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII; cf. also VI, c. 4; and V, c. 9 (at the end).
251. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV (text 28).
252. Boethius, De trinitate.

signifies relation in the direct case and essence in the oblique: because in the definition of person nature is put in the oblique. And these approached nearer to the truth. For the elucidation of this question it must be considered that there is something less common in signification which nevertheless is not outside the signification of something more common. For "rational" is included in the signification of "man," which however is not of the signification of "animal." Whence it is one thing to ask about the signification of "animal," and another to ask about the signification of "this animal" which is "man." Similarly, it is one thing to ask about the signification of this name "person" in common, and another about the signification of the divine person. For person in common signifies an individual substance of a rational nature, as was said. But what is individual is that which in itself is undivided, and is distinct from others. Therefore person, in any nature whatsoever, signifies that which is distinct in that nature. Thus in human nature it signifies "these fleshly parts, these bones, and this soul," which are the principles individuating this man; which things, although they are not of the signification of "person," are nevertheless of the signification of "human person." But distinction in the divine is made only by relations of origin, as was said above. Moreover, relation in the divine is not like an accident inhering in a subject, but is the divine essence itself. Whence also the subsisting divine essence subsists. Therefore, as "Godhead" is God, so the divine paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person. Therefore the divine person signifies relation and subsistence. And this is to signify relation under the mode of substance, which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature; although that which subsists in the divine nature is not other than the divine nature.

And according to this it is true that this name "person" signifies relation in the direct case and essence in the oblique; not, however, relation insofar as it is relation, but insofar as it is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature; although that which subsists in the divine nature is not other than the divine nature. Similarly also it signifies essence in the direct case and relation in the oblique: in the oblique, insofar as essence is the same as hypostasis; but hypostasis in the divine is signified by a distinct relation. And, according to this, it can also be said that this signification of this name "person" was not perceived before the calumny of the heretics. Whence this name "person" was not in use except as one of the other absolutes. But after a time this name "person" was accommodated to stand for a relative by the congruity of its signification: that is to say, that this which stands for a relative has it not only by use (as the first opinion said), but also from its own signification.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this name "person" is said "with respect to self," not "with respect to another": because it signifies relation not under the mode of relation, but under the mode of substance, which is hypostasis. And according to this Augustine says that it signifies essence, insofar as in God essence is the same as hypostasis, because in God that which is and that by which He is do not differ.

Reply to the second: The question "what?" sometimes seeks the nature which the definition signifies: as when one asks "what is man?" and it is answered, "a rational, mortal animal." But sometimes it seeks the supposit (*suppositum*): as when one asks "what swims in the sea?" and it is answered, "a fish." And thus, to those asking "who three?" one will answer, "there are three persons."

Reply to the third: In the concept of an individual substance, that is, of one distinct or incommunicable, relation is understood in the divine, as was said.

Reply to the fourth: The diversity of the notions of less common terms does not cause equivocation in the more common. For although the proper definition of horse and of ass is different, nevertheless they are named univocally by the name "animal": because the common definition of "animal" comes to both. Whence it does not follow that, although in the signification of the divine person relation is contained, not however in the human, there is equivocation; because both agree in the common notion of an individual substance of a rational nature.

Conclusion of the article is: The divine person signifies relation as subsisting; whether, however, relation is signified directly and in the nominative, or consequently and obliquely, is not so manifest in the Holy Doctor; nevertheless we have elucidated his mind and the truth of the matter in the disputation.

Whether the name Person signifies relation, or substance

Caput I - Various Scholastic opinions

The first opinion in this matter is that of Scotus in the First Book, distinction 23, question 1, who, as it seems more probable to him, holds that the name "person" directly signifies neither substance (*substantia*) nor relation (*relatio*), but negation alone.[253] He proves the former thus: in the divine, substance is said singularly, but person plurally; therefore person does not signify substance. He shows the latter thus: Whatever the related term (relatum) is referred to inferiorly, it is also referred to superiorly, and the being of that thing is predicated of it. For instance, if "double of this" is said of "half of this," then, in the same way, double in general will be said "double of a half." Moreover, if "this double" is said to be related to "this half," so also double universally will be said to be related to half. Therefore, if "person" signifies relation, then it will also be said with respect to that terminus to which the relation itself that it signifies is referred; wherefore, just as we say, "the son is the father's son," and "he is related to the father," so also we could say, "the person of the Son is the person of the Father," which is absurd; therefore "person" does not signify relation. Scotus further adds that the name "person" signifies negation directly, but connotes three positives: for he takes the ultimate complement of the person to be the negation of communication - both as of a universal and as of a part - by which a thing is said to be not in another; on which we shall say more in the Third Part of St. Thomas, question 4, article 2.[254] And, indeed, he says the

253. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1.
254. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4, a. 2.

three connoted items in the divine person are these. First, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as certain inferiors contained under that negation. Second, the relation itself of paternity, filiation, or procession, by reason of which that negation belongs to the person. Third, the divine essence, which the person includes.

But this view is not to be embraced: for, as we shall show more at large in the Third Part, "person" does not directly signify negation, although sometimes it is explained by a negation. And although in human matters it is not so easy to assign the peculiar mode by which the nature is contracted so as to be a person, nevertheless in the divine the mode is very manifest: for the personal properties, or relations, are that in which the Church recognizes and celebrates the number of persons, not negations; therefore Scotus poorly thinks that the name "person" directly and formally signifies negation; about which again in Disputation 130.

Among others who think this name signifies a positive thing, not all speak in the same way about that direct signified. The second opinion in order is that of the same Scotus in the First Book, distinction 27, question 1, and likewise in distinction 25, question 1, who affirms that this name does not signify relation, nor substance, but something common to relation and substance; if we are to say that it signifies not a negation, but a positive, which Scotus himself also deems probable.[255][256] Durandus vigorously attacks this view in the First Book, distinction 23, question 1, number 16, showing it to be impossible for there to be something common to the absolute and the relative except in name alone; which also we shall prove in passing in Disputation 130, chapter 3.[257]

The third opinion is of that same Durandus there, number 24, asserting that in the divine the name "person" directly signifies neither relation, nor substance, nor negation, but a certain denomination of second intention (as he calls it) - just as also the name "individual" signifies a second intention.

The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan in this article, who holds that in God the name "person" signifies formally and directly relation; but materially, and as it were consequently, or not directly, substance; and he thinks the Blessed Thomas to be of this view in this very article; indeed, he holds that he changed those things which previously he had followed in De potentia, question 9, article 4, where he had taught that the name "person" signifies directly substance, not, however, directly relation.[258] What Cajetan says can be recommended by this: because the name "person" directly signifies the personal property, and connotes, or not directly signifies, the nature which is contracted by the property; but in the divine, the personal property is relation, while the nature is substance: therefore the name "person" directly signifies relation, and connotes substance.

Fifth and finally, Alexander (I, question 56, member 2), and St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 25, article 1, question 1, and Gabriel, and Capreolus, and Marsilius, and the Canariensis against Cajetan in this very article diametrically oppose him: for they say that the name "person" directly signifies substance, but consequently relation.[259][260] The reason of this opinion is that person is

255. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 27, q. 1.
256. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 25, q. 1.
257. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, n. 16.
258. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.

defined as an individual substance of a rational nature; therefore the direct signified of this name is an individual substance: wherefore, since it is rendered "an individual substance," that is, incommunicable, by relation, it comes about that relation also is connoted by the name "person" obliquely, as that by which the individual substance is what it is.

Caput II - The name Person signifies formally and directly substance; materially, however, but directly relation; essence, however, consequently

St. Thomas in this article remembers two posterior opinions which we reported in the preceding chapter, and he says that each seems to have something of the truth; wherefore he himself embraces a middle way, which in my judgment is truest; nor did he retract that which he had taught in De potentia, question 9.[258] Accordingly, he asserts that the name "person" signifies directly and formally substance; and also directly, but materially, it signifies relation; essence (*essentia*) moreover it connotes consequently and obliquely.

Now, that we may confirm this opinion, it must be noted that the signified of any name is twofold: one is the direct signified, which is wont to be unfolded in the nominative case; the other is the non-direct signified, which is said to be connoted, and is unfolded in an oblique case; we have both in the definition of person. For when we say, "It is an individual substance," we express the direct signified; but when there is added, "of a rational nature," we denote the non-direct signified, which is in the oblique. Again, something can be directly signified in a twofold way: both formally, when it is expressly unfolded by the very name, and also materially, when it is not expressed distinctly, but is contained as the subject and the material of the formal signified.

Accordingly, in the present case, the name "person" directly and distinctly expresses substance, and by connotation signifies not essence, but substance - namely subsistence (*subsistentia*), in Greek hypostasis (*hypostasis*), or, as Richard of St. Victor (whom we cited in the preceding disputation) speaks, existence; but it signifies essence in the oblique, as we noted a little earlier, when we said "of a rational nature." But if we speak of the direct signified of this name in the material sense, it is the relation itself: for that in which an incommunicable subsistence stands is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which directly signify relations - but in another way than "person": for this name does not express hypostasis under a relative name, but under the concept of subsistence, whether this be a relation or something absolute. For if the divine persons were constituted by absolute properties, they would not be signified by the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; yet they would be signified by the names person and hypostasis; and this rightly proves Scotus's argument which we reported in the preceding chapter. For if the name "person" expressly signified relation, we should say "the person of someone" (just as a father is said to be the father of

259. Alexander of Hales, I, q. 56, memb. 2.
260. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1.
258. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.

someone), namely, of him to whom it would be referred - which is absurd, as is there noted; by which very reasoning St. Augustine proves, in book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 6, that the name "person" is not said relatively as "father" is.[261]

And thus his saying, namely, that to signify relation in God he understands expressly and formally, as has been explained. But when St. Thomas said in this article that the divine person signifies relation, he wished to say, not as relation, but as subsisting: because it does not signify relation under an express concept of relation, but under the concept of substance, that is, of subsistence and hypostasis, which is the direct and formal signified; but it signifies relation materially, yet directly: because that is what it is to be a hypostasis. Likewise, when in the same article he says that the name "person" signifies essence in the nominative, insofar as it is the same as hypostasis, and relation in the oblique - which is, as it were, not directly - this must be understood thus: namely, that essence under the concept of hypostasis is the direct and formal signified, as has been explained; but relation abstractly is the connoted in the oblique: because essence is rendered hypostasis incommunicable by relation. But when we say that relation is directly with the signification of the name "person," although materially, we understand it in the concrete: that is, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

From what has been said it follows, first, against the first opinion of Scotus, that the name "person" does not formally signify negation only, or the mode of a subsistent. Second, against Durandus, that the name "person" does not signify a second intention, as we have shown in the two places cited. Third, it follows that Cajetan was mistaken in asserting that this name signifies formally relation, and materially substance; since rather in the opposite way does it signify these two things, as has been proved. Nor does his argument prove anything more than that relation is signified in the concrete directly by the name "person," not formally, but materially; which we do not deny. Wherefore the opinion of Alexander and of others is true in part, as the Holy Doctor says in this article, in that, I say, he teaches that it directly signifies substance, not relation; and he is speaking only of the formal signified, and not also of the material signified, as we explained. Finally, against those things that have been said, the second argument of Scotus has no strength, which tried to prove that that name does not signify substance, because substance is not multiplied, whereas "person" is multiplied in God. For not every "substance" is not multiplied in God, but that which is taken for essence; but that which is called hypostasis or subsistence is multiplied, as "person" is multiplied. And this suffices concerning the doctrine of this question 29.

Quaestio XXX - On the plurality of persons

Then there is asked about the plurality of persons. And concerning this four things are asked.

261. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, c. 6.

Articulus I - Whether there are several persons in the divine

Objection 1. It seems first that there are not several persons in the divine. For person is an individual substance of a rational nature. If therefore there are several persons in the divine, it follows that there are several substances; which seems heretical.

Objection 2. Further, a plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, neither in God nor in us; much less therefore does a plurality of relations. But in God there is no other plurality than of relations, as was said above. Therefore one cannot say that in God there are several persons.

Objection 3. Further, Boethius says that concerning God one must speak thus, that this is true in him, that there is no number. But plurality imports number. Therefore there are not several persons in the divine.[262]

Objection 4. Further, wherever there is number, there is a whole and a part. If therefore in God there is a number of persons, there will be in God a whole and a part; which the divine simplicity rejects.

But on the contrary: what Athanasius says, "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit." Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are several persons.

I answer that: That there are several persons in the divine follows from the things set forth. For it has been shown above that subsistence (*subsistentia*) is multiplied, as person is multiplied. And this suffices for the doctrine of this question.

I said that St. Thomas meant, when he said that the divine person signifies relation not as relation, but as subsistent, that it does not signify relation under the express concept of relation, but under the concept of substance, that is, subsistence (*subsistentia*) and hypostasis, which is the direct and formal signification; but it signifies the relation materially, yet directly, because it is that by which the hypostasis is constituted. Likewise, when in the same article he says that this name signifies essence in the nominative, inasmuch as it is the same thing as hypostasis, and relation in an oblique case, this ought to be understood in this way: namely, that essence, under the notion of hypostasis, is the direct and formal signified, as was explained; but relation is abstractly the connoted in the oblique case, because essence is rendered an incommunicable hypostasis by relation. When, however, we said that relation is the direct signification of the name person, albeit materially, we understand this in the concrete, as it is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[263]

From what has been said it follows, first, against the earlier opinion of Scotus, that the name person does not formally signify a mere negation, but the mode of subsisting of itself. Secondly, against Durandus, that the name person does not signify a second intention: both of which we shall show more at length in the places cited. Thirdly, it follows that Cajetan was deceived when he asserted that this name signifies relation formally and substance materially; for rather it signifies

262. Boethius, De Trinitate.
263. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27, a. 1.

these two in the opposite way, as has been proved. Nor does his reason prove anything other than that relation is signified in the concrete directly by the name person, not formally, but materially - which we do not deny. Wherefore Alexander's opinion, and that of others, is true in part, as the holy Doctor said in this article, to wit, in that he teaches that the direct signified is substance, not relation, if he speak of the formal signified only, not also of the material, as we have explained. Finally, what he adds beyond this lends no strength to the things said, namely Scotus's second reason, by which he contends that that name does not signify substance, because substance is not multiplied, whereas person is multiplied in God: for not every substance is not multiplied in God, but that which is taken for essence; but that which is called hypostasis, or subsistence, is multiplied, as person is.[264][265][266]

Whether it is to posit several persons in the divine

Objicitur: First, it seems that one ought not to posit several persons in the divine. For person is an individual substance of a rational nature. If therefore there are several persons in the divine, it follows that there are several substances. Which seems heretical.

1. Further, a plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, neither in God nor in us; therefore much less does a plurality of relations. But in God there is no other plurality than of relations, as was said above. Therefore one cannot say that there are several persons in God.
2. Further, Boethius, speaking of God, says that "this is truly One, in which there is no number." But plurality imports number. Therefore there are not several persons in the divine.
3. Further, wherever there is number, there is whole and part. If therefore in God there is the number of persons, there will be in God a whole and a part. Which is repugnant to the divine simplicity.

But on the contrary: Athanasius says, "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit." Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are several persons.[267]

I answer that: That there are several persons in the divine follows from the premisses. For it has been shown above that this name "person" signifies in God a relation as a thing subsisting in the divine nature.[263] But it has been set forth above that there are several real relations in the divine. Whence it follows that there are several subsistents in the divine nature. And this is to be several persons in the divine.

264. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1.
265. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1.
266. Cajetan, In Iam, q. 27, a. 1.
267. Athanasian Creed.
263. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27, a. 1.

Reply to the first: Substance is not put into the definition of person insofar as it signifies essence, but insofar as it signifies supposit. This is clear from the fact that "individual" is added. But to signify substance as thus said, the Greeks have the name hypostasis. Whence as we say three persons, so they say three hypostases. We, however, are not wont to say three substances, lest three essences be understood because of the equivocation of the name.[268][269]

Reply to the second: Absolute properties in the divine (such as goodness and wisdom) are not opposed to one another; hence neither are they really distinguished. Therefore, although it befits them to subsist, still they are not several subsisting things, which is to be several persons. But in created things absolute properties do not subsist, although they are really distinguished among themselves, as whiteness and sweetness. Relative properties, however, in God both subsist and are really distinguished among themselves, as was said above. Whence the plurality of such properties suffices for the plurality of persons in the divine.[270]

Reply to the third: By reason of the highest unity and simplicity, every plurality of absolute things said absolutely is excluded from God, but not the plurality of relations, which relations are predicated of something as to another. And thus they do not import composition in that in which they are said, as Boethius teaches in the same book.[271]

Reply to the fourth: Number is twofold, namely a simple or absolute number, as two and three and four; and there is the number which is in things numbered, as two men and two horses. If therefore in the divine number be taken absolutely or abstractly, nothing prevents there being whole and part in it; and thus it exists only in the acceptance of our intellect. For an absolute number apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if we take number as it is in things numbered, thus in created things one is a part of two, and two of three, as one man of two, and two of three. And thus it is not in God, because the Father is as great as the whole Trinity, as will be clear below.[272]

Notations around the article.

The conclusion is affirmative, and from the foregoing article sufficiently manifest; it is expressly set forth in the Athanasian Creed: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit."

But with respect to the solution of the fourth, there is a difficulty proposed in the same argument in this way. If there is in God a number of persons, it follows that there is in Him something greater and less, something more perfect and less perfect; that there are also whole and parts: for all these are found in any number whatsoever. First, because in any multitude the whole multitude is something greater than if one take away some unity of it. Then, because a whole

268. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, c. 8.
269. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, c. 6.
270. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 28, a. 3.
271. Boethius, De Trinitate.
272. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 42, a. 4.

number is something more perfect than a part of it. Lastly, because an entire number has the notion of a whole, and each unity the notion of a part. But these are absurd: for it is said in the Athanasian Creed, "In this Trinity there is nothing earlier or later; nothing greater or less."

St. Thomas answers in this way. If the number which is in the divine be taken absolutely and abstractly, nothing hinders that there be there whole and part; and he will say the same about the other things which we inferred in the argument: because in this way only by the intellect is it said to be whole and part, greater and less, more perfect and less perfect: if, however, number be taken as it is in the things themselves, nothing of these is found in the number of the divine persons. The solution, indeed, if it be rightly explained, is most true; but at first sight it seems not sufficiently to satisfy the argument: for if those things agree to number taken abstractly, they ought also to agree to number contracted to any matter whatsoever, and hence to the number of the divine persons; because what agree to number as such agree also to such a number, although not conversely. For the things which are said of the common and superior are also said of the inferior and singular.

Wherefore, to make this matter plain, note with Gabriel in the first book, dist. 24, q. 2, art. 3, first doubt, that "greater" and "less" can be considered in two ways: according to continuous quantity and according to discrete quantity. He understands continuous quantity either as quantity which they call of bulk, or that which they call of virtue and perfection: so that for something to be greater than another by the continuous quantity of bulk, it ought to be more extended; but by the quantity of virtue it ought to be more perfect in its entity and existence (*esse*). And in this way in the Trinity nothing is found greater, nothing less; and this is what St. Thomas meant when he said, "The Father is as great as the whole Trinity;" that is, as perfect by the continuous quantity of virtue and entity.

In this same way there is not found in the number of the Trinity a whole and a part: whereas in the multitude of other things the whole number is greater, that is, more perfect by a as-it-were continuous quantity than some of its unities: for a ternary of men is of greater perfection than a binary; and a ternary of horses is of more worth than a binary. But for something to be greater than another by discrete quantity, it need not be more perfect: it is enough if in one multitude there are said to be more than in another; and thus we grant in the Trinity a greater and a lesser number, that is, more and fewer unities: for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are more than the Father and the Son. Nor did St. Thomas teach anything against this doctrine; rather he indicated it briefly, when he said that in number itself taken abstractly there is greater and less; but not in the number contracted to the divine persons: as if he were saying: in the perfection of the persons themselves there is not greater and less - for this is attended to by the continuous quantity of virtue and perfection: nevertheless there is greater and less in the abstract number, that is, by reason of discrete number, without regard had to the perfection of the persons in themselves: there is a greater and a lesser number, which indeed is true. Therefore St. Thomas understands by abstract number only the ratio of discrete quantity and multitude in any matter whatsoever. In this way there is found whole and part in the Trinity, that is, the whole number and the parts thereof,

namely the individual unities; there is also found greater and less, more perfect and less perfect, because the greater number and the more perfect number is ternary than binary by reason of multitude and discrete quantity.

But it is to be observed that these names "greater" and "less" are not to be applied to the Trinity without an addition: because in the common mode of speaking they denote a greater and lesser perfection in continuous quantity; and therefore Athanasius said in the Creed, "In this Trinity nothing is greater or less": wherefore it will be necessary to speak with an addition in this way: in God there is a greater and a lesser number. The same must be said of whole and parts, and of more perfect and less perfect. Yet we could say, more and fewer persons, because these names signify more and less in discrete quantity.

Articulus II - Whether there are more than three persons in God

Objicitur: In the second way one proceeds. It seems that in God there are more persons than three. For the plurality of persons in the divine is according to the plurality of relative properties, as was said. But there are four relations in the divine (as was said above), namely paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in the divine.[273][274]

1. Further, nature does not differ more from will in God than nature from intellect. But in the divine there is a person who proceeds by mode of will, as love, and another who proceeds by mode of nature, as the Son. Therefore there is also another who proceeds by mode of intellect, as the Word; and thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in the divine.
2. Further, among created things what is more excellent has more intrinsic operations: thus man above the other animals has understanding and willing; and God infinitely exceeds every creature. Therefore there is not only a person proceeding by mode of will and by mode of intellect, but also by infinitely other modes. Therefore there are infinite persons in the divine.
3. Further, from infinite goodness it is fitting that it communicate itself infinitely by producing a divine person. But in the Holy Spirit there is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Spirit produces a divine person; and that one another; and so on to infinity.
4. Further, everything which is contained under a determinate number is measured; for number is a certain measure. But the divine persons are immense, as is clear from Athanasius: "Immense the Father, immense the Son, immense the Holy Spirit." Therefore they are not contained under a determinate number.[267]

273. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 28, a. 4.
274. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.
267. Athanasian Creed.

But on the contrary: It is said in 1 John, at the end: "There are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." But when one asks, three what, the answer is, three persons, as St. Augustine says in the seventh book on the Trinity. Therefore there are only three persons in the divine.[275][269]

I answer that: According to what has been set forth, it is necessary to posit only three persons in the divine. For it has been shown that several persons are several relations subsisting, really distinct from one another. But real distinctions among the divine relations are only by reason of relative opposition. Therefore it is necessary that two opposed relations pertain to two persons. If, however, opposed relations are not in the same person, it is necessary that they pertain to distinct persons. Therefore paternity and filiation (since they are opposed relations) necessarily pertain to two persons. Paternity, therefore, subsisting, is the person of the Father; and filiation subsisting is the person of the Son. But the other two relations have opposition to those, but are not opposed to each other; it is therefore impossible that both belong to one person. It is necessary, then, that either one of them belong to both of the aforesaid persons, or that one belong to one and the other to another. But it cannot be that procession belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them: because thus it would follow that the procession of the intellect, which is generation in the divine, according to which paternity and filiation are taken, would be posterior to the procession of love according to which spiration and procession are taken; and the person begetting and the begotten would proceed from the spirating, which is against what has been premised. Therefore it remains that only three persons are in the divine, namely the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the first: Although there are four relations in the divine, yet of them the spiration is not separated from the persons of the Father and of the Son, but includes both; and thus, although it is a relation, it does not constitute but embraces not one person only, nor therefore is it called a personal relation; and so it is not called a constituting relation of a person. But these three relations - paternity, filiation, and procession - are called personal properties, as constituting the persons. For paternity is the property of the Father; filiation of the Son; and procession of the Holy Spirit.

1. Moreover. In created things, that which is more excellent has more intrinsic operations. Thus man, above the other animals, has understanding and willing; but God surpasses every creature to an infinite degree. Therefore there is in God not only a person proceeding according to the mode of will and according to the mode of intellect, but according to infinitely many other modes. Therefore there are infinitely many persons in the Godhead.
2. Moreover. From the infinite goodness of the Father it follows that He communicate Himself infinitely by producing a divine person. But in the Holy Spirit there is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Spirit produces a divine person, and that one another, and so on to infinity.

275. 1 John 5:7.
269. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, c. 6.

3. Moreover. Whatever is contained under a determinate number is measurable. For number is a kind of measure. But the divine persons are immense, as is clear from the Athanasian Creed: "Immense the Father, immense the Son, immense the Holy Spirit."[276] Therefore they are not contained under the ternary number.

But on the contrary is what is said in 1 John, last chapter: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit."[277] And when one asks, "What three?" the answer is given: "Three persons," as St. Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 7, chapter 4, and the following.[278] Therefore there are only three persons in the Godhead.

I answer that, according to what has been set forth above, it is necessary to posit only three persons in the Godhead. For it has been shown that several persons are several subsisting relations really distinct from one another; but a real distinction among the divine relations exists only by reason of relative opposition. Therefore it is necessary that two opposed relations pertain to two persons. And if there are relations which are not opposed, it is necessary that they pertain to the same person. Therefore paternity and filiation, since they are opposed relations, necessarily pertain to two persons. Accordingly, paternity, as subsisting, is the person of the Father; and filiation, as subsisting, is the person of the Son. But the other two relations have opposition to neither of these; rather, they are opposed to each other. It is therefore impossible that both should belong to one person. It must be then that either one of them belongs to both of the aforementioned persons, or that one belongs to one, and the other to the other; yet it cannot be that procession belongs to the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follow that the procession of the intellect, which is generation in the Godhead, according to which paternity and filiation are taken, would proceed from the procession of love, according to which spiratio and procession are taken, and the generating and the generated person would proceed from the spirating person - which is contrary to the foregoing. It remains, therefore, that spiratio belongs to the person of the Father and to the person of the Son, as having no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation. And consequently it is necessary that procession belong to another person, which is called the person of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds according to the mode of love, as was treated above.[279] Therefore it remains that there are only three persons in the Godhead, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the first: Although there are four relations in the Godhead, nevertheless one of them, namely spiratio, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to both. And thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to one person alone; nor is it a personal relation, that is, one constituting a person. But these three relations - paternity, filiation, and procession - are called personal properties as constituting the persons. For paternity is the person of the Father; filiation, the person of the Son; procession, the person of the Holy Spirit proceeding.

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276. Athanasian Creed.
277. 1 John 5:7.
278. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, c. 4 and the following.
279. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27.

Reply to the second: That which proceeds according to the mode of intellect, as word, proceeds according to the notion of likeness, just as also that which proceeds according to the mode of nature. And therefore it has been said above that the procession of the divine Word is generation itself according to the mode of nature; but love, insofar as it is of this sort, does not proceed as a likeness of that from which it proceeds - although in the Godhead love is coessential insofar as it is divine. And therefore the procession of love is not called generation in the Godhead.[280] [281]

Reply to the third: Since man is more perfect than the other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than the other animals, because his perfection is by way of composition. Hence in the angels, who are more perfect and simpler, there are fewer intrinsic operations than in man, for in them there is not imagining, sensing, and the like. But in God, as to the reality, there is but one operation, which is His essence; yet how there are two processions has been shown above.

Reply to the fourth: That reasoning would proceed, if the Holy Spirit had a goodness numerically other than the goodness of the Father; for then it would be necessary that, just as the Father by His goodness produces a divine person, so also the Holy Spirit would. But one and the same is the goodness of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. Nor is there any distinction except by personal relations - whence goodness belongs to the Holy Spirit as had from another, and to the Father as that by which it is communicated to another. But the opposition of relation does not permit that, together with the relation of the Holy Spirit, there be the relation of principle with respect to a divine person; for He proceeds from the other persons, which alone can be in the Godhead.

Reply to the fifth: A determinate number, if number be taken as the simple number which exists only in the understanding's apprehension, is measured by unity. But if the number of realities be taken, in the case of the divine persons, then the ratio of the measurable does not apply there, because the "magnitude" of the three persons is the same, as will be clear below; and the same is not measured by the same.[282]

Dubitationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion of the article is: There are not more than three persons in God. This is of faith on the authority of John, last chapter: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit"; and it is gathered from all that we have said concerning question 27 of St. Thomas.[277] [283]

But regarding those points which St. Thomas asserts in the text, Cajetan proposes two doubts. The first is this: In order that the holy Doctor might infer that there are three persons in God, he proved that passive procession does not belong to the Father and the Son together, because it would follow that the procession through the will would be prior, by priority of origin, to the procession through the intellect. But he does not prove that passive procession does not belong to

280. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27, a. 3.
281. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27, aa. 1 and 4.
282. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 2.
277. 1 John 5:7.
283. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 27.

the Son alone - which nevertheless he ought to have proved. For if the Son were produced through the intellect and the will together, the same person could be the Son and the Holy Spirit; and thus there would not be three persons.

Cajetan answers that the same absurdity entirely follows if we say that procession through the will belongs to the Son. For thus it is necessary either that the Son be produced first through the will, and then the procession through the will will be prior to the procession through the intellect; or that the Son be produced afterwards through the will, and this is impossible, because a person produced at once by one procession cannot be produced anew by another. But you will say: He could be produced at once through the intellect and through the will, and thus the same person would be begotten and proceeding. I answer, here St. Thomas is presupposing what he had said in question 27, namely, that there are two distinct processions, one through the intellect, the other through the will; but thus it is not possible that by both a person be produced equally in the first instant; for the same thing cannot be produced by two productions at once. How, however, procession through the will differs from procession through the intellect - namely, because that person who is through the will proceeds from the Father and the Son, and why, if He did not proceed from the Son, the procession through the will would be the same as the procession through the intellect - we shall show in Disputation 14.

The second doubt is: How is it true that only relative opposition in God is the cause of the distinction of persons, since procession is really distinguished from paternity, to which it is not opposed? Cajetan answers that one thing may be opposed relatively in two ways: either by reason of an opposed relation, as paternity and filiation; or by reason of origin, when two are so disposed that one is from the other - thus passive procession is opposed to paternity and to filiation, as if one were to say, it is opposed by reason of an adjoined relation, namely active spiration, which is conjoined to filiation and to paternity. How, however, this suffices, and whether, if active spiration were not conjoined to paternity, nevertheless paternity would be distinguished from passive procession, or not, we shall explain in the cited disputation, chapter 6.

Articulus III - Whether numerical terms posit something in the Godhead

It seems that numerical terms posit something in the Godhead.

1. For the divine unity is His essence. But every number is repeated unity. Therefore every numerical term in the Godhead signifies the essence. Therefore it posits something in God.
2. Moreover. Whatever is said of God and of creatures belongs to God more eminently than to creatures. But numerical terms posit something in creatures. Therefore much more in God.

3. Moreover. If numerical terms do not posit something in the Godhead, but are introduced only to remove, so that by plurality unity be removed, and by unity plurality, it follows that there would be a circulation in the account, confounding the intellect and certifying nothing - which is unfitting. Therefore it remains that numerical terms posit something in the Godhead.

But on the contrary is what St. Hilary says in book 4 On the Trinity: "The confession of consort removes the understanding of singleness and solitude, which is a confession of plurality."[284] And St. Ambrose says in the book On the Faith: "When we say one God, unity excludes a plurality of gods; we do not impose quantity in God."[285] From which it seems that such names have been introduced in the Godhead to remove, not to posit, something.

I answer that the Master in the Sentences holds that numerical terms do not posit something in the Godhead, but only remove. Others say the contrary. For the understanding of this, it must be considered that every plurality follows upon some division; but division is twofold. One is material, which is according to the division of the continuous, and this is followed by number, which is a species of quantity. Hence such number exists only in material things having quantity. The other is formal division, which is by opposed or diverse forms; and this division is followed by multitude, which is in no genus, but is among the transcendentals, according as being is divided by one and many. And only such a multitude occurs in immaterial things. Certain persons, therefore, considering nothing but the multitude which is a species of discrete quantity (because they saw that discrete quantity has no place in the Godhead), maintained that numerical terms do not posit something in God, but only remove.

We, however, say that the numerical terms, insofar as they enter into divine predication, are not taken from number, which is a species of quantity: for in that way they would not be said of God except metaphorically, as are other properties of bodily things, such as breadth, length, and the like. Rather, they are taken from multitude, according as it is a transcendental. But multitude thus taken has this mode of bearing to the many of which it is predicated, as the one, which is commensurate with being, bears to being. Now a one of this sort (as was said above when we treated of the unity of God) adds nothing above being, except only the negation of division. For "one" signifies an undivided being. And therefore, of whatever it is said that it is one, that thing is signified as undivided: thus "one" said of a man signifies the nature or substance of a man as not divided. By the same reason, when things are said to be many, multitude thus taken signifies those things with an absence of division around each one of them. But number, which is a species of quantity, posits a certain accident added above being, and likewise the "one," which is the principle of number. Therefore numerical terms signify in the divine those things of which they are said, and beyond this they add nothing except a negation, as has been said: and to this extent the Master in the Sentences spoke truly. Thus, when we say, "the essence is one," "one" signifies the essence as

284. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, IV.
285. St. Ambrose, De fide.

undivided. When "the person is one," it signifies the person as undivided. When we say, "the persons are many," those persons are signified, and the absence of division around each one of them: because it belongs to the notion of multitude that it be constituted out of unities.

Reply to the first: Since "one" is among the transcendentals, it is more common than substance, quantity, and relation; and similarly, "multitude." Hence it can stand in the divine both for substance and for relation, according as it suits those to which it is adjoined. And yet by names of this sort there is added above essence or relation, from their proper signification, a certain negation of division, as has been said.

Reply to the second: The multitude which posits something in created things is a species of quantity, which is not taken into divine predication, but only the transcendental multitude, which adds nothing beyond the things of which it is said, except absence of division around each. And such a multitude is said of God.

Reply to the third: The one is not a remover of multitude, but of division, which is prior according to reason to both "one" and "multitude." But multitude does not remove unity; rather, it removes division around each one of those of which the multitude consists. And these things were set out above when the divine unity was treated. Yet it must be known that the authorities adduced on the opposite side do not sufficiently prove what was proposed. For although solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, nevertheless it does not follow that by these names this alone is signified. For blackness is excluded by whiteness, yet by the name of whiteness there is not signified the exclusion of blackness alone.

Disputatio CXXVIII - Whether the name "unity" signifies something positive, or only a negation

The conclusion of the article is: The numerical terms, which are said of God, besides those things of which they are said, signify nothing else but a negation. And this conclusion is exceedingly difficult; wherefore it must be examined expressly in the following disputation.

Whether the name unity signifies something positive, or only a negation.

Disputation 128.

Unity formally to be only a certain negation in being, St. Thomas, and others, think. cap. 1.

The formal notion of unity, which is a passion of being, to be something positive, Alexander, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus more probably judge. cap. 2.

An answer is given to the foundation of the first opinion, concerning the unity which is the principle of predicamental number. cap. 3.

First Book, distinction 24, question 1, number 9, and question 2, number 11, and the following; of Gabriel on the same distinction, question 1, article 3, doubt 3; of Capreolus, question 1, article 1, conclusion 3; of Gregory, question 1, article 1, at the beginning and in conclusion 3; of Henry, Quodlibet 1, question 1, letter A: who affirm that the formal notion of unity is the negation of division; wherefore they say that the same thing is formally "one" and "undivided."

Unity formally to be only a certain negation in being, St. Thomas, and others, think.

It is proved: The formal notion of unity is, as it were, the ratio of "undividedness" in being, and thus is conceived negatively; hence they say that the ratio of one does not add any positive entity beyond being, but only removes division. And they do not merely teach this, so that the formal ratio of one be expressed by a negation; but also, that nothing answers to that negation as though materially signified, in which the formal ratio of unity might consist: just as the word "incorruptible" expressly signifies a negation; and yet there answers to it a positive ratio, as the materially signified, which we express better by a negation.

It is proved by this single argument. By whatever positive ratio removed from being - even by the intellect - being always remains one: therefore by no positive [ratio] is it constituted in the notion of "one"; nothing else remains but negation; therefore unity consists in negation. Moreover, it is to be observed that St. Thomas speaks only of the unity which they call entitative, and which is wont to be constituted a passion of being, and is found in any thing in the world. For if the discourse be of the unity which is the principle of predicamental number, he thinks that unity adds above substance some positive notion, namely to be the principle of number. For he teaches that the number of the predicament of quantity is found only in quantified things: for in other things there does not seem to be any number, except by our reason constituting and numbering the first, second, and third unity; and so of the others.

First Part, question 13, member 1 and 2, of St. Bonaventure on the First Book, distinction 24, article 1, question 1, and of Scotus on Metaphysics IV, question 4, to be more probable: who teach that this formal notion of unity is something positive; although they explain it in different ways. Alexander judges it to be the conformation of the effect

to the first cause in the genus of efficient cause: for he says that the conformation to the first cause in the genus of exemplar, and as it were formal, is truth; and in the genus of final cause, is goodness - two other passions of being.[286] Others, however, do not at all explain the ratio of unity, but only affirm that it is some positive ratio.

This opinion, in my judgment, is expressly stated by Aristotle in Metaphysics X, chapter 5, where he writes in these words: "Opposed, however, are one and many in many ways: of which, in one [way], one and multitude, as indivisible and divisible; for what is either divided or divisible is called, in a certain way, multitude; but what is indivisible or not divided, one. But since the modes of opposition are four, of these one is said to be according to privation; they will be contraries

286. Alexander of Hales, Summa, Prima pars, q. 13, memb. 1 - 2; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 24, a. 1, q. 1; Scotus, In IV Metaph., q. 4.

indeed, and neither as contradiction nor as relatives." Since he says that there are four genera of oppositions, and, those enumerated, he concludes that unity and multitude are contraries: who would dare to deny that they are not only opposed privatively, as the adversaries contend?

Objection, taken from the words of Aristotle. But you will object: Aristotle also said that they are opposed according to privation, when he adds, "of these one is said according to privation." He did not deny this genus of opposition between one and many, as he denied the opposition of contradiction and of relation.

First reply. I answer first: even if he did not deny that opposition, at least he did not assert that they are opposed only according to privation: but when he added, "they will be contraries indeed," by which words he enumerated the genus of contrary opposition as one of the four which he said there to be, he expressly meant that they are opposed contrarily. Wherefore, if we concede that they are opposed privatively, we must assert it in such wise that we do not deny that they are also opposed contrarily. For what the Commentator says in that place, namely that therefore Aristotle said that the opposition is reduced to the privative opposition, by which properly "one" and "many" are opposed, is fictitious.[287] For if one and many were properly opposed privatively, and in no way contrarily, even if the contrary opposition be reduced to the privative, Aristotle ought not, from among the four genera of opposition which he proposed in that place, to have chosen that which was not proper to unity and multitude; and he ought rather to have assigned that to them more assertively. For from the cited words it is not sufficiently clear that Aristotle assigned the privative opposition to unity and multitude. Wherefore St. Thomas, on that place, teaches that the opinion is that one and many are opposed contrarily, since the words of Aristotle plainly indicate this; and that he added those words beforehand, "of these one [is] according to privation," not so as to assert that one and many are opposed privatively, but because opposition according to privation is the root of contrary opposition - whether this be true matters little to us; this suffices us at present, that, according to St. Thomas's mind there, one and many, in Aristotle's sense in that passage, are opposed as contraries, insofar as they are said to be divided and undivided.

Further reply. Next I answer that by the words, "of these one is said according to privation," Aristotle did not assert that one and many are opposed privatively, but he enumerated one genus of opposition out of the four which he said to be, and he left it aside as least fitting to unity and multitude; then, before he enumerated the remaining [genera], he affirmed that they are opposed contrarily, by the words, "they will be contraries indeed." Finally, he recounts the other two genera, and openly confesses that the opposition of relation does not suit unity and multitude thus taken.

This exposition I gather from the following words, which are these: "But it is said conversely of one itself, and it is signified from the divisible [that it is] indivisible, because multitude and the divisible are more sensible." As if he were to say: therefore "one" is signified by a negation of what is opposed, when it is called "indivisible," even if it be opposed there as a contrary; because

287. Averroes (the Commentator), In Metaphysicam X, ad locum.

multitude is more sensible and known; and because, as he says a little below, we signify by a negation the simple and first things, of which sort is unity, although their ratio is positive: which ratio Alexander also gives in the place cited.

Yet, it seems difficult what, at the beginning of the chapter, Aristotle said in these words: "Opposed, however, are one and many in many ways: of which, in one [way], one and multitude, as indivisible and divisible; for what is either divided or divisible is, in a certain way, called multitude; but what is indivisible or not divided, one. But since the genera of oppositions are four," and the rest which we have recited above: by which words Aristotle seems to teach that one and many are opposed not only contrarily, nor only privatively, but also in other ways; whereas the same things are opposed to one another in two modes only, namely privatively and contrarily. Of this difficulty some mention is found among interpreters of Aristotle; St. Thomas also saw and noted it in that place. The sense, therefore, is this: that one and many are indeed opposed in many ways, not however in many genera of oppositions; insofar as they are considered as divided and undivided: for in that way he said that they are opposed by many modes, in which one and many, as grasped in diverse ways, are considered as opposites. But there is one way, in which they are signified as [respectively] divisible and indivisible; and thus he indicated and said that "in one [way], namely [in this] mode, one and multitude [are opposed] as divisible and indivisible": that is, out of the various modes by which unity and multitude are understood, one is that which signifies them as divided and undivided. For there are other modes, according to which one and multitude are wont to be taken: which he immediately enumerates in the following words, "One, however, is said in many ways," and so on; of which he there treats, and he brings forward various acceptions.

But indeed, if by the words of Aristotle alleged he had wished to signify that "one" and "many" are opposed by many genera of opposition, as "contradictory," as "relative," as "opposite according to privation," as "contrary," this does not follow, since "one" and "many," as divided and undivided, are signified; therefore they are not opposed according to contradiction, nor as relatives; indeed it would follow that they are not only opposed privatively, as the adversaries maintain. And this suffices for the exposition of Aristotle, which, of those we can adduce, seems to us the best.

By reason the matter is proved, first by an argument ad hominem. If it be true, as St. Thomas admits in the places cited, that the unity which is the principle of number in the predicament of quantity signifies something formally positive, which is, as it were, a positive formal ratio - namely that principle of number which is unity - how is it that the unity which they call transcendental, which is found not only in quantified things, but also in other things, is not formally something positive, so that it be called the principle of multitude? But if you respond that the unity of number, which is in the predicament of quantity, adds above substance something positive, namely quantity as its material subject - for otherwise the species of quantity would be constituted by quantity according to continuity, and likewise by number according to numeration - whereas unity is considered by the mathematician as abstracted from any matter and from bodily quantity: therefore unity is more commonly explained by us by a negation, for the reasons assigned above; its formal ratio, however, is something positive, which can be explained by the principle of multitude.

Next it can be proved thus: for every privation and every negation which is in a subject presupposes some positive foundation, as is clear. Therefore, if nothing positive be the formal [ratio] which follows upon the negation of division, it will follow that the ratio of unity is none; and, as we shall say in the following chapter, being as being, whether it be signified outside the singular and the plural number, is abstracted from one and many; therefore, since a negation of division is conjoined to it, something positive also must be conjoined to it: since in the mind the negation of division is conjoined to that same positive more closely than division and multitude themselves are.

Lastly, if unity is a privation or negation, it cannot be the privation of anything other than multitude: therefore multitude would be prior to unity; because privation presupposes habit. But the consequent is absurd, because unity is posited as the principle of multitude. Some reply that unity formally consists in the negation of multitude, not formally taken, but through its foundation; and they posit the foundation of multitude to be this or that entity. But this is plainly frivolous: for unity is not this or that entity; otherwise the unity which is in Peter and in John would be the negation of the entity of Peter and of John, and this would be multitude.

It is answered to the foundation of the first opinion: I answer, the notion of being (ens) can indeed be conceived with some precise positive ratio, even if the ratio of unity (*unitas*), or of plurality, is not understood. For unity and goodness are passions of being (*passiones entis*), such that being can be grasped by the intellect without them, even if they are convertible with it. Nay rather, goodness is posited as a passion of being in a different way than unity: for this alone does not reciprocate with being, but unity or plurality; goodness alone, however, is converted with being, and is said to be its passion. Moreover, the ratio of being is understood without understanding unity or plurality whenever we conceive being itself, neither in the plural number nor in the singular, as it is signified by the infinitive verb "to be"; but if it is signified by nouns or by verbs, it cannot be conceived except either under unity or under multitude - not because the ratio of unity is a negation (for even if it were so, it could be apprehended without a negation), but because names have been arranged by singular and plural number so as to signify being as one or as many. Wherefore, the same argument could be formed against the first opinion, and it should be solved in the same way: namely, that with any negation set aside, every being can always be apprehended as one and singular; and that nouns, disposed according to plural and singular, signify being as one or as many.

You will say that there is not a privation of entities according to the ratio of being, but according to the ratio of this and that together. But this is nothing else than to assert that unity is the privation of this and that entity, inasmuch as they are divided and many; and thus, according to that ratio, unity will be the privation of multitude formally; and therefore multitude will be prior - which we were above alleging as absurd. Furthermore, that the negation of division and of multitude are the same - because multitude and division are formally the same - will be made clear in the following disputation.

Disputatio CXXIX - Whether numerical names signify something positive in God

Caput I - The two Scholastic opinions

From the foregoing disputation it seems not obscure what ought to be said in the present question; but because the Scholastics have also thought variously in this matter, it will be worth the effort to rehearse their opinions. Therefore the Master, in the First Book, distinction 14, thinks that the name of multitude and of number belongs to God only negatively and metaphorically, so that it signifies nothing positive as properly belonging to Him; therefore (as he says) this name is attributed to God in order to remove the unity of persons; wherefore, according to the Master, the same name signifies number in God, and not unity: indeed, he says that, in the same way and according to the same metaphor, these names belong to God as do the names of continuous quantity, such as length, breadth, and depth.

Over against this opinion all the Scholastics who have made mention of this controversy set themselves: Alexander, St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 24, the articles, question 1; Scotus, question 1, at the end; Gregory, question 2, article 4; Gab., question 2, article 2, and article 3, doubt 2; Durandus, question 1; Capreolus, question 1, article 2, conclusions 2 and 3; Marsilius, in the First, question 27, article 2, and article 3, to the second doubt; St. Thomas, and Cajetan, and the Canariensis on this article.[288]

Now, in this article they teach against the Master that the name of number does not signify in God only the negation of unity and indivision. Their reason is of this sort: If the name of number signified only the negation of unity and of indivision, since that is the ratio of unity, all the names of numbers would signify the negation of the same formal ratio and of unity; therefore it would be the same thing to attribute a ternary to God as to attribute a quaternary, because these two would signify absolutely the same thing - which is plainly absurd.

However much the aforesaid Doctors conspire against the Master in the way we have said, they yet differ among themselves in explaining the signification of the names of multitude and of number. For St. Thomas, in this article - which Cajetan and the Canariensis here follow, and Capreolus in the place cited - affirm that the names of multitude signify formally above the unities themselves nothing but a negation, not (as the Master said) the negation of unity, but a division about each thing; and since, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, the ratio of unity is placed in this negation of division, the name of multitude will signify nothing formal - neither real nor of reason - above the unities themselves. I do not see how the opinion of these men can be proved by any other reason, except this: that if these names signified some ratio of multitude above the

288. Alexander, 1. parte, quaest. 45, memb. 2 - 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 24, art., quaest. 1; Scotus, quaestio 1, in fine; Gregory, quaest. 2, art. 4; Gab., quaest. 2, art. 2; and art. 3, dub. 2; Durandus, quaest. 1; Capreolus, quaest. 1, art. 2, conclusiones 2 - 3; Marsilius, In I, quaest. 27, art. 2; and art. 3, ad dubium secundum; St. Thomas, and Cajetan, and the Canariensis on this article.

unities, it would follow that every multitude, even of spiritual things, would be in the predicament of quantity - which they think absurd. For the multitude of quantified things is therefore in the predicament, because, above the unities, it adds some positive ratio.

Caput II - The more probable opinion

To me the opinion of others has always seemed more probable, who teach that the names of multitude do not only signify a negation, nor do numerical names in God signify only a negation of unity and indivision; but moreover they denote some formal ratio above the several unities - whether we say that the ratio of unity consists in a negation, or that it consists in something positive. This opinion was handed down by St. Bonaventure and Durandus, cited above, although they teach that the ratio of unity is formally placed in a privation. And it is gathered from Alexander, First Part, question 13, member 4, when he asserts that one and many are opposed contrarily - which would not be true if multitude did not signify something positive distinct from the unities themselves, formally and at least according to reason.[289] To the same opinion should be referred Marsilius, in the First, question 27, article 1, conclusion 3, who, although he thinks the formal ratio of multitude to be through the intellect (whether this be true we shall say shortly), nevertheless asserts that it is positive, distinct from the unities through the intellect.

The reason for this opinion is proved thus: one and many are opposed contrarily, as was shown in the preceding disputation, or at least privatively, and in one of these modes they are opposed without controversy. But if they are opposed contrarily, it is necessary that in each extreme there be a positive contrary form: therefore, if multitude signified no ratio beyond the unities themselves formally, there would not be two extremes contrarily opposed. If, however, they are opposed privatively, the privation ought to be on the side of unity, not on the side of multitude, as all confess who teach that the ratio of unity is placed in a privation or negation, as St. Thomas expressly noted above, question 11, article 2; therefore the habit and the positive form, to which unity - taken as a negation - is opposed, ought to be in multitude.

Someone will reply that unity is not opposed to multitude, but to division, as its negation, not of multitude; and thus it does not rightly follow that multitude is some positive form. And this seems to be taught by St. Thomas in this article, to the third reply, when he says, "Unity does not oppose multitude, but division." Thus, then, unity will indeed be the negation of division, not of multitude. St. Thomas had taught this very same thing also above, question 11, article 2, to the fourth.

But this solution can easily be refuted - first, from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chapter 3, where he says that one is opposed to many.[290]

... one and many are opposed in one way, as divided and undivided; of which acceptation of unity and multitude we are now disputing, as we noted in the preceding disputation. Then too, defining in the same chapter multitude, he said, "For what is divided, some call a multitude": therefore multitude and division are formally the same. Wherefore, if unity consists in the negation

289. Alexander of Hales, Summa, Prima pars, quaest. 13, memb. 4.
290. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, c. 3.

of division, it will also be placed in the negation of multitude: it will be necessary, then, that multitude itself be as a habit and a positive form. Moreover, if that were true which St. Thomas says in this article - namely, that transcendental multitude is nothing else than the things themselves with the negation of division around each - there would follow that one and many are not opposed: because unity, which signifies indivision, is not opposed to indivision around any given thing, but to the division of several things among themselves: therefore multitude, to which unity is opposed, ought to signify not only the negation of division around each thing, but also the division of several things among themselves.

From which I infer that what the holy Doctor says in that question 11, article 2, to the fourth - namely, that division formally consists in a negation by which one thing is said not to be another - is not well understood: for hence it follows, in his opinion, that unity cannot be the negation of division; because of one negation there is not another negation. Nor can it be said that unity and multitude are opposed privatively in such a way that negation is on the side of multitude, while habit and positive form are on the side of unity. For this, besides that no one until now has taught it, nor will anyone, supported by any foundation, be able to affirm it, leads us into the absurd which above we urged against the Master, as is manifest.

Solved is the reason of the second opinion.

Caput III - The reason of the second opinion is solved

The argument of the opinion of St. Thomas and others, by which they prove that transcendental multitude is not some positive form above individual unities, even according to notion: I answer, the same thing must be said in the predicament of multitude of quantified things and of those lacking quantity; namely, that in both cases the notion of multitude is something positive above individual unities, which is wont to be explained by the name of division: there must be something peculiar in our multitude which is not in the other, since neither is placed in the same predicament. For that individual unities are endowed with continuous quantity seems altogether accidental to the notion of number, as placed in a predicament: for the quantity of number, since it is discrete, is to be attended not in the individual unities, but in their division and distinction: and this indeed is found also in spirits. Wherefore arithmeticians, in fact, dispute about numbers by their own principles, whether they be of bodily things or of spiritual things. But I for my part strongly suspect that each number, under the proper notion of number, is something per reason and the intellect (*intellectus*): although each, under the notion of multitude, signifies some positive and real form, at least notionally distinct from the unities. I said "under the notion of number," because besides the real division, number also consists of the ordering of prior and posterior: for there is an order among the first, second, third, and the remaining unities, by reason of which numbers are said to differ: and yet this order and distinction of numbers is only through our intellect: for just as from this unity we begin to count and end at that, so we could, on the contrary, begin elsewhere: and, finally, from whatever unity of the multitude to draw the beginning is free. Since therefore there is not by nature in the things themselves an order of first, second, and third, but in our intellect, it

follows that that notion whereby multitude is essentially completed under the notion of number is through our intellect. However, the notion of multitude is real and positive, distinct at least by the operation of the intellect from the unities: now that is the notion of division, and to this unity is opposed, as above remains proved.

Yet three things remain to be noted. First, that there is indeed in the divine persons an order of prior and posterior according to the thing, and not merely through the intellect, by which order the first, second, and third person are by nature: yet this order is not the order of number; for the order of number is only through the intellect: for, in order that the persons be numbered, thus the beginning of the number could be taken from the Holy Spirit, just as from any other person; which doctrine above, disputation 37, chapter 4, we explained easily and rightly. Scotus, along with Isidore, which seemed so difficult to the most learned men of our age that they judged it corrupt - this, then, is the order of origin, whereby one person is said to be the principle of another, and the other proceeds from that one: and that is called prior from whom the other proceeds; but she who proceeds is called posterior: concerning which real order we shall more copiously discourse in disputation 169.

Second, it is to be noted that therefore in the Councils among the Fathers it is sometimes said that God is neither "taken by number" nor "withdraws from number," because at once in him there co-exist the unity of essence and the Trinity of persons. Thus in the Council of Toledo II, in the confession of faith, it is said of God: "He neither withdraws from number, nor is taken by number. In the relations of the persons number is discerned: but in the unity of essence, what is enumerated is not comprehended."[291] And St. Bernard, book five of De consideratione, about the middle, adduces that of Boethius On the Trinity, "But this is the One, in which there is no number"; and he himself, Bernard, subjoins: "Yet the Trinity is God. What then? Do we destroy what has been said of unity, because we introduce Trinity? Not so; but we establish unity." And below: "What does this want (to speak briefly), 'without number'? If it is one, where is number? But I have, you say, what I number and what I do not number: the substance is one; the persons are three." Only there Bernard contends against Gilbert that essence and person cannot be numbered as though distinct; about which enough and more than enough was said in disputation 116, chapter 5, and 120, chapter 4. But if sometimes the Fathers predicate God absolutely "without number," they understand it on the side of the essence, lest they seem to concede several Gods.

Third, note that Ambrose is wrongly alleged by the Master in the first distinction 24, to prove that names of number are said in God only negatively: for Ambrose, book one On the Faith, chapter 2, which place is cited by the Master, speaks only in the sense we have thus far explained when he seems to deny number of God: for he says before the middle of the chapter, "Diversity (he understands of the persons) makes several; unity excludes the quantity of number: for unity is not number, but this is the principle of all."

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291. Council of Toledo II, Confession of Faith: "Nec recedit a numero, nec capitur numero: in relatione enim personarum numerus cernitur; in unitate autem essentiae, quid enumeratum sit, non comprehenditur."

Articulus IV - Whether this name "person" can be common to the three persons

It is proceeded to the fourth as follows. It seems that this name, person (*persona*), cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons unless it be the essence. But this name, person, does not signify the essence in the direct case. Therefore it is not common to the three.

1. Moreover. "Common" is opposed to "incommunicable." But it belongs to the notion of person that it be incommunicable, as is clear from the definition of Richard of St. Victor set above. Therefore this name, person, is not common to the three.
2. Moreover. If it is common to the three, either this community is attended according to the thing, or according to reason. But not according to the thing, because thus the three persons would be one person. Nor again according to reason only, because thus person would be a universal. But in the divine there is not a universal, nor even a particular, nor a genus, nor a species, as was shown above. Therefore this name, person, is not common to the three.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says, in On the Trinity VII, chapter 4, and what follows, and in book V, chapter 9, at the end, that when it was asked "three what?" the answer was, "three persons": because what is person is common to them.[292]

I answer that the very mode of speaking shows that this name, person, is common to the three, when we say "three persons." Just as when we say "three men," we show "man" to be common to the three. It is manifest, however, that it is not a community of the thing, as one essence is common to the three: for thus it would follow that there was one person of the three, as the essence is one. But as to what sort of community it is, those investigating have spoken in different ways. For some have said that it is a community of negation, on account of this, that in the definition of person "incommunicable" is posited. But others have said that it is a community of intention, because in the definition of person "individual" is posited; as if it were said that "to be a species" is common to a horse and an ox. But each of these is excluded by this, that this name, person, is not a name of negation nor of intention, but a name of a thing. And therefore it must be said that even in human affairs this name person is common by a community of reason: not as a genus or species, but as a vague individual. For the names of genera and species - like man or animal - are imposed to signify the common natures themselves, not, however, the intentions of common natures, which are signified by all these, genus or species. But a vague individual - like "some man" - signifies a common nature with a determinate mode of existing which befits singulars, namely that it be per se subsistent (*subsistens*) distinct from others. But in the name of a designated singular there is signified the determinate distinguishing [note], as in the name "Socrates," "this flesh" and "this bone." Yet there is this difference, that "some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the side of the nature, with the mode of existing which befits singulars. But this name, person, is not imposed to signify the individual on the side of the nature, but to signify the thing subsisting

292. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 4 and following; and V, c. 9, at the end.

(*subsistentia*) in such a nature. Now this is common according to reason to all the divine persons, in that each of them subsists in the divine nature distinct from the others. And thus this name, person, according to reason is common to the three divine persons.

Reply to the first: That reasoning proceeds about a community of the thing.

Reply to the second: Although a person is incommunicable, nevertheless the very mode of existing incommunicably can be common to several.

Reply to the third: Although it is a community of reason and not of the thing, yet it does not follow that in the divine there is a universal or a particular, or a genus, or a species: first, because neither in human affairs is the community of person a community of genus or species; next, because the divine persons have one existence (*esse*): but a genus and species and any universal is predicated of several differing in existence.

The conclusion of the article is this. The name "person" is not only vocally common to the three persons, but it also signifies a certain notion common to them, namely the mode of subsisting incommunicably. And this conclusion and the doctrine of the whole article are to be examined in the following disputation.

Disputatio CXXX - Whether the name "Person" signifies a real notion common to the three divine persons

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

That the name "person" signifies something common to the three divine relations (*relationes*), not quidditatively, but denominatively, is the truer opinion. [Further to be treated in] chapter 3, the solution of the arguments of the third opinion.

According to the various opinions which we enumerated in disputation 17, chapter 1, about the signification of the name "person" (*persona*), the Doctors have spoken variously in the present controversy. First, among all it is certain that the signified of this name is not something common to the three persons in reality, about which there is no question at all; nor did Alexander teach the opposite in First Part, question 56, member 4, article 3, although he is wrongly by some reported into that opinion.[293] The controversy, however, is whether the signified of the name is common to the three persons according to a notion (*ratio*), as a genus is to species, or as any universal predicated is common to particulars.

In this question Scotus, in First Book, distinction 13, question 1, and Gabriel, in First Book, article 1 and article 2, teach that the name "person," as well in human affairs as in divine, formally signifies neither a second intention such as that of genus and species, nor any real positive thing, but solely a negation common to all persons, as was explained in that chapter of disputation 127.[294][295] Following Scotus, the Canarian seems to speak above on article 3, question 29, to the third

293. Alexander of Hales, Summa, First Part, q. 56, memb. 4, art. 3.

argument.[296] But this opinion must be rejected by us with St. Thomas in this article, because the name "person" does not formally signify a negation, but some positive mode, as we shall show at greater length in III, q. 4, a. 2.[297]

Second opinion. The other Scholastics think that the name "person" signifies something positive; yet in its explanation they vary. For Henry, Quodlibet 5, q. 6, holds that this name signifies an intention common to all persons; and since in the same question he says that there is a twofold intention, first and second, and that this latter is a being of reason (*ens rationis*), such as genus, species, and individual, he plainly seems to assert that the name "person" signifies a being of reason; for a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. This opinion also is attributed to Durandus, In I, dist. 23, q. 1, num., where nevertheless he only asserts that this name signifies an intention, without explaining whether a first or a second; below indeed we shall see whether his sentiment differs in any way from the opinion of St. Thomas, which is the truer.[298][299]

Third opinion. The third opinion, then, is that this name signifies something real common according to a notion to all the persons. Thus teach Alexander, First Part of his work, q. 56, memb. 4, article 2; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 25, article 2; St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, article 1; Marsilius, In I, q. 28, article 2, the conclusion; nor does Durandus differ from this opinion, as will be explained below, and the more recent Thomists follow it as well.[300][301][302][303][304][305] But even these still differ among themselves. For certain more recent authors, with Cajetan, affirm that the name "person" signifies something positive and real, common according to a notion to the three persons of the Trinity, which indeed is not only superior quidditatively to the three persons, as they are signified by this name "person," but also as they are signified by the name of Father, of Son, and of Holy Spirit; so that this predication be quidditative, "The eternal Father is a person," and likewise, "Paternity is personality."

The principal foundations of this opinion can be reduced to these two. First: either the name "person" is predicated denominatively of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or quidditatively; for it cannot be said in any other way. It is not predicated denominatively; because if it were predicated thus only, the concrete would be said of the concrete, namely "person" of the Father, but not the abstract of the abstract, namely "personality" of the relation. For thus we see in other denominatives, in which the concrete is predicated of the concrete, but the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, as "white" of a wall, but not "whiteness" of the abstract of wall. But personality too is predicated of the relations in the abstract; for we say, "Paternity is personality."

294. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 13, q. 1.
295. Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., article 1 and article 2.
296. The Canarian, above on article 3, question 29, to the third argument.
297. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 4, a. 2.
298. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 6.
299. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1.
300. Alexander of Hales, Summa, First Part, q. 56, memb. 4, art. 2.
301. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 25, art. 2.
302. St. Thomas and Cajetan, on the present article.
303. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1.
304. Marsilius, In I, q. 28, art. 2, the conclusion.
305. Durandus's position does not differ from this, as will be explained below.

Therefore that is predicated in quid; for those things which in the abstract are predicated of others belong to quidditative predication. Whence it follows that, in the same grade, the name "person," which signifies something concrete, is predicated of the Father in which grade "personality" is said of paternity. By the same argument it is proved that the signified of the name "person" is predicated quidditatively of Peter or of any other singular man, not only as they are signified by the name "person," but also by the name "Peter," "Paul," etc. Whence this is no less quidditative, "Peter is a person," than this, "The person of Peter is a person." The same is to be said of singular personalities and of the universal personality, in the same proportion.

Then, either the common notion of person and of personality in God is contracted to be the being of this and that person and personality by something absolute, or by something relative, or finally by something common to both. By something common it cannot be, as is clear; because that which contracts ought to be singular. By something absolute also it cannot be done; because otherwise it would follow that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by absolute properties, which is absurd, as will be proved below in disputation 153, chapter 3. It remains, therefore, that the notion of person and of personality, taken universally, is contracted to this and that divine personality and person by relation (*relatio*). Therefore there is a sign that it is predicated quidditatively of the relations by which such and such a determination is present; for that which is contracted is said quidditatively of that which contracts. The other arguments which are wont to be made for this opinion only prove that the personal relations are personalities; but they do not prove that of the relations themselves, as they are signified by the name of relation, the signified of the name "person" is predicated quidditatively.

Therefore: That the name "person" signifies something common to the three divine relations, not quidditatively, but denominatively, is the truer opinion.

Caput II - The more probable opinion: denominative commonness of "person"

The opinion has always seemed to me far more probable which teaches that the name "person" signifies indeed a common concept to this and that person, as they are signified by the same name; yet does not signify a notion common quidditatively to paternity and filiation, as they are signified by those relative names. For this opinion we cannot adduce the Scholastics alleged in the preceding chapter: for they, except Cajetan and Durandus, only teach that the name "person" signifies a concept common to the three persons, which can be understood in one way and in another. Cajetan alone followed the peculiar opinion which we have now reported; Durandus, however, can be explained in favor of our present opinion. But, that we may confirm it by reason, it must be noted that in the category of substance there is a first and a second substance: the first is the individual of that genus; the second, whatever universal predicated up to the most general. Now the name "substance" (*substantia*), and its signified, is common to first and second substance. Whence it follows that the name "substance" does not signify something common essentially or quidditatively; for to the most general of that category and to the singulars of it nothing can be common essentially and quidditatively besides being (*ens*), especially something that closely

regards the first and the second substance, that is, the individuals and the universals predicated of substance, as is sufficiently clear. Therefore the name "substance" in general signifies a certain real mode, which is, as it were, predicated denominatively of first and second. Moreover, this denomination is taken from the act and, as it were, the office of substance, which is to subsist or to underlie, that is, to be under another, which is common to first and to second substance; that is, to that which is, first and second, to underlie. In the same way "hypostasis," or "subsistence" (*subsistentia*), signifies something common to Peter and to Paul, as it were denominatively, that is, to exist singularly and individually. Wherefore this is the difference between the name "person" and the name "Peter": the latter signifies the very thing to which the denomination of person belongs; the former, however, denotes the very denomination and the mode of subsisting incommunicably. Then too from the signified of the name "Peter" the notion of the common nature is abstracted essentially; but from this or that signified of "person" only a common notion is able to be abstracted denominatively to Peter and to John; although it is essential to this and to that person, as they are signified by the name "person."

Next it must be noted that a person is defined by "an individual" or "the incommunicable." But these two do not signify a quidditative concept of things, but a denominative one. For "individual" is, as it were, a proper passion of each thing in the order of being, as "the good"; but a passion is not predicated in quid, but denominatively. Therefore it is no wonder if even in this respect the name "person" signifies a denominative notion, by comparison to Peter and to John; for one and the same denominative ratio is common to this and that person, as the name "person" signifies. And thus Scotus rightly warns in First Book, distinction 23, question 1, at the end, that from the three persons of the Trinity - namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit - a common quidditative concept cannot be abstracted; yet a common one can be [abstracted] as it were of what is proper to them, which however is predicated denominatively, as we shall say presently.[306]

Hence, therefore, our opinion is rightly proved: for since the name "person" formally and expressly signifies an incommunicable subsistence of a rational nature, it will therefore signify the divine person, only that in place of a common nature the divine should be supplied. Indeed, by this very definition, although the divine nature, or deity, is common, nevertheless it is established that there is a proper essential notion and a legitimate direction of denomination with respect to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For that very mode of subsisting, by which even an absolute [nature] has the ratio of incommunicable or of an individual, which is as it were a passion, is manifest. Wherefore we say that the whole signification concerning "person" redounds to something denominative; whence I suppose that St. Augustine said that the name "person" signifies an intention common to three or more persons - not indeed that which the logicians call a second intention, which is a being of reason, but as it were denominatively it is predicated of Peter and of John, and, in like manner, of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. As to whether also to paternity, filiation, and spiration there be given some common concept of relation, we will say below in disputation 159.

306. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, at the end.

Caput III - The solution of the arguments of the third opinion

First. To the first argument of the third opinion I answer that it does not conclude. The point was: because the abstract, "personality" (*personalitas*), is predicated of the relations in the abstract, therefore it is predicated in quid. I deny the consequence. Not every form which is predicated in the abstract of some subject is essential to it; sometimes it is denominative. For "rationality" is named a difference, and it is also called a property; yet the notion of "difference" in rationality, and the notion of "property," is not therefore essential. So also about hypostasis (to use Scotus's way of speaking): "individuation" is predicated in the abstract of Peter or of John, which nevertheless is not essential to him, but is, as it were, a property; indeed the very ratio of "the individual" is not essential to Peter or to John, as has been proved. We say, therefore, that an abstract can sometimes be predicated denominatively: for we denominate, as it were, from the act and office of a thing, so that, to speak to the point, "singularity" and "individuation" denote that by which Peter or John is rendered singular and an individual; and yet this singularity, or the relation of singularity, does not predicate something essential of this or that, nor is it in quid. Accordingly, in the proper case of paternity or of filiation in the divine, it is said by a like denomination; for "personality" signifies the notion of singularity and individuation, by which, in the last analysis, incommunicability is constituted: but the notion of singularity is, as it were, a passion of the very relation. Therefore it is not surprising if the three divine relations have a certain common denominative predicate.

Reply to the second. I answer that the common notion of person is indeed contracted in the divine, but by the proper differences of the relations; and that common notion of person is not thereby turned into a quidditative essence of the relations. For by the relations the notion of person is contracted, not otherwise than by their proper differences, when they are denominated from the material subject; and yet that same notion of person which is thus contracted is of itself essentially abstracted from the relations, and nevertheless is said denominatively of the relative person. This is what St. Augustine indicated in De Trinitate, book VII, chapter 6, where he proves that "person" is signified with reference to itself, not to another - namely, that it is understood expressly and formally; for all that, however, he does not deny that it is predicated denominatively from relations.[307]

Nor is it enough to say that the name "person" signifies something abstracted both from the absolute and from the relations. For it is impossible that there be something which is abstracted at once from the absolute and from the relative, except in name only; as Durandus very well proves, In I, dist. 23, q. 1, num. 16. And the reason of this can be as follows: if that common concept were abstracted from the thing itself, it would be nothing real but only a being of reason; but the name "person" signifies something real and positive. Therefore it is to be said that it is abstracted essentially from the absolute, while from the relations it is abstracted only as to its formal understanding, and is predicated of the relations denominatively.

307. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 6.

... But it is not predicated in quid but denominatively; therefore it is no wonder if even for this reason the name "person" signifies a denominative notion in comparison to Peter and John, although it is essential to this or that person, as is signified by the name "person." And therefore Scotus rightly warns, in I Sentences, dist. 23, q. 1, at the end, that from the three persons of the Trinity - namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit - there cannot be abstracted any common concept as a quidditative one, yet there can be a common concept as it were of their proper [character]; but the proper is predicated denominatively, as we were just now saying.[308]

Hence, then, our position is rightly proved: for since the name "person" formally and expressly signifies the incommunicable subsistence of a rational nature, it will signify the same with respect to a divine person, except that in the place of "rational nature," "divine" must be substituted. In this definition, although the divine nature itself, or the Godhead, is connotated according to its proper essential notion, nevertheless what is directly signified is denominative with respect to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: for that mode of subsisting is after the mode of an act; it is also an incommunicable, or individual, notion, which is as it were a passion, as has been explained. Wherefore the whole signified is said denominatively of "person." And therefore I think that Durandus said that the name "person" signifies a common intention to three or more persons - not, indeed, what the logicians call a second intention, which is a being of reason, but because it is predicated denominatively of Peter and John, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.[309] Whether, however, to paternity, filiation, and active and passive spiration there is given some common concept of relation, or not, we shall say below in Disputation 159.

Solution to the third opinion's arguments: To the first argument of the third opinion I answer that, although "person" in the abstract is not predicated of the divine relations in the abstract, nevertheless it is not essential to them. For not every form that is predicated abstractly of some subject is essential to it, but sometimes is denominative. Thus rationality is called a difference and risibility a property; and yet neither is the notion of difference essential to rationality, nor the notion of property to risibility. So also, to speak with Scotus, of the thisness (haecceity) of Peter or of John, individuation is predicated abstractly; and yet it is not essential to it, but is as it were a property, just as also the ratio of individuation is not essential to Peter or to John, as has been proved. Therefore we say that sometimes an abstract is predicated denominatively of an abstract - especially when we denote as it were the act and office of it; as if we were to say of a haecceity that by it Peter or John is rendered singular and individual, and that it is very singularity itself, or the reason of the singular. For these are not predicated essentially of this or that haecceity. So, therefore, in the present case, paternity or filiation in the divine is called "personality" denominatively, because personality signifies the notion of singularity and individuation, whereby, ultimately, the divine nature is rendered incommunicable; but the notion of singularity is as it were a passion of relation itself. Therefore it is not a wonder if the three divine relations have a certain common denominative predicate.

308. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, at the end.
309. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, especially n. 16.

To the second I answer that the common notion of person is contracted in the divine essentially and quidditatively, as it were by proper differences, by this and that notion. For by the relations the notion of person is contracted - not as by proper differences, but as by the material subject which they denominate. But this or that notion of person, by which the common notion of person is contracted, is of itself essentially absolute, although it is said denominatively of the relative person: as St. Augustine signified in De Trinitate, book 7, chapter 6, where he proves that "person" is signified as to itself, not as to another; he understands this expressly and formally; yet on that account he does not deny that it is predicated denominatively from relation.[310]

Nor is it enough to say that the name "person" signifies something abstracted from the absolute and the relative: for it is impossible that there be a common concept of the absolute and the relation, except in name only, as Durandus excellently proves in I Sentences, dist. 23, q. 1, n. 16. And the reason of this can be of this sort: if that common concept be abstract, relation and the absolute follow, it follows that it is not "to another." But it is impossible that something be conceived not as to another, and not be conceived as absolute and to itself; for that is absolute which is loosed from a term, because it regards nothing other. Therefore there cannot be some real concept common to the relative and the absolute. By this same argument it is proved that the notion of accident cannot be univocal, or that one objective concept of it be assigned as common to the nine predicaments, however much it be said that it is participated analogically by the inferiors: because that concept cannot fail to be absolute, as has been proved; but the absolute cannot be contracted essentially by the differences of relation: therefore nothing can be common according to notion to the absolute and the relative; but by the same name "accident" relation is signified principally, and the remaining eight predicaments. Then, since Augustine in the place alleged says that "person" is signified as to itself, not as to another, by no means can we assert that the abstract concept of person is from the absolute and the relative, but that it is absolute.

First Collectarium: From the things said there follows a distinction between these three names, "Peter," "a certain man," "person." For the name "Peter" signifies the very thing by which a person is constituted, and connotes moreover the human nature in which he subsists; but "person" signifies the same thing, denominatively, however, and it connotes the nature; whereas "a certain man" directly signifies the nature of man together with the property and mode of subsisting, which it connotes, as St. Thomas taught in this article, and Durandus, q. 1, n. 6 and 7, who tacitly rebukes the holy Doctor by name, as though he had taught the opposite, although in truth he did not say that; although Cajetan, deceived I know not by what reason, thought that according to St. Thomas the same is signified by this name "a certain man" as by the name "person."

Second Collectarium: Then it follows why "a certain man," which is wont to be called a vague individual, is not constituted by the logicians as a sixth predicable: because in truth it signifies nothing common, unless denominatively by way of its connotation, like the word "individual"; but in this way it is sufficiently reduced to the fifth predicable.

310. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 6.

Quaestio XXXI - On those things which pertain to unity or plurality in the divine

Articulus I - Whether there is truly a Trinity in the divine

It is proceeded thus to the first. It seems that there is not a Trinity in the divine. For every name in the divine signifies either substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does not signify substance; for it would then be predicated of the individual persons. Nor does it signify relation, because it is not said according to the name "to another." Therefore by the name "Trinity" one ought not to speak in the divine.

1. Moreover, this name "Trinity" seems to be a collective name, since it signifies a multitude. But such a name is not suitable in the divine, since the unity imported by a collective name is the least unity. In the divine, however, there is the greatest unity. Therefore this name "Trinity" does not befit the divine.
2. Moreover, every "threefold" (trinum) is triplex; but in God there is not triplicity, since triplicity is a species of inequality. Therefore neither is there Trinity.
3. Moreover, whatever is in God is in the unity of the divine essence: because God is the essence. If therefore the Trinity is in God, it will be in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there will be three essential unities, which is heretical.
4. Moreover, in all things that are said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract. For the Godhead is God, and paternity is Father. But "Trinity" cannot be said "three," because thus there would be nine things in the divine, which is erroneous. Therefore by the name "Trinity" one ought not to speak in the divine.

But on the contrary: Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in unity, is to be venerated."[311]

I answer that it must be said that the name "Trinity" in the divine signifies a determinate number of persons. Therefore, as a plurality of persons is posited in the divine, so the name "Trinity" ought to be used: because this name signifies determinedly the same thing which "plurality" signifies indeterminately.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this name "Trinity," according to the etymology of the word, seems to signify one essence of three persons, according to which it is called "trinity" as though "the unity of three." But according to the proper usage of the word, it signifies rather the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, because he is not three persons. Nor does it signify the relations of the persons themselves, but rather the number of the persons as referred to each other; and hence it is that, according to the name, it is not referred to another.

311. Athanasius, Symbol of Faith (Quicumque), at the beginning.

To the second it must be said that a collective name imports two things, namely, the plurality of supposits and a certain unity, namely of some order. For a "people" is a multitude of men comprehended under some order. Therefore as to the first, this name "Trinity" agrees with collective names; but as to the second it differs, because in the divine Trinity there is not only the unity of order, but together with this there is the unity of essence.

To the third it must be said that "trinity" is said absolutely. For it signifies the ternary number of persons; but "triplicity" signifies a proportion of inequality. For it is a species of the proportion of inequality, as is evident from Boethius in the Arithmetic. And therefore it is not in God.[312]

To the fourth it must be said that in the divine Trinity there is understood both the number and the numbered persons. Therefore when we say "Trinity in unity," we do not place number in the unity of essence, as if it were three "ones," but we place the numbered persons in the unity of nature, just as the supposits of some nature are said to be in that nature; and conversely we say "unity in Trinity," as a nature is said to be in its supposits.

To the fifth it must be said that when we say "the Trinity is three" by reason of the number imported, there is signified the multiplication of the same number in itself, since what I call "threefold" imports distinction in the supposits of that of which it is said. And therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is three: for it would follow, if the Trinity were three, that there would be three supposits of the Trinity; just as when it is said, "God is threefold," it follows that there are three supposits of the Godhead.

Notation around the article.

Conclusion is affirmative; around which it must be observed that here St. Thomas does not define the number of the persons - to wit, that they are three, neither more nor fewer; for that follows from the things said in question 27, and from those that must be said below in question 41, article 1. But the Angelic Doctor teaches that the name "Trinity" befits God in the way the name "Plurality" does, because one is contained under the other as the particular under the universal; wherefore, just as "plurality" and numerical names do not signify in God negation, as St. Thomas proved in the preceding question, article 1, so he teaches in the same way about this name "Trinity," which also is a name of number. Wherefore by the same proportion about numerical terms, which we taught in Disputation 129, we must philosophize also about this.

312. Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica.

Articulus II - Whether the Son is other than the Father

It is proceeded thus to the second. It seems that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" (alius) is a relative of diversity of substance. If therefore the Son is other than the Father, it seems that he is diverse from the Father; which is against Augustine, On the Trinity, book 7, where he says that when we say three persons, we do not wish to understand diversity.

1. Moreover, whoever are "others" from each other, in some way differ from each other; therefore if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that he is "different" from the Father. But this is against Ambrose in book 1 On the Faith, where he says: "The Father and the Son are one in deity, nor is there there a difference of substance, nor any diversity."[313]
2. Moreover, one is said to be "alien" from another. But the Father is not alien from the Son. For Hilary says in book 7 On the Trinity that in the divine persons there is nothing "alien," nothing separable. Therefore the Son is not other than the Father.[314]
3. Moreover, "other" (alius) and "something else" (aliud) signify the same thing; they differ only by the consignification of gender. If therefore the Son is "other" than the Father, it seems to follow that the Son is "something else" than the Father.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter: "For one is the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in which there is not one thing the Father, another the Son, another the Holy Spirit, although personally the Father is other, the Son other, the Holy Spirit other."[315]

I answer that it must be said that because by words inordinately uttered heresy is incurred (as Jerome says), therefore when we speak of the Trinity, it must be done with caution and measure; because, as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity: "Nowhere is it more perilous to err, nor more laborious to search, nor more fruitful to find." In these matters of which we speak concerning the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, proceeding temperately between the two: namely, the error of Arius, who posited together with the Trinity of persons a trinity of substances; and the error of Sabellius, who posited together with the unity of essence the unity of person. Therefore, to avoid the error of Arius, we ought to avoid in the divine the name of "diversity" and of "difference," lest the unity of essence be taken away. We posit, however, the name of "distinction," on account of the opposition of relations. Whence, according to some authorities of Scripture, "difference of persons" is found to be said, or "difference" is taken for "division." But lest the simplicity of the divine essence be taken away, the name of "separation" and of "division," which is of a whole into parts, must be avoided. And lest the equality of unity be taken away, the name of "disparity" must be avoided. And lest "likeness" be taken away, the name of "alien" and "discrepant" must be avoided. For Ambrose says in the book On the Trinity that in the Father and in the Son there is not a discrepant but one divinity. And according to Hilary (as has been said), in

313. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, book 1.
314. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 7.
315. St. Augustine, De fide et symbolo ad Petrum.

the divine nothing is separable. But to avoid the error of Sabellius, we must avoid "singularity," lest the communicability of the divine essence be taken away. Whence Hilary says in book 7 On the Trinity: "To preach the Father and the Son as a singular God is sacrilege." We must also avoid the name "unique," lest the number of persons be taken away. Whence Hilary in the same book says that from God singularity and the notion of "unique" are excluded. Yet we say "only-begotten Son," because there are not many sons in the divine. Nor do we say "one-only God," because the Godhead is common to many. Let us also use the name "con-similar," lest the order of nature in the persons be taken away. Whence Ambrose says in book 1 On the Trinity: "Nor is 'con-similar' what ..."

It is objected that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" is the relative of diversity of substance. If therefore the Son is other than the Father, it seems to follow that He is diverse from the Father. But this is against St. Augustine, who says in On the Trinity VII, that when we say three persons, we do not intend to understand diversity.[316]

- Further. Whoever are "others" with respect to one another differ in some way from one another. If therefore the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He is different from the Father. But this is against St. Ambrose in book 1 On the Faith, where he says: "The Father and the Son are one in deity; there, there is no difference of substance, nor any diversity."[317]
- Further. What is alien from another is called "other"; but the Father is not alien from the Son. For St. Hilary says in book 7 On the Trinity, that in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable. Therefore the Son is not other than the Father.[318]
- Further. "Alius" and "aliud" signify the same thing, and differ only by a common-signification of gender. If therefore the Son is "alius" (masculine) from the Father, it seems to follow that the Son is "aliud" (neuter) from the Father.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book On the Faith and the Creed to Peter: "One is the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, although personally there is one who is the Father, another who is the Son, another who is the Holy Spirit."[319]

I answer: Since heresy arises from words inordinately uttered (as St. Jerome says), therefore when we speak about the Trinity we must proceed with caution and deal with the matter modestly. For, as St. Augustine says in book 1 On the Trinity, nowhere is it more perilous to err, nor more toilsome to investigate anything, nor more fruitful to find the truth, than on this subject.[320] And in those things which we say about the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, proceeding temperately between the two: namely, the error of Arius, who posited with the Trinity of persons a trinity of substances; and the error of Sabellius, who posited with the unity of essence a unity of person.[321]

316. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 7.
317. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, book 1.
318. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 7.
319. St. Augustine, De fide et symbolo ad Petrum.
320. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 1, at the beginning.

To avoid therefore the error of Arius, in divine matters we must eschew the names "diversity" and "difference," lest the unity of essence be taken away. We can, however, use the name "distinction," on account of relative opposition. Whence, if anywhere in some authentic writing there is found a diversity or difference of persons, that diversity or difference is taken for distinction. And lest the simplicity of the divine essence be taken away, we must avoid the names "separation" and "division," which is of a whole into parts. And lest equality be taken away, we must avoid the name "disparity." And lest similitude be taken away, we must avoid the names "alien" and "discrepant." For St. Ambrose says in his book On the Trinity, that in the Father and the Son there is not what is discrepant, but one divinity.[322] And according to St. Hilary (as was said), in divine things nothing is separable.[318] And to avoid the error of Sabellius, we must avoid singularity, lest the communicability of the divine essence be taken away. Whence St. Hilary says in book 7 On the Trinity: "To preach the Father and the Son as a singular God is sacrilege." We must also avoid the name "unique," lest the number of persons be taken away. And we must avoid the name "confused," lest the order of nature among the persons be removed.[323][324]

But this name "other" (alius), taken in the masculine, imports nothing but a distinction of supposit. Hence we can fittingly say that the Son is other than the Father, because, namely, He is another supposit of the divine nature, just as He is another person and another hypostasis.

- Reply to the first: "Other" (alius), since it is like a certain pronominal article, stands on the side of the supposit. Hence for its notion there suffices a distinction of substance which is hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinction of substance which is essence. And therefore we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is other.
- Reply to the second: Difference imports a distinction of form. But there is only one form in the divine, as is clear from that which is said in Phil. 2: "Who, being in the form of God." Therefore the name of "difference" does not properly befit the divine, as is clear from the authority adduced. Nevertheless St. John Damascene uses the name "difference" of the divine persons, inasmuch as a relative property is signified in the mode of a form. Whence he says that the hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken there for "distinction," as has been said.[325]
- Reply to the third: "Alien" is that which is extraneous and dissimilar. But this is not imported when one says "other." And therefore we say that the Son is other than the Father, although we do not say that He is alien.

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321. On Arius's positing of a trinity of substances and Sabellius's positing of one person with the unity of essence, see the standard heresiological accounts.
322. St. Ambrose, De Trinitate (or De fide), locus cited in scholastic tradition.
318. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 7.
323. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 7: on excluding singularity and the notion of "unique" from God.
324. St. Ambrose, De Trinitate, book 1: "Nor is that which is one confused..."; cited to avoid confusion of persons.
325. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 3, chs. 6 - 7.

- Reply to the fourth: The neuter gender is unformed; the masculine, and likewise the feminine, is formed and determinate. And therefore by the neuter gender a common essence is signified; but by the masculine and feminine, some supposit determined in the common nature. Whence also in human affairs, if one is asked, "Who is this?" the answer is, "Socrates" - a name of a supposit. But if it is asked, "What is he?" the answer is, "a rational and mortal animal." And therefore, because in the divine the distinction is according to the persons and not according to the essence, we say that the Father is other (alius) than the Son, but not another thing (aliud). And conversely we say that They are one (unum), but not one person (unus).

The conclusion is that the Son can be said to be other (alius) than the Father in the masculine, but not another thing (aliud) in the neuter.

Cic. To this conclusion, and to the doctrine of this and the following article, the disputation of the next article must be expressly deferred.

Articulus III - Whether the exclusive expression "alone" is to be added to an essential term in the divine

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the exclusive expression "alone" is not to be added to an essential term in the divine. For according to the Philosopher in the Second Elenchi, "alone" is he who is not with another. But God is with the Angels and holy souls. Therefore we cannot say "God alone."[326]

- Further. Whatever is adjoined to an essential term in the divine can be predicated of any person in particular and of all together. For because it is fitting to say "wise God," we can say "the Father is wise God," and "the Trinity is wise God." But St. Augustine in book 6 On the Trinity says: "That sentence is to be considered wherein it is said, that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore "alone" cannot be adjoined to an essential term.[327]
- Further. If this expression "alone" is adjoined to an essential term, it is either with respect to a personal predicate, or with respect to an essential predicate. But not with respect to a personal predicate, because this is false: "God alone is Father," since a man also is father. Nor with respect to an essential predicate, because if this were true, "God alone creates," it seems to follow that this would be true, "the Father alone creates." For whatever is said of God can be said of the Father. But this is false, because the Son also is creator. Therefore the expression "alone" cannot be adjoined in the divine to an essential term.

But on the contrary is what is said in 1 Tim. 1: "To the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, the only God."

326. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations (Elenchi), book 2.
327. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 6, ch. 9 (at the beginning).

I answer: This expression "alone" (solus) can be taken either categorematically or syncategorematically. A term is called categorematic which absolutely posits the thing signified about some supposit, as "white" about "man" when it is said "a white man." If therefore this expression "alone" be taken thus, in no way can it be adjoined to any term in the divine, because it would posit solitude about the term to which it would be adjoined, and thus it would follow that God is solitary. Which is against what has been said.

But a term is called syncategorematic which imports an order of the predicate to the subject, as the words "every" or "no one" do. And similarly this expression "alone," because it excludes every other supposit from sharing in the predicate. Thus, when it is said "Socrates alone writes," it is not given to be understood that Socrates is solitary, but that no one else is co-sharer with him in writing, although there are many present with him. And in this way nothing prohibits this expression "alone" from being adjoined to some essential term in the divine, inasmuch as all things other than God are excluded from sharing in the predicate. Hence let us say, "God alone is eternal," because nothing besides God is eternal.

- Reply to the first: Although Angels and holy souls are always with God, nevertheless, if there were not a plurality of persons in the divine, it would follow that God would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not taken away by association with something of an extraneous nature. For one is said to be alone in a garden, although there are many plants and animals there. And similarly God would be said to be alone or solitary, even with Angels and men existing with Him, if there were not several persons in the divine. The association therefore of Angels and souls does not exclude absolute solitude from the divine, much less solitude that is relative and by comparison to some predicate.
- Reply to the second: This expression "alone," properly speaking, is not placed on the side of the predicate which is taken formally. For it regards the supposit, insofar as it excludes another supposit from that to which it is adjoined. But this adverb, since it is exclusive, can be placed both on the side of the subject and on the side of the predicate. For we can say, "only Socrates runs," that is, no one else; and "Socrates runs only," that is, he does nothing else. Whence it cannot properly be said, "the Father is God alone," or "the Trinity is God alone," unless perhaps some implication is understood on the part of the predicate, as when it is said: "the Trinity is God who is the only God." And according to this, that sentence also can be true: "the Father is God who is the only God," if the relative were referred to the predicate and not to the supposit. But Augustine, when he says that the Father is not the only God, but that the Trinity is the only God, speaks by way of exposition, as if he were to say: when it is said "to the King of the ages, invisible, to the only God," this is not to be expounded of the person of the Father, but of the Trinity alone.
- Reply to the third: In either way this expression "alone" can be adjoined to an essential term. For this proposition "God alone is father" is twofold: because the term "father" can predicate the person of the Father. And thus it is true: for a man is not that person. Or it can predicate relation only. And thus it is false: because the relation of paternity is found also in

others, although not univocally. Similarly, this is true: "God alone creates." Nor however does it follow: "therefore the Father alone creates." For, as the sophists say, an exclusive expression "immobilizes" the term to which it is adjoined, so that a descent cannot be made under it through some of the supposits. For it does not follow, "man alone is a rational and mortal animal; therefore Socrates alone [is such]." Therefore, "Socrates alone" does not follow.

The conclusion is that the name "alone," if it be placed categorematically, as the logicians speak, cannot be predicated of an essential term; if we should say "God is alone." But taken syncategorematically it can be adjoined, as when we say "God alone is infinite."

Articulus IV - Whether an exclusive expression can be added to a personal term

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that an exclusive expression can be adjoined to a personal term, even if the predicate be common. For the Lord speaks to the Father in John 17: "that they may know Thee the only true God." Therefore "the Father alone is true God."

- Further. In Matthew it is said: "No one knows the Son except the Father." Which signifies as if it were said, "the Father alone knows the Son." But "to know the Son" is common. Therefore the same as before.
- Further. An exclusive expression does not exclude that which belongs to the very notion of the term to which it is adjoined. Whence it does not exclude a part nor a universal. For it does not follow, "Socrates alone is white: therefore his hand is not white"; or, "therefore man is not white." But one person is in the notion of another, as the Father is in the notion of the Son, and conversely. Therefore, from this that it is said, "the Father alone is God," the Son or the Holy Spirit is not excluded. And thus this locution seems to be true.
- Further. The Church sings: "Thou alone, O Most High, Jesus Christ."

But on the contrary: This locution "the Father alone is God" has two expositive parts, namely, "the Father is God," and "no other than the Father is God." But this second is false, because the Son, who is other than the Father, is God. Therefore this is false, "the Father alone is God," and likewise its similars.

I answer: When we say, "the Father alone is God," this proposition can have a multiple sense. First, according as "alone" is taken categorematically. Second, according as it is taken syncategorematically, and thus again it can be understood in multiple ways. For if it exclude from the form of the subject, thus it is true, so that the sense be: "the Father alone is God," that is, He with whom no other is "father," is God. And in this way St. Augustine expounds in book 6 On the Trinity, when he says: We say "the Father alone," not because He is separated from the Son or the Holy Spirit, but in saying this we signify that those others together with Him are not Father. But this sense is not had from the customary mode of speaking unless another implication be

understood; as if it were said, "He who alone is called Father is God." But according to its proper sense it excludes from sharing in the predicate. And thus this proposition is false if it excludes another (masculine supposit). It is, however, true if it excludes another thing (neuter).

Ad the third, it is to be said that in either way this word, "alone," can be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," is twofold: because the word "Father" can predicate the person of the Father. And thus it is true; for man is not that person. Or it can predicate the relation alone. And thus it is false. For the relation of paternity is also found in others, although not univocally. Likewise this is true: "God alone creates." Yet it does not follow: therefore the Father alone. Because, as the sophists say, an exclusive word immobilizes the term to which it is adjoined, so that no descent can be made under it to any supposits. For it does not follow: "Socrates alone is a rational, mortal animal: therefore Socrates's hand is not white," or, "therefore man is not white."

The conclusion is: If the name "alone" be put categorematically, as the logicians speak, it cannot be predicated of an essential term, for example, if we say, "God is alone"; but syncategorematically it can be added, for example, if we say, "God alone is infinite."

Whether the exclusive word can be joined to a personal term

In the fourth [article] the procedure is thus.

It seems that the exclusive word can be joined to a personal term, even if the predicate be common. For the Lord, speaking to the Father, says in John 17: "that they may know thee, the only true God." Therefore the Father alone is the true God.

1. Moreover, in Matthew 11 it is said: "No one knows the Son but the Father." Which signifies the same as if it were said, "the Father alone knows the Son." But to know the Son is something common. Therefore the same as before.
2. Moreover, an exclusive word does not exclude those things which are of the understanding of the term to which it is adjoined. Hence it does not exclude a part, nor a universal. For it does not follow: "Socrates alone is white": therefore his hand is not white; or, therefore man is not white. But one person is in the understanding of the other, as the Father in the understanding of the Son, and conversely: therefore, by the fact that it is said, "the Father alone is God," the Son or the Holy Spirit is not excluded. And thus this expression seems to be true.
3. Moreover, the Church sings: "Thou alone, O Jesus Christ, art the Most High."

But on the contrary: This expression, "the Father alone is God," has two expositional expansions, namely: "the Father is God," and "no other than the Father is God." But this second is false, because the Son is other than the Father, who is God. Therefore this is false, "the Father alone is God"; and so in similar cases.

I answer that, when we say, "the Father alone is God," this proposition can have manifold understanding. For if "alone" posits solitude about the Father, thus it is false according to what is taken categorematically. But according to what is taken syncategorematically, thus again it can be understood in many ways. Because if it excludes from the form of the subject, thus it is true, so that the sense is: "the Father alone is God," that is, he, with whom no other is Father, is God. And in this way St. Augustine expounds it in De Trinitate, book 6, ch. 9, when he says: "We say the Father alone, not because he is separated from the Son or the Holy Spirit, but in saying this we signify that those who are together with him are not Father."[328] But this sense is not had from the customary mode of speaking unless another implication be understood; as if it be said: "He who alone is called Father is God." According to the proper sense, however, it excludes from sharing in the predicate. And thus this proposition is false if it excludes "another" in the masculine. But it is true if it excludes "another" only in the neuter. For the Son is "other" (alius) than the Father, yet not "another thing" (aliud). Likewise the Holy Spirit. But because this word "alone" properly regards the subject (as was said), it is more apt to exclude "another" (alius) than "another thing" (aliud). Wherefore such a locution is not to be extended, but to be piously expounded, if it be found anywhere in the authentic Scripture.

Reply to the first: When we say, "thee the only true God," it is not understood of the person of the Father, but of the Trinity alone, as Augustine expounds. Or, if it be understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded, because of the unity of essence, insofar as the word "alone" excludes only "another thing," as was said.

And similarly one must speak to the second. For when something essential is said of the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit is not excluded on account of the unity of essence. Hence it must be known that in the aforesaid authority the word "no one" (nemo) is not the same as "no man" (nullus homo), which the term seems to signify. For the person of the Father could not be excepted; but it is taken, according to the usage of speech, distributively for any rational nature.

Reply to the third: An exclusive word does not exclude those things which are of the understanding of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ according to supposit, as a part and a universal. But the Son differs in supposit from the Father. And therefore the reasoning is not similar.

Reply to the fourth: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High, but that he alone is Most High with the Holy Spirit in the glory of God the Father.

Note concerning the article. The conclusion is: When the predicate is common, as "God," "wise," and the like, the name "alone" cannot be added to a personal term: wherefore we cannot say, "the Father alone is God," unless the proposition renders this sense: "the Father is God" - which sense is not alien to the usage "he alone is Father." Concerning this conclusion it must be observed that for this reason we added in the conclusion those words, "when the predicate is common, as God," even if they are not expressly had in the body, because thus it is had in the title of the article, and in that case there is controversy; by "the title of the article" I understand not that which is prefixed to the

328. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 6, ch. 9 (at the beginning).

article (for that was not placed by St. Thomas), but that which in the article itself is inserted before the beginning of the first argument. Wherefore in the body the Holy Doctor only disputes about the particle "alone" in that proposition, "the Father alone is God," in which the predicate is common: for if the predicate were personal, the name "alone" could very well be added, as in this proposition, "the Father alone begets." But concerning the use of these names, and of others about which St. Thomas disputes in Article 2, we must straightway discourse more copiously.

Disputatio CXXXI - On the varied use of names in the mystery of the Trinity

- On the names, "the same" (idem), "other" (alius), and "another thing" (aliud), "one" (unus), and "one" (vnum). Caput 1.
- On the names of diversity, separation, and union. Caput 2.
- On the names "threefold" and "manifold." Caput 3.
- On the words "unique," "singular," and "alone." Caput 4.

Caput I - On the names "the same" (idem), "other" (alius), and "another thing" (aliud), "one" (unus), and "one" (vnum)

In what manner these names are to be used, when they are not predicated per se, but, as it were, adjectivally are adjoined to other words, no one who has learned the mystery of the Trinity - of one essence in three persons - can be ignorant. For it is manifest that one cannot say that the Father is "another God" from the Son, nor "another creator," and so forth; for thus distinction in essence would be signified. And therefore Sixtus the Pope in Epistle I and VI, and the Sixth Synod in act 11, in the Epistle of Sophronius, disapprove this mode of speaking; but, on the contrary, we must say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the same God.[329]

But whether, when notional names are added, one ought to say "the same," or "another God," we shall say below in Disputation 157, namely, whether we ought to say "God begot another God," or "the same God."

Dubium. The author of the Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, in Bede's edition, tome 8, column 113, proposes a doubt: whether, once this proposition has been uttered, "the Father is God," this also is true, "the same God is the Son." He answers, however, that a distinction is needed: for if (he says) this whole "the same God" be supposed, it is not to be conceded, lest we fall into the Sabellian heresy; for "the same" is referred to the Father: as if he said, because that proposition, "the Father is God," has preceded, when we add "the same God is the Son," the word "the same" seems to be referred to God of whom the speech has preceded; that is, to the Father, who is God: and thus the sense is, "God the Father is God the Son," which is to confuse the persons. Otherwise (he says), if the word "the same" be not prefixed to the word "God," but be placed after it

329. Sixtus, Pope, Epistles I and VI; the Sixth Synod, act 11, in the Epistle of Sophronius.

- which that author expressed, "if it be not supposed, but be predicated" - then the proposition will be true; as if someone, with this enunciation premised, "the Father is God," were to subjoin this, "and God is the same the Son," it will be true, because it renders this sense: "God the Son is the same God with the Father." But in the other mode previously stated the sense was: "God the Father is the same God who is the Son" - which the author in the same place thinks to be two different things; although there appears scarcely any difference between these: "God the Son is the same God with the Father"; "God the Son is the same God who is the Father."

I, for my part, judge that care must be taken lest the name "the same," when an enunciation about some person has gone before, seem to refer to that person: for thus it is not to be said, "and the same God is the Son." If, however, it refers only to the concrete name "God," it must be conceded. But this must be discerned according to the rules which we shall hand down below in Disputation 157, cap. 6. For when the name "God" is posited on the part of the predicate, even if it be predicated of some person, it does not supposit for a person, but for the nature; as in this: "the Father is God." Wherefore, when afterwards it is added, "the same God is the Son," the word "the same" does not seem to refer to the person of the Father, but to the nature of the Godhead in the concrete. But when the name "God" is put with some notional word adjoined, which makes it supposited for a person, according to what we shall say there, then it will not be true to say, "the same God is such or such a person," assigning another; as if someone were to say, "the Father is God begetting," or, "God begetting is the Father," it would not be permitted to subjoin, "and the same God is the Son"; because then the name "the same" refers to God the begetter, who is supposited for the person of the Father.

But indeed, if the names "other" (alius) and "another thing" (aliud) be put per se, which the logicians call categorematically, as in this proposition, "the Father is other than the Son," or, "he is another thing than the Son," it is clear also from the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Councils in what manner one should speak: "other," in the masculine, denotes distinction of supposit; "another thing," however, neutrally, denotes distinction of nature. And thus it is permitted to assert, "the Father is other than the Son," and, "in things divine there is other and other"; yet it is not true, "the Father is another thing than the Son," or, "in things divine there is another thing and another thing." This doctrine is gathered first from Novatian, the Roman presbyter, in the book De Trinitate, ch. 22, printed with Tertullian, where he teaches that "one," neutrally, is referred to the nature; "one," however, in the masculine, to the person; the same, therefore, must be said of these names "other" and "another thing." And so, in the Trinity they grant "other and other," but not "another thing and another thing": the Council of Ephesus, tome 2, ch. 7; the Eleventh Council of Toledo in the confession of faith; and the Lateran under Innocent III, in the chapter "We condemn," on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith; St. Basil, in the oration against those who calumniate us as worshipping three Gods, toward the middle; St. Augustine - or rather Fulgentius, who is believed to be the true author of that work - book De fide ad Petrum, ch. 1; and the same Augustine, City of God, book 11, ch. 10; Pope St. Leo I, Sermon 1 on Pentecost, for the same reason; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 7, toward the middle; and St. Anselm, in the Monologion, chs. 40 and 42, say that the Father and the Son are "two," yet "one they are," not "one [person]." St. Bernard,

Epistle 190, asserts that "the whole that is the Father is the Son": because "the whole," neutrally, is referred to the essence; as also St. John Damascene noted, De fide orthodoxa, book 3, ch. 7; and Nicetas, Thesaurus, book 3, ch. 35, who taught exactly the same about these names "other" and "another thing."

Among the Scholastics, the same has been handed down, together with St. Thomas in the second article of this question, by more recent theologians in the same place; and by Alex., Prima Pars, q. 65, in its members.

Bonaventure in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 21, article 1, question 7, and Henricus, in the Second Part of his Summa, article 53, question 1, also pertain here.[330] The Son is not the same as the Father: they use, however, the masculine noun. And as St. Ambrose says, in the first book On the Faith, chapter 2, for the same reason it must be said that what is Father is Son; yet not that he who is Father is Son. In the same way, concerning the name "one" in the masculine and "one" in the neuter, one must philosophize.[331]

This also pertains here, that other Fathers, relying on the same foundation, affirm that in Christ there is not another and another (alius et alius), but another thing and another thing (aliud et aliud). Thus the Council of Constantinople V, in conference 8, canons 3 and 6; and Pope Leo I in Epistle 10, chapter 4, and Epistle 95, chapter 1; and although that Epistle 10 of Leo, when it had been recited in the Council of Chalcedon, at first sight displeased the Fathers of the Council, as is found in action 2, nevertheless afterward, with Theodoret approving according to the judgment of St. Cyril, the Fathers all consented. The same words of Leo are written by Pope Agatho in his Epistle, which is in the Sixth Synod, action 4; and similar things are had in the same Synod, session 17, in the confession of faith toward its end; and Pope Eutychian in Epistle 1.[332] In the same way spoke St. Hilary, On the Trinity 9, a little after the middle; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 5 on Theology; St. Cyril, in the Scholia on the Incarnation, chapter 26; Fulgentius, On the Incarnation, chapter 11; St. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 3, chapter 7; and Nicetas in the place cited; St. Anselm, in the book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 5; the author of the Commentary on Boethius's book On the Trinity, as found in Bede, column 1117.[333] Of these, Nazianzen, Damascene, and Nicetas, and that author expressly affirm that the name "other" (alius) is referred to the supposit (*suppositum*); but the name "another thing" (aliud), to the nature and the essence (*essentia*). And indeed, from the name "other" (alius), that is gathered from John 14: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another (alium) Paraclete." Nor only can we say in the Trinity that there is other and other (alius et alius), but also "the one and the other" (alter et alter): for it is a name of the same signification. So speaks St. Hilary, On the Trinity 2; John Maxentius, book 2 Dialogica, 20; Athanasius, Oration on the Substance of the Son; Fulgentius, book 3, To

330. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 21, art. 1, q. 7; Henricus, Summa, pars 2, art. 53, q. 1.

331. St. Ambrose, De fide, lib. 1, cap. 2.

332. Constantinople V, coll. 8, can. 3, 6; Leo I, Ep. 10, cap. 4; Ep. 95, cap. 1; Chalcedon, act. 2; Theodoret with the judgment of St. Cyril; Agatho, Ep. in Syn. VI, act. 4; Syn. VI, sess. 17, in confessione fidei; Pope Eutychian, Ep. 1.

333. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 9; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 5 de Theologia; St. Cyril, Scholia de Incarnatione, cap. 26; Fulgentius, De Incarnatione, cap. 11; St. John Damascene, De fide orth., lib. 3, cap. 7; Nicetas, loc. cit.; St. Anselm, De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 5; Comment. in Boeth. De Trinitate, apud Bedam, col. 1117.

Thrasimund, chapter 6, whose words we will set forth in the following chapter, and to the seventh objection of the Arians, in the book Against the Arians; and in the Sermon on the Twofold Nativity of Christ; and St. Bernard, Epistle 190, where in the same way he speaks of these names "the one" and "the other" (alter et alterum), just as we above of these "other" and "another thing" (alius et aliud). In the same way one ought to use the name "the same" (idem), either in the masculine, or in the neuter, as Guitmundus, Archbishop of Aversa, notes in the Confession on the Trinity, which is in the fourth volume of the Sacred Library; and Justyn also, in the Exposition of the True Confession of the Trinity, when he says that one must answer under a distinction, not absolutely.[334]

Caput II - On the names of diversity, separation, and union

Among the words that signify diversity are "to differ" (differre) and "difference" (differentia) - in Greek, διαφέρειν and διαφορά - which certain Fathers employ in divine matters: Justin, in the True Exposition of the Confession of the Trinity, a little from the beginning; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 3 on Theology, which is number 35 in order, likewise a little from the beginning; St. John Damascene, On the Faith, book 1, chapters 10 and 11, and book 3, chapter 5; Euthymius, on John 16; and among the Latins, Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity, book 4, chapter 20, and book 5, chapter 1; the Master, in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 24, "Cum autem," and the chapter "Ita"; and Alexander of Hales, First Part, question 44.[335]

Yet more cautiously St. Thomas, in article 2 of this question, teaches that the persons of the Trinity ought not to be called "different," nor said "to differ," following the judgment of St. Hilary, On the Trinity 4, a little before the middle, where, from that verse of Genesis 1, "Let us make man," he gathers in this way: since "not solitary" only is signified, so neither is "different" signified; for neither solitary only nor diverse is to be confessed by us.[336]

But the author of the Commentary on Boethius's book On the Trinity, which is found in the eighth tome of Bede, column 1113, to one asking whether the divine persons differ, says that one must answer by a distinction, not absolutely. For they are said to "differ," that is, to be "distinguished" or to "be apart": and thus it must be conceded: or they are said to differ, that is, to partake of contrary qualities; and thus it is false. And although, with the authorities Damascene, Richard, Euthymius, the Master, and Alexander invoked, they say absolutely that the three persons differ; yet either that they differ by properties, or that the properties themselves differ: which way of speaking surely removes all suspicion from the word. Therefore St. Thomas refuses to grant "difference" among the persons, because that seems to be referred to the essence; wherefore, when it is added "according to the properties," every occasion of error is taken away.[337]

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334. Guitmundus, Archiep. Aversanus, Confessio de Trinitate, in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 4; Justin, Expositio verae confessionis Trinitatis.

335. Justin, Expositio verae confessionis Trinitatis; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 3 de Theologia (ord. 35); St. John Damascene, De fide, lib. 1, cc. 10 - 11; lib. 3, c. 5; Euthymius, in Ioan. 16; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, lib. 4, c. 20; lib. 5, c. 1; the Master, I Sent., dist. 24, c. "Cum autem," et c. "Ita"; Alexander of Hales, P. I, q. 44.

336. St. Thomas, in this question, art. 2; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 4, ad med.; Gen 1:26.

337. Commentarius in Boethii librum De Trinitate, apud Bedam, tom. 8, col. 1113.

I judge the same thing must be said of the name "diverse" (diversus), that although it can be predicated of the persons absolutely, yet because it can furnish some occasion of erring, it is better denied, for the reason that it is referred to the essence. So St. Thomas in article 2, and the Canarian there. For this reason Fulgentius, book 3 To Thrasimund, chapter 6, says: "The eternal and unchangeable Father begot another (alterum), not a diverse one (non diversum)." And Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book 4, chapter 29: "When we say God the Father and God the Son, we do not say a 'diverse' [God], nor do we separate either of them"; although Lactantius in this place, when he says "we do not say a 'diverse'," seems to understand "God." One could refer also St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book 7, last chapter, where he says: "And thus let him say one essence (namely, the Father and the Son), so that he does not suppose something other than another, either greater or better, or diverse in some part." But since he says "aliud" (another thing), of the neuter gender, he seems to speak of the essence, not of the person, according to the notes in the preceding chapter. Truly St. Hilary, On the Trinity 4, in the chapter cited above, plainly of the Son himself says that he is "not diverse." But if among the Fathers he is sometimes called "diverse," it will be with that addition which we noted above - namely, "according to the property," or "according to the person" - or it should be explained in a good sense.[338]

Nevertheless, the names "discrete" (discretus) and "discretion" (discretio) are more readily attributed to the Trinity; and in the same way, the names "distinct" or "distinction" seem to signify a "discrimen" (a distinguishing line). These words are used by the First and the Eleventh Council of Toledo, and by the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in the chapter "Damnamus," On the Most High Trinity and the Catholic Faith; and the ancient translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, in the chapter On the Divine Names, says that some things are said of God "in unity," some "discretely" (in Greek, εἰκότως καὶ διεκκεκριμένως), which denotes "distinctly" and "discretely," from the verb διακρίνω, which signifies "to distinguish and to discern." Perionius, however, translates "distinctly." Lactantius too, in the place just cited, rightly says, "nor do we separate either of them (sc. the Father and the Son)." For "to separate" (secernere) seems to signify more than "to discern" (discernere), namely, to "separate and divide," which must not be said of the divine persons. Richard of St. Victor uses the same word in On the Trinity, book 4, chapter 15, and book 5, chapter 1, but clearly refers it to the properties, as we noted about the word "to differ." Moreover, as St. Augustine observed, On the Trinity, book 7, last chapter, the persons cannot be called "dissimilar": for that is referred to the essence.[339]

Concerning the word "union" (vnio) and "conjunction" (coniunctio), some think that one must speak cautiously in Latin: for in God "unity" (*unitas*) in essence (*essentia*) seems to be granted rather than "union"; for these words, just as already the word "conjunction," seem to signify a collection of many into one by some participation. The name "conjunction" is used by Billius, the translator of Nazianzen, in Oration 23, which is in praise of the philosopher Heron; and in

338. Fulgentius, Ad Thrasimundum, lib. 3, c. 6; Lactantius, Div. Instit., lib. 4, c. 29; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 7, cap. ult.; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 4.

339. Councils of Toledo I and XI; Lateran under Innocent III, cap. "Damnamus," De summa Trinitate, et fide catholica; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. de nomin.; Perionius, transl.; Lactantius, loc. cit.; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, lib. 4, c. 15; lib. 5, c. 1; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 7, cap. ult.

Nicetas's commentary on those words of the same oration, "fac sis," which are near the end of it; and by Perionius, translator of Dionysius, often in chapter 2 On the Divine Names and chapter 3, and he calls the things that are essential in God "conjoined" and "common to the whole divinity"; and below he calls "distinction and unity" in God "conjunction and distinction." In Greek, however, with Nazianzen and Dionysius the word is ἕνωσις, signifying "union" or "unity," which the Greeks employ everywhere, both to denote the union of two natures in the one person of Christ, and to signify the unity of essence and of the essential attributes in the Trinity. Dionysius also uses the word ἡνωμένος, which we render in Latin "united, conjoined": in Greek, indeed, because a richer significance of words obtains among them, they do not fear to use these names in that way. Only the word συνάφεια the Fathers of the Council of Alexandria, in Epistle 10, as preserved by St. Cyril, suspected for expressing the union of the two natures in Christ: because it seems rather to signify "contact of nearness" than "union," as those skilled in the Greek tongue note: and those Fathers use the name ἕνωσις, which is also used in the Trinity: but in Latin thus it is said in that Epistle of the Council of Alexandria: "Nay rather the name 'conjunction' we avoid, as not being suitable to signify the most close unity." And, in my judgment, the name "conjunction" does not so well fit this mystery among Latins, for expressing the unity of three persons in one essence, as does the name "unity." About the word συνάφεια I said something in the preceding disputation against Elipandus, from those things which I added in the books On Adoration, chapter 13.[340]

Wherefore, from the Latin authors, St. Bernard, in book 5 of the Consideration to Eugene, toward the middle, says of God: "For He is One, but not 'united'; He does not consist of parts, as a body": and he said this to express the supreme simplicity of God: because "united" seems to be that which is gathered from many into one. Thus indeed he had said: "thou hast not (i.e., God) that which divides to number, nor that which gathers to one"; by which words he does not deny that there are three persons, since straightway he truly grants number in them; but between person and essence, against Gilbert, he denies number, and establishes supreme simplicity; and therefore he asserts "nor that which gathers to one." For although the three persons are distinguished among themselves, yet because with the essence they are altogether the same, they are not so much said to be "united and collected" in that unity as "one." The same was noted by the author of the Commentary on Boethius's book On the Trinity, as found in Bede, tome 8, column 1115, who near the end says: "We say that 'one' (namely, the three persons) is not from a union, as a species or a genus is said [to be one]: for God does not unite several that share, substantially or accidentally."[341]

I for my part think that, in Latin speech, the mystery of the Trinity in one essence is more conveniently signified by the names "unity" and "one" than by the names "union," "conjunction," and "united"; nevertheless I do not dare openly to condemn the manner of speaking and the use of those names.

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340. Billius, interpreter of Nazianzen, on Or. 23 (in laudem Heronis Philosophi), and Nicetas ad eadem verba; Perionius on Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cc. 2 - 3; Nazianzen and Dionysius on ἕνωσις and ἡνωμένος; Council of Alexandria, Ep. 10, apud St. Cyril: avoidance of συνάφεια; see also the earlier disputation against Elipandus and the additions to the books De Adoratione, cap. 13.

341. St. Bernard, De Consideratione, lib. 5, ad Eugenium (in medio); Comment. in Boeth. De Trinitate, apud Bedam, tom. 8, col. 1115.

Caput III - On the names "triplex" and "multiplex"

There are those who think that the name "triplex" cannot be predicated of God, nor the name "multiplex," as "triune" (trinus) is predicated: thus teaches St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book 6, chapters 6 - 8, and book 15, chapter 3; although Epistle 102 seems to admit this word, yet he teaches that it is said of God by reason of effects; as also the Holy Spirit, by reason of the gifts which he bestows upon us, is said to be "sevenfold." In favor of this opinion there is adduced also St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 2, where he says: "What is one is not confused, nor what is indifferent 'multiple'": but there he plainly speaks of the essence of God; as also St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the Oration to Evagrius, which is 45, where he says that "there is not in God a 'multiple' number, nor is God 'multiple'." St. Bernard also is cited, who in book 3 of the Consideration, near the middle, denies that God is "multiple" or "double"; but he asserts that He is simple. And the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, plainly affirms that God is not "triplex," but "trinus." Among the Scholastics, St. Thomas also teaches this in this question, article 1, reply to the third; and Alexander, question 66, member 1, article 4.[342]

St. Augustine gives the reason: because if God were said to be "triplex" or "multiplex" by reason of the persons, it would follow that there is something greater when the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are together than when there is the Father alone. But St. Thomas for this reason denies that God is "triplex," because "triplum" and "triplex" signify a proportion of inequality; for it is a certain species of unequal proportion; but in God an unequal cannot be.[343]

Yet these reasons, if it be allowed to say so with due respect to such great men, do not efficaciously prove what they contend. First, because if from this, that God were said to be "triplex" by reason of the persons, that absurdity would follow which Augustine inferred, the same would plainly be gathered from this, that He is said to be "trinus": for in a ternary the whole ternary seems to be something greater than any unity taken separately: or, if in that case this absurdity does not follow, in no way can it be inferred from this, that God is called "triplex." But how "more" and "less" ought to be conceded in number, so that even in divine matters, without any absurdity, it may have place, we explained above in question 30, in the notes on the first article.

Then also what St. Thomas asserts proves only that God cannot be called "triplex": but that He cannot be called "multiplex" he does not demonstrate: for the name "multiplex" is not a name of proportion, but of multitude. Moreover, although the name "triplex" be of a lesser proportion, and this be granted in God, it is not inconvenient: since the equality and inequality of number must necessarily be granted in God, as also "fewer" and "more," as we said in that same article: for who would deny that the ternary of persons in God is a lesser number than the quaternary of persons in men; and that four men are more than the three divine persons?

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342. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6, cc. 6 - 8; lib. 15, c. 3; Ep. 102; St. Ambrose, De fide, lib. 1, c. 2; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 45 ad Evagrium; St. Bernard, De consideratione, lib. 3, in medio; Council of Toledo XI, in confessione fidei; St. Thomas, in this question, art. 1, ad 3; Alexander of Hales, q. 66, memb. 1, art. 4.

343. The reason from St. Augustine as above; St. Thomas's reason: because triplum/triplex import a proportion of inequality, which cannot be in God.

Wherefore I for my part judge for another reason that God cannot be said to be "multiplex" or "triplex," even if "trinus" is rightly said: namely, because it yields one of two senses, either that God in himself consists of several things, and thus it is opposed to "simple," as if requiring several things for His composition, which in no way can be said of God. For although God is triune in persons, that is, subsists in three, yet because He is not made up of three, nor coalesces as if from components, nor do those [three persons], together with the essence, make for a composition of God Himself, since they are the same.

For he had said: you (namely, God) do not have that which divides to number, but that which gathers to one. By these words he does not deny that there are three persons, since straightway he truly grants number in them; but between person and essence he denies number against Gilbert, and asserts the highest simplicity. Therefore he affirms not that which would gather to one. For although the three persons are distinguished among themselves; yet because they are altogether the same with the essence, they are not so much said to be united and gathered in it, as to be one. The author of the Commentary on Boethius's book On the Trinity, cited in Bede, tome 8, column 1115, noted the same, who says near the end: We say that not "one" (namely, that the three persons) is said from union, as species or genus is said: for God does not unite several things which co-participate, whether substantially or accidentally.[344]

I for my part think that, in Latin speech, the mystery of the Trinity in one essence is more aptly signified by the names "unity" and "one," than by the names "union," "conjunction," "united"; nevertheless I do not venture openly to condemn the manner of speaking and the use of these names.

Concerning the names "triple" (triplex) and "multiple" (multiplex): there are some who think that the name "triple" cannot be said of God just as "three" (trinus) is predicated; thus St. Augustine in De Trinitate, book 6, chapters 6 - 8, and book 15, chapter 3. For although Epistle 102 seems to admit this word, he teaches, however, that it is said of God by reason of effects; just as the Holy Spirit, by reason also of the gifts which he bestows on us, is called "sevenfold." Ambrose also is cited for this opinion, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 2, where he says: what is one is not "confused," nor is what is "indifferent" multiple; but there he plainly speaks of the essence of God; as likewise Nazianzen, in the oration to Evagrius, which is the 45th, where he says that there is not in God a multiple numen, nor is God multiple. Bernard too is cited, who in the books On Consideration, about the middle, denies that God is multiple or double, but asserts that he is simple; and the Council of Toledo XI, in the confession of faith, plainly affirms that God is not "triple," but "three" (trinus). Among the Scholastics, the same is taught by St. Thomas in this question, article 1, reply to the third, and Alexander of Hales, question 66, member 1, article 4. The reason St. Augustine gives is as above; St. Thomas's reason is that "triple" and "triplum/triplex" import a proportion of inequality, which cannot be in God.[345][346]

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344. The author of the Commentary on Boethius, De Trinitate, cited in Bede, tome 8, col. 1115.

345. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6, cc. 6 - 8; lib. 15, c. 3; Ep. 102; St. Ambrose, De fide, lib. 1, c. 2; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 45 ad Evagrium; St. Bernard, De consideratione, lib. 3, in medio; Council of Toledo XI, in confessione fidei; St. Thomas, in this question, art. 1, ad 3; Alexander of Hales, q. 66, memb. 1, art. 4.

Yet these reasons, to the extent that it is lawful to say of such great men, do not efficaciously say that which they contend. For if from the fact that God is not "triple" with respect to the persons there followed what Augustine inferred: that is, that something greater would be gathered from "triple" in a ternary than in unity taken separately, this absurdity does not follow; nor can it follow from the fact that God is "three"; but how the greater and the less ought to be in number, without any absurdity we have explained above in the question and in the points of the first article.

Moreover, what St. Thomas asserts only proves that one cannot say that God is "triple"; but it does not prove that we cannot say that he is "three" (trinus). For the name "triple" is a name of proportion; but "three" (trinus) can be said, and the name "multiple" cannot be said - if, namely, the name "triple" be a name of multitude and inequality. And these things are conceded concerning God, namely, that equality of number is necessarily in God, just as also we were saying above in the aforesaid article: that in God the ternary is not a lesser number than the quaternary among men; and that there are not more men than there are three divine persons.

Wherefore I indeed for another reason judge that we must not say that God is "multiple," even though he is "three," because one sense of "multiple" expresses that God consists in himself of many things united simply, as if after the manner of composition - which is in no way possible. For although God is three persons, that is, subsisting in three persons, nevertheless neither is he made up "out of" three or from things coalescing; nor do those constitute any composition of God himself, since they are altogether the same with the essence; therefore he who is rightly called "three" cannot be called "triple" or "multiple." For "three" only denotes distinction of hypostases, even in the same nature and without any distinction of them from the essence. But if it effects this sense, namely, that there are many gods, as though God were multiplied - who cannot be multiplied or triplicated unless there were many gods - yet we therefore say that God is "three," because he has some trinity in himself; and therefore, since "three gods" cannot be said, God is rightly called "three" (trinus).

Among the Fathers, Nazianzen, Ambrose, and Bernard, when they deny that God is multiple, manifestly refer this to the essence, and seem to follow the first sense: for they think that "multiple" is opposed to "simple"; and especially Bernard, who in that place, against Gilbert of Poitiers, contends that between person and essence there is no distinction, lest God be said to be multiple and without simplicity; which he thinks is not taken away by the Trinity of persons, if person and essence are altogether the same.

But in truth, if the words "multiple," "triple," and "double" be referred to persons, processions, or relations, I do not see why they could not befit God. Wherefore it will be permitted to say that there is in God a "multiple" as to person; and so to say that there is a "triple" as to person; and a "double" as to emanation. Thus St. Thomas, in De Potentia, question 10, article 1, said that there is a double emanation in God. Others say there is a double procession in the same way. Nazianzen, in the oration alleged, calls the Son and the Holy Spirit "a twin ray of the Father" (ἡλίλυμος τοῦ

346. The Augustinian reason as above; St. Thomas's reason: because triplum/triplex import a proportion of inequality, which cannot be in God.

πατρὸς αὐγῆς), thus he names the Son and the Holy Spirit. And if it is lawful to say a "twin" procession and a "twin" ray, it will also be lawful to say a "double" procession and a "double" ray: for "ray" is referred to origin, not to essence. For those things which are common by a community as it were of the universal - such as are the concepts of person, relation, and procession, which are abstracted from several things by the intellect - or those which at least only in word, as it were by predication, are common, are rightly said to be multiplied by inferiors; and especially then when the inferiors are not of the same mode, as paternity, filiation, and spiration, which are apprehended as though of diverse species. I pass over here the reason by which Nazianzen, in that oration, proves that the Trinity of the persons derogates nothing from God's simplicity: for in the persons he seems to grant only a difference of names and a multiplication, whereas yet he who is rightly called "three" cannot be called "triple" or "multiple," since he is altogether the same with that [essence].

Nor is this sufficient against Sabellius. For Sabellius, too, conceded diverse appellations in the same nature. But Bernard's reason should suffice for us, which we have pursued at length in disputation 116, chapter 5: namely, because although the persons are distinguished among themselves; nevertheless with the divine nature they are altogether the same; wherefore with it, or among themselves, they compose nothing. From which I finally infer that Mirandola spoke amiss about God, saying: "one has a numen in a triple numen." For since numen is referred to the essence, it cannot be multiplied; and therefore Nazianzen expressly denied in God a "triple numen." And indeed, if "triple" could be said, then a triple adoration would also be owed to God - which is absurd. For every divine adoration is owed to the numen.

Caput IV - On the words "only - begotten" (unicus), "singular" (singularis), and "alone" (solus)

Hilary, book 7 On the Trinity, not far from the end, does not dare to call God "only" or "singular"; indeed he thinks it sacrilege to call God "singular"; and St. Thomas consents in this article; Bonaventure likewise on the First Book, distinction 21, article 1, question 1. But Durandus, on the First Book, distinction 9, question 1, and other more recent authors think, according to the propriety of speech, that it can be granted that God is "only" (unicus); and since now the danger of the Sabellian heresy has ceased, that we can, without any inconvenience, use this word. And if we predicate this word of the essence itself, or of the deity, there is no doubt but that it can befit.

Concerning the name "singular": Hilary teaches the same thing which he had said about the word "only," book 7 On the Trinity, past the middle and not far from the end; and Leo the First, in sermon 2 On Pentecost somewhat near the beginning, when he says: And as regards the deity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, there is neither singularity nor diversity; and the author of the Commentary on Boethius's book On the Trinity, in Bede, tome 8, column 1116, who reports Augustine in Questions on the New and Old Testament. Yet among the Latins Lactantius, in the fourth book of the Divine Institutions, chapter 29, near the end, calls God "singular"; and among the Greeks, Sophronius, in the confession of faith which is found in action 11 of the sixth

synod, often calls the deity and its unity "singular." Nor do I see why, according to the propriety of the word, it should take away the Trinity in the persons: wherefore, unless there be danger for the hearers, there is no need to fear to use this word.[347]

Concerning the names which the Logicians call "exceptive," such as "alone" (solus), "only" (solum), in the exposition of articles 3 and 4 we have explained what must be said, and we have interpreted the mind of the holy Doctor. With whom agree Alexander, I, p. q. 65, member 3; Bonaventure on the First, d. 21, a. 2, q. 1 & 2; Scotus, q. 1; Durandus, q. 1 & 2; Gabriel, q. 1; the Canarian, on the fourth article of this question and on q. 27, art. 1, disp. 1, p. 3, in the reply to the second. Nor does anything new occur to be noted, so that we might retain the true use of these names, beyond what we said there, except the exposition of that place John 17: "that they may know you, the only true God," where Christ, speaking with the Father, seems to say, "you alone are God." But, as is gathered from Augustine, book 6 De Trinitate, chapter 9, the name "alone" (solus) is not referred to the pronoun "you" (te), which signifies and indicates a person: for one cannot say, "The Father alone is God"; but it must be conjoined with the name "God," so that thus the sense is: "that he may know you, who are true God, alone." Then, however, the word "alone" excludes from the true nature of the Deity, not the other persons, but the other false gods whom the pagans worship.[348]

Quaestio XXXII - On the notions of the divine persons

Consequently, inquiry must be made about the cognition of the divine persons. And about this four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the Trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason

Objicitur primo: It seems that the Trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For the philosophers did not arrive at the knowledge of God except through natural reason. But by the philosophers many things are found said about the Trinity of persons. For Aristotle says in 1 On the Heavens and the World: By this number, namely the ternary, we have used ourselves more to signify the one God eminent above the properties of things created. Augustine likewise says in Confessions 7: There I read, namely, in the books of the Platonists - not indeed in these very words, but this same thing altogether urged by many and manifold reasons - that "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word," and the like which follow there. In which words the distinction of the divine persons is handed down. It is also said in the Gloss on Romans and on Exodus 7 that Pharaoh's magicians failed at the third sign, that is, in the knowledge of the third person, namely, the Holy Spirit. And thus at least two they knew.

347. Hilary, De Trinitate 7; Leo the Great, Sermon 2 on Pentecost; Comment. in Boeth. De Trinitate, apud Bedam, tom. 8, col. 1116; Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, lib. 4, c. 29; Sophronius, Confession of Faith, sixth council, actio 11.

348. Alexander of Hales, I, p. q. 65, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 21, a. 2, q. 1 - 2; Scotus, q. 1; Durandus, q. 1 - 2; Gabriel, q. 1; the Canarian, ad art. 4 huius quaestionis et ad q. 27, art. 1, disp. 1, p. 3, ad 2; and St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6, c. 9, on John 17:3.

Trismegistus also said: The Monad begot a monad, and reflected within itself its ardor. By which the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit seem to be intimated. Therefore the cognition of the divine persons can be had by natural reason.[349]

Objicitur 2: Further, Richard of St. Victor says in the book On the Trinity, chapter 4: I believe without doubt that for any explication of the truth there will not be lacking arguments not only probable but even necessary. Whence also, to prove the Trinity of persons, some have introduced a reason from the infinity of divine goodness, which communicates itself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; and others from this, that the possession of no good can be delightful without companionship. Augustine indeed proceeds to manifest the Trinity of persons from the procession of word and love in our mind. Which way we have followed above: therefore by natural reason the Trinity of persons can be known.[350]

Objicitur 3: Further, it seems superfluous to hand down to man that which cannot be known by human reason. But it must not be said that the divine handing down about the cognition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the Trinity of persons can be known by human reason.

But on the contrary: Hilary says in book 1 On the Trinity: Let not man think that by his understanding he can attain the sacrament of the generation. Ambrose also says, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 5, a little before the middle: It is impossible to know the secret of the generation. The mind fails: the voice is silent. But by the origin of the generation and of the procession the Trinity is distinguished in the divine persons, as is clear from what was said above. Since therefore man cannot know and attain by understanding that for which reason cannot have what is necessary, it follows that the Trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.

I answer: It must be said that it is impossible to come, by natural reason, to the cognition of the Trinity of the divine persons. For it was shown above that man cannot, by natural reason, come to the cognition of God, except from creatures. But creatures contain the cognition of God as an effect in its cause. Therefore this alone by natural reason can be known about God, what it is necessary to befit him according as he is the principle of all beings: and this is the foundation of the way set forth above in the consideration of God. But the life of a creature of God is more common to the whole Trinity; and so it pertains to the unity of the essence, not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore by natural reason it is possible to know about God those things which pertain to the unity of the essence; but not those which pertain to the distinction of the persons. But he who tries to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason detracts from faith in a twofold way. First, as to the dignity of faith itself, which is, that it be about things inaccessible, which exceed human reason; whence the Apostle says to the Hebrews 11, that faith is of things not appearing; and the Apostle says 1 Corinthians 2: We speak wisdom among the perfect - yet not the wisdom of this age, nor of the princes of this age - but we speak God's wisdom in a mystery, which is hidden. Second, as to the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when someone, to prove the faith, adduces reasons which

349. Aristotle, De caelo et mundo, I; St. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. 7; Glossa ordinaria on Rom. and Exod. 7; Hermes Trismegistus, in the book called Pimander: "Monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflexit ardorem."

350. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, c. 4; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, on the processions of word and love in the mind (esp. lib. 10, c. 1; lib. 9).

are not compelling, it yields to the derision of unbelievers. For they think that we rely upon such reasons and that we believe because of them. Therefore those things which are of faith must not be attempted to be proved except by authorities to those who revere authorities. But among others it suffices to defend that what faith proclaims is not impossible. Whence Dionysius says, book 2, chapter On the Divine Names: If someone is who totally -

But on the contrary: Hilary says in book 1 On the Trinity: "Do not think that the faith can attain to an understanding of the manner of generation." And Ambrose says, book 1, cap. 5, before the mystery: "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails; the voice is silent."

I answer that it is impossible to attain to a cognition of the Trinity of the divine persons by natural reason. For it was shown above that a man can reach a cognition of God by natural reason only from creatures. But creatures lead to a cognition of God as effects lead to a cause. Therefore this alone can be known by natural reason about God, namely what must belong to Him insofar as He is the principle of all beings. And on this foundation we went above in treating of the consideration of God. Now, however, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; whence it pertains to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of persons. Therefore by natural reason those things can be known about God which pertain to the unity of essence, but not those which pertain to the distinction of persons. But he who tries to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason detracts from the faith in a twofold way. First, as to the dignity of the faith itself, which consists in this, that it is about invisible things which surpass human reason. Whence the Apostle says to the Hebrews (11): "Faith is of things not appearing." And the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2): "We speak wisdom among the perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden." Second, as to the usefulness for drawing others to the faith. For when someone, to prove the faith, adduces reasons which are not compelling, it yields to the derision of unbelievers. For they think that we rely upon such reasons and that we believe because of them. Therefore those things which are of faith must not be attempted to be proved except by authorities to those who revere authorities. But among others it suffices to defend that what faith proclaims is not impossible. Whence Dionysius says, book 2, chapter On the Divine Names: "If there is one who totally resists the words, he will be far from our philosophy; but if he regards the truth of the words, namely of the sacred ones, this I embrace, and we too use the canon."[351]

Reply to the first: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of divine persons according to the proper notions, which are paternity, filiation, and procession, according to that of the Apostle in the First to the Corinthians, chapter 2: "We speak the wisdom of God, which none of the princes of this world knew," that is, the philosophers, according to the Gloss. Yet they knew certain essential attributes which are appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit, as will be clear below. Therefore what Aristotle says, "by this number we have applied ourselves, etc.," is not to be understood as though he posited a ternary number in the divine; but he wishes to say that the ancients used the number three in

351. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, lib. 2, cap. 1.

sacrifices and prayers, on account of a certain perfection of the ternary number. In the book also of the Platonists it is found: "In the beginning was the Word," not in the sense that "word" signifies the begotten person in the divine, but in the sense that by "word" there is understood the ideal reason by which God made all things, which is attributed by appropriation to the Son. And although they recognized the things appropriated to the persons, they are said nevertheless to have failed in the third sign, that is, in the cognition of the third person: because concerning the good-pleasure which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit they went astray; "for knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God," as is said in Romans 1. Or because the Platonists posited a first one, a first being, which they also said was the father of the whole universe of things; consequently they posited another substance under it, which they called the mind or paternal intellect, in which were the reasons of all things, as Macrobius relates on the Dream of Scipio. But they did not posit any third substance separated, which would seem to correspond to the Holy Spirit. Thus, indeed, we do not posit the Father and the Son as different in substance; but that was the error of Origen and of Arius, who followed the Platonists. What, moreover, Trismegistus said, "Monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflexit ardorem," is not to be referred to the generation of the Son or the procession of the Holy Spirit, but to the production of the world; for one God produced one world on account of love of Himself.[352]

Reply to the second: Reason is induced to some matter in a twofold way. In one way, to prove sufficiently some root. Thus in natural science a sufficient reason is induced to prove that the motion of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. In another way, a reason is induced not which sufficiently proves the root, but which shows that, the root being posited, the consequences are fitting. Thus in astrology a reason is offered for the excentrics and epicycles from this, that, this supposition having been made, the appearances about the celestial motions can be saved: yet this reason is not sufficiently probative, because perhaps by some other supposition they could be saved. In the first way, therefore, a reason can be adduced to prove that God is one, and the like; but in the second way stands the reason which is brought forward for the manifestation of the Trinity: because, namely, the Trinity being posited, such reasons agree; yet it does not follow that by these reasons the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved. And this is clear in the particulars. For the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in the production of the creature, because it is the work of infinite power to produce from nothing. For it is not necessary, if in infinite goodness He communicates Himself, that something infinite proceed from God, but according to its own mode it reflects the divine goodness. Likewise also what is said, that without companionship the possession of some good cannot be pleasant, has place when in one person perfect goodness is not found. Hence for full pleasantness of goodness one needs the good of some other associated with oneself. But the likeness of our intellect does not sufficiently prove anything about God, because intellect is not found univocally in God and in us. And hence it is that St. Augustine, on John, says that "by faith one comes to understanding, and not conversely."[353]

352. Aristotle, De caelo et mundo, I; Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis; the "Platonists" on the Word; Hermes Trismegistus, Pimander: "Monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflexit ardorem."

353. St. Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, tract. 27, circa medium.

Reply to the third: The cognition of the divine persons was necessary to us in a twofold way. In one way, for holding rightly about the creation of things. For by this, that we say that God made all things by His Word, the error of those who posit that God produced things by a necessity of nature is excluded. By this, moreover, that we posit in Him a procession of love, it is shown that God did not produce creatures on account of any need, nor on account of any extrinsic cause, but on account of love of His own goodness. Whence also Moses, after he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," adds, "God said: Let there be light," for the manifestation of the divine Word. And afterwards he said, "God saw the light that it was good," to show the testimony of divine love. And similarly in other works. In another way, and more principally, for holding rightly about the salvation of the human race, which is accomplished through the incarnate Son and through the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Conclusion: It is impossible, by natural reason, to come to a cognition of three persons in one essence.

Concerning this article nothing occurs that needs to be noted for its explication; nevertheless its doctrine must be examined in the customary disputations.

Disputatio CXXXII - Whether some Gentile philosophers had knowledge of this mystery

- Many philosophers knew the mystery of the Trinity. Caput I.
- Whence philosophers had a shadowed knowledge of the Trinity. Caput II.

Caput I - Many philosophers knew the mystery of the Trinity

St. Thomas, in this article in the solution to the first argument, in order to defend that by natural reason the Trinity cannot be shown, affirms that to no Gentile philosopher was this mystery made known. But if faith is to be given to the writings of the Fathers, we cannot deny that some philosophers attained to some knowledge of this mystery, as Augustine of Eugubio copiously proves in the books On the Perennial Philosophy; for thus testify Clement of Alexandria, book 5 of the Stromata, concerning Plato; Justin the Martyr, in the Oration to the Gentiles; and Cyril, books 1 and 2, against Julian, concerning Orpheus and others; and Augustine in the places to be alleged below.[354]

Let us therefore set forth the testimonies of some philosophers, so that what we have said may be more clearly illustrated. Augustine of Eugubio, book 1 of On the Perennial Philosophy, from the first chapter to the end, cites many things which speak of God the Father and the Son; and in the second book not a few which speak of the whole Trinity, of which we shall report some. Plato, in a letter to King Dionysius, who had inquired of him about the nature of God, speaks thus: "About

354. Augustine of Eugubio (Agostino Steuco), De perenni philosophia, lib. 1 (from cap. 1 to the end) and lib. 2; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, lib. 5; Justin Martyr, Oratio ad Graecos; St. Cyril, Contra Iulianum, lib. 1 - 2.

nature we must speak by enigmas, lest if perhaps the letter should be lost, he who reads it not understand; thus then the matter stands: Around the King are all things, and for His sake all things exist, and He is the cause of all goods; next are those about the second, and the third about the third." The sense of which words Porphyry explained (as Cyril bears witness) in these words: "To proceed to three subsistences, or hypostases, or persons; that is, to have the divine substance with three descents, or to step down into the triple number: namely, to be the supreme and most high God Himself the Good through Himself; after Him, the second, the Maker; then the soul of the world: because anima in Latin is the same as ventus in Greek, anemos; for the soul is, as it were, a certain spirit." Mercurius also, called Trismegistus, that is, thrice greatest, because he treated of the Trinity (as Suidas says), in sermon 3 speaks thus of the Holy Spirit: "Unless there were a certain providence of the Lord of all, that I should reveal this theology, you would not now have had such love as to speak of it; now hear the rest. Of this Spirit, of whom I have often spoken, all things have need; He begets all things; He vivifies all according to their rank and nourishes; and He depends on the holy source; to all who breathe and live He is ever a helper." These are the words of Mercurius, and many others, which Eugubinus more copiously and in detail treats in book 1, chapter 3; and he seems to allude to that in Genesis 1: "And the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters." He adduces other things there also from Plotinus; and in chapter 4 he reports others from that letter of Plato cited above; and finally, in chapter 6, from the philosopher Damascius, who reports that the Egyptians called the first principle "darkness," which the people cried out thrice, that is, to signify the deity which surpasses every cognition, to subsist in three; in accordance with that of Psalm 17: "He made darkness His hiding-place."[355]

But, passing over many other things, I am pleased to add two other testimonies, one of the same Mercurius, another of the Delphic oracle of Apollo. That of Mercurius, indeed, is not contained in those books of his which now circulate; nevertheless it must not on that account be judged spurious: for many things from Mercurius are reported by Lactantius, Augustine, and Cyril which are not found in his books. Suidas therefore recites the following testimony from Mercurius: "There was an intellectual light; before the intellectual light there was always before the world one living being, from whom are all things, and in whom are all things; from whom and through whom and in whom are all things; this is the Father; and gods and all things are under Him and in Him. The Word is not perfect unless it be either the second, and work; by Him the second things of nature and the sacred were fully made of water." And hence he seems to have said that the divine Word made some second thing, which from volatile water and watery matter produced living creatures; or certainly to have written what is written in Genesis 1. He subjoins: "Mercurius: Unite for yourself the heaven of God; the great work of the Spirit is to unite the whole together; together with the bearer, that is, the first, the venerable heaven of Babylon, rolling round through evening winds, the Father, who contains all things, to be near to us," and the rest, which Eugubinus more at length pursues, book 2, chapter 17.[356]

355. Plato, Epistola ad Dionysium Regem; Porphyry as cited by St. Cyril; Suidas (Suda) on Trismegistus.
356. Suidas, s.v. "Trismegistus," reporting a testimony from Mercurius (Hermes Trismegistus).

Another testimony is that which Apollo Delphicus produced, when he was asked by a priest about true religion; and Eugubinus relates it, book 1, chapter 12, saying thus of the inquiry: "Do not gaze upon me, seeking the highest things; I myself, a priest, desire to know and to hear about the divine kinds; and in reply it was said: three, one, ... state ...," and many other things, which, because of brevity, I pass over; besides these, Eugubinus draws certain things, though not altogether perfect, about a knowledge of the Trinity, as having been possessed by the ancients.[357]

Accordingly, that philosophers of the Gentiles had some knowledge of this mystery is not to be taken as though some revelation had been made to them immediately; but because either from Sacred Scripture, or from the Hebrew people, or from Egypt, or from the tradition of parents, they were taught in part; all which things pertain to a special revelation of God. For if the Egyptians knew something of this mystery, they learned it from the Hebrew people, as Augustine of Eugubio posits, book 1 of On the Perennial Philosophy, chapter 1; and Cyril testifies in the first book against Julian, that at the very first Solon of Athens, and Thales the Milesian, and other philosophers of Greece, set out for Egypt for the sake of studying. Augustine also writes, in book 8 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, that Plato learned theology in Egypt from Jeremiah. But this, truly, he himself elsewhere corrects: for in the City of God, book 18, chapter 23, he says that by no reason could Plato have been taught by Jeremiah, since Plato was born seventy years after Jeremiah. What, then, is to be held? That, as regards Trismegistus and the like, if they were instructed by Moses in Egypt, this is not to be understood as though they had heard him in person, but that by the remainder of learning which was handed down they had received it; as Eusebius also says, book 10 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 3, and Theodoret in the Remedies for the Diseases of the Greeks, greatly favoring the same; and many other more ancient Greeks, affectionate toward the Hebrews, agree with the Catholic writers.[358]

Caput II - Whence philosophers had a shadowed knowledge of the Trinity

It is a conceded fact that the ancient philosophers, by the mere ratiocination of natural intelligence, could not have attained even the least knowledge of this mystery. For it is above the capacity of a created intellect; it is of that order of things which our Scholastics call supernatural: not because God's unity is more above nature than His Trinity - for both alike, although they surpass created nature, or rather, although they are most of all of the nature of God - ...[359]

Another testimony is found in Suidas; therefore he recites such a witness from Mercurius (Hermes Trismegistus): There was an intellectual light before the intellectual light; and there was always the mind of mind, luminous; and it was nothing other than the unity of goods, and a Spirit containing all things; outside of him there is neither God, nor Angel, nor any other substance; the Lord of all, and Father, and God, and all things are under him and in him. For his Word, existing

357. The Delphic oracle of Apollo, as reported by Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, cap. 12.

358. Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, cap. 1; St. Cyril, Contra Iulianum; St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, lib. 2 (or lib. 8 in older enumeration), cap. 8; idem, De civitate Dei, lib. 18, cap. 23; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, lib. 10, cap. 3; Theodoret, Graecarum affectionum curatio.

359. The discussion continues beyond this point in the following text.

perfect, the second, and the craftsman, made the unfruitful nature fruitful, and made water a fruitful progenitrix. He seems, moreover, to have said that the divine Word made the water fruitful because, from the water, he produced winged and aquatic living things, as Scripture relates in Genesis. Hermes subjoins: I adjure you, O heaven - O great God, wise work; I adjure the utterance of the Father, which he first brought forth, when he established the whole world; I adjure you by the Only-begotten Word, the Father who contains all things; be propitious to me, and so forth - which Augustine of Eugubio pursues at greater length.[360]

A second testimony is that which Apollo at Delphi produced when asked by a priest about the true religion; Augustine of Eugubio reports it in that same book, chapter 19. He says, therefore: "Do not deem the supreme to be Nemesis - wretched man - O priest, but know of the holy and divine Begetter, and the beloved Offspring, who rule great matters; and of the station which contains the whole compacted world - mountains, the earth, rivers, the sea, Tartarus, and fire, and the air" - and he adds many other things, which, for the sake of brevity, I pass over. From these Augustine of Eugubio draws the conclusion that the ancient philosophers had some, albeit not altogether perfect, knowledge of the Trinity.[361]

Whence the philosophers had a shadowed knowledge of the Trinity.

For it is above the reach of a created intellect, in that order of things which our Scholastics call supernatural; not because it is more above nature that God is one than that he is triune - for both surpass any created nature - but because to the very nature of God the mystery of the Trinity is, by full right, called above nature, whereas unity and many other divine attributes are not so called: for these can be known by ratiocination from the things themselves created; but the mystery of the Trinity not only cannot be fully known, but cannot even be so much as smelled at, except by a revelation of God made to some creature. I would say this, because habitual grace and the other created gifts, which by the same account are called supernatural (as we shall say in our Disputation 14), are so called for a different reason. Moreover, when it is said that the gentile philosophers learned this mystery by a revelation of God, this is not to be taken as though some revelation had been made to them immediately; but because either from Sacred Scripture, or from the Hebrew people, or the Egyptian, or by tradition from their ancestors, preserved from the very beginning by the promulgation itself, they were taught: all which pertain to a peculiar revelation of God. For if the Egyptians knew anything of this mystery, they learned it from the Hebrew people, as Augustine of Eugubio most rightly noted in the first book of De perenni philosophia, chapter 1; and indeed St. Cyril testifies that Samnius, and Thales of Miletus, and Solon the philosophers from Greece, set out into Egypt for the sake of learning. St. Augustine furthermore writes, in De doctrina Christiana, chapter 28, that Plato in Egypt learned theology from Jeremiah; but, as he himself later notes, in City of God 18, chapter 37, by no means could Plato have been taught by Jeremiah, because Plato was born seventy years after Jeremiah. And as to what he subjoins, that Trismegistus was taught by Moses in Egypt, this is not so to be understood as though he had really heard from him; for Moses,

360. Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 2, cap. 17.
361. The Delphic oracle of Apollo, as reported by Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, cap. 19.

as Eusebius testifies in Preparation for the Gospel, book 10, chapters 1 - 3, and Theodoret in The Cure of the Greek Affections, was much more ancient than the gentile Greek philosophers; therefore they learned from Moses, that is, from Sacred Scripture which Moses himself wrote.[362]

There were more testimonies of the Sibyls, by whom this mystery is most clearly delivered, which Lactantius mentions in Divine Institutions, book 1, chapter 6, and book 4, chapters 6 and 7; and St. Augustine, City of God 18, chapter 23; and Julius Sirenus gathered them into one in his little work On Providence toward the end, and Augustine of Eugubio in the first book of De perenni philosophia, chapter 25; therefore I pass them over. But it is clear from the cited authors that those Sibyls preached this mystery not by tradition, nor by writing, nor by communication with the Hebrew people, but by the very impulse of the Holy Spirit; and thus their case is different from that of the philosophers whom we have thus far enumerated, and of others who have spoken of this same matter.[363]

The reason, moreover, why we assert that the philosophers attained the knowledge of this mystery only by that route is this: because no revelation was made to them immediately, as to the Sibyls; then, because neither by natural reason, as we shall say in the following disputation, nor by any demonstration can it be shown in this life; it was therefore necessary to receive that doctrine from others, either by word or by writing. Add that, even if there were some natural reason for this mystery, it would not straightaway follow that the philosophers, by their own strength, without error, discovered it: for, as was noted in Disputation 2, chapter 2, the revelation of faith is necessary not only that supernatural mysteries may be known, but also that many natural truths may be known without error.

Disputatio CXXXIII - Whether in this mortal life the Trinity can be evidently demonstrated without a special revelation of God

- It is shown that it cannot be demonstrated that there are more persons in God, against Raymund Lull. Caput I.
- It is proved against the same that it cannot be demonstrated that there are three persons in God. Caput II.
- It is shown that it cannot be evidently established that in God there are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, against Raymund Lull. Caput III.
- What is to be thought of the doctrine of this author. Caput IV.

362. Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, cap. 1; St. Cyril, Contra Iulianum; St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, lib. 2 (or lib. 8 in older enumeration), cap. 8; idem, De civitate Dei, lib. 18, cap. 37; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, lib. 10, cap. 1 - 3; Theodoret, Graecarum affectionum curatio.

363. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. 1, cap. 6; lib. 4, cap. 6 - 7; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. 18, cap. 23; Julius Sirenus, Opusculum de providentia (toward the end); Augustine of Eugubio, De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, cap. 25.

Caput I - That it cannot be demonstrated that there are more persons in God, against Raymund Lull

Before the supernatural revelation, there is no Catholic who maintains that by natural demonstration - that is, deduced from principles of nature alone, and discovered by the natural power of the intellect - the Trinity of persons in one essence (*essentia*) can be proved; nor did Raymund Lull ever assert this, as some have falsely ascribed to him. Rather, wherever he says that an evident demonstration of the Trinity can be found, he speaks on the supposition of a light from God, or some supernatural illumination divinely infused into us. But when he teaches that the demonstrations which he thinks he has discovered of this mystery are so evident that they can convince a gentile and a Mohammedan, provided he once consent to penetrate them, he does not explain whether, for someone to assent to them, some supernatural light is necessary, or whether the force of the reasons alone suffices - just as the authority of human testimony can also suffice to generate assent.

This opinion is favored by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, question 14, where he teaches that a man can be so illuminated with the light of faith in this life that, after long exercise, he may find necessary and evident reasons of the Trinity. Richard of St. Victor also assents, in On the Trinity, chapter 4, whom the Angelic Doctor in this article, in reply to the second, benignly interprets in another sense. But most clearly with Henry agrees Gerson, Alphabetum 13, letter H; and all these agree with Lull in this, that by the mere acuteness of the natural intellect such a demonstration or evidence cannot be found.[364]

Therefore, Raymund thinks he can prove three things of this mystery, and he attempts to demonstrate them; we will mention them one by one, so that they may be more easily refuted by us in separate chapters.

- First, that there are more persons (*personae*) in God.
- Second, that there are neither more nor fewer than three.
- Third, that these three persons are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

He strives to demonstrate these in the book which he called Apostrophe, and in the book On the Demonstration of Equiparance, and in the beginning of his Sentences, where he disputes whether theology is a science, and elsewhere often; yet he notes that the demonstrations of this mystery are not a priori, nor a posteriori, but of equiparance. Moreover, he calls demonstrations of equiparance such because they are neither per causam (since the Trinity has no cause), nor from effect (since no effect can point it out), but from equalities; nonetheless he asserts that these demonstrations are deduced from prior propositions - not because those are prior to the conclusions (since there is no prior cause there), but because those have no other priors.[365]

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364. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, q. 14; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, cap. 4; St. Thomas, in this article, ad 2; Gerson, Alphabetum theologicum, no. 13, letter H.

365. Raymund Lull, Apostrophe; De demonstratione aequiparantiae; in Sententiarum initio, quaestio "An theologia sit scientia".

With these things posited, he seems to himself to demonstrate the first in this way. Wherever there is concord, there is also plurality. He leaves this proposition as known. But in the divine goodness there is concord: therefore in the divine goodness there is plurality. The same argument, he says, can be made in any attribute. He proves the minor thus: wherever there is act (*actus*), there is the concord of the agent and the acted-upon in the very act; but in the divine goodness there is an act, which he calls to do good (bonificare); therefore there is there the concord, as he says, of the good-making and the good-makeable, in the act of good-making.

To the same end tends another reason of this sort: Wherever there is equality, there is a distinction between the equal things themselves; but in the divine goodness there is equality between the good-making and the good-makeable: therefore there is there plurality. He likewise leaves the major as known; but he proves the minor in the same way in which he proved the minor of the former demonstration.

But these reasons are not only not to be reckoned demonstrations; rather, that they are of no moment at all will immediately appear.

First, indeed, they are not demonstrations, because they suppose that which is evident in no way, nor is believed otherwise than by divine faith - namely, that in God there is an act according to the thing, which is a production. For although by natural reason it can be proved that God understands and wills, and thus that in God there is operation and act; yet by no reasoning, surely, can it be evidently shown that there is an act of the intellect and of the will which is truly a production. And unless faith taught this, we would say that the act of understanding and of willing is in God his own substance, not an operation, and that it is conceived by us only under the mode of operation and act.

Then his reason, to prove that in God there is an act of production from the fact that there is the good-making, the to-do-good, and the good-makeable, is trifling. For this act is not the one which faith teaches to be the production of a person and a notional operation; but it is a certain act, not of an efficient and producing cause - still, in our manner of understanding - but under the mode of formal cause; as we are wont to say, whiteness makes white. Therefore, in this way it is not deduced probably - much less evidently - that in God there is a real concord, in the act of good-making, between the good-making and the good-makeable; but only according to our manner of understanding, by which we distinguish these.

Caput II - That it cannot be demonstrated that there are three persons in God, against the same

Whether, however, the plurality of persons is a Trinity, Raymund thought he had demonstrated in this fashion. That essence is judged to be in the highest degree of action, in which a single action, a single passion, and a single act suffices; that is, that essence is most perfect in acting, in which there is found only one agent or producer, one produced, and one act. He sets by way of example

the good-making, the good-makeable, and the to-do-good (for by these names his School speaks). But the divine essence is in the highest degree of action, that is, it is most perfect in producing: therefore in it those three alone ought to be.

He proves the major of this demonstration thus: if in the same essence there were many actions, one would limit another - which would be a great imperfection, and therefore such a nature would not be in the highest degree of action. Then, keeping the same proportion, he confirms the conclusion by another means: That essence is in the highest degree of distinction, in which there is one distinguisher, begetter, or producer; one also distinguishable, begettable, and producible; and one distinguishing by spirating and loving. But the divine goodness is in the highest degree of distinction: therefore in the divine goodness those three suffice. And a little below he subjoins these words: We intend to say that there is one distinguisher and begetter with respect to the Son, and this is the Father; one distinguishable, begettable, and producible with respect to the Father, and this is the Son; and one distinguishing by spirating and loving, and this is the Holy Spirit.

I for my part am exceedingly amazed how easily this author could persuade himself that these are perspicuous and evident demonstrations of this mystery; since they are not only frivolous, but also certain things seem to follow from them that are contrary to our faith - absurdities. And first indeed, since these reasons suppose that which Raymund thought he had demonstrated in the preceding, and since that had not been sufficiently proved -

Caput III - Raymond's further discourse; and what judgment is to be made concerning his doctrine

Secondly, as we saw in the preceding chapter, they will have no force at all, much less an evident one. Secondly, it is not clear how the author proves the major of these demonstrations, namely, that the essence (*essentia*) is in the eminence of action, in which there is only one producer, one produced, and one act.

Thirdly, from these reasonings there seem to follow absurdities against the mystery. First indeed, that the Father is the distinguisher of the Son, as Raymond himself admits: whereas the distinctives of the persons are their properties, and each is distinguished from another by some property inhering in it, not by another person. Whence also it follows that there is not only one "distinguishable" and one "distinctive": but since there are three persons mutually distinct, there are also three "distinguishables" and three "distinctives," namely, properties; although Raymond asserts there is but one distinctive and one distinguishable. And if it is called "distinguishable" because it is produced by another, then the Holy Spirit too must be called "distinguishable," since He also is produced; and the Son must also be called "distinctive," since He also produces. By the same reasoning it follows that it is absurd when he says that the Holy Spirit is the very "distinguishing" of the Father and the Son, by "to breathe" and "to love": for between the Father and the Son there cannot be an act of distinction, which is "to distinguish," except by "to beget" and "to be begotten," by reason of which the opposition between Father and Son arises; and hence the distinction "by breathing," however, and "by loving," can distinguish only the Father and the Son

on the one side and the Holy Spirit on the other. Finally, in the same person there would be a certain trinity, namely a "distinctive," which is a property; a "distinguishable," which is the person itself; and "to distinguish," which is the distinction itself: for all these ought to be in any person that is distinguished from another.

Secondly, it follows, on Raymond's view, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son as from a producing principle. For in his view the Holy Spirit is "to benefit" (bonificare), the Father is "benefiting" (bonificativum), the Son is "benefitable" (bonificabile). But since "to benefit" is an act, it is not from the "benefitable," which is as it were an effect produced; rather, the "benefitable" is from the "benefiting" through "to benefit." I do indeed see the Lullists assert that the act which is "to benefit," which they say is the Holy Spirit, is not the very act that is the mean between producer and produced, which we call production, but that it is from both, namely from the "benefiting" and the "benefitable," as from a principle: however, I do not see how they can explain this. For "to benefit" by its nature is prior, and as it were the way to the "benefitable" or "benefited": or if this is not so, and that "to benefit" which Raymond assigns is not the act that is the mean between producer and produced, but another that flows from both; he cannot prove that there must be such an act as he posits in all things, even created ones, in which he himself wants there to be those three correlatives, "benefiting," "benefitable," and "to benefit," which indeed he calls "intrinsic correlatives."

Thirdly, finally, from Lullian doctrine it follows that there are more than three persons. For it is of faith that there are two acts of production, namely to beget and to breathe: therefore in God there is "begetting," "begotten," and "to beget," and thus there will be three persons; then "breathing," "breathable," and "to breathe," and thus there will be three more. But if "begetting" and "breathing" are the same person, because these active acts are the same, it follows that at least five remain. Much better therefore did St. Thomas from the number of the two emanations (*emanationes*) in God gather three persons: because the emanations themselves are not formally persons, nor are they distinguished from the persons; but they are origins intermediate between the persons after the manner of a certain way. This reasoning of Raymond is also not evident, because it supposes that there are emanations in God in reality, which is believed by faith alone.

It is shown, against Raymond, that it cannot be evidently proved that in God there are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

But this argument has little strength. For besides that it rests upon the preceding points, whose weakness has been sufficiently proved, it also fails in proving the minor of the first syllogism. Granted that in God there is production, and that the production is most perfect and in the eminence of action and passion, it does not follow that it must be between the Father and the Son; even if it is from the whole substance of the producer - since among humans there is found the begetting of a son where the generation is not from the whole, but from a part of the substance: whence, then, can Raymond gather that a production "from the whole substance," which is only in divine things, is the generation of the Son? especially since the production of the Holy Spirit also is from the whole substance, and He is not Son. The other demonstration does not prove that the third person (*persona*) is the Holy Spirit: for just as "to benefit" would not be in the eminence of

action without "to love," so too it would not be without "to be wise" and "to understand": therefore it is no more gathered that the third person ought to be a produced Love than a Wisdom. What is proved, then, is only that the third person is Love, because He is through the will (*voluntas*). Finally, in order to prove that "to love," without which "to benefit" cannot be in the eminence of action, is a produced person, he must presuppose that there is production in God - a thing that can in no way be evidently proved, as was said in the first chapter.

What judgment should be made concerning this author's doctrine.

Many think that the doctrine of this author is for the most part heretical, and that he himself, rashly deluded by a demon, devised these reasonings and handed them on to the people as though revealed by God, and taught many other errors besides. Thus persuaded themselves Bernard of Luxembourg in his book against heresies under the letter R, and Gabriel Prateolus in his Catalogue of Heresies under the word "Raymundus Lullus," and Peter Galisardus in his table: because they saw that five hundred errors, excerpted from the books of Raymond Lull, had been noted by the authority of Pope Gregory XI, with Aymericus the inquisitor acting; of which a hundred Peter, Bishop of Tarragona, published in the latter part of the Directorium Inquisitorum. For this reason some also think that this author's works were prohibited by Gregory XI, and that this was confirmed by Pius IV in the Index of Prohibited Books under the second rule; because in that rule the Pontiff forbids whatever books had been forbidden by his predecessors. Of the same doctrine of Raymond Lull Gerson writes thus, Alphabetum 16, letter D: "So it was done lately at Paris by the Faculty of Sacred Theology against those who were trying to introduce a certain foreign doctrine of Raymond Lull; which, although in many points is most lofty and most true, yet in others disagrees with the manner of speaking of the sacred Doctors, and with the rules of their doctrinal tradition, and with the usage in the Schools; it has by public edict been rejected and prohibited." And in Alphabetum 19, letter K, he says that in his time a book was published against the doctrine of Raymond Lull.[366]

Furthermore, a great controversy on this matter was stirred up before the most illustrious Cardinal inquisitors in the year 1590, under the pontificate of Sixtus V, when I was still at Rome, by many who were coming from the kingdom of Catalonia, contending that the bull of Gregory XI, by which Raymond's errors are condemned - set down by Nicholas Aymericus in his Directorium Inquisitorum - had been fabricated by that same Aymericus. For they produced a sentence against Aymericus pronounced by the most reverend lord Bernard, Bishop of Castello, commissary deputed by apostolic authority against Aymericus; the authentic transcript of which I later had in Spain from Juan Herrera, architect to King Philip II and a man distinguished in the mathematical sciences: in which Aymericus is condemned for having forged that bull; and that bull is declared to be suspected of falsity. For Raymond's kinsmen, before Germanus, Cardinal of St. Eusebius and legate of the Apostolic See in the kingdom of Aragon, petitioned that the aforesaid bull, as false and made by Aymericus, be declared null. The Legate, moreover, committed the same to the aforesaid Bishop; indeed he wrote and ordered the Apostolic registrars that at Avignon, where the Pontiff

366. Gerson, Alphabetum theologicum, no. 16, letter D; and no. 19, letter K.

then resided, they should search in the register of that Pontiff for that same bull: and when it could not be found, the aforesaid registrars severally attested to this. With these things known, Bernard gave the sentence that we mentioned. All these things are found in a certain printed booklet on this matter, in which many articles also are excused that are attributed to Raymond or condemned from his doctrine. In our own time too, under Pope Gregory XIII, this bull was sought both at Rome and at Avignon carefully, and could never be found. In defense also of that same Raymond many other writings from the same kingdom were brought forward; among the rest there was a handwritten booklet which responded in order to the individual errors noted by Aymericus, showing that some are found in none of his books at all, and that others had been excerpted from his doctrine ill understood.

Some also alleged, in order to defend Raymond's books, that among the private acts of the Council of Trent there is held a tractate on this matter, in which Doctor Villeta of Barcelona defended him, lest he be placed in the Index of prohibited books. Now at last Ludovicus de Paramo, Apostolic Inquisitor against heretical depravity in the kingdom of Sicily, and an outstanding Doctor of the sacred canons, in the second tome of his works, in the question on the burning of books under the title "On the doctrine of Raymond Lull," has diligently heaped up many other things, among which he not obscurely shows that the works of Raymond Lull are not prohibited, and that the aforesaid Aymericus was condemned of falsity and surreption by his own superior inquisitor Bernard, as is evident from the process lately presented at Madrid in the Senate of the kingdom of Aragon. He also produces various approvals of Raymond's doctrine, and among them some of the Faculty of Theology of Paris; all which things, consulting brevity, I pass over. The case, however, is still sub judice.

For my part, some propositions of this doctor have seemed too harsh, and I judge these demonstrations of the Trinity to have no strength. For the author often assumes propositions which, though to him they are certain, yet to me seem to have not even the appearance of probability: and when he does at times assume propositions which we believe by Catholic faith, or which according to faith it is necessary to concede, he does not render them evident or better known. His disciples, indeed, always object to us that their principles do not penetrate our breast; and they say this is the reason why the demonstrations do not seem valid to us. But it is very much to be wondered at that they have never been able by the solid force of reasons to render them clear to us, and to reduce them to first principles which, with a fixed term and an explication, would at once seize minds: which is to me a sign that the demonstrations, in themselves, are not there; but to those who are adepts of this Lullian doctrine they so much please that they seem to themselves to see them.

Moreover, what this author says of the end of this mystery - that once the demonstration is had, he thinks there remains in us no further place regarding the judgment of the mystery - I also esteem to be of twofold danger: for thus all merit of faith in this life regarding the chief mysteries of our faith is taken away. He himself replies that we were not created for our merit, but for the praising of God; which praise we nonetheless obtain, even if the merit of faith be taken away. He further adds that this merit still remains, because faith remains in the soul's preparation. I,

however, would ask this author: if a demonstration of these mysteries can be had, whether he himself has attained it rather than Paul - Paul who everywhere professes that he walks by faith, not by sight: why then does Lull...[367]

Lull, who thought that he was walking by faith, could more easily himself reply that with this kind of demonstrations the assent of faith does not clash with faith; because although they would generate some sort of evidence, it would be so slight, and through species alien to the object, that together with it the assent of faith could remain, as will be proved in 2-2, q. 1, the articles. For not every evidence clashes with the assent of faith, as Scotus falsely thought in 3, d. 24, q. 1, § Contra hanc, proving against Henry that faith does not remain in one who has attained an evident reason of this mystery; but Henry and Gerson, in the places cited, acknowledge much better that with that evidence of reasons faith can remain.[368][369]

How, however, this can be done, Gerson does not explain; Henry for his part defends it thus: because he thinks those two assents, namely the evident one and that of faith, are not contrary; for the assent of demonstration concerns the question, Whether it is; but the assent of faith concerns the question, What it is. For, an evidence of the Trinity being had, just as we now have of the unity of God, since that does not attain to the very "what it is" of God, an obscurity remains about that; and hence faith about it also can remain...

But this author is in error; because faith regarding the mysteries can only be about the question, Whether it is. For faith is "to think with assent," as St. Augustine says in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter two; but the assent about mysteries on the way is only about the question, Whether it is, not about the very "what it is," of which we have as yet no knowledge. For the names of God show us on the way that He is, not what He is, as we noted in disputation 17, chapter 3.[370][371] Moreover, that Raymond had the Spirit of God in many things is indicated by his writings on the Philosophy of love, on the friend and the beloved, and on lofty contemplations, and many other things: yet it could be that in some things, not from the Spirit of God but from his own head, he brought forth certain matters which, although Catholic and true, were nevertheless proposed and explained by him more harshly than was fitting.

Disputatio CXXXIV - Whether by divine revelation a quidditative knowledge of this mystery can be communicated to a wayfarer

Status quaestionis. cap. 1.

- What Scotus and the Nominales think. cap. 2.
- The true opinion of Durandus and Capreolus. cap. 3.

367. 2 Cor. 5:7 ("we walk by faith, not by sight").
368. Scotus, In III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, § Contra hanc.
369. Gerson, in the places cited above.
370. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, l. 1, c. 2.
371. See above, disputation 17, c. 3.

Caput I - Status quaestionis.

The present controversy is not, whether there can be communicated to man a quidditative (*quiditativa*) and proper (*propria*) knowledge of God; but whether, to one remaining in the state of a wayfarer, this can be communicated. By "wayfarer" we mean not merely a man in mortal flesh, but one not yet seeing God with the clear and intuitive knowledge which constitutes a rational creature blessed. Therefore the difficulty is whether some intermediate vision can be communicated to a created intellect which is neither so clear and intuitive as to beatify the soul, nor through alien species as is that which we have deduced from creatures, but is indeed quidditative and proper to Him, yet does not reach to the character of intuitive, which for that reason we may call abstractive (*abstractiva*).

For a certain knowledge is called abstractive, even if it be proper and quidditative; another, intuitive, as Gabriel explains in the first question of the Prologue, article two, notation 2: abstractive indeed is that which abstracts the thing from its existence and *esse*, as when someone knows a rose not existing by its proper species and concept. For since this cognition is not terminated at a thing existing, but at it according to itself, it is called by the Schoolmen abstractive knowledge. But that which is not only proper to the thing, but is borne to it as existing, is called intuitive. In another way Scotus defines each in II, distinction 3, question 9, which begins, "Secundo quare": to the question, therefore, he says abstractive knowledge is that which is borne, not only to a thing abstracted from existence, but also from presence; hence although the intellect by its proper concept understand a thing even as existing, if nevertheless it is not borne to it as present, it is not said to behold it. Thus an astronomer who knows evidently an eclipse in another hemisphere is said to have only abstractive knowledge; but one who not only knows the thing as existing, but also as present, is said to have intuitive knowledge of it.[372][373]

Yet, however much this controversy of terms may seem to be about a word, the opinion of Gabriel commends itself more to me, namely, that intuitive knowledge be called that which is borne to a thing together with its existence in its proper difference of time; and thus knowledge of future things, when it is had through a proper species, is to be called intuitive, because it is borne by a proper concept to the thing together with its proper existence according to its temporal difference. For this intuitive cognition requires, that it be borne to things existing, as they themselves are or will be; not in any other way.

Let this suffice to have said now, that we may understand the opinions of the Doctors; for in chapter 3, as we explain our own, we shall submit the proper differences of intuitive and abstractive knowledge.

372. Gabriel, In I Sent., Prologus, q. 1, a. 2, not. 2.
373. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 9, beginning "Secundo quare".

Caput II - What Scotus and the Nominales hold.

Scotus, in the place cited and in IV, distinction 49, question 11, holds this opinion, namely, that not only can a peculiar illumination of light be granted by God to a human wayfarer so that he may have an evident and proper abstractive knowledge of the Trinity which does not reach to the intuitive, but even that an Angel by the power of a proper species infused by God could have had it, which in a certain manner he calls supernatural and in a certain manner natural: natural indeed because it is for eliciting an act of the natural order; supernatural, however, because it is freely infused by God, and not necessarily, nor derived from the object naturally. He so explains in that question in Ad rationes pro prima opinione ad quartum argumentum, and in Ad quaestionem. To this agrees Maior in II, d. 3, q. 5, conclusion 5, and q. 3, prologue, article 2. The same is affirmed by Bassolis, question 1 of the prologue, article 2; by Peter of Ailly in the first, prologue, article 2; by Ockham in question 1 of the prologue, article ...; and Gabriel in the question of the prologue, article 3, conclusions 2, 3, and 4. But these last four only assert that this sort of knowledge, which they call able to be communicated, is only supernatural. Gabriel further adds that of contingent theological truths, as the mystery of the Incarnation, there cannot be given in this life that evident knowledge; but well enough of those truths which are necessary, as the mystery of the Trinity and the things which follow upon it.[374][375][376][377][378]

The first foundation, namely that such abstractive knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity can be given, is proved: because abstractive knowledge is prior by its own nature than intuitive; but what is prior can exist without the posterior. Next, God can preserve whatever intuitive knowledge in the absence of the object: therefore He can bring it about that what was intuitive becomes abstractive, as is gathered from the definition of each. That this knowledge can be natural by a natural species, in the way which we said, Scotus does not prove, but only asserts; nor do I see by what reason it can be proved.

The other, which Gabriel adds, he himself thus proves; because abstractive knowledge of necessary theological truths does not presuppose intuitive knowledge of God Himself, but only knowledge of creatures: but this man can have; therefore also abstractive knowledge of God Himself can be communicated to him. But abstractive knowledge of contingent theological truths presupposes intuitive knowledge of God Himself: therefore without this the abstractive cannot be communicated. Those things, however, which Gabriel assumes in these two reasons, he further confirms by no argument.

Before, however, we show a priori that an abstractive knowledge of God, which is not in the same way intuitive as is the vision of the blessed, cannot be granted to anyone, let us meanwhile briefly refute the aforesaid opinion.

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374. Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 11; see also Ad rationes pro prima opinione ad quartum argumentum, and Ad quaestionem.

375. Maior, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 5, concl. 5; and q. 3, Prologus, a. 2.

376. Bassolis, Quaest. I Prologi, a. 2.

377. Peter of Ailly, In I Sent., Prologus, a. 2; Ockham, Quaest. 1 Prologi, a....

378. Gabriel, Quaestio Prologi, a. 3, concl. 2, 3, 4.

And first indeed this displeases me in Scotus's doctrine, that he asserts such knowledge can be elicited by the natural power of the intellect: for since that in truth is not distinguished from the clear vision of God, by which men are beatified, and this cannot be elicited except by a supernatural light and help, it follows that neither can that be elicited by natural power, nor can a natural species be given for eliciting it. Nor does it matter that Scotus calls that species supernatural: for he so calls it, not because in itself it is of a supernatural order, but because it is altogether voluntarily infused by God, and is not able to be acquired by another way. But if by its own nature it were supernatural, as is the light of glory, it would be plain that the intellect could not naturally have that knowledge, just as it does not have the vision: for these two are mutually repugnant, namely that the species be of a supernatural order by its own nature, and that the intellect need it for abstractive knowledge, and that the said knowledge can be had naturally.

Then against Gabriel it is proved that there cannot be given a proper knowledge of God which is abstractive, that is, of God Himself as abstracted from existence. For even if intuitive must not only be proper and of a thing existing, but also of one present, as Scotus wished, nevertheless that knowledge would be intuitive: because God is no less necessarily present to all things and to the created intellect, than He exists in the nature of things: therefore if the intellect had a proper knowledge of Him, it would be borne to Him as existing and present, and it would be said most properly to behold Him. And this argument has force also against Scotus.

Secondly, if God could be absent in place, nevertheless that intellection and knowledge would be intuitive and our beatitude: for it would be of God existing according to His proper ratio, which sufficiently seems to make it be called intuitive knowledge, or at least to make those having it blessed. For that the very object whose contemplation makes us blessed be absent in place, or be future in time, or be present, does not vary anything in the vision itself: therefore it matters little, absence or presence, in order that a proper cognition of God be, or not be, our beatitude; just as if the astronomer's beatitude were proper to the sight of an eclipse, even if the eclipse were being made in another hemisphere, if he by its proper species were to know it quidditatively.

Caput III - The true opinion of Durandus and Capreolus.

To me the opinion of Durandus in q. 3, prologue, and of Capreolus in I, d. 3, q. 4, art. 3, in the response to the fourth, against the sixth conclusion, has always seemed more probable, namely that a quidditative and proper knowledge of the Trinity cannot be communicated to wayfarers, but that either the knowledge of this mystery must be through alien species, such as all of us have on the way, or clear, which they call intuitive, in which our beatitude is set. This is proved on these grounds.

First, if someone had a proper and quidditative knowledge of God, nothing would be lacking to him for being said to behold God: for, in the first place, every intuitive knowledge is proper and quidditative of God Himself, not through alien species and after the fashion of other things. But if it also be intuitive, as Gabriel said, it adds over and above these that it be of a thing existing, as we noted in the first chapter; that knowledge of the Trinity will bring it about to behold, not only one

God as existing; because no less of the essence of God is it to exist than to be wise; and no one can by a proper concept understand God unless he also understand Him as wise. Therefore if anyone by a proper and quidditative concept understood God, nothing would be lacking for him to behold; he already has at the outset an intuitive knowledge which is proper and quidditative of God Himself, not through alien species and as of other things. If moreover it be intuitive, as Gabriel said, it adds above these that it be of a thing existing, as we have noted above in the first chapter; that knowledge of the Trinity will bring it about to behold, not only God as existing. Wherefore I would not hesitate to call that [knowledge] intuitive; and even if it be proper and quidditative of the thing, let the disagreement be rather about the intention of words than about things.

Secondly, if God could be absent in place, nevertheless that intellection and knowledge would be intuitive and our beatitude: for it would be of God existing, according to His proper ratio; which sufficiently seems to make it be called intuitive knowledge, or at least to make those having it blessed. For that the very object, by the contemplation of which we are blessed, be absent in place, or future in time, or present, does not vary anything in the vision itself: therefore it matters little, absence or presence, for a proper cognition of God to be, or not to be, our beatitude; just as if the astronomer's beatitude were proper to the sight of the eclipse, even if the eclipse were in another hemisphere, provided he by its proper species were to know it quidditatively.

Thirdly, if someone could have a proper and quidditative knowledge of the Trinity abstracted from existence, nevertheless that vision would be sufficient to make him blessed. For although our beatitude consists in knowing the Trinity as existing, still, if one were to contemplate It quidditatively, that is, Its very essence and the essential perfections which are inseparable from It, he would possess that very object in the contemplation of which the blessed repose. Just as, if beatitude consisted in the contemplation of some created thing, one would no less have it if the contemplation were quidditative - though it abstracted the object from existence - than if it did not abstract: in any way, then, and by any account, it is plain that such quidditative cognition is not a mean between the intuitive which beatifies and that which we have through alien species; wherefore I would not hesitate to call it intuitive, and let there be rather a disagreement about the intention of words than about things.

That [knowledge] which is the proper likeness of the thing itself, as it is, openly shows what it is. But that there can be given through alien species an evident knowledge of the Trinity, in the way in which philosophers have [knowledge] of God himself as he is one, is defended by Henry in Quodlibet 8, question 14, as we saw in disputation 133, and in Quodlibet 12, question ...; Gerson, in Alphabetum 15, letter H, when he says that faith can remain together with an evidence of the Trinity in this life, such as exists in those who are much given to contemplation; Raymond thinks the same, as we reported in that disputation. Added to these are Durandus in III, distinction 23, question 9, number 12; Cajetan on Secunda Secundae, question 171, article 5; Alphonsus of Toledo in Prima quaestio prologi, article 2, conclusion 3; Bassolis cited in the preceding disputation; and Nicholas of Cusa in the Dialogue De pace fidei, c. 8, and book 2 of the Cribratio Alkorani, c. 5.[379]

The arguments of the prior opinion fade away at the outset. The first, in fact, supposes that that quidditative knowledge is prior to the intuitive, by which we are made blessed; whereas it is truly not prior. For since it is not distinguished from it, it cannot be prior; and that it is not distinguished from the intuitive [knowledge] was sufficiently proved in the preceding chapter. Wherefore, to no purpose do our adversaries devise, in their second reason, that God could have preserved in Paul and Moses an abstract knowledge, the intuitive being destroyed, if they had it on the way. Moreover, although some knowledge could be preserved which would not represent God as present, nor as existing, but as abstracted from existence; nevertheless, if that were quidditative and proper, it rightly follows that they would remain blessed, as was said above. The remaining things which Gabriel teaches he proves by no reason, and they have been sufficiently impugned by us in chapter 2.

Primum argumentum. This opinion is variously proved. First, Durandus argues thus. A revelation of this mystery was made to the angels, in order that they might have evidence of God revealing; for it was certain and evident to them that their intellect could not be enlightened by any other than God, so as to know this, or other mysteries: from this, however, they could gather evident knowledge of this mystery in this way: Whatever God reveals is true; God reveals this mystery to us; therefore this mystery is true. The syllogism is evident; each of the premises is evident to an angel; therefore so too the conclusion; and hence the angel will have an evident knowledge of this mystery, as is gathered in the conclusion. To this also pertains the argument of Bassolis concerning the damned, who, as James 2 says, "believe and tremble"; those who feel themselves to have been justly condemned by God because they did not believe the mystery of the Trinity, are evidently convicted that it is true.

Secundum. Others prove it thus: God can grant to some man for a short time his clear vision, and then leave him under the enigma of faith, as some thought about Paul and Moses above in disputations 55 and 56; but the memory of that clear vision would remain in him: therefore it would be evident to him that at some time he saw God three and one. But from the memory of that which we once evidently knew we can gather evidently that it is true: therefore from the memory of the vision of the Trinity we can gather that that mystery is true.

Tertium. Third, it is proved because intuitive knowledge of creatures can be given; but in any creature whatsoever there is a certain relation to God one and three, because although in our mode of understanding it is per se primarily terminated at God as one, nevertheless in reality it is terminated at God as three and one: for there are three who create, and they are entirely the same as the essence which is the principle of creating. And perhaps Nicholas of Cusa, in the places cited, thought this to be the vestige of the Trinity in creatures, from which he said an evident knowledge of the Trinity can be deduced. Of the Doctors alleged, Henry and Gerson with Raymond Lull in

379. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, q. 14 (and see also Quodlibet 12); Gerson, Alphabetum 15, lit. H; Raymond Lull; Durandus, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 9, n. 12; Cajetan, on Secunda Secundae, q. 171, a. 5; Alphonsus of Toledo, Prima quaestio prologi, a. 2, concl. 3; Bassolis (as cited above); Nicholas of Cusa, De pace fidei, c. 8; Cribratio Alkorani, l. 2, c. 5.

another way think that this evident knowledge can be acquired on the way, namely by the exercise of faith and assiduous contemplation, by which Raymond judged that he had found evident reasons.

Quarto. Fourth and finally, an evidence of the Trinity can be gathered from many supernatural effects, as from a vision of God, or an intelligible species, from the hypostatic union at least with the three persons: for by their nature all these things regard the Trinity of persons, and no other way seems to remain.

That such an evident knowledge of the Trinity cannot be granted to a wayfarer, the truer opinion holds

Much truer is the opinion of St. Thomas in the present article, who universally affirms that such an evident knowledge of the Trinity cannot be communicated to a wayfarer: which can be urged by this sole a priori reason. Either that knowledge of the Trinity would be through its proper species, and thus it would be intuitive; or through alien species of creatures, and thus God can only be known as one; for there is no creature which is referred to God as three: but all regard him as one, on the ground that they are produced by him as one, and are terminated to him under this alone ratio. For God does not produce them by that by which he is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but by that by which he is one, wise, omnipotent, etc. Therefore in our mode of knowing, through alien species - if from created effects God ought to be known - so far as they are created, he would only be known as one, wise, omnipotent, etc.

If, however, for knowing the creature by an intuitive and proper cognition, with that expressed order to God, it were also necessary to know God himself by a proper and intuitive concept, it would indeed follow that from this knowledge of creatures the mystery of the Trinity would be known also by intuitive vision: that is, that the creature cannot be known by a proper concept unless God also be known in himself in the same way; and then indeed he would be seen as three, because in reality the essence is the same as the persons; not because that order, in our mode of understanding, would regard God as three. Wherefore, if from that order we know God through alien species, we can attain to nothing other than his essence, and what is common to all the persons.

But some say that the Trinity can indeed be evidently known, as to the question, "Does it exist?," by a created species, through which the Trinity itself is evidently known, not the creature first known, nor the Trinity in the likeness of some creature. This, however, is impossible: for either that species will represent God in the likeness of some created thing, and thus it will not be able evidently to show him as three and one; or it will represent him proximately as three, and thus it will be a proper quidditative and intuitive species of God himself.

Moreover, this opinion will be more easily confirmed by the confutation of the reasons of the former [opinion] in the following chapter.

From testimony or from memory an evident knowledge of the Trinity cannot be gathered

If this evident knowledge of the Trinity could in any way be granted, it ought to be by one of the modes cited in the first chapter: but from those [modes] we shall now easily show that an evident knowledge of the Trinity cannot be gathered; and from this the adversaries' arguments will remain answered. In this chapter we shall speak about the first and second; in the next chapter about the other two. Accordingly, concerning testimony and memory I prove thus.

These two are extrinsic principles; therefore from them it cannot be evidently shown to our intellect the connection of predicate with subject in itself: for this is the intrinsic evidence of the thing, which cannot be had through extrinsic principles. For the explanation of which note that there is a twofold kind of demonstration, and by either kind there is produced an evidence of the thing according to itself and intrinsic: one is through the proper cause; the other through effects; and to this is also reduced a demonstration per impossibile, since from the opposite some contradiction follows, not from something extrinsic, but from those things themselves which by nature of the thing have a connection. There is not, moreover, any other kind of demonstration by which, being taken as general, there is collected from a universal in this way: If things are equal to one and the same third, they are equal among themselves; these are equal to one and the same third; therefore they are equal among themselves. This is a valid consequence; nevertheless it is not a demonstration: because in the conclusion nothing new is gathered which was not already expressed in the major. And in the same way he shows nothing who from this says: since "man is an animal," he thereby says that this and that man is an animal: thus by such [inferences] no new evidence is joined. It remains therefore that the demonstration be wholly by one of the modes aforesaid. But it cannot be by extrinsic principles. Now testimonies and memory - since they are entirely extrinsic - although they suffice for [other uses], nevertheless cannot generate in the things remembered an evidence of them in themselves.

For although by a good consequence and syllogism there can be deduced, from this proposition "God is triune," on the ground of an antecedent which is evident - namely, "Whatever God says is true" - the truth of the consequent, still it does not follow that the consequent is evident; a good consequence indeed makes it necessary that the consequent be true because the antecedent is true; it does not make it necessary that the consequent be evident, unless it have a connection from the nature of the thing itself. Hence that reasoning is of this sort: If God says that he is triune, he is triune; but he says that he is triune; therefore he is triune. In these, because the major proposition is a certain extrinsic principle, having no connection with the conclusion by nature of the thing, the conclusion follows only in so far as it is contained under that universal, "Whatever is said by God is so, whether it be this or that." Therefore this is usually called "evidence on the attesting authority," as Cajetan called it at 2.2, question 5, article 1.[380] For to say that God says something is so, and

380. Cajetan, on Secunda Secundae, q. 5, a. 1.

therefore it is so, is tantamount to asserting that it is so because the one who says it is God; and by the testimony of the one speaking and the revelation there is indeed conviction, but the connection of the extremes with each other is not thereby shown.

And thus also is confirmed the reason by which some concede that one could be convinced by testimony: which is as much as to say that God is triune because of divine testimony and revelation. The Apostle teaches this; and St. Thomas, at 2-2, question 5, article 2, says that the intellect can be convinced when a prophet pronounces in the word of the Lord something future, by an accompanying sign, so that he may know manifestly that it is the Lord who speaks. But all this pertains to conviction by testimony, not to an intrinsic evidence of the connection of predicate with subject.

Finally, the same is confirmed by the example of memory. If someone, for instance, had once had mathematical demonstrations that were certain, when afterward he only remembers them, the demonstration of those truths is not preserved in his memory; he is indeed certain that the proposition is true, and he collects what he once understood; nevertheless the relation of predicate to subject is not now made evident from intrinsic principles, but from an extrinsic principle of remembering that earlier evidence; it shows only that the thing is so, not why it is so by its own nature.

...Therefore testimony and the memory of it, which are altogether extrinsic to the things testified (and remembered), cannot generate evidence of them in themselves. For although by a good consequence and a syllogism this proposition - God is triune - could be deduced from a preceding evident premise, nevertheless, because that premise is altogether extrinsic, it does not engender in the conclusion an evident assent. For in a good consequence, although it is necessary that the consequent be true whenever the antecedent is true, yet it is not necessary that the consequent be evident in itself whenever the antecedent is evident, unless it cohere by a connection arising from the nature of the thing; for when the antecedent is extrinsic, it does not manifest the consequent evidently according to its proper ratio and the connection of the extremes in themselves, but only according to a common extrinsic ratio by which the thing agrees with the principle: as in these syllogisms - God is whatever He says Himself to be; but He says He is triune; therefore God is triune. Or again: If God says that He is triune, He is triune; but He says that He is triune; therefore He is triune. In these, the major proposition is a certain extrinsic principle, having no connection with the conclusion from the nature of the thing; the conclusion follows only inasmuch as it is contained under that universal - Whatever is said by God, is thus. Hence this is commonly called evidence from attestation, as Cajetan also calls it.[381] To say, namely, "God is whatever He says Himself to be," is tantamount to asserting that the thing is so, or that God is thus, on the testimony of the speaker and on revelation; but by this there is not shown the connection of the extremes among themselves according to their own proper ratio, but only according to a common ratio, according to which the thing ought to agree with the testimony - a meaning which is the same as saying: God is three and one, because this agrees with the testimony and revelation of

381. Cajetan, on Secunda Secundae, q. 5, a. 1.

God. And therefore St. Thomas, in the Secunda Secundae, in the second article, says that an intellect can be convinced by the speech of a prophet proclaiming in the Lord's name that something is future, and adding a sign so that he may know manifestly (as if he were to say evidently): "This is said by God," because He (the prophet) does not lie - even if that future which is predicted is not in itself evident. Whence, he says, the assent of faith about that thing remains; he understands, insofar as it is also deduced from that evident principle of the one speaking and testifying. For every assent which rests upon testimony is faith, not evident knowledge of the thing testified. For if it were evident to me that God says that something is future and that He cannot lie, it would not on that account at once follow that that future, in itself, would become evident according to its own proper ratio and nature.

This is further confirmed by the example drawn from memory, from which the second argument was taken. If some mathematician, for instance, should clearly remember that he once had a demonstration of some proposition, yet could not call the demonstration to mind, he would indeed know that the proposition is true, and would collect that the thing he states is so in reality; but in this way the predicate would not yet be evidently known to agree with the subject according to its proper ratio. For memory is an extrinsic principle, showing only that the thing is so in general, not, however, how it agrees with that by a peculiar and proper ratio, which happens either a posteriori or a priori through intrinsic principles.

These two are extrinsic principles; therefore from them our intellect cannot have the evident connection of predicate with subject in itself; for this is intrinsic to the thing, and cannot be had through extrinsic principles. For the explanation of which, it must be observed that there is a twofold kind of demonstration, and by either of them we obtain evidence of the thing according to itself, through intrinsic principles: one is through the proper cause, the other is through effects; to these is reduced the demonstration per impossibile, when from the opposite there follows a contradiction - not in something extrinsic, but in those things which have a connection from the nature of the thing.

That from effects the evident knowledge of the Trinity cannot be had

It remains for us to prove that from no effect, whether natural or supernatural, can there be deduced evident knowledge of the Trinity; and thus we shall dissolve the two subsequent arguments which our adversaries had adduced on their behalf. As to natural effects, we have already said in the second chapter that their relation to God can only show us God as one. Next, concerning supernatural effects, it must be said in the same way that from them the mystery of the Trinity cannot be evidently known. Now there are three supernatural effects which have some difficulty: the first is the clear vision of God; the second is the impressed species of Him; the third is the hypostatic union with the three persons, in the opinion of those who say that one nature can be united to three persons at once, or at least, in the opinion of all who affirm that from three human natures each can be united to single persons.

Concerning the first and second effect I say that from them the mystery of the Trinity, which pertains to the question "Whether it is," cannot be evidently shown, even if the Creator could be known from the creature by a proper knowledge which they call intuitive, without the terminus being known by the same kind of knowledge. For the relation of intuitive knowledge to the object seen cannot be known unless the object itself be known by a proper and intuitive concept. For no one could discern whether this knowledge is intuitive and proper of such an object, unless he himself should see by a proper and intuitive notion the very object, with which he could compare the intuitive knowledge that another has of the same object. Add that, even if someone should see by an intuitive cognition the intuitive knowledge which the Blessed have of the triune God, without the Trinity itself being seen, and should from that gather the Trinity; nevertheless, because such a middle would be extrinsic to the thing, like testimony, therefore it would not generate evidence of the thing itself in itself, as we said in the third chapter concerning evidence from testimony. And what we have said about the intuitive knowledge of God must also be said about the impressed species of the Trinity.

But concerning the third effect, namely of the union, some think that from it the mystery of the Trinity, pertaining to the question "Whether it is," cannot but be evidently shown to us, even if those three unions were seen by a proper and intuitive knowledge: for the reason that those unions could not be seen as distinct and dissimilar, but as if they were of the same ratio. I, however, do not understand this: for if in reality they are truly distinct and dissimilar, as indeed they are, why, even when seen by a proper and intuitive knowledge, would they not appear distinct and dissimilar? Therefore I answer that those three unions, as referred to diverse persons, can be seen as dissimilar and distinct by a proper concept; nevertheless, because from the intuitive knowledge of a relation there does not follow the intuitive knowledge of the terminus - else either angels would not see by an intuitive knowledge the creature, or they would also intuit God as one - therefore from that intuitive knowledge of such unions it is not necessary to know individually the three persons; but it is only necessary to know that such a nature is united in that manner to some divine person; whether, however, a diverse union refer to a diverse person, or diverse unions to the same person, it is not necessary to be known by him who beholds the unions themselves. Add also that, even if from a threefold union three distinct persons were known, it could not be known whether there were more divine persons to whom the same humanity could be united; and thus this mystery could not be evidently known, which indeed consists in this: that there are three persons in the same essence, neither more nor fewer.

Articulus II - Whether notions are to be posited in the divine

Objicitur: It seems that notions are not to be posited in the divine. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in the first chapter of On the Divine Names, that we must not dare to say anything of God beyond what is expressed to us in the sacred utterances.[382] But of notions there is no mention in the utterances of Sacred Scripture. Therefore notions are not to be posited in the divine.

382. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 1.

Further: Whatever is posited in God pertains either to the unity of essence (*essentia*), or to the Trinity of persons. But notions do not pertain to the unity of essence, nor to the Trinity of persons. For things essential are not predicated of notions: we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor even the things which belong to the person: we do not say that paternity generates and that filiation is generated. Therefore notions are not to be posited in the divine.

Further: In simple things there are not to be posited any abstracts which are principles of knowing, because they are known by themselves; but the divine persons are most simple. Therefore in the divine persons notions are not to be posited.

But on the contrary: John Damascene says that the distinction of hypostases consists in three properties, namely, paternal, filial, and processional; we recognize these.[383] Therefore properties and notions are to be posited in the divine.

I answer that the Praepositivus, attending to the simplicity of the persons, said that properties and notions are not to be posited in the divine. And wherever such are found, he explains the abstract for the concrete. For as we are wont to say, "I beg your kindness," that is, "that you be kind," so when in the divine one says "paternity," "God the Father" is understood. But, as has been shown above, the divine simplicity is not prejudiced by our using in the divine both concrete and abstract names. For as we understand, so we name. Now our intellect cannot attain to the divine simplicity as it is to be considered in itself; and therefore, according to the mode by which it apprehends and names the divine, that is, according to what it finds in sensible things, from which it receives cognition. In which, for signifying simple forms, we use abstract names; but for signifying subsistent things, we use concrete names. Whence we also signify the divine, by reason of simplicity, with abstract names; by reason of subsistence and complement, however, with concrete names. And therefore it is necessary not only that essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete (as when we say Deity and God, or wisdom and wise), but also the personal ones, so that we say paternity and Father. And two things especially compel us to this. First indeed is the instigation of heretics. For since we confess the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be one God and three persons, when it is asked wherein they are one God, and wherein they are three, as it is answered that they are one in essence, or in deity: so it was necessary that there be some abstract names by which it could be answered that the persons are distinguished; and of this sort are the properties, or notions signifying in the abstract, such as paternity and filiation. And therefore essence is signified in the divine as the what, but person as the who, and property as the whereby. Second...

And so, since one person is found in the divine to be referred to two persons, namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and to the person of the Holy Spirit, yet not by one relation - for then it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit would be referred to the Father by one and the same relation; and thus, since in the divine only relation multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be two persons - neither can it be said (as Praepositivus said) that just as God is related in one way to creatures, although creatures are related variously to

383. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, l. 3, near the beginning.

him, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, although those two are related by two relations to the Father. For, since the specific character of the relative consists in this, that it is referred to another, it is necessary to say that two relations are not different according to species, if on the opposite side one relation corresponds to them. For there must be one species of the relation of lord and of father according to the diversity of sonship and servitude. But all creatures are referred to God under one species of relation, namely, as they are his creatures. The Son, however, and the Holy Spirit are not referred to the Father according to relations of one and the same kind; wherefore it is not similar. And again, in God a real relation to the creature is not required, as was said above; but to multiply relations of reason in God is not incongruous. Yet in the Father there must be a real relation by which he is referred to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Hence, according to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Spirit by which they are referred to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, by which he is referred to the Son and to the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the first: Although mention is not made of notions (*notiones*) in Sacred Scripture, nevertheless mention is made of the persons, in whom the notions are understood, as the abstract is understood in the concrete.

Reply to the second: The notions are signified in the divine, not as things, but as certain relations, by which the persons are known, although the notions themselves, or relations, are really in God, as was said above. And therefore those things which have some ordination to some essential or personal act cannot be said of the notions; for this contradicts their mode of signifying. Hence we cannot say that paternity generates or creates, as we say wise or understanding. But the essential things which have no ordination to any act, but remove from God the conditions of creature, can be predicated of the notions: for we can say that paternity is eternal or immense, or anything of this sort. And likewise, on account of identity of reality, personal and essential substantives can be predicated of the notions: for we can say that paternity is God, and Deity is the Father.

Reply to the third: Although the persons are simple, nevertheless, without prejudice to simplicity, the proper ratios of the persons can be signified in the abstract, as has been said.

Notationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative. Concerning the text three things are to be observed.

First, what "notion" is. By the name notion the Scholastic Doctors, together with St. Thomas in this article, understand some ratio by which the person is known; St. Augustine, however, used "notion" in another way, in Book V On the Trinity, chapter 6, namely, for the very act of understanding by which we know something about the person. For he says: "One is the notion by which the begetter is understood, another by which the unbegotten is understood." From this, however, it is gathered that on the part of the thing known there is one ratio of the begetter, another of the begotten. Accordingly, for the known ratio Caietanus and the Canariensis in this article, St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 26, question 4, Durandus in question 2,

Marsilius in the First, question 29, article 1, Gabriel in the First, distinction 28, question 1, article 3, doubt 1, and others who dispute about the notions (and whom we shall cite below) have used "notion" in this sense.[384]

Second, note that in the divine there are properties, relations, and notions, and that they are ordered as superior and inferior. Property (*proprietas*) is inferior to the others: it is that by which properly a person is constituted - for example, paternity, filiation, and procession; for these agree with the individual persons so that they agree with them alone; and every property is a notion and a relation, not conversely. Next, notion is inferior in ratio to relation; for every relation can be a notion, but not every notion is a relation: for "unbegotten" is a notion, not a relation. Whether, moreover, some ratio is common to two persons or proper to one alone, it makes no difference for its being called a notion, provided it does not agree with all: for those things which are common are called essential, not notional. Wherefore what are common both according to reality and according to predication and universality are not notions, or, if they are distinct, they are not distinct from particulars; thus "to produce" and "to beget" are not two notions, because one ratio is common by predication, the other particular, which contains the common in itself.

Third, it is to be seen how St. Thomas proves that in the Father there is a twofold relation, because he is referred to a twofold terminus, and in each of them there is its own relation; for he is referred to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. The reason for doubting is that it seems possible for one relative to be referred by one relation to two termini, just as the same father by the same relation of paternity is referred to many sons. Caietanus and the Canariensis reply in this article that a relative can by one relation be referred to two relations, different even in species, not only distinct in number, when those relations are partial. They call "partial relations" those whose foundations, as parts, concur to produce one and the same numerically identical effect - such as are the foundations of paternity and maternity for begetting one and the same son. For this reason they judge that by one and the same species of filiation the son is referred to the mother and to the father. But because in the divine filiation and procession are total relations, it is evident that the Father is referred by a twofold relation, one to the Son, the other to the Holy Spirit. In this sense they interpret Aristotle in Metaphysics V, chapter 15, when he says that "the same cannot be referred twice," that is, that the same relation cannot be referred to two termini different in species, unless they are partial.

However, their opinion does not approve itself to me.

First, those doctors wrongly explain Aristotle's words in that chapter; for there Aristotle strives only to show that a relative cannot be referred to a terminus which is itself relative, but to an absolute - at least in those cases in which the other extreme is referred only by an extrinsic denomination, as "visible." Accordingly Aristotle proves there that sight is not referred to the

384. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 6; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), In Iam, q. 32, a. 2; the Canariensis (Peter of Aragon), ad loc.; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 29, a. 1; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 1.

visible. Whether, however, the same must be said of other kinds of relatives, we shall consider in passing in Disputation 160, chapter 6; you have an exposition of that passage of Aristotle above in Disputation 104, chapter 2.

Second, although the relation of filiation is the same according to reality with respect to father and mother, nevertheless it does not seem to be of the same kind, as St. Thomas plainly taught in the Third Part, question 35, article 5, reply to the last; not so, at least, as in an effect produced by many causes of the same kind and order, as in the motion of a ship which many pull: for these concur in the same way to the same effect; but father and mother in a far different way: whence a third reason is taken. For although mother and father so concur that one without the other cannot beget - in which they are likened to causes which the philosophers call "partial" - yet because they concur in a different way, they are also regarded in a different way by the son produced: just as God, the sun, and a man generate a man, and yet the man begotten regards one differently than another. Rightly, therefore, did St. Thomas prove that in the Father there are two relations according to reason, although they are the same according to reality, because he in a different way produces the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Caput I - Distinction of the concrete and abstract in the divine

Since we must deal with the notions, that is, with the properties and modes by which the persons are known, and since these are principally signified in the abstract, first it must be seen how in God abstracts and concretes are distinguished, as father and paternity, spirator and spiration. Aureolus, as reported by Cajetan in this article, in the First Book, distinction 26, and Cajetan himself here, taught that in God any abstract notion signified abstractly is distinguished by a distinction from the nature of the thing from its concrete. They prove this by the following reason: wherever abstracts and concretes differ only by mode of conceiving and naming, whatever is predicated really of the one is also said of the other; but the same is not said really of paternity and of Father, because the Father is not said to differ "totally" as paternity does qua relation; for in the Father there is essence and relation, and the essence is common and they do not differ by reason alone; but in paternity and relation there is nothing common to each. Therefore Father and paternity differ by a distinction from the nature of the thing. Of other concretes he teaches nothing, as of God and deity, of wisdom and wise, etc.

This opinion remains sufficiently refuted in Disputation 120; for by the same reasoning by which we proved against Scotus that relation and essence in God are not distinguished by a distinction from the nature of the thing, it is also proved that the concrete and the abstract not only in the notions, but even in the other divine predicates, do not differ in that way. Therefore this proof must now be completed.

But against Aureolus note that by his own reason it would also be proved that God and Deity differ by a distinction from the nature of the thing, and likewise the other concretes and abstracts in God: because something real is said of the one which is not said of the other. Here, however, one thing must be observed: in every concrete and abstract, in order that they be distinguished for us

either by our reason or by a diverse mode of signifying, it must be that by the name of the one something is signified directly and expressly or is consequently connoted, which is not signified or does not stand in the other, as we proved above in Disputation 121, chapter 2. For if in our concept nothing responds to the one name which does not respond to the other, those ratios will undoubtedly be synonymous, unless they differ as definition and defined, as what is expressed and what is implicit - which here does not obtain, as we showed there. But the concrete and abstract in God cannot be synonymous, because of the one some things are predicated which cannot be said of the other, although they can be said of it; and what is connoted by the concrete name of the nature, as "God," that is not connoted nor signified by the abstract, as "Deity," namely, the supposit (*suppositum*), as we shall universally prove of all natural concretes in Disputations 136 and 157. The concrete of a person, moreover, as "father," connotes the nature which it has in itself contracted and determined by a property; but by the abstract name "paternity" that is not connoted: by that name the property itself alone is signified, by which the nature can be determined. The same must be said of all personal concretes and abstracts.

Caput II - That in God names and concepts abstract and concrete must be handled otherwise than in other things, against Praepositivus and Gregory

An ancient Scholastic, Praepositivus, as St. Thomas reports in this article, asserted that in the divine the abstracts and concretes are used for the same thing: for he said that paternity is altogether the same as father, lest, if there were any distinction, something be detracted from the divine simplicity. Gregory seems to have followed this opinion in the First Book, distinction 26, questions 1 and 2, where he teaches that in God there are properties...

Gregory taught that there are personal properties intransitive, not transitive, that is, properties which are themselves the persons, but not properties which are of the persons; yet besides these he concedes transitive properties of the persons, which however are signified by a complex expression and remain only in words and in the intellect, nor do they pass over into the thing conceived. On this ground he says that the property of the Father is "to have begotten the Son," which, he says, must not be signified by one simple name, but by a complex and by several words; and therefore it exists only in the intellect, because a complex of words arises only in the intellect. He adds, moreover, that it is not necessary to answer heretics by abstract names, but either by that complex, or even by concretes: as (he says) St. Jerome and St. Augustine have taught us. For to those asking in what respect the Father and the Son are one, we answer, they are one in substance; but in what respect they are several, we say, in persons. Gabriel agrees with Gregory, In I Sentences, distinction 18, question 1, article 3, first doubt, who teaches that the notions consist in name alone, and that in the thing conceived nothing of them is assigned: and he is led to this opinion, lest he seem to assert five things in God, just as we also say there are five notions.[385][386]

385. Gregory, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1 - 2.
386. Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 1.

Yet the holy Doctor admirably refutes the opinion of these men in this article, and with him the Scholastics whom we cited in the notes on the article agree. For although at times we can satisfy heretics asking about this mystery by concrete names, nevertheless sometimes it is necessary to use abstracts and implicits. For if a Greek should ask, wherein the Son differs from the Holy Spirit, we answer, in spiration; to which question we could not conveniently respond by the concrete name spirator. And although we could satisfy by that complex signifying the property, as if we were to say, the Son differs from the Holy Spirit because He spirates Him; nevertheless, because the persons do not so much differ by origins as by relations, and because a heretic can press us to say that by which He differs, we are compelled to use abstract words: which, for my part, I do not know on what ground Gregory and Praepositivus refused to concede; since St. John Damascene in book 1 On the Faith, chapter 11, to show wherein the persons differ and wherein they agree, uses abstract names in these words: "We know one God; but only in the properties, namely of paternity, filiation, and procession, do we observe a distinction," which a little above he had also signified by complex words; he used the same names in the same book, chapter 9.[387] St. Hilary also in books four and nine On the Trinity frequently uses the abstract name "innascibility," to which he opposes "nativity"; to which add St. Basil, book one Against Eunomius, and book four, chapter two. St. Gregory Nazianzen too, Oration 39, which is on the holy lights, after the words, "The Father is Father," uses the name "filiation," and after some things adds: "Let it be permitted, for the sake of clarity, to coin new names."[388][389][390] With all these agrees St. Augustine, book five On the Trinity, chapter 6, as we saw in the exposition of the article, who concedes notions in the same way in the divine: for although by "notion" he himself understands a mode of knowing a person and of distinguishing her from some other, from this very kind of notion is gathered also the notion which the Scholastics posit in God, which is a ratio known of some person; and from the different mode of cognition by which the persons are known are gathered different rationes known in the persons, by which they are understood to be mutually distinct. In the same way St. Basil in Epistle 43 openly asserts notions; for, treating of the distinction of one supposit from another, he says: "Who he was is designated by those proper notions"; and by the name of notions he understands not the cognitions which we have about a person, but the various properties of that person. And a little below, he speaks thus about the distinction of the divine persons: "A thing surpassing reason or all comprehension, or whatever else of that sort, we will not employ for the determination of a property; but this alone will we inquire, by what the understanding of each person may be clearly and without confusion separated from the common consideration." And in book two Against Eunomius, not far from the end, he calls these notions "proper forms of the persons, notes, and characters." St. Gregory of Nyssa likewise in the little book On the Difference of ousia and hypostasis often repeats that in God there are personal properties by which the persons are distinguished, nor do they in any way communicate.[391][392][393] And although these Fathers do not use

387. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 11.
388. St. Hilary, De Trinitate IV; IX.
389. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium I; IV, c. 2.
390. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 39, In sancta lumina.
391. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 6.
392. St. Basil, Epist. 43.

abstracts, since nevertheless St. John Damascene uses them, Gregory without cause disapproved their use. Rightly therefore Alexander, part one, question 63, member 3, and St. Thomas in this very article, said: the essence is signified as "what"; the person, as "who"; but property, notion, and relation, as "whereby," because a ratio is signified by which something is such.[394]

But when we say that notions are in God and are to be conceded in the abstract, we do not assert that they remain in name alone; rather a peculiar concept corresponds to them, as the proper signification of those very words. Wherefore abstract names of the notions must be used otherwise than their concretes: because the signification of these and of those is different, as we saw in the preceding chapter; although sometimes a notion is also signified in the concrete, as "unbegotten"; yet from this it does not follow, as Gabriel thought, that five things are to be conceded in God. For when we say five notions, we say not five things which are said to be really distinct, but five concepts diverse by the intellect's operation alone: just as when we say there are many attributes; for these names signify something of reason, as is manifest.

How this distinction of abstract and concrete does not conflict with the divine simplicity is plainly gathered from the doctrine of disputation 121, chapter 3, where we said that a distinction of reason derogates nothing from the divine simplicity, because it is necessary that God, according to our mode of understanding, be conceived in diverse ways: from this, however, no multiplicity and duplicity follows in the thing itself.

Caput III - What are to be predicated of the notions

Now then, since it has been proved that notions signified in the abstract are to be used for explaining the properties of the persons, it remains to see what can be predicated of them. The Canariensis, in the commentary on this article, part 4, says that there are some predicates signifying action, and some not signifying action, but some attribute or property of God: and of those which signify action, some signify essential action, as to understand, to will, to create, to govern, etc.; others notional action, as to spirate, to beget.[395]

With these premised, he lays down two rules:

The former is, No names signifying action, whether essential or notional, are predicated of the notions; therefore this proposition is false, "Paternity understands," or "begets." He gives the reason, that operations belong not to forms, but to concretes and supposits: but notions signified abstractly are forms, or are signified as forms: therefore operation cannot be attributed to them.

The latter rule is, All names which do not signify action can be predicated of notions signified abstractly: wherefore these propositions are true, "Paternity is father," "Paternity is eternal," or "eternity."

Both rules seem true to me; but the reason of the former is not proved: because there are some voices signifying action which are predicated of attributes in the abstract. We say indeed, "the intellect understands," "wisdom savors and governs," "the will loves," etc. If therefore these voices

393. St. Gregory of Nyssa, De differentia ousiae et hypostasis.

are predicated of abstracts, why also cannot voices signifying notional actions, or other actions, be predicated of notions signified abstractly? Wherefore a better reason is that which Cajetan assigns in this article, and the same the Canariensis follows: namely, that voices signifying actions can be predicated of abstracts whenever the abstracts are the formal principles of those actions; but not otherwise: and thus it is rightly said, "the intellect understands," but not, "the intellect wills"; "mercy has mercy," but not, "mercy punishes": for to the very formal principles of operations operations are also attributed in their own way even to abstracts, as to the principles by which they are done or elicited: and this alone those propositions signify to us. Furthermore, in what way that common axiom is to be understood, "Actions belong to supposits, not to natures," we shall say in the Third Part, question 2, article 11. Therefore, since the notions are not the formal principles of operations, whether essential or even notional, nor are they signified as supposits, it follows that voices signifying actions cannot be predicated of them: wherefore, although we rightly say, "the generative power generates," and "the spirative power spirates," nevertheless we cannot say, "paternity generates," or, "spiration spirates." For, as we shall say below in disputation 164, chapter 3, the generative or spirative power signifies more than relation.

But concerning each rule it must be observed that there is a difference between propositions in which the predicates signify actions, and those in which they signify some form only: the former must always be understood in the formal sense, and cannot be used in the identical sense, as we said also in disputation 119, chapter 3; so that we can never say, "the intellect loves," and the like. The latter, however, can be taken, and often are taken, in the sense which the same author calls identical. Wherefore we conclude concerning them, whether the abstract be predicated of the abstract, or the abstract of the concrete, or conversely. And this St. Thomas signifies in this article in the reply to the second, when he says that those things which have an ordination to some essential or personal act cannot be predicated of the notions; because their mode of signifying repugns: as if he had said, that in the formal sense, in which these propositions are always taken, the forms of actions cannot be predicated of the notions. He adds that the "essences," however, which have no ordination to any act, can be predicated. For we can say that paternity is eternal. Then he adds that, by identity of the thing, it can also be said, "Paternity is God," and "God is Father"; because these propositions can be taken in the identical and not the formal sense. But what must be said if they be taken in the formal sense, is gathered from the things said in that disputation 119, chapter 2. The Canariensis adds that this proposition is false, "God is wise," because the predicate denotes action: which, if it be so, his doctrine is true. But because it can signify the attribute of wisdom, therefore in the identical sense it can be predicated of it; for the concretes of the attributes, as also of the essence, are not formally predicated of the abstract notions: yet in another way it is true to predicate of it, "Paternity is eternal"; for since eternity is an attribute consequent upon the being of the thing, and paternity is, and thus has duration, it is rightly said, even in the formal sense, to be eternal. As for abstracts and concretes, again in disputation 139 it must be discussed.

394. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 63, membr. 3; and cf. St. Thomas, in this article.
395. Canariensis (Peter of Aragon), ad hunc art., pars 4; cf. Cajetan, ad hunc art.

Articulus III - Whether there are only five notions in the divine

Concerning the third, the procedure is as follows. It seems that there are not five notions. For the motions of the persons are not in the relations by which they are distinguished. But the relations in the divine are only four, as was said above. Therefore there are only four notions.

Further: Because in the divine there is one essence, God is said to be one; but because there are three persons, God is said to be triune. If therefore in the divine there are five notions, He will be said to be "quinus" (fivefold). Which is unfitting.

Further: If, the three persons existing in the divine, there are five notions, it is necessary that in some person there be some two or more notions; as in the person of the Father are posited innascibility, and paternity, and common spiration. Either therefore those three notions distinguish things, or they do not. If they distinguish things, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they distinguish only rationes, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we might say that, just as the divine goodness is His wisdom because of real indistinction, so common spiration is paternity. Which is not conceded. Therefore there are not five notions.

But on the contrary: It seems that there are more. For just as the Father is from no one, and in this respect the notion which is called innascibility is taken; so, from the Holy Spirit there is not another person. And in this respect it will be necessary to take six notions. Further: Just as it is common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from the Father. Therefore, just as one notion is posited as common to the Father and the Son, so one notion ought to be posited as common to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

I answer that, notion is said to be that which is the proper ratio of knowing...

The latter, however, can be taken, and are often taken, in the sense which they call "identical." Wherefore we concede them, whether an abstract is predicated of an abstract, or an abstract of a concrete, or the reverse. And this is what St. Thomas indicated in this article, in the

reply to the second, when he says that those things which have an ordination to some essential act or personal act cannot be predicated of the notions; because this is repugnant to their mode of signifying: as if he were saying that, in the formal sense in which these propositions are always taken, names of actions cannot be predicated of the notions. St. Thomas adds: "Essential [names], however, which do not have an ordination to some act, can be predicated. For we can say that paternity is eternal." He adds thereafter that, because of identity of the thing, it can also be said, "Paternity is God," and, "Deity is Father," because these propositions can be taken in the identical, and not the formal, sense. But what is to be said in the sense "of saying" (de dicto), if they are taken in the formal sense, is gathered from what was said in that Disputation 119, chapter 2. Canariensis adds that this proposition is false, "Deity is wise," because the predicate denotes an action: which if it were so, his doctrine would be true. But because it can signify the attribute of wisdom, therefore in the identical sense it can be predicated of that [subject]: for concretes of the attributes, as also of

the essence, are not predicated formally of abstract notions; yet there is another reason with regard to this one, "Paternity is eternal"; for since eternity is an attribute consequent upon the existence (*esse*) of the thing, and paternity is, and therefore has duration, rightly it is said even in the formal sense to be eternal. But about abstracts and concretes we must speak again in Disputation 139.

Truly, there are only five notions in the divine

The third [article] proceeds thus. It seems that there are not five notions. For properly the notions of the persons are the relations by which they are distinguished. But relations in the divine are only four, as was said above. Therefore the notions are only four.

1. Besides. Because in the divine there is one essence, God is said to be one: but because there are three persons, God is said to be triune. If, therefore, in the divine there are five notions, he will be said to be quine. Which is unfitting.
2. Besides. If, when there are three persons in the divine, there are five notions, it must be that in some one of the persons there are two or more notions, as in the person of the Father are posited innascibility, and paternity, and common spiration. Either, therefore, those three notions differ in reality, or not. If they differ in reality, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of many things. But if they differ only in notion, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another; so that we might say that just as the divine goodness is its wisdom because of indifference of the thing, so common spiration is paternity. Which is not conceded. Therefore there are not five notions.

But on the contrary: It seems that there are more. For just as the Father is from no one, and according to this is taken the notion which is called innascibility; so from the Holy Spirit there is no other person. And according to this one will have to take six notions. Besides. Just as it is common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they proceed from the Father. Therefore just as one notion is posited as common to the Father and the Son, so one notion ought to be posited as common to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

I answer that, notion is said to be that which is the proper ratio of knowing the divine person. But the divine persons are multiplied according to origin. Now to origin belongs [both] "from whom is another," and "who is from another"; and according to these two modes a person can be made known. Therefore the person of the Father cannot be made known by this, that he is from another, but by this, that he is from no one. And thus on this side his notion is innascibility. But inasmuch as someone is from him, he is made known in a twofold way. For inasmuch as the Son is [from him], he is made known by the notion of paternity: but inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is [from him], he is made known by the notion of common spiration. The Son, however, can be made known by this, that he is from another by being born, and thus he is made known by filiation. And by this, that there is another from him, namely, the Holy Spirit; and by this he is made known in the same mode as the Father, namely, by common spiration. The Holy Spirit, however, can be

made known by this, that he is from another or from others, and thus he is made known by procession. But not by this, that there is another from him: because no divine person proceeds from him. Therefore there are five notions in the divine, namely, innascibility, paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Of these, however, only four are relations. For innascibility is not a relation except by reduction, as will be said below. There are, however, only four properties. For common spiration is not a property: because it is common to two persons. There are, moreover, three personal notions, that is, [notions] constituting the persons, namely paternity, filiation, and procession. For common spiration and innascibility are called notions of the persons, but not personal, as will be made clearer below.

Reply to the first: Beyond the four relations one must posit another notion, as has been said.

Reply to the second: Essence in the divine is signified as a certain thing, and similarly the persons are signified as certain things; but the notions are signified as ratios making the persons known. And therefore, although God is said to be one because of the unity of essence, and triune because of the trinity of persons, nevertheless he is not said to be "quine" because of five notions.

Reply to the third: Since only relative opposition makes real plurality in the divine, several properties in one person, if they are not opposed to each other relatively, do not differ really. Nor yet are they predicated of each other; because they are signified as diverse ratios of the persons. Just as also we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge: although we say that knowledge is a power.

Reply to the fourth: Since person imports dignity, as was said above, a notion of the Holy Spirit cannot be taken from this, that no person is from him. For this does not pertain to his dignity, as it pertains to the authority of the Father, that he is from no one.[396]

Reply to the fifth: The Son and the Holy Spirit do not agree in one special mode of existing from the Father, as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Spirit. Now that which is a principle in making known must be something special. And therefore it is not similar.

The conclusion is: There are only five notions in the divine persons, innascibility, active spiration, paternity, filiation, and procession: St. Thomas gathers their number from the number of emanations, by which two persons proceed.

396. See above, q. 29, a. 3.

Disputatio CXXXVII - Whether, besides the five notions, a sixth can be constituted

Caput I - Scotus asserts a sixth notion in the Son, namely inspirability

Scotus, on the First Book, distinction 28, question 1, ad 3,[397] besides the five notions which are commonly assigned, namely besides paternity and innascibility in the Father, spiration in the Father and the Son, filiation in the Son alone, and procession in the Holy Spirit alone, does not hesitate to assign another sixth to the Son, which he himself calls inspirability; and it denotes the negation of procession by will. For just as a peculiar notion is constituted, innascibility, which signifies the negation of every procession; so also inspirability could be assigned, which denotes the negation of one procession only. And although, as the Holy Doctor teaches in the reply to the fourth, "non-spirator" is not a notion, because it signifies only the negation of active spiration; nevertheless inspirability, which denotes the negation of passive procession, will pertain no less to the dignity of the person than innascibility, which also signifies the negation of passive processions: or a reason must be rendered why one negation rather than another is a notion.

Nor does it stand in the way, says Scotus, that hitherto only five notions have been assigned by the theologians to the divine persons, because in Scripture only three notions, which are the personal properties, are enumerated (John 5); afterward, however, a fourth was added, which is spiration. Besides, down to the times of St. Ambrose the notion of innascibility and "unbegotten" was hidden; nay rather by him and by other Fathers rejected; afterward, however, in the Church of God by St. Augustine and others, as in Disputation 141 we shall see, it was gladly admitted: what marvel, then, will it be, if we now also add a sixth, and the whole school receives it? for an argument from "not yet" is vain and futile. Wherefore it is not permitted to argue for the number of notions in this way: Up to now in the Church of God a sixth notion has not been handed down by the Doctors; therefore in no way is it permitted now to assign it.

Caput II - The true opinion of many

There are Scholastics by whom the number of five notions is so proved that they assert that neither that sixth nor any other ought to be added: whose opinion I judge to be true and to be embraced. This was taught by Alexander,[398] together with St. Thomas in this article, Cajetan, Canariensis, and more recent Thomists, St. Bonaventure,[398] Durandus,[398] and those who follow,

397. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, ad 3.

398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

Capreolus,[398] Gabriel,[398] Marsilius,[398] and it is gathered from Richard [of St. Victor] in the First Book, distinction 28, article 1, question 1, in the body and to the third together; who all, Alexander excepted, not only affirm that there are only five notions, but also, against Scotus, assert that the negation of a procession is not a notion. Thus explicitly said Richard, Durandus, Capreolus, and Canariensis: the rest, however, in general affirm that no negations of any procession are a peculiar notion; but such is inspirability: in which sense Capreolus interprets the Angelic Doctor.

But why, since innascibility is a peculiar notion, inspirability is not, those who follow this latter opinion vary among themselves. Yet, that each may explain his opinion, they note certain things which ought to be indubitable for all, and which we also admit to be true. First, Canariensis notes that the notion is not the origin itself formally: this indeed is signified and conceived in the mode of a way; but the notion has the nature of a form, as existing in fact in the person himself. But although the origins are called notions, they ought not to be distinctly constituted from the very forms in fact: for since by generation we know the first person in the same way that by paternity, generation ought not to be a notion distinct from paternity.

Second, it must be observed from St. Thomas in this article, at the end, and from St. Bonaventure, Marsilius, and Canariensis in the places cited, that names which signify procession universally do not signify a distinct notion, even if the processions are notions. Just as, if "to generate" should bear a notion, it ought not to be distinct from another notion "to produce": because "to produce" is as universal a predicate, and "to generate" a particular difference; but a universal under which particulars fall ought not to be numbered.

Third, it must be premised from the same Doctors, and St. Thomas in this article in the reply to the fourth, that the notion of a person ought to be conceived by us in the mode of a certain dignity and perfection. For, as St. Thomas says, since person carries with it some dignity, the notion of the person ought in some way to denote that. If, therefore, we take something which signifies no perfection - such as "not to spirate" - we do not conceive something peculiar about the person; which seems to belong to the very ratio of a notion: for a notion is that by which, in a peculiar way, a person becomes known to us; which, unless it be a dignity or perfection apprehended, ought not to be called a notion of the person.

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398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

398. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 68, memb. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad hunc art.; Canariensis, ad hunc art.; recentiores Thomistae; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, no. 9 ff.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Gabriel [Biel], In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 29, art. 1, not. 8; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., d. 28, art. 1, q. 1, in corp. et ad 3.

Cajetan, however, distinguishes in various ways between innascibility and inspirability, so as to satisfy Scotus. First, indeed, Cajetan in this article, no. 9. For the evidence of this I answer thus. Although, regularly speaking, a negation is not a notion of a person (since the notion of innocence is posited by grace: but a privation is rather known by means of a habit than the contrary, and therefore inspirability is not a notion), nevertheless by a peculiar reason innascibility, which is a negation, is called a notion of the Father: first, because the person of the Father alone in the divine has the ratio of first principle; but a first principle is best known by this, that it is not from another. Then too a peculiar notion is posited because of the diverse connection of these terms, "Father" and "Unbegotten": for in creatures he who is a father is at once begotten by another; in the divine, however, not so; but the Father has this as peculiar, that he proceeds from no one: therefore also a peculiar notion of the eternal Father is posited, innascibility, which agrees with no other person. On the contrary, since inspirability agrees with no son, even a created one, but every son is "not spirated," inspirability, or the negation of spirability, ought not to be constituted as a peculiar notion of the eternal Son. Moreover, since he who affirms that in God there are two innascibles, affirms that there are two Gods, as Hilary says in the book On Synods, therefore it is necessary that innascibility be constituted a peculiar notion of some person. Thus far Cajetan.

In my judgment, however, the reason for the distinction which we seek has not been sufficiently explained. For that by that negation there is known to us the ratio of the first principle, we do not deny: but unless by that negation we conceive some positive [content], the ratio of a principle, the negation itself, taken in itself, is perhaps not to be numbered among the notions of a person. But so that by the account of the positive - into the cognition of which it leads - there be said to be a peculiar notion, that [positive] ought to be diverse from the positive which is signified by the other words of the notions: wherefore Cajetan ought to show how that which we conceive by innascibility is something positive distinct, according to our mode of understanding, from the other notions; and it is true, that what we come to know by inspirability in the Son is not [thus distinct].

Besides, what, I ask, does it matter that innascibility is a negation peculiar in the eternal Father and is not found in other created fathers, so that for that reason it is a peculiar notion of the eternal Father? For if nothing is found in some special proposition by which that negation makes him known, a special notion ought not to be constituted. I pass over the third reason which Cajetan adduces from St. Hilary: for that has little weight.

Caput III - The reasons of Durandus and of Canariensis on the same matter

Then Durandus replies,[399] in the First Book, distinction 26, question 1, at the second distinction, namely no. 17, that this is the difference between innascibility and inspirability: that inspirability signifies only the negation of passive spiration, which is contained in the positive notion of the act of spiration; for by the very fact that he is spirator, the Spirit denies being spirated: therefore it does not posit an opposition diverse from active spiration, which is common to the Father and to

399. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1, sub dist. 2 (no. 17).

the eternal Son; whereas innascibility signifies the negation not only of generation - for thus it would not be a notion distinct from paternity - but also of any other procession whatsoever, both active and passive.

Then Durandus answers in the First Book, distinction 26, that second question, no. 10, and sets forth this difference between innascibility and inspirability: that inspirability only signifies the negation of passive spiration, which, since it is contained under the positive notion of active spiration - because by the very fact that one is spirator, he cannot be spirated - therefore is not posited as a notion distinct from active spiration, which is common to the Father and to the eternal Son; but innascibility signifies the negation not only of generation alone (for thus it would not be a notion distinct from paternity), but also of any other procession whatsoever, both immanent through the intellect and will, and transeunt through creation; and thus there is made known to us some dignity of the first person as the first principle, distinct from the other notions.[400]

The reason of Durandus is not sufficient. For my part, I judge that one ought not to constitute as a distinct notion any negation which does not indicate for us some positive dignity different from the other positive notions; otherwise it would be permissible to multiply many other notions by negations. Yet Durandus does not sufficiently show how innascibility signifies to us, materially speaking, a new dignity of the person, which inspirability does not indicate. For someone could say that, just as inspirability is not a distinct notion from active spiration, because this negation follows upon that; so neither is innascibility, because this negation also necessarily follows upon paternity and active spiration. For that which is the principle of every procession, such as are paternity and active spiration together, cannot in any way proceed. Next, to be unable to proceed through creation belongs to the Father, and to any person whatsoever, insofar as he is God; indeed, as below, disputation 140, chapter 1, from St. John Damascene we shall show, "unbegotten" insofar as it signifies "uncreated," or "not proceeding by creation," is not a notion, nor does it pertain to the personal notion, since that is a ratio common in a certain way to all the persons; but a notion ought to belong to only one or two persons.[401]

Then the Canarian reproves those asserting that innascibility is a notion by reason of some conjoined positive; and he asserts that it is a notion by reason of the negation alone. And why innascibility should be a notion by reason of the negation alone, but not inspirability, he proves in no other way than because inspirability denies only the procession through the will, from which some dignity of the Son does not seem to be signified; but innascibility denies in the Father every procession, from which some dignity of his is made known to us, distinct from the other notions: therefore rightly a distinct notion is constituted. And hence, he says, the Father is called by St. Hilary in De Trinitate 9 "greater than the Son," because he is not from another - not that the Son is less, but so that thence the Father's authority may be shown in a new way through innascibility.[402]

Rejected: for this author seems to fall into the very position which he himself attacked. For if he therefore says that innascibility is a notion because it denotes some dignity, or authority, of the Father; it follows that it is not a notion by reason of the negation, but by reason of the positive

400. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, no. 10.

dignity which it indicates. For no negation, as negation, can be a dignity of anyone, or a perfection of him; although by a negation we may sometimes signify a positive perfection, as will be said in the following chapter.

Caput IV - The reasoning of the more recent authors on the same matter

Lastly, others, against the common teaching of the Scholastics, whom we recalled in chapter 2, affirm that the notion of a person does not always pertain to that person's dignity, but that it is enough if through it the person is made known to us. Wherefore, since by innascibility the person of the Father is known to us, but not likewise by inspirability the person of the Son; therefore they say that innascibility is a notion, but not inspirability: not because through innascibility we know some peculiar dignity of the Father, but because his whole person is made known by that negation. They prove, moreover, that by inspirability the person of the Son is not known: because not every negation is apt for knowing the positive better, but only certain ones; of this sort, however, inspirability is not: for the person of the Son is better known to us by filiation and passive generation than by the negation of passive spiration; whereas the Father is better known by the negation of procession; because, as St. Thomas says in the following question, article 4, in the body and to the first; and in the First Book, distinction 28, question 1, article 1, and again in article 2, the first are better known by negation. Therefore a notion is posited.[403]

This opinion, however, can easily be refuted. First, because it teaches contrary to the common opinion of the Scholastics that it is not of the ratio of a notion to signify some dignity of the person to whom it belongs.

Rejected: second. Because, as we said in the notes on the preceding article and in disputation 137, chapter 2, the notion which is posited by the Scholastics in divine matters is not the very cognition by which we know the person, nor the medium through which we come to a knowledge of him, nor the mode of knowing him; but it is the ratio of the person known by us, by the knowing of which the person is thereby known. Now indeed, without the negation, namely innascibility, the person of the Father is known to us, not according to any other positive ratio than that of paternity alone, or of spiration, or of both; for that reason, innascibility ought not to be assigned as a distinct notion - that is, a distinct ratio known of the person - but as a different mode of knowing him, which among the Scholastics is not a notion.

Rejected: third. Either the ratio which we know of the Father through negation is the negation itself - and thus every negation known of a person will be a notion - or it is a positive ratio known by means of that negation; and this will be some dignity. Either, therefore, it is distinct from paternity and spiration, and thus it will be a distinct positive notion against the preceding opinion; or it is paternity and spiration themselves, and thus innascibility will not be a notion, that is, a ratio diverse and known of the person, but a different mode or medium of knowing the same ratio of the

401. See below, Disputatio 140, cap. 1; and St. John Damascene, as cited there.
402. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 9.
403. St. Thomas, in the following question, a. 4, in corp. et ad 1; and In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; and again a. 2.

person. Thus, if the ratio of infinity and of the other attributes, which are conceived and denominated by negation, were known by a twofold way, both by negation and in a positive mode, one ought not to say that there is a different notion of the nature and essence - that is, a different ratio known - but entirely the same, though understood in a different way.

Rejected: fourth. Just as the ratio of the Son is better known to us in itself than through the negation of spiration, so also the ratio of the Father and the ratio of spirator in the Father are better known in themselves to us; and the person of the Father is better known through those positive ratios than through the negation of procession, which is innascibility. Who does not see this? For I know a principle of two productions better by the proper concept of the productions than by the opposed negation. For this reason St. Cyril, Book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 2, thus says: "And he who named the Father God from that which is, signified what he is; but he who said 'unbegotten,' [named him] from that which is not. For he is Father of the Son; but 'begotten' he is not. But that we more suitably name God from that which is than from that which is not will be evident from this, and so on."[5] Therefore, in vain is innascibility by those Theologians constituted a notion for this same reason - that through it the person of the Father is better made known.

But if they say that by that negation the first person is better known by us insofar as he has the ratio of the first principle - because first things are better known by negations - there will be need to assign some other positive ratio of the first principle besides paternity and spiration. For if it consists in these two, or in either of them, it is without doubt better known through them than through negation. But if, in order that a negation be a notion, it is enough that by it the person be known in any way whatsoever, even if he be known under the same dignity; then inspirability also will be a notion: for this likewise, in some way or other, renders the second person known to us.

Some add, with Alexander, Part I, question 69, members 4 and 5, that "unbegotten" is therefore a notion, because even if there were but one person, that person would be called "unbegotten": therefore, since by this negation a person can be known without paternity and spiration, it will be a distinct notion from those.[404] But the contrary reason is manifest: for in the same way inspirability in the Son, and "ingenerability" in the Holy Spirit, could be known, even if neither the Son were generated nor the Holy Spirit spirated, but proceeded in other diverse modes; yet that does not suffice for those negations to be peculiar notions. For now, since we suppose the Son to be begotten and the Holy Spirit to be spirated, those negations are sufficiently known through other positive notions, nor do they denote any dignity different from them.

Caput V - The true reason why innascibility is a peculiar notion, but not inspirability

In order to assign the true reason by which innascibility is said by us to be a notion of the Father distinct from the others, but inspirability in the Son and ingenerability in the Holy Spirit are not so, there is to be observed the doctrine of Durandus, in the First Book, distinction 28, question 1, article 2 - namely, that the negation of a form is not only in some subject which is said to lack that

404. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 69, memb. 4 - 5.

form, but also arises from some peculiar formal ratio opposed to that of which it is said to be the negation: thus the incorruptible in the heavens, which is the negation of corruption, arises from some formal reason opposed to that which corruption requires.[405]

From this it may be gathered first why unbegottenness is a notion, even if it be signified by a negation: because although formally and expressly it signify a negation, and that which the Father is not; nevertheless materially and directly it signifies some positive dignity of the person, namely some mode of subsistence of that person, in which a certain dignity appears to us in our way of understanding, and is known by us through the negation. Thus the incorporeal and the incorruptible denote positive attributes which are the peculiar cause of the negation of body and of corruption, namely, the perfection of perpetuity and of spirit. Following this sentiment is St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, dist. 4, q. 4, where he taught that unbegottenness by reason of negation alone cannot be a notion, because thus it signifies no dignity of the person; but by reason of the positive dignity which it denotes - namely, fullness, or universal authority, and the first principle - which he calls a fountain-like (fontal) dignity.[406] Of which opinion St. Thomas makes mention, in question 33, article 4, to the first reply.[407] There are also among the Fathers some who expressly concede that by unbegottenness a certain positive mode of the person is signified; and they understand it as has been set forth thus far. Thus St. Basil affirms in book 4 against Eunomius, chapter 2, a little after the beginning, where he admits the name "unbegotten" as proper to the Father, and "begotten" as proper to the Son, in these words: "Wherefore unbegottenness is a mode of substance, not the name of substance (that is, of essence)."[408] And St. Cyril, book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 4 near the end: "And by the name 'unbegotten' we wish to signify not the substance (that is, the essence), but the mode by which God is."[409] Likewise St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 9, thus says: "That it be, namely, that all things which the Father has the Son also have, with this one exception, that he is not unbegotten; which word indeed does not indicate a difference of nature, nor dignity and authority, but a mode of existence."[410] When he says that by that word there is signified dignity and authority, he understands that by which the Father excels the Son: for, as we explained in disputation 122, chapter 5, when he says that by that word there is signified the mode of the person's existing, he must also admit that there is signified some positive account which in our way of understanding pertains to dignity, that is, to the perfection of the person. This, according to the opinion of the Scholastics, we said to be necessary, that something have the character of a notion. Add Nicetas, in oration 23 on St. Gregory Nazianzen, which is in praise of Heron, on those words "that also," and so forth, where he calls "unbegotten" the characteristic property of the Father.[411] But when St. Cyril, book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3 at the beginning, says, "It is not therefore unbegottenness that is expounded as substance, but (it signifies) that the substance, of which it is said, is not in such a mode," by which words he seems to

405. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2.
406. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 4.
407. St. Thomas, STh I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1.
408. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 4, cap. 2.
409. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 1, cap. 4.
410. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 1, cap. 9.
411. Nicetas, Oratio 23 in S. Gregorium Nazianzenum (In laudem Heronis).

teach that this name signifies the negation of the mode, not a mode of substance; he must be understood to be speaking of the formal and express signification, as was noted above: yet for that reason he does not deny that it also signifies materially some positive mode of substance, as Cyril himself with other Fathers admits. In the same way St. Augustine is to be understood, who in book five on the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, contends that by that name is signified rather what is not than what is; for we also say this of those names by which we signify some attributes of God, as "Immutable," "Incorporal"; so also Nicetas in the place cited said that the name "Unbegotten" signifies the negation of generation.[412]

Secondly, that we may show that by reason of the positive (element) which is signified by that word, unbegottenness is the fifth notion, we must assign a concept of the positive (signification) diverse from that of the others. For this reason St. Thomas rejects that opinion of St. Bonaventure which we followed, namely, because, as he holds, there is no positive signification (thereby) distinct from paternity and active spiration that answers, in the Father, to this word "Unbegotten": but we, following what St. Bonaventure posited, can easily show a diverse signification. For he who conceives the Father under the single concept either of paternity alone, or of active spiration alone, has not yet expressly apprehended him as the first principle in the Trinity - although he can deduce this from those (notions): for he only understands him as the peculiar principle of the Son by generation, or of the Holy Spirit by spiration; but as yet he does not expressly conceive the Father under the account of the first principle. For although paternity shows that the Father is prior in origin to the Son, and spiration, that he is prior in origin to the Holy Spirit; nevertheless they do not show that he is first, expressly and formally. Therefore, that we may show that the Father is first, we use the word "unbegotten," by which, in the mode of a negation, we signify that the Father is Father, and is referred to the Son, in such a way that by his paternity he is constituted the first person, whose account is rightly understood by the negation of "unbegotten," namely that he is from no one in any way whatsoever, not even from another divine person: which we did not yet expressly know of the Father by the notion of paternity alone, or of spiration; and although it might be rightly deduced, once the number of emanations is supposed: nevertheless because none of those relations supposes this expressly and formally in its concept, therefore, the notion of unbegottenness being added, the person of the Father together with his paternity is made known positively in a new way as the first and fountal origin. For first things and simple things are known better by us through negation, as Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics X, chapter 5.[413] And in this way, the positive (element) that answers to this notion of unbegottenness is paternity under the account of the first (principle); once that is established, it is clear what is the second person and what is the third; and therefore there is no need to multiply other notions. For since filiation refers the Son to the Father alone, but procession refers the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son - under which (procession) spiration is considered - there is no need, in order to signify the second and third

412. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 1, cap. 3; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 5, cc. 6 - 7.
413. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, c. 5.

persons under the account of the second and third person, to constitute other notions; whereas a peculiar notion was necessary in order to show that the person of the Father is the first origin of all things and the fount, which had not yet been expressly stated by the notion of paternity alone.

But you will ask, whether this notion, since materially it signifies a positive (element), is a relation or something absolute; and if it is a relation, whether it is the same as paternity, or different. I answer, the positive signification of this word is paternity, under the special concept of first origin and principle, whereby there is not added a new real relation, but one of reason, because no new other real relation is given than the real relation already existing. Whether, however, before the first person be understood as actually generating, that account of the first and ungenerated signifies a relation, or something absolute, and be a different notion, we shall say in disputation 140, chapter 3, and disputation 169, chapter 7.

From this opinion St. Thomas and Capreolus do not depart, whom we shall cite below in disputation 140, chapter 3, when they assert that by this negation the account of the first principle is signified and made known: although they impugn the opinion of St. Bonaventure, yet in a far different sense, as we shall say there. The same teach that by that negation is signified Durandus, the Master of the Canaries, and Cajetan, as we shall say in the same place: although these three defend in another way the account of a peculiar notion, as we saw above.

But someone may press thus in objection: by the same reason, on account of the different relations of reason, we can constitute new other notions in the second and third person - namely, the account of "word" and "image" in the Son, and likewise the account of "gift" in the Holy Spirit. For these are altogether distinct and are not synonymous, because they connote at the same time diverse respects of reason upon the personal real relations: therefore there will be different notions of the persons.

I answer: In the first place, the account of image is not a different notion from filiation, because in the definition of "Son" the account of "image" is included, when he is said to be "according to the likeness of nature," as we explained in disputation 113, chapters 1 and 7. Then, if the account of "Son" be understood specifically as it is in God, it is the same as the account of "word": for since the Son is generated by the divine intellect, he is thereby the word of the Father; and thus in God these two seem to be distinguished as the common and the particular account, which do not constitute different notions, as we said in the notes on the second article: for the account of Son is determined and further narrowed by the account of word, and conversely the account of word by the account of Son; and therefore there is no need to understand a different notion. For he who distinctly and specifically knows the one, knows also the other, which Athanasius indicated for us in few words, Oration 2 against the Arians, far from the middle: for showing why the second person is called both Son and Word at the same time, he thus speaks: "Scripture conjoins the two in one: it called him 'Son' indeed for this same reason, that it might declare the natural and true subsistence of the Father; but yet, lest anyone should understand something produced and begotten in a human way, again defining the subsistence, it named him that 'Word,' and 'Wisdom,' and 'Splendor': for by those words we apprehend in our thought impassibility in begetting, eternity also, and that comeliness which befits God."[414] Behold how Athanasius judges that by all those names at once one and the same notion of filiation, characterized and sealed, is signified. The same in all respects is held by St. Basil, Homily on those words "In the beginning was the Word," where he says: "He said 'Word' therefore, that he might show the impassible generation of the Father, and theologize the perfect subsistence of the Son, and show by these (words) the co-joining of the Son to the Father without time"; and below: "If he had said 'In the beginning was the Son,' by the appellation 'Son' thought would have leaned toward the passion of generation."[415]

By reason, however, of the relation of reason which the word connotes toward creatures, filiation is not to be constituted as a different notion of the person; because the notions of the persons ought not to be distinguished by respects toward creatures, but only among themselves. And for this same reason, the account of "gift" is not a distinct notion from the account of "spirit," or of "love produced": because "donation" regards creatures only; moreover, the account of "gift" is as it were generic, but the account of "spirit" as it were particular: and from a common and a particular account a distinct notion is not constituted. The account, however, of "unbegotten," although it adds that relation of reason upon paternity, because it adds it with respect to the persons within God himself, is therefore the notion of the first person. The remaining points worthy of note concerning the word "unbegotten" we shall say in disputation 140. But whether it be lawful to hold otherwise concerning the number of the notions, we shall say in article 4 of this question.

414. St. Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos, or. 2.
415. St. Basil, Homilia in illud: "In principio erat Verbum."

Disputatio CXXXVIII - Whether active spiration is really distinct from paternity and filiation

Summary: - That spiration differs from paternity and filiation only by our reason, against Scotus and Durandus, is proved. Cap. 1. - Why it is said that in God there are four real relations. Cap. 2. - Why, on account of a distinction of reason alone, spiration is not predicated of paternity or filiation, nor conversely. Cap. 3.

Caput I - That active spiration differs from paternity and filiation only by our reason, against Scotus and Durandus

Since active spiration, which is called the relation of the spirator, is in the Father and the Son, from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, it is disputed among the Scholastics whether it differs from those (relations) from the nature of the thing, or only by the operation of our intellect. Scotus, however, in a quodlibetal article, holds that it is distinguished from the nature of the thing, not as a thing distinct in reality, but by that middle distinction which he calls formal: being led to this by the very same reasons by which he taught that the attributes are formally distinguished among themselves and from the essence, and that the relations are from the essence formally distinct from the nature of the thing, which we reported in disputations 116, chapter 3, and 120, chapter 3.[416] The chief (reason), however, is this: that very different predicates are said of the one which are not said of the other, as is quite evident: among which that has greater force which we say thus, that spiration is really communicated to the Son by the Father, whereas we affirm that paternity and filiation are not really communicated.

Relying on this foundation, Durandus, in I Sentences, distinction 13, question 2, number 14, by eight reasons proves that active spiration is really distinct from paternity and filiation; not indeed by that middle distinction of Scotus (which Durandus himself does not admit, as we noted in those places), but by a distinction altogether real.[417]

This opposite opinion I judge to be false in the same way as that about the distinction of the attributes from the essence, or of the essence from the relations and the persons: and by the same testimonies and reasons it is to be refuted. Wherefore, since St. Thomas in this article in the solution to the third (objection), Caietan in this question in article 2 of his commentary, the Master of the Canaries in the same place in the second part of his commentary, Marsilius in I Sentences, q. 30, a. 4, dub. 2, Capreolus in I Sentences, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, conclusion 1, say that spiration, from the nature of the thing and prior to our consideration, is the same as paternity and filiation: which, besides the testimonies adduced in those disputations, is also confirmed by Boethius in the book On the Trinity, when he says that "relation multiplies the Trinity" - which must be understood by relative opposition, as will be explained in disputation 147; and by St. Anselm in the book On the Holy Spirit, who, as is commonly reported, says that in the divinity all things are one where the

416. Scotus, Quodlibet, art. (as cited), on the formal distinction; cf. above, Dispp. 116, c. 3; 120, c. 3.
417. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2, n. 14.

opposition of relation does not stand; what the sense of Anselm is in that place we shall say in the cited disputation, chapter 4. Add also St. John Damascene, On the Faith, chapter 11, who thus writes: "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are altogether one and the same, except in this, that the Father is not begotten; the Son is begotten; the Spirit proceeds."[418]

Further, from the opinion of Durandus and his manner of speaking it follows that one must concede that there is a quaternity in God against the definition of the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in the chapter Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.[419] Durandus replies that in that chapter there is condemned only the opinion which Joachim the Abbot falsely imputed to the Master of the Sentences, namely, that in God the essence together with the relations makes a quaternity; but that there is not condemned a quaternity in the relations alone. But this subterfuge is empty: for the same reason obtains for the quaternity in that earlier way and in this latter way in which Durandus affirms it. For on that account is a quaternity condemned, because the Catholic faith has never conceded in God anything but a Trinity; and it has reduced every number in God, which is only in the persons and relations, to a ternary. As to the arguments of Scotus and Durandus, one must satisfy them in the same way as we answered above in the disputations cited, lest they prove that the essence is distinguished from the relations, or persons, by nature of the thing, or really.

Moreover, against certain Thomists it must be observed that they have falsely asserted that spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation in the genus of thing, but in the genus of relation (*relatio*): for if they are really distinguished in the genus of relation, it follows that they are also distinguished in the genus of being; for when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is also multiplied. How can it be, namely, that one relation according to reality is not another, and yet those are not two things and two beings?

Caput II - Why it is said that in God there are four real relations

The difficulty. It seems hard how there are said absolutely to be four real relations in God, even if those are not really distinguished. For, as we were just saying, when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is multiplied together with it; and we say absolutely that there are four real relations: why shall we not say that there are four things?

Refutation of a certain solution. Certain Thomists respond that it is not necessary, when the inferior is multiplied, that the superior be multiplied: for action and passion are two predicaments absolutely, yet they are not two things; likewise, in the divine essence (*essentia*) there are said to be several attributes, yet not several things. However, this solution must not be approved: first, because it seems to contradict natural reason, that when the inferior is multiplied the superior is not multiplied; since from the inferior to the superior is in every matter the best form of arguing. Next, because the name Predicament denotes something of reason, to wit, a series of predicates,

418. St. Thomas, in this article, ad 3; Cajetan, In I, q. 33 (art. 2); Theophilus of the Canaries (Canariensis), In I, q. 33, pars 2; Marsilius of Inghen, In I, q. 30, a. 4, dub. 2; Capreolus, In I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 1; Boethius, De Trinitate; St. Anselm, De Spiritu Sancto; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 11.

419. Lateran Council IV (1215), cap. Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.

which, just as it is constituted by an operation of the intellect, is also sometimes multiplied by the intellect's operation alone: wherefore it does not follow that, because two predicaments absolutely without any other addition can be distinguished by reason alone, therefore two things are posited. In like manner the name Attribute is a name of second intention (as they say), signifying something attributed to God through our reason: wherefore, when we say that in the divine essence there are several attributes, it does not follow that there are several things in it. But when we say that there are four relations, and we add real, we do not signify something of reason: therefore, when the relations are multiplied, the things also are multiplied.

The Canarian, in the third part of his commentary on this article, replies that a distinction of reason alone suffices in order that several real relations be said; but that, for several things to be said, a real distinction is necessary.[420] This solution indeed is most true, yet less sufficient: for it ought to render a reason why it is that four real relations are said on account of a distinction of reason alone, but several things are not said unless from a real distinction alone. Therefore the manifest reason of this is: because the name several, or the names of numbers, when they are added to the term things, can denote nothing other than a real multitude: for a multitude of things is the same as a real multitude; and this is nothing other than a real distinction. But when the name real is added to the name relation, and to both is conjoined a plural term and number, there is not denoted a real distinction, but a multiplication of relations in the genus of real relations, which is considered from the various ways of looking to a real terminus. For when we say four relations, we do not signify that they are really distinct; and when we add real, we do not denote a real multitude, but that each of them tends to a real terminus by its own nature, not through the intellect, however diverse it may be from another by a distinct consideration. And thus we say that there are several real relations, even if they are distinguished by consideration alone: because we only wish to say that each of them, distinguished in whatever way, has a real terminus by its own nature, not through the intellect. I do not say that it has a terminus really distinct from the terminus of another, but that it has a real terminus, albeit considered in a diverse way. And since in the divine things there are four real termini distinguished at least by reason, and since each person is one of those four relations by its own nature, and not through the intellect, referred to another; there will also be four real relations. For, first, the Father under the aspect of paternity is the terminus of the Son; secondly, the Son under the aspect of filiation is the terminus of the Father; thirdly, the Holy Spirit under the aspect of procession is the terminus of the Father and the Son; fourthly, the Father and the Son under the aspect of spirator are the terminus of the Holy Spirit. Now all these aspects of termini are real, although not all are really distinct among themselves; and each of them by its own nature, and not by the intellect, has its terminus.

From these points the initial difficulty is solved. For we grant that, when the inferior is multiplied according to reality, in the same manner the superior is multiplied: but when we say that there are four real relations in God, we do not signify a real distinction of them; but that they

420. Theophilus of the Canaries (Canariensis), on this article, part 3.

are real relations to a real terminus, and that they are not of reason by the intellect's consideration alone, which can rightly be the case even if they are distinguished among themselves by reason alone.

Caput III - That by a distinction of reason alone spiration is not predicated of paternity or of filiation; or conversely

Scotus, Quodlibet 5, article 2, near the end, while conceding this proposition, The goodness of God is wisdom, nevertheless absolutely denies this one, Paternity is spiration, or this one, Filiation is spiration.[421] He also impugns the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article in solution 3, and the example which he adduces there: for St. Thomas denies these propositions on account of a distinction of reason alone; and he adduces the example: just as we do not say the attribute of wisdom is the attribute of power.

First, therefore, Scotus attacks [the argument], because if that reason sufficed, we ought also to deny this proposition, Goodness is wisdom, since these two differ by reason; although he concedes another like it, namely, Knowledge is power, which two also differ by reason, just as paternity and spiration. Then the example does not seem well accommodated: for for this reason we do not say, The attribute of wisdom is the attribute of knowledge, because the name attribute is a name of second intention (as they say), signifying something of reason; and one intention is not predicated of another. But paternity, filiation, and spiration are not names of second intentions, nor do they signify something of reason, but three real relations in God: although they are not all really distinct.

Therefore (says Scotus) others reply better, that the aforesaid proposition is false, because spiration is distinguished from paternity and filiation by nature of the thing. But this solution can easily be refuted: first, because no such distinction by nature of the thing can exist among these relations, as was said in the first chapter; then also, because by the same reasoning Scotus ought to deny these propositions, Wisdom is power, Deity is paternity: for in his opinion the attributes are all among themselves, and the relations are from the essence, distinguished by nature of the thing: yet he himself grants each proposition in that place. And although he grants them only in an identical, not in a formal sense, nevertheless either he ought not to admit them in that sense, or at least in the same sense he ought to concede that one, Paternity is spiration, which in no way he thinks to be true.

Wherefore Scotus himself in another way answers this difficulty; for he says that one abstract can rightly be predicated of another (he understands at least in an identical sense) whenever abstraction does not remove identity: but when it removes it, one is not predicated of another; and therefore this proposition is false, Whiteness is music; although this one is true, the white is musical: because the abstraction of an accidental form from the subject removes the identity of the subject which the white and the musical have. Now identity (says Scotus) is removed when the extremes that are abstracted are of such a nature that in their own formal abstract concept they do

421. Scotus, Quodlibet, 5, art. 2, near the end.

not include infinity: of this sort (he says) are relations; because relation, by its own genus, is not infinite even in God. Hence it happens that paternity and spiration, which have identity in the subject signified in the concrete, and one would be predicated of the other, do not retain that identity when abstracted, and therefore in no way are predicated of one another. But because attributes together include infinity in their own genus, they are rightly predicated of one another in the abstract, albeit in an identical sense, because by their abstraction the identity which they have among themselves is not removed. He holds the same when one extreme is abstract from the absolute and the other from the relative: for on account of the infinity of the absolute, identity is preserved between them.

Refutation. Yet this subtlety of Scotus can be refuted no less than the preceding solution. First, because any relation in God is infinite in its own genus, no less than any absolute attribute: as was proved in disputation 122, chapter 7. For just as a relation, when abstracted in a creature and in the created order, is not infinite; so insofar as it is divine, it cannot but be infinite by reason of the essence, of which it is a mode. Then, because either by this abstraction identity is removed formally, or really. If only formally, and therefore this proposition is not conceded, paternity is spiration, then by the same reasoning this one ought not to be conceded, wisdom is goodness, or, deity is paternity: since between these extremes there is no formal identity; for in his view the attributes among themselves, and the essence from the relation, are formally distinguished. But if by abstraction there is removed a real identity: this is false, and against Scotus. We show it: because paternity and spiration, however they be abstracted, are not really distinguished, as a thing from a thing, as Durandus falsely thought. Besides, since abstraction is effected by the intellect, therefore the real identity always remains; wherefore, if for this reason we concede in some way this proposition, wisdom is goodness, then in like manner this one must also be admitted, paternity is spiration.

Why the absolute attributes of God are truly predicated, but not the relations, etc. Therefore the reason on account of which St. Thomas - whom Cajetan follows - denies this proposition, paternity is spiration, yet nonetheless concedes in some way this one, wisdom is power, is this: namely, that propositions in which one relation is predicated of another are always taken in a formal sense; just as those in which an operation is predicated of a power - as is this, the intellect understands - as we noted in disputation 119, chapter 2; and because in a formal sense one relation is not predicated of another, just as neither is one attribute of another, therefore this proposition must not be conceded, paternity is spiration. But propositions in which one absolute attribute is predicated of another can be taken in an identical sense; wherefore, although false in a formal sense, they can be conceded in some way, because in an identical sense they are true. By the same reasoning, to the second [objection] of this question's article St. Thomas says that this proposition is true, paternity is God, and deity is the Father, on account of real identity: namely, because this proposition is taken here in an identical sense; but he denies this proposition, the attribute of knowledge is the attribute of power, just as paternity is spiration, because they too are taken in a formal sense from

the signification of the words: for by the name attribute there is expressly denoted an order to the reason; and in this alone has St. Thomas compared those two propositions among themselves, namely, that each is taken in a formal sense, and not otherwise.

Moreover, that proposition in which one relation is predicated of another is always taken in a formal sense is deduced from this, that relation explicitly looks to its terminus and seems to express it in itself, and that some sort of act about that terminus is signified by it. Therefore, just as one act cannot be predicated absolutely of another in God, because they are signified under a diverse formal aspect, thus too, in order that it may be predicated in an identical sense, some particle must be added by which that identity is signified.

Articulus IV - Whether it is permissible to hold a contrary opinion about something concerning the notions

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that it is not permissible to hold a contrary opinion about the notions. For St. Augustine says in De Trinitate 1, that nowhere is it more dangerous to err than in the matter of the Trinity; to which it is certain that the notions pertain.[422]

Cur moreover the absolute attributes of God are truly predicated of each other, whereas the relations are not likewise.

The reason, therefore, on account of which Cajetan denies this proposition, "paternity is spiration," while nonetheless conceding in some way this one, "wisdom is power, it is best," is that propositions in which one relation is predicated of another are always taken in the formal sense, just as those in which an operation is predicated of a potency, as is this, "the intellect understands," as we noted in Disputation 119, chapter 2.[423] For in the second reply St. Thomas said that this proposition is true, "paternity is God," and, "deity is the Father," on account of real identity: because namely this proposition can be taken in the identical sense; but he denied this proposition, "an attribute knowledge is an attribute power," just as that, "paternity is spiration," because it too is taken in the formal sense by the force of the signification of the words: for by the name "attribute" there is expressly denoted an order to the ratio; and in this alone did St. Thomas compare those two propositions with each other, namely that each is taken too much in the formal sense, and not otherwise.

Moreover, that proposition, in which one relation is predicated of another, is not to be taken absolutely in the formal sense for the same reason, namely that a relation expressly looks to its own terminus, and seems to express it within itself, and thus, as it were, an act about that is signified. Therefore, just as one act about another cannot be predicated absolutely in God, because they are signified under a diverse formal aspect, so neither can any relation be predicated of another; but in order that it may be predicated in the identical sense, some particle ought to be added by which that identity is signified.

422. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I.
423. Vazquez, Disputatio 119, cap. 2.

But this subtlety of Scotus can be refuted no less than the preceding solution. First, because every relation in God is infinite in its genus, no less than any absolute attribute remains so: for although a relation, as it is abstracted from the created and the uncreated, is not infinite; yet, insofar as it is divine, it cannot but be infinite by reason of the essence (*essentia*), of which it is a mode; as was proved in Disputation 122, chapter 7.[424] Then, because either by this abstraction the formal identity is taken away, or the real. If only the formal identity is taken away, and therefore this proposition, "paternity is spiration," is not conceded; by the same reasoning neither ought this be conceded, "wisdom is goodness," or, "deity is paternity": since between these extremes there is no formal identity; for according to his view the attributes are formally distinct among themselves, and the essence is formally distinct from the relation. Or else abstraction takes away real identity: and this is false, and contrary to the doctrine of Scotus: because paternity and spiration, however abstracted, are not really distinguished as a thing from a thing, as Durandus falsely thought; especially since abstraction is by the intellect: therefore real identity always remains. Wherefore, just as by reason of this we concede in some way this proposition, "wisdom is goodness," so too this would have to be admitted, "paternity is spiration."

From the fact that a thing abstracted is not infinite even in God, it comes about that paternity and spiration, which have identity in the subject signified in the concrete and one was predicated of the other, do not retain that identity in the abstract, and therefore in no way are predicated of each other: but indeed, because each of the attributes includes infinity in its own genus, they are rightly predicated of each other in the abstract, albeit in the identical sense, because by their abstraction the identity which they have among themselves is not taken away. He judges the same whenever one extreme abstracted is absolute and the other relative: for on account of the infinity of the absolute, identity is preserved between them.

Still, this subtlety of Scotus can be refuted. First, because any relation in God is infinite in its own genus, no less than any absolute attribute remains so, as was proved in Disputation 122, chapter 7.[424] For although a relation, as it is abstracted from the created and the uncreated, is not infinite, yet insofar as it is divine, it cannot fail to be infinite by reason of the essence, of which it is a mode. Then, because either by this abstraction formal identity is taken away, or real. If only formal identity, and therefore this proposition is not conceded, "paternity is spiration"; by the same reasoning this one ought not to be conceded, "wisdom is goodness," or, "deity is paternity": since between these extremes there is no formal identity; for in his view the attributes are formally distinct among themselves, and the essence from the relation. Or abstraction takes away real identity: and this is false, and against the doctrine of Scotus: because paternity and spiration, however abstracted, are not really distinguished as a thing from a thing, as Durandus falsely thought; especially since abstraction is through the intellect: therefore real identity always remains.

Wherefore, just as by reason of this we concede in some way this proposition, "wisdom is goodness," so too this would have to be admitted, "paternity is spiration."

424. Vazquez, Disputatio 122, cap. 7.
424. Vazquez, Disputatio 122, cap. 7.

Whether it is permissible to hold contrary opinions about the notions

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that it is not permissible to hold contrary opinions about the notions. For contraries cannot be without error. Therefore to hold contrary opinions about the notions is not permissible.

1. Moreover. Through the notions the persons are known, as was said. But concerning the persons it is not permissible to hold contrary opinions. Therefore neither concerning the notions.

But on the contrary: The articles of faith are not about the notions. Therefore concerning the notions it is permissible to opine thus or otherwise.

I answer that something pertains to faith in a twofold way. In one way directly, as are those things which have been handed down to us principally by God, as that God is Triune, and that the one Son of God was incarnate, and the like. And to opine falsely about these induces heresy by that very fact, especially if pertinacity be added. But indirectly things pertain to faith from which there follows something contrary to faith. Thus, if someone were to say that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah. From this, indeed, it follows that divine Scripture is false. Concerning things of this sort, therefore, someone can without danger of heresy opine falsely, before it is considered or determined that from this there follows something contrary to faith, and especially if he do not pertinaciously adhere. But after it is manifest, and especially if it be determined by the Church, that from this there follows something contrary to faith, to err in this would not be without heresy. And on account of this many things are now reckoned heretical which previously were not reckoned so, because now it is more manifest what follows from them. Thus, therefore, it must be said that concerning the notions some have held contrary opinions without danger of heresy, not intending to uphold anything contrary to faith. But if someone were to opine falsely concerning the notions, considering that from this there follows something contrary to faith, he would fall into heresy. And by this the reply to the objections is clear.

Notes concerning the doctrine of the Article.

The conclusion is: if someone should have opined falsely concerning the notions, considering that from this there follows something against the faith, he would be a heretic; if however he should opine contrary in such a way as not to defend something against the faith, he would not be a heretic. St. Thomas does not decide whether it is against the faith to opine contrary concerning the number of the notions; but he shows how someone would fall into heresy, if he should opine the contrary. Which rule is to be observed universally in every matter pertaining to the faith: about

which we must speak at length in the Secunda Secundae, q. 10, and in the Prima Secundae, q. 76, where we shall show whether any sort of ignorance takes away the notion of pertinacity, which is necessary for heresy.[425]

1. But concerning the number of the notions, about which hitherto we have disputed, namely whether five are to be asserted, or more, or fewer, nothing has been defined by the Church: this, however, is certain, that there are in the divine persons those five rationes, including among them the ratio of unbegottenness (*ingenitum*); and whoever should deny any of those would think against the faith: but if he should say that indeed there are in God those five rationes, but that not all of them are to be called notions, he would not be saying anything against what has been defined by the Church, but would feel against the common doctrine: which would be rash.

The Canarian, however, notes in this article that it cannot be denied that there are in God more negations and affirmations, which, if they were signified by us by some peculiar and abstract notions, would be called more notions without any detriment to the faith: but he adds that it is not licit to impose these new names to signify them against the common sentence of the Doctors. Yet if it were certain to us concerning these affirmations and negations, I do not see why it would not be licit to use peculiar names to signify them, just as the Fathers began to use the name "unbegotten," which previously was unknown; and in this Scotus, cited in Disputation 137, chapter 1, teaches rightly that hitherto more notions were not discovered, which is not a sufficient reason why others also could not be discovered.[426]

Nevertheless I do not see how there could be more, the number of the persons and of the emanations being presupposed: wherefore let us be content with those five which the Scholastics have gathered from the Fathers. And through this the reply to the objections is clear.

Quaestio XXXIII - On the persons in particular

Consequently it is to be considered about the persons in particular. And first concerning the person of the Father. About which four things are asked.

425. St. Thomas, Secunda Secundae, q. 10; Prima Secundae, q. 76.
426. Scotus, Disputatio 137, cap. 1.

Articulus I - Whether it belongs to the Father to be principle

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the Father cannot be called the principle (*principium*) of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. For principle and cause are the same according to the Philosopher. But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore he ought not to be said to be his principle.

1. Moreover. A principle is said with respect to what is principled. If therefore the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is principled; and consequently that he is created. Which seems erroneous.
2. Moreover. The name "principle" is taken from priority. But in divine things there is no before and after, as Athanasius says in his symbol of faith. Therefore in divine things we ought not to use the name "principle."[427]

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says in On the Trinity IV, that the Father is the principle of the whole deity.[428]

I answer that this name "principle" signifies nothing else than that from which something proceeds; for everything from which something proceeds in any way at all we say to be a principle, and conversely. Since therefore the Father is the one from whom another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Greeks use in divine things indifferently the name of cause, as also the name of principle; but the Latin doctors do not use the name of cause, but only the name of principle. The reason of which is that principle is more common than cause, as cause is more common than element. For even a terminus, or also the first part of a thing, is called a principle, but not a cause. Now the more common some name is, the more suitably is it taken in divine things, as was said above: because the more special names are, the more they determine a mode befitting the creature. Whence this name "cause" seems to import a diversity of substance and a dependence of one upon another, which the name "principle" does not import. For in all the kinds of cause there is always found a distance between the cause and that of which it is the cause according to some perfection or power. But we also use the name "principle" in those things which have none of this sort of difference, but only according to a certain order. Thus when we say that a point is the principle of a line, or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of the line.

To the second it must be said that among the Greeks it is found that of the Son or the Holy Spirit it is said that he is "principiated." But this is not in the use of our doctors. For although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of principle, we attribute nothing pertaining in any

427. Athanasius, in his symbol of faith.
428. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20.

way to subjection or diminution to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, in order that every occasion of error may be avoided. In which way St. Hilary says in On the Trinity IX: "By the authority of the Giver the Father is greater, yet the Son is not less, to whom to be one is given."[429]

To the third it must be said that although this name "principle," as regards that from which it is imposed to signify, seems to be taken from priority, nevertheless it does not signify priority, but origin. For it is not the same, what a name signifies, and that from which a name is imposed, as was said above.[430]

Disputatio CXXXIX - On the names which in the Father can signify the notion of principle

Caput I - On the names "Principle" and "Beginning"

That the name "principle" is predicated of the Father and of the Son no one doubts. All the Scholastics to be cited in this disputation teach it; indeed it is defined in the Second Council of Lyons under Gregory X, and is reported in the chapter *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica* in the Sixth Book, where it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle. The same is said in the Council of Florence, in the final session, in the letters of union; and Augustine teaches it in book 5 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 13, as do other Fathers whom we shall mention below.

It can also be proved by an excellent argument drawn from the very definition of "principle," which may be gathered from Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 5, chapter 1, where, after six acceptions of the word, he defines it thus: a principle is that from which something first is, or comes to be, or is known. And although Aristotle knew no principle except that from which, as from what is more perfect, whatever proceeds from it depends, nevertheless we can take his definition thus universally, so that no imperfection is denoted in that which proceeds from another as from a principle. For this reason St. Thomas, in order to give us a definition suited to the divine persons, defines in this article a principle as that from which something proceeds, using almost the same words of Aristotle, but in a way so general that it denotes no imperfection in that which proceeds from another. From this definition it is rightly gathered, according to our faith, that the eternal Father and the Son are principle, because from each of them some person truly proceeds.

But about the name "beginning" (*initium*) one must speak otherwise, namely that it is in no way predicated of the Father or the Son. For although Bonaventure, on I Sentences, dist. 29, art. 1, q. 1, ad 2, says that "beginning" can be taken in a broader signification, and then can signify the same as "principle," namely that from which something proceeds, yet it more properly signifies the beginning of duration; and because absolutely and commonly it denotes a beginning of duration, it cannot be predicated of any divine person, since every divine person is eternal. Thus Hilary, in *On*

429. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, IX, towards the middle and end of the book.
430. Cf. above, q. 13, a. 8.

the Trinity 4, says that the Church confesses one unbegotten God and one only-begotten Son of God, and confesses the Father eternal and free from origin, and the Son from the eternal origin, not from a beginning, but from the ineffable.

With Hilary the Master agrees in I Sentences, dist. 29, where he teaches that Hilary called the Father *initiabilis* because he has in himself the principle of all things, from which things have the beginning of their duration; and therefore he called him *initiabilis*, that is, as if *initiativus*, as St. Thomas explains there. The Master adds that one cannot say that the Son has a beginning, even if one says, "The Son is from the principle," because "to have a beginning" denotes a beginning of duration. The Third Council of Toledo follows Hilary's mode of speaking in its confession of faith, when it affirms that the Son was born without beginning before the ages; and the Council of Worms does the same in its confession of faith.

Nor does Micah 5 stand in the way, where it is said of the Messiah: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." For although the Prophet there speaks of the eternal generation of the Messiah, as the words clearly show, after he had just before spoken of his temporal coming forth from Bethlehem, nevertheless that phrase "from the beginning" does not there denote the Father, from whom, as from a principle, the Son's procession and nativity are; but it means the same as "before anything whatsoever was made," that is, from eternity. To express this more clearly he added, "from the days of eternity." So too in Proverbs 8 it is said, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything"; and in Ecclesiasticus 24, "From the beginning, and before the ages, I was created": for Scripture calls "beginning" that which was before times, and that was eternity.

Caput II - The Scriptural places by which some attempt to prove that the Father or the Son is called principle

More recent theologians try to prove by certain testimonies of Scripture that the Father and the Son are principle. The first is John 1: "In the beginning (in principio) was the Word." For St. Augustine, in book 6, On the Trinity, chapter c., explains, "in the Father"; so too St. Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 1, understands "in the Father as in the source and origin," according to that of John 3: "I went forth from the Father." He may have taken this from the homily "On Origin," homily 2, among the various.[431] Yet the plainer sense of that place is the one other Fathers follow, namely thus: "In the beginning" which is "from the beginning," according to the phrase of the same John in 1 John 1, chapter 1, where, in place of what he said here, "In the beginning," there he says, "What was from the beginning." Augustine also follows this interpretation in the place cited, and in the Questions on the Old and New Testaments, chapter 122; and such was the sense of Basil on these words of John, of St. John Chrysostom, homily 2 on John, and of St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 1; the reading of Tertullian too agrees, book Against Praxeas, chapters 5 and 16: "In primordio sermo erat apud Deum, et Deus erat sermo."[432] Therefore John says "in the beginning,"

431. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, c. c.; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, I, c. 1; cf. John 3: "Ego a Patre exivi."
432. Basil; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 2 in Ioannem; St. Ambrose, De fide, I, c. 1; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, c. 5, 16.

that when all things were made, already the Word was with God, before any of those things came to be; therefore, whether by the name "principle" you understand "beginning," as we said in the preceding chapter, for that which precedes in duration of time, or for the very beginning of duration, and you lay weight, as Basil says, upon that word "was," by that testimony it is signified that the Word of God existed before anything began: because at the beginning, when something begins, already it was; wherefore we cannot assign a time when the Word was not, as Basil notes; and so he asserts that, if one does not depart from the word "was," that is, if its signification be rightly understood, nothing can be affirmed against the eternity of the Son. I pass over other expositions: from this it is sufficiently clear that from that place it is not proved that the Father is principle.

The second place is Psalm 109(110): "With thee is the principium (Tecum principium) in the day of thy power." There Augustine understands by principium the Father, as if he said, "With thee, Father," according to that of John 14: "But the Father abiding in me, he does his works." Basil, however, homily 10 on the Hexaemeron, and Euthymius on that place, understand not "Father," but "kingdom" and "dominion." This exposition is followed by Jansenius and Genebrard, so that the eternal Father speaks to his Son on the day of the resurrection in this way: "with thee shall be kingdom and dominion," that is, "thou shalt obtain rule and dominion on the day of thy strength and power with the splendors of holiness," that is, with most sacred majesty, glory, and splendor.[433] Tertullian agrees, Against Hermogenes, chapter 19, where he explains that of Genesis 1, "In principio creavit Deus," of the principate of power: for in Greek it is ἀρχή, which signifies both "beginning" and "principate." In this latter signification the aforesaid noun is employed by Xenophon, book 1 On Empire, by Aristotle, book 1 of the Politics, and by Plato in the Republic; and the Hebrew word נדיבים (nedibim) signifies principate. Wherefore the Latin word "principium," which our Latin edition has, seems to be taken in this signification.[434] I pass over another Hebrew reading, which, in place of "With thee," has "thy people"; for this variation arose from a variation of the vowel points. Now "the day of power" is either the day of the resurrection, when, death's dominion being conquered, all things were subjected to the Son, as the Fathers commonly interpret - which interpretation most approves itself to me - or it is the day of the second advent, as Theodoret wills. We have therefore enough, by this testimony, to prove that the Father is called "principle."

Thirdly, that the Son too is called "principle," some try to prove by the testimony of John 8, where Christ, the Jews asking who he was, replies, "Principium, qui et loquor vobis." But this place is so difficult, and has so many and such various expositions, that from it nothing certain can be proved. It is to be noted, moreover, that in Greek that word "principium" is not in the nominative, but in the accusative case; for it is τὴν ἀρχήν; then the word "qui" is, in Greek, ὅτι, which signifies

433. Basil, Hom. 10 in Hexaemeron; Euthymius Zigabenus, In Ps. 109; Cornelius Jansenius; Gilbert Genebrard.

434. Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem, c. 19; Xenophon, De Imperio, l. 1; Aristotle, Politica, I; Plato, Respublica; on the Hebrew nedibim.

"because," or "that," and is a causal particle: but if the particle ὅτι be divided thus, ὅτι εἰμι, and be taken almost as a relative of the neuter gender, from this it has come about that Doctors expound this passage in various ways. Now in the emended Vulgate text it reads: "Qui et loquor vobis."

The Doctors explain the aforesaid place in various ways. First, Ambrose, book 3 On the Faith, chapter 4, and book 5, chapter 5; and book 1 of the Hexaemeron, chapters 2 and 4; and Augustine on that Psalm 109, "Tecum principium," and book 10 of the City of God, chapter 24; and book 11, chapter 32; and book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 13; say that Christ answered the Jews, who were asking who he was, that he was "principle," and he was speaking with them, that is, he was God, the principle of all things, speaking with them in assumed humanity. But since Augustine saw that that word "principium" is not in the nominative but in the accusative case, and therefore that the aforesaid exposition does not at all fit, in Tractate 38 on John he supplies something in this way: "Believe that I am the principle, who also speak to you." For he had said before: "Unless you shall have believed that I am, you shall die"; Christ therefore, answering a tacit objection of the Jews, as though they were asking, "Whom ought we to believe you to be?," said, "principle"; supply: "believe me to be."

Secondly, Nonnus, a Greek author, thus interprets: "Principium, qui loquor vobis," so that "principium" functions as an adverb, "before" (prius), in such a way that in Greek the preposition κατά (Latin "secundum") is supplied, as in Genesis 13, where in Latin it is said, "at the place of the altar which he had made before," more properly in Greek it is said τῇ ἀρχῇ; and likewise it is had in Genesis 43, where it is said, "Because of the money which we brought back before"; and thus the sense is, "I am that which from the beginning, or before, I said to you that I was"; or, "I am he who from the beginning speaks with you, and I have often said who I was."

Thirdly, Theophylact and Euthymius, and St. John Chrysostom, homily 52 on John, use the noun "principium" as the adverb "in primis," so that the speech is elliptical, and the sense is: "In primis," or, "You are indeed unworthy to hear what I also say to you."

Fourthly, some more recent writers interpret thus: that interrogation which preceded, "Thou, who art thou?," is as of one despising; as if the Jews said, "Thou, who art thou, that thou shouldest say to us that we shall die in our sin?" Christ replies with an elliptical speech, "Principium," as if he said, "Me, who am the principle, you despise, because I also speak to you."

Fifthly, others of the more recent explain that "Principium" means "from the beginning"; for in Hebrew the noun is put for an adverb, Psalm 78: "I will speak propositions from the beginning (ab initio)"; for in Hebrew, in place of "from the beginning," it has קֶדֶם (kedem) without a preposition; so that the sense is: "From the beginning," that is, "I am from the beginning, or from eternity, who now also in assumed flesh speak to you." Finally, if that noun "principium," which is in the accusative case, can be explained by "from the beginning," we could also explain it in this way: "I am he who am from the beginning, and from the eternal Father, who is the principle of all things; for afterwards it is subjoined, 'And they did not know that he said the Father to be God'"; he added

moreover, "Who also speak to you," as if he said, "I am from the Father, because thus I also speak, and I say to you that in your sin you will die." In whatever way, however, you explain it, from this place it cannot be proved that the Son of God is a notional principle, as is manifest.

Finally, others prove that the Son is "principle" from that of Apocalypse 22: "I am the principle and the end"; but it is manifest that there there is speech not of the principle of the Holy Spirit, but of the principle of creatures.

Caput III - In what way the Father is called the principle of the whole deity

Augustine, book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 2, calls the Father the principle of the whole deity; and indeed Pseudo-Dionysius, chapter 3 of On the Divine Names, after the middle of the chapter, called the Father alone "the fountain of the heavenly divinity," and, as if we were rendering word for word, "The Father is the sole fountain of the super-substantial deity." By the name "fountain" Dionysius understands a principle without a principle; and therefore he said "sole fountain": because in divine realities there is one only fountain; for the Father is a fountain - he is the principle of the Son; the Son is not a fountain - he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, not as a fountain, but as a stream; for he is a principle from a principle. In the same way speaks the Sixth Council of Toledo in its confession of faith, when it says: "We confess the Father unbegotten, uncreated, fountain, and origin of the whole deity." For "fountain" and "origin" seem to signify more than "principle," as we were just saying.[435] The same is said in the Council of Worms in its confession of faith, and in the Council of Florence in the letters of union, session 22; and Athanasius, in the oration against the Gregalians of Sabellius, calls God the Father, somewhat short of "principle," "fountain of deity."[436]

But although the Fathers and the Councils so speak, nevertheless the Canarian (Canariensis), on this article, thinks that that proposition is not to be asserted absolutely; he, however, explains it with the Master in 1 Sentences, distinction 29, in this way: that the Father is called the principle of the whole deity, not because from him deity proceeds, or goes forth, or is produced - for they are anathematized in the chapter "Damnamus," on the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith, who shall have said that the essence is generated or produced - but because he is the principle of each Person proceeding, to whom the divine nature is communicated. For which reason also we shall say below, disputation 156, chapter 6, that the Son is called "deity from deity," "light from light." In which way too Augustine, Dionysius, Athanasius, the Council of Toledo, and the Council of Worms conceive this proposition.

Others explain it thus: that the abstract "deity" is taken for the concrete, and the sense is, "The Father is the principle of all the Persons," not because he is the principle of himself, but, as Bonaventure says in the exposition of that distinction, by an accommodated distribution; just as when we say, "Heaven contains all things," because it contains all other things besides itself.

435. Council of Toledo VI, Confessio fidei: "ingenitum, increatum, fontem, et originem totius deitatis."
436. Council of Worms, Confession of Faith; Council of Florence, session 22, Letters of Union; Athanasius, Oratio contra Gregales Sabellii.

Therefore the Father is said to be the principle of all the other persons, or of all that proceeds from him. In the same way he can be called the principle of the Trinity, not because the whole Trinity proceeds from the Father, but because in the Trinity the Father is the first principle; just as we say that unity is the principle of ternary, not because it is the principle of itself, since it is included in the ternary, but because among the three by which a ternary consists it holds the first place.

Caput IV - The name "Principle" is not said univocally of the essential and notional principle

The name "principle" (*principium*) is not said univocally of the notional principle with respect to the persons, and of the essential with respect to creatures.

The Scholastic Doctors do not agree that the name "principle" is predicated univocally of the notional principle with respect to the persons, and of the essential with respect to creatures. Henry of Ghent, whom Capreolus reports from Aureolus in I, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, in the arguments against the third conclusion, thought that the name "principle" was predicated univocally of both; and he proves it by four arguments, of which we shall set down only two. The first is: If it were not said univocally, that would be because the notional principle is said with respect to something in the same nature, but the essential with respect to something in another nature; but this does not hinder, since to effect something in another nature, or in the same according to species, does not take away the notion of cause (*causa*); and therefore the name "cause" is said univocally of the sun and of a man generating.

The second foundation is this: If anything else prevented univocation, it would be that the notional connotes a real relation (*relatio*) to that which proceeds, whereas the essential connotes only a relation of reason; but even this does not hinder, because a relation of reason truly is in the real predicament; otherwise it would have to be in another predicament, which is absurd. Of the same opinion Durandus makes mention in the cited place.

But a far truer sentence is that of the other Scholastics, who affirm that the name "principle" is not predicated univocally of the two principles. Thus teach St. Thomas in I, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2; St. Bonaventure in the same place, art. 1, q. 2; Scotus, q. 1; Durandus, q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1; the Master of the Sentences in the first article, conclusion 2; Gabriel in question 13, first article, 2; Marsilius on the First Book, q. 31, art. 3, dub. 4; and Canarensis on this article, disputation 118, cap. 4.

Durandus proves the contrary, because the notion of principle would univocally fit the essential and notional principle; likewise the notion of potency (*potentia*): but the notion of potency does not univocally fit the generative and spirative potencies on the one side, and the productive potency of creatures on the other; otherwise the generative and spirative potency would be contained under the notion of the omnipotent - which is absurd, and Durandus himself shows it in the same place; therefore neither is the notion of potency predicated univocally of those and of the potency of creatures.

But this argument is trifling. For even if "potency" were said univocally of those, it would follow only that omnipotence - which is solely the potency with respect to every creature - would contain under the common notion of potency both the generative potency together with the spirative under one respect and omnipotence, and not under any respect whatever: for omnipotence is not every potency, but a potency with respect to every creature, or with respect to everything that does not imply a contradiction, to be produced or not to be produced. Wherefore, as we shall also say in disputation 165, from the fact that in the Son there is no potency of generating, and in the Holy Spirit neither the potency of generating nor of spirating, it does not follow that anything of omnipotence is lacking to the Son or to the Holy Spirit.

The best reason, then, is that which Scotus gives, and which that Henry touched in the second argument: namely, because to a real relation and to a relation of reason no univocal concept can be assigned. Now of the essential principle it is of the very ratio to have a respect of reason to creatures, as was proved in disputation 104, cap. 6; but of notional potency the ratio is a real relation, or some modification flowing from it, as we shall say below in disputation 164. Therefore nothing can be univocally common to a relation of reason and a real relation. For that Henry asserts that a relation of reason is located together with the real in the real predicament is altogether fictitious: for the predicaments are of real beings; and between a real being and a being of reason there can be no common genus, as is manifest.

Moreover, concerning this reason it must be observed whether we are speaking of the intellect beholding God, or of the intellect of a wayfarer. If of one beholding God, it is manifest that there is nothing common abstractly according to concept: for, as we have shown above in the first article, second conclusion and the like, he who sees things as they are cannot abstract from them a common concept; then too, even if he could abstract, he could do this only insofar as he would see many things distinctly: but of God one cannot clearly see as distinct the things which in reality do not differ - such as the essential and notional principle, as was said above in disputation, cap. 3. Therefore, with respect to the intellect seeing God, there is not given a univocal concept common to the notional and essential principle. Moreover, such a concept cannot be assigned by the intellect of the wayfarer; it is proved: because whether the wayfarer apprehends the essential principle in God under a relation of reason or under a wholly absolute concept, since a common concept of absolute and relative, or of a real relation and of a relation of reason, cannot be apprehended, neither will a common ratio to the notional and essential principle be able to be thought.

Therefore, in a twofold way the ratio of the notional principle is conceived and named by us more perfectly: first, because it is conceived with an order and real respect to that which is produced, whereas the essential is conceived with only an order of reason; then, because the notional mode of producing is more perfect and worthier than that which more assimilates the product to the producer. For a production is so much the more excellent the more similar the product is to the producer; and this belongs to the notional principle. But this is to be understood according to our mode of conceiving; for in reality, since each principle is the same in its very nature with the essence, one is not in reality more perfect than the other; nor is there a diverse concept of them; but by one concept and by one name is it signified to one who sees God: therefore

Durandus wrongly considered a greater perfection of potency and principle from the fact that something else is produced simply; rather ought he to have deduced that greater perfection from the greater similitude of the produced to its producer.

Lastly, to conclude what must be said of the name "principle," note that thus the Father and the Son are called a principle, so that neither the Son is said to be principiated from the Father, nor the Holy Spirit from both. Thus St. Thomas taught in this article, in the second solution; nevertheless the same Doctor relates in his little work against the errors of the Greeks, chapter 7, that Athanasius said at the Council of Nicaea that the Holy Spirit is not "imprincipiated," and that the word "principiated" is found among the Greek Fathers. Yet since this word is not in use among the Latins nor the Greeks, it is better to abstain from that term, though Durandus admits it in I, dist. 11, q. 2.

Caput V - The term "principle" is said analogically, not equivocally, of the two principles

Among those who teach that the name "principle" is not predicated univocally of the notional and essential principle, there is controversy whether it is said equivocally or analogically. Gabriel in the cited place judges that it is predicated equivocally; but all the other authors mentioned affirm that it is said analogically. And this seems to me far more plausible. For we cannot deny that there is some ratio of likeness between the two principles; wherefore there must also be some analogy.

But concerning that which is predicated first, not all think in the same way. Durandus said that the notion of the essential principle is more perfectly fitting than the notional; and he gives a reason, because where a principle produces something simply other, there the ratio of principle is greater and more principal than where that which is produced is not simply other. From the essential principle there is produced something simply other, that is, other in nature and in supposit distinct from the principle; but from the notional principle there is not produced something simply other, but only other as to supposit: therefore the ratio of the essential principle in God is more principal than the notional.

But to me the sentence of the others is proved, who say that the ratio of principle first and more chiefly belongs to the notional principle than to the essential. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in I, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, in his response to a little question; and of Marsilius and Canarensis in this article. I repeat the reason: because where a principle produces something simply, there is a greater and more principal ratio of principle than where that which is produced is not simply other - but this Durandus had considered from the fact that it produces something simply; rather ought he to have collected it from the greater likeness of the product to the producer: for so much more excellent is production, the more similar the product is to the producer; but this the notional principle has.

Moreover, this must be understood according to our mode of conceiving; for in reality, since each principle is the same in its very nature with the essence, one is not in reality more perfect than the other; nor is there a diverse concept of them; but by one concept and by one name is it signified

to one who sees God. Therefore Durandus wrongly considered a greater perfection of potency and of principle from the fact that something else is produced simply; rather ought he to have deduced that greater perfection from the greater similitude of the produced to its producer.

Lastly, that we may conclude what must be said about the name "principle," it is to be noted that thus the Father and the Son are called a principle, so that neither the Son is said to be principiated from the Father, nor the Holy Spirit from both. So taught St. Thomas in this article, in the second solution; nevertheless the same Doctor, in the aforesaid little work against the Greeks, chapter 7, says that Athanasius, at Nicaea, said that the Holy Spirit is not "imprincipiated," and that "principiated" is found among the Greek Fathers. But since this word is not used among the Latins nor the Greeks, it is better, for the sake of convenience, to abstain from it, though Durandus admits it in I, dist. 11, q. 2.

Caput VI - On the names Author and Cause

Hilary, De Trinitate 4, near the beginning, calls the Father the author of the Son; and this word is admitted by St. Thomas in I, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, Cajetan, and Canarensis on this article, because the name seems to signify the ratio of a principle so that it not denote a superior cause. St. Thomas adds that only the Father is said to be the author of the Son, because the name "author" seems to signify the first principle; but since that same Hilary, in De Trinitate 2, says that the Holy Spirit must be confessed to be from the Father and the Son as "authors," we ought not to use the name "author" in that signification, so as to signify only the first source; but in whatever way of a principle - even if it be a principle from a principle, as the Son is. In this way Phoebadius, in his book against the Arians, after the middle, which is had in volume 5 of the Sacred Bibliotheca of the Fathers, calls the Father author and the Son "without an author."

But about the names "cause" (*causa*) and "caused," in Greek aitia and aitiastai, there is a greater difficulty. The Greeks employ these words everywhere without any offense: St. Basil in books 1, 3, and 4 against Eunomius; St. Gregory of Nyssa in the little work, "That one ought not to say there are three Gods"; St. Gregory Nazianzen in the oration on the institution of bishops, which is the 29th; St. John Damascene, book 1, De fide orthodoxa, chapters 8 and 11; and elsewhere very often; Theophylact on 1 Corinthians 11; and others whom St. Thomas cites in that little work against the Greeks. Indeed among the Latins, Hilary, De Trinitate 9, when he says that the Son takes his cause from the Father. The Council of Florence, in the last session in the Letters of Union, says that this is the mode of speech of the Greek Fathers.

On this Bessarion, in his oration for the Union, which is had in the last session of the Council of Florence, because in it he had often employed the name "cause," says in the last chapter of that oration: "First, it must be noted that the holy Doctors of the East, even in divine matters, use the name 'cause' and 'to be caused' in a broad way, not indeed as importing limitation and dependence, but as signifying the emanation and production from a principle of that which is from a principle. And thus I too, when speaking to the Greeks, have always used these names." He nevertheless admits in the same oration that the Latins do not admit the name "cause" in divine names; and

among the Latins too Hilary, De Trinitate 4, denies that the Father should be called the cause of the Son; and thus Bessarion thought that this voice was a mark of imperfection, and he taught that that which is perfect, and not that which is imperfect, should be said of God. The interpreters of the Greek Fathers, where this voice occurs, bring back its signification to "principle" rather than "cause," as when John the Theologian of the Latin Church said in the Council of Florence, session 22: "Likewise very often the name of principle is used among the Greeks, because among the Greeks it is commonly treated in the same sense as we Latins understand 'cause.'" Cyril of Alexandria, in the letter to Hermias, as the Latins have it from the Easterners (I understand: as the Latins have it), does not admit in divine names "cause" and "caused." From the Latins, moreover, Hilary, De Trinitate 9, denies that the Father is the cause of the Son. And thus Bessarion, although he used the word, grants that the Latins denote by "cause" that which savors of imperfection; and they avert from God whatever tastes of imperfection. Therefore, from the common form among the Latins they do not use it. Translators who relate the Greek custom, where this voice occurs, say that the Greeks understand "principle" rather than "cause"; whence John the Theologian of the Latin Church in the Council of Florence, session 22, says: "Sometimes moreover the word 'principle' is used by the Greeks in place of 'cause,' because the Greeks use both indifferently."

But someone might object Aristotle, who in Metaphysics 4, chapter 2, says in these words: "Being and one are the same and one nature; therefore they follow upon each other, just as principle and cause, etc."; where he seems either to have received "principle" and "cause" for the same, or at least to have coupled them together so that they would be reciprocated as equals. If this is so, the Father can no less be said to be the cause of the Son than the principle. And he receives in Metaphysics 5, chapter 1, after enumerating many modes in which "principle" is said, at the end of the chapter he adds: "So often also are causes said," or, as others translate, "Moreover, in the modes in which 'principle' is said, are 'cause' also said." He subjoins the reason: "For all causes are principles"; that is, all causes are principles. And since it is certain that the Greek name aitia, in Latin "cause," can rightly be applied to the divine persons, Aristotle would not have doubted to attribute this name to them, if he had known them; therefore we contend that in every way it is also to be attributed by the Latins; because in the opinion of Aristotle "cause" and "principle" are the same, and are mutually convertible.

Some answer to the first place in Aristotle, that there Aristotle uses "cause" in a broad signification for any, even the least, occasion; and in that way it is convertible with "principle." But this interpretation does not fit Aristotle's mind. First, because in Metaphysics 5, cap. 1, he should have distinguished "principle" and "cause," just as he does in the same book when he treats at length the various ways in which "principle" is used. Then also, in the aforesaid chapter he enumerates the modes of causes, and in no way does he mention "occasion." I answer, therefore, to the prior place that Aristotle, after he had posited the position of some genus of things, objects from it that there follows from the same position that the same pertains to causes and principles; and the same thing also pertains to the antecedents, and is to be treated elsewhere. For this, however, pertains to another matter.

Therefore I conclude: although the Greeks, and sometimes even the Latins, have used the word "cause" for "principle," yet among the Latins the form is more secure and more consonant with our way of speaking that we abstain from "cause" in divine names, and we use "principle," which is free from the suggestion of dependency or imperfection; especially since even the Greeks themselves, as Bessarion confesses, use "cause" and "to be caused" broadly for emanation and production, not to import any imperfection, but to signify the order of procession from a principle.

...being and the one. He gives the reason, because these two are the same by nature, that is, they do not differ in the nature of the thing, since they are convertible. But when he added, "Just as principle and cause," he does not bring this as an example of mutual conversion, but of identity from the nature of the thing, on account of which the treatment of both pertains to one and the same science.

To the second: it would be burdensome to report what the metaphysicians contrive in the exposition of that place; but greatly has pleased me the interpretation which Alexander of Hales applies to that passage, namely, that Aristotle says that, besides the modes set down in the context of chapter 1, in which "principle" is commonly said, it is also taken in just as many modes in which "cause" is used, which he enumerates in the following chapter, and they are four. By this account Aristotle does not say that cause is said in as many modes as principle is said; for it is manifest that "principle" extends more widely and is employed in more modes; but that, besides the modes of "principle" which he had enumerated, there are just as many other modes in which "principles" are said, in which also "cause" is said. This is suggested to me, first, because in chapter 1, when recounting the acceptions of "principle," he did not number those by which it is taken as "cause," although "principle" is also said in just as many modes as "cause" is said, which he reports in chapter 2. Then, on this plan that statement fits well which Aristotle subjoins: "For all causes are principles"; as if he were to say, since every cause is a principle, it rightly follows that "principles" too are said in just as many modes as "cause" is also said; but it does not follow conversely that "cause" is said in as many modes as "principle" is said, even if every cause is a principle, because "principle" extends more widely than "cause."

Yet there remains a difficulty in the cited words, in which Aristotle seems to assert, not that "principle" is used in as many modes as "cause" is said, but rather conversely, that "cause" is said in as many modes as "principle" is used - which is neither true nor can it square with the reason which he subjoins. This difficulty, however, is removed if we translate Aristotle's text into Latin in another way than all have hitherto rendered it; and although this translation is indeed new, nevertheless, if the Greek text tolerates it, it is to be preferred to the others. From the very Greek text I most clearly gather this. For the text runs thus: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται; as if, word for word, you were to translate: "Equally then, and as 'cause,' (is said) 'principle'"; about which he had just said above, "Again, the first thing that is thought is that this also is called a principle (ἀρχὴ λέγεται)." Now therefore point by point let our version be more fully justified. First indeed, the particle ὁμοίως signifies the same as the Latin "aeque" ("equally"), which others have rendered "in the same modes," or "so many times": but let us admit their reading. Next, the particle δὲ is continuative, and signifies the same as the Latin "porro" ("further"); and therefore the particle

"autem," which all the interpreters have, is to be taken in that sense which it often renders. Moreover, the particle καί, which has the force of a copulative conjunction, must here be taken in another sense which sometimes it bears, as experts in the Greek tongue attest, namely, "even as," "just as," or "as," which carry a comparative notion; and this especially because the particle ὡς has preceded, which signifies comparisons, namely "in the same modes," or "so many times," or "equally." Add that the phrase τὰ αἴτια, as the article τὰ indicates, is in the plural, as if you were to say in Latin "causae" ("causes"); and thus all have translated it; but the verb λέγεται is in the singular, which no interpreter seems to have noticed; and so it ought rather to be turned into Latin as "dicitur" ("is said") than "dicuntur" ("are said"), as all have rendered it; and it must be referred to the subject which preceded in the immediately prior period, namely ἀρχὴ, "principium." Although plural nouns among the Greeks are sometimes joined to a singular verb, nevertheless, if that rule were observed in this place, the sentence would be more difficult and even false; therefore it is much better also in Latin to translate the singular verb as singular and to refer it to the noun "principium." Therefore we ought not to translate thus, "And likewise causes are said in as many modes"; but thus: "Equally, or equally further, or just as 'cause,' (is said) 'principle' (understood)," without the verb "to be used," which some had supplied; because the same verb "dicitur" ("is said") had been in the preceding period, when he said ἀρχὴ λέγεται, that is, "principle is said." All things therefore rightly agree with our version, which could not stand together with the others.

Articulus II - Whether this name Father is a proper name of the divine person

It is proceeded thus. It seems that this name, "Father," is not properly the name of the divine person. For this name "Father" signifies a relation. But person is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying person.

1. Moreover. "Begetter" is more common than "father." For every father is a begetter, but not conversely. But what is more common is said more properly in divine matters, as has been said. Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is "begetter" and "genitor" than "father."
2. Moreover. Nothing which is said according to metaphor can be the proper name of anything. But "word" is metaphorically called "begotten" or "offspring" among us. And consequently he whose is a word is metaphorically called "father." Therefore the principle of the Word in divine matters cannot properly be called "father."
3. Moreover. Whatever is said in divine matters is said per prius of God than of creatures; but "generation" seems per prius to be said of creatures than of God. For truer generation seems to be there where something proceeds from another distinct, not only according to relation, but also according to essence. Therefore the name "father," which is taken from generation, does not seem to be proper to any divine person.

But on the contrary: it is said in the Psalm: "He shall call upon me: Thou art my Father."[1]

I answer that it must be said that the proper name of any person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from all others. For as it belongs to the definition of man that he is soul and body, so it belongs to the understanding of this man that he is this soul and this body, as is said in the seventh book of the Metaphysics; by these this man is distinguished from all others.[2] But that by which the person of the Father is distinguished from all others is paternity. Whence the proper name of the person of the Father is this name "Father," which signifies paternity.

Reply to the first: among us relation is not a subsistent person. And therefore this name "Father" among us does not signify person, but relation of a person. But it is not thus in divine matters, as some have falsely thought. For the relation which this name "Father" signifies is a subsistent person. Whence it was said above that this name "person," in divine matters, signifies a relation, or one subsisting in the divine nature.

Reply to the second: according to the Philosopher in book 2 of De anima, the denomination of a thing should be especially made from perfection and the end. But "generation" signifies a way in becoming; whereas "paternity" signifies the complement of generation. And therefore the name of the divine person is rather "Father" than "begetter" or "genitor."[3]

Reply to the third: "word" is not something subsisting in human nature. Whence it cannot properly be called "begotten" or "son." But the divine Word is something subsisting in the divine nature. Whence it is properly and not metaphorically called "Son," and that whose principle it is is called "Father."

Reply to the fourth: the name of "generation" and "paternity," just as other names which are properly said of individuals, are per prius said of God than of creatures as to the thing signified, although not as to the mode of signifying. Whence the Apostle also says to the Ephesians 3: "I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named."[4] This appears thus. It is manifest that generation receives its specific terminus from the form of the generated. And the closer this is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation. Thus univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal. For it belongs to the notion of the generator that he generate something like himself according to form. Whence this very fact, that in the divine generation there is the same form in number of the generator and the generated, whereas in created things it is not the same in number, but only in species, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is per prius in God than in creatures. Whence by this very fact, that in divine matters the distinction of the generated from the generator is according to relation only, it pertains to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.

Notations around the Article. The conclusion is: The name "Father" is the proper name of the first person. Concerning the title of the article Cajetan notes the particle "properly" to be used as opposed to "common," "metaphorical," and "extraneous," all of which the holy Doctor examines in the article. But Canasensis understands this particle in the first sense alone; for he contends that the investigation is whether the name "Father" belongs to the first person alone, or is common and is also attributed to others; and to this alone pertains the reasoning of St. Thomas in the body of the article. Whether, however, this name be said of the Father "properly," that is, without

metaphor, is gathered from what we have said elsewhere in Disputation 22, article 4, where, moreover, we established what names are common to God and creatures, and derived from God to creatures; on which name of paternity we treated: and Cajetan discusses that question here around the solution to the fourth objection. The reason of St. Thomas in this article is of this sort. The proper name of any person is that which signifies that by which that person is distinguished from others; but "Father" signifies that by which the first person is distinguished from others; therefore it is the proper name of that person. Around which reasoning, to be sure, Cajetan proposes in this way: either St. Thomas understood that proposition about the "proper name" formally and distinctly signifying that by which the person is distinguished; or only materially and as it were in potency - just as a particular ratio can be signified within common names. In the first mode St. Thomas understands it, not by the mere force of that syllogistic proposition (for the name "Father" is analogically common to created and uncreated); therefore it does not signify distinctly and formally that by which the person of the Father is distinguished, but materially; and in the latter mode; but if he understood it in the latter mode, the conclusion remains false, since in that mode even a common name is wont to signify that which is said distinctly; by the reason of St. Thomas it proves nothing. He himself replies well that the major proposition must be understood in that former mode, namely, that that name is "proper" which distinctly and formally signifies that by which the person is distinguished; but the minor is true: because although the name "Father" be analogically common to created and uncreated, nevertheless when one says "the proper name of the divine person," from the circumstances it is understood to be determined for the principal signification.

Articulus III - Whether this name Father is said in the divine per prius, according as we take it personally

To the third, it is proceeded thus. It seems that this name "Father" is not said in the divine per prius according as it is taken personally. For what is common according to understanding is prior to what is proper; but this name "Father," according as it is taken personally, is proper to the person of the Father; whereas according as it is taken essentially, it is common to the whole Trinity: for to the whole Trinity we say "Our Father." Therefore "Father" is said in the divine per prius essentially than personally.

But on the contrary: The eternal is prior to the temporal. But from eternity God is the Father of the Son, whereas in time He is the father of the creature. Therefore paternity is said in God first with respect to the Son, than with respect to the creature.

I answer that: A name is said first of that in which the whole ratio of the name is saved perfectly, than of that in which it is saved according to something. For of the latter it is said as by likeness to that in which it is saved perfectly: because all imperfect things are derived from perfect things. And thus it is that this name, "lion," is said first of an animal in which the whole ratio of lion is saved,

which is properly called lion; but of some man in whom there is found something of the ratio of a lion - boldness, or audacity, or fortitude, or something of this sort - of such a one it is said by likeness.

But it is manifest from the premises that the perfect ratio of paternity and filiation is found in God the Father and God the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature filiation is found with respect to God, not according to the perfect ratio, since there is not one nature of the Creator and of the creature, but according to a certain likeness, and the more perfect that likeness shall be, by so much the nearer does one approach to the true ratio of filiation. For God is said to be father of some creature by reason of the likeness of a vestige only, as of irrational creatures, according to that of Job 38: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" But of some creature, namely of a rational creature, according to the likeness of an image, according to that of Deuteronomy 32: "Is not he thy father, that hath possessed thee, made thee, and created thee?" Of some indeed He is father according to the likeness of grace; who also are called adopted sons, according to the fact that they are ordained to the eternal inheritance of glory by the gift of grace received: according to that of Romans 8: "The Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. But if sons, heirs also." Of some indeed according to the likeness of glory, inasmuch as they already possess the inheritance of glory, according to that of Romans 5: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Thus therefore it is plain that paternity is said in divine things first according to which there is imported the respect of person to person, than according to which there is imported the respect of God to the creature.

Reply to the first: Common things said absolutely are prior, according to the order of our intellect, to proper things, because they are included in the intellect of proper ones, and not conversely. For in the intellect of the person of the Father God is understood, but not conversely. But the common things which import respects to the creature are said posteriorly to the proper things which import personal respects: because the person proceeding in the divine things proceeds as a principle of the production of creatures. For just as the word conceived in the mind of the artisan is understood to proceed first from the artisan than the artifact, which is produced to the likeness of the word conceived in the mind; so the Son proceeds first from the Father, than the creature, of which the name of filiation is said according to that whereby something participates of the likeness of the Son or of the Father: as is clear from that which is said Romans 8: "Whom he foreknew, and predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son."

Reply to the second: "To receive" is said to be common to the creature and to the Son, not according to univocation, but according to a certain remote likeness; by reason of which He is said "firstborn of the creature." Whence in the authority adduced it is subjoined: "That he might be the firstborn among many brethren," after he had said: "To be made conformable to the image of the Son of God." But the Son of God naturally has something singular above others, namely to have by nature that which he receives, as the same Basil says. And according to this he is called "only-begotten," as is clear in John 1: "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." And by this the solution to the third is plain.[437]

Notationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion of the article is that the name "Father," taken notionally, befits God prior to its being taken essentially.

Concerning the title of the article Cajetan notes first that the name "Father" befits God in a twofold way: both notionally, when one says, "God and Father of our Lord Christ"; and also essentially, when one says, "Our Father," and "Father of mercies." Second, he notes that the question is not whether God is first Father of His Son than Father of creatures, but whether the ratio of paternity signified by this name befits God first within Himself than without. Third, he says that although from the argument But on the contrary it may seem to be gathered that the particle "first" signifies a universal property, yet from the body of the article it is gathered directly that the discourse is about priority according to the order of nature, so that the sense is whether the ratio of Father signified by this name, which is personal, is by the order of nature prior to the ratio of the same said essentially. Wherefore some Thomists do not seem to have grasped the mind of the holy Doctor, understanding him to have spoken of priority of perfection; for when St. Thomas, to prove that "Father" said notionally is prior to "Father" said essentially, assumes that "Father" said notionally is said more perfectly than essentially, he does not infer a priority of perfection, but proves it; whereas from that he gathers a priority of nature, to wit, that it is said to be by nature. But how the Father, said notionally, is prior by order of nature to the Father said essentially, Cajetan and the Canarian most excellently explain in this article concerning the reply to the second, from St. Thomas there. For although essential and common names are prior to notional names by a certain priority of the universal, as "animal" is said prior to "man," yet this is understood only of those which do not signify a relation in time to creatures, as the name "Father" and "Lord" signify. Nay, those which signify relations to creatures, not from time but from eternity, although such indeed are essential, nevertheless by the order of nature are posterior. But whether the act of the intellect, as it is terminated to possible creatures, is prior to the production of the Word, and the act whereby He loves creatures is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, we shall say in Disputation 143.[438]

Moreover, in this article the Canarian asks whether the name "Father" befits God univocally, notionally and essentially. He himself answers that it is not predicated univocally, because just as from the eternal Son and from creatures a common ratio of son cannot be abstracted - for creatures

437. St. Basil, In Ioannem, on John 1:18; cf. John 1:18.

are not produced by God by generation, namely from a principle conjoined in likeness of nature, which is the ratio of son taken from generation - so neither can there be a common ratio of Father with respect to the eternal Son and to creatures. He employs this solution because he thinks the solution of St. Thomas, which is to the second, does not satisfy the argument, although it does not differ from it. The same Canarian adds that the name "Son" is predicated univocally of the eternal Son and of creatures; thence he teaches about the name "Father" with respect to father notionally and essentially. He gives the reason, because there is not given a common concept to both, as has been proved; although truly in analogues one common concept signified by the voice can be assigned. But from St. Thomas in the said reply it is gathered that it is predicated analogically; for although a common concept is not given - which also happens in analogues, as we said in Disputation 114, chapter 2 - yet because one filiation is signified by likeness to others and metaphorically, therefore these names are predicated analogically. For creatures are called sons of God, not properly, but metaphorically, by likeness to the true Son, who is generated from an intrinsic principle; therefore there is some analogy of the name in them.[439]

Articulus IV - Whether to be unbegotten is proper to the Father

To the fourth we proceed thus.

It seems that to be unbegotten is not proper to the Father. For every property posits something in that of which it is the property. But "unbegotten" posits nothing in the Father, but only removes. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father.

Furthermore, "unbegotten" is said either privatively or negatively. If negatively, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Spirit is not begotten, nor yet the divine essence. Therefore "unbegotten" also befits them; and thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it is taken privatively, since every privation signifies imperfection in the subject, it follows that the person of the Father is imperfect. Which is impossible.

Furthermore, "unbegotten" in the divine things does not signify a relation, because it is not said relatively: therefore it signifies the substance. Therefore "unbegotten" and "begotten" differ according to substance. But the Son, who is begotten, does not differ from the Father according to substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.

Furthermore, a "proper" is that which befits one alone. But since there are several who proceed from another in the divine things, nothing seems to prevent that there also be several who are not from another. Therefore it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten.

Furthermore, just as the Father is the principle of the person begotten and of the person proceeding, so too, if on account of the opposition which he has to the person begotten there is posited as proper to the Father that he is unbegotten, by the same reasoning there ought to be posited as proper to him that he is "improcessible."

438. Vazquez, Disputatio 143.
439. Vazquez, Disputatio 114, cap. 2.

But on the contrary is what Hilary says, On the Trinity, book 4: "There is one from one, namely from the unbegotten, begotten," that is to say, the property of unbegottenness and of origin.[440]

I answer that: Just as in creatures there is found a first principle and a second principle, so in the divine persons, in whom there is no prior and posterior, there is found a principle not from a principle, which is the Father; and a principle from a principle, which is the Son. Now in created things some first principle is made known in a twofold way. In one way, insofar as it is the first principle, by this, that it has a relation to those which are from it. In another way, insofar as it is the first principle, by this, that it is not from another. So too, then, the Father is indeed made known by paternity and by common spiration, by respect to the persons proceeding from him. But insofar as he is the principle not from a principle, he is made known by this, that he is not from another. Which pertains to the property of unbegottenness, which this name "unbegotten" signifies.

Reply to the first: Some say that unbegottenness, which this name "unbegotten" signifies as the property of the Father, is not said merely negatively, but imports as it were both together, namely that the Father is from no one, and that he is the principle of others; or it imports a universal authority, or even a fontal plenitude. But this does not seem true; for unbegottenness is not another property than paternity and spiration, so as to include them, just as the proper is included in the common. For "fontality" and "authority" signify nothing else in divine things than the principle of origin. And therefore Augustine says in book 5 On the Trinity that "unbegotten" imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that what is said "unbegotten" avails as much as what is said "not son." Nor on this account does it follow that "unbegotten" ought not to be posited as the proper notion of the Father: because first and simple things are made known by negations. Thus we say that a point is that which has no part.[441]

Reply to the second: "Unbegotten" is sometimes taken negatively only. And according to this Jerome says that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, that is, not begotten. In another way "unbegotten" can be said in some manner privatively, yet it does not import any imperfection. For "privation" is said in many ways. In one way, when something does not have what is naturally apt to be had by another, even if it is not naturally apt to have it itself: thus a son is said to be barren because he lacks a womb, for certain things are naturally apt to have...

Reply to the third. According to St. John Damascene, "unbegotten" in one way signifies the same as "uncreated," and thus is said according to substance, because by this the created substance differs from the uncreated.[442] In another way it signifies that which is not begotten, and thus it is said relatively, in the mode in which negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not-man" to the genus of substance, and "not-white" to the genus of quality. Therefore, since "begotten" in the divine imports a relation, "unbegotten" also pertains to relation. And thus it does not follow that the Father, as unbegotten, is distinguished from the Son, as begotten, according to substance, but only according to relation, namely insofar as the relation of son is denied of the Father.

440. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate IV.
441. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V.
442. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 4 (or nearby).

Reply to the fourth. As in every genus one must posit one first principle, so in the divine nature one must posit one principle which is not from another, and this we call "unbegotten." To posit therefore two innascibles is to posit two gods and two divine natures. Hence St. Hilary says in the book *De Synodis*: "Since there is one God, two innascibles cannot be."[443] And this chiefly because, if there were two innascibles, neither of them would be from another. Thus they would not be distinguished by relative opposition, and so they would have to be distinguished by diversity of nature.

Reply to the fifth. The property of the Father, insofar as he is not from another, is better signified by the removal of the Son's nativity than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Spirit: first, because the procession of the Holy Spirit has no special name, as was said above; second, because in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, if from the Father we remove that he is begotten, although he is the principle of generation, it follows consequently that he is not one proceeding by the procession of the Holy Spirit: because the Holy Spirit is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the one begotten.

Conclusion. The name "unbegotten" is the proper name of the Father. It is called "proper," as Cajetan noted, insofar as it is distinguished from what is common: because it belongs to the Father alone in such a way that it belongs neither to another person nor to the essence and nature, as is gathered from the solutions.

Disputatio CXL - How the name "unbegotten" is the proper name of the person of the Father

- The name "unbegotten" was once held suspect by some of the Fathers. Caput 1.
- Deservedly thereafter the name "unbegotten" was received by the Fathers, that they might signify the Father's notion. Caput 2.
- The name "unbegotten" does not denote a mere negation. Caput 3.

Caput I - That the name "unbegotten" was once held suspect by some of the Fathers

The Greek word ἀγένητος, in Latin "unbegotten," signifies the same as "uncreated" and "by no means made"; with which word the Arians maliciously used to call the eternal Father - not because he is not uncreated, but so that by the opposite word γενητός, that is, "created" and "made," they might style the Son; and so, that they might prove the Son not to be ὁμοούσιος (homousion), that is, of the same substance with the Father, they used this argument: "Begotten and unbegotten," that is, "created and uncreated," differ by nature; but the Father is unbegotten, the Son however is begotten: therefore substance and nature differ. And therefore some Fathers held this word suspect, as Dionysius of Alexandria in the Epistle to Paul of Samosata, which our Francis Turrian has in his Hoplotheca now printed at the beginning; he renders a reason for this in these words:

443. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Synodis.

"No Scripture has delivered the Father as 'unbegotten'." Turrian, however, notes in the same place, number 13, that Dionysius said this not because in a Catholic sense he denied the Father to be unbegotten, but on the contrary against Paul of Samosata, who used that name; the Arian also used it, and just as he styled the Father "unbegotten," so he called Christ "begotten," so as to show him to be recent and created: for he asserted him to be a mere man.[444]

In the same way St. Athanasius rejects the name ἀγέννητον in the Dialogue of the Orthodox and the Anomoean, because the Anomoeans used the same word for the same reason as the Arians; and he rejects it, because it is nowhere had in the Scriptures; and the Anomoean, pressing, asks whether he ought to be called "Father"; the Orthodox replies, by no means; nevertheless, it was not therefore to be said ἀγέννητον, just as, although God is not said to "believe" someone, he is not therefore to be called "unbelieving" or "not-believing": because these words ill-sound.[445]

By the same reason St. Athanasius rejects this word, and confesses that it was maliciously introduced by the Arians, in the Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod somewhat before the end, and in the second Oration against the Arians around the middle, where he says: "For I have learned from the pagans that 'ἀγένητον' is said of that which has not yet been made, but can be made, as wood which has not yet passed into the form of a bench; although it is not thus said" - and the Anomoeus insisted - "was he to be called 'Father'?" the Orthodox replied, "by no means"; nevertheless he said it was not to be said ἀγέννητον, just as, although God is not said 'believing' anyone, he is not therefore said to be "unbelieving" or "not-believing": because these words ill-sound.

Moreover, among the Latin Fathers St. Ambrose, in the book On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, chapters 8 and 9, against the Arians who did not admit the word ὁμοούσιον (homousion) because it is not had in the sacred Scriptures, objects to them the word "unbegotten," which they too had captiously invented, that it is nowhere found in the Scriptures; from which it is clear that he himself did not disapprove this word, but wished to press them with a similar argument.[446] Nor indeed did the Greek Fathers just mentioned reject the word "unbegotten" only for this reason, that it is not in the sacred Scriptures: for by the same reason they would have to disapprove also ὁμοούσιον (homousion), since it is not had in the Scriptures. For what Ambrose and St. Cyril attempt partly to gather from Scripture concerning the word "homousion," as we reported in Disputation 109, chapter 1, is not sufficient that it be contained in Scripture. Therefore those Fathers did not admit the word "unbegotten," because it is not in Scripture and had a signification suspect and craftily introduced by heretics.

Moreover, for another reason St. Basil thinks this word introduced by Eunomius and the Arian himself, so that it should signify that there is no generation in God by which, communicating his nature to another, he would be constituted his Father; thus he noted in book 1 against Eunomius well after the middle, where he reports these words of Eunomius: "But since he is

444. Dionysius of Alexandria, Epistle to Paul of Samosata; see Francis Turrian, Hoplotheca, at the beginning.

445. St. Athanasius, Dialogue of the Orthodox and the Anomoean; see also Epistola de decretis Nicaenae synodi; Orationes contra Arianos II.

446. St. Ambrose, De dominicae incarnationis sacramento, chapters 8 - 9; cf. St. Cyril.

'unbegotten' (namely, God)," says Eunomius, "he will never receive generation," to which the same Eunomius adds "nor will he communicate his nature to the begotten." From which words Basil gathers that Eunomius excludes from God the generation of the Son in the same nature; and therefore he called God "unbegotten." Wherefore in the same book somewhat from the beginning you have this word as suspect; thus he says: "But I too the appellation 'ingenitus' or 'innascibilis', although it most highly fits our thoughts, nevertheless, because I do not find it anywhere in Scripture, and because first it is the calumny and blasphemy of these men, I have rightly judged to consign to silence." Of this signification of "unbegotten" among the Eunomians St. Gregory Nazianzen makes mention in Oration 39, which is on the holy lights; and Nicetas there, in that passage "Pater pater est," says: "For neither has the Father ceased to be 'unbegotten' because he begot"; which words Nicetas, explaining, says: "For he is called 'unbegotten' so that he was never begotten, not however that he has not begotten."[447]

Caput II - That deservedly thereafter the name "unbegotten" was received by the Fathers, that they might signify the Father's notion

For indeed, by now both the Greek Fathers and the Latin admit the Greek word ἀγέννητος and the Latin "unbegotten," without any suspicion; and they apply it not to the essence (*essentia*), but to the mode of existing in itself or of subsistence (*subsistentia*), and to that characteristic property by which they designate the property of the Father alone in that signification which the Scholastics call a notion, so that it signify not a negation of creation, as the Arians wished, nor an impotence of begetting, as Eunomius contended, nor a mere negation of generation, but of any procession whatsoever; and that the same is "unbegotten" as "the author of himself," or "not having a principle." The Fathers of the Antiochene synod admit this word to denote the property of the Father alone in that signification, in the Epistle to Paul of Samosata, which is had in the same Hoplotheca of Turrian; St. Basil, book 4 against Eunomius; St. Gregory Nazianzen in that Oration 38 which is on the holy lights; and Nicetas in the same place; and also St. Athanasius in the Epistle On the Synods of the Arians and the Seleucians somewhat before the end, where he confesses that the word "unbegotten" is contained in Scripture by sense, not by the very sound, and that it signifies the Father, just as "Son" signifies the Son, although these words are not contained in Scripture with the same sound; the same sense is intended, although the force of the name is different. He adds also that it signifies that it is "something made," and that he is called "Son"; but as author he does not have, and thus it belongs to the Father alone. Further, in the former place he says: "The Son of God Christ is called 'generated';" and we read in the exposition of faith of St. Justin the Martyr; and we find in St. Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, by these words, "by one only-begotten Son and Word of God"; and the same mode of speaking Athanasius receives in the second Oration against the Arians.[448] It is also held by St. Cyril, book 1 of the Thesaurus,

447. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, book 1; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 39; Nicetas, Commentary ad loc.

448. Synod of Antioch, Epistle to Paul of Samosata (in Turrian, Hoplotheca); St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, book 4; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38; St. Athanasius, Epistola de Synodis; St. Justin Martyr, Expositio fidei; St. Ignatius of Antioch, Epistola ad Ephesios.

chapters 3 and 4, and finally of the Greeks the same word, in the aforesaid signification, which fits the eternal Father alone, is established by St. John Damascene, book 1 De fide orthodoxa, chapter 9; he notes, however, that it is written otherwise when it denotes "uncreated," otherwise when it signifies "by no mode proceeding from another": for in the former mode the word ἀγένητος is written with a single nu, in the latter with a double nu.[449]

From the Latins too the same word, without any suspicion, is used in that signification which we have said by the Councils of Toledo VI and XI in the confession of faith; and by Pope Damasus in the Symbol to St. Jerome, which is in the fourth tome of St. Hilary; by St. Hilary in the book De Synodis, and in De Trinitate near the end, and book 9, where he uses the name "innascibilis" or "innascibility," which the Scholastics use more frequently; St. Augustine also uses the same word "unbegotten" in book 3 De Trinitate, chapters 6 and 7, and in the book 83 Questions, question 20; and now there is no controversy among the Scholastics about this matter.[450]

Explicating those words, "The Father is Father," he says that "unbegotten" and "begotten" are not of that number of names which lack a middle, so that one or the other must necessarily be attributed, but that some middle is placed between them, namely "procession." For Nazianzen had said: "Nor therefore does the Spirit pass over either into the Father or into the Son, because He proceeded; He proceeded, even if it seem otherwise to impious men," as if he were to say: even if the Holy Spirit be not unbegotten, not on that account must He be called begotten, as impious men suppose. As Nicetas explains these words, these names are not of the number that are opposed contradictorily, even if they have a certain appearance of contradiction, since they seem distinguished only by a prefixed negation.

Note, then, that "begotten" in the divine realities does not signify "proceeding" universally according to any kind of procession, but generation, which is the production of the Son. The same must be said of the Greek name and the Latin "unbegotten": the Greek ἀγέννητος does not merely deny the procession which is generation, but any other whatsoever, so that we may by it signify the Father - things which two are not opposed by contradiction. For if "begotten" were taken in that same universal signification, it would not be the notion of the Son, but a common concept agreeing to each person proceeding. On the contrary, if "unbegotten" were to signify only the negation of the generation of the Son, the Holy Spirit would be called "unbegotten." And in this signification Augustine seems to have used it, when in book 5 on the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, he asserts that it is the same to be "unbegotten" as "not to be son," or, if in Latin it were permitted to say so, "un-sonned"; in the same way he says that he is "unbegotten" who has no parent, all of which befits the Holy Spirit. Yet elsewhere, together with other Fathers, he calls "unbegotten" that which in no way proceeds from another and has not another for its author; and for that reason this word is attributed to the Father alone, but "begotten" to that which proceeds so as to be Son, and so is attributed to the Son alone.

449. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 9: on ἀγένητος (uncreated) versus ἀγέννητος (unbegotten).

450. Councils of Toledo VI and XI, Confession of Faith; Pope Damasus, Symbol to St. Jerome (in St. Hilary, De Synodis, tome 4); St. Hilary, De Synodis; De Trinitate, book 9; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 3, chapters 6 - 7; De octoginta tribus quaestionibus.

Caput III - The name "Unbegotten" does not denote negation alone

Although all the Scholastics admit the names unbegotten (ingenitus) and un-nascent (innascibilitas), nevertheless they vary when they dispute about the signification of each - whether, namely, it be a mere negation, or some positive notion. I will therefore briefly set forth their opinions, so that I may better explain what must be said in this matter.

There was the opinion of some, mention of which is made by St. Bonaventure in I, distinction 28, question 1: they said that "unbegotten" signifies a certain positive notion of a relation opposed to the relation of begetter, just as "unequal" denotes a relation opposed to the relation of equal. But St. Bonaventure rightly impugns this opinion in that place, because from it there would follow in God five real relations, against the common sentence of the Scholastics; and also because it does not appear what that real relation in the Father would be which is opposed to the relation of begetter. Moreover, if such an opposed relation existed, it would constitute another person; for by relative opposition the persons in God are distinguished.

Scotus, however, on the First Book, distinction 28, question 2, article 1, says that "unbegotten," as it is the notion (notio) of the Father, signifies a mere negation of "begotten," and in this denotes a certain dignity of the personal property; for the personal properties in the divine do not signify imperfection, nor a perfection simply and absolutely, which would be better than its privation. But if someone (says Scotus) were to contend that this word signifies some dignity, because it pertains to the ratio of a notion to have some dignity, it could be conceded that the negation which "unbegotten" signifies is a perfection by reason of itself, not by reason of something positive: for just as in the second Person dignity is to have a begetter, so in the first it is not to have one.

This opinion is reported also by St. Bonaventure, and he rightly rejects it: because a pure negation, insofar as it is a negation, can in no way be a perfection unless by reason of some positive to which it is conjoined and from which it arises; and since a notion ought in our mode of understanding to signify some perfection and dignity, that bare negation cannot be the signification of this name which the Scholastics posit to denote a certain notion of the Father.

Therefore the common opinion pleases me, which teaches that this name expresses and formally signifies a negation - or, as it pleases some, a privation (which will immediately be explained) - so as at the same time also to signify some positive thing by way of a ratio and dignity, directly indeed, but materially, which we mean to denote by that negation; for although we sometimes use negative names to signify positives, especially those that are in God - because we more easily conceive of God what He is not, than are we able to explain what He is - nevertheless by them we conceive and wish to signify something positive, as by the name "infinite," "incorruptible"; because the opposite is better known to us, by the negation of which we understand that thing and by other means explain it.

Besides St. Bonaventure in that place who expressly handled it, so taught also St. Thomas in this article to the first objection, and more clearly on I, distinction 28, question 1, article 1, to the first; Capreolus, on question 1, article 1, in the conclusion; Durandus, on question 1; Canaietanus; and Cajetan on question 32, article 3, and on this very article: all of whom, except Cajetan, add that the

negation which the expressed name "unbegotten" signifies is not a pure negation, but a privation in a certain manner, without imperfection; not because it is the negation of a form in a subject which was apt by nature to have the opposite form (for not to have that would be an imperfection), but because it is the negation of a form which in another like subject of the same nature is apt to be present. For "unbegotten" signifies the negation of every procession of which the Son and Holy Spirit are such as are of the same nature with the Father and are capable.

Moreover, the aforesaid doctors teach materially and directly that what is signified under that negative name is the ratio of the first principle; for the first and simplest things are better known to us by negation, as we proved from Aristotle in disputation 137, chapter 5; by reason of which we there also said that "unbegotten" is the notion of the Father, because to the ratio of a notion there belongs some dignity according to our mode of understanding. And by what ratio this notion differs from the notion of paternity was explained in that place.

Further, St. Thomas in this article, to the first objection, refutes St. Bonaventure's opinion in this, that he said the name "unbegotten" does not signify a mere negation, but also something positive; for Bonaventure says that it denotes not to be from another, and to be the fontal origin and the universal principle of the other persons; and on this score the Angelic Doctor impugns it. Because from this it would follow that innascibility is not a notion distinct from paternity and from filiation: for the universal ratio of principle does not constitute a distinct property and notion from this or that principle, as we noted on question 33, in the annotations on article 3. Therefore, since the ratio of universal principle and fontal plenitude is common to this and that (as a genus or species is common to its inferiors), there will not be a distinct notion from paternity and spiration.

But this reason proves little against St. Bonaventure; for since he himself asserts that by that name there is signified not only a negation, but also something positive, he does not contend that both are signified formally and expressly on an equal footing; rather the negation first and formally; the positive, however, materially, yet directly, as we have already explained. Then, when he says that the material and positive signification is the ratio of fontal plenitude and of the universal principle, he does not understand a ratio common according to predication after the mode of a genus or species, but the ratio of the first principle, which is expressed neither by paternity nor by spiration. For "fount," as we said in disputation 139, chapter 5, does not signify a principle in any way whatsoever, but the first principle, which befits the Father alone, who is a principle without a principle: for the Son is a principle, not as a fount, but as a stream; because He is a principle from a principle. But this ratio is not sufficiently expressed by paternity alone, nor by paternity and spiration together, as we said in disputation 137, chapter 5; while the dignity of the Father under the ratio of the first person is aptly signified for us by the negation of every procession, which is innascibility.

But when St. Bonaventure adds that by this notion there is also denoted the ratio of the universal principle, he means the very same thing: for he understands a ratio abstract and common of principle (for "universal," as St. Thomas says, would not be a different notion from paternity and spiration; rather it would be the common principle of all persons that proceed), as if he were to say, of all that proceed; which is the very same thing as the ratio of the first principle and fount. For a

fount is a universal principle of whatever streams flow from it. Therefore St. Thomas did not impugn the positive signification of this negation, since he plainly concedes it; but he thought that it had been badly assigned by St. Bonaventure, although in fact he feels nothing different from what St. Bonaventure thought.

Objicitur: But some object in this way. Even if the Father were not the spirator and principle of the Holy Spirit, He would be unbegotten, that is, proceeding from no other, as is evident; therefore "unbegotten" does not signify, so far as regards the material, the universal principle, that is, spiration and paternity together, in which the ratio of the universal principle consists; or (which is the same) the negation signified by the name "unbegotten" does not arise from the positive ratio of paternity and spiration together, in which the ratio of the universal principle is constituted.

Diluitur. It is answered: this negation does not arise from those two relations taken together, but from the prerogative and subsistence of the first principle; and "universal principle" does not mean a common notion after the mode of a genus, but the first fontal origin, from which, at least remotely, every person proceeds. For the Father would still be first principle and fount with respect to the Son, even if, per impossibile, He did not spirate; and in the actual order He is called "universal principle" because from Him, as from a fount, both processions have their origin - proximate as to one, but remote as to the other - so that from one source each person is originated.

From the Fathers also Basil, Cyril, John Damascene, and Nicetas - whom we alleged in the same place - plainly attest that by that name there is signified some personal mode. If some there also say clearly that this name denotes rather that which is not in God than that which is, nothing hinders; for they speak of the express and formal signification, not of the material and direct one: just as certain names which signify some divine attribute and other perfections formally and expressly denote rather that which God is not than that which He is - such as "incorporeal," "impassible" - because in that way, by our mode of knowing, He is sometimes more readily asserted according to divine perfections. But whether that positive thing, which we have said is signified by this name "unbegotten," is absolute or relative, can easily be gathered from what has been said in disputation 137, chapter 5. The Fathers, for their part, being content to contend against Eunomius and Arius, insist that by that name there is not signified the substance, that is, the essence of God - for on that ground the Arians inferred that the Father and the Son were different substances and natures, since the Father was called "unbegotten" and the Son "begotten" - but whether it signifies something absolute or some relation, they do not dispute.[451]

Porro, if we consider only the expressed and formal signification, which is negation, we ought not to number among relative names that of Unbegotten, because it signifies not the negation of generation and nativity which is proper to the Son, but of any procession whatsoever: for thus it is commonly employed by the Fathers and the Scholastics, as we noted in the preceding chapter, and thus Unbegotten will in the same way pertain to the relatives. Next, just as procession, taken universally, is not a proper notion, because it is a universal predicate which does not constitute a

451. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1; St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4 ad 1; Capreolus, In I Sent., q. 1, a. 1 (conclusion); Durandus, In I Sent., q. 1; Cajetan, In I, q. 32, a. 3; In I, q. 33, a. 4. Aristotelian appeal: cf. Vazquez, disputation 137, cap. 5; on "fount" as first principle, disputation 139, cap. 5.

distinct notion over and against particulars, so too Unbegotten by reason of negation alone ought not to constitute a proper notion: therefore it is necessary that it constitute a distinct notion by reason of its material signification, which is different from that of the others, as we proved in disputation 138, chapter 5. However, granted that when we distinguish the person of the Father by innascibility from the other two, we must understand that innascibility as actually referred to them, nevertheless, because in a certain prior consideration of ours we can think of him before he generates, it is a great question whether he is suitably understood by us to be constituted by something absolute or by something relative; and whether, as innascible, he can then be comprehended under an absolute concept or under a relative concept: a difficulty which truly demands greater discussion and must be examined expressly in disputation 159.

I pass over, however, the arguments by which Nazianzen, Cyril, and Nicetas prove that Unbegotten does not signify the essence of God - especially because it is a negative name, signifying rather what God is not than what he is - which reasoning, in my judgment, does not prove much. For we are accustomed to signify the essence, or its attributes (which is the same), by negative names: as Infinite, Immense, etc. The principal reason, rather, is taken from the principles of faith: because, since the Father and the Son are of the same nature and substance, if the Father is called unbegotten and the Son begotten - since these names are opposed in signification - they could not in any way be referred to the essence, or to the things which are other than the essence. For these are the same in the Father and the Son. Wherefore Basil, Cyril, Damascene, and Nicetas, whom we cited in disputation 138, chapter 5, rightly said that this name denotes not the substance, nor the existence, but the mode of existence, which they call the hypostatic or characteristic property.[452]

Moreover, Augustine in book five On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, in order to prove against those same Arians that Unbegotten does not signify the substance, but the notion of the person, shows that it does not signify something absolute and as to itself, but something relative - not because the signified of this name is some relation, but because it denotes the negation of a relation, and negation seems to look to the same thing to which even the habit (in the broad sense) looks: and since it signifies the negation of generation, which in the Son is a relation, it will also be among those things which are said not with respect to themselves but with respect to something else. This seems to be confirmed by the common doctrine of the Scholastics, who, against Scotus, teach that in the divine things which are absolute, and as such are signified, the concepts are common and essential; but that the personal properties are relations only, since no person is constituted by absolute properties: whether this has been defined by the Church, or is certain among the Fathers of the Church, we shall say in disputation 159.[453] I for my part judge that the name Unbegotten is not only among those things which are said with respect to another and not with respect to itself, by reason of the expressed and direct signification, which is negation (to which alone Augustine seems to have attended), but also by reason of the material signification, which we said to be paternity itself under the notion of first principle. For the negation in question

452. Basil, Cyril, John Damascene, and Nicetas, cited above in disputation 138, cap. 5.
453. On the Communis doctrina vs. Scotus, and whether this is defined by the Church, see disputation 159.

does not arise from both those relations of the first person, but from paternity alone under the aspect of first principle: for the first and universal principle are the same; although the Father did not spirate together with the Son, he would nonetheless be the principle of the Holy Spirit, at least remotely, by reason of which he would be distinguished from him, as we shall say in disputation 147, chapter 7; and he would be called the universal principle, or the fount (which is the same): because, just as every water springs from the fount proximately or remotely, so too both persons would proceed from the Father.[454]

From among the Fathers, Basil, Cyril, Damascene, and Nicetas, whom we alleged in the same place, clearly hold that by that name there is signified some mode of the person. That some, likewise cited there, say that this name denotes rather what is not in God than what is, is no obstacle; for they speak of the expressed and formal signification, not of the material and direct: just as other names signifying some attributes of God and positive perfections denote rather what God is not than what he is, as Incorruptible - for sometimes our knowledge is borne better to the perfections of God by negations, as was noted in disputation 22, chapter 4.[455]

But whether the positive element which we said is signified by this name Unbegotten be absolute or relative, can easily be gathered from what has been said in disputation 137, chapter 5. The Fathers, for their part, being content to contend against Eunomius and Arius, insist that by that name there is not signified the substance, that is, the essence of God - for on that ground the Arians inferred that the Father and the Son were different substances and natures, since the Father was called "unbegotten" and the Son "begotten" - but whether it signifies something absolute or some relation, they do not dispute.[456] And indeed, if Unbegotten signified what is unfashioned and uncreated, and Begotten what is made and created, the name Unbegotten would signify the essence. Thus Nazianzen in Oration 3 On Theology, which is the thirty-fifth, at number 36, and Nicetas in the oration on Nazianzen the twenty-third, which is in praise of the philosopher Heron, in those words "That too," teach the same; likewise Dionysius Alexandrinus, Ignatius, Athanasius, Basil, Cyril, Damascene, and Ambrose, adduced by us above in chapters one and two; nor do they contend for anything else against the Arians than that by this reason they defend that the Son of God is homoousios with the Father, that is, of the same substance with him. But whether it signifies something absolute or some relation, they do not dispute.

Quaestio XXXIV - On the person of the Son

Then we must consider the person of the Son. Now three names are attributed to the Son: namely Son, Word, and Image. But the account of "Son" is considered from the account of "Father." Whence it remains to be considered concerning the Word and the Image.

454. On "fount" as universal principle and the Father's principium of the Spirit, cf. disputation 147, cap. 7.

455. On negative names and our cognition of divine perfections, cf. disputation 22, cap. 4.

456. For the patristic polemic against Eunomius and Arius on "unbegotten," see also St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1; St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4 ad 1; Capreolus, In I Sent., q. 1, a. 1 (concl.); Durandus, In I Sent., q. 1; Cajetan, In I, q. 32, a. 3; In I, q. 33, a. 4.

Concerning the Word three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the Word in God is a personal name

Objicitur. It seems that the Word in God is not a personal name.

1) Personal names are said properly in the divine, as Father and Son. But "word" is said metaphorically in the divine, as Origen says upon John. Therefore "word" is not personal in the divine.[457]

2) Moreover, according to Augustine in the book On the Trinity, the Word is knowledge with love. And according to Anselm in the Monologion, to speak in the supreme Spirit is nothing other than to contemplate by thinking. But knowledge, and thought, and intuition are said essentially in the divine. Therefore "word" is not said personally in the divine.[458]

3) Moreover, it belongs to the ratio of "word" that it be said. But according to Anselm, just as the Father is intelligent, and the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Spirit is intelligent, so the Father is speaking, the Son is speaking, and the Holy Spirit is speaking, and similarly each of them is so called. Therefore the name "word" is said essentially in the divine, and not personally.[459]

4) Moreover, no divine person is made. But the word of God is something made. For it is said in Psalm 148: "Fire, hail, snow, ice, spirit of tempests, which perform his word." Therefore "word" is not a personal name in the divine.

But on the contrary: Augustine says in book 7 On the Trinity: "As the son is referred to the father, so too the word to that of which it is the word." But "son" is a personal name, because it is said relatively. Therefore so too "word."]

Respondetur: I answer that the name "Word" in the divine, if it be taken properly, is a personal name, and in no way essential. For the evidence of this, it must be known that "word" is said properly in us in a threefold way; and in a fourth way it is said improperly or figuratively. It is more manifest and more common in us to call "word" that which is uttered by the voice, which indeed proceeds from the interior with respect to two things which are found in the exterior word, namely the voice itself and the signification of the voice. For the voice signifies the concept of the intellect, according to the Philosopher in book 1 On Interpretation; and again the voice proceeds from signification or from the imagination, as is said in book 2 On the Soul.[460] But a voice which is not significant cannot be called a "word." Hence an exterior voice is called a word because it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Thus then, first and principally, the interior concept of the mind is called a "word"; secondarily, the very voice which signifies the interior concept; thirdly, the very imagination of the voice is called a "word." And these three modes of "word" Damascene posits in book 1, chapter 17, saying that "word" is the natural motion of the intellect according to which it is moved and understands and thinks, as light and splendor with respect to the first; again, "word" is

457. Origen, Commentary on John; cf. also the use "metaphorice dicitur" noted in the schools.
458. St. Augustine, De Trinitate; St. Anselm, Monologion.
459. St. Anselm, Monologion.
460. Aristotle, On Interpretation I; On the Soul II.

that which is not uttered by a spoken word, but is pronounced in the heart, with respect to the third; again, "word" is the Angel, that is, the messenger of intelligence, with respect to the second.[461] But figuratively, in a fourth mode, "word" is that which is signified or effected by a word: as we are accustomed to say, "This is the word which I said to you," or "which the King commanded," when some deed is shown which was signified by the word, whether simply enunciated or even commanded.

But "word" is said properly in God according as "word" signifies the concept of the intellect. Whence Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity: "Whoever can understand a word, not only before it sounds, but also before the images of its sounds are involved in thought, can already see some likeness of that Word of which it was said: In the beginning was the Word" (John 1:1).[462]

Now the very concept of the heart by its very notion has that it proceed from another, namely from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence "word," in the sense in which it is said properly in the divine, signifies something proceeding from another, which pertains to the notion of personal names in the divine, in that the divine persons are distinguished according to origin, as has been said (q. 27, arts. 3, 4, 5). Wherefore it must be that the name "Word," in the sense in which it is taken properly in the divine, is not taken essentially, but personally only.

Reply to the first: The Arians, whose source is found to be Origen, posited that the Son is other than the Father in diversity of substance. Whence they attempted, when the Son of God is called "Word," to assert that it is not properly said, lest under the notion of a "word" proceeding they should be forced to confess that the Son of God is not outside the substance of the Father. For the interior word proceeds from the speaker in such a way that it remains in him. But it is necessary, if the "word of God" be posited as said metaphorically, that the "word of God" be posited as said properly. For nothing can be called a "word" metaphorically except by reason of manifestation: because either it manifests like a word, or it is manifested by a word. If, however, it is manifested by a word, one must posit a "word" by which it is manifested. But if it is called a "word" because it outwardly manifests those things which are outwardly manifested, they are not called "words" except insofar as they signify the interior concept of the mind, which one also manifests by exterior signs. If therefore "word" is sometimes said metaphorically in the divine, still one must posit a "word" properly so called, which is said personally.

Reply to the second: Nothing of those things which pertain to the intellect is said personally in the divine, save only "Word." For only "Word" signifies something emanating from another. For that which pertains to the intellect - such as knowledge, thought, and intuition - does not of itself import procession, but rather an essential act; whereas "Word," as properly taken, imports an origin in the intellect, and thus alone among the intellectual notions is said personally in the divine.

... what the intellect, in conceiving, forms is the word. But the intellect itself, according as it is in act by an intelligible species, is considered absolutely. And likewise "to understand," which is related to the intellect in act as "to be" is to being in act. For "to understand" does not signify an

461. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 17.
462. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 10 (med.).

action going forth from the knower, but abiding in the knower. When, therefore, it is said that the word is knowledge, knowledge is not taken for the act of the knowing intellect, nor for any habit of it, but for that which the intellect conceives in knowing. Whence also St. Augustine says that the word is begotten wisdom, which is nothing else than the very conception of the wise man; which likewise can in the same way be called begotten knowledge.[463] And by the same mode can be understood what it is to say in God, namely, to behold by thinking, inasmuch as the word of God is conceived by the intuition of the divine thought. Yet the name "thought" does not properly befit the word of God. For Augustine says, De Trinitate XV, thus is that word of God said, that "thought" be not said, lest something as it were rolling be believed to be in God, which takes on form in order to be a word, and can let it go, and be rolled about formlessly. For thought properly consists in the inquiry of truth, which has no place in God. But when the intellect has already attained to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Whence Anselm improperly takes "thought" for "contemplation."[464]

Reply to the third: Just as, properly speaking, "word" is said personally in the divine and not essentially, so too "to say." Hence, just as "word" is not common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so it is not true that the Father and the Son and the Spirit have been made one "speaker." Whence Augustine says, De Trinitate VII, that by that eternal word not a singular intellect is understood in the divine, but it befits us to speak concerning the principle of any person. For not only "word" is said, but also "the thing which is understood or signified by the word." Therefore, in that mode in which "word" is said, it befits only one person in the divine to be so called. But in that mode in which "the thing understood in the word" is said, it befits any person to be so called: for the Father, by understanding himself, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all other things that are contained in his knowledge, conceives the word - so that thus the whole Trinity is said by the word, and also every creature. As the intellect of a man, by the word which he conceives in understanding a stone, "says" it. But Anselm improperly took "to say" for "to understand." Yet they differ: for "to understand" imports only the relation of the knower to the thing understood, in which no aspect of origin is imported, but only a certain informing in our intellect, inasmuch as our intellect is in act through the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it imports complete identity, because in God intellect and the understood are altogether the same, as was shown above.[465] But "to say" principally imports a relation to the conceived word: for to say is nothing else than to utter the word. Yet through the mediation of the word it imports a relation to the thing understood, which is manifested to the knower in the uttered word. And thus only the person who utters the word is "the one saying" in the divine, although nonetheless each of the persons is knower and known, and consequently "said by the word."

463. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 2.
464. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 16 (at the beginning).
465. Above, q. 14, a. 2 and a. 4.

Reply to the fourth: The word is taken there figuratively, inasmuch as the thing signified or the effect of the word is called "word." For thus creatures are said to "do the word of God," insofar as they execute some effect toward which they are ordained by the word conceived by the divine wisdom: as one is said to "do the word of the king" when he performs the deed which is appointed by the king's word.

Dubitatio circa Articulum.

Conclusion: The "word" according as it is properly taken in the divine is a personal name.

Concerning the doctrine of the article there is a doubt: why St. Thomas enumerated all the acceptions of "word" in this order - so that in the first place he set the mental word, in the second the vocal word, and in the third the imaginative word. For either (as Cajetan says) he observed the order as regards us, and thus in the first place he ought to have put the vocal word, because that is best known to us; or he observed the natural order, and thus in the second place he ought to have put the imaginative word, and in the third the vocal word - for the imaginative word is prior, according to the order of cause, to the vocal word. Cajetan answers that the order among the things signified by some name is not to be attended according to the nature of cause and effect: for the sun is said to be "hot," because it is the cause of heat; and yet it is not said to be prior in being hot than the other things which it makes hot; but that is the prior signified of the name (he says) in which the notion signified by the name is found intrinsically and formally, and that is posterior in which it is found extrinsically. Therefore, although the sun, which is the cause of heat, is said "hot" later than the rest which by it are made hot - because in the others heat is formally and intrinsically, but in the sun only extrinsically - so, although the imaginative word is by nature prior to the vocal word because it is the cause of it, nevertheless the imaginative word is said "word" extrinsically, but the vocal word formally and intrinsically; and thus the notion of "word" belongs to the vocal word prior to the imaginative word.

However, this doctrine of Cajetan is against the mind of St. Thomas in the article: for he teaches that "word" is employed in four ways - indeed in the three already enumerated, and in a fourth for the thing itself signified. He adds then that only in this fourth way "word" is said improperly and metaphorically; but in the other three properly. Therefore he thinks that only in that fourth way "word" is said by extrinsic denomination.[466]

Durandus, on the Sentences I, dist. 27, q. 22, n. 27, teaches that "word" properly is said only of the concept of the mind, but of the voice metaphorically, because the ratio of what is signified is found in the voice only by extrinsic denomination, but in the concept formally and intrinsically - whereas it belongs to the notion of "word" to be a sign.[467] This opinion does not please me - not because the external voice is called "word" by its nature without free imposition (as Cajetan falsely supposed), but because the term "word" (verbum) was first imposed to signify the vocal word, which by human institution signifies, and from that it was derived to denote the concept of the heart. And it cannot be that it would signify improperly and metaphorically that to signify which it

466. Cajetan, In I, q. 34, a. 1 (on the enumeration of the senses of "word").
467. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 22, n. 27.

was first imposed. Nor does it stand in the way that the vocal word signifies by the free will of men (as Durandus said), and so is said to signify by extrinsic denomination. For since the term "word" was imposed to signify in the first place this sign of voice, nothing prevents that signification by the institution of men from making the term "word" properly and primarily denote the very vocal word.

Wherefore I for my part judge that even the vocal word is properly called "word"; likewise the word of the mind and of imagination. And indeed concerning the word of the intellect some have wrongly supposed that it is called "word" improperly and metaphorically - a view which the Canarian rightly marks in the first article, question 27. For from it there follows that the Son of God is called Word improperly and metaphorically, because he proceeds by the intellect - which is absurd. On that account, however, we ought not to assert that this term "word" was not derived by human speech to God, albeit without impropriety and metaphor. And when the holy Fathers sometimes acknowledge here some trace of impropriety and metaphor, they should be understood as we said in disputation 22, chapter 4.[468] But that the term "word" befits more the word of the mind than the vocal word, Augustine teaches, De Trinitate XV, c. 11, whose judgment St. Thomas follows in this article, and the other Scholastics in I, dist. 27.[469]

Concerning the order, however, in which St. Thomas enumerated them, there is not much reason to be anxious, since Augustine, in the book On the Knowledge of True Life, c. 14, and St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 18, rehearse these in another order. But some think that the word of imagination and of mind - which is properly called "word" - are not taken in the same way: for by "word of the mind" we name the expressed quality which is the actual representation of the object; but we do not call the "word of imagination" an expressed quality, although this too is found in imagination, indeed in any other sensing faculty.

But they call "word of imagination" the very vocal word as objected by us: for before we speak the vocal word itself, we think it in imagination; which, although it have no other kind of existence than objective, is truly called "word," just as an objective man is truly said "man." If, however, the quality expressed in imagination, after the manner of that which the intellect expresses, were called "word of imagination," then any other species expressed in any sensing faculty whatever would be called "word," which is absurd. For just as the other faculties are not said to "speak," nor are they said to "express a word," so too imagination is said to "speak," not because it expresses the species of the thing which it apprehends, but because the word that is to be carried forth by voice is apprehended in it.

I for my part judge that the "word of imagination" is also the expressed quality itself: because it inwardly affects the imaginative sense, and, by a certain participation of the intellect which it has from its conjunction with the intellect, imagination is called "to speak inwardly," insofar as it thinks; and it is said not only to apprehend the vocal word, but also already to speak with itself about the thing. Yet that expressed quality of imagination is not called "word" because it is spoken,

468. On negative names and the mode of predication, cf. disputation 22, c. 4.
469. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 11; cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 27.

but rather because it is, as it were, a "saying" of some thought thing - wherefore we properly call the expressed of our mind a "word," as we shall say in the following disputation, chapter 4. But the species expressed of smell or of hearing or of another sense is not called "word" nor "saying," but only "sensation": because "saying" and "word" are proper to the rational power, or to that which in some way participates in the influx of reason - which in us is imagination alone. For the other senses have nothing of reason, nor any connection with it; whereas imagination, although it does not wield reason, yet in a certain way participates in it.

Next it must be noted that the notion of "word" is not univocal in the mental and the vocal word. For to things of such diverse qualities one and the same proximate common notion cannot befit, since they are not under the same proximate genus: the one is spiritual, the other bodily.

facultate sentiente. But they call the word of imagination the very word of voice as the object of our imagination; for before we speak the very word of voice, we think it with imagination; and although it does not yet have the existence of existence, but only objective being, it is truly called a word, just as a man thought is truly called a man. But if the quality expressed in imagination were said to be a word in the manner of that which the intellect expresses, then any other species expressed in whatever sensing faculty would in like manner be called a word, which is absurd. For as the other faculties are not said to speak, so neither are they said to express a word: but imagination is said to speak, not because it expresses the species of the thing which it apprehends, but because it inwardly apprehends the word that is to be uttered by voice. Yet I for my part think that the word of imagination is also that very quality expressed by which we inwardly think some thing: for by a participation of the intellect, which it has from its conjunction with it, the imagination of man is said to speak inwardly, by that very fact that it thinks; and it is said not only to apprehend the word of voice, but also to speak inwardly with itself. But that quality expressed in imagination is not called a word because it is said, but rather because it is a kind of diction of the thing thought, as we shall say about the word of our mind in the next disputation, chapter 4. But a species expressed either of sight, or of hearing, or of another sense, is not called a word nor a diction, but is called only a sensation; because diction and word are proper to the rational power, or to that which in some way participates in the influx of the rational, such as in us is imagination alone: for the other senses have nothing of reason, nor are they thus connected to it as imagination is, nor does reason depend on them as it does on imagination. Next it must be noted that the notion of "word" is not univocal in the mental word and the vocal: to such different qualities one and the same proximate common notion cannot befit, since they are not under the same proximate genus, as is evident: the one is spiritual, the other bodily.

Caput I - On ancient and recent heretics, and that, the mystery of the Trinity admitted, the Son is properly called the Word

Setting aside the ancient and the more recent heretics, who either against the Trinity of persons (*personae*), or against the equality of them taught, and hence either denied the person of the Word, or removed its property altogether - about whom enough has already been said in disputation 108

and those following - there were also others called Alogians, in Greek alogoi, as Epiphanius remembers in heresy 51, and Augustine in De haeresibus, heresy 30, who denied the Word in the divine and, lest the error be refuted, did not accept the Gospel of John and his Apocalypse, as Epiphanius at the end of that chapter and Augustine attest: perhaps for the same reason they also denied the Epistles of John; and the name alogoi, he says, was imposed on them by Epiphanius; he himself also testifies to this.[470] Against these among the more recent wrote Alphonsus Castro, book 4, Against Heresies, "Verbum Deus," heresy 7; and, as he himself writes, and Prateolus in the Catalogue of Heresies, under "Alogi," and Sander, book 7, On the Visible Monarchy, heresy 29, in the time of Pope Soter and the Emperor Commodus, in the year 180. But by what reason these denied the word in God neither Epiphanius nor Augustine explains, namely, whether because they thought it was not a second person, or that it was not produced, or that it was a pure creature: I suspect, however, that the heresy of these was that of the Jews and of the Sabellians denying the plurality of persons; for Athanasius seems to have made mention of it in the oration against the Gregalians, the little words of Sabellius near the beginning of these words. For they ascribe to the Word such a thing as men conceive in their own mind, and attribute such a wisdom as that which is of our mind; and therefore they asserted God to be one person with the word, just as we call man one with his reason and with the concepts of words in his mind, thinking nothing more. Wherefore the Evangelist, with those Jews in view who do not receive the Evangelists, immediately at the beginning cried out: "In the beginning was the Word" (John 1), where he shows for what cause those heretics, who with the Jews also as Sabellians thought, did not accept the Gospel of John.

Otherwise Cyril, in book 7 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, reports that Eunomius denied the Son of God to be the Word, because, to wit, a word is the utterance of voice; but a son is an animal: and by the same reason he said that the wisdom of the Father was not, because wisdom is not an animal: and therefore, as Cyril reports in chapter 4, the same Eunomius asserted that the Son of God is called "his word" in Scripture, not because according to nature he is from the Father, or because he is himself a son inwardly in and connatural to the Father, but because, hearing the word of the Father (he understands a word of voice), he announces to us; just as sanctification also is called son, because it sanctifies.[471]

But Cyril in that same place, chapter 3, answers that the notion of word and of wisdom is different in God and in men: in these indeed neither is subsistent, but in God it subsists. He also attacks him for having called the Son of God an animal, since an animal is that which participates in life; but the Word of God is life itself. And in that same chapter 4 he thus objects to Eunomius: As the Son is not sanctification by a participation of holiness, so neither is he a word by a participation of the word: but he would be by a mere participation, if for this sole reason he were called a word, that he announces to us a word of voice received from the Father.

But against these heretics, in so far as they agreed with the Sabellians and Arians, there is now no need to make delay, as I noted at the beginning: wherefore it only remains to prove that, the mystery of the Trinity admitted, as Catholics in reality confess, the Son of God is said by John to be

470. Epiphanius, Panarion (Adversus haereses) haer. 51; St. Augustine, De haeresibus, haer. 30.
471. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, lib. 7, cap. 3 - 4.

properly called "the Word": for thus he says in the first chapter, and in the First Epistle, chapter 5, as is known to all: so too the Fathers commonly call the second person in the Trinity the Word, as we said in disputations 111 and 112; for concerning the heresy of Valentinus we shall speak in the next article.

Nevertheless it must be noted that the Word of God can also be called "discourse" (sermo), as Augustine observed in tractate 108 on John, explaining that of John 17, "Thy discourse is thy truth": so also calls it Lactantius, book 4, Divine Institutes, chapter 8; Tertullian, book Against Praxeas, chapters 5 and 6, and Against Marcion, book 2, chapter 27; Cyprian, book 2, Against the Jews, explaining that Psalm 44, "My heart has uttered a good word." And indeed the Greek word logos we can render into Latin either as verbum or as sermo. Wherefore Erasmus is to be reproved, not because, following the reading of those Fathers, he himself rendered that of John, "In principio erat verbum," as "In principio erat sermo," but, as the Canariensis well noted on the first article of question 27, disputation 6, question 2, because in the annotations on that place he said that "discourse" is much better translated than "word": in which he is manifestly deceived. For "discourse" is some aggregate out of several dictiones; but "word" signifies only one simple dictio: and thus it more aptly denotes the simplicity of the second person.

Then it must be observed with St. Thomas in the solution to the second, that therefore the Arians and Eunomians denied in God the "word," because they said it was not consubstantial to the Father. Add that the Sabellians therefore also denied the "word," because they believed there was only one person in God: but if these conceded three persons, and the two former said that the Son was of the same substance with the Father, they would not hesitate to assert him produced by the intellect of the Father, and hence to be properly his word; so that Durandus should be ashamed, who denies that the Son of God proceeds by the intellect, as we saw in disputation 111, and teaches that he is called "Word" by mere appropriation, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Caput II - Various opinions of the Schoolmen

Although Catholics confess that the second person in the Trinity is called "the Word," yet on the question whether "word" properly befits the essence (*essentia*), or the person (*persona*), not all think in the same way. I shall therefore set forth in this chapter the opinions of others, that in the next I may expound the truer.

The first is that of Durandus in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 27, question 3, who affirms that "word" in God is properly predicated essentially, but that it befits the second person only by appropriation. When he says that it befits by appropriation, he does not understand in that way in which common and essential names are sometimes accommodated to the persons, as the name Love; for these properly, that is, not metaphorically and improperly, befit the persons: but he understands that the name "Word" is appropriated to the Son by similitude; because, although he should not proceed by the intellect, as he thinks, nevertheless his production, since it is prior in origin, is likened to procession by the intellect, which is prior to procession by the will.

But there are others who say that it is indeed a common name and essentially agrees with God by reason of essential cognition, just as wisdom and love, yet is appropriated to the Son because his generation is through an act of understanding, just as love is appropriated to the Holy Spirit because he proceeds through an act of will: these opinions are more distant from the sentence of Durandus: for these do not assert that the Son is "Word" only by similitude, but that in reality he properly proceeds by the intellect; whereas Durandus affirms that the second person proceeds only by similitude as "word."

A third opinion is that which St. Thomas there reports of certain men, who used to say that "word" is always taken notionally in God; but that the act of "saying" can be taken essentially and notionally: first indeed, as it is the same as "to understand," essentially, and in this way he has not "word." Second, it is taken for the act of creation, according to that of Genesis, "God said: Be light" (Gen. 1:3), and in this way too he has not "word"; yet it is thus taken essentially. Third, it is used for the act of external generation, and so he has "word." The same opinion was followed by others, as Durandus reports, who used to say, just as the authors aforesaid: "word" is always taken notionally for the second person, but the act of "saying" essentially and notionally: essentially indeed, for that which is to express and to manifest something in a word; and in this way, they asserted, the three persons manifest something in the second, which is the word produced; but notionally, for the act by which the Father produces the second person, which act befits the Father alone.

Tam actum dicendi, quam verbum in divinis solum sumi notionaliter, verior sententia est.

Caput III - That both the act of saying and the Word in the divine are taken only notionally; the truer sentence

I for my part think that the common sentence is to be embraced, which not only St. Thomas hands down in this article, which Cajetan and the more recent authors follow there; but also, as the same Cajetan noted, the former one which in the First Book of the Sentences and elsewhere he had taught, he tacitly retracted. With these agree the Master in the First Book, distinction 27, question 2; Scotus there, question 2; Gabriel, question 3, article 102; nor does St. Bonaventure dissent, Part 2 of that distinction, question 1, where although he says that "word" is taken in God in two ways, in one way when God speaks inwardly, and in this way it is taken notionally; in another way essentially, when he produces a creature outwardly; nevertheless he affirms that in this latter way diction and word...

... therefore he judges that the word, properly taken in God, is employed only notionally.

It is proved first from Scripture, in which the word, or diction, is never ascribed essentially to God, unless when it is narrated that God produced something outwardly; then, however, all grant that it is used improperly. For the thing itself produced outside God is said to be his word, and the production of it is called the saying and speech of God, or some exterior utterance, whereby God is said to have spoken after the manner of a man. By contrast, when mention is made of God's interior word, it is attributed only to the second person, as in John 1, and John 5, and Apocalypse

19, where John says of him whom he saw seated upon a white horse: "And his name is, the Word of God," wherein he plainly denotes his proper name; but that the discourse there is of Christ the Son of God, all agree and it is manifest. On account of which places we reported above that the Alogians denied these books of John to be canonical.[472]

But Durandus replies that the second person is called the Word of God by appropriation, just as the third is called Spirit. For even in that place of the Apocalypse, of the same one who was called Word, John had just before said that he was called faithful and true, and that he judges in justice - three names which are essential, yet seem to be appropriated to the second person. What wonder, then, if also the name of "word" is not proper and notional to him, but appropriated, as the name "spirit" is to the third person?

This subterfuge of Durandus is vain. For although many names are said to be appropriated to the second person which are common and essential to the three persons - and such are those three, faithful, true, and the one who judges with justice - nevertheless we assert this of those things which also in Scripture we see to be common to the three persons; but when nowhere in Scripture nor among the holy Fathers does the name "word" occur as said essentially and as common to the three persons, but is attributed by all to the second person, we can with reason suspect that it was not accommodated by appropriation. Then too, when in that place John says, "And his name is, the Word of God," he plainly understands it as his proper name; for the others which he had said, he had set down not as proper names, but as epithets of him. Of the former he said: "And the one who was sitting upon it was called faithful and true," in the very way in which we commonly express someone's epithets; but of the word he said in this fashion: "His name is, the Word of God," where a special mode is expressed, in which one is wont to be named. For when we are asked after someone's name, we do not answer by commonalities, but by proper identifiers. Moreover, that the name "spirit" is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas teaches below, I, q. 36, a. 1 ad 3.

Secondly it is proved from the Fathers. St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book 5, chapter 13, says in sum: the Son is said relatively, and the word is said relatively; but what is said relatively is notional; for of relation according to its being within God himself Augustine plainly speaks. And in On the Trinity, book 6, chapter 12: the word is taken of the Son alone, not both together; and at the end of the chapter: "One cannot say 'word of word,' for both are not at once word, but only the Son." And in On the Trinity, book 7, chapter 1: "He himself (namely the Father) is not the word, just as neither is he the Son, nor the image"; and chapter 2, at the beginning: "Therefore the Father and the Son are together one essence and one greatness, the way, the truth, and one wisdom; but the Father and the Son together are not one word, because they are not together one Son. For just as the Son is referred to the Father and is not said in reference to himself, so the word is referred to him of whom it is the word when it is called a word. For the Son is that by which he is the word; and the word is that by which he is the Son. Since, therefore, the Father and the Son together are not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not one word. For this reason they are not 'word,' as they are 'wisdom,' since the word is not said of itself, but only relatively to him of

472. Epiphanius, Panarion (Adversus haereses), haer. 51; cf. St. Augustine, De haeresibus, haer. 30.

whom it is the word; just as the Son is said relatively to the Father; but wisdom is said essentially; and therefore, because there is one essence, there is one wisdom; and yet the word is wisdom, but not 'word' in the same way as 'wisdom': for the word is understood relatively, but wisdom essentially. Let us take it to be said, therefore, when 'word' is said, as if it were said 'born-wisdom,' so that he may be the Son and the image."[473]

Many other no less excellent things for our opinion does Augustine teach; but these suffice, in which first consider in the first testimony, when he says that "word" is said relatively, that he altogether denies that it can be taken essentially; for on that account in the latter he opposed "word" to "wisdom," because "word" is taken relatively, but "wisdom" essentially. Therefore it is the same for Augustine to say that something is said relatively as to say that it is not said essentially. Wherefore, if "word" is said relatively, it cannot be said essentially. Add that the names which are appropriated to the persons - such as power to the Father - are not said relatively to another person, unless materially by reason of that other to whom they are attributed. Then note about the second and third testimonies: when he absolutely denies that the Father and the Holy Spirit are the word, and that they are "of the word," he openly indicates that he denies "word" to be a name common and only appropriated to the second person; rather, that it is proper. For if it were a common essential according to the second notion, and appropriated to one person alone, it would not be repugnant to say that "word" is said "of the word," just as "Son" is said "of wisdom," and the Holy Spirit is said "of love," for "God is love." It could also be said that both - namely the Father and the Son - are "word," just as they are called "wisdom," although the name "wisdom" is appropriated - which in the last testimony Augustine does not dare to concede.

Next St. Cyril, book 7 of the Thesaurus, chapter 1, answering the Arians objecting in this way: If the word is consubstantial to the Father, the Father too could be called "Word" - thus he replies: Those who say these things are utterly blind to John; for the word itself he (namely John in that chapter) calls the Son, and seems to have chosen this name as if proper and most signifying of him: "In the beginning" (he says) "was the Word," etc. Therefore Cyril said that by this word, "word," the property of the Son is more expressed: because, as we said in disputation 137, chapter 5, by it is signified not only the kind of sonship of the second person, but also the mode of that procession to be most nearly through the intellect, not through nature, as Durandus falsely thought.[474]

Third, finally, by reason the truth of the opinion is easily proved: for "word" by its nature denotes a real emanation from someone of whom it is the word. Thus St. Basil, in the homily on those words "In the beginning was the Word," after the middle says: "For our heart is as it were a fountain; but the word is an emission as it were a stream flowing out from the fountain." And a little above: "Why is 'word,' as that which proceeds from the mind, shown? For although he speaks about the word of voice, nevertheless he allows that by it that which proceeds from the mind is signified." And Athanasius, in the Epistle on the opinion of Dionysius against the Arians, a little before the end, says thus: "It befits the 'word' to be named for the emanation of the mind; for just as, to speak as of a man, what bursts forth through the tongue is called utterance, without being the

473. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V.13; VI.12; VII.1 - 2.
474. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, lib. 7, cap. 1; cf. lib. 7, cap. 3 - 4.

word which is in the heart; so since he speaks of both words, of voice and of heart, and says that 'word' is the emanation of the mind, of both he plainly understands that the emanation of the eternal word is explained." The same likeness of our word and the divine word is pursued by Anselm in the Monologion, chapter 31; and he teaches that both our word and the divine proceed by emanation. So also the same Athanasius, in the Epistle on the decrees of the Nicene Synod, a little before the middle, says of the Son of God that whether you think of him as "intelligence" or as "the word of God," you will again have thought that he is from that, without any difference. And although there he numbers essential things which are attributed to him by appropriation alone, yet he did not understand "word" in the same way; for with respect to it he had also said elsewhere, even among human things, that it is a procession. But what in God denotes emanation is not said essentially, but notionally, as is confessed by all: therefore "word" ought always to be used not essentially, but notionally.[475]

It remained here to explain how both our word and the divine are compared with the act of saying, and whether its emanation is intellection, or at least diction, and whether in every intellection there is a word or not: yet these we shall more conveniently say in solving the arguments of Durandus in the next chapter.

From what has been said it is inferred, first, that the opinion of Durandus is false, who said that "word," properly taken, is used essentially; but now, that is, by mere appropriation, it is used notionally. Secondly it follows that the second opinion is false, which said that "word" is taken in both ways: since it is settled that it is used only notionally. Third, it is gathered that the third opinion departs further from the truth, since it takes "to say" in another way than "word": for these seem either to be mutually relative, or the same; wherefore, if the one is taken notionally, the other must be taken in the same way. But what he lastly adds, that all the persons express in the word the things which they understand, is most absurd: for that person alone expresses in the word what he understands, who herself produces the word, as all Doctors acknowledge.

Caput IV - The arguments of Durandus are solved

To the first and second argument of Durandus we answer easily: not every intellection, however perfect, is a word, but a word is found only in that intellection which really proceeds from the intelligent. And since the essential cognition in God is the very essence of God, and does not emanate from God in any way, it does not follow that the word is the cause of the things which are understood in it.

But the third argument is difficult, whose solution must be explained - what in us is the act of saying, and what the word is, and what is called in us the word of the mind: whether the expressed species, or rather the very thing itself which is represented by the word. There are some who judge that the act of saying is the production of that physical quality which the intellect produces within itself; but that the quality itself produced is the word, by which formally the intellect is constituted

475. St. Basil, Homilia in illud "In principio erat verbum"; St. Athanasius, Epistola de sententia Dionysii contra Arianos; Id., Epistola de decretis Nicaenae synodi; St. Anselm, Monologion, cap. 31.

knowing; so that intellection and word are altogether the same; and that to say is not to understand, but is the production of the word itself, and the intellection of it. This view seems to be Scotus's, as we recalled in disputation 112, chapter 18; yet we have already sufficiently proved from the Fathers and by reasons that the intellect's "to say" is formally "to understand" - except that "to say" denotes also a real emanation from the one who says.

Others say: the very production of the expressed species is diction, and at once formally intellection; but the expressed quality is the word, expressed by that diction and intellection. And thus they answer Durandus's argument, that that intellection rightly has a word; and hence they suppose that both the real production and that (intellection) together are diction; and because in God the essential intellection is not a production, therefore it is not a diction; therefore he does not have a word. This opinion does not please me. For I think that in us intellection is formally the very quality expressed in the mind, by which the object is present to the intellect; and that to understand is nothing else than to be informed by some actual likeness... and this, however, is found much more perfectly in the species itself and in the quality than in the production and coming-to-be of it: therefore that rather is intellection.

Although by means of that quality itself a man renders himself blessed in himself, yet he understands by means of it: for whether it be produced by God alone, or by the intellect itself, it ought always to represent the object in the same way, since the quality would always be the same in itself, and therefore would render the same effect. Although therefore intellection (*intellectio*) cannot be produced by God alone, but ought to depend upon the intellect actually understanding, nevertheless it is not to be said that it belongs to the notion of intellection directly and formally to be a vital production, but rather that a vital production is something necessarily required in order that there be intellection; because intellection, as intellection, is signified only as an action about the object, which in very truth is not produced, but is known; not however as an action about the very quality inwardly produced: and therefore it is called a grammatical action, that is, one signified by a verb of action, although in reality by it nothing is produced. And this I think Aristotle said, in Metaphysics IX, chapter 9, that by certain actions nothing is produced, as by seeing, intellection, and by the operations of the other senses.[476]

On behalf of the same position there is the fine testimony of Aristotle, On the Soul III, chapter 7, or according to another division chapter 4, where he says: But the sensible thing seems to bring the sensitive power itself from potency to act, and to make it actual; for it does not suffer, nor is it altered. Therefore this is another species of motion. For motion is the act of what is imperfect; but act simply, which indeed is of a perfect thing, is altogether another and different from that. To sense, therefore, and to say only and to understand is similar: as if he were to say that to sense is not the act of something imperfect, just as neither is to understand and to say. But if to sense, to understand, and to say were themselves the action of producing the expressed species (*species expressa*), without doubt they would be imperfect acts, and the definition of motion given in Physics III, chapter 2, namely, "the act of a being in potency as it is in potency," would suit them;

476. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 9.

and hence they would be imperfect acts. For that is called imperfect which is in potency to the having - been - made of a form (*forma*): but such is a subject, insofar as it receives in itself the being - made, and the way to the having - been - made of some form. Since therefore these which we have said - namely, to sense, to understand, and to say - are perfect acts, it follows that they do not consist formally in a being - made and way, but in a form or quality (*qualitas*) in an achieved being; and in this sense St. Thomas seems to have understood this place of Aristotle, above on q. 18, a. 1

Further, that production is not diction (*dictio*) is shown thus. If it were diction insofar as it is production, then just as that expressed quality is produced, so also would it be said: but no one will affirm that that quality is said; therefore the production of it is not that diction which is production. Perhaps someone will answer, that nothing is more properly said than that quality and the expressed likeness of the thing; for that is the mental word (*verbum mentis*), and it is proper to a word to be said and pronounced. But although we cannot deny that that quality of the mind is commonly called the mental word, nevertheless that its production is not diction, nor that it is said by our intellect, can easily be shown. For if one asks, What did you say in your mind? no one will answer, the quality and representation of a horse or a man, but by a spoken word he will explicate the thing itself which inwardly he understood or enunciated. Thus, when the Pharisees were slandering the works of Christ, and inwardly were speaking among themselves against him, saying, "Who can forgive sins but God alone?" if someone were to ask Christ what they were saying against him, he would not answer, the quality and mental word of such and such a thing, but by a spoken word he would signify the very thing which they were inwardly thinking, and would say, "They speak against me, and in their mind they say that no one can forgive sins except God." Finally, when someone is asked what he says within, he answers with spoken words: and words of this sort do not signify the formal concept (*conceptus formalis*) and the expressed quality of the mind, which we call the mental word, but the objective concept (*conceptus obiectivus*), that is, the thing understood; and they are substituted in place of the formal concept, as we noted in disputation 75, chapter 3. Therefore, since inwardly in our mind we say nothing other than what we are wont outwardly to signify by spoken words, and words signify not the formal concept and quality, but the thing understood; it follows that that quality is not what is said by the mind, and therefore the production of it is not the diction of it.

Objicitur: But you will object what we said above, namely, that diction is properly referred to the word; but the mental word is that quality; whence it follows that that quality rather is said by our intellect than the thing itself.

Respondeo: A word is called something not only because it is said, and its production is its diction, but because it itself is the diction of other things; that is, because by the word itself, as by a diction, things understood are brought forth and are said. And for this sole reason the word of our mind is called a word: wherefore it does not follow that its production is the diction of it: therefore our mind inwardly does not say and speak the word, but only says the thing understood, which it expresses and understands by the word itself.

Objicitur: But you will oppose us with St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, chapter 15, who speaks thus of the word of our mind: "Since our word is called our thought; and again, And our true most inward word is not said except by our thought." Therefore he thinks that the mental word is said by us, and that the word is not the thought (*cogitatio*), but rather that the diction of the word is the thought itself.

Respondeo: Augustine philosophizes about the word of the mind in a different way than the Scholastics speak. For he thought that a word is not produced in the mind by any act whatsoever of intellection and thought, but that when after much inquiry and doubt at length there arises in us a determinate knowledge and thought of a thing; whereas by that thought by which we are still inquiring and doubting he judged that no word is produced; and yet he did not doubt that that thought is a certain expressed quality of the thing which we understand and think under doubt: therefore he did not think that the expression or production of the expressed species is the diction of the same. Of this, at the beginning of the chapter he says a little: "But when we doubt, there is not yet a word about the thing about which we doubt, but there is a word about the very doubting; for although we do not yet know whether that about which we doubt is true, yet we do know that we doubt." When he concedes a "word of doubting," he understands it to be the reflex knowledge which we have about the doubting; for he does not call the very concept by which we doubt about the thing a word, indeed he denies it to be a word. For if he thought it to be the word of anything, most of all of the thing itself, since it cannot be the word of itself; but he said that the thing is not a word. And a little below: "But what is it that can be a word, and therefore is now worthy of the name of word? What is it, into which this formable, and not yet formed, passes, unless something of our mind which we toss to and fro with a certain rolling notion, when by us now this, now that, as it has been found or has occurred, is thought; and then it becomes a true word, when that which we used to toss with a rolling notion we have brought to that which we know, and from thence it is formed, taking its every way likeness, so that just as each thing is said, so also it is thought?" This forthwith, he says, he would call a word, lest he seem to labor about a controversy of a word: as if he were to say, If another calls something else in the mind the mental word, I do not make a difficulty; therefore Augustine calls the mental word the certain knowledge which we have about a thing, or a certain judgment after the investigation of thought and intellect: and he says that the diction of the word is the preceding thought: but he never calls the production of any expressed species "diction," nor every expressed quality a "word." He subjoins indeed: "For our thought, coming to that which we know, and from thence being formed, is our true word." Where he calls the very formed knowledge of the thing the expressed word, and, as it were, the word said by the thought of investigation. Finally he adds that the word of God is without thought, not because it is not produced by intellection, but because since thought in Augustine's view is with inquiry, and in God there is no inquiry, there is no thought in him, nor is his word produced by thought: for Augustine himself there admits that the production of our interior word is not similar to the production of the divine word.[478]

478. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 15.

Let us conclude therefore that the word of our mind is an expressed quality, which is the very intellection of the object, and that this is the same as the diction, not of itself, but of the thing understood; for that which is properly said is the thing understood or signified, not the very quality of the mind: indeed even if we speak of the exterior word, we do not so properly assert that the word itself is said, as that the thing signified by the word is said: yet we affirm both of the exterior word; because by the figure metonymy the word is used for the thing, and the thing for the word, as the container for the contained, and conversely. But the interior word, which is the expressed species and the very intellection of the mind, is not what is said, but only the thing understood: the quality indeed is the word, and the diction itself is the nature of the word: for it is not so proper to the word to be said, as to be the very diction of the thing understood. This I would say of our word; for if we speak of the eternal Word, the case is different. Since at once it has to be that which is understood by the Father, and that which is produced, thus it has the notion of a word, so that at once it is also said and uttered by the eternal diction and prolation of the Father, which is his knowledge: in it, already produced and said, the rest of the things which the Father understands in it are said and are brought forth. How however this is true, and how the -

Disputatio CXLI - On the word of the mind and the divine Word

How, however, this is true, and how this word is said to represent the Father, will be explained in Disputation 143, cap. 1. Wherefore, although we do not call the word of our mind except improperly and in a broader signification - that is, we do not call that quality which we term the formal concept, but only the thing itself understood and represented through it, which we, speaking of the direct act, understand as our word - nonetheless God the Father most properly calls his Son as it were his own Word, whom he at once understands and brings forth; but the other things which he says in him, as creatures, he says secondarily. Hence, if we ask, What did the eternal Father say? we answer, His Son and his Word. Whereas if we ask, What do we inwardly say? we cannot answer, That quality or word, but The thing which we understand, as has been proved.

Two things remain for us to note. One is, what Anselm thinks, since in the Monologion, cap. 34, he said that it is the same thing for the supreme Spirit to know, to understand, and to say; whence it seems to follow that "to say" in God is taken essentially, as "to understand" itself: because they are the same. St. Thomas answers in the solution to the third objection that Anselm spoke improperly about "to say": thus indeed "to say" is altogether the same as "to understand," and is common to the three persons; but if it be taken properly, it is notional and proper to the first person, just as "to be said" or "to be the Word" is proper to the second.[479] I, however, think it difficult that Anselm spoke so improperly: for in cap. 31 he discusses the production itself of the divine Word, and he shows in caps. 32, 33, and 34 in what way God says himself and all creatures by his eternal Word; therefore he speaks of the notional act of saying, which is proper to the

479. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 2, ad 3.

Father; for he alone says by his Word. I answer, then, that Anselm did not wish in every respect to equate intellection and diction among themselves, as if they were entirely the same: for that was not necessary to his aim; but that he might show that in the same manner the Father says creatures in his Word, in which he understands them - that which in that chapter alone he strove to establish - he assumes this proposition: It is the same for the supreme Spirit to know, to understand, to say; which is indeed true to this extent, inasmuch as to say formally and essentially is to understand, with only the addition of the respect of procession. Yet conversely, to understand and to know in God is not always to say: for in the Son and in the Holy Spirit there is not "to say." But to prove what we proposed, it suffices if "to understand" be proper to the Father and "to say" in the manner which we said.

Another thing to be noted is that which Cajetan observed on this article: when St. Thomas said that the "saying" of the Father is considered by us after the mode of emanation, so as to prove from this that it is a notional act, and that his "word" is also used notionally; this is not to be understood as though only according to our mode of understanding "diction" had the notion of emanation - that is, were conceived according to the mode of emanation, when yet in reality it is not - but thus, that the thing itself truly is an emanation.[480]

And hence it is easy to answer Durandus's last argument: for we concede that notional acts, insofar as they are signified solely under relation and order of production, do not pass over into creatures, nor reflect back upon the producing person; and in this way they are signified by us by the names of production and generation. But, as they are denoted by the name of diction and intellection, they can pass over: for these names signify rather an order to the thing said and to the thing understood than to the thing produced; since sometimes there is found to be something said and understood which is not produced, as in us; contrariwise, when in us a quality and expressed likeness is produced, it is not that which is said by the intellect. Wherefore, when we said that the word, as word, denotes its procession from another, this is not to be taken as though it were the same thing to proceed as word and to be said; but because the very intention and diction, or word, denotes a real going-forth from another.

In this way Anselm seems to have spoken about our word in the Monologion, cap. 31: "For when I think to myself of a man absent, the edge of my thought is formed to such a likeness of him as I have drawn into my memory by the sight of my eyes; and this likeness in the thought is the word of the same man whom, by thinking, I say. Accordingly the rational mind, when by thinking it understands itself, has its image born with it, that is, its thought formed to its own likeness, as if by its own impression, and this likeness of it is its word." Where, first, he calls "word" the image of the thing, as we also have said. Then too he calls this image the thought itself: therefore he holds that the word is the very thought, and not something produced by the thought. In addition, he affirms that by thinking we say the man whom we think - something he does not assert of the word. Rightly, therefore, we said that the word is the very quality which is intellection, and that this very quality is the diction of the thing understood; but that the production of that quality is not the

480. Cajetan, Commentary on Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 2.

diction, nor is the word itself that which is said. By what reason, however, Anselm asserts that the gaze of our thought is formed into an image, we have explained in Disputation 39, the last chapter.[481]

Articulus II - Whether "Word" is the proper name of the Son

The second proceeds thus. It seems that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsistent person in the divine things. But "word" does not signify a subsistent thing, as is clear in us. Therefore "word" cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.

1. Further, a word proceeds in a certain manner from the one speaking by prolation. If, therefore, the Son is properly the Word, he proceeds from the Father only by way of prolation. But this is the heresy of Valentinus, as the Father reports in the book On Heresies.[482]
2. Further, every proper name of some person signifies some property of that person. If, therefore, "Word" is the proper name of the Son, it will signify some property of him; and thus there will be more properties in the divine things than were enumerated above.
3. Further, whoever understands, in understanding conceives a word. But the Son understands. Therefore there is some word of the Son; and thus it is not proper to the Son to be the Word.
4. Further, Hebrews 1 says of the Son: "Upholding all things by the word of his power." From which Basil takes that the Holy Spirit is the word of the Son. Therefore it is not proper to the Son to be the Word.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says in On the Trinity 6: "The Word is understood solely of the Son."[483]

I answer that "Word" is taken in the divine things personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son; for it signifies a certain emanation of the intellect. But the person who proceeds in the divine things according to the emanation of the intellect is called Son; and this kind of procession is called generation, as was shown above. Whence it follows that the Son alone is properly called "Word" in the divine things.

Reply to the first: In us it is not the same thing to be and to understand. Whence that which in us has intelligible being does not pertain to our nature; but in God to be is his very understanding. Whence the Word of God is not something else which is an accident in him, or some effect of his, but it pertains to his very nature. And therefore it must be something subsistent: because whatever is in the nature of God subsists. And thus St. John Damascene says that the Word of God is substantial and subsisting in a hypostasis; whereas the other words, namely ours, are powers of the soul.[484]

481. Anselm, Monologion, caps. 31 - 34.
482. St. Augustine, De haeresibus, on the Valentinian heresy.
483. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 2 (and cf. c. 3).

Reply to the second: It is not for this that the error of Valentinus is condemned, because he said that the Son was born by a prolation (as the Arians calumniated, as St. Hilary relates in De Trinitate VI), but because of the various mode of prolation which he posited, as is clear from St. Augustine in the book On Heresies.[485]

Reply to the third: In the name "Word" the same property is imported as in the name "Son." Whence St. Augustine says: "By that by which he is called Word, by that he is called Son." For the very nativity of the Son, which is his personal property, is signified by diverse names which are attributed to the Son to express different perfections of it. For to show that he is connatural with the Father, he is called Son; to show that he is coeternal, he is called Splendor; to show that he is altogether like, he is called Image; to show that he is immaterially begotten, he is called Word.

Reply to the fourth: It belongs to the Son to be intelligent in the way in which it belongs to him to be God, since to understand is said essentially in the divine things, as was said. But the Son is God begotten, not God begetting. Whence he is indeed intelligent, not as producing the Word, but as the Word proceeding - inasmuch as in God the Word proceeding, according to the thing, does not differ from the divine intellect, but is distinguished by relation alone from the principle of the Word.

Reply to the fifth: When it is said of the Son, "Upholding all things by the word of his power," "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the word. Whence the Gloss says there that "word" is taken for "command," inasmuch as from the effect of the power of the Word it comes about that things are preserved in being, just as it is an effect of the power of the Word that things are produced into being. But as to what Basil interprets, that "word" stands for the Holy Spirit, he spoke improperly and figuratively: for by the "word" of someone can be meant anything that is a manifestation of him, so that on that account the Holy Spirit is said to be the Word of the Son, because he manifests the Son; something which shows forth the Son.

Second it is to be noted, concerning the reply to the second, that there was the fabulous heresy of Valentinus, as Irenaeus writes in book 1 Against Heresies, cap. 1, which he refutes at length in book 2; Tertullian also makes mention of it in the book On Prescriptions against Heretics, cap. 49, and Epiphanius in heresy 31 and in book 1 of the Compendium of Heretical Fables, in the chapter On Valentinus; likewise St. Hilary in De Trinitate VI a little after the beginning; and St. Augustine in the book On Heresies.[486]

[closing replies and notes carried over]

484. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 18.

485. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VI; St. Augustine, De haeresibus (on the various mode of "prolation" posited by Valentinus).

486. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, c. 1; II; Tertullian, De praescriptionibus haereticorum, c. 49; Epiphanius, Panarion (haer. 31) and Anacephalaeosis I (Compendium), cap. de Valentino; St. Hilary, De Trinitate VI; St. Augustine, De haeresibus.

Reply to the fourth: It is answered that it befits the Son to be intelligent in the same way as it befits him to be God, since to understand is said essentially in the divine, as was said. But the Son is God begotten, not God begetting. Hence he is indeed intelligent, not as producing the word, but as the word proceeding, inasmuch as in God the word proceeding does not differ in reality from the divine intellect, but is distinguished only by relation from the principle of the word.

Reply to the fifth: When it is said of the Son, "upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb 1), "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the word. Hence the interlinear gloss there says that "word" is taken for command, inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the word it comes about that things are preserved in being, just as by the effect of the power of the word it comes about that things are brought forth into being. And when St. Basil interprets "word" for the Holy Spirit, he spoke not properly but figuratively, in the way in which everything that manifests someone can be called that person's "word": and so, in this respect, the Holy Spirit is called the word of the Son, because he manifests the Son.

Notationes circa Articulum.

Conclusion is affirmative, and the matters truly deserving of disputation in this article were examined in the preceding disputation; yet there remain certain items of lesser moment which do not seem to be passed over.

First note. The adverb "properly" in the title and in the body of the article is to be taken as in q. 33, a. 2, as distinguished from the adverb "commonly," so that, as St. Thomas shows, this name so befits the second person that it cannot be made to fit another. And although the second person is not only properly the word, that is, she alone is the word; she is also so properly, that it is not metaphorically nor by an extrinsic denomination, but by her own nature and character.

Second note. Concerning the reply to the second [objection], it is to be noted that there was the fabulist heretic Valentinus, of whom Irenaeus makes mention in book 1 Against Heresies, whom he also at length impugns in book 2, chapter 1; Tertullian also mentions him in the book Against Heretics, chapter 49; Epiphanius in heresy 31 and book 1 of the Compendium of Heretical Fables, in the chapter On Valentinus; likewise St. Hilary in De Trinitate VI a little after the beginning; and St. Augustine in the book On Heresies. He maintained that there had subsisted thirty αἰῶνας, that is, ages, and that all things had their origin from Profundity and Silence; he said that Profundity was the "Propator" and "Proarchē," that is, father and first principle, and he called God unbegotten and everlasting; and that in his silence he had subsisted for many aeons and ages; and that besides this there were Charis, Sige, or Ennoia, that is, grace, silence, or tacit thought; from which that unbegotten God, by a prolation sent forth and, as it were, a seed, generated Nous, that is, mind - for νοῦς in Greek in Latin is mens - and this he called the Only-begotten of God, like to him and equal; and with this, he said, Truth was produced, whereby a quaternary was constituted, which he affirmed to be the root of all numbers. Then afterwards from the only-begotten Mind and Truth the Word proceeded, that is, the λόγος; and in the end, for the safety of all, he fabulously invented that Christ would be sent. All these things Irenaeus reports at very great length.[487]

But the Arians, as Hilary writes, vaunting themselves as champions of the Catholic faith, asserted one God almighty, immutable, etc.; but that the Son was his creature, perfect, yet not as the rest; a thing made, not as the rest, but created before the ages. They also said that the Son, not merely in appearance but truly, was obedient to the will of the Father, not born by a prolation, as Valentinus fabled. Finally, not admitting the fables and errors of Valentinus and of other heretics, they strove to defend their own [dogmas]. Hilary, however, rebuked them, because, under the pretext of excluding the error of Valentinus, they denied the Son of God to be the Word, so that thus they might deny him to be Word. For although he was not in that fabulous way brought forth as Valentinus said, nevertheless, since he truly is the Word of the Father, he could not fail to be brought forth of the substance of the Father by eternal generation, namely by the operation of the mind, as was explained in the above disputation. Sander reports the heresy of Valentinus in book 7 On the Visible Monarchy (year 1580) under Antoninus Pius; but Epiphanius places it under Antoninus the first. Therefore the Catholic faith teaches that in the Trinity there is properly one unique word of the Father, namely the Son; why, however, each person does not have his own word produced, we shall say below, q. 41, a. 6.

Third note. Concerning the reply to the last [objection], it is to be noted that Basil in book 5 Against Eunomius, chapter 11, called the Holy Spirit the word of the Son on the basis of that [text] to the Hebrews 1: "upholding all things by the word of his power" (namely, Christ), and on the basis of that [text] to the Ephesians 6: "and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." That is, as he himself explains, "living and operative." But St. Thomas excuses Basil, that he seems to have spoken figuratively, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit in a certain way represents the Son - which you should understand not from the force of his divine procession, but because by his grace he announces Christ to men and manifests him to the faithful. In truth, that place in Hebrews 1 has a far different sense, which Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius have very well followed out. For the Apostle is speaking of Christ the Son of God, of whom he says, "who being the splendor of [the Father's] glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things" (that is, all the things which were made through him he acts upon, governs, and preserves) "by the word of his power"; that is, without toil and effort, by his mere nod and will, as in Genesis 1: "God said, and they were made"; for that which is done by a word alone is done without solicitude and labor. For "word" there is not in Greek λόγος, the term which John uses in chapter 1: "In the beginning was ὁ λόγος," that is, the Word, the Son of God; but it is ῥῆμα, and it signifies the same as in Latin "word," an utterance or sentence. Likewise that in Ephesians 6, "and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," according to the common interpretation is not understood of the eternal Word of God, but of the word of the preaching of faith; which for that reason is called a sword, as in Hebrews 4, because it penetrates even to the innermost parts of the spirit, and discerns and separates evil thoughts from the good.

487. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, c. 1; II; Tertullian, De praescriptionibus haereticorum, c. 49; Epiphanius, Panarion (haer. 31) and Anacephalaeosis I (Compendium), cap. de Valentino; St. Hilary, De Trinitate VI; St. Augustine, De haeresibus.

Articulus III - Whether by the name "Word" there is imported a respect to creatures

It is argued that in the name "Word" there is not imported a respect to creatures.

1. Every name that connotes an effect in a creature is said essentially in the divine; but "word" is not said essentially, but personally, as was said. Therefore "word" does not import a respect to a creature.
2. Further: The things that import a respect to creatures are said of God ex tempore, as "Lord" and "Creator"; but "Word" is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import a respect to a creature.
3. Further: "Word" imports a respect to that from which it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports a respect to a creature, it follows that it proceeds from a creature.
4. Further: Ideas are many according to diverse respects to creatures. Therefore, if "word" imports a respect to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one word only, but many.
5. Further: If "word" imports a respect to a creature, this is only inasmuch as creatures are known by God. But God not only knows beings, but also non-beings. Therefore in the word there will be imported a respect to non-beings - which seems false.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book On Eighty-Three Questions, that in the name "Word" there is signified not only a respect to the Father, but also to those things that were made through the Word by operative power.[488]

I answer that, in "Word" there is imported a respect to a creature. For by knowing himself God knows every creature. Therefore the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is understood in act. Whence in us there are diverse words according to the diverse things that we understand. But because by one act God understands both himself and all things, his one unique Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures.

And just as God's knowledge is of God only as cognoscitive, but of creatures as both cognoscitive and factive; so too the Word of God, what it is in God the Father, is only expressive; but of creatures it is expressive and operative. And on account of this it is said in Psalm 32: "He said, and they were made," because in the Word there is imported the productive ratio of those things which God makes.

Reply to the first: In the name of "person" there is also included, obliquely, the nature. For a person is an individual substance of a rational nature; therefore, in the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation there is not imported a respect to a creature; but it is imported there in that which pertains to the nature. Nevertheless nothing prevents, insofar as in its signification its essence is included, that a respect to a creature be imported. For it is proper to the Son that he is God-begotten, or a begotten Creator. And in this way a relation to the creature is imported in the name "Word."

488. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 63.

Reply to the second: Since certain names import a relation of God to a creature which follows upon an action of God that passes over into an exterior effect, as to create and to govern, such names are said of God ex tempore. But there is a certain relation which follows upon an act not passing over into an exterior effect, but remaining in the agent, as to know and to will; and such things are not said of God ex tempore. And a relation of this kind to the creature is imported in the name "Word." Nor is it true that all the names importing a relation of God to creatures are said ex tempore, but only those names which import a relation consequent upon an action of God that passes over into an exterior effect are said ex tempore.

Reply to the third: Creatures are not known by God through a knowledge received from creatures, but through his own knowledge. Hence it is not necessary that the Word proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply to the fourth: The name "Idea" is principally imposed to signify a respect to creatures; and for that reason it is said in the plural in the divine, nor is it personal. But the name "Word" is principally imposed to signify a relation to the speaker, and consequently to creatures, inasmuch as God by understanding himself understands every creature. And on this account in the divine there is only one unique Word, and said personally.

Reply to the fifth: In the way that God's knowledge is of non-beings, so also the Word of God is of non-beings, because there is not anything less in the Word of God than in the knowledge of God, as Augustine says. But nevertheless the Word is of beings as expressive and factive; of non-beings, however, as expressive and manifestative.

Conclusion. The Word of God does respect creatures: it renders the sense of the holy Fathers and the reasons that follow, which St. Thomas reports; because whatever is in the knowledge of the Father is in the very Word; but in the knowledge of the Father is every creature; therefore in the very Word. Whence it is that the Word respects all creatures which are said to have been made in it. Concerning the terms of the present conclusion and of the article, we shall examine in the following disputations.

Disputatio CXLII - Whether the Word proceeds from all things that are in God formally

- Status of the controversy. Chapter 1.
- Various opinions of the scholastics. Chapter 2.
- The truer view: that by cognition of the essence and attributes, together with of the Father and the Son, the Word is produced. Chapter 3.
- The Word is not produced by cognition of the Holy Spirit as a per se object. Chapter 4.

Caput I - Status of the controversy

Since in this disputation we inquire, and in the following ones, by whose cognition the divine Word proceeds; and, concerning the Holy Spirit, by whose love he is spirated; we are not in doubt that the intellection by which the Word is produced ought to be of such a sort, common and comprehensive, that it embraces not only the essence of God, but also the rest of the things which are in God. For in his Word he knows all things; so too in it he says all things, even possible and future creatures. Nor, moreover, is the present question whether God understands all things before he produces them, and from their cognition, as from a principle, generates his Word. For, as we said in disputation 112, chapter one, the principle of producing the Word is not intellection but memory, that is, the intellect of the Father in the first act. Nay rather, the production of the Word is the very notional act of intellection. Although some, as Scotus and certain others, think that intellection is prior to the production of the Word - and thus he followed in this controversy a peculiar opinion, as we shall see in the following chapter. But the present controversy, with those others who say that the very act of understanding produces the Word, lies chiefly in this: whether in the intellection of the Father, and in his essence as it were in the species and the principle of understanding per se required for the production of the Word, all the things which are in God are contained, as intelligibles in their first act - just as an object is said to be in the intellect by reason of the intelligible species for producing the intellection itself, i.e., as a principle per se necessary - or rather whether some things are contained there only as concomitants necessary to the very generation of the Word. And with the question thus understood, there are various opinions of the theologians, which we shall report in the following chapter.

Caput II - Various opinions of the scholastics

Cajetan understood Scotus's opinion in the commentary on this article thus, as asserting that neither does the divine Word proceed from the knowledge of the persons, nor the Holy Spirit from love of the same, as from a principle; but from knowledge, or love, of the essence alone: the persons, however, fall under that same knowledge and love necessarily; yet creatures fall under it concomitantly, although these are comprehended under it according to another ratio, namely contingently. Cajetan gathers this opinion from Scotus in I, dist. 9, q. 1, "Ad primum dico," in the solution of the last [objection], where he is solving he speaks about the procession of the Holy Spirit, and asserts what we have just reported; and he asserts the same in the same distinction, q. 2, at the end. And what he says there ought, with even greater reason, to be said about the procession of the Word, as we shall immediately see. But in other places where he disputes whether the Word proceeds from the cognition of creatures or of the essence alone, he merely affirms that it proceeds from the cognition of the primary object alone, that is, of the divine essence; not of the secondary, namely of creatures - without any mention made of the persons; to which he assigns only the primary object, namely the divine essence, and the secondary, namely creatures; as is to be seen in the same author in II, dist. 1, q. 5.

This opinion can be proved first, because, as we said, in that prior sign of reason there are not yet paternity, filiation, and spiration; therefore then there is not yet intuitive knowledge of them; and hence from knowledge of them an act of saying, by which the Word is produced, cannot arise. Or it must be asserted that the Word proceeds not through intuitive knowledge of them as now present, but through abstract knowledge of them as it were as possibles, or as it were future in a subsequent instant of reason; which seems absurd, since the things that are in God are known by intuitive knowledge, which is terminated at that which is present to God Himself. Then again, on this view the Word would proceed from the Spirit as from a passive principle, as from an intelligible principle, and would be an image of the Holy Spirit; because in order that the Word be someone's image, it is sufficient that it proceed from him as from an intelligible object per se required for the production; and by the same reasoning it would come about that the Word would be the image of itself, if it proceeded from knowledge of itself. These are the reasons that can be urged for Scotus's opinion.

But this opinion, from what was said in Disputation 112, chapters 2 and 3, can be refuted with no difficulty. For there we showed against Scotus that the foundation on which this opinion of his rests is false, namely, that the Word proceeds by an act of saying of the intellect which is posterior to intellection, whereas in truth it is produced by the very act of notional intellection. Therefore nothing seems to stand in the way why the cognition by which the Word is produced should not be the cognition of paternity and filiation, as will be explained in the following chapter. The same must be said of the Holy Spirit, since He truly proceeds by an act of notional love, and not, as Scotus thought, by another posterior act which formally would not be love, but only spiration. But how the Word is not generated by knowledge of Himself and of the Holy Spirit as under an esse possible or future, we shall immediately see against Cajetan and others.

The second opinion is that indeed the Word is produced by the cognition of Himself and of the Holy Spirit - not indeed by intuitive, but as it were by abstract, knowledge; which the authors of this view seem to gather for themselves out of Cajetan in the commentary on this article. For there he grants to Scotus's second point that the Word proceeds from Himself and from the Holy Spirit as things known by the Father's science; but this science cannot be intuitive, as of things present, but abstract, as of things possible and, in the subsequent instant of reason, of things future. And indeed, as to the Holy Spirit, this seems to follow more clearly: for in that prior sign of origin in which the Son is produced, the Holy Spirit has not yet been produced; therefore, if He is then known by notional intellection, it will be only abstract, not intuitive, knowledge.

But this opinion is no less easily rejected. For although in God we can distinguish a prior and a posterior by origin and by our reason; and although we may say that one thing is known before another; yet this is done among the things which we understand truly to be in God, not among things wholly fabricated. But in God Himself there is nothing future or possible which is not in act; therefore it is vain for us to contrive a prior and a posterior among things which are not in God, or to feign that the Father has knowledge of the Holy Spirit as future and possible, before He has it as present and existing. When, moreover, we consider the Father and the Son before they produce the Holy Spirit, then we rather conceive Him without knowledge of the Holy Spirit than with abstract

knowledge of Him. For to think of Him without thinking of the Holy Spirit is nothing else than to consider one thing in Him without considering another, from which we attribute no imperfection to Him. Nor do we assert that the Holy Spirit is not known by the Father, but according to our mode we divide things which are in God all at once, and, divided, we come to know them little by little; and so we apprehend the Father under some sign of reason in which we consider Him as yet without knowledge of the Holy Spirit. Let them therefore say that the Word is generated by the intuitive knowledge and science which the Father has of Himself and of the Holy Spirit, rather than by abstract knowledge, which in God is altogether fictitious. Nor indeed did Cajetan say anything about abstract knowledge, but pronounced absolutely that the Word proceeds from Himself and from the Holy Spirit as known by the Father's science.[489]

A third opinion is that of the Ferrarensis, on Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 13, on the clause "To the first it seems," where he affirms that the production of the Word is prior to the knowledge of creatures, even of possibles: because he thinks that the Word is produced to this end, that in Him the Father may understand by notional science the things which are in Him. From which he must necessarily assert that the Word is produced before the Father knows Him and the Holy Spirit. Some note this opinion with greater severity than is fitting, because it seems to fall into the opinion which St. Augustine once taught in the book of 83 Questions, question 23, namely, that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom, that is, by the Son.[490]

Which opinion he afterwards rightly retracted in De Trinitate VI, chapters 1 and 2; VII, chapter 1 and 3; XV, chapter 7; and in the first book of the Retractations, chapter 26.[491] But in my judgment the Ferrarensis is far removed from that opinion. For Augustine had there said that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom, as by a form; which he afterwards judged absurd: since the Father is wise in Himself, not by the Word as by His wisdom; since rather the Word is begotten wisdom from the wise Father; as Athanasius had most excellently taught in the Oration against the Gregalians of Sabellius, before the middle, where he speaks thus: "There likewise the wisdom of the Father is the Son - not as in a man, where by wisdom a man is wise - but from the wise [one] the wisdom is that from whom it takes its origin." And afterwards St. Anselm handed on the same in the Monologion, chapter 43.[492]

But the Ferrarensis teaches only this, that the Word is produced to this end, that the Father may understand by notional cognition in Him as in the produced terminus, not by Him as by intellection and wisdom; for he grants that in the Father there is not only essential science, common to the three persons, but also notional science, by which He knows all things in the Word produced by Himself. Concerning the proposition, "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom," we shall speak expressly in Disputation 151, chapter 1.

489. Cajetan: Commentary on this article.
490. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 23.
491. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, cc. 1 - 2; VII, cc. 1, 3; XV, c. 7; Retractationes I, c. 26.
492. Athanasius, Oration against the Gregalians of Sabellius (midpoint); St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 43.

But in truth this opinion of the Ferrarensis does not please me for another reason: because, as was shown in Disputation 112, chapter 2, the very act of generation and production of the Word is not prior to, nor even distinct from, the act of notional intellection; and so nothing seems to stand in the way why the Word should not at least proceed and be generated by the cognition of Himself.

Caput III - The truer view: that the Word is produced through the knowledge of the essence, the attributes, and, together, of the Father and the Son

Now, the things which are considered within God Himself, by the cognition of which the production of the Word can take place, are three: the essence (essence, essentia), the attributes, and the persons (personae). As to the first two, there can be no difficulty: for it is common knowledge that by force of its generation the Word proceeds of such a nature and perfection that, in that prior sign of reason in which the first person is understood to the generating of the second, there is conceived not only God constituted by the divine essence itself, but also perfect with every attribute and perfection which befits the divine essence and is common to the three persons. Which must necessarily be conceded even in the opinion of Scotus, who asserts that the attributes are distinct from the essence by a distinction of the nature of the thing; nor did he ever deny it. For the eternal generation, just as it communicates its nature, also communicates the things which are proper to it, so that just as it produces God, so too it produces the omnipotent, and so forth. And since generation and the production of the Word are intellection, it follows that by the intellection by which the Father understands the essence and the attributes He produces His Son. How, however, since the attributes are a secondary object of the divine intellect according to our mode of understanding, and creatures too are said, in their own way, to be a secondary object, the case is not the same for both - this we shall see in the following disputation, chapter 4. All these things, therefore - namely, the essence and the attributes - are compared with the Word of God as its principle, not producing, but intelligible in the mode of an object, that is, by the cognition of which, according to our mode of understanding, it proceeds per se.

But about the persons there is a greater difficulty, whether all of them are related in the same way in the production of the Word. The difficulty, however, arises if we speak of them in the mode of an object per se necessary to His production: for if we say that He proceeds in this way, we shall seem to fall into the absurdity which we mentioned in the second reason alleged for Scotus's opinion in the second chapter. Nevertheless I maintain, first, that it cannot be denied that the Word proceeds by intuitive cognition and science which is concerned with two persons - namely, the Father and the Word Himself - as with an object per se necessary and requisite. I advisedly said "intuitive," in order to show false the opinion which I reported in that same second chapter, and there also refuted, of those who assert that the Word is produced by abstract knowledge of the Word itself. And that this knowledge is intuitive of a thing present and existing, I prove thus. Since the production of the Word is an act (actus) of science and intellection, and for the Word to be produced is nothing other than to be understood, as we showed in Disputation 112, chapters 2 and 3: it follows that by the same act He at once ...

The Word is produced and understood by the same act; indeed, for the Word to be produced is the same as to be understood. But when the Word is produced, its production is terminated at its being (*esse*); therefore the cognition likewise. And since at once there is paternity with filiation, not only by nature, but also in our mode of understanding, it is necessary that the notional intellection of the Father be terminated at paternity itself also.

There is, however, to be observed a difference between paternity and filiation: for they are compared in a different manner with the notional cognition which is the production of the Word. Of filiation we have already said that it pertains per se as the object to the notional cognition in the way explained. But of paternity it must be said that it also pertains thereto as an object per se on the part of the principle: not because it is prior by reason to the Word, but because on the part of the Father there concurs, not only the personal property modifying the essence to be the potency of generating, but also the object which, on the part of the principle, is understood in the production of the Word. Wherefore it must be said that paternity is in the intellect of the first person in first act as it were an object in species, so that in second act it may be understood. For I consider false the opinion of those who say that the essence alone stands as the per se motive object for the production of the Word; and what they allege in confirmation has no weight. They say that the notional intellection by which the Word is produced is nothing other than the essential cognition modified by the personal property; but this ought to be prior by reason to the person, because the essential cognition is prior: therefore it ought not to be terminated at the persons. But who does not see that this argument proves nothing? For the intellection by which a person is produced ought not to be prior by reason, but only prior in origin, to the person produced. But priority of origin, as we shall say in the next chapter, is not a property according to reason; and things which are prior in origin to others are wont to be simultaneous with them in reason. For the intellection by which a person is produced is not only an intellection, but also a production; and therefore also as intellection it is conversant about that which it produces, and about that which is produced: therefore it embraces the Father and the Son, each in his own way, as we have explained.

But let someone object: if the Word is produced by knowledge of Himself, it follows that He was first in the Father's memory in first act in the mode of an object; but of those things which are in the intellect in the mode of first act, the word is an image: therefore the Word will be the image of Himself. I reply, first, that this is to be understood in the same manner of those things alone which are in the intellect in first act, from which the word really differs; for such distinction is necessary between the image and that of which it is the image. Since, therefore, the Word is not distinguished from Himself, even if we should say that He was in the paternal intellect in the mode of first act, it is not lawful to infer that He is the image of Himself.

Then, the divine Word was not in the memory of the Father as in first act in the way in which intelligible objects are, which are only understood in second act, not however produced: but He was in the memory of the Father as in a producing principle, and in the Father He is produced and understood; indeed, for Him to be understood is to be produced. But the Word can only be the image of those things which were in the Father's memory in first act in the mode only of an intelligible object; for these it can represent: but He is not the image of that which was in the

Father's memory as in a producing principle, and therefore He is not the image of Himself. Which one may also observe in human things: for the word of our mind, which was in the memory and in the first act of the intellect, is not the image of itself, because it was in that as in a productive principle; it is, however, the image of the object which it represents, because that was in the first act of the intellect as mere object, not as productive principle.

Caput IV - The Word is not produced by cognition of the Holy Spirit as a per se motive object

But indeed concerning the third person the question is much more difficult, namely whether by knowledge of Him, as of an object per se requisite, the Word proceeds. For besides those who say that the Word proceeds by knowledge of Him under possible or future being, whose opinion I reported in chapter 2, others think that the Word is produced by intuitive cognition of the Holy Spirit as present; which they confirm by two reasons. One is that the Word does not proceed only as Word, but also as spirator: therefore the Father produces the Word, not only knowing Him as Word, but also as spirator. But the Father knows thus the Son by perfect knowledge, which they call comprehensive: therefore He knows at once the terminus of that [spiration]; but the terminus is the Holy Spirit: therefore by that very thing He knows the Holy Spirit. The other reason is that the cognition by which the Word proceeds is comprehensive and intuitive of the essence; but the essence is altogether the same as the persons: therefore the same cognition is necessarily of the essence as of all the persons. And this opinion perhaps can be attributed to Cajetan in article 3 of this question: for he, as was noted in chapter 2 of this Disputation, asserts that the Word proceeds from the Holy Spirit as known, and, according to being intelligible.[493] Whether, however, this be knowledge of the Holy Spirit already existing, which they call intuitive, or of the future or possible, which they call abstractive, Cajetan himself did not explain.

But I on the contrary judge that the Holy Spirit cannot be compared as an object per se requisite for the production of the Word: which opinion I gather from Scotus in the places alleged in chapter 2, and I prove it thus. For otherwise it would follow that the Word is the image of the Holy Spirit: for He is now a likeness representing Him, because He is His word; and then in addition He would at least proceed from Him as from an object; which is sufficient for the notion of image. For although an image ought to proceed from that of which it is a likeness, nevertheless it suffices if it proceed in an intelligible manner as from an object: thus the images painted by art are images of men or of things which they represent, and yet they proceed from them only in an intelligible mode as from objects.

But you will say that for the notion of image it is necessary that it proceed physically from that of which it is a likeness, or at least from the cognition of that same thing as from a principle - as happens in images that are painted by art: for that one does not proceed from the thing which is represented, but from the cognition of it as from a principle. But the procession by which the divine Word proceeds is also the cognition of the Holy Spirit; and hence the Word does not proceed from

493. Cajetan, on this article.

the Holy Spirit, nor from His cognition, as from a principle; but the procession and origin by which the Word is produced is the very cognition of the Holy Spirit; which does not seem sufficient that the Word be called His image: for thus He proceeds in no way from Him, neither from Him as He is in Himself, nor from His cognition.

But this evasion is devised without foundation. For if from this, that some likeness proceeds from the cognition of that of which it is a likeness, it is rightly said to be the image of that, it will also suffice that it proceed from that as an object, not as previously known, but as previously existing, as it were in the memory, or in the first act of the intellect for understanding. For which reason no one has hitherto denied that the word produced by our intellect is not only the similitude of the object, but also its image: thus when we think, we are said to turn over images of things in the mind. And since in this manner the word proceeds in a certain way from the object of which it is the word, just as a picture is an image made by art, there does not seem a greater reason why the one mode of proceeding should suffice more than the other for the notion of image. But if the divine Word is not the image of the essence, this is because He is not really distinguished from it; yet He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit in the same way as from the Father: therefore in the same way He could be the image of the one and of the other, if He proceeded from each as an object per se necessary. Nor is only that word an image which proceeds from a species that impressed the potency either proximally or remotely; but also that word which proceeds from an innate species: although then the object is not compared with the word as its efficient even remotely, unless by reason of the species which first presents it in first act. In which way also the Holy Spirit can be compared with the Word, if He is an object per se requisite for the production of it.

Furthermore, to explain how the Holy Spirit is compared to the production of the Word, since by one and the same notional cognition the Word and the Holy Spirit are known, certain things must be observed. First, that the eternal Father by a single most simple intuition of notional cognition understands Himself, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; as also the blessed see. For if He understands the Word and Himself as they truly are, He will see Himself and the Son as spirator; and thus He must necessarily know the Holy Spirit. Moreover, whoever sees the essence will necessarily at the same time know the persons. And the reasons just now alleged rightly prove this; nor can there be any controversy about this matter. Now, however, the question for us is only this: what, according to our mode of understanding, is to be conceived as a principle also in the mode of an object necessary for the production of the Word; not, however, what in reality is conjoined with the same notional cognition.

Thirdly, it must be observed that that is understood by us to be a per se principle of some person, not what is merely accidentally ordered thereto, but what, as intrinsic and from the very origin, is compared as an object both to the intellect that produces and to the production of the Word itself.

Generation, as generation, is understood by us per se alone in the fourth mode of saying per se to terminate at filiation and the relation of the Word in the divine essence; but the relation of spiration we understand consequently therein. Wherefore, since the Greeks deny that He is

spirator, they nevertheless grant that He is the Word of the Father with His whole nature of the Godhead and with the sole relation of Son. And although we argue against them and prove that for this reason He is spirator, because He receives the entire nature of the Father and not divided; nevertheless we do not argue thus because we think the property of spirator follows upon the essence; for then indeed it would be compared per se with the generation of the Son in the fourth mode; but because it does not conflict with filiation, and otherwise the Son is thus God as the Father. That property or notion is not proper to the essence; it is clear, because otherwise in the Holy Spirit, who receives the whole essence, it would be found: therefore, although it is thus necessary that the second person be Son and Word, just as He is spirator; nevertheless the Father's notional cognition, insofar as it of itself suffices for the generation of the Word, does not regard the three persons, nor the second as spirator: because, that property and the third person not being considered, the Son of God is understood consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father.

Three things pertain per se to the notional cognition of the Father, by which the Son proceeds in the fourth mode of saying per se, each in its own manner: essence and the things which follow upon it, paternity, and filiation; essence, and the other common attributes, insofar as that which is to be communicated by generation to the Son - in which the formal terminus of generation consists, as will be explained in Disputation 163; the relation of the Son, as the constitutive property of the generated person and His proper relation, which at once is understood and is generated; finally, paternity, as the relation of the proper principle and per se of generation. The rest indeed necessarily accompany the cognition by which the Son is produced, by a necessity equal to that of generation and of the person, but not as something pertaining in our way of understanding in that fourth mode per se to the generation of the Son as He is Son.

The foundations of the opposing view are dissolved. For the two arguments adduced in this chapter on behalf of the contrary opinion prove nothing other than that the Holy Spirit, with equal necessity with the other persons, is understood by the Father's notional intellection; but they do not prove that the Holy Spirit pertains per se in that mode to the generation of the Son. Hence, too, the argument can be dissolved which is commonly made against our opinion in this way. The Son proceeds eternally by cognition, which is a real perfection in the Father; but the cognition of the Holy Spirit and of the property of spirator in the Son is a real perfection of the Father: therefore by that [cognition] He proceeds. Thus, therefore, this argument is easily refuted: for although the cognition by which the Father knows the Holy Spirit and the property of spirator in the Son is a real perfection of the Father indeed distinct from the cognition by which He knows Himself and the Son; nevertheless in it, in our mode of understanding, a twofold ratio can be distinguished: one, insofar as that cognition is terminated at that which is compared per se as a principle producing the Word; the other, insofar as it is terminated at that which is later in origin than the Word itself: and according to the former rationale there is the production of the Word itself, but not according to the latter. For the Father's cognition, according to whatever real perfection, is not compared with the Son as the production of Him, but according to those things which it regards as object and as per se principle of the Son, as Son: but such is not the Father's cognition, insofar as it is referred to the Holy Spirit. However, since in the Son, besides the personal property by which He is of

Himself constituted as Son, there is also the notion of spirator, which in our mode of understanding is conceived as accompanying the person of the Son according to the rationale of Son; therefore by the Father's cognition, insofar as it is terminated at the notion of spirator and at the person of the Holy Spirit, the Son proceeds as spirator. Thus far, however, I have only said that the Son proceeds according to His proper rationale of Son, not that He proceeds by the Father's cognition, insofar as it is engaged about the Holy Spirit.

But it is asked, whether in that prior, in which we understand the Father, by an intellection of Himself, of His essence, and of the Son, to generate, His intellection is perfect and comprehensive. I answer, that it is indeed comprehensive; and for this, however, that it be said by us to be comprehensive, it is sufficient that it extend to all the things which are per se presupposed in that fourth mode to the generation of the Son, among which there is not yet - namely, is not considered by us - the spiration nor the Holy Spirit. Wherefore those who say that the Word proceeds formally by the intellection by which the Holy Spirit is known, and in turn that the Holy Spirit is not an object per se moving to that intellection and production of the Word, nor compared as a principle on the side of the object, because in the instant of the intellection by which the Father understands, by the intellection which is the origin of the Son, the Holy Spirit is not yet - plainly contradict themselves. For if the Word proceeds formally by the cognition by which the Holy Spirit is known, and the Holy Spirit does not only behave concomitantly with that [cognition]; it follows that in that prior [instant], in which the Son is formally understood to proceed, the Holy Spirit is also known, and thus to move as object and to be the principled object: or if He is not yet then, it follows that the Word does not proceed formally by the very cognition, insofar as it is about the Holy Spirit, but materially, that is, by that cognition which afterward is understood to be about the Holy Spirit. Now to assert that then the Holy Spirit is understood under the being of the future or the possible, besides the fact that we have already shown this to be false - since no such cognition of a future or possible person ought to be devised in God by us - would also be a manifest contradiction. For thus the Holy Spirit, under possible being, would be per se object or principle according to intelligible being, moving to the production of the Word: for the Holy Spirit would be represented in first act in the divine essence as in a species required for the production of the Word; but nothing else is called a motive object than that which exists in an intelligible species, as in first act, so that by it the intellect produces cognition and a word.

Disputatio CXLIII - Whether the Word proceeds by the cognition of creatures

- The same is shown by a posteriori reasoning. Chapter 5.
- Replies are given to the arguments of the prior opinion. Chapter 6.

Caput I - Two theological opinions

There are certain Theologians of our time, who, not sufficiently understanding the controversy among the Scholastics about the procession of the Word from creatures known by the Father's notional cognition, affirm that the Word proceeds not only by the cognition of possible creatures, but also of existing ones: a thing which they suppose to be without controversy. And indeed, if they understand that by the same cognition at once the Father in His Word understands Himself and the other persons, and creatures, even future ones, there is no doubt that all these are comprehended by the Father's notional cognition: but the controversy between Scotus and other Theologians is certainly not placed in this, whether the Father's notional cognition embraces all those things; but whether creatures pertain in the fourth mode per se, as principle, according to intelligible being, to the production of the Word. For some things, as we shall see below, are in the same notional cognition which are concomitant, or consequent in it, nor are they compared per se with the production of a person: in which there will be no one so dull of wit who does not see that future creatures in this way cannot pertain to the generation of the Son. For since they are contingently future, so that they can not be, by possibility on the part of the cause, and thus are known as future from eternity, in such a way that they could not have been known; but the Word proceeds so necessarily that in no way could it have been possible not to proceed; they cannot pertain per se to His production. First, because a principle intelligible ought to be with equal necessity as that which proceeds from it: next also, because, since it would have been possible that God not know any future creature, if there were none: it is altogether accidental to God to know future creatures; not because that adds something intrinsic to God; but because it is a certain order of reason which altogether befalls Him. Nor is it only true that the Word does not proceed per se by the cognition of future things absolutely; but neither by the cognition of contingent truths under a condition, which God has always known: a thing which is proved by the same rationale. For these objects and truths are so eternal, that of themselves it does not involve a contradiction that the opposite part be true:

but, as we said, the principle, as an intelligible, of some person ought to be no less necessary than the very person who proceeds; otherwise one could conceive a person proceeding in the same nature and property without such a principle; whence it would follow that that would not be a principle per se: for, once the per se principle is removed, that which is from the principle is also removed. Therefore, creatures future absolutely, or under a condition, being set aside, about the possibles there is greater controversy.

And of all the things that are in Himself. When he says that the Word is "of" those things which are in the Father, he understands it as "in the science of the Father," of which he had spoken before; but that particle "of" signifies procession; for throughout that chapter he very often uses it in that signification.

There is, moreover, an opinion of certain men, that creatures known as possible pertain per se to the production of the Word no less than the essence of God, and the other things which are in Him. This was taught by Gabriel in the First Book, distinction 27, question 3, article 3, doubt 1,

conclusion 2; by Cajetan on this article; and by the Canarian in the fifth article of question 27, in a single disputation; likewise by not a few among the more recent writers; for among the ancients this matter was not disputed. One is accustomed to cite Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 13; but he held an entirely different view: for he clearly holds that the production of the Word is not by cognition of creatures, moved by this reason, because he thinks the production of the Word, according to the ratio of production and utterance, to be prior to it according to the ratio of cognition; indeed, that the Word is produced to the end that in It the Father may know all things by a notional cognition, which He knows in Himself by the essential intellection, of which enough was said by us in the preceding disputation, chapter 2.[494][495][496][497]

But this opinion is proved, first and foremost, by the authority of St. Thomas in this article 3, when he says that the Word is expressive of creatures, because it is the representative of that which the mind understands; but God understands not only Himself, but also all creatures. Next, from article 1 of this question, to the third reply, where he speaks thus: "For the Father, by understanding Himself, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all other things which are contained in His science, conceives the Word; so that the whole Trinity is said by the Word, and even every creature." By which words he plainly indicates, not only that creatures are named and understood concomitantly in the divine Word by the Father, but also that they of themselves concur per se to its utterance: for indeed the Father, by understanding them, says and pronounces His Word. To this is added St. Augustine, who in De Trinitate XV, chapter 14, seems to have taught this much more clearly: "Thus God the Father knows all things in Himself; He knows in the Son; but in Himself as Himself; in the Son as His Word, which is...."[498][499][500]

But by reason also it is confirmed, first, because the divine Word proceeds from a perfect and comprehensive cognition of the essence; but the essence cannot be comprehended unless omnipotence be perfectly understood: now this cannot be known without possible creatures, to which it is referred: therefore the Word formally and per se proceeds by the cognition of the Father inasmuch as it is terminated to possible creatures.

Second, possible creatures seem to be nothing other from eternity than the very essence of God; but the Word proceeds by cognition of the essence formally, and that is per se compared as object to the production of the Word: therefore so also are possible creatures.

Third, to know the divine essence, or to represent creatures in itself, is some perfection of it; but every perfection of the divine essence pertains per se, as object, to the production of the Word: therefore so also does the representation of creatures; but this cannot be known unless at once the creature be known: therefore thus does the Word proceed by cognition of the essence formally, just as also by cognition of creatures.

494. Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 1, concl. 2.
495. Cajetan, on this article (ST I, q. 34, a. 3).
496. Canariensis, on question 27, article 5, disputatio unica.
497. Ferrariensis, In IV Contra Gentiles, cap. 13.
498. St. Thomas, ST I, q. 34, a. 3: "the Word is expressive of creatures..."
499. St. Thomas, ST I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3.
500. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 14.

Caput II - Scotus's position is set forth

Scotus, however, in the Second Book, distinction 1, question 1, ad primum; and in the same question, in the part "As to this, therefore"; and in Quodlibet 14, question 5, affirms that the Word does not proceed by a cognition of creatures formally, nor do creatures in any way bear themselves to its production as an intelligible principle, but that it is produced from the cognition of the essence alone.[501] I pass over what he holds concerning the persons - whether they pertain to cognition - from the preceding disputation, chapter 1. Therefore, since he says in the First Book, distinction 2, question 7, in the fourth objection near the end, that the Word does not proceed by an act of understanding, but by an act of saying, which he thinks to be different from the act of understanding, and that the act of saying arises from the act of understanding - he asserts that one must add and put forward that only the act of understanding is required per se, and that one which is occupied about the divine essence, and in no way about creatures; which, that he may explain, he notes certain things.

First, that in the divine acts a twofold order can be considered, one of nature, another of origin: as there is an order of time and of reason; and just as, in the same instant of time, several distinct things can be assigned according to reason, so also in a single instant of the order according to nature several instants can be assigned according to origin. Scotus considers the order according to nature in the intellect and will of God with respect to the primary and secondary object: he calls the divine essence primary; but creatures secondary. He says, therefore, that the divine essence is understood by God prior in nature to God's understanding creatures: because He knows them by reason of the essence. In the prior instant, therefore, according to nature, he says the whole order of origin among the persons can be considered: that is, by considering the intellect and the will of God about His essence, the procession of the Word and of the Holy Spirit, in the due order of origin, can be understood. And thus, in one instant of nature, Scotus considers the whole order of origin: because He understands God operating within Himself, from the very fact that He conceives that He is beatified; and since God is beatified by His operation about His essence alone so considered, with good reason he establishes in it, in our mode of understanding, the whole order of origin.

Second, he notes that another complete order of origin can be considered in a second instant according to nature, that is, about the secondary object, namely about creatures: for in the cognition of them the divine persons are thus related, that the Father understands them of Himself, the Son receives from the Father the cognition of them, the Holy Spirit from both; and thus other instants of origin are assigned. But this order of origin (says Scotus) is not the simple one, according to which one person proceeds from another; but a qualified order, and as it were consequent upon the first: for it is first said that one person proceeds from another and receives operation about the primary object rather than about the secondary.

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501. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, ad 1; ibid., q. 1, "Quantum ad hoc igitur"; Quodlib. 14, q. 5; and cf. In I Sent., d. 2, q. 7, obj. 4 (circa finem).

Third, he notes that creatures are not in the Father's memory as in an act first, nor are they made intelligible by the essence itself as by a species; but by the act of intellection whereby secondary things are understood they are rendered intelligible - not that he should think that the being of creatures in the divine intellect is merely a being of reason; but because the memory of the Father is not in act first by the essence as by the species of creatures, but solely is a species of those things which are in God formally and intrinsically.

Caput III - Scotus's position, as truer, is proved by authority

I, for my part, judge the position of Scotus to be much truer, which in this chapter by authority, and in the following chapters by reason, I shall strive to confirm. In the first place, St. Anselm in the Monologion is for it: for when in chapter 29 he had said that the divine Word is not the likeness of creatures, in chapter 30 he then begins thus: "But since it is so, how can that which is simply truth be the word of those things of which it is not the likeness, since every word, by which a thing is said in the mind, is a likeness of the thing itself? And if it is not the word of the things which have been made, how will there be a word - since every word is the word of some thing? Finally, if never were there a creature, there would be no word of it: what then is to be concluded - whether, if there were in no way a creature, by no means would that word exist which is the supreme and needful-of-nothing essence; or perhaps that supreme essence, which is the Word, would indeed be an eternal essence, but would not be a word, if never anything should be made by it?" By these words he proposes the ground for doubting: namely, how, if the Word is not the likeness of creatures, it can be their word: which, if it is not their word, it is not seen how it can be a word. But he replies, after a few things interposed, in this way: "But would it not understand itself (to wit, that supreme wisdom), or how can it even be thought that supreme wisdom should ever not understand itself, when at some time a rational mind can not only recollect its own mind, but also that supreme wisdom?" And a little later: "Therefore that supreme Spirit, as He is eternal, so is He the eternal rememberer of Himself, and He understands Himself after the manner of the rational mind - not after its manner, indeed, but rather that is principal and the rational mind is after His likeness: but if He eternally understands Himself, He eternally says Himself; if He eternally says Himself, His Word is eternal with Him." Therefore, let Him be thought with no other thing existing...[502]

Hence, if the essence exists without other things existing, it is necessary that the Word be coeternal with it. From which we have, in the same way, that the divine Word would be future even if there were no essence [besides the divine], and thus would need no other essence for its production: but if it proceeded through cognition of creatures, without doubt it would need them, and their cognition, for its production.

The Anselmian testimony is resolved. But if you answer that Anselm speaks of creatures future, present, or past, not of possible ones, read him in chapters 33 and 34: for after in chapters 31 and 32 he had proposed the difficulty whether, namely, God says Himself and creatures by the same Word or by a different one - since from the preceding it seemed concluded that the eternal Word is

502. St. Anselm, Monologion, cc. 29 - 30.

not the word of creatures - he answers in chapter 33 that God says Himself and creatures by the same Word, but in this way: "Therefore, since the supreme Spirit says Himself, He says all things that are made: for before they were made, when now they are made, and when they are corrupted or are changed in some way, they are always in Him - not what they are in themselves, but what is the same He; for in themselves they are a changeable essence, according to the changeable notion of a created thing, but in Him they are the very first essence and the first truth of existing: and so, in this way it cannot be rationally asserted that because the supreme Spirit says Himself, He also says whatever has been made, by one and the same Word." He pursues the same in chapter 34, showing that every notion of a created thing is, in God and in His Word, the life of God.

Observe here first: if Anselm had thought that the Word proceeds formally through cognition of possible creatures according to their proper notions, he would have conceded that the divine Word is their word and likeness, and thus is the word of the things that have been made, at least according to their possible being. But since he asserts that by the divine Word there is said and expressed only the essence of God and the essences of the things that have been made, not according to their proper notions - even possible ones - but according to that whereby, in God Himself, they are God Himself and His life, without doubt he sensed that by this sole reason the Word is the word of creatures, even of possibles, namely, insofar as in God they are the life of God; for by this sole reason it is their likeness. He therefore excludes from the production of the Word, as an object per se required, even the essence possible according to its proper notion; and admits only the divine essence and what are formally in it. And since for the same reason he denies that the divine Word is the word of future creatures according to their proper notions, because it is not their likeness; by the same reasoning he ought to speak about possible creatures: for the case is the same for both, namely, that by that sole reason the Word is a likeness of creatures, insofar as they are the same as the essence and life of God Himself.

We, however, do not deny that the Word proceeds through intellection of creatures insofar as in God they are God Himself; nor is there any controversy about this. But we say that it does not proceed through cognition of them according to the proper notions which they have in themselves, even according to possible being.

This Anselmian testimony proves for us that he thinks the divine Word is not per se first the word of creatures: not that we deny, as he denies, that it is the word of creatures - even of future ones - according to their proper notions and likeness; for that cannot be denied. For by His Word God not only says Himself and creatures as they are the same as Himself and His life; but He also says them according to their proper notions: just as He not only understands Himself and creatures insofar as they are the same as Himself, but also according to their proper notions. Wherefore we cannot deny that the divine Word is so the word of creatures as also to be their likeness; but this kind of likeness is not in the same nature, nor is it an image, but it is a likeness by mere representation; and this suffices for the notion of a word: for the word of our mind, which we have about some substance or corporeal thing, is a likeness of it, not in the same nature, as is evident, but by a certain representation; yet in reality it is not an image of creatures, as we shall say in chapter 5.

But indeed Anselm, because he thought it inconvenient if the divine Word, precisely as Word, needed some creature according to the proper notion of a creature, therefore said that it is not the word of creatures according to their proper notions, but in the manner that we have explained. Yet it would without doubt be a great inconvenience if we were to say that it is equally first the substantial word of creatures according to their proper notions, even possibles, and the word of the Father; and that for its substantial production and characteristic property it in any way needed creatures. But, to avoid this absurdity, it is enough if we say that for the production of the Word there is required per se first and formally the cognition of the things which are formally in God, in the way that we said in the foregoing disputation.

There is added St. Thomas, who in De veritate, question 4, at the end, teaches that the Word is referred principally and, as it were, per se to the Father, but consequently and, as it were, per accidens to creatures; and in the second solution he says that the Word is not "of" a creature in the sense in which it would be "from" a creature; yet it is "about" a creature or "of a creature," because it is representative of it, as of an object.[503] But if the Word were produced formally by intellection insofar as it is of creatures, it would proceed from them according to intelligible being, and would also be said to be from them, as will be explained below. Now to interpret St. Thomas as speaking only of creatures which will at some time be, not of possibles, is trifling; for since he speaks about them absolutely, and joins to them only the divine essence, he seems to be speaking of all. Moreover, I do not see by the authority of what other Father or Scholastic writer this our opinion can be confirmed: few indeed have disputed about it, except the school of Scotus, which in this opinion defends its author. Wherefore now in the following chapter it must be confirmed by reason.

Caput IV - The a priori proof

The aforesaid opinion is confirmed by an a priori reason.

In order then by reason to prove this opinion, there must be recalled to mind what in chapters 1 and 4 of the preceding disputation we noted; especially that which, in the last place, we were saying, namely, that there is here no controversy whether by the same cognition by which the divine Word is primarily, by that same, not by another, God knows creatures, even future ones: but whether, through that cognition, insofar as it is of creatures, the Word proceeds formally; so that creatures, according to intelligible being, not only necessarily accompany the production of the Word, but also are compared with it per se in the fourth mode, as a principle according to intelligible being, which it has in memory and in first act. And thus it would be necessary that in a certain priority of reason we conceive possible creatures by the Father's intellect according to intelligible being before the Word is produced: or rather, can we understand a complete and perfect-in-itself Word produced by the Father, creatures possible not yet understood; as if, accidentally, together with the nature and characteristic property of the Word they were compared?

503. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 4, at the end; and solution 2.

Now therefore I show that possible creatures do not precede in our way of understanding, according to intelligible being, as something per se necessary, the production of the Word. For if in this way they necessarily preceded, it would follow that the divine essence, according to its notion, would have a real order and connection with them; and there would be in it an intrinsic perfection of representing - representing, I say, according to the formal relative notion which we signify by the name "representation" - the creatures. But there is in God no such perfection beyond those which God has in Himself insofar as He is absolutely to Himself; therefore that representation of creatures cannot pertain per se to the production of the Word, but only the divine essence insofar as it is absolute to itself.

That this "representation" does not denote some peculiar perfection beyond the essence considered absolutely, without representation, is clear, because there is in God no real relation, that is, intrinsic and from the nature of the thing, to creatures, however you wish to name them, as was stated in disputation 104, chapter 6.[504] Wherefore the divine essence considered as absolute, without the representation of creatures, is understood as infinite and perfect.

But you will ask how it can be that creatures are said to be represented in God without the essence having some peculiar perfection for this? I answer that this happens in no other way than as we say that things future de facto are represented, which, no change being made in God, insofar as they would be in themselves, would not be represented, and would not be future; and they are said to be known by the knowledge of vision, so that what would otherwise be known only by the vision of simple intelligence, is known by the vision of cognition of actual existence. But this happens because the divine essence in itself, and considered absolutely to itself, is of such perfection that even if nothing were to be future or possible outside it, it would be altogether the same: but once a possible or a future is posited, without any change or relative perfection accruing, by a relation of reason alone it comes to be compared as representing and as certainly understanding what is compared. And he who must philosophize ought to grant that that relation is only of reason; which is the consent of all the Scholastics whom we there cited, nor has anyone hitherto dared to hold the opposite opinion; which we there proved by very strong reason. For the supreme being and supremely necessary, namely God, cannot have a connection with other things outside Himself, or need anything in order that He be: for, that being taken away by an impossibility, it follows by the intrinsic topic that nothing outside Him would be possible; whereas, with any other impossibility posited, by the intrinsic topic it would not follow that He Himself would not be possible, as is clear. Therefore God is in Himself absolute from every other. Whence it is that we say the divine essence is the primary object, truly per se necessary for the production of the Word; but creatures are secondary, and in no way per se required, but necessarily accompanying the production itself, although not with an equal necessity with that by which the Word is substantially produced. And as the essence is the primary object required for the production of the Word, so also the attributes, which so perfect the essence itself, that per se also and with equal necessity they regard the production of the Word.

504. See the author's disputation 104, cap. 6, on the absence of any real relation in God toward creatures.

But some say that the divine Word and possible creatures are with equal necessity; for the possible being of a thing is nothing else than not to imply a contradiction, which consists in a negation; and one negation of contradiction is not greater than another. This objection, however, can first easily be refuted from those things which we said above in disputation 104, chapter 6,[504] because in the very essences of things there is "more and less" according to the doctrine of Aristotle; and among truths one is greater than another: it is more a truth that the Word can be produced, than that creatures are possible. For just as it is a greater falsity that the Word cannot be produced, than that creatures are not possible; so too not to imply a contradiction is explained by a negation; yet that negation is not the object of the divine omnipotence, for omnipotence regards a posited object, as we said in the same place.[504] Finally, even among negations there can be, in a certain way, greater and lesser, inasmuch as the opposed positive is greater; whence the privation is greater, as we shall say in I - II, q. 7, a. 2; and thus the negation of the implication of contradiction is greater in that wherein the divine Word can be produced than in that wherein creatures are possible; just as the falsity and contradiction is greater in the opposite, namely in that the Word is not produced, than in that creatures are not produced.

Caput V - The a posteriori proof

The same is shown by a posteriori reasoning.

We can show the same opinion by reducing it to an absurdity, and at the same time explain it further. The first argument is this. If the Word, according to its substance and intrinsic characteristic property, proceeded formally by cognition of possible creatures, and those were objects per se required for this production of the Word, it would follow that the Word is not only a likeness, but also an image of creatures according to possible being - which no one concedes. For an image is a likeness proceeding from that which it represents, made in an intelligible mode; and this suffices if it proceeds from something as from an object existing in reality or as present in the intellect, as we said in the foregoing disputation, chapter 1, where we asserted the same about the Holy Spirit, namely, that the Word is the image of Him, in that by His cognition it proceeds formally: which reasoning we have followed here, and in the same way it has force in the present case. Some reply that in God the Word is not an image of creatures, because it does not proceed from them even as from primary objects existing in the Father's mind in first act, but as from secondary objects. But then I ask, what prevents its being an image of them secondarily, just as the eternal Word is said to be secondarily the word "of" creatures, while it is primarily the Word of the divine essence? To assert, indeed, that the notion of image belongs primarily and also secondarily only with respect to a primary object, although it is asserted gratuitously, has no true measure in reason. For if ...

Commonly likeness is defined thus: a likeness (*similitudo*) proceeding from something (understand also: as from an object) in order to represent. Anselm, as we noted in chapter 3, shrinks from conceding that the divine Word is a likeness of creatures, much less an image; but we

504. See the author's disputation 104, cap. 6, on the absence of any real relation in God toward creatures.

say that it is indeed a likeness, because it represents them; yet not an image (*imago*), because it does not proceed from them as objects per se, but they are wholly accidental to the substance and character of the Word, and it is referred to them only by a relation of reason; and its nature is such that, without them, it would remain in itself in the same mode. For neither the notion of idea, nor anything relative to creatures, denotes in God more than a relation of reason, and his absolute essence (*essentia*) in itself in no way depends on anything extrinsic. Wherefore we can concede that creatures, according to possible existence (*esse*), are in the memory of the Father - which Scotus plainly denies - yet they are there in a secondary manner, as in the produced Word; and by no means do they per se pertain to its substantial and characteristic production.[505]

Posterior reason. Even if, per impossibile, one or another creature, or even all, were impossible, it would not follow, by the intrinsic topic, either that the divine Word would not be produced, or that it would be going to have another property and nature; therefore in no way would a creature per se pertain to the production of the Word. For if it necessarily pertained, it would follow, by the intrinsic topic, that it would not be in the Word in the same mode: for, when that which per se regards the production of something is removed, either its production is taken away, or that thing is produced as something of an altogether different kind in reason. This argument has forced the adversaries to split into various opinions. Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, warns us to be cautious on account of the diverse conditional propositions which in this matter are true. For this conditional is true: "Even if possible creatures did not exist, nonetheless the procession of the Word would exist in itself in the same mode"; from which there seems to follow that the production of the Word is prior to the possibility of creatures. And the contrary proposition is also true: "Even if the procession of the Word did not exist, nonetheless creatures would be possible"; from which there seems to be inferred that the possibility of creatures is prior to the very production of the Word. Therefore Cajetan warns that we must be cautious not to deny what in fact is the case. For although these conditionals are true, nonetheless it must be said that the Word now proceeds through the cognition of creatures. We might also, in Cajetan's favor, add that it is not surprising if from one impossibility another should follow: for from an impossibility anything follows.

But Cajetan's admonition helps us little. For if both those conditionals are true, they plainly indicate that it is altogether accidental both, for producing the Word, that creatures be possible, and, for producing creatures, that the Word be produced. For just as from the fact that, God remaining according to unity, creatures could be produced, it follows that the Trinity is related accidentally to their production, and that creatures can be produced by God precisely as one, not as triune; so also from the fact that the Word would be produced even if creatures were not possible, it is rightly inferred that possible creatures do not per se look to the production of the Word. For if creatures pertained per se to the production of the Word, and the Trinity to the production of creatures, it would follow very well that, with possible creatures removed, the Word would be taken away, and with the Trinity removed from the midst, creation also would be taken away: for when that which is per se is removed, that which arises from it per se is removed.

504. See the author's disputation 104, cap. 6, on the absence of any real relation in God toward creatures.
505. See Scotus' denial, and the author's opinion, disputation 104, cap. 6.

Moreover, we must not only attend to what in fact happens, as Cajetan wishes, but, among those things which in the production or distinction of some thing agree in act, we must discern which are per se pertinent, and which are accidental and concomitant or consequent. For this, it is most useful to argue from impossible suppositions, as in disputation 147 we shall do in the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son: for from that it easily appears what is the formal reason (*ratio formalis*) of something, what also per se pertains to the thing, and what holds only concomitantly. Nor indeed from an impossible supposition does it follow by the intrinsic topic that anything whatsoever follows, as we shall note there in chapter 1; but what is formal and per se in some thing, whether to be distinguished or produced, is most rightly inferred. Therefore both those conditionals rightly indicate that neither do possible creatures per se regard the production of the Word, nor the Trinity the production of creatures, even if it is produced by the three together, and even if, in the very production of the Word, creatures are simultaneously understood by the Father and are called the Father's by the Word itself. Others, constrained by the same argument, admit that, once that hypothesis is made - that creatures would be impossible - the divine Word would not proceed in the same nature and property; and these, to be sure, speak consistently with their own opinion: but this is manifestly absurd. First, because it is not the case that, from the fact that a stone would be impossible, God would not be God, or that some intrinsic perfection would be lacking to God. For since he is the first being, he is so absolutely perfect in himself that he needs no possible thing; indeed, as soon as God is understood, creatures are understood to be possible - that is, not to imply a contradiction - as we noted in disputation 104; though not conversely. Therefore, since God, by the very fact that he is God and supremely perfect in himself, by his own nature begets, it follows that he does not need possible creatures, as objects per se necessary, for the production of the Word. Next, even if some creature implied a contradiction among those which we suppose to be possible, God would truly be omnipotent, infinitely knowing, and wise: for he is not called omnipotent because he can make this and that creature together with others, but because he is in himself so perfect that whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done by him; nor is his omnipotence diminished because he cannot do what is impossible. Concerning knowledge and wisdom the same must be said; therefore at least from this we have that there is no creature in particular by whose cognition the Word proceeds formally, and which would per se be necessary for the production of the Word.

But some say that, from the supposition that some creature would be impossible - for instance, that a stone would be impossible - both would follow, namely that God would be omnipotent, and that he would not be; because that supposition implies a contradiction ex terminis: and hence from it there follows each part of the contradiction in the present difficulty, namely that God would be omnipotent and would not be omnipotent; that the Son would be produced and would not be produced. But this argumentation is frivolous; for in every impossible supposition there is a contradiction in the very terms, as there is in this one, "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son"; nonetheless, as we shall show below in disputation 147, chapter 1, from an impossible supposition, with the supposition itself retained, it does not follow by the intrinsic topic that any part of the contradiction follows; but from it we can argue usefully. Moreover, who would dare to

say that, therefore, God is God and supremely perfect because a man, or an ape of such a nature and figure, can be made possible? or that the Word proceeds within him in such a nature and characteristic property because an ape of such a figure is possible? For what connection will the intelligible Word have with an ape, as with a principle according to possible existence? But if this is ridiculous, indeed absurd, let us say that the productions of the persons within God are altogether absolute from possible creatures, nor are creatures in the order of origin in any way prior. I said advisedly, in the order of origin: for they can be understood as prior in another kind of priority, namely that by which that essence and what follows essentially are understood to be prior to the personal things - a priority which is as it were universal, by which that is said to be prior from which the consequence of subsisting does not hold, according to Aristotle's mind in the Predicaments, in the chapter on the modes of the prior; as animal is prior to man. But this kind of priority matters little for saying that creatures are per se required for the production of the Word; for to this end they would have to be prior not only by this kind of priority, but also by origin. Moreover, by this kind of priority the knowledge of vision of future creatures also precedes; although, according to everyone who holds the truth, that knowledge in no way per se pertains to production.

But if God and the Word itself are in reality absolute from every other, and are not connected with any creature by a real relation, it rightly follows that, when anything else whatever is removed per impossibile, the procession of the Word will be in the same way: because what is absolute remains in the same way when anything else whatever is removed, as before. Furthermore, it is certain that none of the Scholastics posited in the divine Word a relation more than of reason toward creatures; and this follows from the things we said in disputation 104, chapter 6.[506]

To all these add that, for exactly the same reasons, the Holy Spirit does not proceed by the love of creatures under possible existence, even if we say that in this mode they are the object of the divine love. I say this because I know that among the Scholastic Doctors there is a controversy whether love is borne toward possible creatures, or only toward future ones, as we saw in disputation 79. But whoever asserts that it is terminated only to future ones will doubtless teach that the Holy Spirit does not proceed formally by their love; the authors of this opinion we reported in chapter 1. Among those, however, who assert that the love of God is also borne toward possible creatures, whom we mentioned in chapter 2, the controversy can be handled in the same way as about the Word; and it must be defined in the same way, and by exactly the same reasons. We therefore, who assert that God...

God is in himself absolutely perfect without any order to creatures; consequently we teach not only that the production of the Word, but also that of the Holy Spirit is perfect before possible creatures are either understood or loved.

It is necessary to refute the arguments of the prior opinion. To the first testimony of St. Thomas I answer that the divine Word does indeed express in itself the creatures, even according to their proper formal reasons, and is their word, although Anselm thinks the opposite, as was said in

chapter 3; nevertheless from this it is not lawful to infer that creatures pertain per se to the production of the Word according to the Word's own intrinsic notion. For that it is the word of creatures, it has from a respect of reason alone toward them, and consequently; whereas without such an order it is substantially in itself perfect without any respect to creatures. And indeed, since St. Thomas there speaks not only of possible creatures but also of future ones, because the divine Word expresses all creatures according to St. Thomas's own opinion, and therefore the Father by his Word says not only possibles but also futures, it follows that he is not speaking of possibles as per se pertaining on the part of the principle; for futures do not per se pertain, and nonetheless they are expressed and said by the divine Word.

To the second testimony of St. Thomas I answer that it is true that the Father, by understanding himself, and his Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all other things that are in his knowledge, produces the Word; not because all these per se pertain to the substantial production of the Word, but because they are known together by the same knowledge by which the Word is produced, although creatures, as attendant or consequent, bear themselves to the production of the Word. That this is St. Thomas's meaning is gathered from the fact that he speaks of every creature and of all the things that are contained in God's knowledge; under this there falls not only the possible creature but also the future, because God knows one thing when he knows a future, and another when he knows a possible: for they are different objects and intelligible truths. Therefore, since future creatures do not per se look to the production of the Word, it follows that St. Thomas was not speaking there of those things alone that per se concur to that production, but also of all the things that accompany it.

To the third testimony, which was from St. Augustine, one could reply first that in that place the particle "de" does not signify origin, but an order to an object; for Augustine did not say that the Word is born "from" all the things that are in the Father, but that it is "of" all those things: and one can say that the Word is "of" something from which it does not proceed, because it is of it as of an object. In this way St. Thomas teaches, in that question 4 of De veritate, in the replies, that the divine Word can be called the word "of" creatures and "about" creatures, but not "from" creatures; because the particle "a" ("from") denotes origin, whereas the particle "de" ("of, about") can signify only an order toward an object.[507] But because Augustine often uses in that chapter the preposition "de" so as to denote origin, we do not refuse to admit this signification in the whole chapter. Yet if we have shown that he is speaking there not only of the knowledge of possible creatures, but also of future ones, the cited testimony will have no force against our position: for no one will dare to say that future creatures per se pertain to the substantial production of the Word, but only as accompanying. Now that Augustine is speaking of the knowledge even of future things is clear from the whole discourse of the preceding chapter, in which he proves that the Father has the knowledge of all things, even of future ones, and receives the notice of nothing from his angels the spirits; which he proved from that Matt. 6: "For your Father knows what you need before you ask him." He

506. See the author's disputation 104, cap. 6, on there being in the divine Word no real relation toward creatures. Also cf. Aristotle, Predicaments, the chapter on the modes of the prior; and Cajetan's commentary on this article.

507. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 4, ad 2 (on the usage of "of" and "from" in naming the Word with respect to creatures).

adds moreover: "Nor did he come to know it from some time so as to know, but he foreknew without beginning all future times, and in them also what and when we would ask of him, and whom, and about which things, he would hear or would not hear," and so on.[508] Then he shows that this knowledge of God is very far removed from ours in these words: "But the knowledge of God is itself wisdom, as it were wisdom; it is the very essence or substance: because in the marvelous simplicity of his nature there is not one thing to be wise and another to be; whereas our knowledge in many things is losable and receivable; wherefore for us it is not the same thing to be as to know or to be wise: for we can be even if we are ignorant." From this he gathers that in the same way the word which is born from our knowledge is dissimilar to that which is born from the Father's essence; he said expressly "from the Father's essence," not "from his knowledge," because he had already shown that essence and knowledge are the same; wherefore he subjoins: "Such a thing it is as if I were to say, 'from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom,' or, what is more express, 'of the Father's knowledge, of the Father's wisdom.'"

Immediately he begins from the beginning of chapter 15 - which had been alleged for the contrary opinion - to prove that the Word of the Father is "essence from essence," "wisdom from wisdom," and "knowledge from knowledge," in all things like and equal, so that there is nothing in the Father's knowledge which is not in the Word, because his knowledge is his essence, and the Word has received this whole and equally perfect. "Therefore," says Augustine, "the only-begotten of God the Father, the Son of God, in all things like and equal to the Father - God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence from essence - is altogether what the Father is, yet not the Father: for he is Son, that one Father: and on this account he knows all things that the Father knows; but he is 'from the Father' as he is 'to be.'" And a little after: "Accordingly, as it were speaking himself, the Father begot a Word in all things equal to himself; for he would not have spoken himself completely and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in his Word than in himself; and therefore this Word is true truth, because whatever is in the knowledge of which it is begotten, is in it." By these words Augustine openly teaches that in the Word there must be the knowledge of all things, even of future things, which he had said above to be in the Father, so that there is nothing less in the Son than in the Father. For if knowledge of future things were lacking to the Son himself, undoubtedly he would not be "wisdom whole from wisdom," nor "knowledge whole from knowledge," nor would the Father have spoken himself wholly. When therefore afterwards he says, "Accordingly God the Father knows all things in himself; he knows them in the Son, but in himself, as himself in the Son, as his Word, which is 'of' those things that are in himself," which words we alleged for the prior opinion, they must be understood, in accordance with the foregoing, as speaking of the knowledge of all things, both future and past and present; for he is speaking also of the knowledge of future things, which he had earlier said to be in the Father. He says, then, that the Word is born "of" all the things that are in the Father, even of the knowledge of future and of possible things; but in the mode in which they are in the Father. For all the things that the Son has, even knowledge of future things, he has from the Father, and in the same way they are in both; but because the knowledge of God, which is his essence, primarily and per se

508. Matt. 6:8; and see St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, esp. cc. 14 - 15.

befits God the Father insofar as he is of himself; insofar, however, as it is referred to possible creatures, it befits him secondarily and consequently, even if necessarily, as was explained above; whereas insofar as it is of future creatures, it befits him contingently; therefore in the same way it befits the Son. And although creatures do not per se look to the substantial production of the Son according to the Son's own nature and personal property, nevertheless they pertain per se to his procession insofar as such a procession proceeds secondarily, with respect, namely, to possible and to future creatures - about which there is no controversy. Therefore we ought thus to consider the Word, that first it is in itself substantially produced, cut off from every creature even a possible one, as we have said, to be God of such a nature that, if there shall be possible creatures, it knows them; if there shall be future ones, likewise: yet this is altogether accidental and has no real order to them. Wherefore, to the production of the Word considered in this manner, whatever creatures there may be are accidental; yet to that production, insofar as now it is considered with a respect to creatures and to their actual knowledge, both of possible and of future things, possible and future creatures per se pertain; and this alone Augustine contends, namely, that the Word should have all the things from the Father whatever the Father has, and in the same way; which does not militate against our opinion.

In addition, Augustine seems to be using "creatures" as Anselm did - whom we reported in chapter 3 - not according to their proper formal reasons, but according to that whereby in God they are God himself and his life; and in this way they per se pertain to the production of the Word, and about this there is no controversy. For the question is only about creatures according to their proper formal reasons, by which they are distinguished from God and according to which they are not the life of God himself. That Augustine speaks in this sense I gather from his words: "But in himself, as himself in the Son, as his Word." As if he were to say: all the things that the Father sees in himself he knows as the same as himself, which are his life; and therefore he rightly subjoins at once, "Which is 'of' those things that are in himself." For if in God the Father himself they are life and his substance, and the Son is "of" the life and substance of the Father, the Son will be "of" those things per se indeed, yet otherwise than he is "of" creatures considered according to their proper formal reasons.

The arguments, moreover, can no less easily be solved from what has been said.

Reply to the first argument: I say that for the Son to proceed from an act which is perfect and comprehensive does not make that act be a comprehension of creatures at the same time because God knows creatures; rather, from the fact that his knowledge is comprehensive, it has this, that he can know all possible creatures - not with the same degree of necessity and priority as the essence itself, but consequently and secondarily, as they are compared with the essence. For just as, to the notion of comprehension, it belongs that God can know the secrets of his will and the things which he decreed to do in time, yet actual knowledge of these is not required so that the Word may proceed - for these are far posterior to the production of the Word - so neither is actual knowledge of possible creatures required; for these too are accidental to the production of the Word, and in

the order of origin are not per se requisites; although possible creatures, indeed, are necessarily known, yet not with an equal degree of necessity when they are compared with the divine essence; whereas future creatures are altogether known contingently in that comparison.

Reply to the second argument: When it is objected that omnipotence cannot be understood without possible creatures because it is referred to them, I reply that omnipotence, as it is conceived and named by us, cannot be understood without creatures, because a relation is conceived; but as it is in God, as absolute - just as was proved in disputation 104, chapter 6 - it is rightly understood as a quidditative and comprehensive knowledge without such an order and without creatures being understood together with it. For thus it is nothing other than God himself absolutely perfect in himself, whom we confess with all theologians to exist; and, as we noted there, no one ought to marvel if we say that God's omnipotence is known by God in itself absolutely, without any respect to creatures. Rather, as we showed there, the opinion of those is worthy of reproof who, in order to defend that creatures are per se as necessary to the production of the Word as the essence is, invent in God relations, from the nature of the thing, to creatures.[509]

Reply to the third argument: As to what must be said further, to represent creatures is not in God some perfection relative to creatures which would be removed if creatures were taken away; but it is the very essence of God insofar as it is in itself absolute; which would remain in God in the same way, even if there were no possible creatures at all; yet it would not be called by us a representation of creatures - because this is understood with a relation of reason to creatures, which, once creatures are taken away, altogether perishes, as we said above about the presence of future things. Therefore it does not follow that there is any necessary connection between the being of the divine essence and creatures, whether possible or as adduced to ground the production of the Word; for whatever else the divine essence represents, representing creatures is by a relation of reason and from its nature refers to them.

Disputatio CXLIV - In what way the name "Word" denotes a respect

The name "Word" in God primarily signifies the relation of what is produced; it connotes essence secondarily. cap. 1.

Not by reason of essence alone, nor by reason of personal property alone, but by reason of both together, the Word has a respect to creatures. cap. 2.

Caput I - The name "Word" in God primarily signifies the relation of what is produced; it connotes essence secondarily

St. Thomas, in question 4 of De veritate, article 8, and elsewhere, whom Ferrarensis follows; against whom - as was shown above in chapter 3, in the reply to the second doubt - he affirms that the name "Word" directly and primarily in God signifies essence, as it does in us.[510]

509. See the author's disputation 104, cap. 6, on there being in the divine Word no real relation toward creatures.
510. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 4, a. 8; cf. the scholia attributed to Ferrarensis; and above, cap. 3, ad secundum dubium.

It is confirmed: An absolute quality is signified; but by a relation of what is produced, or of what is said, it is connoted secondarily. But this is proved, because in human beings "word" primarily signifies a quality, which Ferrarensis assumes as manifest; yet it connotes the relation of what is produced: therefore in God it will primarily signify essence in place of absolute quality, and secondarily the relation of what is produced.

But far more probable is the opinion of Cajetan in this article, who asserts that "Word" primarily signifies the relation of what is said and produced, and connotes essence; and he thinks this to be the opinion of the holy Doctor in the first and second articles of this question, and in the third article, reply to the fourth, to have retracted the opinion which he had previously followed: for in that reply he says in these words: "The name 'Word' is principally imposed to signify the relation of utterance, and consequently with respect to creatures."[511] And in the first article he says thus: "Word, inasmuch as it is said properly in the divine context, signifies something proceeding from another, which pertains to the notion of personal names in the divine, inasmuch as persons are distinguished according to origins." And in the second article: "Word is the proper name of the person of the Son; for it signifies a certain emanation of the intellect."[512] In which places he not obscurely indicates that the primary signification of this name is the relation of one proceeding by the intellect. For when Ferrarensis says that St. Thomas did not think that "word" formally signifies the relation itself, but that which proceeds and to which the relation belongs, this seems said without any foundation. But when he says that it signifies emanation, assuredly he speaks of that, not formally under the ratio of emanation and by way of emanation, but under the ratio of a relation in actual being: for in this same sense he said that persons are distinguished by origins, whereas in his doctrine they are distinguished by relations in actual being.

It is proved: By this reasoning the opinion is proved. No less is the relation of what is said expressed by the name "Word" than the relation of one begotten by the name "Son": but the name "Son" signifies the relation of what is produced by generation: therefore the name "Word" signifies the relation of what is produced by diction.

Then Cajetan adds that by the name "Word," and by other personal names, relation is signified primarily, and essence is connoted secondarily; just as also by this name "person" - which indeed Ferrarensis does not grant about the other names, although he admits it about the name "person." Yet he is mistaken: for the same rationale applies to all; except that in the name "person" the relation is signified primarily and directly, yet materially, not formally, as was said above in disputation 137, chapter 2.[513] But by other relative, incomposite names, relation is signified directly and expressly, as by the names Son, Word, Father, Begetter, etc. I said this of relative, incomposite names: for complex names, such as "God begetting," "God begotten," "God the Father," "God the Son," directly signify both things, both the absolute substance and the relation: for they consist of a double simple name, one absolute, the other relative.

511. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 3, ad 4.
512. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 1; a. 2.
513. The author, disputation 137, cap. 2.

But Ferrarensis's argument is easily refuted: for we say that in human beings "word" signifies primarily and formally the relation of what is produced by diction, or at least the relation of what is said (for in disputation 142, chapter 4, we showed that it is not of the essence of a "word" in human beings to be produced by diction, as it is of the essence of "Word" in the divine); but the so-called quality, or that produced by utterance, is not signified primarily, but secondarily and materially, as the subject of this relation, which, receiving denomination from it, is called "word," just as "Son" signifies primarily the relation, but secondarily the substance itself which is called son.

Not by reason of essence alone, nor of personal property alone, but by reason of both together does the Word have a respect to creatures.

Caput II - On the respect which the divine Word has to creatures, and by what account

Since the divine Word not only has regard to the Father producing, but also to creatures, inasmuch as they are said and uttered by it, the Scholastics do not agree as to the rationale by which this respect to creatures befits it. For as to the relation to the Father, it is certain that it befits the Word solely by reason of personal property. As to the relation to creatures, therefore, I find two extreme opinions among the Scholastic writers. The first is Scotus's, in the first book, distinction 27, question 3, who teaches that the Word is referred to creatures solely by reason of essence, not by reason of notional property; indeed he even affirms that no divine person is referred to creatures by reason of personal property, but by reason of essence alone; and hence that "gift" is not a property of the Holy Spirit; about which again, question 38, article 3.[514] This opinion about the divine Word seems to have been handed down by St. Thomas in this article, in reply to objection 1; and Capreolus in the first book, distinction 27, question 2, article 1, conclusion 5; Ferrarensis on the Contra gentiles, book 4, chapter 13, at the phrase "to the third it can be said"; and Cajetan in the commentary on this article.[515] But Capreolus also asserts that St. Thomas here retracted the opinion which he had previously followed in the first book, distinction 27, question 1, article 3; yet Ferrarensis contends that St. Thomas never taught the opposite: because in that first distinction 27 he only said that the Word is referred primarily to the Father speaking and producing, but secondarily to creatures as to a secondary object; whether, however, it connotes a respect to creatures by reason of personal property, he did not say; and yet this very thing he taught altogether in that cited reply.

But this opinion of Scotus can be proved: because the respect of the divine Word to creatures is only the respect of one manifesting to things manifested; but to manifest creatures befits each person by reason of essence: therefore it will befit the Word also by reason of that.

The opposite, later, opinion is that of Aureolus, which Capreolus reports in that question 2, article 1, in the arguments against the conclusion, wholly opposed to the former: namely, that the Word has a respect to creatures by reason of personal property alone. For whenever a respect is

514. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 3; and St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 3.

515. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 5; Ferrarensis, on Contra gentiles, IV, cap. 13, at "Ad tertiam potest dici"; Cajetan, on I, q. 34.

ascribed to a person which does not befit the others, it must be ascribed to that person by reason of singular personal property: otherwise, if by reason of essence alone it were ascribed to a person, it would be common to all; for all, in the same essence, are equal: but the divine Word alone has this respect of "word" to creatures, as those said by it: therefore by reason of personal property alone does it befit it.[516]

Yet to me a certain middle opinion has seemed much more probable, which asserts that neither by reason of essence alone, nor by reason of personal property alone, but by reason of both together, this relation of the Word to creatures befits the second person; and indeed that it does not befit by reason of essence alone is sufficiently proved by Aureolus's reasoning: for this relation would be common to the three persons if it arose from essence alone; wherefore the ratio of "word" would be said essentially, and that account would be nothing other than the ratio of manifestation after the mode of the intellect - something we showed false in disputation 142.[517] Moreover, that this relation does not befit by reason of personal property alone, unless essence also be connoted in a peculiar way, is proved: for personal property is only a certain relation to the person producing or produced, which is signified by the name "Son," and by the name "Father": therefore since the Word, beyond the relation which it has to the Father, also has a peculiar ratio of manifesting to the things manifested, this is a sign that, beyond the relation which is property, it includes something else: therefore the essence, which contains the ratio of one manifesting, determined by the property of what is produced, is the foundation of that peculiar relation which the Word has to creatures. Nor has St. Thomas denied this anywhere; he only teaches that the primary respect of the Word is to the Father, the secondary to creatures, as to a secondary object. Hence is gathered what Gabriel noted most excellently in the first book, distinction 27, question 3, article 3, doubt 1: namely, that "Word" and "Son" are not synonymous; for although the real relation of each is altogether the same, nevertheless something is connoted by the name "Word" which is not connoted by the name "Son." Why the "Word," then, is not a peculiar notion, we said in disputation 137, chapter 5; yet in the meantime Gabriel denies, without merit, that "Word" connotes a respect of reason to creatures. For these nominal relations, which we call "of reason," they do not admit; just as they do not admit a distinction of reason, as we saw in disputation 117, chapter 1.[518] But how there is no real respect in God to creatures, we said in disputation 104, chapter 6; up to this point, however, no one has posited in the Word a relation to creatures greater than that of reason, expressed by the Word itself.[519]

Last, it should be observed that the ratio of "word," besides the relation which it has to the Father as to one speaking and producing, and to creatures as to things said by the Word itself, also has a respect of reason to the Father himself: and this respect is that of one representing to him to whom it represents; for St. Thomas says in article 1, reply to the third, of this question: "To say is nothing other than to utter a word; but 'word' imports a relation to the thing understood; by the

516. Aureolus, as reported by Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, in the arguments contra the conclusion.
517. The author, disputation 142, cap. 4.
518. The author, disputation 117, cap. 1.
519. The author, disputation 104, cap. 6.

word uttered the understanding is manifested." Although the Father does not understand by the Son and by innate Wisdom as by a form, as we recalled from St. Augustine and others in disputation 142.[520]

Quaestio XXXV - On the Image

142, cap. 2. Nevertheless He is said to understand, and to see, and to say all things in the Son and in His Word; and to express the same to Himself as His own image. But these things would not be true unless the Word represented to the Father the intelligible objects, and they shone in it and were set before the Father to be beheld. We therefore say that the Word represents to the Father, and that by it the Father understands all things, not as a form (*forma*), but as the term produced of His intellection, just as the Father and the Son are said to love us by the Holy Spirit produced by Them. Wherefore they err not a little, who say that since it does not belong to the notion of the Word to represent to some one the things said and understood, therefore the Son of God is called Word, not because He represents to the Father, but because He represents to Himself. For who on this account will affirm that He is the Word of the Father, and not rather the Word of Himself? For the word represents to him who utters it the things said in it, not to himself. There is indeed a difference between our word and the divine: ours is itself the formal intellection by which someone is constituted an intelligent knower, and it is not produced by intellection itself; but the divine Word is brought forth by the intellection of the one speaking, and is understood, nor is it the form by which he who speaks understands, as we showed at length in disputation 142, cap. 4; it is, however, the term of that intellection, representing to the Father, as it were over against Him, whatever is understood by the Father; and the Father is said to understand and to say Himself and other things by His Word. But that the Word should represent to itself all the things which it understands, is not something notional and proper to the person; for every person has this by reason of essence (*essentia*), by which one is formally constituted intelligent. In the Word, however, there must be some peculiar representation which is not common to the whole Trinity: wherefore it must be with respect to the Father as uttering and speaking; otherwise it would be common and essential.

Articulus I - Whether image is predicated personally in the divine

Objicitur primo. It seems that image is not predicated personally in the divine. For St. Augustine says in the book On Faith to Peter: "One is the Trinity's divinity and the image, to which man was made."[1] Therefore image is said essentially and not personally.

Objicitur secundo. Furthermore, St. Hilary says in the book On the Synod that image is "an indifferent species of that thing which is imagined."[2] But species or form (*forma*), in the divine, is said essentially: therefore image likewise.

520. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3; and see the author, disputation 142.

Objicitur tertio. Furthermore, image is so called from imitation. In this there is implied before and after. But in the divine persons there is nothing before and after. Therefore image cannot be a personal name in the divine.

Sed contra: Augustine says, "What is more absurd than that an image be referred to itself? Therefore, in the divine, image is said relatively. And thus it is a personal name."[3]

Respondeo dicendum, that belonging to the notion of image is likeness (*similitudo*). Yet not any likeness suffices for the notion of image, but a likeness which is in the species of the thing, or at least in some sign of the species. Now, among corporeal things, the sign of a species seems especially to be figure; for we see that diverse animals, according to species, have diverse figures, but not diverse colors. Whence, if the color of some thing be painted on a wall, it is not said to be an image unless the figure be painted. But even likeness of species or of figure does not suffice; origin is required for the notion of image. For as Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions, "One thing is not the image of another unless it is expressed from it."[4] Therefore, for something to be truly an image, it is required that from another there proceed something like in species, or at least in a sign of the species. But those things which in the divine import procession or origin are personal. Wherefore this name "image" is a personal name.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that "image" is properly said of that which proceeds to the likeness of another. But that to whose likeness something proceeds is properly called an exemplar, and improperly an image. Thus, however, Augustine uses the name "image" when he says that the divinity of the holy Trinity is the image to which man was made

Ad secundum dicendum, that species, as put by Hilary in the definition of image, imports a form drawn forth into something from another. In this way image is said to be the species of something, as that which is assimilated to another is said to be its form insofar as it has a form similar to another's

Ad tertium dicendum, that imitation, in the divine persons, does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation

Conclusio est, This name "image" in the divine is a personal name.

Articulus II - Whether the name "image" is proper to the Son

Dico: The second proceeds thus. It seems that the name "image" is not proper to the Son.

Objicitur primo. For, as St. John Damascene says, the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son.[5] Therefore it is not proper to the Son.

Objicitur secundo. Furthermore, of the notion of image is likeness with expression (as Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions).[6] But this belongs to the Holy Spirit: for He proceeds from another according to a mode of likeness. Therefore the Holy Spirit is an image, and thus it is not proper to the Son to be an image.

Objicitur tertio. Furthermore, man also is called the image of God, according to that 1 Corinthians 11: "The man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God."[7] Therefore it is not proper to the Son.

Sed contra est quod Augustine says in the sixth and seventh books On the Trinity, that the Son alone is the image of the Father.[8]

Respondeo dicendum, that the Greek doctors commonly say that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father and the Son. But the Latin doctors attribute the name "image" to the Son alone. For in canonical Scripture it is found only of the Son. For it is said in Colossians 1: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation"; and in Hebrews 1: "Who, being the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance."[9] Some assign the reason for this from the fact that the Son agrees with the Father not only in nature, but also in the notion of a principle (*principium*); but the Holy Spirit agrees neither with the Son nor with the Father in any notion. But this does not seem sufficient: because, just as according to relations (*relationes*) in the divine neither equality nor inequality is considered (as Augustine says), so neither that likeness which is required for the notion of image.[10] Hence others say that the Holy Spirit cannot be called the image of the Son, because the image is not the image of an image; nor the image of the Father, because the image is referred immediately to that of which it is the image; but the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father through the Son; nor yet the image of the Father and the Son, because thus there would be one image of two, which seems impossible. Whence it remains that the Holy Spirit is in no way an image. But this is nothing: because the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, as will be said below. Wherefore nothing prevents in this way the Father and the Son (insofar as They are one) from being one image, since man too is one image of the whole Trinity. And therefore it must be said otherwise, that just as the Holy Spirit, although by His procession He receives the nature of the Father, as also the Son, is nevertheless not called "begotten"; so, although He receives a like species to the Father, He is not called an image: because the Son proceeds as Word, in whose notion is the likeness of species to that from which He proceeds; but it is not of the notion of love - although this agrees to love - that the Holy Spirit is as He is insofar as He is the divine love.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that Damascene and the other Greek doctors commonly use the name "image" for perfect likeness

Ad secundum dicendum, that although the Holy Spirit is like to the Father and the Son, nevertheless it does not follow that He is an image in the sense already stated

Ad tertium dicendum, that the image of someone is found in something in two ways. In one way, in a thing of the same nature according to species, as the image of a king is found in his own son. In another way, in a thing of another nature, as the image of a king is found in a coin. In the first way, the Son is the image of the Father; in the second way, man is called the image of God, and therefore, to designate in man the imperfection of the image, man is not only called "image," but "to the image," by which some movement of one tending toward perfection is designated. But the Son of God is not said to be "to the image," because He is the perfect image of the Father

Conclufio est, according to the opinion of the Latin Fathers the Son alone is called "image" in the divine. As to the text of each article, there is nothing that needs note or explanation; for as regards their doctrine, we shall explain it in the following disputation. But what some recent authors dispute here, whether in the rational creature there is the image of the Trinity, and in the irrational there is a vestige, seems altogether beyond the matter. St. Thomas handles this question below in question 93; and St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 3, part 2, articles 1 and 2; Scotus in questions 5 and 9; Durandus in the First Part of distinction 28, question 4, and in the Second Part, question 2; Capreolus in questions 2 and 3; Gabriel in questions 9 and 10; and Marsilius in the first question.[11]

It is objected that the one like to the Father is not called image: because the Son proceeds as Word, and it belongs to the notion of a word to be a specific likeness to that from which it proceeds; not, however, to the notion of love, although this agrees to love, which is the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is divine love.

I answer to the first, that St. John Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly use the name "image" for a perfect likeness.

To the second, that although the Holy Spirit is like to the Father and the Son, nevertheless it does not follow that he is image for the reason already given.

To the third, that the image of something is found in another in two ways. In one way, in a thing of the same nature according to species, as the image of a king is found in his son. In another way, in a thing of another nature, as the image of a king is found on a coin. In the first way, the Son is the image of the Father; in the second way, man is said to be the image of God. And therefore, to designate in man the imperfection of the image, man is not only said to be "image," but "to the image" (ad imaginem), whereby a certain motion of one tending to the perfection of that of which he is the image is designated. But the Son of God is not said to be "to the image," because he is the perfect image of the Father.

Conclusion - According to the opinion of the Latin Fathers, the Son alone in the divinity is called image. As to the letter of each of the two articles, there is nothing that needs remark and explanation: for as regards their doctrine, we shall explain it in the following disputation. But what some more recent authors here dispute - whether in a rational creature there is the image of the Trinity, and in an irrational creature a vestige - seems altogether beside our subject. St. Thomas treats this question below in question 93, and St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 3, part 2, articles 1 and 2; Scotus, questions 5 and 9; Durandus, First Part, distinction 28, question 4, and Second Part, question 2; Capreolus, questions 2 and 3; Gabriel [Biel], questions 9 and 10; Marsilius, in the First Book, question 1.[521]

521. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 93; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 3, pars 2, a. 1 - 2; Scotus, In I Sent., qq. 5, 9; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. 4; In II Sent., q. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., qq. 2 - 3; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., qq. 9 - 10; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 1.

Caput II - That the notion of image properly belongs to the Son alone is proved by authority

Now, the common and received opinion in this matter asserts two things: first, that truly and properly, without any metaphor, "image" is found in God; second, that this notion of image does not belong to God essentially, but notionally to some person, namely to the Son alone.

The first part of this opinion is handed down by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent Thomists in this question; by St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 31, part 2, article 1, question 1; by Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 27, question c., article 1, conclusion 6; by Henry in Quodlibet 4, question 2; by the Canariensis in question 27, article 2, in the fourth part of his commentary. St. Augustine also, and the Fathers whom we shall cite below, call some person in the divinity "image" absolutely; as also Scripture says of the Son in Colossians 1: "Who is the image of the invisible God"; and in Hebrews 1: "Who, being the splendor of [his] glory and the figure of his substance" - hypostasis in Greek, that is, of his hypostasis or person - as we saw above in disputation 124, chapter 4.[522] But if these testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture can be explained without any impropriety - as will be clear in chapters 3 and 4 from the definition of image - it would be rash to take refuge in tropes and figures.

The second part of this opinion, which asserts that the notion of image, without appropriation, is to be attributed to the Son alone, is also embraced by St. Thomas, Cajetan, the more recent authors, Capreolus, Henry, and the Canariensis in the places cited; and by St. Bonaventure in the same article 1, question 2; although they do not all agree in the reason that is given. Among the Fathers, not only the Latins, but also the Greeks, call the Son alone "image." Origen, On First Principles, book 1, chapter 2, although at length in the following chapter discoursing concerning the Holy Spirit, never calls him image. Nay rather, among the Greeks, St. Athanasius, in Sermon 4 against the Arians, not far from the beginning, affirms that the Son alone is image. For speaking of the martyrs he says thus: "Since these are such, nevertheless the only-begotten Son alone and the Word is called wisdom; or why, since so many are like to the Father, is this one alone image?" He subsequently pursues the reason of this more at large. And in the Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, a little before the middle, he writes thus: "And since there is one God, it is necessary also that there be one image of God, namely the Son, who is his."[8][523] And shortly after: "If you name him image, by that very word you have shown him to be Son: for what is like to God if not his own offspring?" of which testimony we also spoke in disputation 113, chapter 7.

Among the Latins, moreover, St. Hilary, On the Trinity VII toward the end; St. Augustine, On the Trinity book 3, chapter 1, and book 7, last chapter; Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity VI, chapter 19; and Rupert, On the Trinity IV, chapter 2, attribute the notion of image to the Son alone.[524]

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522. Colossians 1:15; Hebrews 1:3.

523. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 4, in fin.; V, c. 6.

524. St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos sermo 4; Epistola de decretis Nicaenae synodi; St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII; St. Augustine, De Trinitate III, c. 1; VII, c. ultimo; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate VI, c. 19; Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate IV, c. 2.

Rupert, indeed, says that the Word is image, but that the Holy Spirit is the likeness of both; thus he explains that passage of Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness," etc. In favor of this opinion St. Anselm also is cited in the Monologion, chapter 37; there, however, he only teaches that the Son is so Word and image of the Father that the Father is not image, as is gathered from the last words of that chapter; of the Holy Spirit he asserts nothing. Therefore Basil, and St. John Damascene, Gregory the Wonderworker, and Athanasius adduced in the preceding chapter, seem to me not to have spoken properly when they also call the Holy Spirit image, attending rather to the reason of likeness founded upon unity of nature, than to the nature of image, which consists in representation and origin.[525]

Caput III - That there is in God the notion of image properly so called is proved by reason

Moreover, by reason let us now confirm the first part of our opinion, namely, that the notion of image properly belongs to God; and this will be made plain from the very definition of image. St. Augustine, in the imperfect work On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 16; and in book 5 of the Questions on Deuteronomy, question 4; and in the Eighty-Three Questions, question 74, teaches that image is not any sort of likeness, but that alone which is expressed for the sake of representing; wherefore he thinks that image by its nature has origin from that which it represents and of which it is said to be the image. And for this reason he says that one thing may be like another, yet not be its image.[526]

From this definition it follows that the notion of likeness which is founded upon unity of quality or of nature neither suffices for the notion of image nor is required for it. First, that it does not suffice has already been proved; that it is not required is shown thus. The rationale of image, which is a likeness expressed for the sake of representing, can be without this unity of nature, nay rather with great diversity, as is clear in the word and cognition of our mind, which is the image of the thing understood, yet of an altogether different nature; for this sole reason, that it is expressed for the sake of representing. Therefore likeness in nature is not required. It is further gathered that in the divinity there is image properly, without any imperfection whatsoever, in this way. In the divinity there is a word expressed by the power of its procession for the sake of representing; therefore it is properly and without any imperfection an image. How this is proper to the Word and does not befit the Holy Spirit we shall show in chapter 5.

Finally, from what has been said it is inferred that image bears to that of which it is image a real relation (*relatio*) - for since an image really proceeds from that of which it is said to be the image and refers to that, it follows that its relation is real, namely, founded upon a real origin and procession. And hence it is now apparent how weak is the argument by which Durandus in the first chapter tried to prove that in God there is not properly image, because there is not properly likeness. For although likeness founded upon unity of nature, in order to be strictly a likeness,

525. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I (or II), where he calls the Holy Spirit the image of the Son; Basil, Contra Eunomium, c. 12; Gregory Thaumaturgus, Expositio fidei.

526. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, qq. 73 - 74; cf. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, c. 16; Quaestiones in Deuteronomium, q. 4.

ought to be a real relation, and in God it is only of reason; nevertheless, since this kind of likeness is not of the ratio of image, nothing prevents there being in God a true and proper notion of image, if there is there a true and proper notion of expression for the sake of representing, even though as yet there be no proper notion of the prior sort of likeness.

Caput IV - That the notion of image in God belongs to the Son alone is proved in various ways by the Doctors

Although the Doctors adduced in chapter 2 against Durandus teach that the notion of image belongs to the eternal Son of the Father alone, nevertheless they do not all prove it in the same way. I shall therefore set down their principal reasons, that from them I may more easily choose the better.

The first reason is St. Bonaventure's in the First Book, distinction 31, part 2 of the distinction, article 1, question 2. He proves the point thus. In the divinity there is image according to the most perfect rationale; but the most perfect image ought to be of one alone. For an image that is of two, since it is as it were divided into several, does not seem to be most perfect. Then too it ought to be according to every mode: for if it were only in essence, not in property or cognition, it would not be the greatest that can be. This reason, as to its latter part, he took from Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity VI, chapters 19 - 20; and St. Thomas notes it in this question, article 2. And as regards the latter part, the same St. Thomas in this very question inquires thus: because in God likeness is not considered according to properties, but according to nature, as we shall say in disputation 167. Add, that if likeness were considered according to personal properties, it would not be greatest in God, since those properties are opposed; for any two creatures could be more alike in properties, since these are not opposed, than the divine persons are. We have also set forth the same line of reasoning above, disputation 113, chapter 1, to prove below that the Word alone in the divinity is properly generated, not the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, a perfect image ought to be the image of one: whence it is clear that, if it perfectly represented two and each of them, it would not preserve the unity required of image. Nor does it avail to object that the Holy Spirit is less a son because he proceeds from two; for he does not proceed as from a father and a mother, as we resolved in disputation 113, chapter 2, against Augustine.

The second reason of the same St. Bonaventure, and of Henry in the places cited, is of this sort. It belongs to the rationale of image to proceed in a natural mode; but the Holy Spirit does not proceed in this mode, since he is produced by will and thus seems to be produced freely; the Son, however, proceeds in a natural mode: therefore, although the one nature is found in both, yet in the Son alone does the rationale of image consist. We adduced this same reason from the same St. Bonaventure and others in disputation 113, chapter 4, to prove that the second divine person is Son, but that the Holy Spirit is not; and there we also proved that both persons proceed altogether in a natural mode, and that in this respect they are equal: therefore either this reason would make both Son and image, or by this reason it would befit neither.

A further reason, gathered from those alleged authorities - embraced and at length confirmed by Cajetan in this question, article 2 - is of this kind. The Son proceeds by intellect (*intellectus*); therefore by the power of his procession he is produced like to the principle understanding; and accordingly, by virtue of his own production, and not from elsewhere, he has to be like to the principle, in which the rationale of image consists. But the Holy Spirit, although he proceeds like to the principle, certainly does not have this inasmuch as he proceeds by will, by the force of his proper procession, but from elsewhere, to wit, because he is in the divine nature. Therefore he has that, not from the principle, but as it were from the nature as subject. Now the rationale of image is, to proceed like to the principle formally and by the force of production, not materially on account of the subject in which it is. Therefore the Son alone, not the Holy Spirit, is the image of the person from whom he proceeds. How indeed the Son, as to person, has this from the force of his procession, but not the Holy Spirit, we have explained and seen above, disputation 113, chapter 4. To this point also pertains the argument of Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles IV, cap. ..., reported in the same chapter, whereby he proves that the Holy Spirit is not Son, although he proceeds like; because he does not proceed like by the force of his procession, as the Son. And this seems to be the doctrine of St. Thomas in this question, article 2. But both are to be impugned in the same manner, as we refuted both there: whence it is clear from that refutation that the Holy Spirit no less proceeds like in nature by the force of his procession than the Son; and therefore, if it belongs to the rationale of image to proceed like in the same nature per se by the force of one's own procession and not from elsewhere - as Henry, Capreolus, Cajetan, and Ferrarensis suppose - this they do not sufficiently prove; it follows, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is no less the image of the Father and the Son than the Son is the image of the Father. But since in that place we have abundantly shown against Cajetan and Ferrarensis that the Holy Spirit no less proceeds like in nature by the force of his production than the Son, and have cut off the subterfuges of these Doctors, there is no need to dispute again against them.

Others finally give another reason, namely, that it belongs to the rationale of image to be expressed to the intention of someone by the intellect; but since the Son is by intellect from the Father, the Holy Spirit by will, it follows that the Son is the expressed image, but not the Holy Spirit. This reason supposes the definition of image which we shall later examine.

For who will deny that Adam begot his son Seth, and in him expressed his own image? Finally, since every son bears the image of the father, an image can rightly be found which does not proceed through the intellect. Therefore, as we saw in that disputation 113, cap. 7, Athanasius rightly infers that the Word of God is the Son, from the fact that He is called image: which would not follow, unless it were of the account of son to be image; and although image extends more widely than son, nevertheless a substantial image in the same nature is reciprocated with son; and from this Athanasius infers that the Word is Son, if He is image.

By a most fitting reason it is shown that only the Son is the image of the Father.

Caput V - The nature of image is clarified

From the definition of image given above, chap. 3, it can rightly be inferred that the account of image fits only the Son. The definition is of this sort: an expressed likeness for representing. And, as we noted in that chapter, likeness is called image which is expressed for representing - whether it has unity of nature with the thing represented or not - for in either way there can be image. Again, if it happen that there is some likeness of two in nature, and one arises from the other, it does not follow that that which is from the other, and is like it, is the image of that other, unless it represent that other. For sometimes one like [thing] does not represent that from which it takes origin; and therefore it is not its image, as we see in univocal generation of non-living things, in which one like is produced from another, which for that reason is not its image, because it does not represent it: for the fire produced does not represent this producing fire more than another, since in the same way it is similar to all.

Further, observe with the Canarian in the second article, part of the commentary of this question, [who says] that an image ought to be expressed for this end, that it represent, whether by art or by nature. And nature is said to express a likeness for that end, when in fact the likeness produced by nature represents; for the end of nature in acting is taken from the very product wrought. Wherefore, if by chance a seal impresses a figure on wax or other matter, it truly produces an image, because its production is reduced to the artificial, which is produced with intention toward imitation.

Hence the Canarian rightly infers that the divine Word is truly and properly the image of the Father: for it is the likeness of the Father - which no one denies - expressed by the intellect as His word, as was said in disputation 141. Therefore it is an expressed likeness for representing that from which it proceeds as from an intelligible principle and an object per se. Wherefore, since it represents the Father in this mode, and proceeds from Him in this mode, as we proved in disputation 142, cap. 3, it will be His image; and since it does not proceed from the Holy Spirit as from an intelligible principle, even if it secondarily represent Him, it will not be His image, as we also showed there, cap. 4. And by the same reason it is not the image of creatures, as remains proved in disputation 143, cap. 5. But that the Word in the divine [mysteries] represents the Father to Himself and to the Father, and not to another, is clear from what was said in disputation 144, cap. 2.

But indeed the Canarian does not prove how the account of image does not befit the Holy Spirit; yet this easily follows from what has been said. For, in order that the Holy Spirit be image, He would have to be not only similar in nature, but also to represent those from whom He proceeds. But He represents no one: therefore He is not anyone's image. For if He represented someone, He ought to represent him to some intelligent [knower]; but He represents to none, as will be evident by induction. For He does not represent to the Father, nor to the Son, since neither understands Himself by the Holy Spirit, either as form, or as the term of His intellection. Nor does He represent to Himself, except in so far as by essential intellection, which is His very essence, He knows Himself and the other persons in Himself. Nor does He represent to any created intellect: not to

the wayfarer, as is plain; not to one seeing God as He is: for he who clearly contemplates the three persons does not see one because it is represented in another, but beholds all equally in the first intuition. Therefore to no intellect does the Holy Spirit represent, nor can He represent; wherefore He is not the image of anyone.

Two things remain to be noted in this disputation. One is that the account of image befits the Son, not by reason of essence alone, because image is a notional property, nor by reason of the personal property of sonship alone, but by reason of both, as was said concerning the Word above in that disputation: because by reason of both it befits the Son to represent the Father to the Father Himself, as one speaking and understanding. The other is that the same property is sonship, image, and word, although it is signified in a diverse mode. For something is connoted by the one which is not connoted by the other: for son signifies only the relation of one proceeding from another by generation; but word, besides this - which it does not express and specifically signify - connotes a respect of reason toward creatures; but image does not connote that [respect]. Now this [image] stands to sonship as the common notion to the particular, as I noted in disputation 137, cap. 5; and why there are not three diverse notions, we also showed there. Nevertheless, Bonaventure said without warrant in I Sent., dist. 31, part 2, article 1, question 2, at the end, that image, besides a respect to the Father, also connotes a relation to the Holy Spirit. For since in no way does it proceed from Him, as we proved in disputation 143, cap. 4, it will connote no respect to Him in the account of image, although it connotes Him in the account of word, because it at least secondarily represents Him.

Quaestio XXXVI - On the things that pertain to the person of the Holy Spirit

After the foregoing consideration, it is to be considered concerning the things that pertain to the person of the Holy Spirit: who is not only called the Holy Spirit, but also the love and gift of God.

Concerning the Holy Spirit, therefore, four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether this name, Holy Spirit, is a proper name of some divine person

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that this name, Holy Spirit, is not the proper name of any divine person. For no common name of the three persons is proper to any person; but this name, Holy Spirit, is common to the three persons. For Hilary shows in De Trinitate that by "the spirit of the Lord" sometimes the Father is signified, as when it is said: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me"; sometimes the Son is signified, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out

demons," showing that by the power of His nature He casts out demons; sometimes [it is said] of the Holy Spirit, as there: "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh." Therefore this name, Holy Spirit, is not the proper name of any divine person.[527]

1. Further, the names of the divine persons are said relatively, as Boethius says in the book De Trinitate. But this name, Holy Spirit, is not said relatively. Therefore this name is not the proper name of any divine person.
2. Further, since "son" is the name of a divine person, one cannot say "the son of this or of that" [man]. But one does say "the spirit of this or of that man." For it is had in Numbers 11: "The Lord said to Moses: I will take of your spirit and will give to them"; and 4 Kings 2: "The spirit of Elijah rested upon Elisha." Therefore "Holy Spirit" does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person.

But on the contrary is what is said, 1 John, the last: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." But, as St. Augustine says in De Trinitate VII, when it is asked, what do we call three, we say three persons. Therefore "Holy Spirit" is the name of a divine person.

I answer that, since there are two processions in the divine [nature], one of them, which is by the mode of love, does not have a proper name, as was said above. Un -

Articulus II - Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son

... Therefore also the relations which are understood according to a procession of this sort are unnamed, as was said above. Wherefore also the name of the person proceeding in this mode, for the same reason, does not have a proper name, but, just as some names are accommodated from the way of speakers to signify the aforesaid relations, when we name them by the name of procession and spiration, which according to the propriety of their signification seem rather to signify the notional acts than the relations, so too, to signify the divine person who proceeds by way of love (*amor*), this name "Holy Spirit" is, from the usage of Scripture, accommodated. And indeed a reason for this congruity can be taken from two points. First, from the very commonness of that which is called "Holy Spirit." For, as St. Augustine says in De Trinitate XV: Because the Holy Spirit is common to both, that is called by Him properly which both have in common; for both the Father is spirit, and the Son is spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy.[528] Secondly, from its proper signification. For the name "spirit" in corporeal things seems to signify a certain impulse and motion; for we name breath and wind "spirit." But it is proper to love that it move and impel the will of the lover toward the beloved. Holiness, moreover, is attributed to those things which are ordered to God. Therefore, because a divine person proceeds by way of love by which God is loved, fittingly He is named the Holy Spirit.

527. A marginal cluster of references is given here: "Vi 22. 9194 14, 258; 1 Cor. & 1; di 15. art.; dist. 4 com. gent. cap. 9 fin. & mal.; cor. opu. 3. cap. 46. & 47; Libro 8. de Trinitate circa med. libri." Hilary is cited for the usages: De Trinitate, book 8, about the middle.

528. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 15, about the middle; cf. cap. 19.

Reply to the first: Therefore one must say that this which I say "Holy Spirit," insofar as it is taken by the force of two words, is common to the whole Trinity, because by the name "spirit" is signified the immateriality of the divine substance; for a corporeal spirit is invisible, and has little of matter. Hence we attribute this name to all immaterial and invisible substances. But through what is said "holy," the purity of divine goodness is signified. If, however, this which I say "Holy Spirit" be taken by the force of one word, thus by the usage of the Church it is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, namely, the one who proceeds by way of love for the reason already stated.

Reply to the second: Although this which I say "Holy Spirit" is not said relatively, nevertheless it is put for a relative, insofar as it is accommodated to signify a person distinct from others by relation alone. Yet some relation can be understood by the name, if the Holy Spirit be understood as "spirated."

Reply to the third: In the name "Son" is understood only the relation of one who is "from a principle" toward that principle; but in the name "Father" is understood the relation of a principle; and similarly in the name "spirit," insofar as it imports a certain motive power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle with respect to some divine person, but conversely; and therefore one can say "our Father" and "our spirit," but one cannot say "our Son."

Conclusion: The name "Holy Spirit" is accommodated by the Church to the third person. The Holy Doctor renders an excellent reason for this in the article, because the third person proceeds through the will (*voluntas*), by way of a certain impetus and spiration. Durandus agrees in the conclusion, but disagrees in the reason; for, as we saw in the disputation made on this point, he holds that the Holy Spirit does not proceed through the will, but proximately through nature, as also the Son - a view which we there impugned.

AD SECUNDUM thus is proceeded. It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For, according to Pseudo - Dionysius, it is not to be dared to say anything about the substantial divinity over and above those things which have been expressed to us by divine utterances. But in Sacred Scripture it is not expressed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only that He proceeds from the Father, as is clear in John 15: "The Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son

Further, in the Creed of the synod of Constantinople it is read thus: "We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified." Therefore by no means ought it to have been added in our Creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; but those who added this seem to be persons deserving anathema.

Further, St. John Damascene says: "We say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we name Him the Spirit of the Father; but we do not say 'the Holy Spirit from the Son'; we do, however, name Him the Spirit of the Son."[530] Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

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530. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, the chapter on the Holy Spirit (as "Spirit of the Father" and "Spirit of the Son").

Further, nothing proceeds from that in which it rests. But the Holy Spirit rests in the Son. For it is said in the reading of blessed Andrew: "Peace be to you; and to all who believe in one God the Father, and one Son, His only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father, abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Further, the Son proceeds as Word; but our spirit in us does not seem to proceed from our word. Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Further, the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.

Further, in things perpetual being and being-able do not differ (as is said in the 3rd book of the Physics), and much less in divine things. But the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son, even if He do not proceed from Him. For Anselm says in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit: The Son and the Holy Spirit have from the Father to be, but in a different mode, because the one by being begotten, the other by proceeding, so that by this they are different from one another. And afterwards he adds: For if for no other reason the Son and the Holy Spirit were multiple, by this alone they would be different. Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by not proceeding from Him.[531]

But on the contrary: What Athanasius says in the Creed: the Holy Spirit is "from the Father and the Son, neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding."[532]

I answer that, it is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, in no way could He be personally distinguished from Him. This is clear from what has been said above. For it is not possible to say that divine persons are distinguished from one another according to something absolute; because it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three. For whatever in divine things is said absolutely belongs to the unity of essence. It remains, therefore, that divine persons are distinguished from one another by relations alone. But relations cannot distinguish persons unless insofar as they are opposed. This is clear from this, that the Father has two relations, one of which is referred to the Son, and the other to the Holy Spirit; which, however, because they are not opposed, do not constitute two persons, but pertain only to the one person of the Father. If, therefore, in the Son and in the Holy Spirit there were to be found only two relations by which each is referred to the Father, those relations would not be opposed to one another, just as neither are the two relations by which the Father is referred to them. Hence, just as the person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical, since it destroys the faith of the Trinity. Therefore it is necessary that the Son and the Holy Spirit be referred to one another by opposite relations. But in divine things there cannot be other opposite relations than relations of origin, as was proved above. Now opposite relations of origin are taken according to "principle" and according to "from a principle." It remains, therefore, that it is necessary to say either that the Son is from the Holy Spirit - which no one says - or that

531. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti (cf. Opuscula 49 - 51).
532. Athanasian Creed.

the Holy Spirit is from the Son - which we confess. And indeed this accords with the account of the procession of each. For it was said above that the Son proceeds by way of intellect as Word, but the Holy Spirit by way of will as Love. But it is necessary that love proceed from word. For we do not love anything except insofar as we apprehend it by a conception of the mind. Hence in this way too it is manifest that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. The very order of things also teaches this. For nowhere do we find that from one there proceed many without order, except only in those things which differ materially; as when one smith produces many knives materially distinct from one another, having no order to one another. But in things in which there is not a merely material distinction, there is always found, in the multitude of products, some order. Whence also in the order of created things produced, the beauty of divine wisdom is manifested. If, therefore, from one person, the Father, there proceed two persons - namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit - there must be some order of them to one another. Nor can any other order be assigned except the order of nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it is not possible to say that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed thus from the Father, that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless someone were to posit in them a material distinction - which is impossible. Hence even the Greeks understand the procession of the Holy Spirit to have some order to the Son. For they concede that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and that He is from the Father through the Son. And some of them are said to concede that He is from the Son, or flows forth from Him, yet not that He "proceeds." Which seems to be either from ignorance or from obstinacy. For if one consider rightly, one will find that the word "procession" is most common among all those things which pertain to origin of whatever sort. For we use it to designate origin of any kind, as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source; and similarly in all other such instances. Whence from any other expression pertaining to origin it can be concluded that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Reply to the first: We ought not to speak about God what is not found in Sacred Scripture, either by words or by sense. Although by words it is not found in Sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, yet it is found as to the sense, and especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Spirit, John 16: "He shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine." Moreover, as a general rule in Sacred Scripture it is to be maintained that what is said of the Father ought to be understood of the Son, even if an exclusive expression be added, except only in those things in which the Father and the Son are distinguished according to opposite relations. For when the Lord says in Matthew 11, "No one knows the Son but the Father," it is not excluded that the Son knows Himself. Thus, therefore, when it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it be added that He proceeds "from the Father alone," the Son would not thereby be excluded; because, as to this which is to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are not opposed, but only as to this, that this one is Father and that one Son.

Reply to the second: In every council, some creed was instituted on account of some error which in that council was condemned. Wherefore a following council did not make another creed than the first; but that which was contained implicitly in the first creed was by some additions explained against arising heresies. Whence in the determination of the Council of Chalcedon it is said that

those who were gathered in the Council of Constantinople handed down the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit; not that it was less in the preceding things than those assembled at Nicaea had said, but explaining their understanding against heretics. Therefore, since in the ancient time of the earlier councils the error of those saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son had not yet arisen, it was not necessary that this be explicitly set down. But afterwards, when the error of certain men arose, in a certain council gathered in the western parts, it was expressly stated by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were convoked and confirmed. Yet they coincided implicitly in this very point, in that it was said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.

Reply to the third: That the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son was first introduced by the Nestorians, as is evident in a certain creed of the Nestorians condemned at the Synod of Ephesus. And this error was followed by Theodorus and Nestorius, and many after them. Among whom was also Damascene. Wherefore in this his opinion is not to be stood by; although some say that Damascene does not confess the Holy Spirit to be from the Son, yet neither does he deny it by force of those words.[533]

Reply to the fourth: By this, that the Holy Spirit is said to rest or abide in the Son, it is not excluded that He proceeds from Him; for the Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. The Holy Spirit, moreover, is said to rest in the Son, either as the love of the lover rests in the beloved, or with respect to the human nature of Christ, because of what is written in John 1: "Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon him, he it is who baptizes."

Reply to the fifth: The Word in divine things is not taken according to the likeness of a spoken word, by which spirit does not proceed, for then it would be said only metaphorically; but according to the likeness of a mental word (*verbum mentale*), by which love proceeds.

Reply to the sixth: By this, that the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father, it is not only not superfluous to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but it is altogether necessary; for one and the same is the power of the Father and of the Son, and whatever is from the Father must be from the Son, unless it be repugnant to the property of filiation. For the Son is not from Himself, albeit He is from the Father.

Reply to the seventh: The Holy Spirit is personally distinguished from the Son in this, that the origin of each is distinguished from the origin of the other. But the very difference of origin is by this: that the Son is only from the Father, but the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. For otherwise the processions are not distinguished, as was shown above.

Conclusion: The Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son. Concerning which a grave controversy with the Greeks is ours.

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Disputation 146:

- The Greeks dogmatize that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, chapter 1.

533. On the Nestorians and the condemnation at the Council of Ephesus.

- This error is refuted from the Scriptures, chapter 2.
- That the Spirit proceeds from the Son is defined by the Church, chapter 3.
- When the particle "and the Son" was added first to the Nicene Symbol, chapter 4.
- That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is taught by the most weighty Fathers of the Greek Church, chapter 5.
- The same truth is shown from the Fathers who say that the one Spirit is from the Father through the Son, chapter 6.

Replies to objections

Reply to the third: That the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son was first introduced by the Nestorians, as is clear in a certain symbol of the Nestorians condemned in the Council of Ephesus. And this error was followed by Theodoret, a Nestorian, and many after him; among whom was also Damascene. Therefore in this his opinion there is no standing. Although some say that Damascene, just as he does not confess the Holy Spirit to be from the Son, so also does not deny it by force of those words.

Reply to the fourth: From the fact that the Holy Spirit is said to rest or remain in the Son, it is not excluded that He proceeds from Him; for the Son is also said to remain in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. The Holy Spirit is also said to rest in the Son, either as the love of one loving rests in the beloved; or with respect to the human nature of Christ, on account of that which is written in John 1: "Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon him, this is he who baptizes" (John 1:33).

Reply to the fifth: The "Word" in divine matters is not taken according to the likeness of a vocal word, from which a "spirit" does not proceed - for so it would only be said metaphorically - but according to the likeness of a mental word, from which love proceeds.

Reply to the sixth: From the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father, it is not only not superfluous to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but altogether necessary: because one power is the Father's and the Son's. And whatever is from the Father must also be from the Son, unless it be repugnant to the property of sonship. For the Son is not from Himself, but from the Father.

Reply to the seventh: The Holy Spirit is personally distinguished from the Son in this, that the origin of the one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the very difference of origin is this: that the Son is from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. For otherwise the processions would not be distinguished, as was shown above.

Disputatio CXLVI - Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son

- The Greeks dogmatize that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. cap. 1.

- This error is refuted from the Scriptures. cap. 2.
- That the Spirit proceeds from the Son is defined by the Church. cap. 3.
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- That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is taught by the most weighty Fathers of the Greek Church. cap. 5.
- The same truth is shown from the Fathers who say that the one Spirit is from the Father through the Son. cap. 6.
- The Greeks object to us certain Eastern Fathers. cap. 7.

Caput I - The Greeks' published heresy; which has endured down to our times, is that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone

Who, however, was first author of this error is not quite clear. Indeed, if faith is to be given to the letter of Justinian, Bishop of Sicily, to Peter, Bishop of Antioch, which is found in the Third General Council, Macedonius seems to be he; for he says - "Macedonius, moreover, breathes the Holy Spirit from the Father alone." But certain more recent theologians, not without probability, think that the text is faulty, and that for "breathes" one should read "separates." For since here Macedonius felt with the Arians that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not of the same substance (*substantia*) with the Father, but only similar, as was set forth in Disputation 109, cap. 1, and also in cap. 100 above; and since Eunomius too was of this opinion, as we there reported; perhaps with him he taught that which St. Basil records near the end of his second book Against Eunomius: for Eunomius spoke thus, "If someone were raised up from creatures to the comprehension of substance, he will understand the Son to be the nature of the Unbegotten (that is, of the Father), and the Paraclete to be the Only-begotten's." He therefore said that the Holy Spirit was made by the Son but not by the Father; hence against him Basil urges these words: "But how is it not manifestly perilous to divide the Spirit from God?" And a little later: "But this tends to the destruction of the majesty of our Lord Jesus Christ; for he removes the Spirit from the Father."[534] Thus, perhaps, Macedonius separated the Spirit from the Father alone, when he said that He does not proceed (*procedere*) from the Father, but from the Son: for the Spirit is said to be His from whom He proceeds; therefore, if He did not proceed from the Father, He would not be said to be His, and so would be separated from Him. But whether this be so, or whether he was another Macedonius than the one who was an Arian; or whether that Arian at various times taught both errors - as commonly happens, for heretics change each day into various colors of errors - none of this can be established with certainty.

The first, therefore, author of this error, which the Greeks now follow concerning the Holy Spirit, without any controversy was Theodoret, while he was still a Nestorian: as is evident from his attack on the ninth anathema of the Alexandrian Council, found in St. Cyril's book to Euoptius.[535] There is also extant in the Council of Ephesus, recently translated by our Theodore Peltanus, in

534. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, book 2, near the end.
535. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ad Euoptium, impugning the ninth anathema of the Alexandrian Council.

tome 2, cap. 37, a certain symbol of the Nestorians (for many followed Theodoret), in which it is defined that the Holy Spirit is neither from the Son nor through the Son, as Theodoret affirmed.[536] And therefore with good reason St. Thomas, in this article, when making mention of the third of this symbol, said that this error was first introduced by the Nestorians. But since Theodoret was anathematized by the Council of Ephesus, and those things which he wrote against Cyril and the aforesaid anathemas were condemned, shortly afterwards he repented, and in the Council of Chalcedon was received into communion with the Church and to the Catholic party. Wherefore this error, which he had taught in passing - together with the other which was principal concerning the person (*persona*) of Christ - seems at that time to have been entirely extinguished.

Further, at what time, or by whom, it was afterwards revived in the Greek Church, is not very evident. Some think that it sprouted again in the time of Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. For, as Aroinus, or rather Annonius, reports in book 4 of the Deeds of the Franks, cap. 67, and Abbot of Ursperg, Sigibert, Ado of Vienne, and Regino relate in their chronicles under the year 766, King Pepin convoked a provincial council at the villa of Gentiliacum to define the question concerning the Trinity between Greeks and Latins; which it is very likely was about the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit: for no other question about the Trinity seems ever to have arisen which was debated among all Greeks and Latins; for in other errors about the Trinity many Latins consented to the Greeks. Therefore he who made the compendium of Ado's Chronicle in our times, explaining this, added that the question was about the procession of the Holy Spirit.[537]

Moreover, the same Annonius, book 4, cap. 95, writes that a Council was held at Aachen by Charlemagne, in order that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son might be defined against the Greeks; "which question" (he says) "a certain John, a monk of Jerusalem, first stirred up in the time of Leo," who died in the year 808; he adds that for this reason Bernhar, Bishop of Worms, and Alahard, or Adelhart, Abbot of the monastery of Corbie, were sent to Rome.[538]

This error is also attributed to Damascene, who lived in the time of Adrian I and Leo the Isaurian, the Iconomachus emperor; and to Theophylact, who lived in the time of Nicholas I, and to Euthymius. Yet I think these Fathers did not deny what the Latins truly hold, as will be proved in cap. 7, although Theophylact sharply criticized our way of speaking.

John the Deacon too - who lived in the same time as Theophylact - relates in book 4 of the Life of St. Gregory, cap. 74, that the Greeks translated into their language the Dialogues of St. Gregory, and left out that particle "and the Son"; perhaps, however, they did this without error about the thing itself. For since, according to the Greek phrase, they gladly confessed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, some Catholics then - like Damascene, Theophylact,

536. Council of Ephesus, in the recent Latin translation by Theodore Peltanus, tome 2, cap. 37, containing a Nestorian symbol denying that the Spirit is "from" or "through" the Son.

537. Aroinus/Annonius, De gestis Francorum, book 4, cap. 67; Annalists: Abbot of Ursperg, Sigibert, Ado of Vienne, and Regino, under the year 766.

538. Annonius, De gestis Francorum, book 4, cap. 95, on the Aachen council of Charlemagne and the embassy of Bishop Bernhar of Worms and Abbot Adelhart of Corbie.

and others - were unwilling to concede that the Holy Spirit is produced by the Son, for the reason which we shall give in cap. 7. Therefore for this cause, because that manner of speaking did not please them, they could have omitted the particle "and the Son."[539]

Finally, as is gathered from Leo IX - who lived in the year 1054 - in his letters to Constantine Monomachus, the tenth emperor of Constantinople, and to Michael the Patriarch of Constantinople, who tried to usurp to himself the name of Universal Patriarch; and from Sigibert in his Chronicle under the year 1054 - when the Schism was openly made known and the Greeks were sundered from the Latins; in the same age St. Anselm composed a book against this error on the procession of the Holy Spirit. This error indeed endured down to our times; and for that cause, under Eugenius IV, the Council of Florence was celebrated. And among the more recent heretics of our time, some report also Valentinus Gentilis as in favor of this same error, in theses 36 and 37; because he says that the Father alone is the "efficientator" of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (for thus he himself speaks), clearly indicating by this way of speaking that both proceed from the Father alone. But since he was an Arian, and affirmed that the Son and the Holy Spirit are creatures, and that the Father alone is "made God" in Himself and of Himself, as we reported in Disputation 109, cap. 1, he ought not to be reckoned for this error. For the Arians were diverse: some said that the Son is from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit from the Son alone; others that both are from the Father as if they were His true creatures. With Arianism, therefore, the assertion of Valentinus easily stands. But the controversy between Greeks and Latins about the procession of the Holy Spirit proceeds on the supposition - by Catholic faith against the Arians - that the Holy Spirit and the Son are true God and consubstantial with the Father.

Caput II - This error is refuted from Scripture

Cardinal Bessarion - by nation a Greek, and Archbishop of Nicaea - argued very clearly and acutely against this error, in the oration delivered in the Council of Florence for the union of Greeks and Latins, which is after the last session; and he chiefly showed from the holy Greek Fathers that the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Father and the Son. We, however, will add also testimonies of Scripture and of councils, that we may demonstrate more fully the truth of this faith.[540]

The first testimony is John 16: "All things whatsoever the Father has are mine"; and chapter 17: "All thine are mine." Therefore the Son has from the Father, not only the essence (*essentia*), but also the property of breathing (*spirare*): for when Christ says, "All mine are thine," only those things ought to be excepted by which the persons (*personae*) are opposed to one another; for in those alone ought distinction to be considered, as will be plain in the following disputation. St. Augustine so understands these places, On the Trinity, book 5, chapter 14; and, of the Greek Fathers, Damascene - whom the Greeks object to us for their error - for in On the Orthodox Faith,

539. John the Deacon, Vita S. Gregorii, book 4, cap. 74, on the Greek translation of St. Gregory's Dialogues and the omission of "and the Son."

540. Cardinal Bessarion, Oratio at the Council of Florence after the last session, for the union of Greeks and Latins, proving from Greek Fathers the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.

book 1, chapter 9, he speaks thus: "Whence it is that all things which the Father has are the Son's, this one thing excepted, that He is not unbegotten; which term indeed indicates not a difference of nature, nor dignity and authority, but the mode of existence." If, therefore, the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, nor were the Son to breathe Him, Damascene would not say, "this one thing excepted, that He is not unbegotten." Since, then, he excepts only that, he wills that all other things which are the Father's be also the Son's. And in chapter 11: "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are altogether one and the same, except that the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten, the Spirit proceeds." Where he holds that all things are common between the Father and the Son, except paternity and filiation.

The second testimony is in the same chapter, John 16: Not indeed (namely, the Holy Spirit) will He speak from Himself, but whatever He shall hear, He will speak, and what is to come He will announce to you. He will glorify me, because He will receive from what is mine, and will announce it to you (John 16:13 - 14). Although not all the Fathers interpret this in the same way, many nevertheless, and weightier among the Latins, understand it of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Among the Latins, first is Hilary, De Trinitate 8, near the beginning; and Augustine, Tractate 99 on John, whom Bede follows in his commentary on the same place; and Anselm in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 7. For they hold plainly that to "hear from the Father" or from the Son is not to be understood of a bodily ear or of discipline, but of the nature which the Holy Spirit received from both by His procession: thus also He received the knowledge of all things; for indeed His knowledge is His substance and nature. In the same way Ambrose, On the Faith, book 5, chapter 6, explaining that saying of Christ, John 12: From myself I have not spoken, does not wish to refer it to the humility of His flesh; he renders the reason with these words: "For the more learned commonly take it, that the Son 'hears,' and that to 'say something to the Father' is understood through the unity of nature." And by this reason he explains what it is for the Son to have heard from the Father.

He then adduces the testimony of John 16: Not indeed will He speak from Himself, etc.; and he adds a comment with these words: "Because the sentence and the operation of the Trinity is one." And in book 2 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 12, explaining the same place, he says: "That the Son of God knows all things and has prescience of all things to come, the same things which you suppose to be proper to the Son, the Holy Spirit likewise received from the Son; and they were received through unity of substance, just as the Son received from the Father." Therefore Ambrose holds that for the Son to "hear" is nothing else than to receive the nature; for this, as Augustine said, is His knowledge. To these there is added among the Greeks Nazianzen in the Oration on the Faith, which is the forty-ninth, near the end, where he proves that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son from His own substance, from that place Joel 2: "I will pour out of my Spirit," etc.; and from John 16: "He will receive of mine and will announce it to you"; he subjoins moreover, "of that (understand: He will announce to you), which is the Son, because the Son also is of that which the Father is." As if he said: The Spirit will announce of that which He receives from another, just as the Son announces of that which He received from the Father. But that which the Son received from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Son, is His knowledge, as Augustine said, which is to Him

substance and nature. Didymus also agrees, book 2 On the Holy Spirit, cited by Jerome in tome 6, who thus expounds that, "Not indeed will He speak from Himself": that He is not "from Himself," but from another; He subsists and speaks "from the Father, and from me."

I do not ignore that grave Fathers also of the Greek Church expound this place otherwise; nevertheless to me the interpretation above of the Latins, of Nazianzen and of Didymus, is approved. For Chrysostom in Homily 67 on John, and Theophylact, and Oecumenius on chapter 16 of the same, and Cyril, book 10 on John, chapter 41, thus understand that, "Not indeed will He speak from Himself": that is, He will not teach other things than what I have taught; He will follow the same discipline. For he seems to speak "from himself" who in doctrine disagrees with others; and in the same way they explain that, "He will receive of mine and will announce it to you," namely that there is one and the same knowledge in each; never however do they interpret these words of the procession of the Spirit from the Son. I except Cyril, about whom immediately. Tertullian also agrees, On the Veiling of Virgins, at the end; for he himself reads thus: "For He will not speak from Himself, but what commands He shall have received from Christ"; not that the Spirit has received a command from the Son, but because those very things which Christ commanded to be done and to be believed, the Spirit Himself also does, and will speak, and will announce.

However, among these Greek Fathers Cyril, book 13 of the Thesaurus, chapter 4, although he seems to embrace that interpretation which in the aforesaid book 10 on John, chapter 41, he had followed, nevertheless he also refers it to emanation and procession: for he says on these words, "For He will not speak from Himself," etc.: "It is plainly a like thing, if honey too were to say of its own sweetness (which quality is naturally inherent to it): nothing of my sweetness did I give to the tasters, but 'of mine' they received; for naturally the qualities of substances proceed from the substances themselves, and inseparably: as, for example, sweetness from honey, heat from fire, coldness from water. Therefore just as these qualities are not said to 'partake' of the substances in which they are, but to be naturally in them and to go forth from them, so too must it be understood of the Holy Spirit."

The third testimony is John 15 and 16, where Christ promises the Apostles that He will send them the Holy Spirit; but, as we will show in Disputation 170, the mission of one person by another cannot be understood unless He proceeds substantially from the one by whom He is sent, if the persons are of the same nature and substance, as the Greeks affirm of the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, since He is sent by Him. Moreover, it will be proved in the same place that not only are the created gifts of grace bestowed on us by the Son, but that then the very person of the Holy Spirit is sent to us.

The fourth testimony is Romans 8:9: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His."

There are also other [testimonies], in which the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son; yet on no account could He be called the Spirit of the Son unless He were referred to the Son; but He would not be referred to the Son unless He proceeded from Him. For if identity of nature and of

power, or some other cause sufficed, that He might be called the Spirit of the Son, then by the same reason the Son could be called the Son of the Spirit; which none even of the Greeks concedes. By which argument Augustine judged that the procession of the Spirit from the Son is sufficiently proved; indeed the Council of Alexandria, as we shall see in the next chapter, deduced this Catholic truth from that text, that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of truth; that is, of the Son, since the Son is called Truth. From which it is clear that the Greeks of our time by no means clearly impugn our position, nor is anything found to the contrary in Scripture.

But they object also that place of John 15: When the Paraclete shall have come, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father. For since Christ did not add, "that He proceeds from Himself," but only said "from the Father," this testimony seems to lack force for establishing that He also proceeds from the Son.

It is answered: Augustine against Maximinus, book 2, chapter 12, says that by these words the Son is not excluded, but rather the Father is expressed as author and principal; as in the first of the Apostles He is called "principle." Then Anselm in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit answers thus: It would also be said that the Son is predestined "in the Holy Spirit," unless the Son, as Son, were more known by those words of Matthew 11:27: "No one knows the Son save the Father, neither does anyone know the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal." Neither is the Son excluded from the knowledge of the Father, nor the Holy Spirit from the knowledge of each. Finally I answer, from the other places it is manifestly proved that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; and therefore the one procession is not excluded where the other is set forth. Add to this that, when it is said there, "who proceeds from the Father," it plainly denotes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; because, as we shall say in Disputation 171, "mission" is the very eternal procession of the person.

It has been defined by the Church that the Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Caput III - That the Church has defined the procession of the Spirit from the Son, and on the addition "and the Son" in the symbol

This truth was defined in the Epistle which Cyril sent together with the whole Council - not Ephesine, as Castro falsely supposes, but the Alexandrian - to Nestorius, and it was later received by the whole Council of Ephesus; it is contained in tome 5 of the Council of Ephesus among the documents, and among the Epistles of Cyril it is the tenth, where it is said that the Spirit of truth, whom we confess in one nature consubstantial with the Son, is poured forth as He Himself says: "I will pour out of my Spirit," and where the same procession is taught from the Son together with the Father.[541] Our Peltanus has transferred it as before in the ancient compilation of the Councils.

541. Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431), in the recent Latin translation by Theodore Peltanus, tome 2, cap. 37, contains, among the documents received by the council, the Alexandrian synodal letter of St. Cyril against Nestorius, wherein the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son and His procession "from" the Son is asserted, and a Nestorian symbol is rejected which denied that the Spirit is "from" or "through" the Son.

Therefore this truth is defined in one of the four most general Councils, although the Greeks may evade; but let them not on that account either disparage the Council of Ephesus, or at least afterwards object to us that in none of the four general Councils was this truth defined.

That Epistle too was read and approved in the Council which is called the universal collation of the Church; the Olympic Epistles of Cyril were approved by the Council of Chalcedon in action 3, to posterity incorporated in the definition of faith, chapter 6; and we have also in the Sixth Synod that very particle ("and from the Son") insinuated; and in the Seventh Synod it is confirmed; and in the Council of Florence, in the profession of the faith, the Greeks themselves, in their codices of the Seventh Synod, acknowledged that that particle had not been omitted, but that the Latins of the Church in that session had retained it, as was corrected from a most ancient manuscript codex, in which that particle was found; and I do not doubt that among the Greeks of old that particle too was in use: for the Greeks of the earlier ages used the phrase "through the Son," as we shall note below, to keep the idiom of their language, as will be noted in chapter 6.[542]

And the book "Carolinus," which Adrian I first set forth in his writing on images to Charlemagne (and in the Epistles of Adrian it is among the letters of the Pontiffs in tome 2, and in the tome of the Councils after the Seventh Synod), rebukes Tarasius because, in Synod, action 2, in his Epistle, priests and bishops had said: "and in the Holy Spirit, the lifegiver, proceeding from the Father through the Son," and had not said: "proceeding from the Father and the Son." Which Adrian immediately defends, showing that the doctrine both of the Greeks and of the Latins is that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both; and he assigns no difference between those two particles, "through the Son" and "from the Son"; indeed among the very Fathers, who assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, you will find both.[543][544]

Now this truth has long since been explained in the Catholic Church by the Nicene symbol, which the Church publicly sings; under which accordingly this truth will be proved first by that particle "and the Son," as will be seen below.

And "through the Son" proves what Tharasius and the Seventh Synod and the Fathers said: "through the Son." Furthermore, that that particle has the same force among the Greeks which the particle "and the Son" has among the Latins, we will prove in the same chapter alleged.

It is also truly defined then in the Latin Councils. First, indeed, in Toledo I under Leo I in the oration of the faith; in Toledo III (commonly the fourth) under King Reccared; and in Gelasius I: St. Leander of Seville, Bishop, and St. Eufemius of Toledo, were present there; for in the confession of faith, as Isidore reports, the Fathers are said to have asserted: "And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord

542. Cardinal Bessarion, Oration at the Council of Florence after the last session, for the union of Greeks and Latins, proving from the Greek Fathers the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son; and the profession of the Council of Florence itself, wherein East and West confess the same symbol, with the truth of the procession from both expressed.

543. Aroinus/Annonius, De gestis Francorum, book 4, cap. 67; the Annalists: the Abbot of Ursperg, Sigibert, Ado of Vienne, and Regino under the year 766, on the controversies regarding the symbol and the clause "through the Son" used by Greeks, and the defense by Adrian I that "through the Son" and "from the Son" are equivalent with respect to the Spirit's procession.

544. Annonius, De gestis Francorum, book 4, cap. 95, on the Aachen council of Charlemagne and the embassy of Bishop Bernhar of Worms and Abbot Adelhart of Corbie, where the equivalence of "from the Father through the Son" and "from the Father and the Son" is treated and defended by the Apostolic See.

and lifegiver, who proceeds from the Father and the Son." And again in the same confession it is stated that the same is holy, the Son and the Spirit, not otherwise, indeed by the same [confession], and that the Holy Spirit, not created, is rightly believed, and is more truly taught to proceed from the Father and from the Son; concluding, from order, that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. All which in that Council either were changed, which the Toledan Councils decreed, by the work of the most learned Doctor Garcia Loaysa, of Complutum, a most illustrious man and chief under the most pious Emperor Philip II, examined by all the Spanish Councils; and we have them, as he set forth the very autograph copies with a learned note; what is written in the Second Council of Toledo under Honorius I; and in the Fourth Council under Mauritius I; and the Eleventh Council under King Wamba; in the confession of faith which we have; and in the acts celebrated under anathema at the Sixth Synod general; and in the Octave of Aquitaine; and in the notary acts: "Gestiana," and under Charlemagne again inserted, because in the year sixteen and eighteen it stood, by that very same decree it was then concluded to have been definitively settled for the Catholic truth; likewise it is celebrated in the Council at Barum by the Greeks and Latins under Urban; and the author is Adrian concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit in that place; and afterward the Lateran, under Innocent III, where in the decree for the instruction of the Greeks and Latins the testimonies are exhibited and decided; and the Council of Lyons defines the same; and that of Florence publicly in the Church, and the East together with the West embraces one and the same symbol of the Nicene faith; and thus we have the same truth defined together with the symbol of the Nicene with that particle added, as is sung everywhere.[542]

Where the particle "and the Son" was first added to the Nicene symbol. So much for now.

Caput IV - Where first this truth was delivered by the Church in the symbol by the addition "and the Son"

We have said thus far where this truth was defined by the Church; next, where first it was added to the symbol: and, first, at Toledo, as is clear. It was added to the symbol at Toledo: which is enough.

We have said above where this truth was defined by the Church; but where the clause "and the Son" (*Filioque*) was first added to the Nicene Symbol.

It can be confirmed from the Tripartite History, book 9, chapter 14, and from the Symbol of Damasus, which is found in the ninth tome among the works of St. Jerome, where that clause is added, and lastly from Hugo Etherianus, book 3 On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 16, whom I have not read.[545]

Yet these things are of no moment. For, first, in that epistle it is only related how those Fathers of Constantinople, hindered by certain inconveniences, were unable to come to Rome, and therefore sent their written profession of faith to the Roman Council, and, together with it,

542. Cardinal Bessarion, Oration at the Council of Florence after the last session, for the union of Greeks and Latins, proving from the Greek Fathers the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son; and the profession of the Council of Florence itself, wherein East and West confess the same symbol, with the truth of the procession from both expressed.

celebrated one general council. But concerning the addition of that clause, not even a word; indeed, among the decrees of that Roman Council, which are contained in that ninth book of the Tripartite History, chapter 16, nothing is determined of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son; rather, by Canon 16 he alone is condemned who denies the Holy Spirit to be from the Father.

What is adduced from the Symbol of Damasus also matters little: both because it is not sufficiently certain whether that symbol is Damasus's, and the canons which Marius Victorinus collected in the ninth tome are of uncertain authors; and also because that symbol is far different from the Nicene and Constantinopolitan, whereas we are now inquiring not where this truth was first defined, but where the clause "and the Son" was first added to the Nicene Symbol which is sung in the Church.[546]

But it is objected to us by Jeremias, Patriarch of Constantinople, in that censure of the Oriental Church, chapter one, that in the Nicene Symbol confirmed at Constantinople it is expressly said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Still, that this is false is manifest even from the words of the symbol which he himself subjoins in that chapter. For it is said: "And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds from the Father," etc. Where, although it is only expressed that he proceeds from the Father, nevertheless it is not said "from the Father alone": and these two are far different.

The Greeks, and Jeremias with them, complain in another place that we have added the clause "and the Son" against the definition of the Fathers of the Nicene Council, whereas the Nicene Fathers did not put it. But who does not see that the things which, in subsequent ages, were rightly added to the symbol by Latins and Greeks alike, according to sincere and right faith, are by no means opposed to the decree of the Nicene Council? For it is plain that in the Nicene symbol not more was pronounced about the Holy Spirit than this, "And in the Holy Spirit"; afterwards, indeed, the Fathers of the First Council of Constantinople added those words, "the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds from the Father."

Why so few things were said about the Holy Spirit in the Nicene Council, St. Basil explains in his epistle to the Church of Antioch, which is number 60: where, after reciting the first Nicene Symbol, at the end of the epistle he says thus: "But since the statement about the Holy Spirit was not defined, because as yet there had not appeared those who were waging war against the Spirit - whether those are to be condemned who say that the Holy Spirit is a creature and of servile nature - on that synod no mention was made."[547]

Therefore, after the Constantinopolitan Council, at the time in which (as we said in chapter one) those of Ephesus lived, when some had begun to deny that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, with very good right it was opposed and defined in the aforesaid Councils; and for

545. Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Tripartita, lib. 9, cap. 14; Symbolum Damasi, as printed "in 9. tomo Hieron."; Hugo Etherianus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, lib. 3, cap. 16.

546. On the uncertainties surrounding the Damasine symbol and the canons gathered by Marius Victorinus, see the collection cited as "in 9. tomo Marius Victorinus."

547. St. Basil, Epistola 60 (ad Ecclesiam Antiochenam): after reciting the Nicene Symbol he explains the brevity about the Holy Spirit because controversies had not yet arisen.

a fuller explication of the symbol that clause "and the Son" was added: and how consonant this is to Sacred Scripture was proved in chapter 2. How far also the doctrine of the Fathers, even of the Greeks, consents, we shall easily show in what follows.

But if the Greeks object to the Latins that they added that clause "and the Son" to the symbol, let them also mark Tharasius: for in the Seventh Synod, action 6, in an epistle to the supreme priests and bishops, he added that phrase "through the Son"; and we shall show especially in chapter 6, § 6, that it has altogether the same force.

Nor does it stand in our way that in the Council of Ephesus, Canon 7, it is said that it is lawful for no one either to profess or to write another faith (the Nicene and the Constantinopolitan symbols having been recited among other things). This, I say, does not stand in our way; because, as we have said, by the aforesaid addition neither is another faith professed nor written, but the same is more declared and explained according to the doctrine of the Fathers and the true sense of Scripture. If, however, it were not lawful to add even a word, as the Greeks contend, then the Council of Chalcedon should also be condemned, which added many things to the Nicene Symbol and also subtracted some. And it is plain that a General Council, even with the approbation of the Roman Pontiff, could not prescribe the manner of composing the symbol for future Councils and Pontiffs. For it is free to successors, as to equals, to explain the faith in another manner and in other words, provided they add nothing against right faith nor subtract anything.

But as to that which the Master attests (Sentences I, dist. 11), namely that Pope Leo III, for the caution of our faith, placed on a silver tablet the Constantinopolitan symbol without that addition "and the Son," upon the altar of the Apostles Peter and Paul, although at that time the addition had already been made (for he lived in the year 900), we willingly grant it; yet this in no way militates against the aforesaid addition. For he did not do this in order to condemn the addition, but that the memory of that symbol might be preserved, which by no means is contrary to ours.[548]

Caput V - Greek Fathers on the procession of the Spirit from the Son

Passing over the Latin Fathers - of whom an innumerable multitude of testimonies could be adduced - out of many and most weighty doctors of the Greek Church, Bessarion confirms this truth in sections 6 and 7 of that oration which he delivered at the Council of Florence: these, indeed, speak in a twofold manner about the Holy Spirit. Some say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and through the Son; of these testimonies, just as of the Latins, we shall offer some in this chapter. Others, indeed, say that he proceeds through the Son; from which kind of testimonies one and the same truth is to be proved in the following chapter. Here, however, we shall set forth not only the testimonies which the excellent man Bessarion produced - such as could not be calumniated among the Greeks - but also others, which nevertheless they maliciously and without foundation do calumniate.[549]

548. Peter Lombard, Sentences, book 1, dist. 11, on Pope Leo III's silver tablets of the Constantinopolitan symbol without the Filioque on the altar of the Apostles Peter and Paul.

549. Cardinal Bessarion, Oratio at the Council of Florence, especially sections 6 - 7, adducing Greek Fathers for the procession from the Father and the Son.

First testimony. It is that of Athanasius in the symbol in this manner: "The Holy Spirit, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding from the Father and the Son." The Greeks, indeed, unjustly deny that this symbol is Athanasius's: for Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration on the praises of Athanasius, which is the twenty-first, attests that Athanasius issued a perfect confession of faith, which the whole West and the East venerates. St. Augustine also, in the Psalm, recites entire under the name of Athanasius this symbol: yet, with the name of Athanasius suppressed, he makes use of his sentences in On the Trinity, book 1, chapter 8, in epistle 174, and in the Enchiridion, chapter 36. Wherefore the Greeks cannot deny that a symbol of this kind was published by Athanasius.[550]

On what foundation, then, will they be able to say that that clause "and the Son" was maliciously added by the Latins? In the time, indeed, of Gennadius Scholarius, as he himself writes in the book For the Defense of the Council of Florence, chapter 1, section 3, the Greeks used to concede that this symbol was published by Athanasius; yet fanatical men did not hesitate to assert that he was drunk when he composed it!

Genebrard also reports, in book 3 On the Trinity, that there exists by a very old manuscript codex in the monastery of St. Germain at Paris, a tract De Synodis, in which it is said that Athanasius composed the aforesaid symbol "Quicunque" when he was hiding in a certain pit because of the most grievous persecutions of the Arians, and especially of the emperor Constantius the Arian. The same is written by Nauclerus in the Chronology in the ninth age. Genebrard further alleges a little book written in Greek On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, which was presented to Lazarus Baïssius, orator of King Francis I of France, at Venice, in which not only is Athanasius asserted to be the author of this symbol, but also, in confirmation of this matter, there is brought forward the testimony of Nazianzen, which we reported above. Finally, Genebrard cites John Balethin, a Parisian theologian, who some four hundred years ago published a book, in which, among other things, he sets down in its proper place the judgment that Athanasius is the author of this symbol. Let these things, said by the way, suffice, that our age's Valentinus Gentilis may be put to shame, who, with no other foundation than their accustomed loquacity, have tried to undermine the authority of this symbol.[551]

Second testimony. It is of the same Athanasius, in Sermon 4 against the Arians, toward the beginning; where he writes to the effect: For we do not introduce three first principles, nor three [separate] processions; but, as it were, the sun coming forth and the splendor, and from both the ray proceeding. He plainly compares the Father to the sun, the Son to the splendor; and he makes the Holy Spirit to proceed from both, namely from the Father and the Son. And in the epistle to Serapion On the Holy Spirit he speaks thus to the same effect, teaching that the Spirit is truly God and has his relative origin from the Son, while the Son is naturally God, begotten and subsisting

550. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 21, In laudem Athanasii; St. Augustine, De Trinitate 1.8; Epist. 174; Enchiridion 36.

551. Genebrard, De Trinitate, lib. 3; Nauclerus, Chronologia, aet. 9; on the Greek tract De processione Spiritus Sancti presented to Lazarus Baïssius at Venice, affirming Athanasian authorship and citing Nazianzen; John Balethin, a Parisian theologian of some four centuries past, likewise affirming the same.

essentially from the Father; those who trample the Spirit under foot he bids to be avoided, according to the Apostle's precept after the first and second admonition. I pass over other testimonies of Athanasius, by which we can convict the Greeks not less clearly.

Third testimony. It is of Basil, book 3 against Eunomius, near the beginning, where he says: Why is it necessary that the Spirit be third in dignity and order, and in nature also be third? For in dignity he holds the second place after the Son, since he has his being from him.

Caput VI - On Greek Fathers who said "from the Father through the Son," and that "through" signifies causality

The same truth is shown by the Fathers who said that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son.

There are also other weighty and ancient doctors of the Greek Church who taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. From these Bessarion in that oration proves the same truth, in chapter 6; he first premises, however, in chapter 5, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in article 3 of this question, that the particle "through" (per), which those Fathers use, signifies the reason of cause or of principle (*principium*), which indeed no one can deny. For as to what the Greeks assert, namely that it is put for the particle "with" (cum), who could rightly say that Peter, who is clothed with a garment and therefore walks with a garment, walks through a garment? and the like. Add that in Scripture the particle "through" (per) signifies cause or principle: Genesis 4, "I have gotten a man through God"; John 1, "All things were made through him"; and Colossians 1, "All things were created through him." In which places, if we should interpret "through" as "with," a senseless meaning would be rendered. Basil also teaches in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 29, that the particle "through" sometimes signifies the same as "from" (ex).

Two other points which the Greeks advance are frivolous: namely, that the Fathers use in this mystery the particle "through" both to denote the relation of the Son to the Father, and also to signify identity of nature. For if in that way of speaking the consubstantiality of the Son were signified, by the same manner of speaking we could say that the Son proceeds from the Father through the Holy Spirit, as if to indicate that the Holy Spirit is also of the same substance with the Father. Then too it is not sufficiently clear how the relation of the Son to the Father is denoted by that particle; or, if it could be denoted, it is not evident for what reason this would be necessary. Therefore it follows that the Greek and Latin Fathers used that particle to signify cause. Now that particle cannot signify a material, formal, or final cause of the Holy Spirit, as is clear; therefore it denotes an efficient cause: but this cannot, with respect to the Holy Spirit, be anything other than the producing principle; therefore those who say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son also confess that the Son is a principle of the Holy Spirit.

Basil asserts this particularly in book 3 against Eunomius, chapter 12, where he proposes the question why the Holy Spirit is not called the Son of the Son, and answers in these words: not because he is not from God through the Son, lest we suspect the Trinity to be multiplied into infinity. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not propose that question,

since it would have no difficulty; nor would he answer in that way, for he could much more easily have said that the Spirit is therefore not the Son of the Son because he does not proceed from him. In the same chapter Basil also asserts that the Holy Spirit is manifested by the Father through the Son; which, as Bessarion very well noted, cannot be understood of the temporal manifestation by which the Holy Spirit, being sent by the Father and the Son, poured forth upon the disciples, but of the eternal procession, which he calls "manifestation." For Basil adds there: for this reason the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, because through him, namely through the Son, he is manifested. But if he were speaking of temporal manifestation, it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son from a point in time, because from a point in time he was manifested through the Son. Moreover, Bessarion proves in the aforesaid chapter 6 that the particle "through" does not signify the same as "with," because it would not rightly be said that the Spirit is "the Spirit of the Son" for the reason that he "is with" him and is manifested; for then it could also be said that the Son is "the Son of the Spirit," because he "is with" him and is manifested.

That by the name "manifestation" the eternal procession is signified is clearly proved by Bessarion from other Fathers. First, from Nyssen in book 1 against Eunomius, which among his works we do not have, where he has these words about the Holy Spirit: "He is distinguished by his own property, which is, that he is neither begotten from the Father as the Only-begotten is, nor produced as a son, and that through the Son he is manifested." It is also clear that the Holy Spirit is not to be distinguished from the Son or from the Father by a temporal manifestation alone, but by the eternal procession. Cyril of Alexandria also uses that name "manifestation" in the epistle to Valerian the bishop, which Bessarion cites (but among his epistles in the Latin codices that epistle is not found), where he says: "Just as the Father, so also he who is manifested from him, the Only-begotten Son, is holy by nature." And again: "The Holy Spirit is proper to the Son, not only inasmuch as the Word is manifested from the Father, but also inasmuch as he is understood to have been made man; that is, not only according to the divinity, but also according to the humanity." And Gregory Nazianzen, in the theological oration which is the 37th, not far from the beginning, expressed this to us in different words, in answer to the objection of those who were asserting that the Holy Spirit ought to be called a Son, because nothing seemed to prevent his being called a Son; thus he answers: "We do not say that anything is lacking; for nothing is lacking to God: but the difference of manifestation and, so to speak, of their mutual relation has also brought forth distinct names for them." Who does not see that the names of the persons proceeding were derived not from temporal manifestations, but from origin and eternal procession? Therefore Bessarion rightly concludes in the cited place that among the Greeks these three come to the same, namely: that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and that he proceeds through the Son, and that he is manifested through the Son. In the same way that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son is affirmed by Nyssen in the oration to Ablabius On the fact that one ought not to say there are three Gods, by Cyril of Alexandria, book 1 on John chapter 1, and book 12 chapter 56, and book 1 of the Thesaurus chapter 2, and in the book On the Right Faith to Theodosius after the middle, and in

books 5, 6, and 7 On the Trinity; likewise by Tarasius in the epistle to the supreme priests and bishops, which is found in the third action of the seventh synod, where in his confession of faith he speaks in this same mode; whom the Liber Carolinus unfairly reproves, as we noted in chapter 3.[552]

At length, since many and weighty Fathers of the Latin Church, before the schism arose between the Greeks and Latins, conspired in this opinion, it is great rashness on the part of the Greeks that with such an obstinate mind they still remain in their error, and that they do not hesitate to oppose so common testimonies of the Fathers of both Churches by frivolous reasonings and baseless grounds.

From the Latins indeed this catholic sentiment was taught by Tertullian in the book against Praxeas, chapter 4, who uses the particle "through," as did the Greeks alleged above, and in chapter 8, where he uses the particle "with," as other Latin Fathers; and by many Greeks; by Cyprian in the sermon on the coming of the Holy Spirit; by Hilary, book 2 On the Trinity; by Ambrose, book 2 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 1; by Rufinus in his exposition of the Symbol which is found in the 9th tome of St. Jerome; by St. Augustine, tractate 99 on John, and elsewhere very often; by Prosper, book 1 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 13; by Leo I in epistle 91, otherwise 93, which is to Turibius, chapter 1; by Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3; by Idacius Clarus against Varimandus after the middle in the 8th tome of the Sacred Library; by Boethius, book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 12; by Pope Hormisdas in the epistle to the Emperor Justin, chapter 2; by Gregory in the Synod which is read in his Life, book 1, chapter 2; and in book 2 of the Dialogues, the last chapter, and book 1 of the Morals, chapter 18; and by Bede, book 1 On the Elements of Philosophy.[553]

Fifth testimony is of St. John Chrysostom in the homily on the Symbol, who calls the Holy Spirit one proceeding from the Father and the Son. Sixth testimony is of Didymus, book 2 On the Holy Spirit, in St. Jerome's sixth tome: explaining John 16, "For he shall not speak from himself," he thus writes: because he is not from himself, but is from the Father, and is from me; for that which is put, "he will speak," is from the Father and from me he is; nothing clearer could have been said. Seventh testimony is of Simeon the Metaphrast in the Life of Dionysius the Areopagite: "My Christ," he says, "ascends into heaven and, returning to the paternal seat, sends to the disciples the Spirit who proceeds from him."

The same truth is shown from the Fathers who said that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son.

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552. Cardinal Bessarion, Oratio at the Council of Florence, especially chs. 5 - 7; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 37 and 24; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem lib. 1, c. 1; lib. 12, c. 56; Thesaurus lib. 1, c. 2; De recta fide ad Theodosium (post medium); De Trinitate libb. 5 - 7; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium; Tarasius, Epistola ad summos sacerdotes et episcopos (actio 3 of the Seventh Council); the Liber Carolinus, ch. 3.

553. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean chs. 4 and 8; St. Cyprian, Sermo de adventu Spiritus Sancti; St. Hilary, De Trinitate II; St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto II, 1; Rufinus, Expositio Symboli (in St. Jerome's tome 9); St. Augustine, Tract. 99 in Ioan. and elsewhere; Prosper, De vita contemplativa I, 13; St. Leo I, Ep. 91 (alias 93) ad Turibium, c. 1; Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum c. 3; Idacius Clarus contra Varimandum (in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 8); Boethius, De Trinitate I, 12; Pope Hormisdas, Epistola ad Iustinum imperatorem c. 2; St. Gregory the Great, Synod in Vita I, 2; Dialogi II, c. ult.; Moralia I, 18; Bede, De elementis philosophiae I.

Fourth testimony is of Epiphanius, heresy 69, where concerning the Holy Spirit he says: "Proceeding from the Father, and receiving from the Son." By which words he shows, against the Arians, that the Holy Spirit is not a creature: therefore he refers those words to the eternal emanation; otherwise he would prove nothing. He repeats the same words and reason frequently, in order to prove that the other things besides the Holy Spirit are created, because neither do they proceed from the Father, nor do they receive from the Son. The same, in the Anchoratus, pages 332, 349, 350, 351, says that the Holy Spirit is from the Son; and likewise that he is from the Father and the Son, and from both; which things are so manifest that no one can call them into doubt. However, at the Council of Florence, in session 18, one Mark in the name of the Greeks tried to defend that in Epiphanius the word "is" was not present; but when he had been convicted by John, theologian of the Latin Church, he turned aside in this manner, namely, that to be "from the Father and the Son" was nothing else than to be "of their substance," that is, of the same substance with them. But John and Cardinal Bessarion in that very place refuted this also, proving that this "to be" is referred to the persons of the Father and the Son.[554]

From the same following words of Basil the same truth is most clearly gathered: for he subjoins: "Just as the Son is by order second after the Father, because he is from him, and by dignity, because the Father is to him origin and cause of being; yet by nature he is in no way second, because in truth the Godhead is one: so the Holy Spirit, although he is by dignity and by order second after the Son, nevertheless it does not follow that he is of a different nature." Therefore, since Basil teaches that the Spirit by order and dignity is second after the Son, he necessarily confesses that the Spirit is from the Son, and that the Son is the origin of the Spirit: for to be by order second after someone, according to Basil's cited words, is to be from him; and to be by dignity second is to be second in origin. Add that, if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, he would not have with him the order of first and second, as we shall see below in disputation 168, chapter 2.

In the Council of Florence, session 20, when the Greeks were hard pressed by this testimony, they said it had been corrupted, because not in all Greek codices, but only in some, were these words found. And indeed in the Basel edition of the year 1551 we do not read them. But the Latin theologians brought forward a very ancient manuscript, written by hand six hundred years earlier, in which these words were contained. Moreover, from the following words of the same Basil the same truth is clearly collected, as has been stated above.

Caput VII - The Greeks object certain Eastern Fathers

It is objected to us by the Greeks that some Fathers of the East are on their side.

First: Dionysius. Let us briefly see what the Greeks object to us from the Fathers. First indeed Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names, calls the Father "the fount of the supersubstantial deity." If, then, the Spirit proceeded from the Son, the Son too would be a fount. I answer: by

554. On the Basel 1551 Greek edition lacking the clause; on the ancient Latin manuscript with the clause; on John the Latin Theologian and Cardinal Bessarion at the Council of Florence, sessions 18 and 20.

"fount" Dionysius understands not just any principle (*principium*), but the first principle, as we explained above in disputation 139, chapter 3. Therefore, even if the Father alone is the fount of the Godhead, that is, the principle without a principle, nevertheless the Son can be a principle from a principle, like a rivulet; and in this respect alone the Holy Spirit proceeds from him.

Second testimony: they further adduce Basil, who in epistle 43 says thus: "No second person has community in notion with the Son, as the Son has with the Father: but if the Spirit proceeded from both, in the notion of spirator the Father and the Son would agree." I reply: who does not see that Basil is speaking not of a common notion of these two persons, but of the proper notion of each, namely, of paternity and of filiation, according to which they have no communion at all? And since in that same place Basil plainly says that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, he openly confirms our opinion.

Third testimony seems to favor the Greeks: Nazianzen, in the oration to the bishops who had come from Egypt, which is the 24th; for he says: "All things which the Father has, the Son also has, except causality." Therefore, since according to the Greek phrase the Father is the cause of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Son is not a cause. I answer: Gregory, in the way of speaking, is only signifying that all things are common to the Father and the Son except the opposed relations of cause and caused; and thus he speaks of that causality by which mutually the Son and the Father are referred to one another, not of that by which they regard the Holy Spirit, as is clearly gathered from St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapters 8 and 11; whom we set forth in chapter 3 of this disputation, and indeed from whom we proved that the Son, together with the Father, breathes the Holy Spirit.

Fourth they bring forward Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 11: that the Holy Spirit is "from the Son." Some scholastics, with St. Thomas, in question 10 On Power, article 4, reject Damascene on this, as if it would follow the error of Theodoret. But since Theodoret denied that the Holy Spirit is "through the Son," as we related in chapter 1; and since Damascene in that same chapter says that the Holy Spirit is not "from the Son," but "through the Son" is communicated or manifested, and that he is the Spirit of the Son; he does not seem to have agreed with Theodoret. Moreover, nor does it seem that Damascene followed the subsequent error of the Greeks who affirm that the Holy Spirit indeed proceeds "through the Son," but that the particle "through" denotes only concomitance and not causal force; for we have seen in this chapter that he by no means persuades of that, since Damascene well notes that the force of the particle "through" is causal.

First, indeed, they adduce Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, who calls the Father the fount of the supersubstantial deity; but if the Spirit were to proceed from the Son, the Son too would be a fount. I answer that by fount Dionysius understands not any sort of principle, but the first principle, as we explained above in Disputation 139, ch. 3. Wherefore, even if the Father alone is the fount of the deity, that is, the principle without principle, the Son can be a principle from a principle, as a little stream is; and on this account alone does the Holy Spirit proceed from Him.

Second, they bring forward St. Basil, who in epistle 43 says thus: According to proper notion the Son has no communion with the Father; but if the Spirit proceeded from both, the Father and the Son would agree in the notion of spirator. But who does not see that Basil is speaking not of every notion of these two persons, but of the proper one, namely, of paternity and filiation, according to which they have no communion at all? Yet according to another notion they do have communion; for "spirator" is not a proper notion of either, but a common one of both. Therefore Basil does not oppose our position, but confirms it, when in the same place he denies any communion according to the proper notions of paternity and filiation; for according to those notions there is none, but there is communion according to the common notion of spirator.

Third, they seem to adduce St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the Oration to the Bishops of Egypt, which is the 24th, where he says: All things that the Father has, the Son has, except causality. Since therefore, according to the Greeks, the Father alone is the cause of the Holy Spirit, they infer that the Son is not a cause of the Holy Spirit. I answer that Gregory, by "causality," means only that causal priority which belongs to the Father with respect to the Son, and to the Son with respect to the Father, in their opposed relations; that is, he is speaking of causality in paternity and filiation. He is not speaking of that by which the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and the Son, namely the causality of spiration. Hence the statement is true: all things that the Father has, the Son has, except the causality whereby the Father is a principle without principle. But the causality whereby the Spirit is breathed is common to the Father and the Son. Indeed, from this very saying we proved that the Son agrees with the Father in this, that He breathes the Holy Spirit.

Fourth, the Greeks bring forward St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 11, who denies that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. Some of the Schoolmen reject Damascene, saying that he followed the error of Theodoret. But since Theodoret, as we reported in ch. 1, denied that the Holy Spirit is through the Son, and Damascene in that same chapter says that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, but is communicated or manifested through the Son, and that He is called the Spirit of the Son, he does not seem to have agreed with Theodoret. Moreover, neither was Damascene a follower of the Greeks' error, who affirm indeed that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, but that the particle "through" does not denote a cause, as we saw in this chapter; this I am far from persuaded of, because Damascene well knew that the force of the particle "through" is causal; he also knew the definition of the Council of Alexandria against Theodoret. Wherefore he could not be excused from fault on the pretext, as Clichtoveus attempts to defend him in that chapter, that he had asserted this through ignorance. I therefore hold that Damascene did not deny that the Spirit proceeds from the Son in the sense of the Latins. For he calls Him the Spirit of the Son, which, as the synod of Alexandria notes in its circular letter, is said by reason of origin; he also says that He is communicated or manifested through the Son, which would not be true unless by reason of external emanation from Him.

From the Latins, moreover, this Catholic doctrine was taught by Tertullian, Against Praxeas chs. 4 and 8, who uses the particle "through" just as the Greeks cited above, and he also uses the particle "from," as do the other Latin Fathers; and by many Greeks as well; St. Cyprian, Sermon on the coming of the Holy Spirit; St. Hilary, De Trinitate II; St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto II, 1;

Rufinus, in his Exposition of the Creed (in St. Jerome's tome 9); St. Augustine, Tract. 99 on John, and frequently elsewhere; Prosper, De vita contemplativa I, 13; St. Leo I, Ep. 91 (alias 93) to Turibius, c. 1; Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum c. 3; Idacius Clarus against Varimandus (in the Bibliotheca sacra, tome 8); Boethius, De Trinitate I, 12; Pope Hormisdas, the Letter to Emperor Justin, c. 2; St. Gregory the Great, the Symbol recited in his Life I, 2; Dialogues II, last chapter; Moralia I, 18; and Bede, De elementis philosophiae I.

But they object to us that some Greek Fathers denied the Spirit to be from the Son, and so they think that the particle "from" and the particle "of" denote the ratio of first principle, and cause; while the Latins affirm that the Spirit proceeds from both as from one principle; yet if He proceeded from both as from a first principle, there would be two innascibles, and consequently two principles. Therefore these Greek Fathers thought that the particle "from" signifies a first principle and cause; and, to avoid speaking of two first principles of the Holy Spirit and of two spirations, they preferred to say that the Holy Spirit is through the Son rather than from the Son. Wherefore, even if we were to say that Damascene saw and read the acts of the Seventh Synod - which does not appear, nor is it at all likely - he could without any fault of error have used this manner of speaking; because in the Seventh Synod it is defined only that the Holy Spirit is through the Son.

In the same sense Maximus should be understood in the letter to Marinus, where, speaking of the Fathers of the Latin Church, he says that they do not concede that the Son is a cause, that is, a principle of the Holy Spirit; for he understood "cause without cause," that is, a first principle. And as to what some Latins said at the Council of Florence, that the words were not found in the Greek copies, Bessarion convicts this excellently in ch. 7 of that oration; and indeed, unless Maximus had understood that the Latin Fathers spoke in that sense, he would manifestly have imposed a falsehood upon them; for he could not produce a single Latin Father, even of the least authority, who denied that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as from a principle from a principle. Thus too I should understand Theophylact on John 3, "God does not give the Spirit to the Son by measure"; and Euthymius on John 14, "I will ask the Father"; who, together with Damascene, deny that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, or proceeds "from" the Son; because they nowhere deny that He proceeds through the Son; nay, they there assert that He is given through the Son and is therefore and is called the Spirit of the Son; which must be understood of the eternal emanation; for He is not called the Spirit of the Son because He is given temporally, but because from eternity He proceeds. Add also that these authors, as they themselves expressly note, therefore deny that the Spirit proceeds "from" the Son, lest they be forced to concede two first principles and, consequently, two spirations; but the Latins affirm that He proceeds from both as from one principle. If therefore He proceeded from both as from a first principle, there would be two innascibles and hence two principles. Thus these Greek Fathers denied that the particles "of" and "from" express the notion of first principle; while the Latins, who use these particles without any peril, were blamed by them in an unmannerly way; especially since many among the Greek Fathers - whom we recalled in ch. 5 above - use the particles "from," "out of," and "of."

Why the Greeks denied the Spirit to be "from" the Son. They denied it because, according to their language, those two particles, "of" and "from," denote the ratio of first principle; and since the Son is not the first principle of the Holy Spirit, but a principle from a principle, lest there appear to be two first principles and two spirations of the Holy Spirit, they preferred to say that the Holy Spirit is through Him rather than from Him. And thus, even if Damascene had seen and read the acts of the Seventh Synod - which does not appear, nor is it at all likely - he could without any fault of error have used that manner of speaking; because in the Seventh Synod it is defined only that the Holy Spirit is through the Son.

An if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, would He be distinguished from Him?

Disput. 147.

- Status quaestionis, ch. 1.
- The view of Henry, Scotus, and others, ch. 2.
- The view of Henry and Scotus has no peril in the faith, ch. 3.
- The true opinion is proved by the authority of St. Thomas, ch. 4.
- By what reasons this opinion is proved by Durandus, Cajetan, and others, ch. 5.
- By two very good reasons the aforesaid opinion is confirmed, ch. 6.
- The reasons of the former view are dissolved, ch. 7.
- Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine, ch. 8.

Disputatio CXLVII

Caput I - Status quaestionis

There have not been lacking theologians who have followed the opinion of Gottschalk (as reported by Scotus, Ord. I, d. 1, q. 4), who thought that this question, as proceeding from an impossible hypothesis, is superfluous and useless. For since the things that are in God are in the highest mode necessary, the opposites of them will be in the highest mode impossible. But such is this: that the Holy Spirit should not proceed from the Son, contrary to what the truth of our faith grants. Wherefore, since from an impossibility anything follows, that is, any part of a contradiction, it is no wonder if, from the aforesaid supposition, it is inferred both that the Holy Spirit is nevertheless to be distinguished from the Son, and that He is not to be distinguished. Our disputation would therefore be useless and unprofitable, since nothing certain can be gathered from it.

But, as Gregory of Rimini notes in I, dist. 11, q. 1, art. 2, and as Scotus most aptly observed in the same place, it is very useful to argue from some impossible supposition, as will easily appear in the present question: neither from such a hypothesis can both parts of a contradiction be inferred through the topic (as they say) of the intrinsically remaining supposition; but with the hypothesis remaining and standing, one cannot infer both parts of a contradiction. For example, if it were

supposed that man were not an animal, yet reason would remain in him; if someone inquired whether anything remained by which man could be distinguished from a horse, it would not follow that both parts of the contradiction followed; rather it must be said that nevertheless something would remain by which man would differ from a horse, namely that which now formally distinguishes him from the horse would remain. If, however, someone were to argue in this way: If animal did not remain, rational could not remain; therefore that by which the difference is constituted would not be able to remain; although he would conclude correctly, yet not by the topic of the intrinsically remaining supposition, but by destroying one part of the supposition from another, which however the present inquiry does not proceed by; for it proceeds with the hypothesis remaining fixed, namely that the Son is begotten by the Father, but that the Holy Spirit is not spirated by the Son, yet in the same numerically one nature, as before; and that the same filiation and passive spiration remained and persevered; whether anything would remain by which the Son and the Holy Spirit could be personally distinguished from each other. With that hypothesis retained, both parts of the contradiction cannot be inferred, as will be clear in the course of the disputation.

This mode of disputing and arguing is moreover very useful, that we may understand what is the formal reason and the necessary cause of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit: whether it be the active spiration or the filiation. For if the Holy Spirit, not proceeding from the Son, were not distinguished from Him, it follows that the necessary reason of distinction in the Son now is spiration; but if He would still be distinguished, it follows that there is another reason of distinction, even when the cause of distinction is removed; and then by the topic of the intrinsically remaining, distinction is removed when its cause is removed, but with that cause remaining, and with any other descriptor removed, the distinction remains.

Caput II - The view of Henry, Scotus, and others

In this question, thus understood, the view of Henry of Ghent was, which Scotus later followed in I, dist. 1, q. 2, that, the supposition being posited, nevertheless the Holy Spirit would be sufficiently distinguished from the Son; wherefore, against the Greeks, who admit that supposition, it cannot be proved that the Holy Spirit is the same person with the Son. And since in fact Scotus and Henry agree with the Latin Church that in the Son there are two relations, one of active spiration, the other of filiation, they consequently affirm that by filiation alone the Son is sufficiently distinguished from the Holy Spirit; although by active spiration also, as by an opposed relation, He personally differs.

This first opinion can be proved by the testimony of St. Anselm in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2, where he speaks thus: "This therefore alone is the cause of plurality in God, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit cannot be said of one another but are from one another, because in the aforesaid two ways God is of God." As if he were to say: this alone is the cause of distinction among the persons, that the Son proceeds by generation, and the Holy Spirit by procession; for this is to proceed in two modes. But the Holy Spirit would proceed nevertheless by

procession, and the Son by generation, even if the Spirit were not produced from the Son; therefore by that cause also He would be distinguished personally from Him. Anselm goes on, and at the end of the chapter he assigns this single reason of personal distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, that the one goes forth by being born, the other by proceeding; until some other distinction is shown. And in ch. 4 he says: unless by these modes they were more than one - the Son and the Holy Spirit - they would not be diverse from each other; but because the one exists by being born, the other by proceeding, they are diverse.

Then the aforesaid authors confirm this position by a twofold foundation: both from the formal reason of a constituting principle, and from the plurality of emanations. The first foundation is taken from such a constituting principle, which so sufficiently constitutes a thing that it also distinguishes it from any other which is not constituted by the same principle; for that by which a thing is constituted in its own proper ratio either properly and of itself, or by the ratio of living, or by some genus under which its constitution falls, the same, insofar as it adheres to the very subsistence of that constituted thing, is such that through it a thing is distinguished from all others which do not adhere by the same constitution. And so a man is distinguished from a stone by the rational, by which he is constituted substantially; and hence a man is either distinguished from a stone by the rational, by which he is substantially, and properly, constituted; or by the ratio living, which is a genus under the constitution of which his constitution falls: yet that which adheres more to his proper subsistence more suitably distinguishes him. Thus either the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, which constitutes Him, or by something else which constitutes His subsistence, or by an opposed relation; but if by filiation He is sufficiently constituted in His personal subsistence, He is thereby distinguished; and the Holy Spirit likewise, the same remaining, would be distinguished by His own constituting ratio. Therefore, even if active spiration were not found in the Son, filiation, which constitutes the person, would suffice for distinction; the effect follows by the topic of the intrinsically remaining: the effect of that cause remains, whatever descriptor be removed from the hypothesis, apart from the impossible hypothesis; wherefore if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, filiation remaining in the Son and procession in the Holy Spirit, they would nevertheless be distinguished.

If anyone replies (says Scotus) that things are distinguished only by those by which they are constituted more than by others with which they agree: I answer that, just as a rational animal is distinguished from brute animals, with which it agrees as animal; and from stones, with which it does not agree as living. To this objection Scotus replies in three ways in order: first, that nothing which is from another can be distinguished by a principle that it does not substantially presuppose in its constitution, or by any action which does not adhere to its constitution substantially; and therefore man is not distinguished from stone by any operation other than by that which issues from his substantial constitution, or by some action that adheres to that constitution.

Caput III - On the sentence of Henry and Scotus and whether it is safe in the faith

Henry adds, by his arguments. Henry adds that these two emanations can be from the same principle according to the thing, yet must necessarily terminate in diverse persons: for a multitude of emanations does not require a multitude of principles, as it does require a plurality of termini, as is manifest also in creatures.

Aureolus in part agrees with Henry and Scotus, first. Aureolus, in I, Distinction 11, Question 1, Article 2, whose arguments Capreolus relates in the same Distinction, Question 2, Article 2, Conclusion 1 (which in fact have nothing difficult beyond what has been said); then Gabriel in the same Distinction, Question 2, Article 2, the Conclusion; lastly Gregory in I, Distinction 11, Question 1, Article 1, report something differing from them in a certain way.[555] For Aureolus and Gabriel, while they teach that the principle of the Son's distinction from the Holy Spirit is filiation - in which they agree with Scotus and Henry - nevertheless affirm that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He ought not to be distinguished from Him: not indeed by the intrinsic place with the supposition retained, for that would clash with the same assertion; but because, as Gabriel says in Conclusion 3 of that article, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, in the Son there would be no spiration, and consequently no filiation, which is altogether the same as spiration; in which they differ from Henry and Scotus. But, as I warned above, the question proceeds in every opinion, by the intrinsic place, with the supposition remaining, as Scotus rightly noted; from which it follows that in that case the Holy Spirit would have to be distinguished from the Son, if in fact filiation is the sufficient principle of distinction. And it is ridiculous, in this question, to argue by destroying the supposition, as we were saying above; rather one must inquire whether, filiation remaining and without active spiration in the Son, the Son would be sufficiently distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

Gregory also dissents from Scotus, first, because he teaches that filiation is not the principle constituting the Son from the nature of the thing, as Scotus thought; for it is altogether the same reality as the Son; but that which from the nature of the thing constitutes something else must also from the nature of the thing differ from it. Secondly, because he affirms that in the Son there is nothing on the part of the thing besides spiration, by reason of which He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit, since in the Son spiration and filiation are altogether the same; whereas Scotus, on the contrary, thinks that these two relations are distinguished from the nature of the thing. Thirdly, he adds that, if one speaks of the principle of distinction as it exists outside the soul, there is in the Son no notion signified incomplexly: for this author denies that in God notions are signified incomplexly; yet he agrees with Scotus that, if one speaks of the principle distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is signified by us complexly, that is, insofar as it is expressed by some account and enunciation, the Son is not distinguished from the Holy Spirit because He breathes Him, but because He proceeds from the Father by generation; which is the same as if, in the school of Scotus and the others who concede notions signified incomplexly, he were to say: the

555. Aureolus, In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 1, a. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 1; Gabriel, In eadem dist., q. 2, a. 2, concl. (the same place); Gregory, In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 1, a. 1.

Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, not by spiration; and therefore, even if He did not breathe with the Father, He would nonetheless be distinguished from Him; for this follows by the intrinsic place, because, the principle of distinguishing remaining, the distinction cannot fail to follow.

The sentence of Henry and Scotus has nothing perilous in the faith.

On whether this censure should be judged dangerous in the faith

This censure is frivolous to be judged dangerous in the faith. For who does not see how ridiculous it is to amend the words of the Council, which are found in the same way in all the Greek and Latin codices, so that we may insinuate that Scotus's sentence is an error? Rather, those men ought to be noted who so lightly contrived this emendation, since from the aforesaid words an easy sense can be gathered elsewhere, which is as follows. Since the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, they consequently teach that He proceeds from the Father alone, and therefore that He (namely, the Holy Spirit) is not the Son; and thus they wished that to be declared in the Symbol, lest it be defined in the four general Councils: for in these Councils the Greeks assembled in that Florentine Council professed to stand, just as in the four Lateran Councils. Therefore the Florentine Council does not, against the Greeks, in the aforesaid words infer that absurdity which our Theologians strive to infer against them and against Scotus, namely, that He (the Holy Spirit) would be the Son if He proceeded from the Father alone; but rather that the Greeks wanted to maintain - what they, according to the truth, despair of establishing - that if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, at least He proceeds from the Father and is distinguished from the Son, lest they confound the Trinity. Against the Greeks, however, the Council infers this absurdity: that a partition of the divine substance would follow. For if the Son did not spirate the Holy Spirit, He would not receive from the Father the power of spirating; and consequently He would not have the Father's substance and power, if indeed in the Father's substance is the power of spirating. Nor does it matter, if you should say that this power is not communicated to the Holy Spirit: nevertheless the Father's substance would be divided in common; for since the power of spirating connotes a personal property, it is not communicated to that person to whom the personal property and the relation conjoined to it is opposed; and this takes place without any partition of the divine substance. But when the property and the relation conjoined to the power of spirating do not repugn and are not opposed to another person, that power cannot fail to be communicated to that person also, unless a partition of the divine substance should follow. For, as is evident from Caput 2 of the preceding disputation, all the things which the Father has are the Son's, except those which are mutually opposed; and by the same reason of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, if anything, apart from those that are opposites by relation, were not common to the persons, it would follow that either the essence would be divided between them, or something of perfection would, by that very account, differ from the remaining persons - about personal properties, as is said in the Council of Florence, in that same last session, in a certain confession of faith sent to the Greeks, and in another letter.[556] Furthermore (says the Council), lest we seem to

divide the identity and unity of the divine substance, and to hold that that same substance differs from the hypostases in reality and not by reason alone, therefore we said that the word "and from the Son" is necessary in the Symbol.[557]

Another thing, however, which is brought against Scotus is much more frivolous. For the partition of the divine substance, which those theologians cited above try to deduce against St. Thomas, follows only from the error of Gregory, because he taught that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; but Scotus affirms nothing of the kind - rather, with the rest of the Scholastics, on the basis of that supposition alone, which they judge impossible and false, he disputes under a condition whether in such a case the Spirit would be distinguished from the Son; in which question, whether this or that be said, no division of the substance of God follows.

A ridiculous censure ought to be judged so in matters of faith. For who does not see that it is ridiculous to amend the words of the Council - on which that foundation rests - which are found in the same way in all the Greek and Latin codices, so as to insinuate the suspicion of Scotus's error? Rather, those ought themselves to be noted who so lightly devised this emendation, since an easy sense can be gathered from the aforesaid words; which is as follows. Since the Greeks teach that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, they consequently teach that He proceeds from the Father alone, and therefore that He (namely, the Holy Spirit) is not the Son: in order thus to establish a Trinity of persons, which is defined in the four general Councils; for in that Council of Florence the Greeks gathered there used to defer to those Councils as to the four Gospels. Therefore the Council of Florence does not infer against the Greeks, in the aforesaid words, that absurd thing which our Theologians try to infer against them and against Scotus - namely, that the Holy Spirit would be a son if He proceeded from the Father alone - but rather it wished to establish what the Greeks, according to the true faith, ought to assert, namely, that if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, at least He proceeds from the Father, and is distinguished from the Son, lest they confound the Trinity. But against the Greeks the Council infers this absurdity, that a partition of the divine substance (*substantia*) would follow. For if He did not breathe the Holy Spirit, He would not have received from the Father the power of spirating: and therefore neither the whole substance nor the power of the Father; since in the Father's substance is the power of spirating. Nor does it matter if you say that this power is not communicated to the Holy Spirit, but nevertheless that the Father's substance is not divided in Him: because since the power of spirating connotes personal property (*proprietas personalis*), it cannot be communicated to that person to whom a personal property, and the relation (*relatio*) conjoined with it, is opposed, and for this to be without any partition of the divine substance; but when the property and relation conjoined with the power of spirating do not repugn nor are opposed to another person, that power also cannot fail to be communicated to him, unless a partition of the divine substance follow. For as is evident from ch. 2 of the preceding disputation, all things which the Father has are the Son's,

556. Council of Florence, the same last session; in a certain confession of faith sent to the Greeks; and in another letter.

557. "Porro autem (inquit Concilium) ne identitatem, coniunctionemque divinae substantiae distribuere, atque ipsam eandem substantiam re, et non sola ratione ab hypostasibus differre, credere videamur, idcirco verbum ex Filio necessarium in symbolo diximus esse."

except those which are mutually opposed; and the same reason holds of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, if something besides those things that are relatively opposed were not common to the persons, the essence (*essentia*) would without doubt be divided among them, or some essential [thing] would differ by more than a rational distinction from the personal relations, as is said in the Council of Florence.[558]

The opinion of St. Thomas in this article, which many Scholastics follow, as far more probable and more in agreement with the doctrine of the Fathers, is to be embraced by us. The Angelic Doctor therefore affirms that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by the opposition of relation alone (*oppositio relativa*), so that, if He did not proceed from Him, there would be one and the same person of both, having two relations by which He would be referred to the Father: he understands two distinct by reason alone, just as now in the Father there are two by which He is referred to two persons, namely paternity and spiration. With St. Thomas agree Cajetan, the Canarian, and more recent Thomists in this article; he himself handed down the same in the Summa contra Gentiles IV, ch. 24; and Ferrariensis there; St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 11, q. 1: for in the body of the article he plainly grants whatever the arguments of the Sed contra contend; among which one proved that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him; Durandus also in the same distinction, q. 2; Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1; Marsilius in I, q. 15, to the third argument: although this author asserts it for this reason alone, that in that case the Son would not be Son; and thus the Holy Spirit would not be distinguished from the Son; in which he seems to remove the supposition and to make the disputation superfluous, and in part to agree with the Nominalists, who follow the prior opinion.

But, as we were saying in ch. 1, the controversy proceeds with the supposition made and the same remaining, namely, if truly there were a Son begotten in the divine nature, but from Him the Spirit did not proceed, as the Greeks fable.

This opinion can be proved first by the authority of the Fathers, who affirm that by the opposition of relation alone the persons can be distinguished; that is, by the relation of cause and caused, as the Greeks speak: for thus it follows that, the opposition being removed, the personal distinction is taken away from the midst: but this opposition would not exist if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, as is manifest. But, on the contrary, the doctors of the prior opinion, in order to defend that, upon the supposition made, the Holy Spirit must be distinguished from the Son, strive to prove that not the opposition of relation alone is the cause of distinguishing the persons, but that they can be distinguished from elsewhere. I except St. Gregory, whom I recalled in ch. 2: for he not only teaches that in that case the Holy Spirit must be distinguished from the Son, but also that now in fact the Son is not distinguished from the Holy Spirit by spiration, but by filiation: from which opinion Scotus is not far, as is gathered from that author's former argument,

558. Council of Florence, the same last session; in a certain confession of faith sent to the Greeks; and in another letter: "Moreover (says the Council), lest we seem to distribute the identity and conjunction of the divine substance, and to believe that that same substance differs really, and not by reason alone, from the hypostases, therefore we judged the word 'and from the Son' to be necessary in the Creed."

by which he proves that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, by which He is substantially constituted, and that He cannot be distinguished from Him by any reason adventitious to Him already constituted - of which sort spiration seems to be.

That therefore the cause of the distinction among the persons is the opposition of relation alone, is proved first by the testimony of St. Gregory of Nyssa, which Bessarion cites in Oration 6, from the book to Ablabius; where concerning the divine persons he says thus: Those things which are considered around cause and caused, we do not deny a difference by which alone we detect one to be discerned from the other: namely, in that we believe that one is indeed cause, the other truly from a cause, and from that which is from a cause. Where St. Gregory says that the distinction among the persons arises and is believed solely from the relative opposition according to cause and caused: how then do Scotus and the other doctors of the prior opinion attempt to defend a distinction among the persons also from disparate relations, as they speak?

Add the testimony of the same St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 1 against Eunomius, according to whom - as we alleged in the preceding disputation, ch. 6 - he distinguishes the Spirit from the Son by this alone, that He is manifested through the Son: but we showed there that this must be understood of the eternal procession, and that the particle "through" in that place signifies causality.

Then, in favor of this opinion, Boethius is reported in the book On the Trinity, where he says that by relation the Trinity is multiplied in God.[559] But since he does not say this of opposed relations, we cannot argue from it against Scotus: for he can say that the persons are multiplied also by disparate relations.

Finally, the most received proposition among theologians is wont to be alleged, which is attributed to St. Anselm: In the divinity all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way.[560] For in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 3, after he had spoken about the unity of essence and the plurality of relations, he said as follows: "Thus therefore are tempered the consequences of this unity and of this relation, that neither the plurality which follows relation passes over to those things in which there sounds the unity of the aforesaid simplicity, nor does the unity restrain the plurality where the same relation is signified: so that neither does unity ever lose its consequence where the property of some relation is not opposed; nor does relation lose what is its own, unless where the inseparable unity withstands." But St. Anselm can in no way favor us, if he be carefully read in that chapter and the following: for he does not think that there is only plurality and distinction among opposed relations; but that there is a twofold mode of procession, in each of which is its own opposition, not because any mode of procession is opposed to another. For with the words immediately preceding he thus explained this opposition of relation: "We have set forth above an opposition of relation which arises from this, that in the two aforesaid modes God is from God," - he proves that "Father and Son and Holy Spirit" are said of one another, and the proper [attributes] of each are ascribed. But a little earlier

559. Boethius, De Trinitate.
560. Attributed to St. Anselm; see De Processione Spiritus Sancti, chs. 3 - 4.

in the preceding chapter he had said that this is the cause of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the one exists by being begotten, the other by proceeding; nor had he said that there is a distinction between them to the extent that one proceeds from the other: indeed, in that same ch. 3, past the middle, he says: "But when it shall appear that the Holy Spirit is of the Son, then also it will be clear that for this reason the Holy Spirit cannot be Son." Finally, in ch. 4 of the same book he proves that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son by this argument: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the whole God the Father, who is the same God with the Son and with the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, or the Son from the Holy Spirit: but the Son cannot proceed from the Holy Spirit, as he himself proves: therefore it is the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Son.[561]

Caput V - By what arguments this opinion is proved by Durandus, Cajetan, and others

From that axiom which is attributed to St. Anselm, and which we were just recalling, Cajetan and the Canarian in this article derive an argument for the opinion which we reported in ch. 4, as follows. Since in God there is substance and relation; the reason of distinguishing and constituting the persons is always ascribed to relations, not to substance; and since relation has something in common with the absolute, and something peculiar inasmuch as it is relation; the reason of distinguishing and constituting is ascribed to relation according to its proper notion: but its proper notion is order to a term; wherefore it will belong properly to it to constitute and to distinguish something by order to another: for whatever is constituted by the absolute is constituted to itself: therefore, if relation distinguishes the persons in God, inasmuch as it is relation and according to its proper notion, it follows that it distinguishes only from the opposed person. For since it ought by the same notion to distinguish by which it constitutes; if it constitutes toward another, namely toward the correlate, it will also distinguish only from that. Whence it follows that it is the same to be distinguished relatively and to be distinguished by relation, as relation is: but in both ways the distinction can be made only from the opposed. From all which things it rightly follows that the Father is distinguished by paternity from the Son alone; and the Son by filiation from the Father alone; and both from the Holy Spirit by spiration alone. Wherefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him: because no form of distinction would remain in Him.

This doctrine, although it seems subtle, nevertheless has no firm foundation. For relation, even according to its proper notion, can distinguish from something other than the opposed relation. First, because the most general things of this category are distinguished from the other nine [categories] by an intrinsic mode, to their own proper; yet they are not opposed to them, but, as they say, by a disparate notion they are distinguished from others. Secondly, within a category not only those things differ which are opposed, but also many others do so. For paternity does not differ only from filiation, but also from similarity, ...

561. St. Anselm, De Processione Spiritus Sancti, chs. 3 - 4.

Thirdly, as Cajetan admits, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father, He would nevertheless be distinguished from Him: therefore already paternity would distinguish the Father from something other than the opposed relative, and procession likewise. Fourthly, finally, relation according to the proper notion of relation is terminated to an absolute, not to a relative, except in the divine, as will be noted in Disputation 159, cap. 6; therefore according to the proper notion of relation, it not only distinguishes from the opposed relation, but also from the absolute to which it refers. Wherefore the opinion of St. Thomas must be proved for us in another way and, from that same common principle sufficiently accepted by theologians, In the divine all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, must be explained otherwise and confirmed.

Durandus confirms this opinion by another reasoning; which, though with a few changes it proves the contrary, as we shall see in the following chapter, nevertheless it presupposes certain things in his position which in truth are not so; therefore in the present chapter it has seemed good to set it forth. Thus Durandus argues: in fact, in the Father there are two disparate relations, namely paternity and spiration, and yet they do not constitute two persons: therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, procession and filiation would not constitute and distinguish two persons, because they would be disparate in the same way, not however opposed, as now spiration and paternity are. Durandus, however, notes in the cited question, num. 16, that this reasoning must presuppose what he himself taught in I Sent., dist. 13, q. 2: that active spiration and paternity are really distinct; for in I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, he calls every distinction from the nature of the thing and prior to the intellect, which he thinks to be between those two relations, a real distinction; thus indeed his reasoning has greater force. And indeed it can also be ineffective against Scotus; because since he concedes a distinction from the nature of the thing between those two relations, it can easily be proved against him that it is real, as was shown above in Disputation 116, cap. 5.

But someone will reply from the doctrine of that same Durandus in I Sent., dist. 13, q. 2, num. 22: that therefore by active spiration a person distinct from the Father is not constituted, because spiration is a common relation to two persons. But against this it seems to be the case that, in that case where the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, spiration would not be communicable, and nevertheless it would not constitute a different person, but the same as that which paternity would constitute.

Scotus meets this argument otherwise. For he replies in I Sent., dist. 2, part 2, q. 2 (which is the fifth in order to the second), and again in distinction on the second question cited, to the second argument, that there need not be as great a distinction between the active principles of a production as there must be between the things produced: because it is impossible that one and the same thing be produced by two passive productions; whereas the same agent can by two productions produce different things: the same man, for instance, produces a man and a work of art.

But Durandus presses Scotus in this way. Although the same supposit can by two productions produce two different things, and the same thing cannot be produced by different productions, yet that only happens whenever the supposit is not constituted by the relation of the producer: if,

however, the supposit were constituted by relation, it is clearly gathered that by a double disparate relation of the producer there would be constituted a double supposit; since also by a double disparate relation of the produced there would be constituted a double supposit in that case in which the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son. For, as regards that effect, the same reasoning would seem to hold for either relation, namely of the produced and of the producer.

Others, says Durandus, answer this otherwise: they say that from one and the same supposit acting there can be two substantial productions, yet there cannot be two substantial productions of the same product: wherefore, if two productions are concerned with the same supposit, at least one must be accidental: for instance, the same man produces another substantially, and instructs him in some discipline: but two substantial productions cannot terminate in the same supposit: and they call that a substantial production, by which something is produced according to substance. But those who answer thus can be refuted in the same way. For the argument made does not contend to prove that from the same agent there cannot be two substantial productions; nor even that there cannot be two of the same subject produced; but that there is an equal reason of the relations of the producer and of the produced for constituting a supposit: so that if a twofold disparate relation of the produced suffices for constituting two persons, a twofold disparate relation of the producer likewise suffices.

But indeed this reasoning of Durandus proceeds in his opinion only in this way, if he supposes that the relations of spiration and of paternity are distinguished in reality. For if they are distinguished only by reason, an easy explanation can be given why paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, although they are disparate relations: namely, because they are not really distinct; for this distinction is necessary between persons. On the contrary, if filiation and procession, although they are only disparate relations, constitute two persons, because they are really distinct. Moreover, by a similar line of reasoning, and that a most effective one, we can press Scotus, and clearly prove our position, as will appear in the following chapter.

Caput VI - By two very strong reasons the aforesaid opinion is confirmed

Since it is quite clear from Disputation 120, cap. 4, 5, and 6, that active spiration and paternity differ by reason alone, Durandus's reasoning ought to be framed thus. Two disparate relations of the producer, such as spiration and paternity, do not constitute two persons; nor would they constitute two persons in that case in which the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, because since they are not opposed among themselves, they are the same according to reality, and differ by reason alone: therefore two disparate relations of the produced, such as filiation and procession, would not constitute two persons, if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone: because in the same way they would be the same according to reality, just as the active relations are: for in no way would they be opposed. Wherefore, as the same supposit now begets and breathes, so also it would be begotten and would proceed.

But let someone say with Scotus that filiation and procession even in that case would be really distinguished, because then there would be two emanations really distinct, the one by intellect, the other by will: and from two emanations there necessarily arise two relations of the produced really distinct; to which two relations in the agent can correspond, in Scotus's opinion, two relations formally only distinct, or, in the Thomists' opinion, diverse by reason alone. But since the same ratio ought to be of the relations that result from emanations, and of the emanations themselves, which are nothing else than relations on the way, and differ from the relations themselves by reason alone; who, I ask, would dare to affirm, or inconsiderately grant to Scotus, that in that case there would be two emanations really distinct without any opposition, merely because they would be disparate; whereas as things now stand there are not two relations of the producer distinct, even if they are disparate? The same argument, therefore, can be made about the emanations, as we were making about the relations of the produced and of the producer, in this way. Suppose there were now in the Father, as there are now, two disparate relations of the producer, yet they would not constitute different persons, because since they were not opposed, they would be the same really; it will follow that there would not be two emanations, nor relations of the produced really distinct, because they would not be opposed either: for there would not be a greater repugnance between the emanations, and between the relations of the produced, to prevent their being the same, than there is between the relations of the producer. Therefore, some Thomists carelessly concede to Scotus that in that case there would be two emanations really distinct; which, once admitted, they can scarcely defend that there would not be two relations of the produced and two produced persons.

Wherefore, since it has been proved that in that case there would be one and the same person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit with a double relation of the produced, namely of the begotten and of the proceeding, diverse by reason alone, it must be explained in what way those two relations and emanations would stand according to our mode of understanding. Some suppose that then that person would proceed just as a work of art is produced, namely by the will and intellect of the craftsman. But because a work of art is not elicited by the will and the intellect, but is made by their command and direction only, this example does not rightly explain the emanation of that person, for from both powers it would be elicited proximately and substantially. Wherefore that person would be better compared to the operation of intellect and of will, in such a way indeed as it would be entirely the same thing in us, that is, if each power produced the same act and operation equally as first; then, just as there would be no real order between intellect and will in operating, so also there would be none between that divine person, insofar as he was Son, and the same, insofar as he was Holy Spirit: because, since by that ratio by which he was Spirit, he would not proceed from the Word produced by the intellect, he would have no real order with Him; but both ratios would converge upon the same person.

Another reason is of this sort: whatever in God does not repugn to be, is necessarily in Him: for nothing can be both present and absent to God; but those things which befit Him, necessarily befit Him: for which reason it is commonly said, in eternal things to be and to be able are the same. But

if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not opposed, it would not repugn for both of them to be the same person according to reality: therefore the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit would be the same: far from their being distinguished.

Caput VII - The reasons of the earlier opinion are resolved; the testimony of Anselm is explained

It remains that we should resolve the arguments adduced in the second chapter by the very testimony of the true position. First among these is the testimony of Anselm, who, if one rightly considers what we said above in cap. 4, seems plainly to have set down that Scotist position - either because he judged it sufficient that the Son and the Holy Spirit be mutually distinguished by two relations and by modes of proceeding even if not opposed, which Scotus calls disparate relations, or at least because he wished to concede this to the Greeks, against whom he was disputing, intending to prove from another line that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. For in that book of his On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, cap. 2, towards the end, he says to this effect: that the Son and the Holy Spirit have existence from the Father, yet in different ways, the one by being born, the other by proceeding; and that by this difference they are mutually other from one another; wherefore, although by unity of nature it would follow that, if the Spirit proceeds from the Father, He proceeds also from the Son, nevertheless that unity does not have the force to infer an identity of production or mode, because plurality, which arises from nativity and from procession, stands in the way. By these words he asserts that the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit is assigned by different modes of proceeding; and he intends to meet the Greeks on their own ground by showing from elsewhere the procession of the Spirit from the Son.

But when these words are pressed for the cause of distinction, namely, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be assigned diverse modes of proceeding, if in some other way that cause should not be in place, he is not therefore teaching that disparate relations without the opposition of spiration would suffice to constitute different persons; rather he is arguing ad hominem against the Greeks and speaking in accommodation to their position. Therefore, as we said in cap. 4, one must not force Anselm into those straits, nor make mere disparity suffice for an efficacious argument against our conclusion; on the contrary, unless the Trinity of persons is granted, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. Whatever Scotus and others may think, no sufficient argument can be taken from those words of Anselm to the contrary; the Greeks themselves, as he says in the same place, do not concede to be confined to those narrow terms, nor that by mere opposition the distinction of persons can be proved; rather, a sufficient and efficacious argument against them is not taken from there.

To the next argument drawn from the common principle they commonly use, Cajetan and the Ferrariense commentator answer consistently in the places cited above in that chapter, distinguishing in the same way as before: that is, that relation, as relation, both constitutes and distinguishes in God according to its order to another; and that, since it constitutes, it constitutes precisely by its proper formal ratio of terminating toward another, and since it distinguishes, it

distinguishes not only from the opposed relation, but also, according to the proper ratio of relation, from the absolute to which it refers. Therefore, it does not follow that, were the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son, He would then not be distinguished from Him at all, or that no form of distinction would remain in Him; for, as has been explained, disparity alone without opposition does not suffice to constitute the diversity of supposits in the divine, and unity of nature does not obliterate the proper formalities of the relations by which the persons are constituted and distinguished.[562]

As we said in chapter 4, that opinion is clearly transmitted. The opinion of Scotus seems to have handed it down, either because he thought that the Son and the Holy Spirit are sufficiently mutually discerned by diverse relations (*relationes*) and by modes of proceeding, even if not opposed - what Scotus called disparate relations - or certainly because he wished to concede this to the Greeks against whom he was disputing, being willing to prove from elsewhere that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; for he, in that book De Processione Spiritus Sancti, chapter c., toward the end, speaks thus: "The Son, meanwhile, to mention another cause, since it is clear to us that the Holy Spirit is of Him and proceeds, therefore He is not the Holy Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Son; because the Son by being born has existence (*esse*) of the Father, but the Holy Spirit not by being born, but by proceeding." By these words he asserts that, for the cause of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, he assigns the different mode of proceeding, in the meantime until another cause is shown, wishing to defer in this to the sentence of the Greeks. But in chapter 3, after the middle, after he has explained the same mode of distinction, he says: "When, however, it will appear that the Holy Spirit is of the Son, then it will also be clear that, for this reason, the Holy Spirit cannot be the Son, and the Son cannot be the Holy Spirit." Yet I for my part judge it much more convenient not to concede this to the Greeks, but rather to force them into such straits that they admit the distinction among the persons can be thought only by opposition: for thus an effective argument is taken against them, that they concede the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, unless they are willing to deny the Trinity of persons. Wherefore the opinion of Scotus and of others weakens the one effective argument that the Latins are wont to have against the Greeks, and makes it of no moment.

Reply to the first argument drawn from the constituting principle. Cajetan and the Ferrariensis, in the places cited in the fourth chapter, answer that by the same principle by which a thing is constituted, by that same it is also distinguished, whenever the constituting principle is not a relation (*relatio*): for if it be a relation, it only distinguishes from the opposed, as we noted from the mind of these authors above in chapter 5. Yet this solution does not please me: both because in that chapter 5 it was shown that by relation something can be distinguished not only from the opposed relative, but also from other things; and also because, even if what the Ferrariensis and Cajetan teach were true, it does not satisfy Scotus's argument. For Scotus argues thus. Whatever constitutes something in the notion (*ratio*) of being, and consequently in the notion of the one, and consequently in the notion of what is indistinct from itself and distinct from any other that is not

562. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 13, q. 2; dist. 33, q. 1; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 2, part 2, q. 2 (ad ordinem secundi); ad secundam rationem eiusdem quaestionis; Cajetan, ad I, q. 36; Ferrariense, locis citatis.

constituted by that same principle: therefore, by that whereby a thing is constituted distinct from any other that is not constituted by that principle, it ought to be distinguished. What, then, does it avail, if we answer Scotus that not every constituting principle of some thing distinguishes it from others unless it be absolute? For if his account prove this universally, it proves thus. Whatever constitutes something in the notion of being, thereby, whatever it be, it also constitutes the same in the notion of the one, and consequently in the notion of what is indistinct from itself and distinct from any other that is not constituted by it: but filiation constitutes the Son in the notion of person (*persona*); therefore in the notion of the one indistinct from itself and distinct from any other which is not constituted by filiation, such as is the person of the Holy Spirit. The consequence stands under a legitimate syllogistic form; the minor cannot be denied; the major is most true universally of every constituting principle, even a relative one: for if it constitutes in the notion of a relative being, it constitutes in the notion of the one distinct from any other.

Another response. Others say that the same should always be the distinguishing and the constituting principle; and that now the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, because by it He is constituted; but in that case in which the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Son, He should not be distinguished from Him, because then there would be another filiation: for now He has the power of spirating, which then He would not have. Yet these men, while they seem to have devised something new, fall into a view which they have not proved. For they are forced to say that the constituting and the distinguishing principle are not the same; and that the Son is constituted by filiation, but is distinguished by spiration: which can be easily refuted.

First, for the Son, in the notion of the Son and as person, is constituted by a property which belongs to Him alone; but this is filiation as filiation only, not considered under the notion of spiration or of the spirative power: because the property constituting one person does not include in its formal concept that which is common to another; now the spirative power is common; therefore that formality does not pertain to the notion of the constituting principle.

Second, because if by filiation, insofar as He has the power of spirating, the Son is now distinguished, He ought rather to be distinguished insofar as He has it in act (*actus*) under the relation of spirator, than under potency (*potentia*), which is distinguished from act: for this is not in God save in our mode of understanding, distinct from the act of spirating. Therefore, if by reason of that power He is now distinguished, by reason of that He also has opposition, which we contend: but filiation, as it is filiation and as it is the property of the Son, by reason of itself does not have opposition: therefore, since these men wish to depart from the common way, they are compelled to fall back into it, and with the other Thomists to admit that the Son is now distinguished not by filiation but by spiration; and thus that it is not the same principle which constitutes and which distinguishes: therefore the argument must be answered in another way.

Third, because filiation does not of itself formally include the very power of spirating, nor a condition of will so as to constitute it under the notion of the power of spirating, as we shall show in disputation 164, chapter 3: therefore in itself it does not now have a peculiar notion on account

of which it would distinguish the Son from the Holy Spirit, which it would not have if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son: wherefore it does not follow that there will be another filiation, as filiation is, if in the Son there were not the power of spirating.

Fourth, because the present question proceeds on the supposition that the same Son, who now is and spirates, would not spirate - as the Greeks suppose - yet He would remain the same Son; namely, whether He would have a sufficient principle by which He would be distinguished from the Holy Spirit, with only the same filiation retained; thus that we may investigate the formal reason of distinction. And that this question is useful from an impossible supposition has already been sufficiently shown in chapter 1.

Therefore I answer that the major proposition is true of every principle that constitutes something in reality: for this constitutes in the notion of a being indistinct from itself and really distinct from any other that is not constituted by that principle. Thus a man by his form is really distinguished from a horse and from others that are not constituted by the same; but by that principle by which a thing is constituted according to reason only, certainly it need not be really distinguished from anything else which is not constituted by it according to reason. And thus we see in one and the same thing two principles, either specifically or even generically diverse, by which either diverse species or diverse genera are constituted: as in the same motion action and passion, and in other cases similarly. In these, however, the specific or generic principle constitutes the genus or the species, but does not really distinguish them from anything else which is not constituted by them: because, since the constitution is only through reason, it suffices if it distinguish only by reason. Wherefore, since the constitution of the Son of God by filiation, just as also of the other persons by their properties, is not a real constitution but only by reason, it is not necessary that by that property by which He is formally constituted He be really distinguished from anything else which is not constituted by it. Further, that the constitution of the divine persons is only by our reason we shall measure in disputation 158, chapter 2, in which the sentence of St. Gregory is proved to us, which we reported in chapter 2 of this disputation.

From this same doctrine it follows that the Son and spiration are substantially distinguished, according to person, from the Holy Spirit, not accidentally: even if spiration, in our mode of understanding, accrue to the person of the Son already constituted. For that it be first conceived by us, with filiation constituted, and in our mode of understanding in the notion of a person substantially complete, does not prevent that spiration be in reality filiation substantially, and that from it there be a substantial distinction according to person; since in reality it is the same, according to a reality wholly individual, with filiation. For this personal distinction is according to reality; and thus it ought to arise from a true real opposition which the Son has with the Holy Spirit by reason of spiration, not from a principle which concurs to the constitution only in our mode of understanding. And from these things reply can be made to the first and the second which in the confirmation of the argument were alleged.

Reply to the third confirmation. We concede that, if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son alone, nevertheless He would be distinguished from the Father, and the Father from the Son by paternity alone: not because that which constitutes the person according to reason, thereby

sufficiently distinguishes from another which is not constituted by that principle; but because the Father, with the Holy Spirit, by reason of paternity would have some opposition, at least remote, which would suffice to make it altogether repugnant that He be the same person with the Holy Spirit. Now the remote opposition would consist in this, and even now it exists, that since the Father, as He is Father, is the principle of the Son, and the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit, necessarily also the Father must be the remote principle of that same Holy Spirit. For what is the principle of a principle is also the principle of that which arises from that second principle: and it is altogether repugnant to be the same as something which is from a principle, and to be the cause of that very principle; for thus something would be the cause of its own principle. Since, therefore, the Father and the Son are really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by the common spiration by which they are set in opposition to the Holy Spirit, they are nevertheless related in a different way: because the Son differs by spiration alone, but the Father is also distinguished by paternity; that is, the Son, because He only spirates; but the Father, by the very fact that He spirates and generates, is distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

It remains that we dissolve the arguments adduced in the second chapter for the earlier opinion. First among these is the testimony of St. Anselm who, by a single judgment - if they be rightly considered -

And therefore, finally it must be observed, as Ferrariensis warned, that this is a true proposition: "Filiation distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit"; because in some way at least it distinguishes by reason, that is, on the part of filiation there is no greater distinction than that of reason, as if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son. Yet this proposition ought not to be conceded: "Filiation distinguishes the Son really from the Holy Spirit."

As to the latter argument taken from the emanations, enough has already been said in chapter 6 of this disputation, namely, that in the case in which the Spirit would not proceed from the Son, there would not be two emanations according to reality, just as neither two relations of the produced, nor two persons: for we showed there that the reason of both is the same. But those who readily concede to Scotus that then there would be two emanations; can scarcely defend that there would not also be two persons, as we noted in that place.

Caput VIII - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

The distinction between filiation and passive spiration, and whence it arises. Canariensis in this article thinks that they are distinguished by reason of their origin; but since the account of relation and of origin is the same (for this latter is nothing other than relation in becoming, and as it were on the way), and it has been shown that filiation is not distinguished by its own account from procession; it follows that neither can it be distinguished by reason of its origin: otherwise, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, by reason of its origin - which would then remain in the same way - it would be distinguished from the same. Wherefore it must be said, from the preceding doctrine, that filiation is distinguished from procession by the opposition only of the relation of spirating conjoined to it, by which alone the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

For it is impossible that the Son, who spirates the Holy Spirit, not be distinguished from Him; and hence it is necessary that filiation, which is the property of this person in the spirator, be distinguished from procession.

Objicitur. But someone may object: The divine essence also is conjoined to active spiration, and yet it is not really distinguished from the procession which is in the Holy Spirit.

Respondetur. The account is different: for the essence is conjoined as something common to the opposed relations themselves, and therefore with all the things to which it is conjoined it is altogether the same according to reality; but filiation is conjoined to spiration only as something peculiar to that spirating person: and it cannot be understood that there is something peculiar to a person who is opposed to another, which is not distinguished from that other. For if the person is distinguished, that also which is peculiar to him will be distinguished.

Next, it must be examined why St. Thomas said in this article that the relations which are in the Father do not constitute distinct persons, because they are not opposed: for that seems false, as Caietanus says. First, because filiation and procession constitute different persons, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, and yet they are not opposed relations. Next also, because negation is the cause of negation; affirmation ought to be the cause of affirmation: therefore if those relations which are not opposed do not constitute distinct persons, it follows that by opposed relations there are always constituted different [persons], which is absurd: for spiratio and processio are opposed, and yet spiration constitutes no person.

Caietanus answers well, that St. Thomas uses as equivalent the phrases "to constitute different persons" and "to distinguish them, whence their distinction arises." For he expressly said: "By relations which are not opposed, distinct persons are not constituted" - he did not say, "persons are not constituted," but he adds, "distinct"; as if he were saying, "relations which are not opposed do not distinguish persons." And in this sense it is rightly said that by spiration and procession persons are constituted as distinct, that is, are distinguished. Hence in the same sense no one can say, "Filiation constitutes a different person from the Holy Spirit," because by filiation no person is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. And from this the solution is clear to the objections brought against St. Thomas.

In the same sense St. Thomas said below, question 40, article 2, in these words: "But it must be that the very distinguishing factors constitute distinct things," that is, cause them to be distinct. But when he says in question 33, article 2, that the proper name of each person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from all others, so as to infer that the name "Father" is proper to the first person, he is not speaking of the principle of real distinction, but of a distinction also as it were specific; such is filiation in the Son, although from it there does not result a real distinction.[563]

563. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 40, a. 2; I, q. 33, a. 2.

Disputatio CXLVIII - Whence a real distinction of the divine emanations arises

Outline of the chapters: - Various Scholastic opinions. Cap. I. - The truer opinion: these two emanations are really distinguished only by the opposition which they have by reason of the adjunct. Cap. II.

Caput I - Various Scholastic opinions

The controversy proposed is not about the divine processions active and passive together, by which, namely, account they are distinguished among themselves if the passive be compared to the active: for from the preceding disputation it is clear that they are distinguished in the same way as relations and persons, namely by relative opposition alone. For relation differs from origin in this, that relation is a form as it were in the state of having been made (in facto esse), like paternity; but origin is the very same form in the state of being made (in fieri), as generation: for this is that very paternity, as it were on the way. The question, therefore, is about passive processions taken in comparison with each other. Since it is certain that they really differ, it remains that we explain whence their distinction arises. And although from what has been said in the preceding disputation one could answer without difficulty; nevertheless, because in this matter too various Scholastic opinions have not been lacking, it was necessary to institute a special disputation about it.

Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 13, question 1, recounts several opinions.[564] The first is Aegidius's, in the same distinction, article 2, namely, that origins are distinguished by their termini, just as motions in general are discerned by their termini.[565] This opinion was adopted by Ferrariensis, IV Contra gentiles, chapter 24, near the end;[566] Scotus, however, impugns it by this reasoning: origins do not have their being by termini, but rather the contrary; therefore they are not distinguished by termini, but rather termini by origins. Ferrariensis replies that just as motion has its being by the terminus, because from it it takes its species, so also origin; for the same account seems to hold in both cases. But since now the question is not about specific distinction, but about real; and a motion seems to take its species only from the terminus, that is, it is specified from the order which it has to the terminus: this solution does not satisfy. About the specific distinction of these processions we have already spoken in disputation 113. Whether, however, this opinion of Aegidius, as regards our present purpose, has any probability, will be seen below.

The second opinion is that of Henry in his Summa, article 37, question 7, which Scotus also mentions, namely, that the emanations really differ because their principles differ formally.[567] But since formal distinction is less than real, Scotus rightly infers against Henry that it cannot be the cause of a real distinction between the processions. The same opinion Henry followed in Quodlibet 6, question 1, where he asserts that the emanations are distinguished on account of a distinction of

564. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1.
565. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., d. 13, a. 2.
566. Ferrariensis (possibly Francesco de Sylvestris), In IV Contra gentiles, c. 24 (near the end).
567. Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 37, q. 7.

reason between the principles.[568] And although Scotus reports these two opinions as diverse; nevertheless, since Henry nowhere taught that there is a formal distinction from the nature of the thing among the attributes among themselves, or among the principles of the emanations, but only a distinction of reason; the distinction which Henry posits, even if he call it "formal," is not that which Scotus devised as from the nature of the thing and midway between the real and the rational, as we saw in disputation 116, chapter 3. Henry's opinion, understood in this way, can be refuted much more easily. For a distinction of reason, much less than a formal one which is from the nature of the thing, can be the cause of a real distinction among persons. First, because this distinction is far inferior to any distinction from the nature of the thing; next also, because it has an order to the created intellect (since by the divine intellect it cannot be made), as was shown in disputation 118, chapter 2. But no divine procession of a person depends on any creature, even a possible one, as we saw in disputation 143, chapter 34 and the following; therefore that distinction cannot be the cause of distinguishing emanations. Another opinion Scotus reports there from Adam Godamus, in the First Book, distinction 6, question 1, article 2, which in fact comes to the same and must be refuted in the same way.[569]

The opinion of Scotus himself in that place is that the emanations are distinguished by wholes, or by themselves; which is the same thing. He seems to have taken this from St. Bonaventure in the same distinction, question 3; Gabriel follows them, in the single question, article 2, conclusion 3.[570] To be distinguished by wholes, as he himself explains, is this: that they are altogether other and have nothing in which they agree; by which account species constituted under the same genus are not distinguished; but the specific differences of species, as "rational" and "irrational," and the most general differences of the predicaments, are distinguished in this way. Of such a nature Scotus thinks these two origins to be, and that they are by themselves and by their own nature distinct, so that even if the one did not suppose the other, nor were opposed to it in any way even by reason at least of a conjoined relation, nonetheless they would be diverse. For just as he said that relations, by their own nature without any opposition, merely because they are disparate, are mutually distinguished; so he judged that one ought to philosophize about the processions.

Finally, Durandus agrees with this opinion of Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 13, question 2, number 32 and the following, when he asserts that these two processions are distinguished by themselves, not by reason of opposition, but because they are disparate and by their own nature diverse.[571] For although in the First Book, distinction 11, question 2, he teaches that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him according to supposit; nevertheless in the same place he grants that then in the same person there would be two relations really distinct; and in the Father and the Son likewise he grants, in the First Book, distinction 13, question 2, number 14, that, in order that certain things be distinguished in God suppositely, he deems relative opposition necessary, as we saw in the preceding disputation,

568. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VI, q. 1.
569. Adam Godamus, In I Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 2.
570. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 3; Gabriel, Quaestio unica, a. 2, concl. 3.
571. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2, nn. 32 sqq.; cf. also In I Sent., d. 11, q. 2; and In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2, n. 14.

chapter 4; and he proves this by a like example: because in the Father there are two disparate relations, although there is only one supposit; and he judges it sufficient, in order that two relations be distinguished really, that they be disparate and be referred to diverse [terms]; and at that number 14 and the following he pursues the matter more broadly. Thus, then, about the passive emanations, in the same proportion Durandus philosophizes.

Caput II - The truer opinion: these two emanations are really distinguished only by the opposition which they have by reason of the adjunct

Much truer is the opinion of St. Thomas, in De potentia, question 10, article 4, who philosophizes in the same way about the processions as about the relations: namely, that they can be distinguished only by relative opposition - either because they are directly relative and opposed according to themselves, or because by reason of an adjunct they have this opposition.[572] For every emanation, since it is a relation in becoming (in fieri), is somehow toward another, just as a relation in the state of having been made (in facto esse). Yet, for the sake of explaining this point, it should be noted that these processions can be taken in a twofold way. First, as they are on the part of the thing; and in this way they are distinguished by themselves: that is, there is not in them something, distinct from another by the nature of the thing, in which they agree, and another by which they are distinguished; nonetheless, in reality they are opposed of themselves: for passive generation is altogether the same as spiration, which is really opposed to procession. Then these two emanations can be taken as they are in our intellect; and in this way, because passive generation is distinguished from spiration by our thought, therefore it does not differ totally from procession; but because, by reason of the conjoined relation of spirating, passive generation holds a conjunction with spiration - on account of which spiration is opposed to procession - by this very conjunction passive generation is distinguished from procession. And therefore the Spirit's emanation would not be another personal emanation than the Son's emanation.

... and he proves it by a like case: because in the Father there are two disparate relations (*relationes*), although there is only one supposit (*suppositum*). And in order that two relations be really distinct, he thinks it sufficient that they be disparate and referred to diverse [terms], as he pursues more at length in that number 14 and the following. Therefore, by the same proportion Durandus philosophizes about passive emanations (*emanationes*), namely that they are really distinguished of themselves solely by the fact that they are spirated; yet he says that this distinction would not be sufficient for them to be processions (*processiones*), or emanations of persons (*personae*), that is, of diverse supposits, unless by reason of the adjunct they were opposed. For in his view, as we were just saying, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him according to supposit; nevertheless, there would then be in the same person two really distinct relations, as he likewise concedes them in the Father and in the Son in that same place; but, in order that some things be distinguished in God according to supposit, he judges opposition of relation necessary, as we saw in the preceding disputation.[573]

572. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 10, a. 4.

Cajetan rejects this doctrine in the place cited above; he adds that in Summa I, q. 27, a. 4 the emanations are not distinguished totally by themselves, that is, by themselves taken as wholes, because they agree in a certain common notion of immateriality; they are, however, distinguished by singular opposition. This, however, is not proved: for they do not agree in any univocal, precise concept, as we shall say in disputation 158, chapter 7; and the notion of immateriality is included within the singular ratio of each: therefore they are distinguished as the predicaments are distinguished as wholes. For although the predicaments include the common notion of being; nevertheless that notion is analogical, and is included among intrinsic modes; it does not prevent the most general from being distinguished as wholes. It is true, on the other hand, that these emanations are not distinguished as wholes in another respect, as we saw above: because the one has opposition by reason of the adjunct, not by reason of itself.

From what has been said it follows that these processions are distinguished by an order of prior and posterior according to origin (*origo*), because the one supposes the other. For since passive generation is terminated at the person begotten, and this, in the order of origin, is prior to the person proceeding, as we shall say in disputation 167, by the same reasoning the origin of the Son is in its own order prior to the origin of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore the very true thing is that which St. Thomas taught in that question De potentia, article 2, to the seventh: namely, that the emanations are distinguished because the one is from one [supposit], and the other from two; whence it follows that that which is from two is posterior in its order, because it supposes the person proceeding by the prior emanation, so as thus to proceed from two.[574]

But Scotus attacks St. Thomas with this reason, triflingly: If this were true, it would follow that there could be a third emanation, which would be from three, and a fourth, which would be from four persons. But Scotus's argument is frivolous: for the holy Doctor does not from that prove that there are only two emanations in God because the one is from one, and the other from two supposits; rather he had deduced the number of emanations in the Prima Pars, question 27, article 5, from the number of operations, which are only two - one through the intellect, the other through the will - and more, specifically distinct, cannot exist in a rational nature. But why one person cannot proceed as another, at least by an operation and production numerically distinct from the prior, he proves there.[575]

Articulus III - Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son

It is proceeded thus to the third. It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father through the Son.

1. For what proceeds from someone through someone does not proceed immediately from him. If therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, he does not proceed from the Father immediately. Which seems unsuitable.

573. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2, nn. 14, 32 sqq.; cf. also d. 11, q. 2; and d. 13, q. 2, n. 14.
574. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7.
575. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 5.

2. Further, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, he does not proceed from the Son except on account of the Father. But that on account of which a thing is, is the greater. Therefore he proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.
3. Further, the Son has existence (*esse*) by generation; if therefore the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, it follows that first the Son is generated, and afterwards the Holy Spirit proceeds. And thus the procession of the Holy Spirit is not eternal: which is heretical.
4. Further, when someone is said to act through someone, the converse can be said. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said that the bailiff acts through the king. But in no way do we say that the Son breathes the Holy Spirit through the Father: therefore in no way can it be said that the Father breathes the Holy Spirit through the Son.

But on the contrary: Hilary says in the book On the Trinity: "Keep, I beg, the religion of my faith, that I may always hold fast the Father, namely thee, and adore thy Son together with thee, and may I merit thy Holy Spirit, who is through the Only-begotten."[576]

I answer: It must be said that in all the expressions in which it is said that someone acts through someone, this preposition "through" (per) designates some causal cause, or principle, of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that causal [term] to which this preposition "through" is adjoined is the cause of the action, according as it goes forth from the agent; and then it is a cause of the agent that it act, whether it be a final cause, or a formal, or an efficient, or a motive [cause]. Final indeed, as when we say that the artisan works through desire of gain. Formal indeed, as when we say that he works through his art. Motive indeed, as when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, the causal term to which this preposition "through" is adjoined is the cause of the action according as it is terminated to the thing done: as when we say that the artisan works through the hammer. For it is not signified that the hammer is a cause for the artisan that he act, but that it is a cause for the artifact that it proceed from the artisan, and that it has this very thing from the artisan. And this is what some say, that this preposition "through" sometimes notes authority in the direct [case], as when it is said, "The king acts through the bailiff." Sometimes, however, in the oblique [case], as when it is said, "The bailiff acts through the king." Therefore, since the Son has from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him, it can be said that the Father, through the Son, breathes the Holy Spirit, or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son: which is the same.

Reply to the first: In any action two things are to be considered, namely the supposit (*suppositum*) acting, and the virtue (*virtus*) by which it acts, as fire heats by heat. If therefore in the Father and the Son the virtue by which they breathe the Holy Spirit be considered, no medium falls there: because this virtue is one and the same. But if the spirating persons themselves be considered, since the Holy Spirit commonly proceeds from the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is found to proceed immediately from the Father, inasmuch as he is from him, and mediately inasmuch as he is from the Son. And thus he is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So

576. Hilary, De Trinitate, in the book cited.

too Abel proceeded immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father, and mediately, inasmuch as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam. Although this example of material procession seems inept for signifying the immaterial procession of the divine persons.

Reply to the second: If the Son were to receive from the Father another virtue numerically distinct for spirating the Holy Spirit, it would follow that he existed as a second and instrumental cause: and thus the Holy Spirit would proceed more from the Father than from the Son. But one and the same numerically spiring virtue is in the Father and the Son: and therefore he proceeds equally from both. Although at times he is said, according to the aforesaid relation, to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this virtue from the Father.

Reply to the third: Just as the generation of the Son is coeternal with the generator (for the Father was not before he begot the Son), so also the procession of the Holy Spirit is coeternal with its principle. Hence the Son was not first begotten before the Holy Spirit proceeded, but both are eternal.

Reply to the fourth: When someone is said to act through something, the conversion is not always admitted. For we do not say that the hammer acts through the craftsman; we do say, however, that the bailiff acts through the king. Because it belongs to the bailiff to act, since he is master of his act; but it does not belong to the hammer to act, but only to be acted upon: wherefore it is not designated except as an instrument.

Moreover, the bailiff is said to act through the king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium: because the more prior the supposit is in acting, the more immediate its virtue is to the effect; for the virtue of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. whence also first principles are called immediate in demonstrative sciences. Thus therefore, inasmuch as the bailiff is a mean according to the order of acting supposits, the king is said to act through the bailiff; but according to the order of virtue the bailiff is said to act through the king: because the virtue of the king brings it about that the action of the bailiff attains its effect. Now no order is attended between the Father and the Son as to virtue, but only as to supposits: and therefore it is said that the Father breathes through the Son, and not conversely.

Notations around the article.

The conclusion is affirmative, and sufficiently known from what precedes. But what the Greek Fathers thought, and why certain particular expressions [of theirs occurred], I shall say in disputation 146, chapter 6; for as to this doctrine of the present article, scarcely a few things remain to be noted.

First, concerning the reply to the second, it must be seen whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally (principaliter), or more principally (principalitius), than from the Son. St. Thomas in that reply, St. Bonaventure in I Sent., distinction 12, chapter 2, Durandus in question 2, Scotus in question 2, Gabriel in question 3, and Marsilius in I, question 1, article 2, conclusion 2, and the following, teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both equally perfectly, and in the same way, if the procession be referred to the virtue of spirating - that is, on the part of the virtue, the Holy Spirit proceeds equally perfectly from both, because one and the same altogether is [that

virtue] in both; if, however, it be compared with its producing supposit, he does not proceed in the same way; and in this respect they are not of the same character, because the Father, having the virtue of spirating from himself, spirates from himself; but the Son [spirates] from the Father, from whom he has that virtue communicated. And for this reason Bonaventure and Marsilius concede that the Holy Spirit proceeds more principally (principalius) from the Father; indeed Bonaventure adds that the Spirit proceeds from the Son principally (principaliter), but from the Father more principally (principalitius). From which it is plain that "principally" (principaliter) and "more principally" (principalitius) are not used for the same thing. In the same manner of speaking Durandus uses that comparative adverb.

Better, however, St. Thomas and Gabriel grant only that [the Spirit] proceeds principally (principaliter) from the Father; but they do not use the comparative adverb. Augustine uses the same mode of speaking, De Trinitate, book 15, chapter 16, because the Father both has that virtue, and the Son has it from the Father. Jerome also uses almost the same manner of speaking in Epistle 88, where he says that the Holy Spirit properly proceeds from the Father - "properly," he says, because he breathes by his own proper virtue, that is, from himself; but the Son [breathes] by a virtue communicated from another: which manner of speaking St. Thomas also approves in that reply. The comparative adverb, however, is not free from suspicion, for it seems to signify the name of a more perfect principle; and therefore it is better to abstain from it. Scotus also reports the opinion of a certain theologian who reproved Bonaventure because he used the comparative adverb between the Father and the Son, whereas to the Son the position of that [adverb], namely to spirate more principally, does not belong - if the comparison ought rightly to be made between those things that participate the same form.[577]

Next, note that there is no order of origin between the Father and the Son in the act of spirating - that is, neither spirates before the other. Thus Scotus, Marsilius, and Gabriel in the places cited concede simply; nevertheless, if it be taught that, once both have the virtue of spirating, each in like manner spirates, no such order will obtain between these persons in the act of spirating. From this it is gathered that wherever there is an order of origin between some things, there ought to be a priority; but this [priority] is not in the act of spirating, but in having the virtue of spirating: for although it is the same in both, nevertheless it is prior by origin in the one than in the other; yet, when each has it, they spirate together: for that the Father spirates by a virtue from himself, while the Son [spirates] by a virtue from another, denotes only the order of origin in having the virtue, not in spirating. For the very spiration, which is an origin, establishes the order of cause and caused between the spirating [persons] and the Spirit; nonetheless, it is from both equally according to virtue.

Whence in demonstrative sciences the principles are called "immediate." Thus the Bailiff is a middle according to the order of acting supposits (*supposita*), and so it is said that the King acts through the Bailiff; but according to the order of powers it is said that the Bailiff acts through the

577. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 12, c. 2; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2; Scotus, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 2; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 13, q. 3; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 1, a. 2, c. 2; St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 16; St. Jerome, Ep. 88.

King, because the King's power causes the Bailiff's action to attain its effect. Now among the Father and the Son no order is attended as to power, but only as to the supposits; and therefore it is said that the Father spirates through the Son, and not conversely.

Notes concerning the article.

The conclusion is, from the preceding, sufficiently clear. But what the Greek Fathers felt, and why some rather used the particle "through" than the particle "from" or "of," was treated in Disputation 146, cap. 6. Now, a few points remain to be noted concerning the doctrine of this article.

And first, concerning the solution of the second, it must be seen whether the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father principally (principaliter), or more principally (principalius), than from the Son. St. Thomas in that solution, St. Bonaventure in I Sent., dist. 12, q. 2, Durandus, q. 2, Scotus, q. 2, Gabriel, q. 3, and Marsilius in I, q. 15, art. 2, conclusion 2, and in the following, teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both equally perfectly and in the same way, if the procession is referred to the power of spirating; that is, on the part of the power, the Holy Spirit proceeds equally perfectly from both, because one and the very same power is entirely in both. If, however, it be compared with the producing supposits, he does not proceed in the same way and (as they speak) uniformly, because the Father, having the power of spirating from himself, spirates from himself; but the Son [spirates] from the Father, from whom he has that power communicated. And for this reason it is said that the Father spirates through the Son, and not conversely.

One says, moreover, that the Bailiff acts through the King: although this preposition "through" signifies a medium. For the more prior a power is in acting, the more immediate it is to the effect; the power of the first cause joins the second to its effect. Whence principles are called immediate in demonstrative sciences. Thus the Bailiff is a middle according to the order of acting supposits; therefore the King is said to act through the Bailiff. But according to the order of powers the Bailiff is said to act through the King: because the power of the King causes that the action of the Bailiff attain its effect. Now order is not attended between the Father and the Son as to power, but only as to the supposits: and therefore it is said that the Father spirates through the Son, and not conversely.

Bonaventure and Marsilius, however, grant in that solution that the Holy Spirit proceeds more principally from the Father; indeed Bonaventure adds that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Son, but more principally from the Father. From which it is clear that "principally" and "more principally" are not used for the same thing. Durandus uses in the same way of speaking that comparative adverb.

Yet better do St. Thomas and Gabriel grant only that [the Spirit] proceeds principally from the Father; but they do not use the comparative adverb. In the same way of speaking St. Augustine uses, De Trinitate XV, c. 16, "according as the Father has that power from himself, but the Son has it from the Father."[1] To the same point looks the way of speaking of St. Jerome, in Epistle 88, where he says that the Holy Spirit properly proceeds from the Father; he says "properly," because he spirates by his own power, that is, from himself; but the Son [spirates] by a power

communicated by another; this manner of speaking St. Thomas also proves in that solution.[2] The comparative adverb, however, is not without suspicion: for it seems to signify a greater perfection of principle; and therefore it is better to abstain from it. Scotus also reports the opinion of a certain Theologian, who blamed Bonaventure for using the comparative adverb between the Father and "the other," since to the Son there would not befit the positive of that [comparison], namely "to spirate principally," that is, from himself: but comparison ought to be made between things that share the same form.[3]

Then note that there is no order of origin between the Father and the Son in the act of spirating; that is, the one does not spirate before the other. Thus Scotus, Marsilius, and Gabriel in the places cited above simply grant; although they also seem to teach that in a certain way this order could be granted in spirating. Therefore that there is no such order between those persons in the act of spirating is gathered from this: because in that wherein there is an order of origin between certain [things], there ought to be priority; but this is not in the act of spirating, but in having the spirative power: for although it is the same in both, nevertheless it is prior in origin in the one than in the other; yet, once each has it, they spirate together. But to spirate from oneself, or to spirate from another, since it only denotes having the power of spirating from oneself or from another, only signifies the order of origin in having the power, not in spirating: for the spiration itself, which is an origin, constitutes the order between the spirating [person] and the spirated [Spirit]; yet nothing prevents it from being from both by the same power equally.

[1]: St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 16. [2]: St. Thomas, in the solution to the article cited. [3]: Scotus, reporting an unnamed theologian's censure of St. Bonaventure.

Articulus IV - Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit

Objicitur 1. It seems that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit does not seem to proceed from the Father and the Son inasmuch as they are one: neither in nature, because then the Holy Spirit would in like manner proceed from himself, since he is one with them in nature; nor inasmuch as they are one in some property: because one property cannot be of two supposits, as it seems. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are several. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objicitur 2. Further, when it is said "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit," unity of person cannot be designated there: for thus the Father and the Son would be one person. Nor even unity of property: because if on account of one property the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, by like reasoning on account of two properties the Father would seem to be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Which is unfitting. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objicitur 3. Further, the Son does not agree more with the Father than does the Holy Spirit: but the Holy Spirit and the Father are not one principle with respect to any divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.

Objicitur 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, they are either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father. But neither can be given: because if one which is the Father, it follows that the Son is Father; if one which is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not Father. Therefore it must not be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objicitur 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it seems conversely it should be said that one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. But this seems false. For when I say "principle," it must suppose either for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either way it is false. Therefore this also is false: "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."[4]

Objicitur 6. Further, one in substance makes "the same." If, therefore, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that they are the same principle: but this many deny. Therefore it must not be conceded that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objicitur 7. Further, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because they are one principle of the creature, are said to be one creator; but the Father and the Son are not one spirator, but two spirators, as many say. This also agrees with the words of St. Hilary, who says in I De Trinitate that the Holy Spirit must be confessed to be from the Father and the Son as authors. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit.[5]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in De Trinitate, V, c. 14, that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Spirit.[6]

I answer: The Father and the Son are in all things one, in which the opposition of relation does not distinguish them. Whence, since in this, to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, they are not relatively opposed, it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Some, however, say that this is improper: "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit." Because when this name "principle," taken singularly, does not signify a person, but a property, they say that it is taken adjectively; and because an adjective is not determined by an adjective, it cannot be fittingly said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, unless "one" be understood as placed adverbially, so that the sense be, "They are one principle," that is, "in one way." But by a like reason it could be said, "The Father [is] two principles of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," that is, "in two ways."

Therefore it must be said that although this name "principle" signifies a property, nevertheless it signifies it in the mode of a substantive; as this name "Father" and "Son" also [do] in created things. Hence it takes number from the form signified, as do other substantives. Therefore, just as the Father and the Son are one God on account of the unity of the form signified by this name "God," so they are one principle of the Holy Spirit on account of the unity of the property signified in this name "principle."

Reply to the first: It must be said that if the spirative power be attended to, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son inasmuch as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature together with the property, as will be said below. Nor is it

incongruous that one property be in two supposits, since there is one nature. But if the supposition of the spiration be considered, thus the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are several. For he proceeds from them as from one principle according to that in which they agree, although they are several supposits.

Reply to the second: When it is said "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit," one property is designated, which, as a form, is signified by the name. Nor does it therefore follow that, on account of two properties, the Father could be said to be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; for that would imply a plurality of supposits.

Reply to the third: As to the relations or properties, no likeness or unlikeness is attended to in the divine; but as to the essence. Whence neither is the Son more like the Father than is the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the fourth: These two, namely "the Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," or "one principle which is not the Father," are not contradictorily opposed. Wherefore it is not necessary to grant either of them. For when we say "the Father and the Son are one principle," this which I call "principle" does not have a determinate supposition, but a confused one, for two persons together. Wherefore in the process there is a fallacy of figure of speech, from confused supposition to determinate.

Reply to the fifth: It must be said that this also is true: "One principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son"; because this which I call "principle" does not suppose for one person only, but indistinctly for two, as was said.

Reply to the sixth: It must be said that it can fittingly be said that the Father and the Son are the same principle, inasmuch as "the same principle" supposes confusedly and indistinctly for two persons together.

Reply to the seventh: It must be said that although it is said that the Father and the Son, although they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, are nevertheless two spirators on account of the distinction of supposits - just as also two spirating [persons], because acts are referred to supposits - yet the same reason does not hold of this name "creator": for the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons (as was said), but a creature does not proceed from the three persons as they are distinct persons, but as they are one in essence. But it seems better to say that, since "spirans" is an adjective, whereas "spirator" is a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating [persons] on account of the plurality of supposits, but not two spirators on account of the one spiration. For adjectival names have number according to the supposits, but substantives according to the form signified.

[4]: The objection is supported by clustered references in the margin: 1. lib. 19, ar. 4; IV Contra, cap. 25; Opusc. 1, cap. 11 (fine); Opusc. 9, q. 6; and John, 8, lib. 3, com. 3; c. t. 15, lect., etc. [5]: St. Hilary, De Trinitate I; and V, at the end of the book. [6]: St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 14.

to the first it must be said that, if the spirative power is attended to, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son inasmuch as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature together with the property, as will be said below. Nor is it unfitting that

one property be in two supposits (*supposita*) whose nature is one. But if the supposits of the spiration be considered, thus the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are more than one; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of two.

To the second it must be said that, when it is said, "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit," one property is designated, which is the form (*forma*) signified by the name. Yet it does not follow that on account of several properties the Father could be called several principles; for there would be implied a plurality of supposits.

To the third it must be said that, as regards relative properties, likeness or unlikeness is not attended to in the divine, but as regards the essence (*essentia*). Hence, just as the Father is not more like Himself than He is like the Son, so neither is the Son more like the Father than the Holy Spirit.

To the fourth it must be said that these two, namely, "The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," and, "one principle which is not the Father," are not contradictorily opposed. Hence it is not necessary to grant one or the other of them. For when we say, "the Father and the Son are one principle," this word I call "principle" does not have determinate supposition; rather, it supposes confusedly for the two persons together. Hence in the sequence there is the fallacy of the figure of speech, from confused supposition to determinate.

To the fifth it must be said that this assertion is true, "The one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son"; because this word I call "principle" does not suppose for one person only, but indistinctly for the two, as has been said.

To the sixth it must be said that it can suitably be said that the Father and the Son are the same principle, inasmuch as "principle" supposes confusedly and indistinctly for the two persons together.

To the seventh it must be said that some say that the Father and the Son, although they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, are nevertheless two spirators on account of the distinction of supposits, just as also two spirating [persons], because acts are referred to supposits. Nor is there the same reason about the name "creator"; for the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are two distinct persons (as has been said), whereas a creature does not proceed from the three persons as they are distinct persons, but as they are one in essence. But it seems better to say that, since "spirating" is an adjective, whereas "spirator" is a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating [persons] on account of the plurality of supposits, but not two spirators on account of the one spiration. For adjectival names have number according to the supposits, but substantives from themselves according to the form signified.

As to what St. Hilary says, that the Holy Spirit is "from the Father and the Son as authors," it must be explained that the substantive is put for the adjective.

Conclusion is affirmative.

Disputatio CXLIX - Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit

An Pater et Filius sint unum principium Spiritus sancti. Disputatio. 149.

Status Quaestionis.

Caput I - Status quaestionis

Scotus in the first book, distinction 12, question 1, according to the question; and Durandus in the first book, distinction 24, questions 2 and 3; and "Gab." in the first book, distinction 12, question 1, in the beginning, think that there can be a question both about the thing and about the word: about the thing indeed, whether in the Father and the Son there is one power of spirating; in which sense there is no disagreement among Catholics. For all confess that the power is one; nor was there ever a heretic who would assert that there are two. But whether, the one power existing in the Father and the Son, one ought to say two principles, or one, they thought there was a controversy about the word, as the aforesaid Scholastics put it; whom the Canariensis censures upon this article in the second part of his commentary, and rashly imputes to them that they said this question is one of name, as if it were of less moment. For since the Council of Florence, in the last session in the letters of union, and that of Lyons, as is reported in the chapter "Fideles" de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica in VI, define that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, this is not a matter of small weight, nor to be held of little account.[578]

But it is not true that the Canariensis imputes to those authors so harshly; for they did not think that the question was unfruitful and of no moment, but only that among Catholics there is disagreement about the denomination and manner of speaking; which, however, in the thing itself is indeed arduous and difficult, and it very much matters that we do not, by inordinate words, establish error; since, however, in the thing itself there is no controversy, as has been noted. And indeed in the cited Councils there was handed down a definition not only of the manner of speaking, but also of the very thing against the Greeks. For when the Greeks were urging against the Latins that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two unbegotten principles and by a twofold power spirating, if He were to proceed from each, as clearly appears from the Council of Florence, the Councils define that He proceeds from each as from one principle, so as to show that what the Greeks were urging against us does not follow. It remains for us now to dispute about the word, whether the Father and the Son can be said to be two, or rather only one, principle of the Holy Spirit.

578. Council of Florence, session ultima, in the letters of union; Council of Lyons, as reported in c. Fideles de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica in VI.

Caput II - Durandus and Gregory hold that the Father and the Son cannot be called one principle of the Holy Spirit

Durandus in the first book, distinction 29, question 2, and Gregory in distinction 12, question 1, teach that the Father and the Son cannot be said to be one principle of the Holy Spirit. Gregory proves this by the following reason. Either "principle" is taken for the form of acting, or for the agent itself; for in both ways the term is customarily used. For both the power of generating is called a principle, and father and mother are called principles of offspring. In neither way, however, can the Father and the Son be said to be one principle. For if it be taken for the power or common notion, it is rather to be said that in the Father and the Son there is one principle, in which respect the Father and the Son are one principle. But if it be used for the supposit, since the Father and the Son are two supposits, they cannot be called one principle; for thus the sense would be, "The Father and the Son are one person." Durandus adds that, since more frequently the name "principle" denotes the supposit than the power itself, it is rather to be said two principles than one. He answers moreover the Councils of Lyons and Florence, that they took pains expressly to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, not absolutely, "from one principle," but with the addition of the particle "as," so as to denote that the Father and the Son ought not so much to be said one principle, as to have themselves "as it were" one principle. Just as when two causes concur to one and the same effect, and do not more perfectly produce it than one alone would produce it, they are said to have themselves after the manner of one principle; and to this agrees Antihodoren, book 1 of the Summa, chapter 30, where he teaches that the Father and the Son are a single principle in the way in which the Holy Spirit is called manifold, that is, by reason of the effect; thus, therefore, the Father and the Son will be said to be one principle by effect, that is, on account of the one person who proceeds from them.[579]

When, however, some approve a manner of speaking from St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, chapter 13, in that place Augustine is not truly speaking about the procession of the Holy Spirit, as in the argument it is adduced, but as it is related he merely says in these words: "When we say, the Father [is] a principle and the Son [is] a principle, we do not say two principles of a creature: because one God together is one principle of a creature; as one creator, and one God." From these, nevertheless, we can rightly argue against Gregory and Durandus in this way. If the Father and the Son are said to be one principle of creatures, because by reason of one power they concur to their production: why then will they not be said one principle of the Holy Spirit, if by the same common spirating power they spirate? St. Augustine, in the same book, chapter 14, expressly teaches this, a place which St. Thomas cites in the argument, But on the contrary.[580]

579. Antihodoren, lib. 1, Summae, cap. 30.
580. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 13; and c. 14; cited by St. Thomas in the argument, Sed contra.

Caput III - The sentence of Durandus and Gregory is rightly censured as rash by the Canariensis and more recent theologians

The sentence of Durandus and Gregory is rightly censured as rash by the Canariensis and by more recent theologians in this article, even if it consists only in a manner of speaking; nor is it permitted, even by inordinate words, to lessen the gravity of the matter. For example, if someone were to assert that there are three Gods, yet would explain that he does not assert three deities, but three supposits having deity, nevertheless in the manner of speaking he would deserve the mark of error. Therefore with good reason the note of rashness is branded upon the aforesaid opinion, because it uses a manner of speaking which the Councils reject. For that the Councils add the particle "as" (tanquam) makes no difference: for that is not a note of mere similarity, but shows the very truth of the thing; just as the particle "as if" (quasi) in John 1, "glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father," shows the truth of the thing.[581] For the Councils wished to meet the Greeks, who falsely imposed upon the Latins that they asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles; therefore the Councils had to show not only that which is in the thing, but also to hand down the true manner of speaking, which could in no way be censured by the Greeks. It would be of little account if the Councils showed that the Holy Spirit is spirated by the Father and the Son "as by one principle," if they merely wished to say that He has a likeness and manner of one principle; since nevertheless properly they could be called two principles. Therefore it must be said that the Father and the Son not only have one common power, which is the principle of spirating, but also that they are not two principles. Rather, they truly and properly are said to be one, not many, principles of the Holy Spirit; and this is the truer sentence.

Concerning the solution of the earlier argument of their sentence, which was taken from the supposition of the name, the remaining theologians vary, whose opinions we shall briefly pursue, that at length we may hand down what seems to us.

Capreolus, in the first book, distinction 12, question 1, after the solution of all the arguments, replies that the name "principle" supposes confusedly for the two persons of the Father and the Son; and that this confused supposition comes from that particle "as," just as the Logicians say in this proposition, "At Paris and at Rome pepper is sold," the name "pepper" supposes confusedly by reason of that same particle "and." Capreolus is agreed with by Cajetan, except that Capreolus admits this confused supposition in the term placed both on the side of the subject and on the side of the predicate; whereas Cajetan admits it only on the side of the predicate, as in the aforesaid proposition. That supposition admitted, they rightly teach that one cannot make ascent or descent in that term (as the Logicians say), that is, one cannot assign some singular, by reason of which the proposition be rendered true. Therefore, when we say, "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit," the term "principle" is taken confusedly, so that if under it we were to assign either the Father or the Son, it would plainly be the sophism which passes from confused to determinate supposition.[582]

581. John 1:14, "glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father."
582. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 12, q. 1; Cajetan, ad loc. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 29, q. 2; Gregory, dist. 12, q. 1.

quod they call a figure of speech, when, namely, no individual or singular is rightly assigned under some common term. They seem, however, to have taken their opinion from St. Thomas in the sixth reply, where he says that the name "principle" is taken with confused supposition.

This opinion is not approved by the Canariensis, because the particle "as if" never has such force of affecting the term as to make it have confused supposition; and he thinks that the name "principle" is taken with determinate, not confused, supposition. With the Canariensis other theologians also agree, as we shall see below. For my part, although I do not doubt that sometimes the particle has that force, to make the term have confused supposition, nevertheless I am well assured that the name "principle" is taken with determinate supposition in the aforesaid proposition. For since in God there is only one principle, nor can several be assigned under it, it cannot happen that there be confused supposition. Nor indeed can the Father and the Son be assigned under it as singulars of it, although, as will be explained below, they are connotated by that name; which does not hinder the term from having determinate supposition, as will be explained below. By the same reasoning it is proved that the term "principle" is not taken collectively for the Father and the Son (as some have falsely thought, whose view is falsely attributed to Marsilius in the First, question 1, article 3): for this name is not collective, like "people," but signifies one simple form.[583]

How, moreover, the term "principle" is taken with determinate supposition is variously explained by the theologians. Gabriel, in I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2, and art. 3, dub. 1, although he follows the opinion of Gregory, if we keep the propriety of speech, nevertheless, replying to the argument made above, says that the name "principle" is taken in a different way when we say that the three persons are the principle of creatures than when we say that two are the principle of the Holy Spirit. For in the former way, "principle" is taken for the divine essence; wherefore to say "the three persons are one principle of creatures" is the same as to say "the three persons are one essence"; but in the latter way, "principle" is taken for what is constituted out of the essence and the notion of spiration. Hence in that same place, art. 3, dub. 4, he gathers that in the divine there are four things constituted - yet not really distinct: because, besides the three persons, there would be also the spirator, or the principle of spiration, constituted in the manner that we have said. For this opinion Gabriel cites Ockham.[584]

But Gregory sharply attacks this opinion: first, because nothing is constituted in God unless there be a distinction in God between that which constitutes and that which is constituted; and also, because it would follow that there are four persons in God. Yet these reasons little hinder the opinion of Gabriel from being probable: for by the same account the opinion of Scotus and Cajetan would be improbable, who posit an individual of the Godhead, concrete, and constituted by a certain common subsistence; but that opinion is not judged improbable, inasmuch as it asserts that there is a common concrete, constituted prior to the understanding of the three persons, namely the individual of the Godhead. Nor indeed is it lawful to infer that there are four persons; because

583. Marsilius, In I, q. 1, a. 3.

584. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2; and a. 3, dub. 1; and art. 3, dub. 4, where he follows Gregory; and he cites Ockham for the view about a fourfold "constituted" in the divine.

the persons in God ought to be really distinct and to be incommunicable; but that individual is not really distinct from the three persons, nor is it incommunicable. Nor again must what constitutes and what is constituted be really distinguished in order that we say that there is something constituted in God. For constitution in the divine is through intellect, in the way in which the persons are constituted, as will be explained below in disputation 158, chapter 1. In the same way, concerning the principle of spiration, or the concrete "spirator," in Gabriel's opinion one may with equal probability philosophize; about which we shall speak in disputation 156, chapter 3. The Canariensis, in his commentary on this article, part 3, teaches that the name "principle" is taken with determinate supposition for the power of spiration signified in the concrete, determinate in which, as the Logicians say, just as in this proposition "man runs" the term "man" is taken. He also adds that under that term "principle" some singular can be assigned: for the Father and the Son are this principle.[585] Yet I for my part think that the name "principle" is not there taken with determinate supposition, as the term "man" is taken in this proposition "man runs," but personally, as the term "God" in this, "the Father and the Son are one God." For when we say "the Father and the Son are one principle of spiration," it is the same as if we were to say "they are this one principle of spiration": because the principle of spiration, like "spirator," is only one. But it must be observed that in the same way one must philosophize about this concrete name "spirator" or "principle," if it be taken concretely, as about the term "God," so that it directly signify the nature itself, or the power of spiration, but connote, vaguely, the supposits having such a power - this or that - just as about the term "God" we shall say in disputation 158, chapter 2, that which must be asserted in the same way about all concrete substantives. Whence it comes about that their multiplication is taken from the form, because that is the direct signification, and not from the supposits, which are only connoted: and therefore in the concrete we ought to say, "the Father and the Son are one principle and one spirator of the Holy Spirit," by the very same reason by which we say, "they are one God." But of this more fully in the place cited.

Furthermore, since the power of spiration even when signified in the abstract does not only signify the essence - as must be said about the power of generation in disputation 164 - but in a certain way is determined by a relation, the opinion of Gabriel can also be in part true, namely, that the principle of spiration is constituted by a relation: provided we understand this of the principle itself even in the abstract, in the same way as will be explained below.

Quaeritur: Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from two spirators, by the force of his procession. Disputatio 150.

Two Scholastic opinions

The knot of the present controversy is not whether there are several principles; nor whether the Father and the Son are to be called several spirators; nor, finally, whether one may say "several spirating" adjectively: this will be made manifest from those things which we shall say in disputation 155, chapter 8.[586] But it is whether the power of spiration is so in two supposits, and by

585. Melchior Cano (the Canariensis), Commentary on this article, part 3.

its nature so requires, that the procession of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as it is rational according to its characteristic property, demands two supposits on the part of the principle; which are compared to the production otherwise than the power of creating is in the three supposits: for in these the plurality by its own nature is so necessary, that their plurality does not enter per se in the fourth mode, on the part, namely, of their production, as passions are joined to the essence and the essence to the passions; and yet they are not conjoined in the fourth mode, which is when the effect is predicated per se of the cause and of the principle, or conversely. And this manner of understanding the question is disputed among the Scholastics: for no one doubts that the principle of spiration ought necessarily to be in two supposits, not per accidens but per se, and joined to them by the highest necessity; but whether they be required per se in the fourth mode on the part of the principle by reason of such procession of the Holy Spirit by reason of such love, they do not feel the same way.

Let the first opinion among the Scholastics be that of Scotus in I, dist. 11, q. 1. He asserts two things: one is that the Holy Spirit, by the force of his procession and by his characteristic property, requires, on the part of the principle, two supposits spirating; wherefore he would in the same way proceed if the principle of spiration were in one supposit, as he now proceeds when it is in two: just as the principle of creating, inasmuch as it is the principle of creating, does not of itself require to be in three.

He proves the first point thus. Whenever the principle of some operation and production equally perfect is in one supposit as in two, it does not of itself require more supposits per se in the fourth mode, inasmuch as it is compared with the operation and the effect: but the will of God to spirate would be thus perfect in one supposit as in two, since it would be divine; therefore in one supposit it would sufficiently spirate and in the same way as it now spirates, just as, if omnipotence were in one supposit only and were divine, it would in exactly the same way create. Then he thus proves the second: nothing is added to the power of spiration by a plurality of supposits; therefore in vain are more supposits required per se for spirating, unless something were added; but that would be the ratio of mutual love; now one perfection cannot be added to a power from a supposit, since rather the supposit has it from the power; but the ratio of mutual love does not of itself concur to the production of the Holy Spirit: for it is a relation only in the product, which can confer nothing of power upon the power of spiration, nor does it of itself require something real in the principle of spiration; therefore, substantially and according to the characteristic propriety, the Holy Spirit would proceed in the same way as he does now, if there were in one supposit the power of spiration.

Another point that Scotus teaches is that nonetheless the power of spiration is not in proximate potency to spirate so long as it is in two supposits: not because the principle of spiration, inasmuch as it is the principle of love, requires two supposits per se; but because whenever in an agent there are two active principles ordered among themselves, the posterior is not in proximate potency to act until the prior acts: such are the powers of generating and of spirating, as intellect and will. For

586. See disputation 155, chapter 8.

the will, since it is posterior in operation, is not yet in proximate potency to act until the intellect acts; and since in God by the intellect the other supposit proceeds, we first understand the power of spiration in two than that it spirates, by reason of the order which this posterior power has with the prior. Wherefore (says Scotus) if by the divine intellect no person proceeded, but by the will the other supposit were produced, the will would be in proximate potency to spirate until the intellect understood; but now it would not be first in the two supposits before it were in proximate potency for acting, since the plurality of supposits is not required on the part of the principle of spiration as such; but for this reason, that the posterior person is not yet in proximate potency until the prior acts; and now the prior supposit in God is produced.

Gabriel in I, dist. 12, q. 2, art. 2 seems to follow the same opinion as regards the mode of speaking; yet in article 1, notation 2, he seems to follow Scotus's opinion about the thing itself: for he affirms that the Holy Spirit would proceed in the same way even if the power of spiration were in one supposit only.

But, before I set forth the true opinion, I wish in passing to note against Durandus what I said in disputation 111, chapter 2: namely, that he asserts falsely that the procession of the Holy Spirit in reality is proximate by nature by the will, but by the will only in name and appropriation; as in that place it has been sufficiently proved. And if Durandus, with the rest of the Scholastics, were to grant that the Holy Spirit in reality proceeds by the will, he would also, without doubt, teach with St. Thomas that, according to its mode and characteristic propriety, he proceeds from two in such a way that per se in the fourth mode he requires two spirating supposits. It remains, therefore, that we show this against Scotus in the following chapter.

Secunda sententia is that of Durandus in I, dist. 11, q. 3, who, when the opinion of Scotus and of St. Thomas (which we shall report in the next chapter) has been rehearsed, has himself devised a middle position. He says, first, if we speak of spiration according to its formal notion, it is indeed from the Father and the Son as having the power of spiration, not as from two spirators, nor yet as from one spirator, but only inasmuch as they have the power of spiration, whether that be one or many; whether it reside in one or in many supposits. Secondly, he teaches that if the discourse be of the intrinsic mode which spiration has, inasmuch as it is one simple procession, the Holy Spirit proceeds from two: not as they have the power of spiration, but as they have one power which is equally perfect in each, and therefore more supposits are not required per se on the part of the principle. Thirdly, he says that if the question proceeds about the mode which spiration has from its order to certain extrinsic things - which mode is more in the word than in the thing itself, because the act of spiration is attributed to the will by a certain likeness, whereas in reality it does not proceed from it - then for this reason it per se requires to be from two supposits: and thus he judges the opinion of Scotus to be true if we speak of the thing itself, and the opinion of St. Thomas likewise to be true, if the discourse be of the mode of speaking, inasmuch as the procession is commonly attributed to the will.

The truer opinion: that the Holy Spirit per se, in the fourth mode, requires two supposits on the part of the principle

A far more probable opinion is this: that the Holy Spirit per se in the fourth mode proceeds from two having the same power of spiration, so that if that power were in one only, the Holy Spirit, according to the same characteristic propriety, would not proceed. Wherefore it is not only necessary that the spirating power be in two supposits in order to be in proximate potency for acting, as Scotus conceded; but also that, on the part of such a principle, several supposits are required per se in the fourth mode. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in this article 4, in the first reply; and in the First, dist. 11, art. 2, in the body, and art. 4, reply to the second; whom Cajetan, the Canariensis, and the more recent Thomists follow in this matter.[587]

Capreolus in this article, Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 12, question 1, conclusion 4; in the same sense inclines Marsilius in the First, question 15, article 3; Henry too favors it, in his Summa, article 34, when he asserts that the principle of spiration is the will concordant of two who mutually love one another; for plurality belongs to the notion of mutual love; and therefore the Holy Spirit, according to the characteristic property of his procession, is called the mutual love. Henry, however, differs from this position in that he asserts that the principle of spiration is the will concordant in the second act of willing and loving; for this author, as we saw in disputation 12, chapter 1, thinks that the notional acts, by which the divine persons proceed, arise from the essential acts as from a principle - something which Scotus, in the passage cited a little above, sharply refutes; and we ourselves have more fully impugned it in that disputation.[588]

But Scotus wrongly charges Henry with a contradiction, because he said that the Holy Spirit must be distinguished from the Son even if he were not produced by him. With this, Scotus does not seem to be consistent when he later says, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds per se from two: for thus he could not proceed from one alone. Yet the rebuttal is trifling. For Henry does not assert that the Holy Spirit can in fact proceed from one supposit (*suppositum*) alone; nor does he assert that he would have the same characteristic property which he now has, if he proceeded from one alone. Rather, on the supposition that he proceeded from one alone, and truly were a divine person - whether of the same characteristic property which he now has or of a different one - he must nonetheless be distinguished from the Son.

Let us come to the proof of our position. We can confirm it first of all from Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity, book 3, chapters 3, 7, and 11, where he teaches that love cannot be perfect and delightful unless it be at least of two. And in chapter 16 he says that nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom is said to be in one person only: for in one person the fullness of the wise could exist; but the fullness of love by its own nature requires several supposits in order to be perfect; for the perfection of love consists in this, that it be mutual. Therefore, since the Holy

587. St. Thomas, I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 1; and In I Sent., d. 11, a. 2, in corp., and a. 4, ad 2; with Cajetan, the Canariensis, and recent Thomists ad loc.

588. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 12, q. 1, concl. 4; Marsilius, In I, q. 15, a. 3; Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 34. On Scotus's refutation of Henry's doctrine of notional acts arising from essential ones, see the place cited above; cf. also our disputation 12, cap. 1.

Spirit proceeds as perfect love, it follows that he also proceeds as mutual love - which assuredly he would not have, if he went forth from one person only. From this doctrine a reason is drawn for this position. For since the Holy Spirit proceeds as the bond (*nexus*) of the Father and the Son, and as their reciprocal love, his procession is as a bond from two who love one another; and while it is not altogether the same thing to proceed from two and to proceed as a bond, nevertheless to proceed from two who love one another is to proceed as a bond. But when we say that he therefore proceeds from two because he proceeds as a bond, we do not signify an efficient cause, but a final one; that is, to the end that the Spirit proceed as a bond - which is his characteristic property - he proceeds from two. Whence it comes about that certain Thomists wrongly concede to Scotus that in the same way the Holy Spirit would proceed, if the divine will, which is the principle of spiration (*spiratio*), were in one person only. For in that case the same principle would not remain; therefore the Spirit proceeding thence would not be of the same characteristic property; whether that person would then produce another Holy Spirit, we do not inquire. Yet if it were fecund, it would indeed produce a Holy Spirit, but - as has been proved - that Spirit would not be of the same property as the one who now proceeds.[589]

It is further gathered that those who concede that the power of spiration therefore requires several supposits, because, since it is a notional operation of the will, the procession of the Spirit necessarily presupposes also the procession of the Word, which is a notional intellection, do not well explain the opinion of St. Thomas which they are striving to defend; indeed, they plainly fall back into the position explained by Scotus. For in this way that power would require per se, in the fourth mode, to be in two supposits only by reason of the order which the emanations have; and hence, if we were to suppose the impossible, that by the operation of the intellect no person were produced, but yet by the will one were, the Holy Spirit would proceed in the same way as he now proceeds; and therefore he would not require several supposits per se in the fourth mode on the part of the principle; for when that which is required in that mode is removed, the effect is removed.

A reply to Scotus's arguments

To Scotus's first reason some Thomists reply along with the Ferrariensis, in IV Contra gentes, chapter 25, toward the end, that from the fact the power of spiration is equally perfect in two supposits it does not follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds by his own nature from one only; rather, he proceeds necessarily from two, since in two the power is perfect in the same way. But this solution does not dissolve Scotus's argument. For he does not contend that the Holy Spirit does not in fact proceed from two; nor does he deny that he necessarily proceeds from two, just as he does not deny that creatures produced by three persons are necessarily produced, since omnipotence is necessarily in the three. Rather, he contends that a plurality of supposits is not required per se in the fourth mode on the part of the principle, although it be necessarily conjoined with the

589. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, III, cc. 3, 7, 11, and 16; cf. also the Ferrariensis on St. Thomas, In IV Contra Gentiles, c. 25 (sub fine).

principle; because each supposit contributes nothing peculiar to the power of spiration. And this follows most cogently, if we concede to Scotus that the power of spiration would be equally perfect, and would be disposed in the same way, in one as in two supposits; for thus, if on that supposition it be understood to remain in one only in the same way, it would spirate also in the same way; just as, because omnipotence is equally and in the same way in one as in all the persons, if one person only remained, it would create in the same way.

The true solution. I answer, therefore, that the power of spiration would not be equally and in the same way in one as it is in two supposits, not because it is not whole in each one, but because it does not have every condition required for producing such a bond and the Holy Spirit in each single case; rather, it requires both together in order that, as a condition by reason of mutual love, the Holy Spirit may proceed in the characteristic property which he has. Wherefore there is a difference between the omnipotence of creating and the power of spiration, namely, that the omnipotence of creating is in the three, and a creature necessarily proceeds from the three, not however as they are three, but as they agree in one power; but the power of spiration is necessarily in two, in such wise that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, precisely as they are two. And hence, on this second ground, we can without difficulty meet that same reason of Scotus.

We say, then, that the power of spiration, which is the divine will, requires, as a necessary condition for spirating the bond, the modification which we understand it to have from the personal properties of the Father and the Son, not because something of power and virtue accrues from them, but because those are the conditions necessary for spirating the bond; and these conditions are real. We grant also that the relation of mutual love is indeed of reason; nevertheless it has necessarily a foundation in reality: for a relation of reason does not arise from the intellect's consideration alone without any real foundation. Such, therefore, must the Holy Spirit be by the force of his procession in the thing itself, that in him a relation of mutual love can be conceived, and by it the characteristic property of that procession be explained by us; but he would not have this unless in reality the principle of spiration were in two; therefore that property requires this by its own nature and by the force of its procession, which is mutual love.

Moreover, two things must be observed. The first is, that when we say that mutual love is the procession of the Holy Spirit, we do not understand a double love from one person to another, but the same most simple love, which, since it truly is from two and they love one another, has the true notion of mutual love and dilection.

The second is, that when we say that the properties of two persons are the conditions required for the power of spiration, by conditions we do not understand something required in order that the will be the power of spiration and the principle by which. For, as we shall say in disputation 164, chapter 3, the power of spiration is whole in the Father, and whole in the Son, and accordingly in each of them it has the entire modification necessary, so that it be a power; but we say that the properties of the two persons are conditions not for the power itself of spiration, but for producing the bond as such; and, if we were to speak, so to say, of the person produced, it is for this reason that a person of such a property can be produced; for were we to say so, by reason of that property

of the bond, the whole power which is common to both supposits is conferred upon that person, so that by it as by something common to both supposits he be produced. For if it is as dilection, which is love from both, by reason of that it necessarily be produced from two.

Quaestio XXXVII - On the name of the Holy Spirit, which is Love

And then it is asked concerning the name "love"; and about this two things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Spirit

Objicitur. First, it seems that love is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For St. Augustine says in De Trinitate XV: I know not why, just as wisdom is said both of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and nevertheless all together are not three but one wisdom, so also charity is not said both of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and all together one charity.[590] But no name which is predicated singularly of each of the persons and of all in common is the proper name of any one person. Therefore this name "love" is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit.

1. Further, the Holy Spirit is a subsisting person; but love is not signified as a subsisting person, but as a certain action passing from the lover into the beloved. Therefore love is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit.
2. Further, love is the nexus of lovers, because according to Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, it is a certain unitive power;[591] but a nexus is a mean between the things which it connects, not something proceeding from them. Since therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (as has been shown), it seems that He is not the love or nexus of the Father and the Son.
3. Further, of any lover there is some love; but the Holy Spirit is a lover; therefore there is some love of Him. If therefore the Holy Spirit is love, He will be love of love, and spirit from spirit, which is unfitting.

But on the contrary: St. Gregory says in a homily on Pentecost in the Homilies on the Gospels: He Himself, the Holy Spirit, is love.[592]

I answer: The name "love" in the divine realities can be taken essentially and personally. And insofar as it is taken personally, it is the proper name of the Holy Spirit, just as "word" is the proper name of the Son. For the understanding of which, one must know that, since in the divine realities, as has often been said, there are two processions, one according to the mode of intellect, which is the procession of the word, the other according to the mode of will, which is the procession of love, and since the former is more known to us, there have been invented for it more proper names to

590. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV.
591. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV.
592. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, homily for Pentecost.

signify singly the things which can be considered in it, but not so in the procession of the will. Hence also by certain circumlocutions we are wont to signify the person proceeding; and the relations which are received according to this procession are named by the names of procession and spiration, as was said above; which nevertheless are names more of origin than of relation according to the property of the word. And yet one must consider in like manner according to each procession.

For just as from the fact that someone understands some thing there proceeds in the understanding person a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood, which is called "word," so from the fact that someone loves some thing there proceeds (so to speak) a certain impression of the thing loved in the lover's affection, according to which the thing loved is said to be in the lover, as likewise the thing understood is in the understanding person; and thus when someone understands and loves himself, he is in himself not only by identity of reality, but also as the understood is in the understanding person, and as the loved in the lover.

But on the side of the intellect there have been invented words to signify the respect of the understanding person to the thing understood, as is clear in this, that I say "to understand." And there are also other words invented to signify the process of the intellectual conception itself, namely "to say of oneself" and "word." Hence in God "to understand" is said only essentially, because it does not import the relation of the principle of the word to the very word proceeding; but "word" is said personally, because it signifies that which proceeds. But "to say" itself is said notionally, because it imports the relation of the principle of the word to the word itself.

On the side, however, of the will, besides "to love" and "to have dilection," which import the relation of the lover to the thing loved, there are not words imposed which import the relation of the very impression or affection of the thing loved which comes to be in the lover from the fact that he loves his principle or conversely. And therefore, because of the lack of words, we signify such relations by the terms "love" and "dilection," as if we were to name the word "conceived intelligence" or "begotten understanding." Thus therefore, insofar as in "love" or "dilection" there is imported nothing but the relation of the lover to the thing loved, "love" and "to have dilection" are said essentially, just as "intelligence" and "to understand." But insofar as we use these words to express the relation of that thing which proceeds according to the mode of love to its principle and conversely - so that by "love" is understood the love proceeding, and by "to have dilection" is understood to be spirated the love proceeding - "love" is the name of a person, and "to have dilection" or "to love" is a notional verb, as "to say" or "to beget."

Reply to the first: Augustine speaks of charity according as it is taken essentially in the divine realities, as has been said.[593]

Reply to the second: Although "to understand" and "to will" and "to love" are signified according to the mode of actions that pass over into objects, nevertheless they are actions remaining in the agents (as was said above), yet in the agent itself they import a certain relation to the object. Hence love also in us is something remaining in the lover, and the "word of the heart" remains in the one

593. Cf. the corpus of this article.

speaking, yet with a relation to the thing expressed by the word or to the thing loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, it has more: for both the word and the love are subsisting. Therefore it is said that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father into the Son, or into anything else; not that something transitive into another is signified, but only the relation of love to the thing loved, just as also in "word" there is imported the relation of the word to the thing expressed by the word.

Reply to the third: The Holy Spirit is said to be the nexus of the Father and the Son, insofar as He is love. For since the Father loves by one dilection Himself and the Son, and conversely, there is imported in the Holy Spirit (insofar as He is love) the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as of a lover to the loved. But from the very fact that the Father and the Son love one another mutually, it must be that the mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit, proceeds from both. Therefore, according to origin, the Holy Spirit is not a mean, but the third person in the Trinity; but according to the aforesaid relation He is the mean nexus of the two, proceeding from both.

Reply to the fourth: Although the Son understands, nevertheless it does not befit Him to produce the word, because "to understand" befits Him as the word proceeding; so too, although the Holy Spirit loves, taken essentially, nevertheless it does not befit Him to spirate love, which is "to have dilection" taken notionally; because thus He loves essentially as the love proceeding, not as that from which love proceeds.

Notations concerning the article.

Conclusion: If "love" be taken notionally, so as to signify the relation of the one proceeding according to the mode of love, then "love" is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. This conclusion is taken from St. Augustine, De Trinitate XIV, c. 17, where he asserts that the love proceeding, which is God, is the Holy Spirit; and he proves it from 1 John 4: "God is charity... let us love one another, because dilection is from God; everyone who loves is born of God and knows God; he who does not love does not know God, because God is charity." In which place John says two things, both that dilection is of God, and that dilection is from God Himself: therefore it follows that God is the love proceeding, which is no other than the Holy Spirit.[594] But this passage is explained by the Council of Mileve, c. 4, of created dilection, that when John says "dilection is from God," from this he proves that the dilection by which we confess God is His gift. Nevertheless, God Himself is called charity, that is - as John said - in order to commend to us the gift of charity, which is called by the same name as God Himself, and by which we are made most like to God.[595]

Others endeavor to deduce the same from that passage to the Colossians 1: "He translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His dilection," because they think that by the name "dilection" the Holy Spirit is signified. But (as Augustine most aptly noted, De Trinitate XV, c. 19, toward the end) "dilection" there cannot be taken for the notional love which is the Holy Spirit; otherwise the Son would be called the Holy Spirit, since He is called "the Son of dilection," which is absurd.

594. 1 John 4:7 - 8.
595. Council of Mileve, c. 4 (on created dilection).

Wherefore, he says, "dilection" there is to be used for essential love, and "Son of dilection" to be said, that is, "beloved"; for the Hebrews do not have adjectives, and therefore they use substantives in the genitive case, in which manner they say "son of perdition," that is, "a perished man."[596]

Moreover, first it must be noted that the opinion of Durandus is false, who in I, dist. 32, q. 1, n. 8, affirms that the name "love" is never taken notionally in God, except according to appropriation - not as common names are wont to be appropriated to each of the persons - but because he thinks that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not through the will, save only by a certain likeness, as we have seen; and by the same reasoning he taught that the name "word" is not the proper name of the second person, but is only in that way appropriated, as we have reported.[597] For he thought that the Son did not proceed through the intellect, but that His procession is merely similar to an operation of the intellect; whereas however we have shown that to be false in the disputation there cited.

Next, note that Aureolus labored to no purpose (as Capreolus reports, In I Sent., dist. 32, on the arguments against the fifth conclusion), when he wished to prove that there are in God two loves, one essential and the other notional; for (as Cajetan says on this article) essential and notional love are the same from the nature of the thing, whereas the notional adds only, over and above the essential, the relation of production - which, in general, is the case with terms that in God are taken both essentially and notionally.[598]

...But this is truly so of all essential acts and notional acts when compared with one another, as was shown in Disputation 113.

Articulus II - Whether the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit

Objicitur. It seems that the Father and the Son do not love themselves with the Holy Spirit.

1. For St. Augustine in book 7 On the Trinity proves that the Father is not wise by a begotten wisdom.[599] But just as the Son is begotten wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is proceeding love, as was said. Therefore the Father and the Son do not love themselves by the proceeding love which is the Holy Spirit.
2. Further, when it is said, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit," the verb "to love" is taken either essentially (*essentialiter*) or notionally (*notionaliter*). But it cannot be true if it is taken essentially; for by equal reason one could say that the Father understands by the Son. Nor can it be true if it is taken notionally; for by equal reason one could say that the Father and the Son breathe by the Holy Spirit, or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore in no way is this true: "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit."
3. Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and himself, and us. But the Father does not love himself with the Holy Spirit; for no notional act is reflected back upon its own principle of the act. For it cannot be said that the Father generates himself or breathes

596. Colossians 1:13; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 19.
597. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, n. 8; cf. Vazquez, Disputatio 11, cap. 1; and on "word," Disputatio 41, cap. 2.

himself. Therefore neither can it be said that he loves himself with the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as "to love" is taken notionally. Likewise, the love by which he loves us does not seem to be the Holy Spirit; because a respect toward the creature is imported, and thus it pertains to the essence (*essentia*). Therefore this statement also is false: "The Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit."

But on the contrary: Augustine says in book 6 On the Trinity that the Holy Spirit is that by which the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and loves his Begetter.[600]

Respondetur: I answer that a difficulty arises concerning this question from the fact that when it is said, "The Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit," since the ablative is construed in the relation of some cause, it seems that the Holy Spirit is the principle of loving both for the Father and for the Son; which is altogether impossible. And therefore some have said that this proposition is false: "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit." And they say that this has been retracted by Augustine in his book of Retractations, namely, that he retracted "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom." Others say that it is an improper proposition, and thus is to be explained as, "The Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit," that is, by essential love which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Others said that this ablative is construed in the relation of sign, so that the sense is: the Holy Spirit is the sign that the Father loves the Son, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds from them as love. Others said that this ablative is construed in the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Spirit is the love by which formally the Father and the Son love one another. Others said that it is construed in the relation of formal effect. These last approached nearer to the truth. Hence, for clearing up this point, it must be known that, since things are commonly denominated from their forms - just as "white" from whiteness, and "man" from humanity - everything from which another is denominated, with respect to this, has the relation (*relatio*) of form. Thus, if I say, "This man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is construed in the relation of formal cause, although it is not a form. Yet it also happens that something is denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent by its action, but also by the very terminus of the action, which is the effect, inasmuch as the effect includes in a way the form of the action in intellectual operations. We say, for example, that what generates is "heating" by "heating," although the heating is not the heat which is the intrinsic form of fire, but an action proceeding from the fire. And we say further that a tree is "flowering" by its flowers, although the flowers are not the form of the tree, but certain effects proceeding from the tree itself. According to this, therefore, it must be said that, since in the divine realities "to love" is taken in a twofold way - essentially, namely, and notionally - according as it is taken essentially, thus the Father and the Son do not love themselves with the Holy Spirit, but with their essence (*essentia*). Whence Augustine says in book 15 On the Trinity: "Who would dare to say that neither the Father, nor himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit loves, except by the Holy Spirit?" And according to this

598. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32; Cajetan, on Summa theologiae I, q. 37, a. 1.

599. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII (on "the Father is not wise by begotten wisdom").

600. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI (to the effect that the Holy Spirit is that by which the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and loves his Begetter).

the first opinions proceed. But according as it is taken notionally, thus "to love" is nothing other than to spirate by love, just as "to say" is to produce the word, and "to flower" is to produce flowers. Therefore, just as it is said that a tree flowers "by its flowers," so it is said that the Father says "by the Word," or "by the Son," himself and the creature. And the Father and the Son are said to love "with the Holy Spirit," that is, with the proceeding love, both themselves and us.

Reply to the first: To be wise or understanding in the divine realities is not taken except essentially. Therefore it cannot be said that the Father is wise or understanding by the Son. But "to love" is taken not only essentially but also notionally. And according to this we can say that the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, as has been said.

Reply to the second: When, in the intellection of some action, a determinate effect is imported, the principle of the action can be denominated both from the action and from the effect; as we can say that a tree is "flowering" by "flowering" and by "flowers." But when a determinate effect is not included in the action, then the principle of the action cannot be denominated by the effect but only by the action. For we do not say that a tree produces a flower "by the flower," but "by the production of the flower." In this, therefore, when I say "he breathes" or "he generates," only the notional act is imported. Hence we cannot say that the Father breathes with the Holy Spirit, or generates by the Son. We can, however, say that the Father "says" by the Word as by the person (*persona*) proceeding, and "says" by "diction" as by the notional act; because "to say" imports a determinate person proceeding, since to say is to produce the word. And similarly "to love," as it is taken notionally, is to produce love. And therefore it can be said that the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit as with the person proceeding, and with love itself as with the notional act.

Reply to the third: The Father loves not only the Son but also himself and us with the Holy Spirit; because, as "to love" is taken notionally, it imports not only the production of a divine person, but also the person produced by the mode of love, which has a relation to the thing loved. Hence, just as the Father "says" himself and every creature by the Word which he begot, insofar as the begotten Word sufficiently represents the Father and every creature, so he loves himself and every creature with the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as love of the highest goodness, according to which the Father loves himself and every creature. And thus also a respect toward the creature is imported both in the Word and in the proceeding love, as it were secondarily, inasmuch as divine goodness and truth is the principle of understanding and loving every creature.

Why it can be said, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit." Disputation 151. - Various Scholastic opinions. Caput 1. - The more probable position, in the judgment of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the Thomists, is explained. Caput 2. - The true reason for the aforesaid position. Caput 3. - Certain objections are solved. Caput 4. - In what sense it can be said that the Holy Spirit loves himself by himself. Caput 5. - Whether it can rightly be said, "The Father is wise," or "the Father is wise by begotten wisdom." Caput 6. - Why it cannot be said, "The Son is wise by begotten wisdom or by unbegotten wisdom." Caput 7.

Caput I - Various Scholastic opinions

We set forth in this controversy the proposition, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit," as one that can somehow be said. For thus speaks Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 5, whose words we reported in the preceding disputation, chapter 3.[601] St. Jerome also, on Psalm 17, says: "The Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but the love which the Father has for the Son, and the Son for the Father."[602] St. Bernard, in the book On the Love of God: "I love you," he says, "lovable Lord, since from the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit, the love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father, and so great is the love that it is unity."[603] Hugh of St. Victor, in a letter to Bernard, writes thus: "If you rightly say that you love by the love which proceeds from you, why are not the Father and the Son said to love by the love which proceeds from them? And again: If the Holy Spirit were the love of your heart, and of the Father, and of the Son, who, I ask, could deny that by the Holy Spirit, that is, by your love, you would love yourself?"[604]

Wherefore now the controversy among the Scholastics that remains is only this: by what reason that proposition can truly be pronounced. In this chapter, in the customary manner, I shall enumerate various opinions of our theologians which do not approve themselves to me, so that thereafter, in what follows, we may confirm that which will seem truer.

The first opinion is that of Gotfred of Poitiers, as reported by St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and Capreolus, asserting that, in the proper sense, the proposition is false, and that Augustine retracted it in a similar case. For since in book 83 of the Questions, question 23, he had said, "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom," later, in the book of Retractations, chapter 26, and in book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 1, and in book 7, chapter 3, and in book 15, chapter 7, he retracted that. But to this seems similar the statement, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit." Certain more recent writers adhere to Gotfred, among whom is the Canarian in this article; for he confesses that he altogether does not know how to defend Augustine's proposition in its proper sense.[605]

Scotus refutes Gotfred's opinion excellently in the first book, distinction 32, question 2, first article, both because Augustine nowhere expressly retracted this proposition - and he would have retracted it, as he did many others, if he had judged it false - and because it is altogether different from that, "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom," as we shall see below in chapter 6. Therefore neither does it seem to have been retracted by Augustine. There is added that, since other Augustinians also, such as Bernard and Hugh, have pronounced this proposition, it is not credible that Augustine retracted it. How, moreover, it is true in the proper sense will appear clearly below; from which Gotfred's position will also be confuted.[606]

601. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, c. 5 (cited previously).
602. St. Jerome, In Psalmum 17.
603. St. Bernard, De amore Dei.
604. Hugh of St. Victor, Epistola ad Bernardum.
605. Melchior Cano (Canariensis), on this article.
606. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).

The second opinion is of those who assert that the proposition is true, provided that "the Holy Spirit" is taken for essential love, which is wont to be appropriated to the Holy Spirit. This is attributed to Alexander of Hales, who rather, in the first part, question 47, member 2 at the end, and member 3, article 3, where he makes some mention of this matter, seems to grant the proposition in its proper sense, with "the Holy Spirit" taken for the third person. Yet Durandus plainly taught that view in the first book, distinction 32, question 1; but, whoever be its author, Scotus rightly attacks it in the place cited, and Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 32, question 1, article 1, first conclusion. St. Bonaventure also, in that place, article 1, question 1. For if by the same reason the proposition were true, by the same token this also could be granted: "The Father and the Son are good by the Holy Spirit," if indeed they are good by essential goodness which is wont to be appropriated to the Holy Spirit.[607][608][606][609][610]

The third opinion is that of Simon of Tournai, whom Scotus cites in the place alleged, St. Bonaventure in that first article, question 3, and Capreolus in that first question, article 2: he granted that proposition only in this sense, "The Holy Spirit is the sign of the mutual love of the Father and the Son." But they impugn this opinion, because by the same reasoning one could say, "The Father and the Son love the creature," since at least a rational creature can be a sign of this mutual love; and it can also be refuted at least by reason, because that sense is very improper and alien to the letter: for thus it would be permitted to say, "Fire burns by smoke," because it is a sign of heating.[611]

The more probable position, in the judgment of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the Thomists, is explained. Caput 2.

Quocirca nunc solum superest controversia inter Scholasticos, qua ratione vere dicta propositio pronunciari possit. In hoc autem capite, more solito, varias Theologorum nostrorum sententias, quae mihi non probantur, enumerabo, ut deinde in sequentibus eam, quae verior videbitur, confirmem.

Prima sententia est Gotfredi Pictaviensis, quem referunt Bonaventura, Scotus et Capreolus, asserentis, in proprio sensu falsam esse propositionem, eamque in simili retractasse Augustinum. Nam cum in libro 83 Quaestionum, quaestione 23, dixisset: Pater esse sapientem sapientia genita, postea in libro Retractationum cap. 26, et in De Trinitate lib. 1 cap. 1 et 2, lib. 7 cap. 3, et lib. 15 cap. 7, id retractavit; huic autem videtur similis illa: Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto. Gotfredo nonnulli recentiores adhaerent, inter quos est Canariensis in hunc articulum; fatetur enim, se prorsus nescire eam propositionem Augustini in proprio sensu defendere.[612][613][614][615][616]

607. Alexander of Hales, Summa, prima pars, q. 47, memb. 2 (in fine), et memb. 3, art. 3.
608. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1.
606. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).
609. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1.
610. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 (and q. 3).
611. Simon of Tournai, as reported by Scotus, St. Bonaventure, and Capreolus in the places cited.
612. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).
613. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1.
614. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 (and q. 3).
615. Melchior Cano (Canariensis), on this article.

Gotfredi opinionem refellit optime Scotus; neque enim St. Augustine illam praedictam propositionem realiter retractavit, ut suo loco, capite 6, videbimus; atque adeo qui huic sentient, frustra nituntur.[612] Tertia sententia est eorum, qui volunt propositionem hanc, si quidem concedatur, concedendam esse tantum sensu aliquo remoto aut improprio, prout Spiritus Sanctus accipitur pro amore essentiali, qui Spiritui Sancto solet appropriari; ita Alexander, Durandus aliique, quorum mentionem faciemus mox; quam sententiam tamen non probamus, quia si tantum ratione appropriationis concederetur, sequeretur: Pater et Filius sunt boni de amore suo, cum tamen bonitate essentiali sint boni, quae Spiritui sancto nonnisi appropriatione tribuitur. Alii vero, ut Simon Tornacensis, referunt Spiritum Sanctum non esse ipsam mutuam Patris et Filii dilectionem, sed eius tantummodo signum; quae opinio, quia ad significationem creaturae manifestae cedit, facile refellitur: non enim recte diceremus, ignis comburit fumo, quia fumus est signum combustionis.[617618619]

Caput II - The proper mode of speaking: that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit

Communis et verior sententia est eorum, qui affirmant hanc propositionem secundum proprietatem sermonis veram esse, si Spiritus Sanctus accipiatur pro tertia persona Trinitatis, dilectio vero seu amor pro actu voluntatis notionali, quo Spiritus Sanctus procedit. Ea tradit Sanctus Doctor in hoc articulo; secum eo Caietanus et recentiores multi Thomistae, Bonaventura in I, d. 32, art. 1, q. 1 et 2; Scotus q. 2; Capreolus q. 1, art. 1, conclusione 5 et sequentibus; Gabriel q. 2, art. 2, conclusione 1; et Marsilius in I, quaestione 14, art. 4, annotatione 3, conclusione 1 et 2; tametsi hic auctor, quaestione 35, art. 1, opinionem, quam tertio loco retulimus, non leviter insinuet.[614612613]

Verum non omnes eodem modo hanc sententiam probant: Sanctus Thomas, Caietanus et Capreolus dicunt, hanc denominationem esse veluti in ratione effectus formalis; nam agens interdum a suo effectu et termino actionis denominatur, veluti a forma. Id autem magis adhuc explicat Sanctus Thomas, in corpore, et in solutione 2, cuius explicationem Caietanus et recentiores Thomistae sequuntur, hoc modo. Quoties ad conceptum actionis pertinet terminus illius determinatus et particularis, non tantum denominatur agens ab actione, verum etiam a termino in casu effectivo: atque hac de causa dicimus, arbor floret floribus, qui sunt effectus ipsius arboris. Eodem igitur modo dicimus, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, quia est terminus determinatus et particularis, ab ipsis per dilectionem mutuam productus, et ad conceptum ipsius productionis pertinens: non tamen dicimus, Pater et Filius spirant se Spiritu Sancto; tametsi

616. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII (on "the Father is not wise by begotten wisdom").
612. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).
617. Alexander of Hales, Summa, prima pars, q. 47, memb. 2 (in fine), et memb. 3, art. 3.
618. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1.
619. Simon of Tournai, as reported by Scotus, St. Bonaventure, and Capreolus in the places cited.
614. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 (and q. 3).
612. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).
613. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1.

Spiritus Sanctus sit terminus per spirationem productus: quia, ut ait Sanctus Thomas in solutione 2, spiratio solum significat ipsam emissionem: ac si diceret, non includit in suo conceptu Spiritum Sanctum, ut terminum particularem et determinate per illam productum.

Ceterum praedictam rationem explodit Scotus quaestione illa 2; alter dicitur Durandus, et Canariensis locis citatis, hoc modo. Primum: aedificare est actio, et in suo conceptu non minus includit aedificium, tanquam terminum suum determinatum et particularem, quam includit dilectio notionalis Spiritum Sanctum; et tamen non dicitur aedificator aedificare aedificio: ergo ob eam solam causam non diceretur, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto. Deinde, spiratio non minus includit in suo conceptu Spiritum Sanctum, tanquam terminum particularem et determinatum actionis, quam dilectio notionalis: Spiritus enim inde dicitur, quia spiratur, estque determinatus et particularis terminus spirationis, quatenus spiratio est: et tamen dici nequit, Pater et Filius spirant se Spiritu Sancto. Generatio quoque refertur ad Filium, ut ad proprium terminum, et tamen non dicimus, Pater generat Filio suo aliquid aliud; neque enim hae duae operationes sic significatae solam includunt processionem sine ordine ad terminum particularem, sed etiam ipsum terminum designant, et in suo conceptu includunt: ergo ob illam rationem non dicentur, Pater et Filius diligere se Spiritu Sancto.[618][615][612]

Porro exemplum Sancti Thomae recusum est: nam verbum floret non significat actionem producendi flores, sed floridum esse: est enim verbum neutrum: ergo mirum non est, si dicamus, arbor floret floribus: et quamvis denotet etiam verbum floreo flores producere, ut quibusdam placet, non tam significat ipsam actionem flores producendi, quam floridum esse floribus a se productis: quae sane denominatio non est agentis a termino actionis, sed subiecti a forma, quam habet taliter producta. Idem de verbo floresco, quod significat floridum fio. Quinimo etiam si flores ab arbore producti non essent, dici posset arbor illis florere, veluti ad Hebraeos 2, virga Aaron dicitur fronduisse frondibus, non a se, sed virtute Dei productis. Videtur sane eandem significationem habere verbum floreo, atque verbum niteo: quare sicut dicitur aliquis nitere auro, gemmis, et margaritis, velut in hymno omnium sanctorum canit Ecclesia, Portent nitent margaritis, quae tamen non sunt ab ipso productae: sic arbor diceretur florere floribus non a se productis. Quodsi verbum aliquod significaret actionem producendi ipsos flores, ut si fingamus verbum florico, certe non diceretur arbor floricare floribus.

At Caietanus, ut defendat rationem Doctoris sancti, solita subtilitate notat, bifaria actione includere in suo conceptu terminum productum: uno modo, ut particulariter determinante qualitatem actionis, et hoc pacto dealbatio includit albedinem, et calefactio calorem; est enim dealbare, aut calefacere, ac si dicamus, facere album et calidum, quod est determinate significare qualitatem actionis: altero modo actio includit terminum in suo conceptu quasi coniunctum actioni, ut productum suo producente; et hac ratione dilectio notionalis includit in suo conceptu Spiritum Sanctum, et dictio, seu prolatio, includit verbum; dictio enim est verbi prolatio. Hoc posteriori modo (inquit Caietanus) intelligendus est Sanctus Thomas; loquitur enim de actionibus,

618. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1.
615. Melchior Cano (Canariensis), on this article.
612. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (and there refuting Gotfred).

quae posteriori illo modo includunt terminum in suo conceptu; illae autem sunt, quae postulant alium accusativum praeter terminum; huiusmodi est dictio, hac enim non tantum dicimus verbum, sed etiam historiam verbo expressam, quam non respicit sicuti rem productam. Talis est dilectio notionalis, quae non tantum respicit Spiritum Sanctum ut terminum productum in casu accusandi, sed etiam rem aliam, ut dilectam. In his igitur actionibus recte denominatur agens a termino producto in casu effectivo, et ideo dicere possumus, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, et Pater dicit verbo suo quaecumque intelligit; contra vero spiratio, et generatio, priori illo modo solum includunt terminum in suo conceptu, et ideo agens non denominatur a termino in casu effectivo. Hanc doctrinam, et explicationem mentis Sancti Thomae, defumpsisse videtur Caietanus ex Capreolo in I, distinct. 32, quaest. 1, art. 1, ad primum argumentum, et ad secundum etiam tertio loco adductum.

Nonnulli hanc Caietani distinctionem refellunt, quia non magis includitur in conceptu dictionis verbum productum tanquam productum coniunctum producenti, quam Spiritus in conceptu spirationis: omnis enim actio, sive in genere, sive in specie considerata, ordinem habet ad suum terminum tanquam ad productum coniunctum producenti: id quod praesertim verum est in generatione: haec enim ita intrinsecum ordinem habet ad Filium genitum, sicut dictio ad verbum; et tamen non dicimus, Pater generat Filio aliquid aliud. Denique verbum diligere non significat actionem, quae postulat duplicem casum accusandi: non enim dicimus, saltem in creaturis, homo diligit amorem suum et amicum; et tamen dicimus, homo diligit amicum amore suo: ergo male Caietanus discrimen constituit inter illa duo genera actionum.

Secundus modus, quo alii propositionem illam hac ratione explicant, concedunt quidem omnem actionem ordinem habere ad suum terminum determinatum et particularem, nihilo minus agens non denominari in casu effectivo a termino cuiusvis actionis; sed id solum accidere in actionibus immanentibus, quarum terminus, sicut manet natura sua in agente, natus est denominare agens per modum formae: ideo dicimus, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, quia dilectio est actio immanens, et ideo terminus illius, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, denominat ipsum operans per modum formae in casu effectivo: at vero in actionibus transeuntibus, vel quae significantur ut transeuntes, talem denominationem non fieri; et quia generatio, et spiratio significatur ut actiones transeuntes, licet re vera in Deo sint immanentes; idcirco dicunt a terminis earum non denominari in effectivo principium operans, ac proinde non posse dici, Pater generat Filio, vel spirat Spiritu Sancto.

Ego sane non dubito in aliquibus immanentibus actionibus talem denominationem a termino fieri, non tamen ea ratione fugio: idem enim accidit in aliquibus quoque transeuntibus, ut cum dicimus, ignis calefacit lignum, aut comburit calore: tum etiam in omnibus immanentibus talis denominatio non contingit, nam spiratio, et generatio in Deo sunt immanentes, et tamen in illis non fit talis denominatio.

At dicunt praedicti Theologi, has actiones in Deo esse quidem immanentes, significari tamen ut transeuntes, non alia ratione, nisi quia in rebus creatis sunt transeuntes, quae iisdem nominibus significantur; quod certe negare non possumus. Ceterum cum in divinis concipiantur a nobis ut immanentes, id satis videbatur, ut addito termino divino fieret praedicta denominatio. Quod si id non satis videatur eo, quod nomina communia sint transeuntibus et immanentibus operationibus;

saltem ut fiat talis denominatio, necesse est, non solum actionem ipsam significari ut immanentem, sed etiam terminum ipsum; imo terminus potissimum debet significari ut immanens, quia concipitur velut forma denominans: atqui in ea propositione, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, non significatur ut terminus immanens: sicut enim nomine spiritus significatur operatio voluntatis Dei ut transiens; eodem modo nomine Spiritus significatur ipse, qui est amor productus, significaturque quoniam dicere possimus: Pater et Filius diligunt se amore producto ab ipsis; non tamen, Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto. Nam Spiritus Sanctus significatur ut quid extra productum, et ita non ut forma intrinsece denominans.

Responderi quis posset hoc modo: etiam si Spiritus significetur ut terminus extra productus, quia tamen coniungitur verbo, diligunt, quod significat immanentem actionem, ideo determinatur et restringitur, ut velut immanens forma concipiatur; verum, si hoc satis est, non etiam sufficeret addere terminum aliquem divinum, ut cum operatione spirandi in immanens conciperetur cum suo termino? Vel saltem non sufficeret ex parte termini ponere nomen significans aliquid immanens, etiamsi verbum denotaret operationem transeuntem, et talis fieret posset denominatio hoc modo: Pater et Filius generant se ipsos amore suo? Cum enim denominatio non sit ab operatione, sed a termino, hic sic significetur terminus ut manens in producente, id videtur satis, ut ab eo denominatio illa in casu effectivo proveniat, et significationem verbi modificet, ut denotet immanentem: sed nemo dicere audebit, Pater et Filius spirant se amore suo: ergo alia ratio reddenda est.

Horum quoque sententia accedit ad modum loquendi, quem aliquando secutus est St. Augustine: dixit, Pater est sapiens sapientia genita; postea tamen retraxit, ut videbimus capite 6; itaque hi Doctores concedunt, cum dicimus, Pater dicit verbo, vel Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, denominationem illam a termino actionis provenire, veluti a forma: sic enim etiam dicere liceret, Pater est sapiens sapientia genita: haec enim est veluti formalis denominatio.[616]

Caput III - The true rationale of the foregoing sentence

Multo facilior ratio praedictae sententiae et propositionis reddi potest, quae non tantum in praesenti, sed in ceteris locum habere potest. Eius autem gratia praemittendum est duo esse genera actionum et operationum, sive in genere, sive in specie denotentur: quarum aliae continentur sub respectu solum ad terminum, quem producunt, ut generare, spirare, producere et efficere; aliae vero cum duplici ordine, altero ad terminum productum, altero ad rem aliam, non quidem productam, sed eam vel per modum obiecti, vel per modum subiecti se habentem. Harum vero quaedam sunt transeuntes, ut calefactio, transmutatio; quaedam immanentes et vitales operationes, ut dictio, dilectio, intellectio. In actionibus prioris generis non fit denominatio a termino producto in casu effectivo, et ideo non dicimus, Pater generat Filio, vel aliud quid, nec spirat Spiritu Sancto. Ratio vero est manifesta, nam si in his operationibus fieret denominatio huiusmodi, necesse erat eas significari sub ordine ad aliquid aliud quam ad terminum: nam cum dicimus, Pater generat Filium, significamus generationem ad aliquid aliud ordinari; sensus enim

616. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII (on "the Father is not wise by begotten wisdom").

est, Pater generat Filio se, aut aliquid aliud. Quod si hae actiones et operationes nihil aliud praeter terminum suum respiciunt, non potest operans in casu effectivo a termino producto denominari, cum nihil supersit, quod operans denominatione illa respiciat.

Contra vero in operationibus posterioris generis, cum alter respectus figatur vel ad subiectum, vel ad obiectum, cum quibus verbum has actiones significans construitur in casu accusandi; optime potest fieri denominatio a termino producto in casu effectivo: quare recte dicimus, ignis comburit, aut calefacit calore, non tantum colore, quem in se habet, sed etiam eo, quem in subiecto producit: dissimiliter albetur albedine in ipso producta. Hae namque actiones non solum significantur sub respectu ad terminum productum, sed etiam sub respectu ad subiectum, in quo inducunt terminum productum veluti formam illius. Atque hoc obtinet in actionibus, quae significantur cum ordine ad obiectum: unde dicimus, Pater intelligit, seu dicit verbo suo, quaecumque intelligit; nam ipsa intellectionis actio Patris, quae notionalis est, refert respectum simul ad verbum, et significatur ordine etiam ad obiecta dicta et intellecta: ergo tunc eadem operatio et productio Filii Dei per intellectionem ...

Since the same act is signified by diverse words, it is not surprising if at times that denomination be taken from the terminus, at times not, because one and the same operation is signified in different ways. Wherefore, although we do not say, "The Father begets something other than the Son," yet we do say, "The Father understands, or says by his Word, something other than the Son."

Hence it is plainly evident why we rightly say, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit," and yet it cannot be said, "The Father and the Son breathe themselves with the Holy Spirit." For the same operation of the divine will is, in the former way, signified - besides the respect to the produced terminus - with an order also to the objects; and the Father and the Son are objects of the divine love. But in the latter way it is signified with order only to the produced terminus. Let us therefore conclude with Scotus in the place cited, from which this reason is clearly gathered: just as in God love has an order not only to the produced terminus, but also to the thing loved; and speaking or understanding likewise to the thing said or understood; so too the love itself produced by loving regards the thing loved, and the Word the thing said; and therefore the denomination in the effective case is drawn by reason of respect to the thing understood or loved. [620]

Some objections are solved.

Caput IV - Some objections are solved

This common opinion is attacked by Durandus in I, distinction 32, question 1, number 10. He strives to prove that the proposition, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit," cannot be true, by the following reason. Either it is understood of notional love, or of essential love. It cannot be true of essential love; for just as that love has no order to the Holy Spirit, so too it cannot be said of it, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit" -

620. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (loco citato).

a point which, without controversy, all admit. But neither can it be true if it be understood of notional love; because what is common to every person includes nothing notional. But to have a respect of reason to someone as loved is common to any person; for every person loves another person and other created things. Therefore such a respect cannot be included in a notional act (*actus*); whence it follows that that proposition cannot be true by reason of such a respect.

Then again, even if such a respect of reason were included in a notional act; since, however, a notional act cannot be, nor be understood, without respect to the thing produced, it follows that it cannot regard anything other than the thing produced. But the Father and the Son are not produced by love; therefore notional love cannot be borne towards them.

These arguments of Durandus rest upon a false foundation, already refuted by us in Disputation 111, chapter 2, namely, that notional acts are not operations of the intellect and will. For thus it would plainly follow that no respect in them would be included to any other thing than to the person produced. The same would altogether follow if the opinion of others were true, which we attacked in Disputation 112: although they say that notional acts are operations of the will and the intellect, they add, nevertheless, that they are not formally to understand and to love, nor that these operations are included in notional acts. But because - as was there explained - intellection is formally included in "speaking," and love in "spiration," with the relation (*relatio*) of production added, it necessarily follows that a notional act, by reason of the essential act which it includes in itself, and which its relation in its own peculiar mode determines and modifies, is borne towards other things besides the produced terminus. Whence it also comes about that the notional act, by reason of the essential act which it contains, can reflect back upon the very principle itself. But because, when a terminus in the effective case is added, there is denoted the notional action, by that peculiar mode, modifying the essential act, it cannot befit any person whatsoever, but only that person who is the principle of it; therefore we shall not say, "The Holy Spirit loves himself with himself," as we say, "The Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit." This doctrine seems to be gathered from St. Bonaventure in I, distinction 32, article 1, question 1, to the second-to-last argument, from which there is full satisfaction given to Durandus's arguments.[621]

Others object thus: although the notional act of speaking signified by the word "said" has an order to the things said through the medium of the Word, nevertheless notional love most immediately regards the things loved, not through the medium of produced love. Nay rather, prior in origin to produced love, by the notional love - as origin and operation - the things are loved by the Father and the Son, before the Holy Spirit is produced.

I, however, cannot understand this difference between love and speaking. For just as speaking is not borne first upon the things said and only afterwards upon the Word, but rather by uttering that Word it at once produces the Word, and in it, as in the terminus of the action, it simultaneously utters the others which per se conduce to its production; why should not the same be said of love, namely, that by one and the same love the Spirit is produced, and that the production of the Holy Spirit is not first understood as terminated upon other things loved than upon the Holy Spirit

621. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, ad penult.

himself, who at once is both the thing loved and the thing produced? Therefore at once the Father and the Son, by loving, produce the Holy Spirit, and by producing love him; and in him, as in the terminus of their love, they love the other things which are of themselves compared with his production. And for this reason in the effective case that denomination is made: because in the produced terminus there is also included that respect to the other things loved, as was explained above.

Caput V - In what sense it can be said that the Holy Spirit loves himself with himself

Some Thomists were unwilling to concede this proposition: "The Holy Spirit loves himself with himself," because that denomination in the effective case can neither be attributed to the Holy Spirit as the terminus produced by an operation - since he is not produced by himself - nor as principle, because the principle of loving in the Holy Spirit is his own essence (*essentia*), or will (*voluntas*). Therefore, although we could say, "He loves himself by his essence," or "by his will," nevertheless it cannot be said, "He loves himself with himself."

Nevertheless, the doctrine of St. Thomas in I, distinction 32, question 1, article 2, ad ultimum, and of Marsilius in I, question 35, article 1, proposition 4, after the conclusion answering the question, pleases me, who think a distinction must be made. Either the statement is about notional love and the proposition - by which this is signified - that he loves by a produced love: then it ought to be denied, because this love does not befit the Holy Spirit, as all are well aware. Or the statement is about essential love, and it must be conceded: but then the effective case does not denote the principle by which, of what sort, that is, the essence or will, but the principle which, namely, the person; for in this way we are wont to say, "Peter understands or does this or that by himself."

St. Thomas then adds: if from the act of notional love we were to separate the order and relation of origin, so that there would remain solely love according to the notion of love, it could very well be said that the Holy Spirit loves himself by a love not only essential, but even personal. I, however, do not see how, once the relation of origin is removed, there could remain a love which would not be essential - a love which would befit any person, and yet would nonetheless be common to all. But if the Holy Spirit is said in a peculiar way to be love, this happens only by reason of the relation of love as produced; and since the verb "to love" of itself rather signifies a common operation of will, and is not commonly used for the notional act unless something be added, without any distinction it can be said: "The Holy Spirit loves himself with himself."[622][623]

Caput VI - Whether it is rightly said that the Father is wise, or is wise with begotten wisdom

At one time St. Augustine thought this proposition to be true: "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom," that is, with the Son. Thus he treated it in the book On 83 Questions, question 23; but afterwards, judging better, he changed his view in book I of the Retractations, chapter 26, and

622. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad ult.
623. Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 35, a. 1, prop. 4 (after the conclusion answering the question).

elsewhere in the places alleged by us in Disputation 142, chapter 2. His retractation is rightly embraced by the Schoolmen: St. Thomas in I, distinction 32, question 2, article 1; St. Bonaventure, article 2, question 1; Scotus, question 2, to the second question; Capreolus, question 1, article 2; Gabriel, question 1 - who all, while they concede that proposition about which we have hitherto disputed, "The Father says himself," with respect to creatures...[624]

They nevertheless absolutely deny this proposition, "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom." The reason is that, since "to say" signifies production, and "begotten wisdom," or the word, is the terminus of that production, the Father, who is the principle of this utterance and of the word, can rightly be denominated from the word in the effective case, according to the things set down a little above. But when we say "to be wise," we do not signify an action, but the formal effect of wisdom. Wherefore, since God the Father is wise by his essence (essence, essentia), not, however, by the Son as by a form, it cannot be said: "the Father is wise by begotten wisdom."

Moreover, whether it can be said, "the Father savors/knows-by-taste (sapere) by begotten wisdom," does not seem to stand on the same footing; for "he savors/knows-by-taste" (sapit) does not signify a formal effect, but an operation. Nevertheless Scotus in the place cited, and Gabriel in that first question, article 3, at the end, deny this proposition; because "to savor/know-by-taste," just as also "to understand," is often taken essentially. But an essential act does not regard a produced person; wherefore, in the effective case, another person who is said to understand and to savor cannot be denominated from that person as from the terminus of the action; nor indeed can he be denominated as from a principle. For it is established that begotten wisdom is not the Father's principle of savoring and of understanding; therefore in no way can such a denomination be effected. Someone will say that begotten wisdom is compared with the Father as a (so-called) subauthoritative principle; and on this ground the Master, in I, distinction 32, concedes the proposition: "The Father created all things by his word." Nevertheless, on this ground that prior proposition cannot be conceded; for the reason why it is said that the Father created all things by his word is that the ratio of the idea is appropriated to the Son (as we shall say below, question 45, in the notes to article 6), because what is done is by the intellect - not because it is really proper to him; but the word takes the place of the idea: for all the persons of the Trinity equally agree in the production of creatures.

But Scotus and Gabriel concede this proposition: "The Father understands, or savors, in his word," just as he is also said to savor or to understand in his essence; for, with respect to creatures (which have the character of a secondary object), the Father is said to understand in his primary object, which is the word. For it remains proved in disputation 144, chapter 2, that the word represents creatures to the Father.

For my part, I do not see why that proposition cannot be conceded: "The Father understands and savors by his word, which is begotten wisdom." But in truth one cannot say, "The Father is wise by begotten wisdom," because by that mode of speaking a formal effect is denoted, as we said

624. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2, a. 1; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 2, q. 1; Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2 (ad secundam quaestionem); Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1.

above. And indeed I find no difference, or at least none of any moment, between these two expressions, "in his word" (in verbo suo), and, without the preposition, "by his word" (verbo suo). Either way of speaking is permissible, because the word is the terminus of a notional operation, as has been explained.

Caput VII - In what way it cannot be said that the Son is wise by begotten or by unbegotten wisdom

This proposition is treated by St. Thomas in I, distinction 32, question 2, article 2; by Gabriel, question 1, articles 1 and 2; by Durandus, question 2; and by Capreolus in the place cited.[625] And for the explication of it St. Thomas and Capreolus note that these two prepositions, "from" (a) and "through" (per), signify a cause in such a way that the preposition "from" (a) more commonly denotes the genus of efficient cause; but the preposition "through" (per) signifies indifferently every genus. And since in divine things there is, as it were, the genus of efficient cause, namely the principle of origin, whenever we use this preposition we seem to denote origin. It is also the genus of formal cause, but only by our consideration, by which we apprehend something as, so to speak, a form in God, and something else as the effect of it - a genus of cause that by the preposition "through" (per) we can signify.

This supposed, St. Thomas, Durandus, and Capreolus first teach that the proposition "The Son is wise by begotten wisdom" can have a twofold sense. For if the ablative "by begotten wisdom" denote an order of origin and a kind of quasi-efficient cause, it is the same as if we were to say "from begotten wisdom" (a sapientia genita). In this way, however, the proposition is false; for the Son does not have to be wise from begotten wisdom - that is, from himself as from a principle by origin - as is manifest. On the contrary, in the same sense we could say: "The Son is wise from unbegotten wisdom," that is, "from unbegotten wisdom," or "through unbegotten wisdom," which is the Father, he has to be wise; for from him he receives wisdom by origin, and so on. But if the ablative "by begotten wisdom" denote an order or relation of a quasi-formal cause, the proposition "The Son is wise by begotten wisdom" is still false; because the wisdom by which he is wise is the essence itself: but this is not begotten. Wherefore we should rather say, even in this sense: "The Son is wise by unbegotten wisdom," or "through unbegotten wisdom"; for the preposition "through" (per) can denote a quasi-formal cause. Or finally, thirdly, that ablative "by begotten wisdom" can denote the order of a quasi-subjective and material cause, as when we say: "Man understands by himself, is wise by himself, or through himself"; and in this way the proposition "The Son is wise by begotten wisdom" could be conceded. For he is wise by himself; but he himself is begotten wisdom - although this manner of speaking, as Durandus noted, is very improper.

625. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2, a. 2; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1 - 2; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 32 (loco citato).

Gabriel adds finally, from the same doctrine, that the eternal Father can in some way be said to be wise "by unbegotten wisdom," or "through unbegotten wisdom," in the second and third senses explained; not, however, that he is wise "from unbegotten wisdom," because from none does he receive by origin to be wise; nor "by begotten wisdom," because in no way is he wise through the Son.[626]

Disputatio CLII - Whether the Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit

Caput I - The earlier opinion of the Schoolmen

There is no lack of those who have asserted this proposition, "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit," to be false - even though they concede the preceding proposition to be true. The preceding, about which there was recently controversy for us, is that of St. Augustine and of the other Fathers, as was noted; this proposition, however, we do not find among the Fathers, but it seems to have been handed down only by some Scholastics. Scotus, therefore, in I, distinction 32, question 2, at the end, judges this proposition to be false for the following reason. The love by which the Father and the Son can be said to love creatures with the Holy Spirit is without doubt notional; for about essential love there is no controversy. But neither can the proposition be true of notional love, because this love is said to be only of that object which it regards as primary and per se, or at least of that which necessarily accompanies the primary. Creatures, however, are neither the primary object of notional love, nor do they necessarily accompany the primary object, which is the divine essence; for they are loved contingently and freely. Therefore notional love is not said to be of creatures. But because the Father and the Son necessarily accompany the essence, which is the primary object, therefore they are said not only to love the essence by notional love, but also themselves.[627]

However, this reason of Scotus proves little. For although creatures, whether future or existing, are loved freely, nevertheless possibles are necessarily loved with a love of complacency, as was shown above, disputation 79, chapter 2; and Scotus himself, cited by us there, concedes this love of complacency in God toward possible things, even if he does not say that this love is necessary in God. Perhaps in that distinction 32, question 2, just now cited, he speaks of the efficacious love of creatures, which indeed is borne only toward creatures which in fact are to be; and of this efficacious love he said that the Father and the Son do not love creatures with the Holy Spirit, for the reason set forth above - because creatures in this way are not necessarily conjoined with the primary object of love, which is the divine essence.

Nevertheless, even in this way his argument is not sound. For just as the Father by his word not only says himself and possible creatures, which he necessarily knows, but also future creatures which he could have failed to know, if indeed they could have failed to be (as, according to the

626. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 in fine.

sentence of St. Augustine, we showed in disputation 143, chapter 6), so too the Father and the Son are said not only to love with the Holy Spirit themselves and possible creatures, but also future creatures, however freely and contingently they may be loved. Add that Scotus falsely asserts that the Father and the Son, under the personal property, are secondary objects of the love by which the Holy Spirit proceeds, and that only the essence is the primary object - as in disputation 142, chapters 3 and 4, against him we proved; and we noted the same in disputation 150, chapter 3, when we defended that the Holy Spirit proceeds by procession as the outstanding gift in the mode of loving; and hence that two supposits are necessary on the part of the object for the production of the Holy Spirit.

Canariensis agrees with Scotus in the commentary on this article when he asserts that the aforesaid proposition is false. He seems, however, to conclude along Scotus's line of reasoning, which we have just related. But the exposition of the learned Doctor John is too far-fetched and inept: for by the same reasoning we could say: "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit," that is, "when they understand creatures, they breathe the Holy Spirit"; whereas that sense, which the particular clause "when" (dum) yields, would only denote co-existence, which likewise the cognition of creatures has with the procession of the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, Gabriel, in the first question at the second to last argument, and Marsilius, in I, question 35, article 1, proposition 5, after the conclusion answering the question, treat this proposition; yet they do not explain it in the same way. Marsilius thinks, first, that the proposition is true of notional love, in the sense that

Caput II - That the Father and the Son are truly said to love creatures with the Holy Spirit; the more probable opinion

Now in this matter the thing to be supposed is what we noted at the end of disputation 143, chapter 5, on the procession of the Holy Spirit - namely, that he does not proceed formally by a love of creatures, even of possible ones, just as neither does the word proceed by a cognition of creatures. For by force of reasoning the case is the same; where we treated this more at large, there is no doubt, once we suppose possible creatures to be loved by God with some love.

The remaining task, therefore, is in the present to show whether the Father and the Son are said to love creatures - not only possibles but also futures - with the Holy Spirit. The truer opinion is, therefore, that all of them are loved by the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit. This is treated by St. Thomas in this article, in reply to the third; by St. Bonaventure in I, distinction 32, article 1; by ... in the body[629]

Scotus asserts that the Father and the Son under their personal property are secondary objects of the love by which the Holy Spirit proceeds, and that the essence alone is the primary object, as we proved against him in Disputation 142, chapters 3 and 4; we noted the same in Disputation 150,

627. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2, ad ult.
629. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 32, a. 1.

chapter 3, when we defended that the Holy Spirit proceeds of Himself as the nexus of two who mutually love, and therefore that two supposits are necessary on the part of the object for the production of the Holy Spirit.

Scotus is seconded by Canariensis in his commentary on this article, when he asserts that the aforesaid proposition is false. Yet he seems to be refuted by the reasoning of Scotus which we set forth just above; but, in deference to the holy Doctor who defends the aforesaid proposition, Canariensis grants it, and notes that it can be rightly explained in this sense: "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit," that is, while they love creatures, they breathe the Holy Spirit. But this exposition seems too forced and inept; for by the same reasoning we could say, "The Father and the Son understand creatures with the Holy Spirit," that is, while they understand creatures, they breathe the Holy Spirit. For that sense, which the clause "while" renders, denotes only concomitance; and that concomitance cognition of creatures also has with the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Marsilius thinks first that the proposition is true of notional love, in the sense that the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, who is the first gift and the reason of liberal donation which can be made or is made to creatures; then he also judges it to be true of essential love, because the procession of the persons within God is the reason of the procession of creatures outside Him; for this procession is through love. Therefore, when we say, "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit," there is denoted a ground of efficiency, not on the part of God - for in God the ground of effecting is the essence - but on the part of the effects; for since the Holy Spirit is the first gift, He seems to be the ground of any liberal donation, and therefore of the procession of creatures, which proceed by a liberal donation. This view St. Thomas seems to have followed in I Sentences, distinction 18, question 1, article 3, in the body.

But I for my part do not see how the breathing of the Holy Spirit can be said to be the reason of the procession of creatures, except by appropriation - and that very improperly. For the reason for producing creatures is the unity of essence; whereas the plurality of persons, on its own part, does not per se pertain to that. Therefore it pleases me to understand the aforesaid proposition only of notional love (*dilectio notionalis*), just as that other proposition too, "The Father and the Son love one another with the Holy Spirit," must be understood of the same, as we showed in the preceding disputation. And the reason why we say, "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit," is altogether the same as that on account of which they are also said to love themselves: namely, because the Holy Spirit, as the term produced by love, not only has the respect of something produced toward the Father and the Son, but also regards the secondary objects of love, just as the notional love itself does. Wherefore, just as we said in Disputation 144, chapter 2, that the Father understands creatures in the Son and in His Word, so too we must say, "The Father and the Son love creatures with the Holy Spirit": although He does not proceed by a love of creatures formally; for that is not denoted by this proposition.

But here two things must be observed. One concerns the opinion of St. Thomas who, as some interpret him, thinks that possible creatures are not loved by God, as we saw in Disputation 79; and, therefore, the aforesaid proposition is not to be understood of them, but only of future

creatures. And so he prudently said in this article, in reply to the third, "The Father not only loves the Son, but also Himself and us, with the Holy Spirit"; by which words he plainly understands future, not possible, creatures. But since in that same disputation we said that possible creatures also are loved by God, and we interpreted St. Thomas in a favorable sense, therefore we judge that the aforesaid proposition is true of all the aforementioned.

The second thing to be noted is that notional love may freely be referred to creatures; to which, if they were not going to exist, it could fail to be terminated: and this would occur without any real change in it, but by a change only of a respect of reason, as we showed in Disputation 80, chapter 2.

Quaestio XXXVIII - On the name of the Holy Spirit, that it is gift

Consequently inquiry is made concerning gift (*donum*). And concerning this two questions are asked.

Articulus I - Whether "gift" is a personal name

Objicitur: It seems that "gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports some distinction of individuals in the divine realities. But the name "gift" does not import any distinction in the divine realities. For Augustine says in the book On the Trinity that the Holy Spirit is given in such a way as to be the gift of God, so that He also gives Himself, as God does.[630] Therefore "gift" is not a personal name.

1. Besides. No personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the gift which the Father gives to the Son, as is clear from Hilary, book 8 On the Trinity.[631] Therefore "gift" is not a personal name.
2. Besides. According to Damascene, in the divine realities nothing is subject or serving.[632] But "gift" imports a certain subjection both to him to whom it is given and to him with whom it is given. Therefore "gift" is not a personal name.
3. Besides. "Gift" imports a respect to a creature. And thus it seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from eternity, as "Father" and "Son." Therefore "gift" is not a personal name.

But on the contrary: Augustine says in book 15 On the Trinity: "As a body of flesh is nothing other than flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit." But "Holy Spirit" is a personal name. Therefore "gift" also is [a personal name].[633]

I answer: In the name "gift" there is imported an aptitude to be given. But what is given has an aptitude or habitude both to that by which it is given and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by someone unless it were his; and it is given to someone so that it may be his. Now a

630. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 19 (middle), tom. 3.
631. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, VIII (around the middle, and shortly after).
632. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, IV, c. 19 (from the middle and following; cf. also c. 27).

divine person is said to be "of" someone either according to origin, as the Son is "of" the Father, or inasmuch as she is had by someone. But we are said to "have" that by which we can freely use or enjoy as we will. And in this mode a divine person cannot be had except by a rational creature conjoined to God. Other creatures, indeed, can be moved toward a divine person, but not in such a way that it is in their power to enjoy the divine person and to use His effect. And to this end a rational creature sometimes arrives: namely, when it becomes a partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding such that it can freely know God truly and rightly love Him. Whence only a rational creature can have the divine person. But to the end that it may thus have Him, it cannot arrive by its own power; hence it must be given to it from above. For that is said to be given to us which we have from another. And thus a divine person fits to be given and to be gift.

Reply to the first: The name "gift" imports personal distinction in the divine realities according as "gift" is said to be "of" someone by origin. And yet the Holy Spirit gives Himself inasmuch as He is of Himself as able to use or rather to enjoy; just as a man is said to be master of himself. And this is what Augustine says on John: "What is so much yours as yourself?"[634] Or it must be said, and better, that a gift must somehow be of the giver. But "to be of this one" is said in many ways. In one way by way of identity, as Augustine says on John. And thus the gift is not distinguished from the giver, but from the one to whom it is given. And thus it is said that the Holy Spirit gives Himself. In another way something is said to be "of" someone as possession or property. And thus it must be that the gift is essentially distinguished from the giver. And thus the gift of God is something created. In a third way "this is of that" is said by origin alone. And thus the Son is "of" the Father, and the Holy Spirit is "of" both. In this way, therefore, when "gift" is said to be "of" the giver, it is distinguished personally from the giver and is a personal name.

Reply to the second: The essence is said to be "the Father's gift" in the first mode, because the essence is the Father's by way of identity.

Reply to the third: "Gift," insofar as it is a personal name in the divine realities, does not import subjection, but origin only in comparison to the giver. In comparison, however, to him to whom it is given, it imports free use or fruition, as has been said.

Reply to the fourth: "Gift" is not said from the fact that it is actually given, but insofar as it has an aptitude that it can be given. Whence from eternity a divine person is said to be "gift," although He is given in time. Nor, from the fact that a respect to the creature is imported, must it be essential; but that something essential be included in its concept, as essence is included in the concept of person.[635]

Conclusion is affirmative.

633. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 19 (middle), tom. 3.
634. St. Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus, on "Quid tam tuum est quam tu?"
635. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 4; q. 34, a. 3, ad 3.

Articulus II - Whether "gift" is the proper name of the Holy Spirit

Objicitur: It seems that "gift" is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For "gift" is said from that which is given. But, as Isaiah says, "A Son is given to us" (Isa. 9). Therefore "to be a gift" belongs to the Son, just as to the Holy Spirit.

1. Besides. Every proper name of some person signifies some property of that one. But this name "gift" does not signify any property of the Holy Spirit. Therefore "gift" is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit.
2. Besides. The Holy Spirit can be called "the spirit" of some man; but He cannot be called "the gift" of some man, but only the gift of God. Therefore "gift" is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in book 4 On the Trinity: "As 'to be begotten' is to the Son to be 'from the Father,' so 'to be the gift of God' to the Holy Spirit is to proceed from the Father and the Son." But the Holy Spirit receives a proper name insofar as He proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore "gift" is also the proper name of the Holy Spirit.[636]

I answer: "Gift," insofar as it is taken personally in the divine realities, is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For the sake of whose evidence it must be known that "gift" properly is a credible giving, according to the Philosopher, that is, what is not given with an intention of recompense; and thus it imports gratuitous donation. Now the reason of gratuitous donation is love. For we give something freely to someone because we will his good. Therefore, the first thing we give him is that love whereby we will his good. Whence it is manifest that love has the character of first gift, by which all gratuitous gifts are given. Hence, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love (as was said above), He proceeds under the notion of first gift. And hence Augustine says in book 15 On the Trinity that by the gift which is the Holy Spirit many proper gifts are distributed to the members of Christ.[637]

Reply to the first: The Son, because He proceeds by way of Word, which by its very notion has that it be the likeness of its principle, is properly called Image, although the Holy Spirit also is like the Father; so too the Holy Spirit, because from the Father He proceeds as Love, is properly called Gift, although the Son also is given. For this very thing, that the Son is given, is on the side of love, according to that of John 3: "So God loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son."

Reply to the second: In the name "gift" there is imported that it is of the giver by origin; and thus there is properly imported the ratio of the origin of the Holy Spirit, which is procession.

Reply to the third: Before it is given, a gift is only the giver's; but after it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, since the name "gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be said to be the gift of man, but the gift of God who gives. But once it has been given, then it is the man's, whether it be the Spirit, or what is given.

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636. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20 (middle), tom. 3.
637. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV (cf. c. 19), on the distribution of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the members of Christ.

The conclusion is affirmative. Both points will be further explained by us in the following disputations: whether the ratio of gift is the property of the Holy Spirit alone (Disputation 153).

Disputatio CLIII - On whether the notion of gift is the property of the Holy Spirit alone

Reply to the first: Just as the Son, because He proceeds by way of word - which by its notion has that it be the likeness of its principle - is called properly an image, although the Holy Spirit also is like to the Father; so too the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds from the Father as love, is called properly gift, although the Son also is given. For this very fact, that the Son is given, is from the Father's love, according to John 3: So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son.

Reply to the second: In the name of gift it is implied that it be of the giver by origin. And thus there is implied the property of the Holy Spirit's origin, which is procession.

Reply to the third: A gift, before it is given, belongs only to the giver; but after it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, since gift does not imply giving in act, it cannot be said to be the gift of man, but the gift of God who gives. But when it has now been given, then it is man's - either the Spirit, or what is given. Both points will be further explained by us in the following disputations.

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

Among the other names which are attributed by the theologians - especially indeed by St. Augustine - to the Holy Spirit, there is "gift," with respect to which there were various opinions of the Scholastics.

The first opinion is that of Durandus in the First Book, distinction 18, question 1.[638] Presupposing the definition of gift handed down by St. Thomas in article 1,[639] in which a twofold respect is included - one to the giver, the other to him to whom the donation is made - he teaches first that gift can be predicated in the divine only with respect to the creature, yet so that it comes properly to the divine essence, insofar as it can be given to creatures, just as to any person; for as much the essence as the person is given to a rational creature. He proves this, because inasmuch as God is given to a rational creature, He is given as an object known and loved, or after the manner of a ruler and governor having special care; but such liberal donation equally befits essence and person, as is clear; therefore the notion of gift is common to both. Then he adds that this common notion of gift is appropriated to the third person, because that person, according to appropriation, is also said to proceed by love; but love has the notion of first gift, as St. Thomas also said in article 2; therefore he thinks the same of the name "love" and of the name "gift," namely, that each is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation alone.

638. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1.
639. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1.

This opinion rests on a false foundation. For, as we saw in Disputation 111, chapter 1, Durandus holds that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son by the will, but immediately by nature; and therefore that to Him there does not properly befit the notion of love as produced, and consequently not of gift. But if he thought that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the will, he would not doubt to concede to Him the special notion of gift; for he admits that the first gift is produced love. That the foundation of that disputation is false was shown in chapter 2.

The second opinion is that of Ockham, as reported by Marsilius in the First Book, question 21, article 1, notation 3, and of Gabriel in the First Book, distinction 18, the single question, article 1.[640] He asserts that "gift" can be used in a twofold way: in one way for that which can be given gratis to someone; and in this way the notion of gift befits not only the Holy Spirit but also any person whatsoever; for each of them can be given to the creature - "For to us a Son is given" (Isa 9), and John 3: "That He might give His only-begotten Son." And thus "gift" includes a respect to creatures to whom it is given or can be given. In another way, gift is said of that which proceeds by the force of love of some object, not because something is liberally given to someone; and in this way the Holy Spirit has the notion of gift, not with respect to creatures to whom He is liberally given, but with respect to the Father and the Son; because He is the mutual love of both: wherefore He will be the gift of the Father into the Son and of the Son into the Father; just as He is also the love of the one into the other, and conversely. Thus Gabriel taught in that question, article 2, conclusion 1. By this reasoning the same Gabriel thought that the divine essence is the gift of the Father to the Son, to whom from eternity it is given by the Father; to which Capreolus agrees on that distinction 18, question 1; and it seems to be proved from St. Hilary: for in book 8 On the Trinity, about the middle, he says that the essence is the gift which the Father gives to the Son.[641]

But, as Durandus most rightly noted in the First Book, that same distinction 18, the cited question 1, number ..., and as the Canariensis notes in the first part of the commentary on this question, the divine essence can in no way be called a gift with respect to some person receiving it, or one person with respect to another person. For names are not to be used as one pleases, nor are various significations to be invented for them; rather, among theologians they ought to denote what they signify in common usage among philosophers and the learned. Now "gift," as Aristotle testifies, Topics 4, chapter 4, is an irredeemable giving, that is, gratuitous and liberal, and hence proceeding from no necessity; but such cannot be among the divine persons, whether they be compared mutually among themselves, or the divine essence be compared with them: for there no liberal giving can intervene; therefore neither can "gift" be found among them. In addition, if "gift" were taken in the divine in the aforesaid way, there could not be constituted the property of the Holy Spirit, which is against the doctrine of Augustine in book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 20, as we will explain below.[642]

640. William of Ockham as reported by Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 1, not. 3; Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., d. 18, q. unica, a. 1.

641. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, VIII (around the middle). See also Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1.

642. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20.

The third opinion is that of the Canariensis in the second part of the aforesaid commentary, who asserts that "gift" is taken in three ways. For since a gift has a twofold respect - both to him who gives, to whom it is said to belong, and to him to whom it is given - it can be called a gift, first indeed, as it is of some giver by identity, and thus the divine essence is a gift, and any person of Himself, because He can give Himself to creatures gratis; in the second way, that is called a gift which is someone's by origin and can be given; thus the notion of gift befits only a person proceeding, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit; for these alone are someone's by origin. In the third way "gift" is said of that which not only is another's by origin and can be given, but also by the force of its origin proceeds as a gift; and in this way it befits only the Holy Spirit, who, since He proceeds as love, seems by force of His origin to have the notion of gift. This opinion is reported by Marsilius in the First Book, question 21, article 1, notation 4,[643] and the Canariensis thinks that it is the opinion of St. Thomas in article 1, reply to the first.

I indeed admit that three acceptions of gift are assigned by St. Thomas in that reply to the first: either when it is the same as the giver - and in this way the divine essence can be called a gift - or when it is the possession of the giver, as a servant; or in the third way, by origin, when the gift proceeds from the giver - and thus it befits any person proceeding, who, by the one from whom he proceeds, can be given by a mission by which he is sent to creatures. But the Canariensis adds another acception, omitting that second one, namely when that which proceeds, by force of its origin, proceeds as a gift; and in this way, he says, it is proper to the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas in that place concludes that only in that third way can there be a person and that it befits any person proceeding; but in article 2 he teaches that in that ultimate way it is proper to the Holy Spirit - which must be further explained by us below; nor must so many multiple acceptions of "gift" be assigned.

Caput II - That what is by nature a gift is the property of the Holy Spirit; the truer opinion

Lest our disputation wander uncertainly hither and yon, first of all a definition of gift must be established, then those things which are necessary for its full understanding must be added. A gift, therefore, as Aristotle testifies, Topics 4, chapter 4, near the end, is an irredeemable giving, that is, without hope and compact of return; or, if you prefer, it is a liberal giving from love.[644] Wherefore it must be seen whether in this way it belongs to any person by a peculiar reason to be "gift"; for it is not permitted to coin new acceptions or even definitions of "gift" on our own authority.

From this definition it first clearly follows that a gift has a respect both to him who freely gives, and also to him to whom the donation is made. Then it is clear that only that is called a gift which can be given to a rational nature; for this alone is capable of liberal and gratuitous donation, as Augustine says, book 4 Contra Iulianum, chapter 3, not far from the beginning.[645] Finally, as

643. Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 1, not. 4; the Canariensis refers this to St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 1.

644. Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4.

645. St. Augustine, Contra Iulianum, IV, c. 3 (near the beginning).

Cajetan noted at the beginning of article 1, and as is gathered from St. Thomas in the body, it is evident that a gift stands above the recipient's faculty, insofar as it is conferred by the will of the giver alone.[646]

Moreover, it must be observed that not only is that a gift which is actually given, but that is also called a gift which can be given, or which is deputed to that. Thus taught St. Thomas in article 1, reply to the fourth; St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 18, question ...; Gabriel, in article 1; Marsilius in the First Book, question 21, article 3; whom the Canariensis follows in this article.[647] Wherefore, that the Holy Spirit from eternity is given to no one hinders not at all but that He be truly called a gift. Augustine expressly teaches this, book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 15, at the end, when he says: "One way it is understood when 'gift' is said, another when 'given' is said: for 'gift' can exist before it is given, but 'given,' unless it shall have been given in act, in no way can be said."[648] Wherefore, when that same Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 19, says: "Therefore it is a gift of God to the extent that it is given to those to whom it is given," he must be understood to speak of "gift" insofar as it is given, or thus, that he takes as equivalent "to be given" and "to be apt to be given." Moreover, that he is speaking of "gift" insofar as it can be given, is understood from the words which he immediately subjoins about the same Holy Spirit: "But with Himself He is God, even if He be given to no one, because He was God coeternal to the Father and to the Son before anything was given." Therefore, since in book 4 On the Trinity, as we shall see below, Augustine affirms that "gift" is a property of the Holy Spirit, it follows that in that very place he also asserts that He is a gift before He is given in act.[649]

With these positions, which ought to be indubitable, the truer opinion is that the notion of "gift," namely that which by its very nature is a gift, is the property of the Holy Spirit, and befits no other person. Thus teaches St. Thomas in article 2; St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 18, question 4.[650] They understand "gift" with respect to creatures, to whom by its own procession it is apt to be given.

However, for the explication of the aforesaid opinion, observe that "gift" can be taken in a twofold way. In one way, for any reality whatsoever which, a liberal will acceding, can be given; now to this thing the reason of gift accrues from an extrinsic denomination only, from the will of the giver, which is to it wholly accidental and extrinsic. In this way "gift" can be said not only of any divine person and of the divine essence itself, but also of any created thing which can be matter of liberal donation: for both the divine essence and any divine person and a created thing can be given. And beyond this the Holy Spirit has also another reason of being a gift, namely of that which can be given, as will at once be clear; nevertheless, in this first acception He is also a gift with respect to Himself as given, that is, if we think of the Holy Spirit giving Himself together with the divine essence and with the other persons, as He is given when He comes into the soul of the just,

646. Cajetan, on Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1, proem; cf. St. Thomas, ibid., corp.

647. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 18, q. ...; Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., d. 18, a. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 3; the Canariensis follows them here.

648. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, V, c. 15 (at the end).

649. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 19; and XV, c. 19 together with V, c. 15; cf. also IV, c. 20.

650. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 2; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 4.

according to John 14: "We will come to him, and we will make our abode with him"; thus He is a gift of creatures, which He gives from Himself, just as the Father and the Son do. Yet this is not the property of the Holy Spirit, since it is common to many others.

In the other way, that is called a gift which by its nature and substantial property is a gift. But in this way it is the property of the Holy Spirit alone: for this He has by force of His production, not by some will accidentally supervening to Him, as happens in the prior acception. And in this way I think a real distinction is necessary between the gift and the one who gives: which will be better explained for this reason. The mission of the Holy Spirit, by which He is sometimes sent to us, is the very eternal procession itself, with only an added respect of reason to the creatures to whom He is said to be sent by reason of some particular effect, as was shown in Disputation 170.[651] "But with Himself He is God, even if He be given to no one, because He was God coeternal to the Father and to the Son before anything was given." Therefore, since in book 4 On the Trinity, as we shall see below, Augustine affirms that "gift" is the property of the Holy Spirit, it follows that he also asserts Him to be a gift before He is given in act.[649]

1. We shall show: by the same mission by which the Holy Spirit is sent, He is given by the very one by whom He is sent. For since this mission is by its nature love, and, inasmuch as it denotes an order toward creatures, it is gratuitous, it follows that He who is sent is likewise given liberally by Him. Therefore the Holy Spirit, by the power of His procession, which is love, has intrinsically the capacity to be given, not by a will and a supervening love as the principle of giving, but by that very love by which He proceeds substantially, as by the very donation; for by that very love He is also substantially sent, and the mission itself is a donation. But the Son, even when He is sent by the Father from whom He proceeds, is not sent by love itself; that is, His mission is not love substantially, but it is intellection; and to this there is added love, as it were accidentally and as a principle by which God the Father is moved to send and give His Son by generation and intellection as by a mission. Therefore the procession of the Son is not substantially the very donation, because it is not a procession of love; rather, it is a donation only by reason of love, by which, as by a principle, He is sent and given; whereas the Holy Spirit is sent by that very eternal love as by a mission, and is given as by a donation. How, however, the mission itself is an eternal procession of the person must in its place be shown from the doctrine of the Fathers and by reason. This indeed is the property of the Holy Spirit, of which St. Augustine, to be cited in the following disputation, said that it is the same as that by which He is Spirit, which can belong to no other divine person nor to a creature: for anything else is not substantially, but only by an extrinsic denomination, love.

From what has been said it follows, first, in what sense love is called the first gift, namely because love, if it could be given among men as other things are, would substantially and by the force of its procession be a gift; but other things would be given from it.

651. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 170 (on the mission as procession with a respect of reason).
649. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 19; and XV, c. 19 together with V, c. 15; cf. also IV, c. 20.

Next, it is clear that it is rightly said with Augustine that the Son proceeds from the Father as begotten; but the Holy Spirit as gift: because the Holy Spirit proceeds substantially by love and by charity, which is the very donation.[652] Wherefore the Spirit proceeds substantially not only as Spirit, but also as gift; whereas the Son proceeds by intellection, which substantially is not donation, but generation. Now what is brought forth by generation goes forth as begotten, and its origin is called nativity.

But you will object: the Son also can be said to be substantially a gift; for, since He is substantially God, and God is of Himself love and charity by nature, He will be substantially a gift. I answer: just as the Holy Spirit is wisdom by His nature, yet is not said to be produced wisdom, because He does not proceed through the intellect; so also the Son is love essentially, because He is God; yet He is not produced love, because He does not proceed through the will. Now for the notion of a gift, namely what is apt to be given, it does not suffice to be love essentially; it is required to be produced love, so that His very production be substantially a donation: and this is proper to the Holy Spirit.

But how, although the respect to creatures which seems to be signified by the name "gift" belongs to the Holy Spirit as something wholly extrinsic and accidental, nevertheless "gift" is His personal property, will be evident in the following disputation.

Disputatio CLIV - Whether the ratio of "gift" belongs to the Holy Spirit according to the essence, or according to the personal property

Caput I - What Scotus and Cajetan hold

The Doctors also differ in their opinion on this controversy; for from diverse principles diverse conclusions must be collected. Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 18, the single question, teaches first that it does not agree with the Holy Spirit to be a gift by reason of His personal property.[653] He proves this, first, because each person is understood to be sufficiently constituted by essence and property, before creatures are understood in any way, as we saw in Disputation 143, chapters 2 and 4;[654] but the notion of gift necessarily looks to creatures, at least possible ones: therefore, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be a gift, He is already conceived as constituted by personal property: therefore the very notion of gift cannot formally pertain to the personal property. Second, that order to creatures, which belongs to the notion of gift, is a relation of reason to creatures; but no relation of reason belongs to the essence or property of a person: therefore neither does the notion of gift. Third, because otherwise the Holy Spirit would be constituted in a twofold way: in one way by a real relation, in another way by a relation of reason, which is absurd.

652. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 14.
653. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 18, q. unica.
654. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputationes, Disputatio 143, cap. 2 et 4.

Further, to defend Augustine, who in some places seems to assert that "gift" is the property of the Holy Spirit, Scotus then teaches that "gift" can be used in three ways. First, for that which proceeds liberally by an act of love; and in this sense he grants that the Holy Spirit is a gift, not because He can be given, but because by love He proceeds liberally: for thus to give is not to give liberally, but to proceed liberally. Second, "gift" is said of the mutual love of two; in which way the Holy Spirit can also be called a gift of the Father in the Son, and conversely; and thus he concedes that it is a property of the Holy Spirit. Third and finally, "gift" is said of that which is given liberally; and in this sense "gift" is not the property of the Spirit, nor "giver" the property of the spirator: because the formal signification of this name "gift" is a respect of donability, which belongs to God only in comparison with creatures; but materially it signifies, as it is in God, the personal property of the Holy Spirit, who can be given liberally to creatures. In the same proportion one must speak of the "giver": namely, that the formal signification is a respect of reason toward creatures; but the material is the property or notion of the spirator. This opinion of Scotus, in this third point, Cajetan almost embraces; for he says that the name "gift" signifies three things: both that which can be given, and a respect of reason which he calls donability, and another respect as it were of possession, namely that it be of someone, that is, of him by whom it is given. He says therefore that the primary signification is the respect of donability; but the respect as it were of possession, which is a personal property, is connoted; while the material signification is love.[655]

This opinion, in the first place, does not sufficiently accord with the mind of Augustine: for he speaks of the gift which can be given to creatures, when he asserts that it is the property of the Holy Spirit, as is plainly clear from the places cited in the preceding disputation and from those which we shall relate below. Therefore we must defend in the following manner that the very property of the Holy Spirit is the ratio of gift, which He has by the power of His substantial origin: for if it belonged to Him only by a certain extrinsic denomination, inasmuch as He can be given, the ratio of gift would be common to the three persons, as was noted in the preceding disputation, chapter 2. Then too, since this same is the mind of the holy Doctor in this question, who in all things followed the sense of Augustine, Cajetan does not satisfy his office, when he tries in this way to defend him.

But if someone should say on behalf of Cajetan that the Son is not the personal love which is the material signification of the name "gift," but only the Holy Spirit; and thus that the property of the Holy Spirit is the material signification of "gift," but not the properties of the other persons: let him, I beg, first observe that Cajetan does not say that the material signification of "gift" is the personal property, but love; while the personal property is connoted by the name "gift," as that of another by emanation: therefore he holds that in the material signification of "gift" the property of the Holy Spirit is not directly included, otherwise it would not be a connotatum of that name. Wherefore Cajetan assigns a different signification to the name "Spirit" than to the name "gift": for, according to him, the name "Spirit" formally and directly signifies the property of the third person, and then connotes love and the respect of gift; whereas the name "gift" signifies and connotes in another way, as was explained above. Moreover, from this opinion of Cajetan it follows that the

655. Cajetan, on Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1, proem., and ad loc.

ratio of gift belongs to the third person by an extrinsic denomination only, in which way it can belong to any other: here, however, we wish so to assign the ratio of gift to the Holy Spirit that it be His property: for this is what Augustine and St. Thomas maintain.

Caput II - The truer opinion: that by His personal property the Holy Spirit is not only Spirit but also gift

The opinion of St. Thomas in article 2 is proved for us, which affirms that the third person, by His personal property, is not only Spirit, but also gift, and that He is a gift by that by which He is Spirit; just as the Son is a word by that by which He is Son.[656] The holy Doctor hands this down more expressly in the First Book, distinction 18, question 1, article 4; and St. Bonaventure follows in question 5; Capreolus in the single question, to the first argument of the second order, and to the second, and to the sixth; Marsilius in the First Book, question 21, article 3, doubt 4.[657] It is gathered moreover from Augustine, Book 5 on the Trinity, chapter 11, where he writes thus: "Yet that Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity, but is understood in the Trinity, in that He is predicated 'Spirit,' is said relatively, since He is referred both to the Father and to the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; but the relation itself does not appear in this name; it does, however, appear where He is called the Gift of God; for it is the gift of the Father and of the Son; and a giver of a gift, when we say it, we say relatively and truly toward one another."[658] Therefore, according to Augustine's mind, not only is the relation of Spirit to the Father and the Son the very ratio of gift; rather, it is expressed more by the name "gift" than by the name "Spirit."

And in Book 4 on the Trinity, chapter 20, after the middle, he says: "And this is for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God: to proceed from the Father, and to be sent, and to be given."[659] He uses, therefore, indifferently for the same thing "to be gift" and "to proceed from the Father": but "to proceed from the Father" is a property of the Holy Spirit: therefore the ratio of gift is also His personal property. And St. Thomas, in the place alleged from the First Book of the Sentences, says that in the procession of the Holy Spirit there is the ratio by which He is God and gift. But let this be explained more exactly and the arguments of Scotus more easily dissolved.

It must be noted that in the notion of gift there is contained a respect to creatures, just as also in the notion of word. Wherefore, in the same way, that will be the property of the Holy Spirit as this is the property of the Son. Now this is how the property of the second person is constituted, according to what was noted in Disputation 143, especially chapter 6: namely, that before it actually denotes a respect to creatures, even possible ones, it constitutes the person; or at least, in everyone's opinion, before it actually regards future creatures, of which nevertheless He is called the word. Therefore, just as "word" is constituted in the property of word before it is actually the word of creatures, by this alone that it is the word of the Father, and is of such a kind in itself by

656. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 2.

657. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 4; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 5; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 18, q. unica, ad arg. 1 secundi ordinis, ad 2, ad 6; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 3, dub. 4.

658. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 11.

659. St. Augustine, De Trinitate IV, c. 20.

property, that although creatures be only possible or future, it is yet their word; so in the same way the Holy Spirit is constituted in the ratio of gift by personal property, not inasmuch as He actually includes a respect to creatures, even possible ones: for this respect is of reason, as is more explicitly explained in Disputation 104, chapter 6; and by this ratio, from such an "to be" from the Father and the Son by love, even if creatures are only possible, He can be said to be given. Wherefore the property of the Holy Spirit will not be formally, absolutely, the "gift" by express ratio of gift; but, according to a logical distinction and according to the ratio of the gift, that is, according to the foundation of the gift, which is such a love produced, it will be His property. And in this I truly hold that the Holy Spirit is that by which He is gift, by that by which He is Spirit. By this principle, the arguments of Scotus reported in the first chapter are all easily dissolved.

Caput III - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

From what has been said it may first be gathered in what sense one may say that the Holy Spirit by His procession is a gift, as Scotus noted in the First Book, distinction 18, question 1, to the fifth: for to one and the same belong both the name and, as it were, the signification which is the relation resulting from origin. Therefore, if He be conceived as origin, by His procession He is gift: because in that way of speaking...

From what has been said it may first be gathered in what sense it can be said, "the Holy Spirit by procession is gift." For, as Scotus noted in the First Book, distinction 18, question 1, to the fifth, "procession" is a common name, and signifies both origin and the relation (*relatio*) which results from origin.[660] Therefore, if it be taken for origin, it is not rightly said, "the Holy Spirit by procession is gift": because this mode of speaking denotes, as it were, the effect of procession in the genus of formal cause (*causa formalis*), and the Holy Spirit is not gift, nor spirit, by the procession itself as by a form: for origin does not give a person existence as a form does, and therefore it is not a constitutive property - as we shall say in Disputation 158, chapter 4. Yet it can rightly be said that the Holy Spirit has the effect by procession: because in this manner of speaking there is denoted not only the effect of procession in the genus of formal cause, but it can also be signified as it were in the genus of efficient cause (*causa efficiens*); and since the Holy Spirit receives by origin the things which He has, therefore by procession, thus taken, He is said to have the notion of gift. But if "procession" be taken for relation, it is rightly said, "by procession He is gift," that is, by His personal property as by a form - just as by procession He is Spirit.

Second, it follows in what way the Holy Spirit is said to be our gift. St. Bonaventure, in the First Book, distinction 18, question 6, lays down this rule: that the particle "our" is predicated of those things which are in God with some respect to us, either according to the habitude of a cause or of relation.[661] On this ground God is called "our God," because He bestows life on us: for this reason indeed Θεός in Greek is said as it were "bestowing life," as was said in Disputation 58. Likewise the third person is called "our spirit" by reason of the relation by which He regards us; because He is

660. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, ad 5.
661. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 6.

breathed to us, or rather, as I judge, because He is said to inspire in us good works, that is, to move us to good works. And although this effect is common to the whole Trinity, nevertheless it is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation, as are the other works of grace. But if one were to say "our spirit" because He is breathed to us, one would also have to say "our Holy Spirit": which, however, cannot be said, as St. Thomas noted in the place just cited: in this same way God is called "our Father."[662]

St. Bonaventure then notes that this order of relation, by reason of which God is called "our spirit" or "our Father," can be twofold: first, as that of our possession (*possessio*), in which respect the spirit too can be called our gift, because He is possessed by us; then as a relation of another mode, and so God is called "our God" and "our Father." Although the Son of God is said to be born and given to us, nevertheless He cannot be called "our Son," but "our gift": yet on a different ground than the Holy Spirit; because the Son cannot be said to be anyone's by reason of possession, but by reason of relation, just as of the Father; but "gift" is said by reason of possession.

Another rule is handed down by St. Thomas, in the First Book, distinction 16, question 1, article 5, which differs little or nothing from the former: namely, that those things are called "ours" which are in God and denote respect to us either of end (*causa finalis*) or of efficient cause; but the rest are not called "ours."[663] Marsilius follows this rule in the First Book, question 21, article 3, doubt 2, and the Canariensis at the end of his commentary.[664] On this ground God is called "our good," inasmuch as He is signified as end; He is also called "our Lord," "our creator," etc. From this rule St. Thomas excludes abstract predicates. For this reason we do not say that the divine essence is "ours"; and although we say "God is our justice" and "our wisdom," on account of the habitude of efficient cause, nevertheless we do not say "the justice of God is our justice," "the wisdom of God is our wisdom." Moreover, St. Thomas notes in article two, to the first objection, that the Holy Spirit is then only said to be "our gift" when He is actually given to us, although He is called "gift" from eternity, because He can be given: for the particle "our" denotes being actually possessed by us; but Scotus judges that he too is called "ours" who can be given to us.[665]

Third, from what has been said there follows the true interpretation of the words of St. Thomas in the second article of this question, when he proves that the Holy Spirit proceeds as gift from the fact that He proceeds as love. For although "love" is an essential name common to the three persons - God is charity - yet here it is taken by St. Thomas for love breathed and produced (amor spiratus et productus); and thus he rightly proves that He is gift: for if He proceeds as love, it follows that His procession is a "dilection"; but "dilection" by its very nature is a "donation," as we proved in the preceding disputation, chapter 2: therefore this produced love, by its own property and by the force of its own procession, proceeds as gift. This is the mind of St. Thomas, which in my judgment neither Cajetan, in the second article, in the third solution which he applies to Aureolus's argument, nor the Canariensis in the second part of his commentary, attained, when

662. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 2 ad 1.
663. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 5.
664. Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 3, dub. 2; Canariensis (Peter of Aquila), In I Sent., in fine commentarii.
665. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1.

they assert that in that place "love" is used by St. Thomas neither essentially nor personally, but abstractly, so that the sense is: "the Holy Spirit proceeds as love," that is, in the manner of love. Therefore they did not rightly understand the holy Doctor: for in that way he would only prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds to a likeness of a gift, not however truly as gift.

[On the proper name "Gift" of the Holy Spirit]

But Aureolus, as quoted by Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 18, question unica, in the arguments against the third conclusion against the holy Doctor, first argues as follows: the Holy Spirit is not the same gift as He is love: for He is the love whereby He is God; but He is not the same gift as He is God: for God is both love by essence, and gift by property: therefore St. Thomas ill infers, from the fact that He proceeds as love, that He is gift. But from what has been said the reply is: the Holy Spirit is that produced love whereby He is gift, namely, by personal property; and of this love St. Thomas is speaking, as was said above.

He argues second: for St. Thomas in the first article did not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, but as an impression; how then in the second article, so as to prove that He is gift, does he assume that He proceeds as love? Cajetan well replies that to proceed as an impression - namely, of the will - and to proceed as love are the same: for want of names we now speak in one way, now in another.

He argues third: for "love" is taken either essentially or notionally. If essentially, St. Thomas does not from that prove the Holy Spirit to be gift by the force of His procession, because love, in that respect, is common to the three persons. If however it be taken notionally, it follows that the Holy Spirit has a peculiar kind of causality toward creatures: for since He is the first gift which can be given to creatures, He will be the cause on account of which the other things are given by God; but this seems absurd, since all efficacy ad extra is common to the whole Trinity.

Cajetan thinks this argument has been satisfied by his doctrine, which I reported above; but it did not approve itself to us. Then Capreolus replies that love there is taken notionally; yet it does not follow that there is for the Holy Spirit a peculiar efficacy toward creatures by reason of this notional love, because the whole account of causing is essence, which is common. But since whatever God operates He effects through will, therefore (says Capreolus) it is necessary that God should first have in Himself the form of things in the intellect through His Word, and through love in the will, which is the Holy Spirit; which are not diverse causes, but diverse notions in the same cause: and in this way there agrees to the Holy Spirit a certain special ratio of cause toward creatures.

St. Bonaventure, however, in the First Book, distinction 18, question 1, and Marsilius in the First, question 21, article 2, say that the Holy Spirit is the first gift, because He is always given in the other gifts that make one pleasing [to God], or because He is the exemplary cause of the other gifts; or finally, Marsilius adds, because He is "subauthoritatively" the cause of the other gifts, that is, He receives from another to be the cause of the other gifts: for that is what the particle "subauthoritatively" denotes.[666] But a much better and easier reason can be given, in accordance

666. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 2.

with what was said in the preceding disputation, why the Holy Spirit is the first gift: namely, that by the force of His origin He has substantially the property of gift; whereas to others, whether to creatures or to the divine persons, the notion of gift belongs denominatively, and not by the force of their origin. The reasons of St. Bonaventure and of Marsilius do not so exactly explain the notion of "first gift": both because, with the other gifts, there is not only given the Holy Spirit, but also another person, although in the appropriation of the gifts of grace it is said in a peculiar manner that the Holy Spirit is given; and also, because thus the Son too has from another to be the cause of the other gifts, just as the Holy Spirit.

It remained here for us to dispute whether the notion of gift is a peculiar notion distinct from procession: but about this enough and more than enough has been said in Disputation 137, chapter 3.

Quaestio XXXIX - On the persons as referred to the essence

After the things that concern the divine persons have been treated absolutely, it remains to consider the persons in comparison to the essence (*essentia*), to the properties, and to the notional acts, and in the comparison of the persons among themselves.

Articulus I - Whether in God the essence is the same as the person

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person. Ad ...

... yet this does not suffice. It is said notionally; nevertheless it does not follow that there belongs to the Holy Spirit a peculiar efficacy with respect to creatures on account of this notional love, because the whole ratio of effecting is the essence, which is common. Moreover, because whatever God operates, he effects through the will, therefore it is necessary (says Capreolus) that God should first have in himself the form of things in the intellect through his Word, and through love in the will, which is the Holy Spirit; which are not different causes, but different notions in the same cause: and for this reason there agrees to the Holy Spirit a certain special ratio of cause with respect to creatures.[667]

This solution pleases me less; for the efficacy and power of God concerning creatures, of themselves on the side of the principle, also demand the notion of cause, a certain procession within God himself: for every creature goes forth from God, insofar as he is essence and omnipotent; therefore the Holy Spirit is not the first gift because he has a peculiar ratio of cause with respect to creatures upon whom other gifts are conferred.

But St. Bonaventure, in I Sent., dist. 18, question; and Marsilius, in I, question 21, article 2, say that the Holy Spirit is the first gift, because he is given in the other gifts that make one pleasing, or because he is the exemplary cause of the other gifts; or finally, Marsilius adds, that he is the cause of the other gifts subauthoritatively, that is, he receives from another to be the cause of those gifts -

667. Capreolus.

for that is denoted by the particle "subauthoritatively."[668] But a far truer and easier account can be given, according to the foregoing in the preceding disputation, why the Holy Spirit is the first gift: namely, because by the force of his origin he has substantially the property of gift; whereas to others, whether creatures, or to the divine persons to whom he is given, the notion of gift belongs denominatively, and by reason of his origin the name of "Gift" agrees to him.

Moreover, the reasons of St. Bonaventure and Marsilius do not so exactly explain the ratio of the first gift: both because together with the other gifts not only is the Holy Spirit given, but also the other persons, although in the appropriation of the gifts of grace only the Holy Spirit is said to be given in a peculiar mode; and also because the Son has from another to be the cause of the other gifts, just as the Holy Spirit.

It further remained here that we should dispute whether the ratio of gift were a peculiar notion distinct from procession; but of this enough and more than enough has been said in disputation 137, chapter 3.

On the persons as referred to the essence

After the things that concern the divine persons have been treated absolutely, it remains to consider the persons in comparison to the essence (*essentia*), to the properties, and to the notional acts, and in the comparison of the persons among themselves.

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person

It is objected:

1. It seems that in the divine things the essence is not the same as the person. For in whatever things the essence is the same as the person, or supposit, it must be that there is only one supposit of one nature, as is evident in all separated substances. For things which are the same in reality cannot be multiplied unless the rest also be multiplied. But in the divine things there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore the essence is not the same as the person.
2. Moreover, affirmation and negation are not verified of the same thing. But affirmation and negation are verified of essence and person: for the person is distinct, but the essence is not distinct. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
3. Moreover, nothing is subjected to itself. But the person is subjected to the essence. Whence it is named supposit or hypostasis. Therefore the person is not the same as the essence.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in De Trinitate: "When we say the person of the Father, we say nothing else than the substance of the Father."[669]

668. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 18; Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 21, a. 2.
669. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6.

I answer: Considering the divine simplicity, this question has the truth in manifold ways. For it was said above that the divine simplicity requires this, that in God there be the same thing essence and supposit, which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise, because when the divine persons are multiplied, the essence retains unity. And because, as Boethius says, Relation multiplies persons; some posited that in this way the essence and the person differ in the divine things, the relations of which they said to be "assisting," considering in relations only that they are toward another, and not that they are things. But (as was shown above), just as relations in created things are accidentally inherent, so in God they are the very divine essence. Whence it follows that in God there is not something other than the essence which is the person according to reality, and yet that the persons are really distinguished from one another: for the person (as was said above) signifies the relation, insofar as it is subsistent (*subsistens*) in the divine nature. But relation, compared to the essence, does not differ in reality, but only according to reason; compared, however, to the opposite relation, by the force of opposition it has real distinction. And thus there remains one essence and three persons.[670]

Reply to the first: In creatures there cannot be a distinction of supposits through relations, but it must be through essential principles, because relations are not subsistent in creatures. In the divine things, however, relations are subsistent. Therefore, according as they have opposition among themselves, they can distinguish supposits; yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from the essence according to reality, inasmuch as they are really the same with the essence.

Reply to the second: Inasmuch as essence and person in the divine things differ according to the ratio of the understanding, it follows that something can be affirmed of the one which is denied of the other: and consequently that, one supposit being posited, another is not posited.

Reply to the third: We impose names upon divine things according to the mode of created things, as was said above. And because the natures of created things are individuated through matter which is subjected to the specific nature, hence it is that individuals are called subjects or supposits or hypostases. And for this reason also the divine person is called supposit or hypostasis; not that there be there some supposition or subjection according to which it is named in created things.

Conclusion: The person is really the same as the essence, but differs only by reason. Of this matter we have treated at length in disputation 110.

670. Boethius, De Trinitate, near the end.

Articulus II - Whether it should be said that three persons are of one essence

It is objected:

1. It seems that it should not be said that three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says in the book On the Synods that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are indeed three according to subsistence, but one according to consonance. But the substance of God is his essence. Therefore three persons are not of one essence.[671]
2. Moreover, one should not affirm anything concerning divine things which is not expressed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, as is clear from Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 1. But nowhere is it found expressed in Sacred Scripture that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of one essence. Therefore this is not to be affirmed.[672]
3. Moreover, the divine nature (*natura*) is the same as the essence. It would therefore suffice to say that the three persons are of one nature.
4. Moreover, it is not customary to say that the person is "of" the essence, but rather that the essence is "of" the person. Therefore neither does it seem fittingly said that the three persons are of one essence.
5. Moreover, St. Augustine says that we should not say that three persons are "from" one essence, when in the divine things there is understood something other than essence and person. But as prepositions are transitive, so also are oblique [cases]. Therefore by equal reason it is not to be said that the three persons are "of" one essence.[673]
6. Moreover, what can be an occasion of error is not to be said concerning the divine things. But when it is said, "three persons of one essence," or "of one substance," an occasion of error is given. For, as Hilary says in the book On the Synods, if the common predications "one substance of the Father and the Son" be used, either one supposit which has two names is signified, subsistence, or one divided substance has made two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance, which to two has been usurped and assumed. Therefore it is not to be said that three persons are of one substance.[671]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in book 3 Contra Maximinum: "That which we, 'homoousion,' which in the Nicene Council against the Arians was established, signifies the same as that three persons are of one essence."[674]

I answer: As was said above, our intellect names divine things, not according to the mode of the things themselves, because thus it cannot know them, but according to the mode found in created things. And because, in sensible things from which our intellect takes knowledge, the nature of some species is individuated through matter; and thus nature has the ratio of form, but the

671. St. Hilary, De synodis.
672. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus I.
673. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (on modes of speaking about essence and person).
671. St. Hilary, De synodis.
674. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, III, c. 14 (and c. 28).

individual or supposit the ratio of a thing having form: for this reason also in the divine things, as to the mode of signifying, essence is signified as the form of three persons. But in created things we say that any form is "of" that of which it is the form, as the health or the beauty of some man. But we do not say that the thing having a form is the form, unless with the addition of some adjective that designates the form. Thus we say, "this woman is of excellent beauty," "this man is of perfect virtue." And likewise, because in the divine things, the persons being multiplied, the essence is not multiplied, we say one essence "of" the three persons, and the three persons "of" one essence; so that these genitives may be construed in the designation of form.

Reply to the first: "Substance" is there taken for hypostasis, and not for essence.

Reply to the second: Although "three persons of one essence" does not occur in Sacred Scripture in these words, nevertheless it is found as to this sense, as in John 10:30, "I and the Father are one," and John 14:10 - 11, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me." And by many other [places] the same can be had.

Reply to the third: Because "nature" designates a principle of act, but "essence" is so called from "to be," some things that are of one nature can be said which agree in some act, as all things that heat. But they cannot be said "of one essence" unless they are one in being. And therefore the divine unity is more expressed by this, that it is said that the three persons are of one essence, than if it were said that they are of one nature.

Reply to the fourth: A form taken absolutely is wont to be signified as that of which it is the form, as "the virtue of Peter." But conversely the thing having a form is not wont to be signified as that of which it is the form, unless when we wish to determine or designate the form. And then two genitives are required, one of which signifies the form, and the other the determination of the form; as if it be said, "Peter is of great virtue." Or also one genitive is required that has the force of two genitives; as when one says, "this man is blood-thirsty," that is, "a shedder of much blood." Because therefore the divine essence is signified as a form with respect to the person, it is fittingly said that the essence is "of" the person; but not conversely, unless something be added to the designation of the divine essence, as if it be said that the Father is a person "of" the divine essence, or that the three persons are "of" one essence.

Reply to the fifth: This preposition "ex," or "de," does not designate the relation of a formal cause, but rather the relation of an efficient or material cause. Now these causes are distinguished in all things from those of which they are causes. For nothing is its own matter, nor is anything its own active principle. But something is its own form, as is clear in all immaterial things. And therefore, by this that we say, "three persons of one essence," essence is signified under the ratio of form; it is not shown that essence is other than the person, which would be shown if we were to say, "three persons from the same essence."

Reply to the sixth: As Hilary says in the book On the Synods, the saints are not to be prejudged because of things not handled piously: for, because some things are not had piously, they ought not to be had. So, if "homoousion" is ill understood, what is that to me understanding it well? Thus therefore one substance "from one property of being begotten," not, however, from proportion, nor from unity, nor from communion.[671]

Conclusion: One essence is said to be "of" the three persons, and the three persons are said to be "of" one essence. Concerning the consubstantiality of the Son and the Holy Spirit with the Father we have already discussed in disputations 109 and 110. Now, however, only the mode of speaking is to be noted, which St. Thomas approves in this article. We say, therefore, that the three persons are of one essence, and conversely, that one essence is of three persons; in which mode of speaking the Sixth Synod uses, session 4, when it says, "The Trinity is of one will and of one operation."[675] Add also that it can rightly be said: "The three persons are of the Deity"; for thus we commonly say, "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three persons of the Deity."

Articulus III - Whether essential names are predicated singularly of the three persons

It is objected:

It seems that the essential names (as this name "God") are not predicated singularly of the three persons, but plurally. For just as "man" is signified as having humanity, so "God" is signified as having Deity.

It is objected: It seems that essential names (as this name "God") are not predicated singularly of the three persons, but plurally. For just as "man" is signified as having humanity, so "God" is signified as having Deity. But the three persons are three having Deity. Therefore the three persons are three gods.

1. Further, in Genesis 1, where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew truth has Elohim, which can be interpreted "gods" or "judges." And this is said on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are several gods and not one God.
2. Further, this name "thing" (if it be said absolutely) seems to pertain to substance. But this name is predicated plurally of the three persons. For St. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine: "The things to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." Therefore other essential names also can be predicated plurally of the three persons.[676]
3. Further, just as this name "God" signifies one having Deity, so this name "person" signifies one subsisting in some intellectual nature. But we say three persons. Therefore by the same reasoning we can say three gods.

671. St. Hilary, De synodis.
675. Sixth Synod, session 4: "Trinitas est unius voluntatis, et unius operationis."
676. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I, 5 - 6.

But on the contrary: It is said in Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God."

I answer: It must be said that of essential names some signify the essence substantively, others adjectivally. Those which substantively signify the essence are predicated of the three persons only in the singular and not in the plural. But those which signify the essence adjectivally are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason for this is that substantive names signify something in the mode of substance, whereas adjectival names signify something in the mode of an accident which inheres in a subject. But substance, since it has existence through itself, has unity or multitude from itself; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name is attended according to the form signified by the name. An accident, however, since it has existence in a subject, receives unity or multitude from the subject; and thus singularity and plurality in adjectives are attended according to the supposits. Now in creatures one and the same form is not found in several supposits except by a unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. Hence names signifying such a form, if they are substantives, are predicated of many in the singular, but not so if they are adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; yet we say that several men are collegiate. But in divine things the divine essence is signified in the mode of a form, as was said above. And this is supremely simple and most one, as was shown above. Whence also names signifying the divine essence substantively are predicated singularly and not plurally of the three persons. Therefore this is the reason why we say that Socrates and Plato and Cicero are three men, but we do not say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Gods, but one God: because in three human supposits there are three humanities, but in the three persons there is one divine essence. But those which signify the essence adjectively are predicated plurally of the three, on account of the plurality of supposits. For we say three existing, or three wise, or three eternal and uncreated and immense ones, if they are taken adjectivally. If, however, they are taken substantively, we say one uncreated, immense, and eternal, as Athanasius says.[677]

Reply to the first: Although "God" signifies one having Deity, yet it is another mode of signifying. For "God" is said substantively, but "having Deity" is said adjectivally. Hence, although there are three having Deity, nevertheless it does not follow that there are three gods.

Reply to the second: Different languages have a different mode of speaking. Hence, just as because of the plurality of supposits the Greeks say "three hypostases," so also in Hebrew it is said plurally Elohim. But we do not say "gods" nor "substances" in the plural, lest plurality be referred to the substance.

Reply to the third: This name "thing" is among the transcendentals. Hence, insofar as it pertains to relation, it is predicated plurally in the divine; but insofar as it pertains to substance, it is predicated singularly. Whence Augustine says in the same place that the same Trinity is a certain supreme thing.[676]

677. Athanasius, Symbol of faith (Quicunque vult): "the uncreated is one, the immense is one, the eternal is one," etc.
676. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I, 5 - 6.

Reply to the fourth: The form signified by this name "person" is not essence or nature, but personality; whence, since there are three personalities, that is, three personal properties in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is not predicated singularly, but plurally, of the three.

Notationes circa Articulum

There are two conclusions of the article. The first is: Essential concrete substantive names, as "God," etc., are said singularly of the three persons. The second is: Adjectival names, as "wise," are said plurally of the three persons. From which two rules are gathered universally, both in created things and in God. One is that concrete substantive names are said in the plural or the singular according to the unity or the number of forms, not of supposits. The other rule is that adjectives follow not the unity and number of forms, but of supposits.

Then, with Cajetan, it must be observed that in some codices there is added in the title of this article: "As this name God," whence he himself gathers that the question is about concrete names, not abstract. And indeed St. Thomas, who did not prefix titles to the articles, in the beginning of the argument, where he is wont to place the titles, thus says: "To the third it proceeds thus: It seems that essential names, as this name God, are not predicated singularly"; to which the doctrine of the whole article agrees. Now then let us treat, in our accustomed manner, the doctrine of this article itself.

Disputatio CLV - Whether concrete names are predicated in the singular and in the plural according to the singularity and plurality of forms

- The opinions of Richard and Durandus. Caput I.
- What Marsilius and Gabriel think. Caput II.
- The opinion of Cajetan and other Thomists. Caput III.
- That concrete substantive names are said in the singular or in the plural from the unity or the number of the form alone: the more probable opinion holds. Caput IV.
- Corollaries of the preceding opinion. Caput V.
- Arguments against the aforesaid opinion. Caput VI.
- Our adversaries object St. Thomas to us. Caput VII.
- Adjectival names ought to be predicated plurally of the three persons, but of the one God singularly. Caput VIII.

Caput I - The opinions of Richard and Durandus

There is no dissension among the Scholastics about names signifying abstractly, but all readily concede, both in God and in created things, that they are enunciated in the singular or in the plural according to the unity or plurality of the form. For since these names signify and connote nothing else than the form itself, of necessity, according to the number of that form, they must either be multiplied or receive unity.

But of concrete names a different judgment must be rendered; for since, besides the form, they either signify or connotate something else, it does not seem sufficient in all cases, for them to be said singularly or plurally, to have regard to the unity and plurality of the signified form. Moreover, since among concretes some are adjectival, as "wise," and some substantive, as "man," "God," and they do not signify the form in the same way, the ratio of the two is not equal. About adjectives the theologians readily agree, as we shall see in Caput VIII; but concerning substantives, if we speak universally, there is no slight controversy: for about concrete substantives which are attributed to God absolutely, all Catholics think in the same way; nevertheless, in order to assign the true rationale for these divine concretes, it is necessary to speak of all of them generically.

Therefore let the first opinion be that which Richard reports in the Third Book, distinction 1, article 1, question 5, of those who say that, if one divine person were to assume many humanities, neither one man nor many would be said simply. This opinion Richard does not disapprove; and Durandus plainly follows it in the Third Book, distinction 1, question 3, ad 3,[678] who, although along with St. Thomas in this article he taught that substantive concretes neither receive number nor unity according to number or the unity of persons, nevertheless asserts that in that case neither one nor many men are to be said simply; and hence that unity and plurality of names are not to be taken universally from the unity and plurality of forms. He renders the reason, because the name "man" is to be used according to common custom; but custom has obtained this, that, when "one man" or "many men" is said, not only the unity or plurality of forms, but also the unity or plurality of the supposit be considered: therefore in that case neither one man simply nor many would be said. And that substantive concrete names in God are regularly said according to the unity of form alone, even if there are many supposits, is not because universally these names by their nature follow only the unity or number of forms; but because usage has it that substantive names in God are neither numbered nor have unity according to supposits, but only according to forms. Durandus furthermore adds that, if we choose what is said with less impropriety, then, if one and the same person were to assume many human natures, they would have to be called many men; but if many persons were to assume the same nature, one man would be said.

Scotus rightly refutes this opinion first, in the Third Book, first question, q. 3, ad 1, with this argument: "One or many" are a property of being and divide its nature equally; wherefore, wherever the nature of being simply is found, it is necessary that unity or plurality simply be found. Therefore, if a name signifies the nature of something that simply is being - such as is a substantive concrete of the signified - which simply would be an ens, then either one or many would be said.[679]

678. Durandus, In III Sent., d. 1, q. 3, ad 3; cf. Richard, In III Sent., d. 1, art. 1, q. 5.

For another reason also this view does not please me: because Durandus seems to derive the unity of substantive names in God not so much from their native and primary imposition as from common usage, to which they are now applied for signifying. But this is altogether false: for, as we shall also say in the following chapter, divine substantive names do not signify in another way after the revelation of the mystery than before, but remain in their original signification; nevertheless, now too they are said singularly in God. Yet it is clear that, before the mystery of the Trinity was revealed, the word "God" was imposed in the same way to signify the divine nature in the concrete, as the word "man" to denote the nature of man; therefore, if in that case in which three divine persons were to assume one human nature, or one divine person were to assume three human natures, we, attending to the primary imposition of the name, would be unable to say either many men simply or one man simply, then, even after the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity, neither "many Gods" nor "one" is to be said simply - although now by ecclesiastical usage the word is so accommodated that we say "one God" simply in three persons. Wherefore the Gentiles, who have not hitherto changed this word, could, according to the propriety of each language, pronounce neither one God nor three Gods simply. Therefore our Christian religion would so confound words with significations that to the Gentiles it would leave intact neither the one nor the other signified. These things are assuredly most absurd; and this reasoning also tells against Durandus.

But in truth, since Durandus, as we reported in Disputation 125, chapter 1, asserts that in God there is only one common absolute subsistence, by which the divine nature is so signified in the concrete that it is said: "this God common to three persons," and affirms that to be proper to the divine nature subsisting in three persons; and hence that one human nature, if assumed by three divine persons, would not have that subsistence; he could indeed assert that the substantive concrete names of God signify the divine nature together with that absolute subsistence, both before the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity and after; and thus, remaining in their original signification, be predicated singularly of God simply, whatever revelation be made. However, because he plainly denies, as we shall see in Disputation 136, chapter 1, the understanding of an individual concrete of deity prior to the persons, even if he should concede that subsistence, he could not defend himself in this way, but would be forced to fall into the absurdity which we were inferring. But Richard, who, as we recalled in that Disputation 125, chapter 3, concedes in God no common subsistence, but only three relative ones, cannot defend himself in this way: wherefore, if he judges the opinion which we have reviewed in this article to be probable, he is compelled to fall into the absurdity which we were just now inferring.

Caput II - What Marsilius and Gabriel think

Marsilius, in the Third Book, question 2, article 3, dubium 2, holds that in created forms, even if many are assumed by one supposit, or one by many, unity and plurality are to be taken from supposits, not from natures. Wherefore, if many persons were to assume one humanity, many men would have to be said; but if one person many humanities, one man would have to be said. Gabriel

679. Scotus, In III Sent., q. 3, ad 1.

embraces the same opinion in the Third Book, first distinction, question 2, article 3, dubium 4, ad secundam rationem.[680] They prove the first point thus: if many men were to assume the same nature, each person would be a man, and there would be one man; but there would be no common man who in the concrete would be predicated of this and that person; therefore there would be many men. And they deny that in that case there would be a common "man" in the concrete, because they seem to think that concrete names are names of supposits, and that by them supposits are signified directly; and they teach the same about concrete substantives as about adjectives. Marsilius adds that the divine supposits are denominated from the human nature in the same way as a subject is denominated from an accidental form. Wherefore, just as the same air is said to be one luminous thing, even if it be illuminated by different lights; in the same way there will be one man, even if there are many humanities in the same supposit. Marsilius then proves his opinion further: because, if one humanity were assumed by one person, and afterwards were dismissed, he would begin to be another man for no other reason than because he was in another person; therefore, similarly, if it were assumed at once by many, there would be many men.

This opinion must be refuted in the same way as the preceding, and is to be driven to a like absurdity by the same argument. For if this rule were true, it would follow that substantive concrete names in God are multiplied according to the number of persons. For if the name "man" by its imposition signifies a supposit, and from that ought to be multiplied or to take unity, then, according to the primary imposition of this name "God," it will follow that many Gods are to be said, because there are many persons. For (as we were saying above) before the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity, the name "God" by itself signified in the same way as the name "man" and the other concrete substantives of created forms; after the revelation itself was made, the signification has not been changed; therefore, according to that primary imposition, even now many Gods could be said. Wherefore the same Marsilius, in the First Book, question 5, article 2, ad quintum, where he hands down the aforesaid opinion while he treats of the name "God," for this reason only asserts that many Gods cannot be said, because the usage of the Church is that the name "God" be taken not personally, but essentially, on account of the wiles of heretics, who strive to introduce many Gods according to essence.[681] By which words he plainly reduces this signification of the name "God," by which it is used essentially only, to the usage of the Church, not to the very primary imposition of the name; and hence, with the propriety of the word and its native signification preserved, the three divine persons, according to his opinion, could be called "many Gods"; wherefore the Church would have labored in vain in her mode of speaking against the Gentiles, by changing the ancient signification of the word.

But Marsilius's arguments are trifling. To the first I answer that concrete substantive names do not signify supposits directly, but natures, while connoting supposits, as we showed in chapter 4; but the number or unity of a name must be taken from the direct signified, not from what is connoted, as we shall say there. From which it will be clear that what Marsilius assumes is false, namely, that concrete substantive names are in the same case as adjectives: because a substantial

680. Marsilius, In III Sent., q. 2, art. 3, dub. 2; Gabriel, In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, art. 3, dub. 4, ad 2.
681. Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 5, art. 2, ad 5.

form denominates the supposit in the same way as an accidental [form] denominates the subject. To the latter argument I say that, in the case in which an assumed humanity were dismissed, there would not be another man, as we shall see more fully below; and thus, when at once the same humanity is assumed by three, there are not three men, but one, as there is one God.

Caput III - The opinion of Cajetan and of other Thomists

Since St. Thomas spoke in various ways on this matter, his disciples too have been divided into various opinions. Cajetan, on this article, and in the Third Part, question 3, article 7, around the solution of the second objection, to whom the Canariensis adheres in the commentary on this article, and certain more recent men, teach first that the plurality of a substantive concrete name is not to be taken from the plurality of form alone, but that the plurality of supposits is also required. They gather this from St. Thomas above, question 36, last article, ad 2, where he says that for this reason the Father is not called "several principles," although in him there is a twofold form of principle, namely of generation and of spiration: because, if there were several principles, we would denote in him several supposits as well.[682] And in III, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2, he says: if the same person were to assume several humanities, several men would not be said; because the name of some form is never said in the plural except on account of a plurality of supposits.[683] With these agrees Ferrariense, IV Contra gentiles, cap. 11, q. 9, around these propositions, where he asserts that the condition required, for a substantive name to be said in the plural, is a multitude of supposits.[684]

Secondly, Cajetan and the others teach that, indeed, a plurality of supposits is required for the plurality of the name; and they interpret the Doctor in the cited places in this way, namely, that he did not exclude a plurality of forms, but thought that likewise necessary; assigning only this difference between concrete adjectives and substantives, that adjectives are said in the plural from the plurality of forms alone, but substantives from both.

Thirdly, Cajetan alone adds that even in that case in which several divine persons were to assume the same humanity, it would not be said "one man" simply, but "one" according to the nature. In this he plainly follows the opinion of Richard and Durandus set down in chapter 1: for thus neither would there be simply many men (since, in his view, for the plurality of the name a plurality of form and supposit is required), nor simply one man, but with that addition, "according to the nature." And whereas we can infer against Cajetan that absurdity which we were deducing there against Richard and Durandus - namely, that by the same reasoning the three divine persons could not be called "one God" except with the same addition - Cajetan could defend himself in the way in which, for Durandus's sake, we said above in that chapter, namely, that the notion of deity is different from that of a humanity assumed by three persons. For Cajetan, as we shall see in Disputation 156, chapter 1, affirms that there is a concrete of deity which he calls "semiperson," constituted in our understanding prior to the three persons by the common subsistence, of which

682. St. Thomas, I, q. 36, a. ult., ad 2.
683. St. Thomas, III, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2.
684. Ferrariense, IV Contra gentiles, cap. 11, q. 9.

all the things that are said of one God can be predicated; but that no such individual of a humanity assumed by three persons can be assigned; and thus he will readily answer that the three persons are simply one God, but that there will not be one man in the case in which one humanity has been assumed by them.

But that there is no such individual as Cajetan thinks, and that the concrete of humanity in our consideration precedes the persons in the same manner as the concrete of deity precedes them, we shall show there not obscurely. Wherefore, in this third point the Thomists do not agree with Cajetan, but commonly assert that more is required for the plurality of a concrete name than for unity: because for the latter they say the unity of form suffices, but for the former the plurality of both form and supposit is necessary. Moreover, in explaining the mind of St. Thomas and in reconciling what he asserts in this article and in the other places recently cited, they labor much, as we shall see in chapter 5. Further, the foundations of this opinion, besides the testimonies of St. Thomas which we have thus far recited, are the chief arguments which we shall bring against our opinion in chapter 6.

The more probable opinion will be set forth, that concrete substantive names are said singularly or plurally from the unity or number of form alone.

Caput IV - On the rule for concrete substantive names

St. Thomas assigns two rules in this article: one for concrete substantive names, the other for adjectives. In this chapter we shall assert and confirm that which he delivers concerning substantive names, for we judge it much more probable than the others; but the other, concerning adjectives, we shall set forth in chapter 8. The rule about substantives seems to have been followed by the author of Auxerre in book 3 of the Summa, first treatise, first chapter, question 5; by Scotus in III, distinction 1, question 3, and on I, distinction 12, question 1, n. 9; and to this same question St. Thomas also, in the third book on the Sentences, distinction 1, question 2, article 5, to the second and third responses, when they asserted that, in the case where one person would assume several humanities, there would be several men. The same is taught by Capreolus on I, distinction 4, question 1, article 1, to the first of Aureolus.[685]

Therefore the rule is of this sort: Concrete substantive names of natures are said in the singular or the plural solely from the unity or number of the form (*forma*) which they signify. The holy Doctor expressly delivered this in this article with these words: "In concrete substantive names, singularity or plurality is attended according to the form signified by the name." Yet some interpret his mind as wishing only to teach that the plurality of forms, or the unity thereof, must be attended to for the plurality or unity of the name, but that this does not suffice; for one thing is that it be required, as we said above from Cajetan, but another that it suffice. And they think St. Thomas said

685. Antisiodorensis, Summa, lib. 3, tract. 1, cap. 1, q. 5; Scotus, In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 3; In I Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, n. 9; St. Thomas, In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 2 et 3; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 Aureoli.

this in order to constitute the difference between adjectival and substantive names, because for the unity or plurality of an adjectival name one considers only, and it suffices to have, the unity or plurality of the subject, not of the form.

However, this exposition is easily refuted both by the very words of the text and by the reason which he adduces. First, because St. Thomas did not say that, for the plurality or unity of the name, the unity or plurality of form is to be attended to and considered; for thus he would signify only (as those Doctors aforesaid affirm) that it is necessary, yet would not denote that it suffices. Rather, he said that the singularity or plurality of the name is attended according to the form signified; but to be attended according to the form is to be derived from that. For if it necessarily arose from elsewhere, it would not be said to be attended according to the form; for indeed, with several forms existing, it could happen that the name signify in the singular; and whenever we say that some property is attended according to the form, or according to the matter, we signify that it arises from that alone.

Then too, never in the whole article did he make mention of the unity and number of supposits (*supposita*), so as to show that this also is required for the unity and plurality of the name. Therefore, since he makes mention only of the form, and from that says the unity or plurality of the name is to be attended, it follows he judged that also alone to suffice; especially since he speaks of singularity in the same way as of plurality; and for singularity the unity of the form suffices, and he signifies this when he says that the singularity of the name is to be attended from the singularity of the form.

Moreover, the reason of St. Thomas and the whole discourse of the article plainly indicate that he gathered that aforesaid rule as necessary and sufficient for judging about the divine terms: otherwise he would have proved absolutely nothing at all. For, in order to prove that substantive names are predicated of God in the singular, but adjectives in the plural, he frames this argument: Substantive names signify something after the mode of substance; but adjectival names after the mode of an accident, which is in a subject. Now a substance, just as it has existence (*esse*) per se, so per se it has unity or multitude; whence the singularity or plurality of a substantive name is attended according to the form signified by the name. Therefore he infers that forms have from that whence they have existence, unity or plurality, not indeed merely as from a required principle, but also as from a sufficient and complete one: for just as they do not have existence from elsewhere, but per se; so perfectly they do not have unity and number from elsewhere. And since concrete names of forms follow the thing signified, as whatever else follows the thing which it signifies, St. Thomas rightly infers that from those alone the singularity and plurality of such names in signifying is to be taken.

Scotus, however, establishes the aforesaid position thus: everything that depends is necessarily terminated by something that does not depend; and it cannot depend upon another that itself depends. But an adjectival name, by its very imposition, depends, because it signifies an accidental form, or after the mode of an accident, which depends; on the contrary, a substantive name does not depend, because it signifies a form subsisting per se. Therefore it is necessary that an adjective depend upon a substantive. Whence it is that, if an adjectival name be added to an adjective, the

one cannot depend upon the other, but each must be terminated by another substantive. But when an adjective is added to a substantive, upon that it depends and by that it is terminated; therefore, since names of number are adjectives, when they are added to a substantive, they are terminated by it and take singularity or plurality, and hence follow the number or unity of the forms which they signify. But because, when they are added to adjectives, they depend and are determined not by the adjectives themselves but by the subject, it is necessary that from that they receive unity and number.

This reason does not sufficiently show that the signification of singular or plural number in substantives must be taken from forms, but in adjectives from the subject; rather, it shows that the forms themselves of accidents depend upon subjects, whereas substantial [forms] depend upon themselves. Therefore the aforesaid rule is better confirmed by the reason of St. Thomas which we a little above reported; and, that being passed over, it can also be shown by another no less easy and efficacious.

Now a certain doctrine is to be presupposed, sufficiently known, namely, that among concrete substantive names some are names of a person (*persona*), as hypostasis, person, supposit (*suppositum*), Peter and John, and (as the more common opinion holds) Christ; others are of a nature (*natura*), as God, man, a certain man, and the like. Next, what the holy Doctor teaches above in question 29, article 4, must be premised, to wit, that this is the difference among the names "person" and "a certain man," that "person" directly signifies subsistence (*subsistentia*), that is, the terminus of the nature by which a person is constituted, and it connotes the nature of that person; but "a certain man" directly signifies the nature of man, and it connotes the person in whom it subsists; which we also observed in disputation 130, chapter 3. From this the following reason is drawn. The signification of a name ought to be numbered according to its direct signification, for this is what it directly manifests and affects. But the direct signification of a concrete substantive name of a nature - "God" for example - is of a nature or form, not of a person; thus "God" does not signify a supposit, but a form. Therefore from that it must be numbered, and consequently it is to be said in the singular or plural according to the unity or number of the form, not of the supposit. Hence also it comes about that concrete names of a person are numbered, or said in the singular, not from the nature, but from personality, which is the direct signification.

Caput V - Corollaries of the preceding opinion

From the aforesaid rule it follows, first, that the three persons are one God, and that the name "God," in its primary signification, remained [singular] after the mystery of the Trinity was revealed; and by the same reason the three persons would be one man, if one humanity had been assumed by them together - not because there is some individual of the Deity constituted by that common subsistence which some contrive, but because the direct signification of a concrete substantive name is the form, while the persons are connoted in general. By the same reason the Father and the Son are said to be one principle, or one spirator, of which we also said something in disputation 180, because the direct signification is the will in the Father and the Son, which is one,

while the persons are connoted. And if St. Hilary in book 2 On the Trinity calls the Father and the Son the authors of the Holy Spirit, it matters little; for he uses that name as if it were an adjective, as St. Thomas taught above, question 36, last article, to the last objection; but adjectives are numbered according to their subjects.[686]

Secondly, it is gathered that, in the case where one person would assume many humanities, there would have to be said to be many men, as Capreolus openly acknowledges on I, distinction 4, question 1, article 1, ad primum Aureoli, following the opinion of the holy Doctor; and on III, distinction 1, question 2, article 5, ad secundam, because the direct significata of the name "man" would be several.[687]

Thirdly, it is inferred from the aforesaid rule that it would be the same man, if the same humanity were assumed by several persons and then dismissed by one, or even by all, so as to remain in its proper supposit. This opinion is also favored by the author of Auxerre, who in book 1 of the Summa, first treatise, first chapter, question 7, teaches that, if a humanity had first been assumed by three, then were dismissed by two and remained only in one, it would be the same man. The reason indeed is the same, because the same direct signification - namely, humanity - would remain, from which, as we said above, unity and plurality are to be taken.[688]

However, some contend that, in the case where the humanity were dismissed and remained in its own supposit, it would not be a different man; for, in order that it be another man, both would have to remain; yet they do not dare to say it would be the same, because, for it to be the same man, the humanity ought to remain in the persons at once. They are mistaken nevertheless, since, for it to be said that there are several men, or that one be called another man than another, it is not necessary that all be in act. For Peter is now said to be another man than John, though John is dead; and John, dead, and Peter, alive, are said to be two men. Likewise, in order that one be said to be the same man, it matters not whether the humanity be at once in three persons, or successively; for if unity is taken from the form signified, not from supposits, it will be the same man in whatsoever person. Otherwise one must say that, for the singularity of the name, not only the unity of the form is required, but also that of the supposit; which above was sufficiently impugned against Marsilius.

Finally, it follows that the Father cannot be called "several principles," for this mode of speaking denotes a real distinction, which in God is found only among the supposits. He can, however, be called several principles "according to reason." As for relations, there is a peculiar cause why, although they differ by reason alone, several things are said absolutely, as we said in disputation 138, chapter 2. Therefore, that the Father cannot absolutely be called "several principles," because that mode of speaking signifies a real distinction, is clear; nor should you think that in the abstract we can say "several principles," unless we add "according to reason." For abstract [terms] in God,

686. St. Hilary, De Trinitate 2; St. Thomas, I, q. 36, a. ult., ad ult.
687. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 Aureoli; In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 2.
688. Antisiodorensis, Summa, lib. 1, tract. 1, cap. 1, q. 7.

unless they be pure relations, are not said to be several absolutely, as we noted in that place. Wherefore, if it is not said that the Father has several principles in the abstract - that is, several powers - what wonder if it cannot piously be said that there are several principles?

Caput VI - Arguments against the foregoing opinion

Against the position and the rule which we delivered in chapter 4 concerning substantive names, there are certain objections, by which those who follow the opinion mentioned by us in chapter 3 can contend. The first is this. If one person assumed several humanities, there would be two men; therefore there would necessarily be a distinction between them. For it is said that division includes the negation of one with respect to the other. Therefore one man could not be predicated of the other; but the consequent is absurd. For just as now "God" is predicated of "man" and "man" of "God," because each nature is in the same person, so then too one man would be predicated of the other, because each humanity would be in the same person

The argument is solved: I say that distinction and division of one from another necessarily include not just any negation between them, but not that which impedes predication in the concrete, rather the negation of those natures in the abstract. By that very fact that one humanity is not another, they are two men, even if one be said to be the other by the communication of idioms and the predication of the nature in the same supposit.

You will say: In the very way in which they are called "several men," one ought to be denied of the other; therefore, since in the concrete they are called "two men," in the concrete one ought to be denied of the other - which is false. I answer: It is not necessary that, in the very way in which they are called "several men," namely in the concrete, one be denied of the other. For not every plurality impedes the predication of one of the other, since even those which are distinguished - on account of various modes of affecting either the subject or the supposit - are not, in the concrete, denied one of the other. This we shall show when treating the third part of St. Thomas on question 15.

The posterior confirmation urges thus: from our position it would follow that it could be said that Christ is "two," because he has two natures. For if one having two humanities would be called two men, one having one divinity and one humanity would be called two - which is against the common opinion of the theologians and the Fathers, as we shall see on III, q. 17, a. 1. I reply in particular that "two" taken per se and substantially denotes a supposit, not natures; hence it cannot be said of Christ ... [continues in the next chapter].

Against the sentence and rule which we set down in chapter 4 on substantive names, there are certain oppositions by which those who follow the opinion recalled by us in chapter 3 can attack it. The first is this: if a divine person were to assume several humanities, there would be two men; a distinction between them would be necessary. But distinction, or division, includes the negation of the one from the other; therefore "one man" could not be predicated of the other. Yet the consequent is false; for just as now "God" is predicated of "today's God," because he is the person of both natures, so then too it would be said of the other, since the person would be the same for both

It is answered: the distinction and division of one thing from another do imply some negation, but not any and every negation whatsoever - namely, not a negation of predication in the concrete, but only in the abstract of natures. Thus "one humanity is not another humanity"; even if one be said to be many by the predication of properties and of natures in the same supposit. Nor does plurality ever impede predication, since even those things which are distinguished in their subject or supposit, on account of diverse modes, are mutually predicated, as we shall treat more fully in the Third Part of St. Thomas.

A second opposition is that, from our sentence it would follow that it can be said that Christ is two, since he has two natures. For if one having two humanities would be called two men, one who now has divinity and humanity would be called two; but this is against the common opinion of the theologians and of the Fathers, as we shall see in the Third Part, question 17, article 1.

I answer in particular that "two" taken per se can be taken in the masculine and in the neuter. If it be taken in the masculine, therefore Christ cannot be said to be "two," because the word "two" denotes supposits, not natures, as we proved from the Fathers and the Councils in Disputation 131, chapter 1. But if it be taken in the neuter, it denotes natures, as we said there. In such a signification you will not find among the Fathers that it has been handled in so many words; yet some have nonetheless said that in Christ there is "one thing and another," whom we mentioned in that place, and we shall bring them into the Third Part. There are also some who say that Christ is "one thing and another," or that he "is both." St. Cyril of Alexandria, in the Scholia on the Incarnation, chapter 26, says that different things are predicated of Christ according to one thing and another, and he adds: "And he himself is this and that," which is tantamount to saying "he is one thing and another." St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 35, says: "And by this [Christ] is made less (to wit, Christ) and remained equal, and truly one as was said; but he is one thing on account of the Word, another on account of the humanity: on account of the Word equal to the Father, on account of the man lesser"; where Augustine says that Christ "is both," that is, lesser and equal; and by the same reason he "is one thing and another," namely lesser and equal; which he demonstrates wholly from that chapter.[689]

Next, some of the Fathers grant that, in the identical sense (as they say), Christ is two natures at once: Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 38; St. John Damascene, On the Faith, book 3, chapter 19; Anselm, On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 5; Bernard, Sermon on the Vigil of the Nativity.[690] Because of which things, a sentence might seem true to someone, which Durandus reports in the Third Book, distinction 6, question 1, number 10, namely that Christ can be said to be two in the neuter.[691]

However, the common School of Theologians together with St. Thomas in the Third Part, question 17, article 1 - whom it is not necessary to set out one by one - rightly deny that Christ can be called "two" either in the neuter or in the masculine. St. Thomas and certain others prove it

689. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 35.

690. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 38; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, 3, cap. 19; St. Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, cap. 5; St. Bernard, Sermo in vigilia Nativitatis.

691. Durandus, In III Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, n. 10.

thus: if Christ were said to be "two" in the neuter, the reason would be that Christ is two natures; but Christ cannot be called "two" natures, because although he is his divinity, he is not his humanity. Yet this reason is difficult: first, because when, in the identical sense, some of the Fathers grant that Christ is two natures, they would also grant that he is "two" in the neuter, if no other obstacle stood in the way; next also, because, as we were saying a little before, St. Cyril grants that Christ "is this and that" (which also is true in the formal sense), just as Augustine says. For since Christ is lesser and equal in the formal sense, in the same we can say, "he is this and that," "one thing and another," namely equal and lesser. Why then could we not, on account of the diverse natures and their properties, say "he is two" in the neuter?

Therefore the most cogent reason why in no way can it be said that Christ is "two" without an addition is this: whenever many things are united in something, and one thing contains those many under some union and unity, they are not said to be many. Thus Peter, although he contains many things, is not said to be many, nor two; because those many, conjoined, are simply said to be one. Now "one" and "many" are simply opposed; therefore, since Christ is not only one, but also "one thing" simply on account of the union of all the things which he has, he cannot be said to be "many," nor "two." But with an addition it would rightly be said in this way: "Christ is several natures together"; it would also be said, "there are many things in Christ," and "there are two things in Christ," just as it is said that "one thing and another is in him"; because by this manner of speaking, along with the multitude of the things which are in Christ, there is signified the unity by which they cohere in him and are Christ. Nor is it only said that "one thing and another is in Christ"; rather, Christ himself is called "one thing and another" not only in the identical sense, but also in the formal. But to say that Christ is "one thing and another" does not dissolve the unity which he has in one person; rather, that manner of speaking denotes the union; whereas to say that "Christ is two" altogether takes away unity.

Finally, it is lawful to speak as Sophronius speaks in the letter received by the Sixth Synod, action 11, where a little before the middle he said that "Christ is one and two in this very respect knowable: one indeed according to subsistence and person, but two according to the natures themselves." For when he says "one and two," not "two" absolutely, he clearly indicates two natures, but under a unity, which he who would grant "two" absolutely would not signify, nay, would take away. Therefore, in the same way, if one person of the Word should assume two humanities, although it would not be permitted to say that there are "two" absolutely, yet it would be permitted to say that there are "two men," just as if we were to say that there are "two natures," it would also be permitted to say, "in the Word there are two men." For thus "two" would be signified, not absolutely, but in the human nature; which plurality can stand together with unity. Why indeed Christ is not called "several sons," we shall say in chapter 8, where we shall also show why one is called "an artisan" who has several arts; on which basis too our adversaries strive to weaken our sentence.

They oppose to us St. Thomas.

reply to the second, where he says that therefore the Father is not called several principles, namely of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, although he has the power of spirating and of begetting, because there would be implied (says he) a plurality of supposits: that is, by that manner of speaking we should denote that there are several supposits if there are several principles. Therefore he thinks that for the plurality of a substantive name, such as "principle" is, the plurality of form does not suffice, but there is also necessary a plurality of supposits.

Next, in the Third Part, question 3, article 7, reply to the second, in the case in which a divine person should assume two humanities, he affirms that they ought not to be called two men; because a name drawn from some implicit form is said in the plural on account of the supposits; and therefore in that case, he says, it ought to be said "one man." And whereas in this article he clearly said that the plurality and singularity of the name are to be considered only and to be taken from the unity or plurality of the form, as we plainly deduced from his very text above in chapter 4, he seems even to be at odds with himself. Wherefore also the Thomists try to reconcile his statements.

Concerning these propositions Ferrarensis, in book 4 on the Contra Gentiles, chapter 11, offers two solutions.[692] The first is that the rule of St. Thomas given in this article, when he says that the plurality or singularity of the name is to be looked at from the unity or plurality of the signified form, is to be understood of concrete substantives; but the rule handed down in the Third Part, where he says that for the plurality of a name the plurality of supposits is required, is to be understood of adjectives. This solution was Capreolus's in the First Book, distinction 4, question 1, article 1, to the first of Aureolus; but Ferrarensis easily refutes it, because St. Thomas in the Third Part was plainly speaking of substantives: for the question was about the name "man," which is a substantive - whether, without a plurality of supposit, several "men" ought to be said - and he answers, they ought not.

Then Ferrarensis answers from his own position: that the formal reason of plurality and singularity in substantives is the singularity or plurality of the form, and of this St. Thomas spoke in this article; but that the singularity and plurality of supposits is also a required condition; and thus it is to be understood in the Third Part in the cited place. However, this solution can be no less easily attacked than the preceding. First, because for the singularity of a substantive name in no way is the singularity of the supposit required; otherwise three persons would not be one God, nor one man if they assumed one humanity - which is absurd, as we proved in chapter 3. Next also, even if the plurality and singularity of the form were a required condition but not the formal reason, nonetheless St. Thomas ought not, in this article, to have said that the plurality and singularity of the name are taken from the unity and plurality of the form, but he ought to have added that they are also taken from elsewhere; for they are also to be attended to from the condition, just as from the formal cause, the condition is necessarily required.

692. Ferrarienfis, In IV contra gentes, cap. 11; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 Aureoli. St. Thomas, I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2; III, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2; III, q. 17, a. 1. Sophronius, Epistola recepta a VI Synodo, actio 11.

Thirdly, some more recent Thomists judge the rule assigned by St. Thomas in this article to be true about the substantial form which carries the supposit along with itself, so that then, in general, the singularity and plurality of the name are taken from the unity and multitude of the form alone. For just as then the form bestows existence upon the supposit, so too it bestows unity or plurality upon the name. And this has place only in substantives; for although adjectives signify a form which does not give existence to the supposit but comes to it already constituted - just as the form signified by an adjective does not bestow unity and plurality upon the supposit - so neither upon the name. Such also they think the name "principle" to be, which, although it is a substantive, nevertheless, because in the Father it comes to a supposit already constituted, therefore the Father is not called "two principles," even if he has two forms of principle.

But in this way it cannot at all be reconciled and defended, what the Angelic Doctor teaches in both places. For hence it would follow either that three persons assuming the same humanity are not one man, or that one person assuming several humanities is several men; which is against the doctrine of the same, in the Third Part, in that question, article 7, both in the body and in the second reply. Moreover, the humanity assumed by the divine persons is signified as carrying the supposit along with itself; and thus one man would indeed be said, even if one [humanity] were assumed by three; but if three humanities were sustained by the same person, three men would have to be said; which also manifestly is against the doctrine of the same St. Thomas in that place. Or else that form is not signified as carrying the supposit along with itself, but as coming to one already constituted; and thus no less does it follow against his doctrine. For although, if three humanities were assumed by one person, three men would not be said, because then the plurality would have to be taken only from the form when it carries the supposit; nevertheless, if one were assumed by three, by the same reason one man would not be said, because then the unity would not be taken from the form, inasmuch as it would not carry the supposit along with itself.

Others finally among the Thomists reconcile St. Thomas's statements in another way. For the sake of this matter they premise that it falls out differently in those cases in which there is unity of nature than in those in which, together with unity of supposit, there is also unity of nature.

There is a multiplicity of natures. For some substantial form, such as the divine, can by its own nature be found in many supposits; yet no accidental form can by its nature be in many subjects. Whence it follows that, if at some time the same humanity were found in three divine supposits, even if it arrived to supposits already constituted after the manner of an accidental form; because nevertheless after the manner of a substantial form it would be one found in many, as the divine nature is, a substantive name would from it take singularity, and the three persons would be said to be one man. But when many natures would be in the same person, because they would be after the manner of an accidental form, whose proper feature it is to be multiple in the same subject, singularity of the name would be taken from the supposit, as in adjectives, even if the name were substantive. For in the former case the name is not only substantive, but also signifies after the manner of a substantive, and remains under the imposition of a substance; in the latter case, even if the name be substantive, nevertheless it signifies after the manner of an adjective, and it does not remain in its imposition as a substantive, which always signifies either one nature in one supposit,

or one in many, but never many in one. From this doctrine they thus reconcile the statements of St. Thomas, that in this article he is speaking of substantives which follow the mode and norm of substantives, as has been explained; but truly in the Third Part he treats of substantives which do not follow the norm of substantives but of adjectives, by signifying many forms in the same supposit.

It is rejected. A keen speculation indeed, but one which, when the matter is attentively considered, can easily be refuted by the reasoning with which above we confirmed our opinion. For the direct signified of a substantive name is a substantial form, not a supposit; nor does a substantive name by its imposition signify a supposit; therefore from the form, not from the supposit, ought singularity and plurality of the name to be taken. And that a substantive signify one nature in many supposits, or many in the same, matters little for saying that the primary imposition and signification of the name vary: for substantive names were from the beginning imposed to signify a substantial form in such wise that, although at that time only one supposit under one form was known, nevertheless after the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity nothing is changed in the primary signification and imposition of the name. Therefore substantive names, which now signify one form in three persons and by reason of the form are said of them in the singular, were imposed before the revelation of the mystery to signify in the same way: nor were they imposed for this, to signify one form in three; therefore it comes to the same thing if, after the imposition of the name, one form be found in many, as if it be found in three by its nature, or many forms in the same person, not by their nature but supervening upon it, as from either case we assert that the name is said in the plural or in the singular according to the unity or multitude of the form, when in the primary imposition of the name no account was had of many supposits, just as no account was had of many forms in the same person. Therefore no such substantive has been imposed to signify after the fashion of an adjective, as the aforesaid doctors maintain. And this suffices concerning the first rule which St. Thomas sets forth in this article.

Adjectival names ought to be predicated in the plural of the three persons, but of the one God in the singular.

Caput VIII - The second rule, about adjectives

It remains that we explain the second rule which the Holy Doctor set down in the same article concerning adjectives. And it is this, that the plurality and singularity of names must be taken from the singularity or plurality of supposits, not of forms. Incidentally we shall also say by what reason the substantive names of accidental forms take singularity or plurality. Now the reason for this rule is that which St. Thomas assigns there, namely, because they signify a form after the manner of something adjoined, that is, as had from another; therefore they take singularity and plurality from the supposit or subject to which they signify the form to be adjoined. And from this a difference is constituted between substantive and adjective names: that substantives, in the opposite way, signify the form as subsisting through itself, and thus as having from itself unity or plurality, and accordingly from that is taken the singularity and plurality of the name; but contrariwise in

adjectives it is taken from the subject or supposit to which they signify the form to be adjoined. And therefore adjectives directly signify subjects under such and such a form, and the same thing is said to be white as to be "having whiteness," and "omnipotent" as "having omnipotence," and in general every adjective is defined by "having" such or such a form; but a substantive, as "man," "God," since it does not signify a form as adjoining to another, but as having to be through itself, ought not to be rendered by "having" such a nature, as "God" by "having deity," and "man" by "having humanity," as will be shown more fully in the following disputation, cap. 3.

What mode of speaking follows from the aforesaid rule. This being posited, it follows that one could say three persons of the Trinity are three omnipotents, three equals, three immensities. Thus speaks the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter "Firmiter," De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, where it says thus: the Father generating, the Son being born, the Holy Spirit proceeding - consubstantial, coequal, and co-omnipotent, and coeternal.[693] But when Athanasius in the Symbol says, not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent; not three immensities, but one immense; either he takes the names substantively, as St. Thomas noted in this article;[694] just as conversely St. Hilary used the name "authors" adjectivally, when in book 2 De Trinitate he called the Father and the Son "authors" of the Holy Spirit (for it is by no means necessary that these names be taken as substantives, that is, in a substantive sense, which would require neutral usage); or certainly, since adjectival names take singularity and plurality from the bearer of the form, because they signify precisely what "having" such or such a form signifies; and in God not only the supposit but also the divine nature in the concrete has omnipotence, indeed "omnipotent God" is said proximately, as common to the three persons; therefore we can say "three omnipotents," if we refer to the persons who are said secondarily to have omnipotence; and "one omnipotent" only, if we refer to the nature itself which is said primarily to be omnipotent. Therefore, when Athanasius said "not three omnipotents but one omnipotent," he did not deny three omnipotents in respect of the persons, but in respect of the nature; and looking only to the concrete nature he denied three omnipotents, that is, "gods," and he said that one only is to be conceded. And in the same mode of speaking is St. Augustine in the book On the Trinity, cap. 8.[695]

It must, however, be noted that there are certain substantive names which signify an accidental form, or after the manner of an accident - such as "artisan," "maker," "philosopher," "creator," "governor" - which on the one hand do not seem to follow the nature of adjectives, because we do not say that the three persons are "three creators," "three makers," but "one"; in which they follow the rule of substantive names, which are numbered or receive unity according to the form. Conversely, the same man having many arts is called "one artisan," and having many philosophies - moral, natural, and political - is called "one philosopher": in which these names seem to follow the norm of adjectives, which are numbered from the subject, not from the form, or are said in the singular. And by this very argument some use themselves against the rule of substantives which we proved in cap. 4.

693. Lateran Council under Innocent III, cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica.
694. St. Thomas, in this article.
695. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book, cap. 8.

I say, therefore, that these names, even if they signify an accidental form in us, and in God a form or relation arriving in time, as "creator," "governor," "maker," because nevertheless they signify substantively, do not so much signify the form itself as the subsisting nature of that quality. I do not say "what has that form," but that they signify the very subsisting nature to which such a form of art or of creating, etc., belongs. And since in a man there is one nature, therefore he is called one philosopher, one artisan; and since in God there is one substantial nature and one individual of the Godhead, to which that denominating form belongs, therefore he is called one artisan, one creator, and one governor - even though there are many supposits - because this denomination from a form, as it were accidental, after the manner of the substantive does not extend beyond the substance itself and the nature of the thing subsisting through itself.

Nay rather, note that the name "Son" takes singularity or plurality from the supposit, not from the nature: and therefore Christ cannot be called "several sons," even if he have several filiations, as under an anathema Gregory Nazianzen defines in Oration 51;[696] and for the same reason it cannot be said that there is one Son from the Virgin and a different Son from the eternal Father. Either because the name is as it were adjectival (for it means the same as "begotten"), or because it is a name of a supposit when it is said in the concrete - even if some filiation belong to Christ by reason of the human nature - especially since the divine person, constituted by filiation, is called Son. Therefore, one who would say "two sons, not one," even if he held a catholic meaning, would ...

Articulus IV - Whether the essential names in the concrete can stand for the person.

It is objected that the essential names in the concrete cannot stand for the person so that this be true, "God begot God." Because (as the logicians say) a singular term signifies and supposes for the same. But this name, "God," seems to be a singular term, since it cannot be predicated in the plural, as was said above. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it seems that it supposes for the essence and not for the person.

1. Further. A term set in the subject is not restricted by the term placed in the predicate by reason of signification, but only by reason of the time connoted. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" supposes for the essence. Therefore, when it is said, "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate suppose for the person.
2. Further. If this is true, "God begot," because the Father begets, for the same reason this will be true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is "God begetting" and "God not begetting." And thus it seems to follow that there are two gods.
3. Further. If God begot God, either himself as God, or another God; but not himself as God, because, as St. Augustine says in On the Trinity, no thing begets itself.[697] Nor another God, because there is but one God. Therefore this is false, "God begot God."

696. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 51.
697. St. Augustine, De Trinitate.

4. Further. If God begot God, either God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. If God who is God the Father, then God the Father is begotten, which is false. If God who is not God the Father, then there is God who is not God the Father. Which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that God begot God.

But on the contrary: In the Creed it is said, "God of God."

I answer that some have said that this name "God" and similar names properly according to their nature suppose for the essence, but from an added notional [predicate] are drawn to suppose for the person. And this opinion seems to have proceeded from a consideration of the divine simplicity, which requires that in God the having and the thing had be the same. And thus the having of deity, which this name "God" signifies, is the same as deity.

But in the properties of locutions, not only the thing signified is to be attended to, but also the mode of signifying. And therefore, because this name "God" signifies the divine essence as in one having it - just as this name "man" signifies humanity in a supposit - others have spoken better, that this name "God," from its mode of signifying, has that it can properly suppose for a person, just as also this name "man." Therefore sometimes this name "God" supposes for the essence, as when it is said, "God creates," because this predicate belongs to the subject by reason of the form signified, which is deity. But sometimes it supposes for a person: either for one only, as when it is said, "God begets"; or for two, as when it is said, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said, "To the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, to the only God," etc. (1 Tim 1:17).

Reply to the first: This name "God," although it agrees with singular terms in this, that the form signified is not multiplied, nevertheless it agrees with common terms in this, that the form signified is found in several supposits. Hence it is not necessary that it always suppose for the essence which it signifies.

Reply to the second: The objection proceeds against those who were saying that this name "God" does not have a natural supposition for the person.

Reply to the third: This name "God" is related to supposing for a person otherwise than this name "man." For the form signified by this name "man," that is, humanity, is really divided into diverse supposits; it of itself supposes for a person even if nothing be added which determines it to the person, which is a distinct supposit. But the unity or community of human nature is not according to the thing, but only according to consideration. Whence this term "man" does not suppose for the common nature, unless on account of the exigency of some addition, as when it is said, "man is a species." But the form signified by this name "God," namely the divine essence, is one and common according to the thing. Whence of itself it supposes for the common nature; yet by something added its supposition is determined to the person. Hence, when it is said, "God begets," by reason of the notional act this name "God" supposes for the person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not beget," nothing is added which determines this name to the person of the Son. Whence it is given to understand that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. But if something be added pertaining to the person of the Son, the locution will be true; as if it be said, "God begotten does not beget." Hence also it does not follow, "there is God begetting and God not

begetting," unless something be posited pertaining to the persons, as, for instance, if we say, "the Father is God begetting, and the Son is God not begetting"; and thus it does not follow that there are several gods, because the Father and the Son are one God, as has been said.

Reply to the fourth: This is false, "the Father begot himself God," because "himself" (being reciprocal) refers to the same supposit to which also "the Father" refers. Therefore it would follow that the Father begot himself. Which is false. And the negation is true, "he begot God who is not God the Father." But if the construction be understood not to be appositive, but that something is interposed, then conversely the affirmation would be true and the negation false; so that the sense would be, "he begot God, who is God, who is the Father." But this is an extorted exposition. Hence it is better that simply the affirmation be denied and the negation conceded. A certain prepositor said that both the negation and the affirmation are false: because this relative "who," in the affirmative can refer to the supposit, but in the negative it refers both to the thing signified and to the supposit. Hence the sense of the affirmative is, that to be God the Father belongs to the person of the Son. But the sense of the negative is, that to be God the Father is not only removed from the person of the Son, but also from his divinity. But this seems unreasonable, since according to the Philosopher, of the same of which there is an affirmation, there can also be a negation.[698]

The conclusion is that sometimes the name "God" is supposed for the nature, sometimes for the person. We shall examine this conclusion and the doctrine of the article more deeply in the following disputations. For as regards the text of the article, there is nothing which needs special remark.

- Two scholastic opinions.
- It is to be conceded that there is a concrete of the Godhead, although in another way than Cajetan posited; the truer opinion.
- The arguments for the first opinion are solved.
- Why we cannot say, "This God is this God."

Caput I - Two scholastic opinions.

Before we come to the supposition of this name "God," it is necessary to dispute whether "this God," which is wont to be called the concrete individual of the Godhead, so precedes the persons in thought that, before we understand the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we conceive this God, and of him we enunciate something.

Henry and many more recent Thomists, to the best of their ability, deny that such an individual concrete can be understood before the persons, or before the personal properties.[699] They prove the first point thus: the name "God," by which we signify that concrete, is the name of a supposit; for the same thing is "God" as "one having deity," as is clear from St. Thomas in the reply to the first of the preceding article, and from St. John Damascene, book 3 On the Faith, chapter 11 in fine, and

698. Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias, last chapter.
699. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8; on the Sentences I, dist. 26, q. 1, n. 6; Durandus.

Nicetas, The Treasury, book 3, chapter 33.[700] But there is no common supposit which in thought precedes the three persons; therefore no such thing is the individual concrete of the Godhead. Next, if there were an individual concrete of the Godhead common to the three persons, there would also be a common individual of humanity, if one humanity were assumed by three; for the same reason seems to apply. But this cannot be; for it would follow that a man is assumed by three persons, not humanity; since, before humanity is understood in the persons, he is a man. Wherefore the same also would have happened in the assumption of humanity by the Word; but a man cannot be assumed, because a supposit would be assumed, as St. Thomas teaches in the Third Part, question 4, article 3.[701] Therefore such an individual is not to be conceded. Finally, if this concrete were granted, there would likewise be granted a concrete "spirator" common to the two spirating persons; but no one, or very few, concede this. Why then ought we to assert the individual of the Godhead?

Cajetan, however, in this article, and in the Third Part, question 2, article 2, around the solution to the third, and question 3, articles 2 and 3, not only builds up such an individual and the concrete of the Godhead prior to the persons, but even calls it a semi-supposit or a semi-person, lest, if he should say person or supposit, he should seem to introduce a quaternity in God.[702] He proves it by a twofold reason. One is that we enunciate many things of "this God" which do not belong to him by reason of the persons, but by reason of the essence: as when we say, "one God creates," and other things of that sort. Therefore that individual concrete of the essence is understood before the persons. For which reason St. Thomas in this article expressly noted that the name "God," in this proposition "God creates," is supposed for the nature, not for the person; and the same was taught by St. John Damascene and Nicetas in the places a little above alleged. But since it is not supposed for the abstract nature, therefore for the concrete of that [nature], which we now endeavor to prove. On account of this concrete, too, Cajetan says that that saying of Athanasius in the Creed is true: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; not, however, three gods, but one is God." Who then would dare to deny that there is in this way one God who is predicated in common of the three persons? The other reason is taken from his doctrine, which, as we have recalled in Disputation 125, chapter 2, holds that there is given a certain absolute subsistence of the deity, common to the three persons, which in thought is prior to the three personal subsistences. Since, therefore, the concrete of a nature seems to be nothing else than the nature subsisting, and before the three persons are understood the subsisting deity is understood, therefore here too "this God" in the concrete is also understood numerically.

Caput II - On the individual concrete of the deity prior to the persons

Moreover, if there were granted an individual concrete of the deity common to the three persons, there would also be a common individual of the humanity, if one humanity were assumed by three; for the same reason seems to hold. But this cannot be; because it would follow that a man

700. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 3, cap. 11, in fine; Nicetas, Thesaurus, book 3, cap. 33.
701. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4, a. 3.

would be assumed by three persons, not the human nature; for, before the humanity be understood in persons, there is already a man: wherefore the same would have happened now in the assumption of the humanity by the Word. But a man is not assumed, because a supposit (*suppositum*) would be assumed, as St. Thomas teaches in the Third Part, question 4, article 3; therefore such an individual is not to be conceded.[703]

Finally, if this concrete were granted, there would also be granted the concrete of the spirator common to the two spirating persons; but this none, or scarcely any, grant: why then ought we to assert also the individual of the deity?

Cajetan, however, in this article and in the Third, not only constructs such an individual, a concrete supposit of the deity prior to the persons; but further he calls it a semi-supposit (*semi-suppositum*), or semi-person, lest, if he said person or supposit, he might seem to introduce a quaternity in God. But he proves it by a twofold reason. The first is, that we enunciate many things of this God, which do not belong by reason of the persons, but by reason of the essence (*essentia*): as when we say, one is creator, and other things of that sort: therefore an individual as the concrete of the essence is understood prior to the persons. For which reason St. Thomas in this article expressly noted that the name "God," in that proposition, "God creates," stands for the nature, not for the person; the same is taught by St. John Damascene and by Nicetas in the places a little above alleged.[704] And yet it does not stand for an abstract nature; therefore it stands for the concrete of that nature, which we now are striving to prove. On account of this concrete Cajetan says that what Athanasius says in the Symbol is true, "the Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God, not three gods, but one God." Who then will deny that there is now one God in the way that is predicated commonly of the three persons?

The other reason is taken from his doctrine, which, as we recalled above in Disputation 125, chapter 2, holds that there is given a certain absolute subsistence (*subsistentia*) of the deity common to the three persons, which in thought is prior to the personal subsistences. Since the concrete of a nature seems to be nothing else than the nature subsisting, and before the three persons are understood the subsisting deity is understood, therefore here too "God" in the concrete is understood numerically, and for that reason it is called a semi-person, because it is subsistent; but because it does not yet subsist incommunicably, it is not a perfect and complete person. Hence Cajetan further infers that this individual is peculiar to the divine nature and does not befit any created nature: wherefore, if the human nature were assumed by three (he himself says), it would not have such a concrete before it were understood in persons; because, since such an individual is constituted by nature and common subsistence, and this belongs only to the divine nature by reason of infinity (for other natures subsist only by the subsistence of a supposit), only in it, and not in another nature, can such a concrete be assigned.[705]

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702. Cajetan, on this article; and Summa theologiae, III, q. 2, a. 2 (on the solution to the third), and q. 3, a. 2 - 3. Also Disputation 125, cap. 2 above. Athanasius, Symbolum (Quicumque).

703. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4, a. 3.

704. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3 ad 1; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, III, c. 11; Nicetas, Thesaurus, III, c. 33.

705. Cajetan, on this article; and on Summa theologiae, III, q. 2, a. 2 (solution to the third), and q. 3, a. 2 - 3.

However, before we set forth our own position, it pleases me incidentally to note something against Cajetan, either against the concrete of the deity, or at least against his reason for it, and to collect the same against any other nature. For if three persons were to assume one humanity, we would enunciate such propositions about that one man as we affirm about the one God who is in three: for we would say, "This one man sits, walks, eats," etc.; we would also say, "The Father is man, the Son is man, the Holy Spirit is man," and yet not three men, but one man. But as for the common subsistence, by reason of which Cajetan constitutes that concrete individual of the deity, we said quite sufficiently above in Disputation 125, chapter 3, where I proved, that there is no such common thing which deserves the name subsistence, nor is there anything of this sort by reason of which the concrete of the deity could be constituted; because there is only the common existence (*esse commune*), by which the deity and any nature is approved to exist.[706] Finally, Cajetan improperly calls that individual a semi-person, since no one until now has used this word: indeed, if he retained the mode of speaking which he usurped about the common subsistence, he ought to call it in full a supposit. For just as he called the act of existence (*esse*) of the divine nature itself "subsistence," not "semi-subsistence," so that which is constituted by it he ought not to call a semi-supposit, nor a semi-hypostasis, but absolutely a supposit and hypostasis (*hypostasis*), especially since it is the same as subsistence and that which hypostasis is, if you render the word by word.

That a concrete of the deity must be conceded, although in another way than Cajetan posited, is the truer opinion.

I for my part think it necessary to concede that the individual concrete of the deity, in our thought, is prior to the persons; although by a very different reason than that by which Cajetan asserted it; and in the same way, if one created nature were assumed by many persons; and in any nature with respect to its supposit. First, I think this kind of concrete must be conceded as necessary on account of those various enunciations which Cajetan mentioned, which are not only to be conceded in the divine nature, but also in the human, if one were assumed by three. There are also many others, even when we use notional terms and words, in which such a concrete must necessarily be understood, and the name must stand for it.

Second, that this concrete cannot in its concept include the persons in the singular is plain; because, if to the constitution of the concrete of the deity which we call "God" there belonged the three persons in the singular, even in the oblique case, neither would three be said to be one God, nor would God be common to the three persons. For that which in its own concept includes these three supposits in particular cannot be common to the three and befit each one; and so Thomists who concede this individual of the deity, and say that of its very ratio are the persons themselves, or include them in its concept, cannot but fall into those absurdities which we have mentioned.

Third, that this individual in our thought is prior to the persons can readily be proved and explained from the doctrine of the preceding disputation, chapter 4. For when we say that concrete names of natures, such as "man" and "God," directly signify the nature and connote the person in which the nature subsists, this must be understood so that it does not connote this or that person

706. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 125, c. 3.

in particular, that is, this or that singular supposit, but universally this or that person or supposit. For just as we said above that the concretes of natures are not counted by the connoted element, but by the directly signified, so also the demonstrative pronoun does not demonstrate the connoted, but the directly signified; and thus it is said "this man," not because he is in this supposit, but because this nature is in this or that supposit. And therefore we say "this God" numerically, demonstrating the nature, not the persons: for if we demonstrated them, it would not be said "this God" which was and was demonstrated before the revelation of the mystery, when it was not established concerning the three persons, which is absurd. Therefore, since the word "God" and "this God," which are concrete names of the deity, signify altogether the same thing after the revelation of the mystery of the three persons, it follows that before the revelation those concretes did not connote this or that person in particular, but the person universally; and the same reason will be of all the others: for when the connoted element is changed, the signification of the name is also changed; nor can it be said that what is signified by the name is the same when a change has been made in the connoted element. Whence it is that the concrete of the deity is prior in our thought to the persons, with that kind of priority with which the universal is prior to the particular; as "animal" is said to be prior to the particular, namely, to "man"; about which Aristotle in the Predicaments, in the chapter on the modes of prior, treats.[707] Therefore we rightly understand "this God" before we think this and that person of the Trinity. But that the connoted element is common does not hinder the name "God," or the name "this God" or "this man," from being singular. For a name is said to be singular from the directly signified, not from the connoted; although for forming an expository syllogism it is not a fit middle term, as we noted in Disputation 123, chapter 3. And from this it is evident that a concrete of the deity is assigned by us otherwise than by Cajetan and the other Thomists.[708]

Likewise the same must be said of human things and of creatures. Fourth, in the same way it follows that there is an individual of the humanity and of any nature, which in our thought is prior to the persons. Because the concretes of other natures are signified with the connotation of a supposit not in the singular, but universally, just as the concrete of the deity; for the same reason is of all: therefore the concrete, as something common on the part of the connoted, precedes in our consideration the persons. And thus, if one humanity were assumed by three persons, the concrete of the humanity would be demonstrated absolutely in the same way, and we would say "this man," not pointing out this or that person in particular; just as we have shown that the concrete of the deity is demonstrated without a singular person being demonstrated.

707. Aristotle, Categories, on the modes of the prior.
708. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 123, c. 3.

Caput III - The arguments for the first opinion are solved

Setting aside the reasons of Cajetan which, as we saw in the first and in the second chapter, only prove that there is given a concrete of the deity prior to the persons in our consideration, not in the same way in which he constitutes it; it remains to solve the arguments which are brought forward for the opinion of Durandus and Henry in chapter 1.

Reply to the first argument from the authority of St. Thomas, St. John Damascene, and Nicetas, who interpret the concrete name "God" or "man" by these names, "having deity," or "having humanity": I answer that these two are not of the same signification, "God" and "having deity," and I think the same of other concrete substantives. For, as we shall say in the following disputation, many absurdities would follow in the mode of speaking about the mystery of the Trinity. We would then say that there are three gods, because there are three "havings" of deity; and it would follow that God generates another God, because one "having deity" generates another "having deity": and since St. Thomas admits in the reply to the third of this question that we must not say "three gods," although we say "three having deity," because "having deity" signifies adjectivally, whereas "God" signifies substantively; he plainly grants that those two names do not signify the same in the same mode, just as an adjective and a substantive are never of the same signification. Therefore when those two Fathers said that "God" is "one having deity," they did not think the mode of signifying entirely equal on both sides; but they said this to show that it is not licit to use the word "deity" abstractly for a person, that is, to predicate of it what is said of a person, because the abstract is understood; but truly, because the name "God" is placed in any person, it is said of it what we enunciate of a person; because it signifies the nature conjoined with the person. Thus says St. John Damascene, from whom Nicetas took the same thing. But the word "God" signifies both the community of the nature and it is placed in each person, just as "man": for God is he who is endowed with the divine nature, and man he who is endowed with the human; and if he were to say that therefore the name "God" is placed in any person, this is, that it is said of it what we enunciate of any person, because he who is endowed with the divine nature is God. Wherefore he does not expound the concrete "God" by "having deity," nor does he predicate "God" of one having deity, so that again he might enunciate of God what befits the person. Therefore the proposition of St. John Damascene must be understood, as it were, by conversion. But when it is said in the argument that the name "God" is a name of the supposit, it must plainly be denied: but it must be said to be a name of the nature, connoting the supposit; nor do we only say that there is not given a common supposit, but also that common concrete cannot rightly be called a semi-supposit, or semi-person, as against Cajetan I noted in chapter 1.[704]

Reply to the second: we concede that there is also given an individual concrete of the humanity, just as of the deity: but from this it does not follow that "man" was assumed by God. For although "man" precedes in our thought this or that particular supposit, nevertheless it does not precede a supposit in general. Wherefore, if before the humanity were assumed by the Word, "man" were

704. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3 ad 1; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, III, c. 11; Nicetas, Thesaurus, III, c. 33.

already understood, the humanity would be understood to be in some supposit: but it cannot be understood to be in any other, for it was in none other, nor did it remain in any, except in the divine; therefore Christ did not assume "a man," since the nature alone did he assume, which previously could not be thought as suppositated in any manner. If he assumed a nature previously suppositated either by a proper supposit or by some other divine person, it would not be said that he assumed a man; because he would not terminate that nature inasmuch as it was suppositated in another supposit, but only inasmuch as the humanity was, as we shall show at length in the Third Part, q. 4, a. 3.[703]

Reply to the third: we gladly concede likewise that, in the same way, there is not the concrete of "spirator," just as of "God," constituted as Gabriel related in Disputation 149, chapter 4; for he asserts that it is constituted from the essence and active spiration, as from a property contracting; but by that very way by which we have conceded the individual of the deity, namely, that the spirator be the nature with the common property of spirating, connoting the supposit in the oblique case. And because the Spirit proceeds of himself from the Father and the Son as from two spirating, because he is their mutual love, therefore the concrete "spirator" will connote two supposits, not this or that particular one. Wherefore, if in other two persons there were the same in number nature and property, they would by the very same be "spirator": because this concrete, by the force of its signification, does not express this or that person; and yet it must be said that paternity and filiation belong of themselves to the production of the Holy Spirit, because they are the very objects of such love by which the Holy Spirit proceeds.[709]

By what reason we may say, "This God is this God."

Caput IV - On the sense of the proposition "This God is this God"

Canarensis, in the Third Part, on the commentary of the present article, does not well hold this proposition, "This God is this God," neither that it must be absolutely denied nor that it must be absolutely conceded; but that, a distinction being applied, it must both be denied and conceded. Lest, if we were to concede it absolutely, we should seem to prop up the error of the Gentiles asserting many gods; nor, if we were to deny it absolutely, should we seem, with Sabellius, to confound the persons. For some incautiously used to say that it must be conceded, others indeed that it must be denied, showing the Father on the part of the subject and the Son, or another person, on the part of the predicate. Either therefore the sense is (says Canus): "The Father, who is God, is the Son, who is God"; and in this way he thinks it must be denied: or the sense is, "The Father and the Son are the same God"; and thus he thinks it must be altogether conceded. He thinks the same of this proposition, "God generating is God generated." For if you render this sense, "The Father, who begets, is the Son, who is begotten," the proposition is false; but if the

703. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4, a. 3.
709. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 149, c. 4.

sense be, "The Father begetting and the Son begotten are the same God," it is true; the same of this, "This spirator is this spirated," with respect to the Father and the Son; and of this, "This man is this man," if one humanity were in three persons.

But I for my part think that the sense of the aforesaid proposition is plain, if we rightly hold the signified of this concrete "God": for since "God" cannot directly signify the person, unless a notional term be added to it, the proposition, "This God is this God," will be true, if the name "God" be modified by the pronoun "this," and not set appositively, as grammarians speak. For, as we said above, just as numerical names follow the unity or multitude of form, because in these concretes of natures, substantive names signify only the form directly, and therefore, where there is one form and nature as in God, names of multitude cannot be conjoined, but singular ones; so also the demonstrative pronoun "this" cannot demonstrate the persons (for these are not signified by that name, but connoted), but demonstrates the nature and the concrete of the deity, which, since it is one, always, either on the part of the predicate or on the part of the subject, demonstrates the same God. Therefore the proposition, "This God is this God," will be true and not to be distinguished as Canarensis distinguishes; and it is not possible to demonstrate the Father on the part of the subject and the Son on the part of the predicate, or the contrary: for if this were truly possible, we could also say, "This God is not this God," and it would follow that there is a different and another God, and consequently two gods, of whom the one would not be the other. Then we would say, "These two are the Father and the Son," of whom to say -

on the contrary:

We would be saying, "This God is not God." These are plainly absurd, and against the legitimate signification of the word.

I answer:

Yet I said that this is to be understood when the pronoun "this" affects the noun "God." For if "God" is set appositively, so that the sense is, "This, who is God, is this, who is God," the proposition is to be denied, if on the part of the subject it demonstrates the Son, and on the part of the predicate it demonstrates the Father. For "this," absolutely placed, demonstrates the supposit according to the rules handed down in Disputation 145, chapter 6.[710] Then the name "God," appositively, signifies the same as if you were to say, "Who is God"; but in this way that sense is false, and the negative proposition is true; as if we were to say, "The Son, who is God, is not the Father, who is God." But this sense is not the common one, and it must be distinguished by the mode of utterance and the point of position. The very same judgment must be given about this proposition, "This spirator is not this spirator": for there is an individual of "spirator," as we said in the preceding chapter.

Finally, in the same proportion one must speak about that proposition, "God begotten is God begetting." For either the word "begotten" is placed appositively, and it is true; the sense is, "God, who is begotten, is God, who is begetting": for since there is one God who is at once begotten and

710. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 145, c. 6.

begetting, it is rightly said, "God, who is begotten, is God, who is begetting"; for there is not one God who is begotten, and another God who is begetting. But if that word "begotten" is not set appositively, and the word "begetting" likewise, the proposition is false; for in this way those words affect the term "God" so as to make it supposit for Father and Son: for notional terms added to essential ones sometimes make them supposit for a person, as will be clear in the following disputation. But one must not judge in the same way about this proposition, "Begetting God is begotten God," because whether the name "God" is set appositively, or is affected by other words, it is always false. For whether you say, "Begetting God is begotten God," that is, "the Father is the Son"; or, "the begetter, who is God, is the begotten, or the Son, who is God," it is always a false assertion.

It is objected:

But someone may object to us with Anselm, who in the tract On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 6, teaches that when one says, "This man," or, "that man," now the person is shown; just as with a proper name one names "Christ," or "Peter": therefore likewise, when one says, "This God," the same person is shown, and so we could show various persons by this name, as by this name "This man," so that one might not be predicated of another: in the same way as if we were to say, "This man," with Peter pointed out, "is not this man," with John pointed out.

It is answered:

We reply that Anselm taught only this, to assign a discrimination between universal names, as the object "man," and singulars, as "this man": because universals can in no way be taken for a person; but singulars indeed, as "this man," since they demonstrate a contracted nature, demonstrate it in a supposit, not that they directly show the supposit.

Which of these propositions, "God generates," "God does not generate," is true, which is false. Disputation 157.

By what reason the more ancient Scholastics say the affirmative proposition is true. Chapter 1.

The negative proposition is held to be true by Durandus and the Nominalists. Chapter 2.

The truer opinion, which asserts that the aforesaid propositions are contradictory, and that the affirmative is true, the negative indeed false, is variously proved by the Scholastics. Chapter 3.

The same opinion is shown by the best reason. Chapter 4.

Certain objections against this supposition of the name "God" are dissolved. Chapter 5.

The name "God," unless something be added to it, is always used to supposit for the concrete individual of the Godhead. Chapter 6.

What must be thought about this proposition, "God begot another God." Chapter 7.

Disputatio CLVII - Which of the propositions "God generates" and "God does not generate" is true

Caput I - Why the ancients said the affirmative proposition is true

There is no one among the Scholastics who says that the affirmative proposition "God generates" is not true: about the supposition of the name "God" in that proposition they do not agree. For St. Thomas in this article and in I, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 2; St. Bonaventure, q. 4; Gabriel, q. 1, article 1, note 6; Gregory, in the single question; Capreolus, question 1, article 3, to the second and the third; and the last of Aureolus; and Aureolus in the first question; and Canariensis in part 2 of the commentary on this article, hold that the name "God," when it is placed absolutely without any additum, supposits for the essence of God, understood concretely: but when a notional term is added, it determines it so that it supposits for some person according to that which the term postulates.[711]

They think the same about other propositions in which some notional act is enunciated about God.

Nor indeed did St. Thomas in this article in the solution to the third think that the name "God" is always used to supposit for the person, at least confusedly, as Cajetan very well noted on this article in his reply to doubts about the third solution: for he merely asserts that sometimes it is used to supposit for the person, namely when a notional term is added. And in the reply to the second he answers that that argument has force only against those who assert that the name "God" cannot have natural supposition for the person, as if to say: we concede that sometimes it supposits for the person; yet for that reason he does not affirm that it always supposits for it. And in I, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 2, he says, "The name 'God' not only imports the nature, but the supposit indistinctly; and therefore of itself has it, that it can supposit properly for the person." He did not say that it actually always supposits for the person, but that it can, because it confusedly imports the supposit, as he says. For as we noted in the preceding disputation, since a concrete name of a nature connotes the supposit vaguely, it is rightly said that a name of nature imports a supposit, and accordingly St. Thomas judges that, not always, but sometimes, it is used to supposit for it. But Capreolus, who in the place cited thinks the aforesaid proposition to be true, also teaches that the name "God" not only distinctly supposits for the person when a notional term is added, as in that proposition, but also that it always, at least confusedly, supposits for the person, in whatever way it is placed.

Caput II - The opinion of Durandus and the Nominalists that the negative is true

About the other proposition, "God does not generate," there is greater dissension among the Scholastics. For Durandus in I, dist. 4, q. 2, n. 12 and following; Aureolus, question 1, as is reported by Capreolus in the place cited; Gabriel, question c., article 2, conclusion 2; Gregory, in the single

question, in the verse "But a doubt remains"; and Marsilius in I, question 8, article 3, to the second principal reason, affirm that, the propriety of the words being maintained, this proposition "God does not generate" is no less true than the affirmative; but that it should be denied on account of scandal, lest we seem to deny generation in God.

Gabr. proves the first point thus: since the subject of these propositions, which is "God," is not an entirely singular term, but in some way common, and therefore is not a fit middle in an expository syllogism, as was said in Disputation 123, chapter 3,[712] and is not distributed in any of the aforesaid propositions, the propositions will not be contradictory, nor contrary, but subcontrary, as the logicians say: as these, "A man runs," "A man does not run"; therefore it is not necessary, if the affirmative is true, that the negative be false: for both can be true at once according to the rules of the logicians: therefore just as this is true, "A man does not run," one man not running, even if others run; because the term "man" is common and signifies this man and that indistinctly: so also this will be true, "God does not generate"; because the term "God" is common, signifying this person and that not distinctly, and one of those persons does not generate.

From this community of the name Durandus gathers, number 10, that it is not the same thing to prepose the negation to the proposition or to postpose it. For if it be preposed in this way, "Not God generates," it is the contradictor of the affirmative, and hence false; just as if it were preposed to that proposition, "A man runs," it would be made the contradictor of the affirmative, and hence false, if the affirmative were true, or conversely; whereas with the negation postposed it is made only subcontrary, and can be true at the same time: for it makes very much difference whether the negation be preposed or postposed, whenever the subject of the proposition is not an entirely singular term: for if it is singular, it is all one. But if the term "God" is entirely singular, then whatever things are denied of God are also denied of every person; and on that account the proposition "God does not generate" is false: and by the same reasoning whatever is enunciated of this term will also be said of every supposit. Wherefore if this is true, "God generates," this also will be true, "The Son generates," which is absurd. But St. Thomas, in the place of the First Book of the Sentences cited, says that the name "God" is partly singular and partly common; and by reason of commonness it is enunciated essentially of the supposits, and whatever is said of the supposits is also affirmed of him, namely of God; by reason of singularity, however, it has it that the negation and the affirmation about him are set in contradictory opposition and not in subcontrary. Wherefore if this is true, "God generates," as all admit, this must be false, "God does not generate."

So teach St. Thomas in this article ad 3, and in I, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; St. Bonaventure, question 1, ad 3; Capreolus, question 1, article 2; Cajetan, and more recent theologians on this article; and Canariensis in part 3 of the commentary, doubt 2.[713] Yet to render the proper reason of this seems difficult. First, St. Bonaventure says that the name "God" is singular; and therefore it

711. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3; In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 4. Gabriel Vázquez, q. 1, a. 1, n. 6. Gregory of Rimini, Quaestio unica. Capreolus, I, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2 et ad 3; and the last of Aureolus; Aureolus, Quaestio prima. Canariensis, Part 2 of the commentary on this article.

712. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 123, c. 3.

713. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3 ad 3; In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1 ad 3. Capreolus, I, q. 1, a. 2. Cajetan, on this article. Canariensis, Part 3 of the commentary on this article, doubt 2.

amounts to the same thing to prepose the negation by saying, "Not God generates," and already to postpose it by saying, "God does not generate": but that proposition, "Not God generates," is manifestly false; for it removes generation from God in any supposit, as if we could say, "No God generates": therefore that will also be false, "God does not generate." To this reason, however, the things that in the previous chapter were adduced from Durandus, to prove that the name "God" is not entirely singular, seem to stand in the way, to which we must give satisfaction.

St. Thomas in this article ad 3 assigns another reason. He says, therefore, that in that proposition "God generates" the name "God" is narrowed by reason of the notional term adjoined on the part of the predicate, so that it supposits for the person of the Father; but in that, "God does not generate," unless by an added reason a like restriction could be made, so that it would supposit for the person of the Son. Wherefore, in my judgment, that proposition of the divine nature confusedly - namely, for that nature in any supposit - repugns generation; this being posited, "God," no determination being made, is used to supposit for the nature. This reason, followed by Cajetan on this article around the solution to the third, replying to the first and second of Aureolus, teaches that the name "God" in the negative proposition is used to supposit for the undetermined concrete of the Godhead, in consequence of which there arises a dispute about the force of the expression, and thus that it is false, which signification St. Thomas wishes, not contending in any way to equal its force with generation. With whom Capreolus seems to agree in I, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 2; for he says that in the negative proposition the name "God" supposits "for the thing of nature confusedly," that is, for the supposit indistinctly.

But many follow Cajetan: Soto, book 5 of the Summulae, part ..., in the chapter "De electione," question, notation 3.[714] Canariensis rejects this reasoning in many ways, from which this argument seems effectual: If the name "God" in the affirmative proposition were used to supposit for the per -

Caput III - On the contradictory status of "God generates" and "God does not generate"

If the name "God" in the affirmative supposits for the person of the Father, and in the negative for the concrete individual of the Godhead, it would follow that the propositions "God generates" and "God does not generate" are not contradictories; because they are not about the same subject, which seems absurd. And indeed St. Thomas clearly asserted that they are contradictories, and St. Bonaventure agreed, when he said that it is the same thing to prepose the negation as to postpone it, because the term is altogether singular: with the negation prefixed, there is truly a contradiction; or at least, if a contradictory were to be assigned to this proposition "God generates," it ought to be this one, "the Father does not generate"; because in the affirmative "God" supposits for the Father. But who will say that we can assign a contradiction with the same terms? Or that the contradictory of this, "God generates," must necessarily be this, "the Father does not generate"? Or who will deny that it is altogether the same to prepose and to postpone the negation to this term "God"? For we signify the same thing when we say, "Not God generates," and "God does not generate."

714. Domingo de Soto, Summulae, book 5, part..., in cap. De electione, q., notation 3.

Next, Cajetan does not sufficiently prove why the name "God" in the affirmative proposition is determined by reason of that predicate, "generates," so as to supposit for the Father; and why in the negative it cannot be determined by that predicate, "does not generate," so as to supposit for the Son and the Holy Spirit. For it is no less proper to the Son and the Holy Spirit alone not to generate, than it is to the Father alone to generate.

But let us hear the reason of Cajetan: In the affirmative (he says) therefore the name "God" is restricted by reason of that predicate, so as to supposit for the Father alone; because to generate is proper to the Father alone. But "not to generate" is not proper to the Son and the Holy Spirit alone; it is also proper to the essence, and therefore the name "God" cannot be determined by such a predicate, so that it supposits for the Son and the Holy Spirit alone. But since "not to generate" belongs only to the essence as noted abstractly, whereas as signified concretely; for the divine essence is rather said concretely to generate, that is, "God," or the individual of the Godhead - as will be proved below from the same Cajetan - it follows that in that proposition, "God does not generate," that predicate "does not generate" can determine the subject "God," so that it supposits for the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom alone it belongs not to generate. Then also, if that predicate "does not generate" belongs to the divine nature signified concretely, it follows that that proposition, "God does not generate," will be true, if the subject "God" supposits for the concrete individual of the Godhead; the opposite of which was taught by Cajetan. Or it must be said that the name "God" in that negative proposition supposits neither for the individual of the Godhead nor for the Son and the Holy Spirit, but for the person of the Father; because it cannot supposit for another: but why shall we say it supposits rather for the Father than for the Son and the Holy Spirit?

Moreover, since we truly say, "God is begotten," "God is unbegotten," if "unbegotten" is taken notionally for the property of the Father, a reason must still be given why it is not permitted to say, "God generates," "God does not generate," since "to generate" and "not to generate" seem to be the same as "begotten" and "unbegotten."

Finally, the Canariensis thus interprets the mind of the holy Doctor in both: that in each proposition the name "God" supposits for the person of the Father, and therefore there is truly a contradiction, "God generates," "God does not generate"; the former being true, the latter false. He infers this from the fact that in the text, in solution 3, he said that in the negative there is no term by reason of which the name "God" could be determined so as to supposit for the person of the Son. He did not say (says the Canariensis) "for the person of the Father," because he did not intend to exclude the name "God" from supposition for that, but only for the person of the Son. The Canariensis is further persuaded of this because we cannot deny that those two propositions are contradictories, as St. Thomas and the others cited above admit; but in the affirmative the name "God" supposits for the person of the Father: therefore it will be the same in the negative, because they are about the same subject.

Yet this reasoning and the doctrine of the Canariensis do not satisfy me: for although a common term in an affirmative and true proposition could be determined so as to supposit for some singular - for instance, if we were to say, "Some man runs," the subject "man" could be determined

for Peter running - nevertheless in the negative proposition, "Man does not run," it cannot happen that it is determined for the same singular for which it supposited in the affirmative: for he who says, "Man does not run," does not determine him who runs, but vaguely this one or another. Therefore similarly, although the term "God," in a certain manner common to the persons, would be determined in the affirmative by the addition of that predicate, for the Father who generates, nevertheless it cannot be that in the negative it is determined for the same; but of itself it is put indiscriminately for the Father or for another person. And truly, this interpretation which the Canariensis applies to the text of St. Thomas is not according to his mind, as will appear below.

Further defense of the same opinion

The same opinion is shown by the best reason.

Caput IV - The logical supposition of the name "God" in "God generates" and "God does not generate"

Further, in order to show as well the truth of that proposition "God generates" as the falsity of that one "God does not generate," first we must see for what the name "God" supposits in each proposition, and to that end a definition of supposition must be premised. Now supposition, as Peter of Spain teaches in the Summulae, is the acceptance of a term for something of which the proposition is true. Other logicians thus define it: for a term in a proposition to supposit for some thing is nothing else than that the term be placed in the proposition and the thing which it signifies exist, as the copula of the proposition denotes. For if the term is put for a thing which is not, they truly say it is not supposed; wherefore many logicians think that in this proposition, "Man is disputing," when Peter is disputing, the subject "man" supposits for Peter, by reason of whom the enunciation is true. And in this way they teach that the signification of the name extends more widely than supposition: because signification comprehends all the things which the word according to its imposition has been wont to denote; but supposition is a determinate signification for that thing alone by reason of which the enunciation is true.

But since such is the nature of words that they are substituted for concepts and things, I think that there is nothing else to the supposition of a name than the subrogation of it in the place of the thing: and this is the same as signification. For, in order to make present to the hearer the thing which we conceive in mind, we supposit by the voice. Which my view has this consequence, that the signification of the name extends as widely - in fact is entirely the same - as supposition. Whence it happens that, in the aforesaid proposition, "Man is disputing," if Peter alone is disputing, the term does not supposit for Peter, but for the concept of man vaguely and indefinitely. For although the proposition is true of Peter alone, nevertheless the word equally signifies him and another, and it is enunciated indiscriminately of this man or that one, although for the truth of the proposition it suffices that Peter dispute.

From this account it is easy to gather for what the name "God" supposits in those two propositions: it supposits for that which it signifies; and since the name "God" of itself signifies the concrete individual of the Godhead, as was explained in the preceding disputation, and that is the very divine nature directly signified with a connotation of person indistinctly and in general, it follows that in those two propositions the name "God" supposits for that individual directly, connoting a person confusedly. Wherefore to affirm generation of it will be true; but to deny it will be false; and in this affirmation and negation there will truly be a contradiction. It is not necessary, however, to assert that the name "God" in the affirmative proposition supposits for the person of the Father, but for the concrete, with some person vaguely connoted; although by reason of one determinate, namely the Father, the proposition is rendered true. Why, moreover, the negative is false, when that name "God" supposits for that concrete, we shall say a little below.

This is our view; it is that of Scotus in the first Book, distinction 7, question 1, s. quia autem, where he asserts that the name "God" in the affirmative proposition supposits for that concrete individual of the Godhead.[715] Cajetan also agrees in the following article around solution 3, when he says that the name "God" can be supposed in this way in the affirmative proposition; although he also says it can be supposed for the person of the Father. But in this latter way without doubt Cajetan does not take supposition for the whole signification of the name absolutely, but only for that part by which the proposition is rendered true; which we do not deny; nor does St. Thomas dissent in the places cited. For in this article in solution 3 he therefore asserts that this proposition "God does not generate" is false, because that negation removes generation from the divine nature in whatever person; which is true for no other reason, unless because "God" concretely connotes persons vaguely and directly signifies the nature. Wherefore he who denies generation of God, denies it of the divine nature, in whatever person he denies it. Nor does it stand in the way that he says of the same name "God," in the body of the article, that in the affirmative proposition it supposits for the Father: for he takes "supposition" in that place not for the whole signification of the name, but for that part by which the proposition is rendered true. But if the discourse were about signification, the holy Doctor would not deny that this name signifies the same in the affirmative as in the negative proposition - namely, the divine nature concretely, connoting persons indefinitely. For since he grants that those propositions are contradictories, he must admit that in each the name "God" signifies the same; otherwise there would not be an affirmation and negation about the same, and therefore neither would those propositions be able to have the relation of contradictories.

I answer: the direct signification of the name "God" is not persons, but the nature; but persons are by it indirectly and indistinctly connoted, as we said in the preceding chapter. Wherefore this name, by reason of its direct signification, is most singular, but by reason of its connotation it has a certain commonness. And since a universal and a particular sign, such as "every," "no," "some," affects the direct signification of a name, it follows that to this term "God" no sign of this sort can be adjoined: for these can only affect words that are common by reason of their direct signification; whereas, when it is added to a name, they modify its direct signification, as we noted in the

715. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, s. "quia autem".

disputation of the preceding chapter, last section, about the demonstrative pronoun. And therefore we cannot say "no God," "every God," "some God"; for then we would denote that there are many gods directly signified by that name. Yet we can add to the connotata whatever signs you please; for we can say, God in some person begets, in every person he does not beget, etc., because on the side of the connotatum there is a certain community.

Hence it follows that, for the truth of that affirmative proposition, "God begets," it is enough if the divine nature begets in one person. For, that an affirmative proposition of some singular subject be true, it is enough that in some way the predicate belong to it; as when we say, "Peter disputes" or "walks": for the proposition to be true, it suffices that Peter dispute or walk in some place, since there is no sign distributing for every place. Yet for the truth of the negative, "God does not beget," it is necessary that God in no person beget; for the negative particle "not" has the force of distributing. And although, when "not" is placed after a common term, it does not affect that term nor distribute it, but only the words to which it is prefixed; when placed after, it distributes the connotata of that term and denies the predicate in every way and respect, because the term is singular and does not admit of any division as a common term does. Wherefore he who says, "God does not beget," denies generation of the whole God, so as to deny it to him absolutely, and therefore in every person. Just as he who says, "Peter does not walk" or "does not dispute," signifies that he neither disputes nor walks in any place or time: so then it affects the predicate, as altogether to remove it from the subject. For if it belongs to God in some person to beget, how will it be true "not to beget"?

Hence it follows that this syllogism is not legitimate: The Son is not the Father; the Son is God; therefore God is not the Father. For this conclusion, "God is not the Father," is universal on the side of the connotatum of this name "God," and the term "God," by reason of the connotatum, is in a certain way distributed; for it makes this sense, "God in no person is Father"; and yet that same term "God" was in no way distributed in the antecedent: for in the minor, "The Son is God," the term "God" is not distributed by reason of itself, as is clear, nor by reason of the connotatum; for the sense is not, "God is in every person," but "in some person." A similar syllogism is this: The Son does not beget; the Son is God; therefore God does not beget; and it has the same defect.

From what has been said the argument of Durandus is also easily dissolved. I answer, therefore, that these two propositions, "God begets," "God does not beget," are not subcontraries, as these are, "man disputes," "man does not dispute," but truly contradictories, because the term "God" is singular according to its direct signification, and the particle "not" denies the predicate absolutely and according to every connotatum; whereas the name "man" is common, and therefore those propositions of this word are subcontraries. And by the same reasoning, since the term "God" is singular by reason of the direct signification, it is the same (as Bonaventure noted, cap. 3, cited above) to prefix the negation to it or to postfix it: for in either way the predicate is denied of the subject in every way, because it is denied of the whole of that which is singular - contrary to what Durandus contended in his very first argument.[716]

716. St. Bonaventure, cap. 3 (as cited above).

This doctrine is rightly explained by the single example which Durandus uses against us, and is aptly retorted upon his very argument. For the name "Christ," which according to the sentence of Durandus and of the common run of theologians, as St. John Damascene seems to have taught (On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 3) and Nicetas (Thesaurus, III, c. 3), is the name of a person connoting two natures in him; and since with respect to one he dies, with respect to the other he does not die - just as God in one person begets, in another does not beget - we truly say, "Christ died," yet it is not true to assert, "Christ dead"; because he who of Christ absolutely denies death, denies it in whatever nature; since, he being a singular term, he who denies death of him denies it absolutely, although he who affirms death of him attributes it only to him in some nature. But if someone should wish that the name "Christ" is not the name of a supposit, but directly signifies the human nature united to the Godhead and connotes the Person of the Word (for "Christ" is the same as "anointed," and "anointed" signifies a sanctified and united nature - a view which is gathered from the Council of Frankfurt, in the Sacrosyllabus mid-book, and from St. Athanasius, Oration against the Arians after the fourth discourse, and from Fulgentius, Against Trasamund III, c. 6), let us take the name "Son of God," which without controversy is the name of the supposit: of this indeed we can truly say, "died"; but to deny that he died is not lawful for the reason stated. Therefore we can rightly lay Durandus low with his own sword.[717][718]

But in very truth, just as of Christ, so far as it is the name of the supposit, we truly enunciate contrary predicates - we say, he is passible and impassible; mortal and immortal; begotten and unbegotten; begotten and begetter; spirating and proceeding - so also of God we could assert, he is begotten and unbegotten; begetter and begotten; spirating and proceeding. For these contrary predicates rightly belong to the same singular supposit by reason of the diverse things which are connoted by the same name - by reason of the natures in Christ, or of the persons in God. But we take the name "unbegotten" for the notion of the Father in a contrary sense, not for the negation of generation contradictorily. In this way Fulgentius cited above (cap. 2, in the second argument) seems to have spoken, when of Christ he says, "suffering a passion without feeling it": for he took these two as contrary predicates, which belong to the same Christ, not as contradictories. And from here also the later argument of Durandus, which we brought in the second chapter, is dissolved.

It must be observed, however, that although these propositions are true, "The Father is unbegotten," and "not-begotten"; "the Son is nonbegetting"; "the Holy Spirit is nonspirating" - and although the notional terms which are said of the persons are also said of the concrete of the Godhead, as we shall immediately see - yet these propositions, "God is not-begotten," "God is nonbegetting," "God is nonspirating," are not to be conceded absolutely. For it seems to be equivalent to the negative propositions, and to render their sense, because that participle into which the adjective verb is resolved is negated; and it comes to the same as if the verb were negated. It therefore yields this sense: "God is not begotten," "God does not beget," "God does not spirate" - which is plainly false.

717. St. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, III, c. 3; Nicetas, Thesaurus, III, c. 3.

718. Council of Frankfurt, Sacrosyllabus (mid-book); St. Athanasius, Oration against the Arians, after the fourth discourse; Fulgentius, Against Trasamund, III, c. 6.

First, because if in this proposition, "God begets God," the name "God" is supposed for the concrete individual of the Godhead, "God" has a principle from which he proceeds: therefore either this principle will be called the Father - and this cannot be, because the essence is prior to the notional terms, and therefore here "God" is prior to the Father; therefore the Father cannot be the principle of God; and the same reason proves it of the Son; or there is another principle of God besides the Father and the Son - and this is absurd, because in God, besides the Father and the Son, there is no other principle. Then, if God, as he is the individual of the Godhead, is from the Father or from the Son, he ought really to be distinguished from them; but if he is from God, he ought really to be distinguished from God; and therefore either "God" will be really distinct from the persons, or God from God. Which two are plainly absurd: the one, because it really distinguishes the persons from the essence, against the things we said in disputation 120, chapters 2 and 4; the other, because it posits two gods really distinct, of whom one is the principle of the other. Lastly, if God, as he is the concrete of the Godhead, is said to beget, every person will be said to beget; for every person is God.

Nevertheless all these things which the Canarian objects are much slighter than he supposed, by our consideration. For the solution of these, note first: when we say that the concrete individual of the Godhead, which is called "God," is abstracted from the personalities, we do not mean that it is abstracted in reality, but only by our consideration, just as "man" is separated by reason alone from this and that individuation of a man; because just as we understand man without understanding this one or that one, so also we understand God without understanding this or that person. Then observe that the things which in reality are done and belong to singulars, as to Peter and John, namely, to beget and to walk, are truly enunciated of the common term, as of man, whom we consider as abstracted from singulars. For if Peter walks, we truly say, "man walks," not because in reality the action proceeds from "man" in general - for actions and passions, as Aristotle said (Metaphysics I, c. 1), are conversant about singulars and proceed from singulars.

But because by our consideration we ascribe to those common concepts the things which in reality belong to singulars: so also to the individual of the deity abstracted from the persons by our consideration we ascribe the productions of generation and spiration, which in reality are only from the persons: and in order that by our consideration they may be rightly predicated of God so abstracted, it is enough that they be from the persons who truly are God, just as from the fact that Peter, who is a man, begets, we truly say, "man begets."

Respondetur to the objection of the Canarian. First, it follows that there is not another procession, when we say, "God is from God," besides that whereby the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit from both. Second, it follows that there is not in God another principle according to reality besides the Father and the Son: for God is not a distinct principle from those two, but the notion of principle, which really belongs to them, is by predication ascribed to God in the same way as we said; in the same manner as, when we say, "Peter walks," and "man walks," we signify not two principles but one, which we predicate both of the singular and of the common concept.

Third, it is gathered that, even if we say, "God begot God," there is no need to distinguish really God from God abstracted from personalities in the same way as abstracted; but it is enough that the persons be distinguished, namely the begetting person from the begotten. Thus, when we say, "man begot man," it is not necessary to distinguish man abstracted from man abstracted; but it is enough to distinguish Peter from John. Similarly, when we say "God begot the Son," or "the Father begot God," it is not necessary to distinguish God from the Son, or the Father from God: just as when we say, "Peter begot man," or, "man begot John," it is sufficient that the singular individuals or supposits, to which the action and passion belong, be really distinguished.

Fourth and finally, it does not follow, if God begets, that therefore any person whatsoever also begets, although any person whatsoever is God; because to begetting belongs to God by reason of one person to whom it is conjoined, not by reason of the bare essence. Wherefore it is rightly inferred, "the Father begets," and "the Father is God": therefore "God begets," just as, "John begets," and "John is man": therefore "man begets." By the same reasoning it does not follow, "God begets, therefore any person who is God begets": for, in order that we may truly say, "God begets," it suffices if one person who is God begets: because what belongs to God by reason of one connoted [notion] does not belong to the others connoted; and in general, what belongs to God by reason of a notional connotation does not belong to God by reason of the bare "existing-as-essence."

Hence the objection of the Canarian remains solved. But whether with the particle "insofar as," or "according as itself," it can be said, "God begets," we shall see in art. 6.

The third argument, which in cap. 2 was adduced on behalf of Durandus, is easily dissolved from what was said in cap. 4, where we proved that the name "God" does not signify the same as "one having deity."

The name "GOD," unless something be added to it, is always used to suppose for the individual concrete of the deity.

Caput VI - On how the name "God" supposes with and without notional terms

From the foregoing doctrine two points can be gathered, which must be treated in this chapter and the next. One is, that the name "God," whenever a notional term is not added to it, on the side on which it stands in the proposition, is always used to suppose for the individual concrete of the deity. I said, on the side on which it stands; for if the name "God" be placed on the side of the subject, and the notional term on the side of the predicate, as when we say, "God begets the Son"; or conversely, the name "God" on the side of the predicate and the notional term on the side of the subject, as when we say, "the Father begets God," it cannot happen that it be used to suppose for a person; but it remains in its whole signification of the individual concrete of the deity. And although in this proposition, "the Father begets God," on the side of the predicate there stands the term "begetting," according to the rules of the Logicians, who expound adjectival verbs by participles in this way, "the Father is begetting God," nevertheless, because the notional term "begetting" does not affect the name "God," but only regards the word "Father," therefore it does not determine the name "God," so that it be used to suppose for the Son: therefore it is necessary

that the notional particle which is posited on the same side as the name "God" affect it, and (as the Logicians say) be its syncategoreme, so that its supposition and signification can be restricted. Wherefore, when we say, "God-begetting has a Son," "God" is placed for the Father by reason of the syncategoreme "begetting": in like manner, in this proposition, "God-begetting is not God-begotten," for if it were used to suppose for the individual concrete of the deity, this proposition would be false: for the Father and the Son are one and the same God: yet such a proposition is true: therefore in it "God" is not used to suppose for that individual, but, in the same way as the common words "man," etc., when some particle expressing a property or office of some individual is added, it is determined to stand for some singular.

Yet a difference is to be noted between the name "God" and common names, such as "man." If to the latter a demonstrative pronoun be added, it does not determine a person, but it is the same as if it were not added: because, as we said in the preceding disputation cap. 4, a demonstrative pronoun only points out the direct signification of the name; and since the direct signification of the name "God" is utterly singular, it cannot be narrowed by that pronoun: whereas common words, like "man," since they signify a nature in common, when that pronoun is added are restricted, so that they suppose for some individual of the nature. But because the name "God" has a certain commonness on the side of the connoted, with respect to the personal properties, therefore by some notional term being added it can be determined so as to suppose for some person. Wherefore the Canarian was deceived in the fourth doubt of this article, when he asserted that the name "God" could be determined to stand for a person by the demonstrative pronoun being added, as when we say, "this God (pointing to the Father) begets this God" (pointing to the Son). For already in that cap. 4 it was proved that we cannot point out "this God" and "that God" as if other than the former, when "God" is used to suppose for the concrete individual of the deity: and it is used to suppose for the same in that proposition, "God begot God."

Then, according to the same doctrine, in this proposition, "God is from God," the name "God" is used to suppose for the same concrete of the deity: for, as we proved in the preceding chapter, in order that "God" be said to beget God, once the name "God" is posited for that concrete individual, it is not necessary to distinguish God from God, that is, one concrete individual from another concrete individual: but of the same we truly say, "he begets" and "he is begotten": wherefore of the same God it is permitted to say, "God from God," "light from light."

Certain persons, however, think that in the Creed it is said "God from God" by reason of the notional word which is added: for immediately there follows, "begotten, not made," as if the sense were, "God from God begotten, not made": whereas "God-begotten" is taken to suppose for the person, as we said just above. But in the Creed the word "begotten" seems to be set by itself, so that concerning the Son we confess these three distinct things: first, that he is "God from God"; second, that he is "begotten"; third, that he is "not made." For even without the word "begotten" the Church is accustomed to call the Son "God from God," and the like. Thus in the Roman Breviary on the feast of Saint Lawrence, in the first antiphon of the second nocturn at Matins it is said, "Blessed Lawrence was praying and saying, 'God from God, have mercy on me, your servant'"; and John Maxentius, in the confession of the Catholic faith about the middle, which is in the fifth volume of

the Bibliotheca sacra, as he proves that Christ can be called "one of the Trinity" without a division of the deity, thus says: "And if to say 'God from God' does not make a division of the divinity, especially since one is the divinity of the Trinity, much more does to say 'one of the Trinity' not make a division of the Trinity." He taught, therefore, that which we were just now saying, namely, that a division of the deity is not necessary in order that "God from God" be said, as though there were one "other" from whom, and another who is from the other: for of the same God we say, "God from God."[719][720]

Nay more, even with essential abstract names the Church is accustomed to express the origin of one person from another without any division of the deity or of the essential property, so that it may be manifest from this that not only by reason of an added notional term, but even absolutely one can say "God from God." For in the hymn at Matins for Tuesday the same Roman Breviary has thus, "Sharer of the Father's light, light himself, and light and day," where he calls the Son "light of light," that is, "light from light," as in the Creed "light from light." And again in the hymn at Lauds for Monday, "light of lights, and fount of light." There comes in St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in the little work On the difference of nature and hypostasis, not far from the end, thus writes: "It is not to be said that the glory of the Father is one, and that of the Son another, or that it is the same, since the Apostle did not say, 'who is glory from glory' (although this is the truth of the matter):" therefore he grants that the Son according to the truth is "glory from glory," although Paul did not say "glory from glory." And St. Augustine, On the Trinity 15, cap. 14, calls the Son "light from light," "wisdom from wisdom," "essence from essence," with no other notional term added: not because there are two wisdoms and essences and one is from another; but because there is one person who has essence and wisdom from another, and because each divine person is called "wisdom" and "essence," therefore the Son is called "wisdom from wisdom," and "essence from essence." Finally, since the Councils and Fathers commemorated in disputation 139, cap. 3, call the Father "fount of the deity," what wonder if "deity from deity" and "God from God" are said by them with no notional syncategoreme added? In the same sense the Council of Toledo XV spoke when it said that "according to the essence the divine will begot the will," as we shall show below in art. 5.[721][722]

Finally, when Paul said, in 1 Timothy 1, "To the King of ages, immortal and invisible, to the only God be honor and glory," the name "God" is much more used to suppose for the individual concrete of the deity, since no notional term is there added in any way. However, when St. Thomas in this article in the body says that there the name "God" is used to suppose for the three persons together, thus it must be understood: not because the name "God" in that place directly signifies the three persons, but because the concrete of the deity, for which it directly supposes, is common to the three persons, and whatever is predicated of that individual is truly said of them. But the

719. Breviarium Romanum, in festo S. Laurentii, antiphona I nocturni secundi ad matutinum.

720. Ioannes Maxentius, Confessio catholicae fidei, in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. V; cf. also St. Gregory of Nyssa, Opusc. de differentia naturae et hypostasis, prope finem.

721. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 14.

722. Council of Toledo XV: "secundum essentiam voluntas divina genuit voluntatem," to be shown below at art. 5.

word "only" is added, not so that we signify that God is solitary or alone, but that we set apart the true and immortal God from other false and mortal [gods], and that to him, not to others, we attribute glory, according to what we noted in disputation 131, cap. 4.

I wonder, however, why St. Thomas said that in the proposition "God creates," the name "God" is used to suppose for the nature, that is, for the individual of the deity, and not for the persons: for the persons also are truly said to create; and the addition of the particle "alone," which does not exclude the divine persons, matters little. For in the same way the name "God" seems to be used to suppose in this proposition "only God creates," and in this, "God creates": and the word "only" does not exclude the persons. In that proposition also, "God breathes," "God" supposes for the concrete of the deity for the same reason. But because spiration of itself proceeds from two supposits, according to what was noted in disputation 150, cap. c, therefore St. Thomas said that the name "God" in that proposition is used to suppose for the persons. Which he could have said on a different ground than in that proposition, "to the only God be honor and glory": for he takes the "supposition" for that part of the signification by reason of which the proposition is rendered true; wherefore he says in treating that one, "God creates," that the name "God" is used to suppose for the person of the Father; but in that other, "to the only God be honor and glory," since glory is attributed to the three by reason of the universal essence, the reason of the supposition is different. Yet I would absolutely say that the name "God," for the concrete of the deity, is used to suppose in both; even if what is enunciated of God belong to the persons.

What we have said thus far about the name "God," namely, that it is used to suppose for the individual concrete of the deity even when a notional term which is not its syncategoreme is posited, must also be understood in other propositions in which predicates of the human nature are predicated of God by the communication of idioms. And the same too about the name "man," when we assert of it predicates of the divine nature; as will be more fully proved in the Third Part of St. Thomas, question 16, article 3. Now, however, by this single argument drawn from the foregoing it is shown.

If two divine persons were to assume two humanities, and were to suffer neither in the same place nor at the same time, it would not be permitted to say, "a different God suffers here than there," "one now, another before": but we ought to say, "the same God suffers now and before, here and elsewhere": therefore the name "God" is used to suppose for the individual concrete, not for the person having the deity. For thus we should have to say, "another God suffers here than there, now than before," which is absurd. On the contrary, also, if one humanity were assumed by three, we should not say "another man suffers," but "one and the same"; although nevertheless there would be a different person and another person having the humanity. But when St. Thomas and others affirm that these concrete names of the natures in those predications, when they are placed on the side of the predicate, are used to suppose for the nature, but on the side of the subject for the person, he seems to be employing the "supposition" of the name not for the totality of its signification, but only for that part by reason of which the proposition is rendered true, as we shall say more broadly in that place. And although of natures abstractly signified the words of those

natures are not mutually predicated, yet of the same concretely signified they are rightly predicated, as we shall say there also; because in concrete names the supposit is connoted in which the natures meet, as will there be explained.

But against this doctrine someone will object with St. John Damascene, book 3 On the Orthodox Faith, cap. 4, at the beginning, where he says thus: "This, then, is to be noted, that names taken from the humanity are referred to the true essence or nature; and that the common names of God and men are referred according to the natures, according to which we say, 'God is just'; and that 'subsistence' embraces every species, genus, orders, and even the diversity of persons. We name by that which is special, although Scripture is also wont to name by universals; wherefore, when Scripture says that for this reason he is called 'God,' 'one God' and 'essence,' therefore sometimes the name 'God' is used to suppose for the person..." And Nicetas also in the Thesaurus, cap. ...[723]

Caput VII - What is to be thought concerning the proposition, "God begot another God"

I answer: St. John Damascene and Nicetas only meant to teach that the name "God" is sometimes taken to stand for the person, not because its signification is thereby always narrowed, as when some notional syncategorem is added; but because, without any such addition, we sometimes predicate of God those things which befit Him by reason of some person. Thus in the same place he says that the name "a certain man in the land of Hus" is set down by Scripture for Job; not because, so set down without anything else, it signifies some determinate person, but because of a certain man of the land of Hus there are rightly said the things which we see to agree with Job.

Finally, from what has been said it follows that Capreolus slipped, in the First Book, distinction 4, question 1, article 3, in solution 2 and 3, and in the last argument of Aureolus, when he says that the name "God" always supposes for the nature distinctly and properly, and that it also always supposes for the person; sometimes indeed distinctly, when a notional term is added - as, "God begets"; sometimes indistinctly, when no notional term is added.[724] Cajetan attacks Capreolus in this article with three reasons, of which this one may suffice. In the proposition "God begets" either the name "God" is not the subject; or it supposes for some person distinctly; or it supposes for a person confusedly. If distinctly, it is either for the Father or for the Son. Not for the Father, as was proved in cap. 3 against the Canarians; not for the Son, because then the proposition would be true. Therefore it supposes for a person confusedly. But this, besides being false (for the proposition would then also be true for some person), is even against Capreolus himself, because in that proposition a notional term is added.

But on the contrary: although St. Thomas and Gabriel grant that the proposition can have a true sense, namely, if the name "God" be taken appositively, and the word "another" substantively; for thus the sense is, "God begot another who is God," we rightly say "another" because this adjective in the masculine denotes a person, as we noted in disputation 130, cap. 1; nevertheless that sense

723. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, III, c. 4; Nicetas, Thesaurus, cap....
724. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 - 3; Aureolus, ad ult. arg. Cajetan refutes Capreolus in this article.

and manner of speaking is not in use. Nor does it stand in the way that Christ said in John 14: "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete," for the name "Paraclete" is an adjective, and therefore can be multiplied; indeed it can follow the number of the persons, as was said in disputation 155, cap. 8, according to which doctrine we say "three omnipotent," and we could say "three paracletes." It is therefore not surprising if Christ says, "He will give you another Paraclete." And from this with reason we deduced above, in cap. 4, that the name "God," in the proposition "God begets God," does not suppose for the possessor of godhead, nor is it altogether the same as that possessor.

Wherefore, second, we ought rather to say, "God begot the same God"; for thus identity is not denoted in person, but in nature, which the name "God" signifies. For, as Scotus teaches in that question 1, ad 1, from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12, "the same" and "different," or "something other," are opposed without any middle; hence whatever is not other than something is the same with it. Therefore, if God begot God, and not another God, it follows that He begot the same God.[725]

Third, all the Doctors cited rightly note that this proposition is not true: "God begot Himself God"; because the reflexive pronoun "Himself/God Himself" denotes identity of the supposit of begetter and begotten, and so, removing every distinction both on the side of the nature and of the supposit, makes the proposition false. For that God may be said to beget God, a distinction of supposits is necessary. Wherefore neither among men nor among divine things is anyone said to beget himself. But from this it is not lawful to infer: therefore "God begot another God," on the ground that, if He did not beget Himself God, He ought to have begotten another God. For "the same" and "other" are opposed without a middle only if they are referred to the same, that is, either solely to the essence, or solely to the persons; but if to both together, they cannot be set without a middle, so as to divide being. Now in that proposition the name "God," both on the side of the subject and on the side of the predicate, supposes for person and essence together; and therefore (he says) we can neither say "God begot Himself God," because we remove the distinction of persons, nor "God begot another God," because we remove the unity of essence. From this he further infers that we can say neither "God begot another God," nor "the same God," because the same absurdity follows.

But certainly the reason of Durandus is trifling; for the name "God," as has been proved up to now, plainly supposes for the concrete individual of the nature. Therefore, just as it is not lawful to say "He begot another God," because by that we would signify a division of the nature, so too it is lawful to say "God begot the same God," because only the identity of the nature is signified. Indeed it is lawful to say "God begot the same God with Himself," wherein only the identity of nature is signified between the begotten and the begetter; and the particle "with Himself" does not confound the persons, but denotes the identity of deity in God-begotten with the generating person, with whom indeed the Son is the same God. But when we say, "God begot Himself God," we signify that

725. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 4, q. 1; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12.

the same person begot Himself; for that is what the particle "Himself" denotes. And therefore Hugo of St. Victor, in the place cited, holds that one cannot say, "God begot another God," nor "God begot Himself."[726]

St. Thomas, in this article ad 4, explains in two ways Augustine in epistle 66, which is to Maximinus, when he asserts: "Of one the Father begot another Himself." He says, therefore: either the pronoun "Himself" is in the ablative of separation, and the sense is, "He begot another from Himself," whereby the distinction of persons is signified; or it is in the accusative, and then it establishes a simple relation: for it refers only to identity of nature, not of person; and he says the sense is: "He begot another most like to Himself," that is, of the same nature with Himself; as a friend is wont to say of a friend: "He is another I," on account of the highest union of wills. The latter sense appears to be according to the mind of Augustine, which is figurative and improper, as St. Thomas noted there. The Canarian, however, in the third part of his commentary, reports from Augustine, book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 14, these contrary words: "God begot what He Himself is, and not another Himself." But that book is not "to Maximinus," but "against Maximinus"; and the words cited by the Canarian I could not find in that chapter.[727]

Fourth, as the holy Doctor very well observed in the solution of the fifth argument, this proposition is false: "God begot God who is the Father," or "who is God the Father." For although the same God, who is the individual concrete of deity, is begetter and begotten, nevertheless in that proposition the name "God" is so restricted by reason of the adjunct that it is made to suppose for the person of the Father. Thus the proposition is false. For if we say, "God begot God the Father," and the word "Father" be appositive, the proposition will be false: because the name "God" is determined in such a way that it supposes for the Father; and yet that appears altogether to be the sense of both forms: therefore the first proposition also will be false. With St. Thomas agree Gregory, on I Sentences, dist. 4, q. 1, ad ultimum; and Durandus, q. 2, ad ultimum; but Durandus thinks that proposition is false for another reason, namely, because in that proposition the name "God," on the part of the predicate, supposes for the Son; thus, however, the proposition is false; for the sense is: "God begot a son who is the Father." But Durandus is mistaken; because in that proposition "God" is not set for the Father; but whereas otherwise it would be set for the individual of deity, if the apposition were not made, by reason of the apposition it is determined for the person of the Father alone. St. Thomas adds that, if something is interposed by reason of which that apposition of the notional term is not made, the proposition can be true: as if someone should say: "God begot God, who is God, who is the Father." Then indeed the word "God" seems to suppose for the individual of deity, because no notional term is apposed to it, and of that it is truly said, "who is God, who is the Father." Lastly, Marsilius, in I, q. 8, art. 3, ad ultimum, distinguishes the aforesaid proposition "God begot God who is the Father": either the sense of it is, "God begot the Son, who is not the Father, who nevertheless, as the Father, is God," and this sense is true; or

726. Hugo of St. Victor, Summa sententiarum, tract. 1, c. 11.
727. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, c. 14; St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.

the sense is, "God begot God, who is not God, who is the Father," and this is false. This distinction he took from the Master, in I, dist. 4. But these senses seem to have been applied only at will; therefore I approve what above I said from St. Thomas concerning the aforesaid proposition.[728]

Articulus V - Whether essential names signified in the abstract can suppose for the person

To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that essential names signified in the abstract can suppose for the person, in such a way that this is true: "essence begets essence." For Augustine says in De Trinitate VII: "The Father and the Son are one wisdom, because they are one essence"; and explicitly, "wisdom from wisdom," as "essence from essence."[729]

Further: Generation among us either produces or corrupts, with respect to the things which are in us; but the Son is begotten; therefore, since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is begotten.

Further: God is the same as the divine essence, as is clear from what was said above. But this is true: "God begets God"; therefore, "essence begets essence."

Further: Whatever is predicated of anything can stand for that thing. But "the Father" is "essence divine." Therefore "essence" can suppose for the person of the Father; and thus essence begets.

Further: Essence is a thing that generates, since the Father, who generates, is essence. If therefore essence is not that which generates, it will be essence both generating and not-generating, which is impossible.

Further: Augustine says in De Trinitate IV: "The Father is the principle of the whole Deity"; but He is not principle except by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Deity.[730]

But on the contrary: Augustine says in De Trinitate: "In the Trinity no one begets himself." But if "essence begets essence," it does not beget anything other than itself, since there is nothing in God that is distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore essence does not beget essence.[731]

I answer: Concerning this the Abbot Joachim erred, asserting that just as it is said "God begot God," so it can be said that "essence begot essence," because it is said that God begot God, inasmuch as what is called "God" is the same as "essence"; considering essence precisely on account of the divine simplicity, as if "God" were nothing else than the divine essence. In this he was deceived, because for the truth of locutions one must consider not only the things signified, but also the mode of signifying, as has been said above. Now although according to the thing it is the same, "God" as "deity," nevertheless the mode of signifying is not the same in the two. For this

728. Gregory, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, ad ult.; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, ad ult.; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 8, a. 3, ad 4; the Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., d. 4.

729. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, c. 1 - 2 (in princ.).

730. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV (cf. c. 20).

731. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV; and the common axiom that in the Trinity no one begets himself.

name "God" as it were signifies the divine essence as having in itself the notion of a subsistent, and thus naturally has what is able to suppose for the person; and so the things which are proper to the person can be predicated of this name "God," so that it be said that "God is begotten" or "generating," as has been said. But this name "deity" or "essence" does not have from its mode of signification that it should suppose for the person, because it signifies the essence as a form abstracted. And therefore the things which are proper to the persons, by which they are distinguished from one another, cannot be its attributes. For it would be signified that there is a distinction in the divine essence, as there is a distinction in the supposits.

Reply to the first: We must say that, for expressing the unity of essence and person, the holy Doctors have sometimes spoken more expressly than the propriety of speech allows. Hence such locutions are not to be extended, but to be expounded; namely, that abstract names be explained by concretes, or even by personal names; so that, when it is said "essence of essence," or "wisdom of wisdom," the sense is: "the Son, who is essence and wisdom, is of the Father, who is essence and wisdom." Yet in these abstract names a certain order must be observed: because those which pertain to nature are more closely related to the persons, since acts belong to supposits. Hence these locutions are less improper: "nature of nature," or "wisdom of wisdom," than "essence of essence."

Reply to the second: In creatures, generation takes nature according to number, which begins to be by generation anew, and ceases by corruption; and therefore what is generated receives another nature in number than that whereby the generator subsists. But in God, what is generated does not receive another nature in number, but the very same nature is communicated without any division or change; wherefore it is not the essence that is generated, but the person, to whom the numerically same essence is communicated, without increase of number or any corruption. Therefore the argument fails.

Objicitur 1. It seems that the essence generates the essence. For Augustine says in the seventh book On the Trinity, chapter 1 - 2 at the beginning: the Father and the Son are one wisdom and one essence; and taken singly, wisdom is from wisdom, as essence is from essence. Therefore essence generates essence.

1. Further, when we are generated or corrupted, those things which are in us are generated or corrupted. But the Son is generated. Therefore, since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
2. Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is evident from what was said above. But this is true: God generates God, as was said. Therefore this is true: essence generates essence.
3. Further, of whatever a thing is predicated, it can stand for that thing. But the Father is the divine essence. Therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father; and thus essence generates, because it is the Father who is the generator. If therefore the essence is not the generator, the essence will be a generating thing and not generating; which is impossible.

4. Further, essence is a generating thing, because it is the Father who is the generator. If therefore the essence is not a generator, it will be that the essence is a generating thing and not generating; which is impossible.
5. Further, Augustine says in the fourth book On the Trinity that the Father is the principle of the whole Deity. But He is not a principle except by generating or spirating. Therefore the Father generates or spirates the Deity.

But on the contrary: Augustine says in On the Trinity that no thing generates itself. But if the essence generates the essence, it generates only itself, since in God there is nothing which is distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not generate the essence.

I answer: Concerning this the Abbot Joachim erred, asserting that just as it is said, God begot God, so it can be said that essence begot essence, considering that on account of the divine simplicity God is not other than the divine essence. But in this he was deceived, because for the truth of locutions one must consider not only the things signified, but also the mode of signifying. Now this name "God," because it signifies the divine essence as in the possessor, from its mode of signifying naturally has that it can supposit for a person. And therefore those things which are proper to the persons can be predicated of this name "God," so that it be said that God is begotten or is begetting, as was said. But this name "essence" does not have from its mode of signifying that it supposits for a person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. And therefore those things which are proper to the persons, by which they are mutually distinguished, cannot be attributed to the essence. For it would be signified that there is a distinction in the divine essence, as there is a distinction in the persons.

Reply to the first: To express the unity of essence and person, the holy doctors have sometimes spoken more expressly than propriety of speech allows. Whence such locutions are not to be extended, but to be weighed; that is, abstract names are to be expounded by concretes, or even by personal names; so that when it is said, essence from essence, or wisdom from wisdom, the sense may be: the Son, who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father, who is essence and wisdom. Yet among these abstract names a certain order is to be observed: because those which pertain to act are more closely related to the persons, because acts belong to supposits. Hence this is less improper, nature from nature, or wisdom from wisdom, than essence from essence.

Reply to the second: In creatures, the generated does not receive the numerically same nature as the generator has, but another numerically distinct one, which begins to be in it anew through generation, and definitively ceases through corruption. And therefore it is generated and is corrupted per accidens. But the begotten God receives the numerically same nature as the generator has. And therefore the divine nature in the Son is not generated, neither per se nor per accidens.

Reply to the third: Although God and the divine essence are the same according to reality, nevertheless, on account of a different mode of signifying, it is necessary to speak in a different way about each.

Reply to the fourth: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by way of identity, on account of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can supposit for the Father, because of the different mode of signifying. The reasoning would proceed in those cases in which one is predicated of the other as a universal of a particular.

Reply to the fifth: This is the difference between substantive and adjective names: because substantive names carry with them their supposit; but adjectives do not, rather they place the thing signified in a substantive. Whence the sophists say that substantive names supposit, but adjective names do not supposit but copulate. Therefore personal substantive names can be predicated of the essence on account of identity of the thing. Nor does it follow that personal property determines a distinct essence. But something is posited about the supposit imported by a substantive name. Yet notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless with some substantive added. Hence we cannot say that the essence is generating; we can, however, say that the essence is a generating thing, or God generating, if "thing" and "God" supposit for the person, but not if they supposit for the essence. Whence there is no contradiction if it is said that the essence is a generating thing and a thing not generating: because first "thing" is taken for the person, secondly for the essence.

Reply to the sixth: Deity, insofar as it is one in several supposits, has a certain agreement with the nature of a collective name. Whence, when it is said "the Father is the principle of the whole Deity," it can be taken for the universality of the persons, inasmuch namely as in all the divine persons He is the principle. Nor is it necessary that He be the principle of Himself, just as someone from the people is called the ruler of the whole people, not however of himself. Or it can be said that He is the principle of the whole Deity, not because He generates and spirates the Deity, but because by generating and spirating He communicates it.

Notationes circa articulum. - In this question St. Thomas proposed to examine whether this proposition is true, "the essence generates," as is gathered from the first argument. Now the conclusion is negative, and of faith: concerning which there was the error of the Abbot Joachim, condemned in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith. He asserted that the divine essence generates and is generated; which also seems to have been earlier condemned in the first Council of Toledo in the profession of faith, where it is said: "If anyone shall say that the Deity is passible of birth, let him be anathema"; but it is the same to say that the Deity is passible of birth and that it is generated. The Bishop of the Canary Islands also reproves Holcot, for having said in his determinations, I q. 10, dub. 4, that there is no reason for this truth other than that the Council defined it against Joachim. For how could the Church decree that without a great reason? Yet that author only denied that there is a natural reason for this truth; which ought not to be a wonder, since the mysteries of the Trinity surpass all natural reason. Nevertheless, St. Thomas in this article, St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 1, art. 1, q.; Scotus q. 1; Durandus, the single question; Gabriel q. 1; Gregory q. 1; and Marsilius in I, q. 9, art. 1; and Durandus, art. 2, assign certain reasons.[732] The most forceful, however, is that between the begotten and the begetter there must be a real

distinction: for since they are opposed relatively, they cannot fail to be really distinct; but the divine essence signified abstractly cannot be distinguished from any generating or generated person; therefore neither can it generate, nor be generated; for nothing generates itself. Which reason stands even by the light of nature alone: for the real distinction between begetter and begotten is most well known to all. By natural reason too it can be proved that the essence of God cannot differ really within itself from anything. First, not from another essence, because there is only one in God; then, not from any person, as has been proved, disp. 120, cap. 4; therefore neither can the essence be generated, nor generate. For that actions be attributed to the essences of things signified abstractly, but to supposits alone, is certain, as we shall show in III, q. 1, art. ... Therefore, if it did not repel reason that the divine essence be generated and generate for the reasons set down, even if it were signified abstractly, it could be said to generate and be generated.

Second, note that it is said rightly: the essence is communicated, although it cannot be said: the essence is generated. For, as Scotus says in the place cited, in replying to the arguments, at the phrase, "to the reason about 'to communicate,'" to communicate and to produce or to generate differ widely. For to produce and to generate denotes a real relation between producer and produced, between begetter and begotten only; and therefore it demands a distinction between producer and produced, between begetter and begotten, which cannot exist between the essence and anything else which is in God. And so we shall not say, the essence generates, the essence is generated. But to communicate, even when it is by real production, besides the real relation which it signifies to the thing produced, denotes also a relation of reason to that to which something is communicated, and in like manner to that which is communicated to the produced. Now this relation between that which is communicated and that which communicates does not require a real distinction, since it is itself a relation of reason. Wherefore it is rightly said, the essence is communicated, for in this way of speaking there is signified only a relation of reason between the person who communicates and the communicated essence, although we do not say, the essence generates, because thus we denote a real distinction between the essence and something else which generates.

Indeed, Marsilius rightly taught, in that question 9, art. 2, almost the same reason; following Scotus, he rightly says that something can communicate itself, because in this way of speaking there is denoted only a relation of reason between him who communicates and him who is communicated. For this reason, although the person is not distinguished from the essence, nor is said to produce it, nevertheless it is said to communicate it, solely because it produces another person in the same essence. However, the essence is not said to communicate itself, because that which communicates itself must produce something else to which it may communicate itself; but the essence does not produce something to which it can communicate itself.

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732. Lateran IV under Innocent III (c. Damnamus, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica) condemns Joachim's error; cf. Toledo I, profession of faith ("Si quis dixerit deitatem nativam esse, anathema sit"); the Bishop of the Canary Islands against Holcot, In I Sent., q. 10, dub. 4; St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 1, art. 1, q.; St. Bonaventure, ibid.; Scotus, q. 1; Durandus, q. unica; "Gabriel," q. 1; Gregory, q. 1; Marsilius, In I, q. 9, art. 1; Durandus, art. 2.

Third, it is to be observed with Scotus in the same question that words which signify notional acts, such as to generate, to be generated, cannot be predicated of the essence signified abstractly in the "identical" sense (as they say), as when we say, the essence is the person. For notional verbs signify those acts after the manner of an adjoined form, and therefore they are always taken formally, just like any adjective names. Therefore let them always be predicated by force of their signification in the formal sense, and never in the identical sense. For that sense can be expressed only by a substantive verb - sum, es - which things were all noted in disp. 119, cap. 2, and 137, cap. 3, where we said many other things about the various predications in the mystery of the Trinity.

St. Thomas adds in this article that a notional act is truly predicated of the essence signified abstractly, some substantive name being added on the part of the subject, as if we were to say, the essence is a thing which generates, or, the essence is God who generates. For in these propositions each sense is included, both the identical in the prior part of them, and the formal in the latter. For it is the same as if we say, the essence is the same according to reality with the person, or with God, who generates: but St. Thomas understands this if, according to those things which he handed down above, "thing," or "God," supposits for the person. Nevertheless, in the same way it could be said if it supposit for the concrete of Deity; because of that too the notional acts are truly predicated, as we showed in the previous disputation. Whether indeed the essence be the formal principle of generation and the formal terminus of that, we shall say in disputation 166, cap. 3.

Lastly, note that the Fathers, and even Councils, sometimes use abstract names, so as to denote the origin of one from another, as we saw in the previous disputation, cap. 6, when they say, "light from light," "brightness from light," "wisdom from wisdom," "essence from essence," etc. Yet St. Thomas rightly warns in the reply to the first that these locutions are to be explained in this sense, that abstract names be set forth for concretes, or by personal names in this way: "the Son, who is wisdom, is from the Father, who is wisdom," etc. You have the testimonies of the Fathers in that cap. 6.

Moreover, the Fathers of the fifteenth Council of Toledo under King Flavius Egica and Archbishop Julian also taught, among other things, this proposition, "according to essence, will begot will," in a certain book on three substances, which by Peter the Regionary of the Roman Church...

Articulus VI - Whether the persons can be predicated of essential names

Moreover, the Fathers of the Council of Toledo XV, under King Flavius Egica and Archbishop Julian, also taught, among other things, this proposition, according to essence, will begot will, in a certain book on three substances, which they sent to Pope Benedict II through Peter the Regionary of the Roman Church. The Pope had noted this proposition not indeed in writing, but only by word some two years earlier; and that the Fathers of the Council should be made aware of this his notation, he also enjoined it by word. But the Fathers replied to the Pope with a certain little book; whose reply we have in the Council of Toledo XV, in the new compilation of the Councils of Spain. Now the words of the notation are these: By a natural order we know that the word draws its origin

from the mind, as do reason and will; and they cannot be inverted, so that it be said that, just as the word and will proceed from the mind, so the mind is from the word or from the will; and from this comparison it seemed to the Roman Pontiff that "will from will" cannot be said. Where it must be very much observed that this proposition, "will from will," was not noted by the Pontiff because those Fathers used abstract for concrete names, nor because they said "will begotten"; but because they said "begotten by will from will." For if they had said "wisdom begotten from mind," he would not have noted it; because wisdom has its origin from the mind, and will also from the mind; but will is not from will, nor mind from mind.

But the Fathers of the Council excused their proposition acutely, as is reported more fully in that Council, not meanwhile caring about abstract and concrete terms. They excuse it on this ground, that they did not state that proposition with the addition, according to the comparison of the human mind, or according to relation, but according to essence; they do say, however, according to the comparison of the human mind, that is, according to appropriation. For this sense is plainly gathered from the words of the Council, so that mind is appropriated to the Father, but will to the Holy Spirit. For the Council says among other names otherwise common and essential: "But here, according to the comparison of the human mind, the several things agree in each one in such wise that from them the one is said of the one, the other is not said at all; just as also the one named by the relative word 'Father' is not the very one who is Son." Therefore the Fathers excuse themselves that they did not say "will begot will" according to the comparison of the human mind, that is, according to appropriation. For thus the sense would be, that the Holy Spirit begot the Holy Spirit, which is absurd; and in this way the Pontiff understood the proposition; because he thought it absurd that will should be from will, whereas rather will is from mind. For the Fathers of Toledo were taking "by will" for an act, not for the faculty itself, as is evident there. Wherefore the Pontiff would not condemn this proposition, Will is from mind, or wisdom is from mind. Then the Fathers of Toledo add that they had said "by will from will according to essence," according to the doctrine of St. Augustine in On the Trinity XV, c. 2,[733] where he calls the Son "wisdom from wisdom," "counsel from counsel," "essence from essence," because in God essence, counsel, and wisdom are the same according to essence, and the Son has all these from the Father. The history of this matter was written by Roderic, Archbishop of Toledo, bk. 3, ch. 13, of the History of Spain,[734] where he relates that the Pope was satisfied when a book was written on this matter.

Objicitur 1. - It seems that the persons cannot be predicated of essential concrete names, so that it be said, "God is three persons," or "is the Trinity." For this is false, "Man is every man," because it cannot be verified of any supposits. For neither Socrates is every man, nor Plato, nor anyone else. But similarly this, "God is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any of the supposits of the divine nature. For neither the Father is the Trinity, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit. Therefore this is false, "God is the Trinity."

733. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 2.
734. Roderic (Rodericus) Toletanus, Historia Hispaniae, lib. 3, c. 13.

Objicitur 2. - Further, inferiors are not predicated of their superiors, except by accidental predication; as when I say "animal is man." For to be man befalls animal by accident. But this name "God" stands to the three persons as a common to inferiors, as St. John Damascene says. Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God" except accidentally.

Sed contra: St. Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter: "We believe one God to be the Trinity of the divine name."[735]

Respondetur: I answer that (as has already been said), although personal or notional adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantives can, on account of the real identity of essence and person. But the divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but as three. Wherefore both one person and two and three can be predicated of the essence; as if we say, "The essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." And because this name "God" of itself has that it supposes for the essence (as was said), therefore, just as this is true, "the essence is three persons," so this is true, "God is three persons."

Reply to the first: As was said above, this name "man" of itself has to suppose for a person, but from an adjunct it has that it stands for the common nature. And therefore this is false, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified of any supposit. But this name "God" of itself has that it stands for the essence. Wherefore although for none of the supposits of the divine nature is this true, "God is the Trinity," nevertheless it is true for the essence. Not attending to this, the Porretan denied it.[736]

Reply to the second: When it is said, "God or the divine essence is Father," it is a predication by identity, not however as of an inferior of a superior; because in the divine there is not universal and singular. Wherefore just as this is per se, "the Father is God," so also this, "God is the Father"; and in no way per accidens.

Notationes circa articulum.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative. But concerning the doctrine of the whole article there are certain points worthy of observation.

1) First, the Bishop of the Canary Islands notes that the question of the article was proposed against Gilbert, who asserted this proposition to be false, "God is three persons"; because "God" supposes for any person whatsoever; but it is false to say "any person whatsoever is three persons." The same thing seems to be proposed by the Holy Doctor in the first argument. In truth, as we have reported,[737] Gilbert only taught that "God" is sometimes taken for the essence, and then one must simply concede, "God is his deitas (deity)," because thus he did not distinguish God from essence by nature of the thing; but sometimes it supposes for a person, and then it cannot be said, "God is his deitas," because he distinguished the person from the deitas by nature of the thing. Wherefore

735. St. Augustine, De fide ad Petrum (Pseudo-Augustine), "Credimus unum Deum, unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem."

736. Gilbert of Poitiers (Porretanus).

737. See Vazquez, disp. 120, cap. 1.

by the same rule he would deny this proposition, "God is three persons," if "God" were to suppose for the essence; but if it were to suppose for the persons, he would concede it in some sense, namely when it were set collectively for all; for if for some only, he would without doubt deny it, as also the Thomists do.

2) Secondly, note, concerning the solution of the second objection, that this proposition "God is Father" is per se in the way assigned by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I, c. 4,[738] as St. Thomas teaches in that solution. For, as he taught above,[739] in the perfection of the divine existence (*esse*) it is contained that he is Word. Now the Holy Doctor speaks of the proposition as it is in our intellect; for the proposition is not outside the intellect. Wherefore the Thomists are mistaken who say that that "per se" is found only in the thing itself in God, not in the proposition as it is in the intellect.

Moreover, one must see in what way this proposition is per se. The Bishop of the Canary Islands, in this article, in a single disputation in the second part, judges that no predication about God is per accidens; yet he holds the aforesaid proposition to be per se, but in the identical sense: which St. Thomas seems to indicate in the second reply. Then the Bishop of the Canary Islands adds that that predication is not properly of an inferior of a superior, as Blessed Thomas also said: for then it would be per accidens, as this, "animal is man": for it is accidental for the superior, namely "animal," to be found in the inferior; in divine things, however, there is neither inferior nor superior, because there is not universal and particular, although there is what is common according to the thing, and incommunicable.

However, it seems to me we must distinguish. For if we speak of the essence abstractly, as St. Thomas seems to have spoken in the reply, then the proposition cannot be per se in any sense other than the identical sense; as if we say, "the divinity is Father": for to be the same as the Father also in that way belongs to it per se; yet it is not predicated formally of that, according to what was noted elsewhere.[740] But in truth, if the discourse is of the essence signified concretely by this name "God," the proposition is per se in the formal sense; and accordingly a particle must be added, "inasmuch as," and "according as": namely thus, "God inasmuch as God," or "according as God is Father." For, as Durandus rightly noted,[741] since the properties which in the first way belong per se are signified according to a mode of signifying, they are signified of the proposition in the same mode; wherefore it is not only to be said that when something is predicated of something from what belongs per se according to the formal notion of the subject, where it agrees adequately to it, as "rational" of "man"; but also when something is said of another which regards per se in some way the being of it; either as from its essence, and thus it is predicated in the first mode, as when we say "man, as man, is animal"; or rationally in the second mode, from the property of the subject it is said, or subjectively it is predicated of the essence, "man, as man, is capable of laughter." And in this way I think the aforesaid proposition pertains: "God, inasmuch as God, is Father"; that is, "God is Father," because thus it is predicated of the essence; not conversely. For "Father," in the

738. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4.
739. See St. Thomas, q. 27, art. 3, ad 2.
740. See Vazquez, disp. 136, cap. 3.
741. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 12, q. 1, n. 6; cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4.

concrete, is referred to God or to his essence according to the person that belongs to it per se, and necessarily coheres to it; but "God" is of the essence of the Father; wherefore this proposition, "the Father is God," is in the first mode of saying "per se": for there is, as it were, a certain difference of notedness between these propositions; that this, "the Father is God," is a direct proposition, because on the part of the predicate a quidditative term is placed, and it has the notion of form with respect to the subject; but that other, "God is Father," seems to have a type of indirectness, because that which is on the part of the subject has rather the notion of form than that which is placed on the part of the predicate.

Nevertheless, as far as we can add the notes "inasmuch as" and "according as" to propositions to perfect them, one must not say per se in this manner, "the Father is, per se and inasmuch as, God," or "God, inasmuch as, Father," and similarly with the other persons. For in this mode of speaking, as St. Augustine asserts,[742] we signify not only that the predicate belongs per se to the subject, but that by the same formal notion the subject and predicate are constituted, which is false. Hence Augustine said that "Word" is not that by which it is "Word," because the formal notion of "wisdom" is one, and that of "word" is another; "word" is said of the Son, not of the Father. Yet certain persons unskilfully suppose that the particle "inasmuch as" can be so applied; but Augustine, when he used that way of speaking, chiefly intended to show that it is false in the case in question; from this it is manifest that it is false likewise in other cases.

Hence also is understood that which St. Thomas taught in De potentia, q. 8, art. 2, ad 6,[743] when such a mode of speaking is used, that it is to be taken with caution, lest by adding "inasmuch as" we confound diverse formal notions in God.

3) Thirdly, the Bishop of the Canary Islands notes in this article that the proposition "God creates" is not per se in the fourth mode, as if it designated something accidental befalling God. He proves this first from St. Augustine, On the Trinity IX, where he says that in God there is nothing accidental, because he is immutable; and second, because the name "Creator" is imposed from a relation of reason which regards creatures, and therefore is not an accident in God, but only according to our mode of understanding. Therefore, although we say "God is Creator," this does not introduce an accident into God; rather, it signifies by extrinsic denomination, from the effect; and thus it is not properly per se in the fourth mode, which requires an intrinsic effect from a proper cause. Consequently I distinguish: when we use the expression "accidentally predicated," if we mean a predicate which does not adhere to the subject by an intrinsic nature and substance of the subject, in this way it is accidental to say "God creates"; because God can be Creator and not creating now. But if we speak of an "accident" predicable strictly so called, it ought not to be attributed to God; and thus the argument is solved according to the latter understanding.

Reply to the third: We say that it is not a proposition per se, even if an effect is predicated of its proper cause. For, in order that it be per se in the fourth mode, it must be necessary: for that which is per se, even in that mode, is distinguished from what is predicated accidentally, as Aristotle says

742. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII (cf. c. 1 - 2), on the improper use of "inquantum" in divine predications.
743. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 6.

in Posterior Analytics I, c. 4. Moreover, there can be science of propositions in the fourth mode of per se, as Aristotle teaches in the same place; but of contingent and non - necessary things there cannot be science. Therefore, in the fourth mode of saying per se is that proposition which he himself affirms, that an eclipse is in the moon; and similarly this one, "Whatever is created is from God": for these are necessary, and so also others in like manner.

Articulus VII - Whether the essential names ought to be appropriated to the persons

It seems that the essential names are not to be appropriated to the persons.

- For that which can verge toward an error in the faith ought to be avoided by individuals; for, as St. Jerome says, from words inordinately uttered heresy is incurred. But to appropriate what are common to the three persons to one person can verge toward error: because it can be understood either that they belong only to that person to whom they are appropriated, or that they belong to that one more than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes ought not to be appropriated to the persons. And one finds this in the Master, I Sentences, d. 19, in the lines.[745]
- Further, essential attributes, when signified in the abstract, signify after the manner of a form (*forma*). But one person does not stand to another as form: since from one and the same form there is constituted only one supposit (*suppositum*), not distinguished from itself. Therefore essential attributes, especially when signified in the abstract, ought not to be appropriated to the persons.
- Further, the proper is prior to the appropriated. But essential attributes, according to the mode of understanding, are prior to the persons, as the common is prior to the proper. Therefore essential attributes ought not to be appropriated to the persons.

But on the contrary: The Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor 1:24).[746]

I answer: For the manifestation of the faith it was fitting that the essential attributes be appropriated to the persons. For although a demonstration concerning the Trinity of persons cannot be established (as was said above), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared through things more manifest. Now essential attributes are more manifest to us according to reason than are personal properties: because from creatures, from which we receive our cognition, we can, with certitude, arrive at knowledge of the essential attributes, but not at knowledge of the personal properties, as was said above. Therefore, just as we use the likeness of a vestige or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so too do we use the essential attributes. And this manifestation of the persons through essential attributes is called appropriation. But the divine persons can be manifested through essential attributes in a twofold way: in one way by way of likeness, as those things which pertain to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds

745. Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 19 (in the lines).
746. 1 Corinthians 1:24; Luke 6:19.

by way of intellect, as the Word; in another way by way of unlikeness: as power is appropriated to the Father (as St. Augustine says), because among us fathers are wont, on account of old age, to be weak, lest we suspect anything of that sort in God.[747]

Reply to the first: Essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons in such a way that they be made to be proper to them, but for manifesting the persons by way of likeness or unlikeness, as has been said. Whence no error of the faith follows, but rather a clearer manifestation of the truth.

Reply to the second: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons so as to be made proper to them, it would follow that one person would have to another the relation of form: which St. Augustine excludes in the sixth book On the Trinity, showing that it is not to be added to paternity that it "begot wisdom," as if the Son alone were wisdom, so that the Father and the Son together could be called wisdom; but the Father is not called "wise by the wisdom begotten." Rather, the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, because he is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom.[748]

Reply to the third: Although an essential attribute, according to its proper ratio, is prior to the person according to the mode of understanding, nevertheless, insofar as it has the ratio of something appropriated, nothing prevents the proper of the person from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body insofar as it is a body; yet color is naturally prior to a body insofar as it is white.

Conclusion: Although the essential things are themselves common to the three persons, nevertheless by us some are accommodated to one person, others to another, that we may know them better; and this accommodation is called appropriation.

Articulus VIII - Whether the essential attributes have been suitably assigned to the persons by the holy Doctors

It seems that the essential attributes have been assigned to the persons incongruously by the holy Doctors.

- For St. Hilary in book II On the Trinity says: "Eternity is in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift." In which words he posits three names proper to the persons, namely, the name of Father; the name of Image, which is proper to the Son (as was said above); and the name of Gift or of Donum, which is proper to the Holy Spirit (as was said above). He also posits three appropriated things. For he appropriates eternity to the Father, "form" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Spirit. And it seems that this is irrational. For eternity imports the ratio of essence; "form" is the principle of essence; but "use" seems to pertain to operation. Yet essence and operation are not found appropriated to any person. Therefore these appropriations seem incongruous.[749]

747. St. Augustine, De Trinitate (cf. the appropriation of power to the Father).
748. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI.

- Further, St. Augustine in the fourth book On Christian Doctrine says thus: "In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of equality and unity." And this seems incongruous: because one person is not denominated formally by that which is appropriated to another. For the Father is not "wise by the wisdom begotten," as was said. But, as he subjoins in the same place: "These three - one, all things are on account of the Father; equal, all things on account of the Son; connected, all things on account of the Holy Spirit." Therefore they are not inappropriately appropriated to the persons.[750] Likewise, according to Augustine, power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. And this seems incongruous. For "virtue" belongs to power. But "virtue" is found appropriated to the Son, according to that of 1 Corinthians: "Christ the power of God." And also to the Holy Spirit according to that of Luke: "Power went forth from him and healed all." Therefore power ought not to be appropriated to the Father.
- Likewise Augustine, in the book On the Trinity, says: "We must not take confusedly what the Apostle says, 'From him, and through him, and in him' (Rom 11:36): 'from him' he says on account of the Father, 'through him' on account of the Son, 'in him' on account of the Holy Spirit." But this seems incongruous: because by this which he says "in him" there seems to be imported the relation of final cause, which is the first of causes; therefore this causal relation ought to be appropriated to the Father, who is principle not from a principle. Likewise, the truth is found appropriated to the Son, according to that of John 14: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Similarly "the book of life": according to that of the Psalm, "In the head of the book it is written of me"; the Gloss adds, "with the Father who is my head." And similarly that which I say, which is this: "Because over the breadth of the earth..." and "Behold I..." - the Gloss says, the Son speaks what he said to Moses, "I am who am." But it seems that these are proper to the Son, and not appropriated. For the truth, according to Augustine, is proper to the Son; just as only the Son is the Word, so only the Son is Truth; yet the Father and the Son together can be said Wisdom; but the Father is not Wisdom from the Son, whereas the Son is Wisdom from the Father who is Wisdom.[751]

For he appropriates eternity to the Father, beauty (species) to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit. And it seems that this is unreasonable. For eternity imports a duration of being; but beauty is a principle of the essence; and use seems to pertain to operation. Yet neither essence nor operation is found appropriated to any person. Therefore these appropriations seem unfitting.

Likewise Augustine says: In the Father there is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit unanimity or connexion. And it seems this should be otherwise: because one person is not formally perfected through what is appropriated to another. For neither is wisdom begotten, as is said thereupon in the same place; but these three are said on account of the Father, equality on account

749. St. Hilary, De Trinitate II (shortly after the beginning).
750. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, at the end of c. 3.
751. John 14:6; Psalm 39:8 (Vulgate; 40:7); Gloss (ordinary) ad loc.

of the Son, connexion on account of the Holy Spirit. Therefore they are not appropriated to the persons according to Augustine, the Father by unity, the Son by wisdom, the Holy Spirit by charity, but rather unity to the Father, equality to the Son, connexion to the Holy Spirit.[752]

Likewise, virtue is referred to power; yet we find it appropriated to the Son and also to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 1:24, and also according to that of Luke 6:19: "Power went out from him, and healed all." Therefore it ought not to be appropriated to the Father.

Again, in the book On the Trinity Augustine says that in the doxology "of him, and through him, and in him are all things" God is named on account of the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit.[753] But it seems this is unfitting: because by that which he says "of whom" (ex quo) there is imported the notion of final cause, which is the first of causes; therefore "of whom" ought to be appropriated to the Father, who is principle not from a principle; yet "of whom" is not appropriated to the Father, but to the Son. Likewise, truth is appropriated to the Son, according to "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (John 14:6); and likewise "In the head of the book it is written of me" (Ps. 39:8 Vg. [40:7]); and on that place the Gloss says: "With the Father is the book, in which..." And likewise what the Gloss says there, that the Son speaks what he said to Moses, "I am who am." But it seems that these are proper to the Son, and not appropriated. For the truth, according to Augustine, is proper to the Son; just as only the Son is the Word, so only the Son is Truth; yet the Father and the Son together can be called Wisdom; but the Father is not Wisdom from the Son, whereas the Son is Wisdom from the Father who is Wisdom.

Again, a "book of life" seems to be something proper: because it signifies a being from another; for every book is written by someone. Likewise, this very name "who is" seems to be proper to the Son. For if, when it is said to Moses, "I am who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said: "He who is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, has sent me to you." Therefore, and further, he could have said: "He who is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, has sent me to you," thereby manifestly designating a certain person. But this is false. For no person is "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." Therefore "who is" cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.

I answer that our intellect, which is led by the hand from creatures into the knowledge of God, must consider God according to the mode which it takes from creatures. Now, in the consideration of any creature there occur to us four orders. For first, the thing itself is considered absolutely, inasmuch as it is some being. Secondly, the consideration of the thing is inasmuch as it is one. Thirdly, the consideration of the thing is according to what there is in it of virtue for operating and causing. Fourthly, the consideration of the thing is according to the habitude which it has to things caused. And thus also around God there occurs to us a fourfold consideration.

Accordingly, according to the first consideration, by which God is considered absolutely according to his existence (*esse*), that appropriation is taken which is from St. Hilary, according to which eternity is appropriated to the Father, beauty (species) to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit.

752. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I, c. 5 (at the end): "The three are one on account of the Father; equal on account of the Son; connected on account of the Holy Spirit."

753. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 10.

For paternity, inasmuch as it signifies an existence not begotten of a principle, has a likeness with the Father's proper feature, who is a principle not from a principle. But species, or beauty, has a likeness with the Son's proper features. Now three things are required for beauty: first, a certain mode, that is, wholeness or perfection; for the diminished are on that account ugly; and secondly due proportion or consonance; and thirdly, clarity. Hence things that have a shining color are said to be beautiful. Therefore, as to the first, there is a likeness with the Son's proper feature, inasmuch as he is Son, having in severe and perfect manner the nature of the Father. Hence, to intimate this, Augustine in his exposition says that in the Son there is the summit and perfection of life, etc.[754] As to the second, it agrees with the Son's proper feature, inasmuch as he is the express image of the Father. Hence we see that some image is called beautiful, if it represents a thing perfectly, even though the thing itself is ugly. And Augustine touched on this when he said: "Where is there so great a conveniency and the first equality, etc."[754] As to the third, it agrees with the Son's proper feature, inasmuch as he is the Word, which indeed is light and the splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says; and Augustine touches this too, when he says: "As a perfect Word to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the omnipotent God," etc.[755][756]

But use has a likeness with the Holy Spirit's proper features, if we take "use" in a broad way, insofar as use includes under itself also enjoyment (fruition): inasmuch as to use is to take something into the faculty of the will; and to enjoy is to use with gladness, as Augustine says in De Trinitate. Therefore the use whereby the Father and the Son enjoy one another agrees with the Holy Spirit's proper feature, inasmuch as he is Love. And this is what Augustine says: that affection, delight, felicity, or beatitude - "use" has been called by him.[757] The use, however, whereby we enjoy, has a likeness with the Holy Spirit's proper feature, inasmuch as he is Gift. And Augustine shows this when he says that in the Trinity the Holy Spirit is the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten, by a generous lavishness and abundance pouring upon us, or upon creatures.[754] And thus it is clear that it is fittingly that eternity, species, and use are attributed or appropriated to the persons. But not essence or operation: because in the notion of these, on account of their commonness, nothing is found to have a likeness with the persons' proper features.

The second consideration of God is insofar as he is considered as one. And thus Augustine appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and unanimity or connexion to the Holy Spirit. That these three import unity is manifest, but differently. For unity is said absolutely, not presupposing something else. And therefore it is appropriated to the Father, who does not presuppose some person, since he is a principle not from a principle. But equality imports unity in respect to another; for that is equal which has one and the same quantity together with another. And therefore equality is appropriated to the Son, who is a principle from a principle. But

754. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 10.
754. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 10.
755. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 8 (shortly before the middle).
756. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 10.
757. St. Augustine, De Trinitate X, c. 11; cf. VI, c. 10 (in the middle).
754. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 10.

connexion imports the unity of two things; hence it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit inasmuch as he is from two. In this sense too that can be understood which Augustine says, that "the three are one on account of the Father; equal on account of the Son; connected on account of the Holy Spirit."[752] For it is manifest that each thing is attributed to that in which it is first found; just as all lower things are said to live on account of the vegetative soul, in which the notion of life is first found in these lower things. Now unity is first found in the person of the Father, even with the others, per impossibile, set aside. And therefore the other persons have unity from the Father. But if the other persons are removed, equality is not found in the Father; rather, as soon as the Son is posited, equality is found. And therefore all things are said to be equal on account of the Son: not because the Son is the principle of equality to the Father, but because, unless the Son were equal to the Father, the Father could not be said equal: for the Father's equality is first considered in reference to the Son. For this very fact, that the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father, he has from the Son. Likewise, if the Spirit be excluded, who is the nexus of the two, the unity of connexion between the Father and the Son cannot be understood; and therefore all are said to be connected on account of the Holy Spirit. For, the Holy Spirit being posited, there is found the notion of connexion in the divine persons; whence the Father and the Son can be said to be connected.

But according to the third consideration, by which in God there is considered sufficient virtue for causing, a third appropriation is said to be taken, namely, of power, wisdom, and goodness. And this appropriation is both according to a notion of likeness, if one consider what is in the divine persons; and according to a notion of unlikeness, if one consider what is in creatures. For power has the notion of a principle; hence it has a likeness with the heavenly Father who is the principle of the whole divinity. A father on earth, however, sometimes fails on account of old age. Wisdom has a likeness with the heavenly Son, inasmuch as he is the Word, which is nothing else than the concept of wisdom. A son on earth, however, sometimes fails on account of the scantiness of time. Goodness, however, since it is the reason and object of love, has a likeness with the divine Spirit who is love; but it seems to have a repugnance to an earthly "spirit," insofar as that imports a certain violence and impulse; as is said in Isa. 26: "A strong wind, like a whirlwind driving a wall." But "virtue" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, not inasmuch as "virtue" is said to be the very power of a thing, but inasmuch as sometimes "virtue" is said of that which precedes the power of a thing; as when we say some work has been accomplished by virtue of some agent.

But according to the fourth consideration, inasmuch as God is considered in relation to his effects, that appropriation is taken, "of whom, through whom, and in whom." For this preposition "of whom" (ex quo) sometimes imports the habitude of a material cause, which has no place in the divinity; and sometimes the habitude of an efficient cause, which indeed befits God by reason of his active power. And hence it is appropriated to the Father, as also is power. But the preposition "through" (per) sometimes designates a medial cause; as we say that a smith works through a hammer. And yet "through" is sometimes not appropriated but proper to the Son, according to John 1: "All things were made through him:" not because the Son is an instrument, but because he

752. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I, c. 5 (at the end): "The three are one on account of the Father; equal on account of the Son; connected on account of the Holy Spirit."

is a principle from a principle. Sometimes, however, it designates the habitude of a form through which an agent acts; as we say that the craftsman works through art. Hence, just as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so too "through whom." But the preposition "in" properly denotes the habitude of a container. Now God contains things in a twofold way. In one way, according to their likenesses; as things are said to be, namely, insofar as they are in his knowledge. And thus what I say "in him" would be appropriated to the Son. In another way, things are contained by God, insofar as by his goodness he preserves and governs them, leading them to a fitting end. And thus "in whom" is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as is goodness. Nor is it required that the habitude of final cause (although it be the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, who is principle not from a principle; because the divine persons, of whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed as to an end (since each of them, being God, is the ultimate end), but by a natural procession, which seems rather to pertain to the notion of natural power.

To the other things asked it must be said that, since truth pertains to the intellect (as was said above), it is appropriated to the Son, yet it is not proper to him. For truth, as was said above, can be considered as it is in the intellect, or as it is in the thing: just as, therefore, the intellect and the thing taken essentially are essential and not personal, so too truth. The definition of Augustine adduced is given of truth according to the mode in which it is appropriated to the Son.

But "the book of life," strictly taken, imports knowledge, yet obliquely life. For it is, as was said above, the knowledge of God concerning those who are to have eternal life. Wherefore it is appropriated to the Son, although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, insofar as it imports a certain interior motion, and thus agrees with the Holy Spirit's proper feature inasmuch as he is love. Now, "to be written by another" is not of the notion of a book insofar as it is a book, but insofar as it is a certain artifact. Hence it does not import origin, nor is it personal, but it is appropriated to a person.

Likewise, the very name "who is" would be appropriated to the person of the Son, not according to its own proper notion, but by reason of its adjunct: inasmuch as, namely, in the speech of God to Moses the liberation of the human race was prefigured, which was brought about through the Son. Yet, insofar as "who" is taken relatively, it could sometimes be referred to the person of the Son; and thus it would be taken personally, for instance if one says: "The Son is begotten, who is," just as also "the begotten God" is personal. But taken infinitely it is essential.

And although this pronoun "this" (iste), grammatically speaking, seems to pertain to some determinate person, nevertheless any demonstrable thing, grammatically speaking, can be called a "person," although according to the nature of the thing it is not a person. For we say "this stone" and "this donkey." Hence also, grammatically speaking, the divine essence, according as it is signified and supposes under the name "God," can be demonstrated by this pronoun "this," according to that Exodus 15: "This is my God, and I will glorify him."

Quaestio XL - On the persons in comparison to relations or properties

Then there is asked concerning the persons in comparison to relations, or proper properties. And four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether relation is the same as person

It is objected that, in the divine, relation is not the same as person. For whatever things are the same, when one of them is multiplied, the other is multiplied. But it happens that in one person there are many relations, as in the person of the Father there are paternity and common spiration. And again one relation is in two persons, as common spiration is in the Father and the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.

1. Further, nothing is in itself, according to the Philosopher in Physics IV. But relation is in a person. Nor can it be said that it is by reason of identity; for thus it would also be in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, and person are not the same in the divine.
2. Further, whatever are the same are so disposed that whatever is predicated of the one is predicated of the other. But not whatever is predicated of person is predicated of property. For we say that the Father generates, but we do not say that paternity is generating. Therefore property is not the same as person in the divine.

But on the contrary: In the divine there do not differ "that which is what it is" and "that by which it is," as is had from Boethius in the book On the Hebdomads.[758] But the Father is Father by paternity. Therefore the Father is the same as paternity. And by the same reasoning the other properties are the same with the persons.

I answer that concerning this some have been of different opinions. For some said that the properties are neither persons, nor in persons. They were moved by the mode of signifying of relations, which indeed do not signify as in something, but rather as to something. Hence they said that relations are assistent beings, as was explained above. But, since relation, insofar as it is a certain thing in the divine, is the essence itself; and the essence is the same as person (as is evident from what has been said), it is necessary that then relation be the same as person. Therefore, others, considering this identity, said that the properties are indeed persons, but not in persons: because they did not posit properties in the divine except according to the mode of speaking, as was said above. Yet it is necessary to posit properties in the divine, as we have shown above. And these indeed are signified in the abstract, as certain forms of the persons. Wherefore, since it belongs to the notion of a form that it be in that of which it is the form, one must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are persons, just as we say that the essence is in God, which nevertheless is God.

Reply to the first: Person and property are the same in reality, yet differ according to reason. Hence it is not necessary that, when the one is multiplied, the other be multiplied. Yet it must be considered that, on account of the divine simplicity, there is considered a twofold real identity in the divine of those things which differ in created things. For because the divine simplicity excludes the composition of form and matter, it follows that in the divine the abstract and the concrete are the same, as deity and God. But because the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is his essence; and on account of this, wisdom and power are the same in God, because both are in the divine essence. And according to this twofold ratio of identity, a property in the divine is the same as a person. For personal properties are the same as the persons in that respect in which the abstract is the same as the concrete. For they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father himself, and filiation the Son, and procession the Holy Spirit. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to that ratio of identity, according to which that which is attributed to God is his essence. Thus therefore the common spiration is the same with the person of the Father and with the person of the Son; not because it is one person subsisting of itself, but just as one essence is in two persons, so too one property, as was said above.

Reply to the second: The properties are said to be in the essence by a mode of identity only; but in the persons they are said to be by a mode of identity, not indeed according to the thing only, but as to the mode of signifying, as a form is in a supposit. And therefore the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.

Reply to the third: Participles and notional verbs signify notional acts. But acts are of supposits. The properties, however, do not signify as supposits, but as forms of supposits. And therefore the mode of signifying is repugnant to participles and notional verbs being predicated of properties.

Conclusion: Relation, according to the thing, is the same as person; it is said to be in a person. Certain points are wont to be disputed in this article, about which enough and more than enough has been said by us. First, whether relation is distinguished from person by nature of the thing, or by reason alone: about which we treated in Disputation 121, and it is gathered from what was said in Disputation 20. Second, whether notional acts are predicated of personal properties or not: about this, however, we treat differently in Disputation 136, chapter 3. Third, whether a property is said to be in a person, as paternity in the Father: and this too we treated there, chapter 2.

758. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.

Articulus II - Whether the persons are distinguished by relations

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the persons are not distinguished by relations. For simples are distinguished by themselves; but the persons are most simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by relations.

1. Further, no form is distinguished except according to its genus. For white is not distinguished from black except according to quality. But hypostasis signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
2. Further, the absolute is prior to the relative; but the first distinction is the distinction of the divine persons. Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by relations.
3. Further, that which presupposes a distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, since in its definition it is posited; for the being of the relative is to be disposed toward another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in the divine cannot be relation.

But on the contrary is what Boethius says in the book On the Trinity, that only relation multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.[759]

I answer that, in whatever many there is found something common, one ought to seek a distinctive something. Wherefore, since the three persons agree according to unity of essence, it is necessary to seek something by which they may be distinguished, to this end that they be several. Now there are found in the divine persons two things, according to those which differ, namely origin and relation: which, although they do not differ in reality, do differ nevertheless according to the mode of signifying. For origin is signified by the mode of an act, as generation; but relation by the mode of a form, as paternity. Certain men, therefore, attending to the fact that relation follows upon the act, said that the hypostases in the divine are distinguished by origin, so that we might say that the Father is distinguished from the Son inasmuch as the former generates and the latter is begotten. But the relations, or properties, manifest consequently the distinctions of hypostases or of persons: just as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which are constituted by material principles. But this cannot stand for two reasons.

First, because in order that certain two things be understood as distinct, it is necessary that their distinction be understood through something intrinsic to each: as in created things, either through matter or through form. But the origin of a certain thing is not signified as something intrinsic, but as a kind of way either from the thing or to the thing; as generation is signified as a kind of way toward the generated thing, and as proceeding from the generator. Whence it cannot be that the generated thing and the generator be distinguished solely by generation; but one must understand both in the generator and in the generated those things by which they are

759. Boethius, De Trinitate.

distinguished from each other. But in the divine person there is nothing else to understand except the essence and relation or property. Wherefore, since they agree in the essence, it remains that the persons be distinguished from each other by relations.

Second, because the distinction of the divine persons is not thus to be understood as though something common were divided; for the common essence remains undivided; but the very distinguishing things must constitute distinct realities. Now relations or properties thus distinguish or constitute hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons, just as paternity is Father, and filiation is Son, since in the divine the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the notion of origin that it constitute a hypostasis or a person. For origin signified actively is signified as proceeding from a subsisting person, and so presupposes it; but origin signified passively (as nativity) is signified as a way to the subsisting person, and not yet as constituting it. Wherefore it is better said that persons or hypostases are distinguished by relations than by origin. For although they are distinguished in both ways, yet first and more principally by relations according to the mode of understanding. Wherefore this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also a hypostasis. But this name "begetter" or "generating" signifies property only. For the name "Father" signifies a relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; but the name "generating" or "begotten" signifies an origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.

Reply to the first: The persons are subsisting relations. Wherefore it does not repugn the simplicity of the divine persons that they be distinguished by relations.

Reply to the second: The divine persons are not distinguished in the essence in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only according to that which is said to another. Wherefore for their distinction relation suffices.

Reply to the third: The more prior the distinction is, the nearer it is to unity. And therefore it ought to be least. And so the distinction of persons ought to be only by that which distinguishes least, namely by relation.

Reply to the fourth: Relation presupposes the distinction of supposits when it is an accident; but if relation be subsisting, it does not presuppose, but it itself brings the distinction. For when it is said that the being of the relative is to be disposed toward another, by the "other" is understood the correlate, which is not prior, but is simultaneous by nature.

Conclusion: The divine person is constituted and distinguished by relations.

Whether the divine person is constituted and distinguished by relations, or by absolute properties. Disputation 158.

Disputatio CLVIII - Whether the divine person is constituted and distinguished by relations, or by absolute properties

Caput I - That in the persons there are not properties by which they are distinguished and constituted; taught by Praepositinus and Gregory

This is the chief difficulty in this whole question, which so greatly wrung the wits of the Scholastics that they diverged into various opinions, which it will be necessary for us to recount. The first opinion was that of Praepositinus, which, as St. Thomas notes, certain Scholastics held,[760] who asserted in sum that in the persons there are no properties, neither absolute nor relative; that in the divine the persons are neither constituted nor distinguished by properties, but are distinguished by themselves, and are in no way constituted by something other than themselves. This opinion Gregory followed and set forth at length,[761] explaining it thus: that properties can be taken in two ways - first, for the very persons themselves; in which sense St. Jerome seems to have used the term in the exposition of faith to Damasus, where he says: Thus, shunning the impiety of Sabellius, we distinguish three persons expressed under "property"; and a little later: For we confess not only names, but also names as properties, that is, as persons; or, as the Greeks say, hypostases, that is, substances.[762] In this way Gregory agrees in the Decretal: the properties that are in God are the persons; and the persons are distinguished by properties, because by themselves they are distinguished; but they are not constituted by them, because nothing is constituted by itself. But if a property were to effect something other than the person, it would follow that the person would not be altogether simple and without composition, since in it there would be something that was not itself.

He proves, secondly, that the divine person is constituted by nothing. First, because the divine person is altogether simple, without any composition; therefore it can be constituted by nothing. For if it were constituted by something, either that something would be the person itself, or something other: if it were the person itself, the person could not be constituted by it, because nothing is constituted by itself; but if it were something other than the person, it would follow that the person is not altogether simple and without composition, since in it there would be something that was not itself. He proves, secondly, that the person is not the essence itself; the essence is simple and is constituted by nothing else; therefore neither is the person. Thirdly, he argues in I, q. 4, the single article, after the conclusion, from the chapter Firmiter "On the supreme Trinity and the catholic faith," where it is said that the Father gave his whole substance to the Son: if there is some property in the Father that is not in the Son, since that ought to be of the substance of the Father, it follows that the Father did not give his whole substance to the Son, but retained some part to himself.[763]

760. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 32, a. 2.
761. Gregory (as cited) on I Sentences, dist. 26 and 27, q. 1.
762. St. Jerome, Expositio fidei ad Damasum.
763. The decree Firmiter "De summa Trinitate et fide catholica" (Decretum).

Caput II - The foregoing opinion is refuted

The other Scholastics, however, in opposition to Gregory, agree that in the persons there are properties by which they are both distinguished and constituted; although they also concede "notions," as we have seen elsewhere, yet they do not assign them in the same way, as we shall immediately report. All, moreover, impugn the opinion of Praepositinus and of Gregory; among whom the Master in I, dist. 33, affirms that no one ever dared to deny properties in the persons.[764] The canonists indeed, in their commentaries preceding this article, for the first part of Gregory's sentence, charge him with errors; for, if it were true that the properties by which the persons are distinguished were not constitutive, a person could not be constituted by anything; for nothing constitutes itself; but if it were constituted by something other than the person, it would follow that the person is not simple, and without composition; since there would be something in it which was not itself. And thus the divine persons would by no means be constituted; for Gregory's first proof, namely that the divine person is altogether simple without any composition, does not take this away. For if it be altogether simple, as the essence is; but the essence, which is simple, is constituted by nothing else, neither will the person be so constituted. Thirdly he argues, from the aforesaid chapter Firmiter of the Summa of the Trinity and the catholic faith, where it is said that the Father gave his whole substance to the Son; if there be any property in the Father that is not in the Son, since that ought to be of the substance of the Father, it will follow that the Father did not give his whole substance to the Son, but retained some part to himself.

It is noted that he asserts there are no properties in the persons, contrary to what the Church sings in the Preface of the Trinity: "Unity in essence, property in persons," etc. Add Sophronius, who, in the letter received and approved in the Sixth Synod, action 11, far from the beginning, shows the identity and distinction of the persons by these words: "This indeed on account of nature, the identity; that, however, on account of the alterities of the properties of these three (namely of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit), and on account of the dissimilarity of the properties, which without confusion figure each person." Where he concedes properties in the persons, and that the persons themselves are figured by properties, that is, are thereby distinguished from others.

Gregory nevertheless answers either that the Church's wording is not "according to property," or that it is to be understood in the sense (as they say) of an intransitive form of speech, as if it had said, "the properties are adored in the persons," that is, the very persons. But this solution he could not adapt to the testimony of Sophronius, to which Gregory himself does not refer. For when Sophronius says that by these properties the persons are figured, he speaks not intransitively but transitively; for it would be absurd to say that a person is figured by itself. Wherefore, not without a note of rashness, these authors deny properties and notions in the persons, which the whole school admits, not only as signified complexly, but even incomplexly, as we noted against them in that disputation 136, chapter 2; and the cited testimonies sufficiently prove it. For who would deny this manner of speaking: "The Father is Father by paternity"? For although paternity, apprehended as a

764. The Master (Peter Lombard), I Sentences, dist. 33.

certain simple form - as even the attributes are apprehended in God - is distinguished by reason alone from the Father, nevertheless we can absolutely and without any additament say, "paternity is in the Father." For the words imposed by us signify the thing to us as it is conceived by us; and since the intellect distinguishes in the persons the properties from the essence (*essentia*), and in each of them apprehends something common to the three and something peculiar to each, it cannot but conceive properties after the mode of a form, which it signifies by simple and incomplex names. Wherefore we would not rightly say that the divine persons differ "by their wholes"; for surely they agree among themselves and also differ from one another; but the things which agree and differ are conceived by us in such a way that in them we distinguish something by which they agree and something by which they differ. Thirdly, just as deity is said to be in the three persons signified as a form, why will not paternity be said to be in the Father, and any other property in its own person? And Sophronius often says in that epistle that the divinity is in the three persons.

As to the latter part, namely, where that opinion says that the divine persons are constituted by nothing else, this is pleasing to Canariensis in the third part of the commentary on this article and in the second part of the commentary on article 4, if it be understood thus: he thinks the divine persons are not constituted in reality, but only by the intellect, just as a species is said to be constituted of genus and difference, and is constituted by them. This view was handed down by St. Thomas on the First Book, distinction 26, question 2, article 1; by Cajetan on this article, around the answer to the first; and by Ferrariensis on Contra gentiles IV, chapter 26, "Ad evidentiam;" and it is also most highly approved by me for this reason. A constitution from the nature of the thing requires a distinction from the nature of the thing between that which constitutes and that which is constituted; for the same thing does not constitute itself. But the person, the essence, and the property are entirely the same from the nature of the thing; therefore from the nature of the thing the person can be constituted neither by the essence nor by the property. But that it be constituted by the intellect, it is enough that by the intellect also the relation (*relatio*) be distinguished from the person.

Scotus, however, in the places to be cited in the next disputation, chapter 4, therefore says that the persons are constituted from the nature of the thing, because he thinks the properties or relations are from the nature of the thing, or really distinguished from the essence, as we saw in disputation 120, chapter 3; which posited, it follows that the person is really constituted by relation, as by a proper constituting principle, and by essence as by a common one. The same must be asserted by Durandus and Gabriel, whom we alleged in that same chapter; because they hold concerning the distinction of the relation from the essence in the same way, as we saw in that chapter 3: but we showed their foundation to be false in that disputation: therefore it follows that the person is constituted by the intellect alone by relation and essence.

But some say that this constitution, according to the mode in which it is conceived by us, is not in reality in the persons: because we think this constitution along with some distinction of a constituting principle and a constituted thing; but in the divine person that distinction which we apprehend is not in reality: therefore neither is the constitution according to the mode in which it is conceived by us. Nevertheless, on the side of the thing there is that which we wish to signify by

the name "constitution," and for that cause it can rightly be called a real constitution. For when we say that the divine person is constituted by relation, we mean only to signify that in the divine person there is something common, by which he agrees with the others, and something by which he differs; and this is present in reality, even without a real distinction of the one from the other. They say, moreover, that this constitution is deservedly called real, because absolutely the Scholastics, in the Council of Florence, say that the persons are constituted by relations; but they admit that the metaphysical constitution in man from genus and specific difference is wholly of reason and in no way real. You might be moved [by an objection], because in man nothing common according to the thing is found with such [constitutive notes], but only by reason: wherefore neither according to the thing signified, nor according to the mode, ought the constitution of man to be called real.

A groundless middle. Yet this middle view, lacking foundation, was devised; and all the other Scholastics rightly said that, once a constitution is posited, it is either real or of reason, from the fact that either the constituting principle is distinguished from the constituted person by the nature of the thing, or it is not distinguished, as we saw above; for between these there is no middle. For when by the name "constitution" we signify not only a thing agreeing with others and distinct from them, but also a certain act and order of the constituting principle about the thing constituted, if this act is only by reason, the constitution must be called not real but of reason. Now this act in the divine person is an act of reason, if the constituting principle is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from the constituted thing, as the more probable opinion holds; there is no one who does not know this. For what act or real order can that have which is the same in itself? Therefore, if we attribute a real constitution, it ought to be distinguished really, or by the nature of the thing, from that which is constituted. Why, however, it is said that the person in the divinity is absolutely constituted, we shall say a little later.

The opinion of Gregory and of Praepositivus therefore is acceptable as to the latter part, wherein they assert that the person is constituted by no principle from the nature of the thing. Yet on that account they ought not to have asserted that the person is in no way constituted; since all the other Scholastics plainly admit that the persons are constituted and distinguished by something; and John the Theologian, a man of the Latin Church most learned in divine letters, in the Council of Florence, session 19, at the end, asserts this same thing in these words: "Although there are three hypostases, and persons different among themselves, nevertheless we confess one God, ...; but that a person consists of diverse substances and of property." We speak, however, without additament when we say that the persons are constituted by relations; but we do not absolutely assert that the persons are composed or are composite - even though both composition and constitution are by reason, as we said in disputation 121, chapter 3. For when we speak of constitution, we commonly understand that one also which is by reason; since about many other things also which, even in themselves potentially, our adversaries hold to be constituted by reason alone, we absolutely assert a constitution. For we say that man is constituted by the rational [difference]; that man is constituted by the animal and the rational; yet this constitution is by reason. Nevertheless, with the

name "composition" we seem more expressly to denote something which is opposed to the simplicity of God; and therefore we abstain from it, and we attribute it to God only with an additament.

From what has been said the foundations of Gregory easily fall. Reply to the first argument: we say that the divine person is in reality most simple; nevertheless by reason it can be constituted by some principle; for this constitution in no way impedes the simplicity of the thing.

Reply to the second: I answer that in reality the person is no less simple than the essence; yet in our intellect there is a greater foundation to constitute the person than the essence: because in the person we apprehend something common and something peculiar; but in the essence, not so. And just as in a constitution which is according to the thing we at length come to the constituting principles which no longer constitute, so also in a constitution by the intellect, the intellect at length comes to principles which can no longer constitute: such are relation and essence.

Reply to the third, from the chapter Firmiter, I say that the Father communicates to the Son his whole essence, which is distinguished in reason from relation and property; and this the Council signified when it asserted that he communicated his whole substance. It did not say "his whole reality under every aspect"; for thus also under the aspect of property the Father would communicate [it to the Son], which is false.[765][766][767][768][769][770][771][772]

... would communicate it under the aspect of paternity; wherefore it would be necessary to say that he communicated his whole reality to the Son, because since his reality is also paternity, it would then be said that he communicated it. Yet this is not so in such wise that he retains some part in himself and gives some part to the Son, but only thus: that in the very essence remaining, which is really the same as paternity, under the formal aspect of paternity - under which he did not communicate it to the Son - he did not communicate it. Of which we shall also speak below in disputation 163.[773]

The divine persons to be constituted and distinguished by absolute properties was the view of Ioannes de Ripis and of Scotus.

Caput III - On the opinion that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by absolute properties (Ioannes de Ripis and Scotus)

The second opinion was that of Ioannes de Ripis, which Scotus reports and, as probable, embraces in the First Book, distinction 26, question 1, n. 9.[774] A third opinion, namely, that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by absolute properties. In this position they first

765. Council of Florence, session 19 (cited by "Joannes Theologus... in Concilio Florentino sessione 19, in fine").
766. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.
767. Cajetan, on this article, around the reply to the first objection.
768. Ferrariensis, In Contra Gentiles IV, c. 26, § "Ad evidentiam".
769. Scotus, as cited, and see disputation 120, c. 3; and the following disputation, c. 4.
770. See above, disputation 121, c. 3.
771. Sophronius, Letter received and approved in the Sixth Council (Constantinople III), action 11.
772. The decree Firmiter "De summa Trinitate et fide catholica" (Decretum).
773. See below, disputation 163.

engage with Gregory and Praepositivus, and agree with the other Scholastics in admitting in God a constitution from something common and from a peculiar property; yet they dissent from them, because they think that the proper principle constituting and determining the essence to be the being of a person is some absolute property. They prove this, moreover, by many arguments, which we shall report in the last chapter.

This opinion is branded as erroneous by the Canarien. in this article, part 2 of his commentary, and by other more recent writers; and from the doctrine of the Fathers it can plainly be refuted. First, St. Augustine, passim; in book 3 On the Trinity, c. 2, concerning the Father and the Son, he speaks thus: "Whatever therefore are said 'with respect to self' (ad se) are not said of the one without the other." If, then, the Son were such a person by an absolute property, already the Son would be said to have something absolute "with respect to self," which would not be said of the Father; and of the Father in like manner: wherefore already the one without the other would be said to be something that is absolute. And in book 7 On the Trinity, last chapter, he explains that saying of John 10, "I and the Father are one," in such a way that "one" refers to the essence, "are" to the relations. And in book 9, c. 1: "Let us believe," he says, "that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, the creator and ruler of the whole creation; and that neither the Father is the Son, nor the Holy Spirit is either the Father or the Son; but that there is a Trinity of persons related to one another, and a unity of equal essence."

The same says St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Faith to Gratian, c. 1,[775] and St. Jerome, in the exposition of the creed to Damasus,[776] where he says that the three persons are distinguished by properties; but from the preceding and the following it is clear that by "properties" Jerome means relations. Boethius, in the book On the Trinity, towards the end, says that by relation the Trinity is multiplied.[777] St. Anselm expressed the same in nearly the same words in De Incarnatione Verbi c. 3. Certainly, on the procession of the Holy Spirit, he writes thus: the only cause of plurality in God being presupposed, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are said, not "with respect to self," but "to one another"; because besides these modes there is "God from God" (namely generation and procession), all of which can be called relation.[778] Therefore, according to his mind, relation alone is the cause of plurality - and therefore of distinction - in God. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1, c. 10, on the Holy Spirit, says: "Having all things that the Father and the Son have, except the property of being unbegotten and of being begotten." And c. 11: "We recognize God indeed ... but as to the properties, namely of paternity, filiation, and procession, we note distinctly what belongs to each person according to cause and what proceeds from cause; and this he calls the perfection of the person and the mode of existing of that person." Therefore Damascene judges that the distinction in God is from relations alone and from the sole order of cause and caused; and this he calls the perfection of the person and the mode of existing of the same.[779] Finally, in the

774. Ioannes de Ripis, as reported and embraced as probable by Scotus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1, n. 9.
775. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, I, c. 1 - 2.
776. St. Jerome, Expositio Symboli ad Damasum.
777. Boethius, De Trinitate, near the end.
778. St. Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, c. 3.
779. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 10 - 11.

Eleventh Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, it is said thus: "Therefore this holy Trinity, which is one God, which neither receives number nor is contained under number: for the number of persons is discerned in relation," etc.[780] And the Latin Theologian John, in the Council of Florence, session 19, somewhat before the middle, speaks thus of the divine substance: that it differs in many other things - except that the Father is Father and the Son is Son. And at the end of the session, when he had said that hypostases consist of essence and property, so that "person" is nothing other than "substance and property," he adds thereafter: "Which substance and property, although they be united in themselves and by their properties be really distinguished among themselves (namely, the hypostases), since they are 'toward another' (ad aliquid), yet we confess God to be chiefly according to substance." Where he therefore says that persons differ precisely in that they are "toward another": he recognizes no absolute properties as real.[781]

From all these things at least this, in my judgment, can be gathered: that Ioannes de Ripis and Scotus have manifestly slipped, in that they assert that the distinction among the divine persons arises from absolute properties, whereas the holy Fathers with one voice profess that it is taken from relation alone. But as to constitution, that aforesaid opinion cannot so plainly be condemned: about this the Fathers do not speak; although the Theologian John in the Council of Florence, session 19, not only said that persons are distinguished by properties which are "toward another," but also that by these same properties and by the essence they consist, which amounts to their being constituted.

Those who come somewhat nearer to the truth said that the divine persons are constituted by relative properties, not insofar as they only contain the order of one to another, but insofar as they are origins: for both are included in the concept of property, Bonaventure thought, in the First Book, distinction 26, question 2.[782] For this reason they teach that the Father is constituted by active generation, not by paternity; the Son by passive generation, not by filiation; and the Holy Spirit by procession, as it is an emanation. They think the same about distinction: for if origins sufficiently constitute the person, the same will sufficiently also distinguish; those which are opposed, according to what was noted in disputation 147, chapters 4 and 6. This opinion is attributed to St. Bonaventure in that distinction 27, question 2; yet there he seems to have spoken only of distinction.

The aforesaid opinion can be proved in this way. First: whenever in any thing two things occur, one prior, the other posterior, by the latter that thing cannot be constituted and distinguished substantially, but by the former. Now in any divine person origin is prior to relation: therefore a person cannot be constituted and distinguished substantially by relation, but by origin. Moreover, when there is origin, a person is understood; for if it be active, of the producing person; if passive, not without the produced person. But when there is origin, relation is not understood at once, but afterwards: therefore it accrues to a person constituted and produced; but what accrues to a thing constituted cannot constitute it substantially; therefore neither can relation constitute the person.

780. Council of Toledo XI, in the confession of faith.
781. Council of Florence, session 19 (cited by "Ioannes Theologus... in Concilio Florentino sessione 19").
782. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2.

St. Thomas and Cajetan refute this opinion in this article; the Canarien., in part 3 of his commentary on this article; and more recent Thomists; and Durandus In I Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, nn. 13 - 14.[783][784][785] The Canarien. first lays down that in the divine realities relation and origin are absolutely the same in reality, and are distinguished only by our thought: for the very same relation, conceived as a way and production of a person, whether actively or passively, is called origin and has the concept and ratio of a second act; the same, however, considered as the form of the person (as they say) in actual being, is relation: therefore the same thing is considered as generation, and thus it is origin, and as the ratio of the begotten, and thus it is relation, and so of the others. This posited, it must be proved that origin is not a principle constituting or distinguishing under the proper aspect of origin, in our way of understanding: for this constitution is of concepts in our thought, and therefore we only seek the ratio of the constituting principle as it is apprehended by us: for in reality origin and relation are entirely the same; nay more, these two are entirely the same as the person. Therefore, in our way of understanding, origin is not a constituting and distinguishing principle, as St. Thomas and Durandus prove in this way. Every principle or form constituting and distinguishing some thing ought to be conceived by us after the mode of a form inhering in the thing in actual being, which it constitutes and distinguishes: for since it is a question of the being of a thing, it ought to be considered after the mode of some form, not after the mode of a way and production of the thing. For it is one thing for a thing to be, another to be produced. Now a thing is said to be when it is already constituted and distinguished; but origin is not formally conceived as a form inhering in actual being, but as a way and production: therefore, in our concept, it cannot be the principle constituting and distinguishing the person.

This argument rightly proves about passive origin, because passive origin is as it were the way and becoming of the produced person: wherefore it cannot be the form in actual being that constitutes it, and distinguishes it from others. For when we understand that a person or some thing is being made or produced, we do not yet understand that it is; for formally it is one thing to be produced, whereby it comes to be a person, another whereby it is formally constituted by some principle by which it is, not by which it is produced; but by the name of origin we do not understand - nor did the aforesaid authors understand - relation in actual being signified by the name of origin, such as is the relation of the begotten: for this is entirely the same as the relation of the Son; for "Son" and "begotten" are synonyms, as "gladius" and "ensis": but we understand relation after the mode of a way, which we signify by the name "generation" and "to be generated." And about this we rightly said that it is not the form constituting and distinguishing the person.

But some say that relations and origins are not distinguished, not even by a distinction of reason, but only by a mode of signifying. This is by no means true: first, because nothing can differ from another by mode of signifying unless it also differ by reason and concept. For since signification is that which makes something to be known, the signification will be the same which

783. Cajetan, on this article.
784. The "Canarien." cited here, part 3 (and earlier part 2) of his commentary on this article.
785. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1, nn. 13 - 14 (and n. 14 cited again below).

makes the very same thing to be known, and it will then be different when it effects different concepts in the mind. This I also noted above in disputation 136; otherwise relations and origins will be synonyms - unless someone were to say that they differ as the definition differs from the defined and the explicit from the implicit: which has no place here.

Besides, "to be generated" and "to be begotten" are conceived by us in a different way, just as "to be moved" and "to be in motion"; therefore the concept of origin, which is "to be generated," is not the same as the concept of relation, which is "to be begotten." Otherwise, just as we say "the Son proceeds by generation," we would also say "he proceeds by filiation," which is absurd. Therefore, just as we say that the person proceeds by generation, and not by the relative property; so conversely we shall say that the Son is constituted by filiation, not by passive generation. About active origin the same can be proved no less easily, because the principle constituting the person that produces ought to be understood after the mode of a first act, not after the mode of a second act; but origin is understood after the mode of a second act: therefore it cannot be the principle of the producing person.

Reply to a ready question. If you say that origins, both active and passive, conceived according to the mode of origin only in general, are merely a way, but conceived particularly, are a form per se subsisting: this is manifestly blocked by reason. For a way, however much it be understood as toward something determinate, is always in our concept "as a way" and "as a second act," not as a first act: but that which constitutes after the mode of a first act ought to be conceived after the mode of a first act.

The argument of St. Bonaventure will be solved in the following disputation together with the arguments of Scotus. For the present it only remains to observe that the Fathers sometimes without distinction assign the distinction of the persons by origins and by relations. For they say that the Father is distinguished from the Son because he is Father, or also because he begot; and of the Son similarly - that by either way the difference is rightly inferred. For we do not deny that from origin the difference of the produced person and of the producer is gathered; for from opposed origins there result opposed relations. But we only assert that origin itself, under the formal concept of origin, is not conceived as a principle constituting and distinguishing after the mode of an inhering form, which seems to be proper to such a principle; nevertheless we do not deny that origin is a way to constitution. And therefore St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Faith to Gratian, c. 2; Fulgentius, book 1 On the Faith to Peter, c. 1; Athanasius, in Dialogue 1 On the Trinity against the Anomoeans; Richard of St. Victor, book 4 On the Trinity, c. 1, gather the distinction and plurality of persons from origins; with whom Bessarion agrees in his Oration for the Union of the Greeks and Latins, c. 6, after the middle, which is had after the Council of Florence. But indeed no one said that origin is the formal principle of distinction: in these modes of speaking the controversy about this matter is solved among scholastic theologians. Much less do the Fathers assert that the principle constituting the person is origin; about this they do not speak. But what some assert, that the constituting and the distinguishing principle are the same, is false, as is gathered from disputation 147, c. 7.

The divine persons to be constituted and distinguished by relations alone is the truer view.

Caput V - That the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by relations alone: the truer view

With the other opinions set aside, the one truer seems alone to remain, which St. Thomas and Cajetan hand down; Ferrariensis on this article; Ferrariensis also in Contra Gentiles IV, c. 26; Durandus in I, d. 26, q. 1, n. 14; Gabriel; Capreolus, q. 1, and others.[783][786][785][787]

But indeed we have clearly shown above, in chapter 2, from the doctrine of the Fathers, that the principle of distinction ought to be relation (*relatio*). And since, as we have said against St. Bonaventure, this ought not to be understood of relations under the mode of way and origin, it follows that the persons are distinguished by relations, and that relations are the principle of distinction.

Some Thomists moreover also gather from this that the constituting principle ought to be relation, because the same thing ought to be the principle of constitution and of distinction. Yet they are deceived; for, as we have shown elsewhere, in the divine persons the constituting principle and the distinguishing principle are not the same according to the doctrine especially of St. Thomas, who teaches that the Holy Spirit would not be distinguished from the Son unless He proceeded from Him: whence it follows that the formal principle of distinction in the Son is not filiation, but spiration, as we have proved in the place cited; although nevertheless filiation is the constituting principle.[788]

Therefore this position, which we have followed as truer, merely asserts that the constituting and the distinguishing principle - whether the same or diverse - cannot be something absolute, nor an origin, but must be a relation in actual being. Concerning origin we have now sufficiently shown this against St. Bonaventure; but concerning the absolute it is proved likewise from the doctrine of the Fathers whom in chapter 2 we have recalled, namely, that in the divine persons all things are common except relations: therefore every absolute is common; but by what is common to all, neither can one person be distinguished from two, nor two from one; therefore by something absolute persons cannot in any manner be distinguished. Wherefore the principle of distinction ought to be relation; for, as we said, origin cannot be so in any other way.

Concerning the constituting principle: from the same doctrine of the Fathers, this sentence of St. Thomas is thus deduced. A proper principle, which constitutes something, cannot be that which is common to others, but that which is proper to itself; for this determines that which is common to have this, and thus in the notion of this it is said to constitute. But whatever is absolute is common to all the persons, as we have from the Fathers; and if anything is peculiar to any person, it is relation: therefore relation, not the absolute, ought to be the constituting principle. From which it follows, that therefore the constituting principle of the Son is filiation, not spiration, as we said

783. Cajetan, on this article.
786. Ferrariensis, In Contra Gentiles IV, c. 26.
785. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1, nn. 13 - 14 (and n. 14 cited again below).
787. Capreolus, q. 1.
788. Vazquez, Disputatio 147, cap. 7.

elsewhere, because that is proper to the Son; but filiation does not distinguish the Son from the other persons, but only from the Father; because it is not opposed to the Holy Spirit, but only to the Father: it does, however, entail opposition, as we noted in the same place: therefore of the ratio of the constituting principle it is to be proper to the constituted person; but of the ratio of the distinguishing principle it is not to be proper, but it is opposition; for a distinguishing principle can be common to two persons.

It only remains to advert concerning the text of St. Thomas, that for this reason he said that the persons are distinguished by relations and by origins, yet more principally by relations - not because both are formal principles of distinction, and relation is more principal - but because origins also, as ways, pertain to the distinction of a person, inasmuch as by such and such an origin, as production, a distinct person proceeds, not because origin distinguishes as a form; and about this formal principle of distinction there is now controversy. And therefore in De potentia q. 8, a. 5 he said that a thing may be distinguished by something as form, and by something as way; and constituted similarly; and that that which distinguishes as form distinguishes more principally than that which distinguishes as way and production: therefore he said that the persons are distinguished more principally by relations than by origins.[789]

Scotus argues against the aforesaid opinion from the comparison of the related to the relation.

It is asked whether Scotus impugns the sentence of St. Thomas by four heads, and at the same time confirms his own. The first is from the comparison of the related to the relation. The second is from the comparison of origins with relations. The third is from the ratio of the constituting principle. The fourth, from authority. In this chapter we shall adduce the arguments from the first means; in the following, from the third means; for those which he takes from the second means are more difficult and demand a special discussion; therefore in the following disputation we shall institute a discussion concerning those.

But before we come to the first, among the others which he takes in the fourth place from authority, because they are lighter, let us only answer that one which he adduces from Proverbs 30, where Solomon, speaking of God, asks: "What is his name, and what is the name of his son, if thou knowest?" He infers from this that if the second person were constituted only by the property of filiation, he would not have asked, "What is the name of his Son?" For that was well known. Some of the Hebrews strive here to interpret so that he not speak of the Son of God, who is the second person in the Trinity; whom Jansenius rightly refutes in the same place. Granted, therefore, that the speech there is about the second person, Scotus's objection is easily met: for there Solomon does not ask about some more proper name of the second person, but about a name which adequately and exactly explains the nature and property of the Son of God; and because it is ineffable to men, whatever it be, whether relative or absolute, therefore he says, "if thou knowest," as if to say, you will not find such a name, because the Son of God surpasses every name, according to what we handed down about the names of God.[790] But that this is what Scripture wished to

789. St. Thomas, De potentia q. 8, a. 5.
790. See above, Disputatio 57, cap. 3, on the names of God.

signify is clear, because he not only asks there about the name of the Son, but also about the name of God himself, when he says, "What is his name?" Now many proper names of God existed among the Hebrews, and among others that Tetragrammaton, more accommodated than the others; nevertheless he rightly asks about a name which may be able to express his essence to us: because there is none such, so as to exhibit God and his name above every name.

First argument of Scotus. He argues thus in the first chapter: That which is referred is prior to the relation; for the thing is prior to being referred: but in God not the essence is referred, but the person: therefore the person is prior to the relation. In what way, then, can the person be substantially constituted by relation? For if he is not constituted by relation, he exists as before absolutely and in himself.

I answer: In created relations it is true, what Scotus assumes in the major; but in the divine there is another reason. For since they are substantial and subsistent, by them in such wise the essence is substantially completed and determined to the notion of person, that by it the person is substantially constituted, and at the same time substantially referred to another; therefore while it is constituted, by that very fact it is formally referred, and conversely.

Second, Scotus argues thus. Every composite supposes its component parts, and also the union of the same, even if it be a per accidens composite: for man supposes body and soul and, together with them, the union as something prior; and white supposes body and whiteness, and likewise the union of them: therefore the related supposes the thing which is referred and the relation and the union of both. But that which is referred in the divine is the person: therefore the person is prior to that by which it is referred.

It is solved. I answer: This only proves that the essence and relation are in a certain way supposed as something prior; not, however, prior to the person as person related. For the related person does not result from the person and the relation - something which Scotus ought to prove and ought not to assume gratis - but from the essence and the relation; because by that very fact the person is constituted as person and as related, as we were just saying. Moreover, although the essence be supposed as prior, nevertheless the relation itself cannot be supposed; because since a relation is not understood to be unless in something, and as soon as it is understood to be in the essence, a person is understood, the relation cannot be understood first inhering where a person is not understood. And thence also it is so in composites from substance and accidental forms, which are always understood to inhere and whose being is to be in, that the form inhering is not first understood than is understood the composite from the subject and that accidental form, as is manifest.

Third, Scotus argues: because a relative, formally, is referred to the absolute; therefore the Father in the divine is referred to the Son according to the Son's absolute; therefore the person is first by an absolute property than he is Son. But about this argument more fully will be treated in the following disputation.

Fourth, he argues. Every real relation supposes its extremes really distinct and constituted: therefore the divine relation of paternity supposes extremes constituted: and hence it itself neither constitutes nor distinguishes a person. But in the same way it is replied that this is true of accidental relations; but a substantial relation, which establishes a supposit, can also distinguish and constitute the extremes. Then Scotus urges us in this way: Relation, as relation, is to another; therefore either paternity is to another distinct by filiation, or to something else; if to something else, it is distinct only by filiation: therefore if someone wished to prove that in God there is not a real relation, he ought to prove in this way: This relation is not to another real; therefore it is not real. But this would be an evident begging of the question, because it would be just the same to say, "it is not to another real," as to say, "this relation is not real" - namely, either because it supposes no real opposite relation, or because it in no other way has a real other to which it is opposed. From this, however, one could not rightly infer, "Therefore it is not real," because in his argument he would seem to beg the question. But Scotus's objection is vain; for when someone would thus assume, "this relation is not to another," he would not beg the principle, because he would only say that that relation is not to another distinct really, whether by an opposite relation, or in some other way. And although he would say, "distinct really by an opposite relation," he would not beg the question, but would argue rightly, as is plain.

Arguments of Scotus taken from the ratio of the constituting principle.

Caput VII - Arguments of Scotus from the ratio of the constituting principle

From the third means, which precedes the proposed head, first Scotus argues thus. A constituting principle renders that which it constitutes entirely incommunicable, in the very mode in which it constitutes it: therefore by the constituting principle a person repugns being communicated to many; for it makes the whole incommunicable. But paternity, and any relation whatsoever in the divine, is communicable by nature; for a relation is a certain quiddity, and every quiddity is communicable: therefore this is not the constituting principle of a person. Someone will say that relation indeed is communicable of itself, yet that from the essence it has incommunicability. But this is manifestly false; for spiration, which of itself can be communicated, is not made incommunicable by the essence: therefore the same reason will hold of the other relations, especially of the opposite relation, which is spiration. Further, when two things together constitute something, neither of them receives from the other the mode which it has in the constitution; for man is matter and potency, and form and act; yet neither does the form receive potency from matter, nor matter the ratio of act from the form, but the form itself is by act constitutive. Moreover, because the rational faculty of man terminates in the simplest concepts, and the last term of it is such by nature that, whatever impossibility might be in the hypothesis, nevertheless the entire concept always remains indifferent if the whole of that concept remains - just as, if it be supposed that what is rational could create something or be of a different color, the nature "rational" would remain incommunicable in those species; so, according to the first procession in God taken from the word itself, there must be perfect simplicity remaining in the

entire concept of paternity: thus paternity, if it were received in two supposits, in the Father and in the Holy Spirit (which is false), would still, under the sign of paternity as paternity, not be incommunicable.

I answer: Paternity, universally and of itself, is named from something common, namely, from a certain quiddity by which it can be communicated through likeness to many effects, as a created nature can be communicated: but the increase of created effects does not communicate that by which a person is constituted as divine; for it is conceived as that which is to be communicated, or what the uncreated relationship signifies; and because it is conceived as something that is to be communicated by its proper notion, it does not have incommunicability from the essence, except insofar as it is in that very fact subsistent relation. And thus, according to this very fact, it is the same in species; yet it is altogether dissimilar: for the very nature which is common in itself, from the fact that it is terminated to a supposit, has incommunicability; just as the same specific nature in created things, although it is the same in species, nevertheless has incommunicability from its subsistence. Therefore, in the divine, relation as subsistent constitutes the person, and by that very fact it is incommunicable.

Further, Scotus argues from the same means in this way. From paternity, filiation, and procession there is abstracted a common concept, not only according to the intention of reason, such as some think the scholastic concept to be, but also according to the thing there are real concepts and quidditative concepts of those intentions; so that a certain common reason of relation of origin truly is conceived and abstracted from the concrete relations: therefore, since what constitutes is altogether simple and last in the order of constitution, and not a common concept and particular but a simple, that which is altogether simple is the last in the order of constituting; but the person is constituted, not by an animating form which does not consist in a relation, but by a relation which consists in a terminus to another: therefore the constituting principle, according to that common concept, will not be simple, but common.

To this we say that the common concept which reason abstracts from paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the aspect of a common reason, does not exist in reality, but in the intellect; wherefore, as neither does "animal" really constitute Socrates, but the specific difference does, so here neither does the abstract common notion of "relation of origin" constitute, but the determinate relation - paternity, or filiation, or procession - according as it is really incommunicable, constitutes the person.

veluti if a person were constituted by whiteness and blackness, we could indeed from each of the constituents abstract the notion of color; but nothing hinders this, because for something to be the last constituting principle in the same genus, it is necessary that it no longer be able to be constituted by the same genus of constitution; just as the indivisible difference, which ultimately constitutes the species man, namely "rational," cannot further be constituted by genus and difference, because then it would not itself be the ultimate constituting principle in that genus; yet that very same "rational" can really be constituted out of matter and form: for it embraces both, since in the genus of real physical constitution it is not the ultimate constituting principle; rather, the form, which in that same genus is not further constituted, is the ultimate physical constituting

principle: therefore, in the same way a relation can ultimately constitute the person, by determining the essential existence (esse) to personal existence, provided only that it is not further determined by us by another personality, and is constituted; even if it be constituted by a twofold concept, namely of genus and difference, and be constituted by both.

I add third against Cajetan that we cannot abstract from the divine relations a common univocal concept, because, as I said in Disputation 114, chapter 3, in a relation there is a twofold concept, of in and of toward, which are compared to one another in such a way that the concept of in is transcendent and is necessarily included in the concept of toward; for the toward cannot be conceived without the in. Wherefore a divine relation has both: yet because it is substantial, it is conceived by us not as subsisting of itself, but as a substantial mode of the nature itself; nor can the concept of the in of a divine relation be explained in any other way: but this concept is denominative of either a hypostatic form, or of a mode of subsisting, and is as it were of second intention, as we shall show in the following disputation: therefore nothing else can be abstracted commonly and quiditatively from the divine relations, but only denominatively. Scotus himself agrees with us in 1, Dist. 23, question 1, at the end, when he asserts that nothing common quiditatively can be abstracted from the three persons, but only something common as it were proper; but a "proper" is predicated denominatively, about which we have already spoken in Disputation 130.[791][792]

Disputatio CLIX - How relation constitutes the divine person

Nodus difficultatis in praesenti controversia.

Caput I - Statement of the difficulty in the present controversy

On account of the arguments which Scotus draws from the second medium, which we recalled in chapter 6 of the preceding disputation, it was necessary to institute the present question. For those arguments so exercised the ingenuity of the Thomists that they divided them into various opinions. But Scotus's arguments are taken from the comparison of the producer with the produced, and of the relation with the origins

- First, comparing the producer with the produced, he argues thus in the first place: Everything is prior to the produced, not insofar as it is a producing act primarily - thus it is referred to the product, and therefore is together with it - but insofar as it is of such a nature or property as to produce: therefore the producing person in the divinity is prior to the produced, not insofar as it is an act producing, but according to such a nature and property as to produce: wherefore, before it is understood as actually producing, it is already a person: but then it cannot be constituted by the relation, for this arises from production: therefore it is constituted by something absolute.

791. Scotus, In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, at the end.
792. Vazquez, Disputatio 130.

- Second, if persons are, according to the notion of person, relative, it will be nothing else for the Father to produce than to have a Son; for the Father is Father by the fact that he has a Son: therefore, from itself, by reason of its own person alone, with no origin understood, he has a Son: in vain, therefore, do we posit origins.
- Third, the absolute is produced before that from which relation arises; for to relation there is not of itself motion, from the Physics V, text 10: therefore the person which is produced is prior as absolute than as relative: then therefore it will already be constituted by something absolute.

Then, comparing relations with origins, he also argues in a twofold way. - First, every supposit (suppositum) which is the principle of operation or of production is understood before the operation; because it befits a thing first to be than to act: therefore before it is understood under the relation of the producer, it is understood as constituted: wherefore it cannot be constituted by that relation, but by something absolute; because there is no other relation by which it can be constituted. - Further, relation is as it were the form (forma) of the divine person insofar as it is a person; but every form is understood prior to that which is, of which it is the form, and which it constitutes: therefore paternity is understood prior to the person of the Father; and yet paternity cannot be understood without filiation, because they are simultaneously known: therefore filiation is understood before the person of the Father; since filiation results from generation, which proceeds from the Father, it follows that before the person of the Father is understood.

All these arguments seem to look to the same point, and they have difficulty around the person of the Father alone; namely, how it can be that the person of the Father, which ought first to be understood as constituted before he generates, can be constituted by paternity, which results from generation: but in the other persons there is no difficulty at all; for passive generation precedes the person of the Son, and filiation is in fact; likewise, active spiration already presupposes the Father and the Son constituted by other relations; for they are not constituted by the relation of "spirator": finally, passive procession precedes the person of the Holy Spirit and the relation in him, as we said of passive generation. We must therefore strive to untie the knot of this difficulty, after first recounting the opinions of others, who, while they tried to explain this matter, I do not know whether they made it more difficult. But for the explication of this question, the Schoolmen who say that the persons are constituted by relations dispute that which we set forth in the title, In what way relation constitutes the person.

Caput II - Opinion of Cajetan and of the Canariensis

Cajetan, with his accustomed subtlety, seems to have labored more than the rest in solving this question, I know not whether so fruitfully. He teaches in article 4 of this question, to the second doubt, that paternity is taken in a twofold way - for upon this the whole difficulty seems to turn - one way as conceived under the express concept of paternity, not as it exercises the office of relation: and in this way, he says, it constitutes the person (persona) of the Father in God, before he is understood to generate and to have a Son: for relation as conceived, according to Cajetan's

view, does not require a terminus; in another way it is considered as exercised, he says, that is, as it exercises the office of referring: thus, however, it requires a terminus in act, and in the terminus, filiation: in this way it cannot constitute the person of the Father, as Scotus's arguments clearly convince, especially that one, because paternity and filiation are in this way together after the origin; but the person of the Father ought to precede the origin. Thus he interprets St. Thomas, article 4 of this question, when he says that relation, as it is the hypostatic form, constitutes the person, and is to be considered prior to origin and to the person produced; not, however, according to the proper notion of relation, because according to the proper notion of relation it cannot be understood prior to origin: though by this it distinguishes a person from another. Nor did St. Thomas teach the opposite in I q. 42, a. 3 (says Cajetan), when he said that there is not priority, even of reason, among the persons: for he is speaking of them as they are actually now referred under the proper concept of relation as exercised. Wherefore some wrongly charge the holy Doctor with contradiction.[793]

The Canariensis, moreover, is not far from Cajetan's sense, although he professes the sentence of Durandus in an equal degree: for he says that two things belong to the notion and essence (*essentia*) of relation: one is to be the form and property of the relative, as whiteness is the form of the white - behold for you Cajetan's "relation as conceived"; the other is to refer one to another - behold relation exercising the office of relation. He therefore asserts that the divine person is constituted by relation insofar as it is the form of the relative: not, however, insofar as it refers to another: and in this sense the Canariensis understands St. Thomas, in exactly the same proportion as Cajetan understood him. Hence he infers that it is truly said that the divine persons are constituted by relations: for since they are constituted by relations considered first in that way which pertains to the essence of relation itself, it comes about that they are truly constituted by relations: indeed that that little particle can be added, "insofar as," or "according to the notion of relation," if it denotes relation as understood in the former mode. For if someone takes relation in the latter mode, and adds the particle "insofar as," he ought to use it as a mark which they call of specification: and the sense will be, "relation insofar as relation constitutes," that is, "what is truly relation constitutes."

Ferrariensis makes mention of this opinion of Cajetan in book 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 26, at the verse, but with this interpretation: which, though he says it is subtle, he nevertheless affirms is neither true, nor according to the mind of St. Thomas. We will therefore attack these together with the opinion of the Canariensis by the same reasons.[794]

The first reason of Ferrariensis is: That which befits something according to a formal notion befits it according as it is such: but according to Cajetan's view, to constitute a hypostasis befits relation according to the express and formal notion of relation: therefore it befits it, insofar as it is relation: but St. Thomas says the opposite in article 4 of this question, namely, that relation does not constitute the person according as it is relation: therefore Cajetan is at variance with the holy Doctor whom he thinks he follows.

793. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 42, a. 3.
794. Sylvester Ferrariensis, In IV Contra Gentiles c. 26.

You will say for Cajetan: relation constitutes according to the notion of relation considered in the former mode; not, however, in the latter mode, as it exercises the office of relation. But against this ...[795]

This is what Cajetan himself concedes: that relation, in that prior mode, carries the express and formal notion of relation.

Second, Ferrariensis argues in this way. For a form to exercise its act is nothing other than to give being to the subject in which it is, under the aspect of formal cause; for what else can a form exercise? Thus whiteness exercises the act of a form when it makes the subject white. Therefore relation is then understood to exercise its act when it bestows upon the subject the being of one-related-to-another and now refers the subject to another; for it has no other act. Wherefore, if some relation is conceived in a subject under the express concept of relation, it is understood then as referring the subject to another, that is, as exercising the office of relation. In vain, therefore, do Cajetan and the Canariensis distinguish two acceptions of relation, since it is entirely the same thing to be the form of the relative inhering in the subject and to refer the subject to another - just as it is the same thing to be the form of the white and to give the being of white.

Third, the opinion of Cajetan and the Canariensis can be impugned in this way. Either relation, taken in that prior mode, is to itself, or to another. If to itself, it takes on an absolute mode, and so it lacks the express and formal notion of relation, which is to be-to-another - the very opposite of what they teach; and they must needs assert, in order to defend their position, that those are true acceptions of relation, and that persons are constituted formally by relation. Or else relation, in that mode, is to another, and then it must have the term which it regards; therefore, inhering in the subject, it refers that subject to another. Wherefore the difficulty returns which at the outset we proposed from Scotus. Moreover it is necessary that relation, even as conceived, have a term - this being the express and formal notion of relation under which it is conceived; for it cannot be understood or defined except as to another. Therefore the distinction of Cajetan and the Canariensis is fabricated.

Caput III - What Capreolus and Ferrariensis have thought

Capreolus, on I Sentences, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 2, to the first of Scotus, from those things which were alleged in the third place; and Ferrariensis, on IV Contra Gentiles, chap. 26; most plainly, following the sentence of St. Thomas in article 4 of this question, say that relation can be considered in a twofold manner: both as a hypostatic form and as a property of the person - and in this mode it constitutes the person, yet does not distinguish, so that the Father can be understood as constituted by relation under the concept of hypostatic form before he is understood to generate; and also as it is relation - and in this way it does not constitute the person, but distinguishes by it. For in the former mode it is not to another, nor is it formally relation, and therefore it can be understood before origin; but in the latter mode it is now formally relation, and thus it can only distinguish, because all distinction in the divine is by relative opposition. In

795. Aristotle, Physics V, text 10.

keeping with this, Capreolus notes that, since the very same reality is essence, hypostatic form, and relation, nevertheless they are formally diverse in the same reality and are distinguished by our consideration: first, the essence, which is called deity, by which the person is constituted in the notion of God; second, the property or hypostatic form, by which it is constituted in the notion of person; third, the relation, by which one person is distinguished from another.[796][797]

Likewise, on behalf of this sentence the Canariensis reports Marsilius in I, q. 29, a. 1, dub. 1, conclusions 1 through 3, where in truth he uses that same distinction in the same words and teaches exactly the same.[798] Elsewhere, in q. 30, a. 3, to the first argument adduced to the contrary, he says that relations are not constituted by notional acts - that is, that notional acts are not the foundations of relations. For, although in human affairs the relation of paternity follows upon generation, it is plain that relation does not constitute the generator substantially; yet in the divine the relation of paternity is before generation, because the person substantially constituted is prior to generating. But it is constituted by relation. Nay more, he concedes that the eternal Father is constituted by paternity before he have a Son than that he generate - which Scotus urged as absurd, as we saw above - and I do not see by what reason it can be defended. And certainly, if that were true, there had been no need for Marsilius to distinguish relation in those two modes, so that in one he would constitute and in the other distinguish. But now it is necessary to refute the opinion of Capreolus and Ferrariensis. Scotus attacks it in I, dist. 28, the last question. In common with him does Durandus in I, dist. 26, q. 1, num. 16.[799][800]

The first argument is as follows. That relation - under the notion of property or hypostatic form - which, as such, is formally something, is either absolute or relative. If absolute, then the person is constituted formally by an absolute form, which Scotus concedes. If relative, then in vain is relation distinguished into the notion of hypostatic form and relation, since even under the notion of hypostatic form it is formally to another; and once this is admitted, the very same absurdities seem to follow which Scotus infers against those who say that persons are constituted formally by relations, which we recalled in the first chapter. However, some reply that relation, under the concept of hypostatic form, is formally absolute, and nevertheless persons are constituted by relations inasmuch as they are relations - the particle "inasmuch as" being taken as a note of specification, not as denoting duplication; that is, that persons are constituted by that which is relation, not under the notion of relation, but of the absolute.

But this is frivolous. Those who assert that persons are constituted formally by absolute properties do not deny that they are constituted by that which in reality is relation, because in the judgment of all the properties are the same in reality with the relations. Now, however, the controversy is by what formally persons are constituted: whether by relation, or by the absolute. But those aforesaid theologians, as also the Canariensis in the cited chapter 2, misuse the particle "inasmuch as," so that it be a note of specification in the sense which they themselves want. For, as

796. Capreolus, In I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.
797. Sylvester Ferrariensis, In IV Contra Gentiles c. 26.
798. Canariensis reporting Marsilius, In I Sent. q. 29, a. 1, dub. 1, conclus. 1 - 3; and cf. the same, q. 30, a. 3, ad 1.
799. Scotus, In I Sent. d. 28, q. ultima.
800. Durandus, In I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, n. 16.

we shall say in I - II, dist. 73, c. 9, and in III, q. 16, a. 10, that particle is then called a note of specification when it determines and designates a part or peculiar nature of the subject, by reason of which the predicate belongs to it, even if it belong by accident and not per se. Thus when we say, "Christ, inasmuch as he is man, is white, or walks," or "The bishop, inasmuch as he has teeth, is white." In these cases the said particle cannot be a note of perfection, as is evident, because the predicate is not predicated per se of the subject. But ineptly is that particle said to be a note of specification in this proposition, "Relation, inasmuch as relation, constitutes," so that the sense would be, "that which is relation constitutes." For this is the sense which they call identical, not formal, which cannot be denoted by that particle alone. Add that the particle "inasmuch as," as I shall also say there, when it replicates and repeats the subject, as in the aforesaid proposition, is called reduplicative and is always a note of perfectness.[801]

The second argument of Durandus is of this sort. Either hypostatic form and relation are distinguished by opposition (certain codices read "according to supposit"), or they are distinguished as superior and inferior. If by opposition - that is, as opposites - then it follows that persons are constituted formally by the absolute; for that which is distinguished by opposition from relation is the absolute. But if as inferior and superior, so that the notion of property be superior to relation, it follows likewise that persons are constituted formally by the absolute. For if that personal property, which is superior, constitutes the person with relation excluded, it must necessarily include the opposite, namely the absolute. For superiority never excludes the inferior unless it includes another opposite; just as "animal" never excludes "rational" unless it includes "irrational." Therefore, either we must say that the person is constituted by the property inasmuch as it is also relation, or we must affirm that persons are constituted by absolutes.

The third argument of Scotus and Durandus is this. The notion of hypostatic form, or personal property, is not compared with relation quidditatively, but denominatively. For it seems to be a denomination of second (as they say) intention, such as the denomination of the individual, the denomination of person, and of the constituting principle. Or, if it is a real denomination, it does not seem to be quidditative, as we noted in disp. 130, cap. 2. But the present question is about that which constitutes the person: we do not inquire about the denominative notion of what constitutes, but about the essential and quidditative; just as when we inquire by what Peter is constituted in the notion of person, we demand the quidditative concept of that by which he is constituted, not how that is denominated - whether it be called the principle of the individual, or the notion of person.

Lastly, as to that which we were reporting from Marsilius in the later place - namely, that relations are prior to origins, of which St. Bonaventure makes mention in I, dist. 27, part 1, dub. q. 2 - it is absurd. For if he admits that which Scotus was inferring, namely, that the Father has a Son before he is understood to have generated, why shall we say that he has begotten? Or to what end do we concede generation to him who already has a Son? Then too, if we speak of passive generation, it cannot be posterior to relation; for "to be generated" is prior for him who is begotten

801. Vazquez, Disputatio 130, cap. 2.

- therefore, than "to be a son." But if passive generation does not come to the Son constituted in the notion of son, neither will active [generation], which corresponds to the passive, be able to come to the Father, who is together with the Son.

Caput IV - The opinion of Durandus and Gabriel

Durandus, in I, dist. 26, q. 1, num. 18, and dist. 27, q. 1, openly teaches that persons are constituted by relations, and are distinguished under the express and formal notion of relation, and that the person of the Father cannot be understood by us as first constituted and then as generating and having a Son, but as both at once. Gabriel teaches the same in I, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 4; and it seems to have been the opinion of Scotus, in I, dist. 23, the last question; to questions 4 and 5; to the principal argument; and in Quodlibet 4, at the end, to the principal argument - although in dist. 26 he defends as probable the opinion of Ioannes de Ripa, as we reported in the preceding disputation, cap. 3. They philosophize as follows. First, lest they be compelled to say that persons are constituted by an absolute form under the absolute concept...

They affirm that, taken absolutely, the persons are constituted formally by relations, as relations. For in whatever other way they might be constituted, apart from by relation under the formal and proper account of relation, one would have to say that they are constituted by something absolute, as up to now has been proved against Cajetan, the Canary Islander, and others.

Moreover, they say that the person of the Father is together with the generation and the Son; and that generation is not prior to paternity; nor are they forced to assert that in some way the person is conceived as constituted before the relation is understood; for so it would come about that the person would not be constituted formally by relation, but by something absolute. And indeed, if the constitution of the person were from the nature of the thing, we could easily defend the aforesaid opinion on both sides: for then by nature at once paternity would constitute the person of the Father and would beget the Son, even if the Father were prior in origin to the Son; for this priority among the persons, even as formally related, is found, as we said in Disputation 168, cap. 2. But in truth we could not first by reason understand the first person before the generation; because that very person, generation being, as it were, completed, cannot be considered as constituted by the relation of paternity, since paternity cannot be understood before generation, as even the adversaries against Marsilius admit, and as we proved in the preceding chapter.

Some, however, who embrace this opinion of Durandus in that in which he asserts that generation is not understood before paternity, nor conversely; nor is the supposit considered prior to being constituted than to generating; for the foundation of paternity and of the other personal relations in God they say is not generation - indeed, origins seem to be distinguished from relations only by name. They assert rather that the foundation of relations is the essence of God understanding itself with the rest of all things; and in this way an origin, as it were, inchoate is understood prior to the relation itself. For an origin, compared with the relation of production, is

not prior nor posterior to the producing person; but this, they say, is the difference between a created relation, which comes to an already constituted supposit, and the divine, which constitutes the supposit - something which above Durandus assigned.[802]

But their opinion, in part, has already been impugned in the preceding disputation, cap. 4, where we showed that to beget and paternity, to be begotten and filiation, are not synonymous, and therefore differ not only in name but also in concept. For who would deny that the respect which we conceive in origin, and that which we apprehend in relation, are not thought by us in the same way? The respect of origin is of production and of way; the respect of relation is as of father and son, and as of producer and produced. Whence the first argument against this manner of speaking is gathered, and it is manifest, namely, that between these concepts of origin and relation there is an order - not real by nature or origin, but by our reason and consideration; because one is as way, the other as form in the thing as constituted: therefore one ought to be thought prior to the other - not relation, therefore origin. For it is not therefore that we understand the Father to beget because he is Father; but rather from this we understand him to be Father, after the manner of those who are created, who have begotten; and similarly concerning the Son.

Secondly, this opinion is impugned, because they do not rightly say that the foundation of the relation of paternity is the essence alone understanding itself, and so forth: for since this is in the Son, in the Son too we would understand the foundation of paternity, which is absurd. But when we speak of the foundation of a divine relation, we do not contend to assert something distinct from the nature of the thing from the relation itself; but that which is conceived in our manner as the proximate cause of a relation: but the essence is not the proximate cause, even as understanding; because so it is found in the Son: therefore it is by reason of a notional intellection, which is production: and this we call origin. And since the foundation ought to be conceived prior to the relation, origin will be prior in our consideration than relation.

Thirdly, since the principle of origin, namely of generation, is not the essence alone, but the person - for the essence does not produce, but the person - and in our manner of understanding we first conceive that whence there is generation, than generation itself: for the principle is not through generation, but on the contrary, in our manner of understanding: it is necessary that the first person be conceived as existing in itself before producing: then, however, it cannot be considered as constituted by the relation of paternity, because paternity cannot be understood before generation, as even the adversaries against Marsilius admit, and as we proved in the preceding chapter.

Caput V - The truer account is set forth

The one difficulty of the present disputation seems to be reduced to the person of the Father, namely, by what rationale he is understood to be constituted by relation before he actually generates; for concerning the other persons there is absolutely no difficulty, even if we speak with the common opinion - which in the preceding disputation we established - namely, that the

802. Durandus, In I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, n. 18.

persons are constituted by relations. For if we speak of the person of the Son, we easily understand that origin is prior, than that the person herself be understood as produced: for we first consider a thing to be produced, than to be; and since that person is constituted by the relation of filiation, which follows upon passive generation, all is consistent. Concerning the Holy Spirit, in the same way. Wherefore, if in these two persons we rightly understand the foundations of the relations to be origins (for this reason the second person is Son, because he is begotten, and the third [is] Spirit, because he proceeds, not the other way around), why shall we not say the same also concerning the person of the Father?

However, for the explication of the proposed difficulty, it must be observed that this constitution of the persons by properties is only per reason, as was proved in the prior disputation, cap. 2. Wherefore, when it is asked concerning the person of the Father, how he is understood to be constituted before he generates, we are not inquiring about a constitution from the nature of the thing, according to which he would precede generation in real order; but about the constitution in our intellect, according to which alone he precedes generation in our consideration; that is, how the Father is thought by us before he is understood to generate - whether under the concept of paternity, or in some other way. For it cannot be denied that something is understood by us which is able to generate, before it is understood actually to generate. But that which is conceived as a principle for generating ought to be a person, and not the essence alone. All the Scholastics cited admit this with St. Thomas in art. 4 of this question; indeed St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 27, first part, question 1, who said that the persons are distinguished by origins, not relations. To these also Henry of Ghent accedes, as is reported by Scotus in I, dist. 28, the last question; and likewise in Quodlibet 4, question 5.[803][804][805][806]

Another way: It is answered that no one up to now has denied this, except the recent authors alleged, who think it sufficient that the essence be first conceived under its essential act of intellection.

Under what concept, however, the person is then understood as constituted, not all think in the same way: nevertheless, against Marsilius, according to their various opinions they agree that the person cannot be considered under the concept of the relation of paternity, as actually referred to the Son; concerning which enough has been said above. For together with St. Thomas in that art. 4, it is taught that any origin whatever is prior in our consideration than the relation of the person (as he himself says): of the originating, that is, than the relation which responds to origin. Thus generation is prior to paternity in the view of St. Thomas and of others; but because the difficulties proposed do not satisfy their sentence, therefore one must philosophize otherwise.

First indeed, if the persons are conceived by us in a distinct and express concept, they are rightly understood to be constituted by relative properties under the expressed and formal account of relation: for thus the three persons are conceived as mutually distinct by their relations.

803. St. Thomas, in this question, art. 4.
804. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 27, prima pars, q. 1.
805. Henry of Ghent, as reported by Scotus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. ultima.
806. Scotus, Quodlibet 4, q. 5.

Concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit, as I noted a little above, that does not seem difficult: concerning the Father the same can be said, if he is conceived not before the generation, but already as having the Son, and as distinct from him by paternity.

But because in our consideration the Father can precede generation, it is necessary that he also be conceived by us to be in some other way, before he generates. Therefore, secondly, it must be said that the first person of the Father can be conceived, before he is understood actually to generate, not indeed under the concept of Father - for paternity is founded on generation, as was proved in the preceding chapter - but under the concept of the unbegotten (innascible), and of fecundity for producing. In the former way he is considered by St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 27, first part, question 1; in the latter way by Henry of Ghent, as is reported by Scotus. Add that, when I say that the first person is conceived by us in that way in which he is before he is understood to generate, I do not assert that he is then necessarily understood to be constituted; but that by a simple concept he can be apprehended. For since this constitution is only per reason, as was said above, it is not necessary that the person always be apprehended as constituted. If, however, it were a real constitution, in whatever way he were understood, he ought to be constituted; just as, if we apprehend animal before man, it is not necessary to apprehend it as constituted of living and sensible; for that constitution is by reason, which, although at length it may be known, still the thing can be apprehended in one way or another. But a real constitution of animal from body and soul cannot fail to be in the very animal; wherefore this in animals does not depend upon our consideration. Therefore, if the Father were constituted in reality, in whatever way he were first understood by us as being, than as generating, by that very fact at least he ought to be held to be constituted with a real property.

Thirdly, nothing hinders the person of the Father from being apprehended as constituted, before he generates, from the essence and from that property, or notion, of innascible and fecund for producing, which elsewhere St. Bonaventure calls the fontal plenitude, as we saw in Disputation 127, cap. 5. For we can apprehend the essence as fecund from itself, and the fecundity as, so to say, ordered toward the being of a person that can produce; and yet we do not as yet understand the express notional paternity. Afterwards, however, in this way apprehending the first person - what stands in the way? For if we add that expressed notional relation afterward, we conceive the same first person as Father.

St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure indeed teach the same. For St. Thomas in art. 4 of this question contends that the person of the Father cannot be conceived under the account of paternity before he is understood to have begotten; because paternity is founded upon generation: therefore the first person is not conceived under the notion of Father, since paternity is not yet understood; but under the account of a certain quidditative denomination, namely of the unbegotten, or of the fecund as to producing - not a denomination which is the hypostatic form properly expressing. And later, in I, q. 42, art. 3, he teaches that among the persons there is no priority of nature, since they are together, according to the superior doctrine we have set down: nevertheless the person can in our manner be considered as first, if in that way it be understood; namely, that the first person be

first according to our consideration, before he generates; otherwise the person of the Son could not in any way be considered to be subsequent in our consideration, unless we had already considered that same person under the expressed account of relation.

St. Bonaventure, moreover, in I, dist. 27, first part, q. 1, ad secundum, clearly defends that the person of the Father can be well understood, not indeed as Father before he begets in our consideration, since the notion of paternity is founded on generation; but he can be understood under another notion, namely that of innascible, and again as fecund for producing; then at length is referred to that relation of paternity and of generation.

Satisfaction of the arguments of Scotus alleged in the first chapter.

Caput VI - The arguments of Scotus adduced in the first chapter are satisfied

It remains that, if there are any arguments against our position proposed, we should resolve them. First we must satisfy the argument of Scotus advanced in that place, on the occasion of which this present controversy among us is disputed; and certain objections which they propose to us must be solved. We give warning about one argument of Scotus, who contends that first one understands the person...

But because in our consideration the Father can precede generation, it is necessary that in another way also he be conceived by us to exist before generating.

Second assertion. Therefore, second, it must be said that the first person of the Father can be conceived before he is understood actually to generate, not indeed under the concept of father, for that is repugnant - because paternity is founded upon generation, as was proved above in chapter 3 - but under the concept of being unbegotten and fecund for producing. In the former way he is considered by St. Bonaventure in I, distinction 27, first part, question 1; in the latter way by Henry, as is reported by Scotus.[807] [808] Add that, when I say that the first person is conceived by us in that way before he is understood to generate, I do not assert that he is then necessarily understood to be constituted; but that he can be apprehended by a simple concept. For since this constitution is only by reason, as was said above, it is not necessary that the person always be apprehended as constituted. If, however, it were a real constitution, in whatever way it were understood, it would have to be constituted: just as, when we apprehend animal before man, it is not necessary to apprehend it as constituted of the living and the sentient; for this constitution is by reason, which lasts as long as it is thought; but the thing can be apprehended in one way and in another. But the real constitution of animal from body and soul cannot fail to be in the animal itself whenever animal is thought by us; for this does not depend on our consideration. Wherefore, if the Father were constituted really, in whatever way he were first understood by us to exist before generating, he would have to be conceived at least confusedly as constituted by a proper real property.

Third assertion. Third, nothing hinders that the person of the Father be apprehended as constituted, before he generates, from the essence and that property, or notion, of being unbegotten and fecund for producing, which elsewhere the same St. Bonaventure calls the fontal

plenitude, as we saw in disputation 137, chapter 3; for we can apprehend the essence as of itself fecund, and, as it were, by fecundity contracted unto the being of a person, so that it can produce; and yet we do not as yet understand the expressed notion of father. But that the first person can be apprehended in this way, what hinders? For he can be thought, as fecund and unbegotten, before he generates and before he is father.

Now these two modes of the constitution of the persons were not obscurely handed down by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure; for St. Thomas, in article 4 of this question, contends that one cannot conceive the person of the Father under the aspect of father before he is understood to have begotten, because paternity is founded in generation; therefore then he conceives the first person, not expressly under the aspect of father - because paternity is not yet understood - but under the aspect of a certain hypostatic form, which we express more by some quidditative, non-denominative name, such as unbegotten or fecund-for-producing, than by a denominative like paternity, while the hypostatic form is more expressed thereby.[809] Afterwards indeed, in q. 42, art. 3, he teaches that among the persons there is no priority of reason, because they are relatives; which would not stand with the foregoing doctrine, unless he had considered the person in another way. For if the first person is understood to be before he generates, he will be substantially prior, according to the notion by which the person of the Son is; how then would he afterwards deny that one person is prior to another in our consideration, unless he had considered him in another way, under the expressed notion of relation?

But St. Bonaventure, in I, distinction 27, first part, question 1, to the second, admits that no one can fully and distinctly understand the person of the Father unless paternity be understood, although he plainly admits in the body that the person of the Father can be understood to be before he generates, and then not be conceived under the aspect of father, but of unbegotten. In two ways therefore St. Bonaventure considers the first person; what wonder, then, if likewise in two ways he is constituted by our consideration, as has been explained? Add that the things we have said are to be understood only of the constitution of the first person. And it must be said by way of distinction that the Father is understood distinctly under the expressed and formal concept of paternity and relation to the Son; for he is not understood distinctly, until another is understood from whom he can be distinguished: then, however, he is now actually referred to that other by the relation of paternity and of generation.

Third. Third, nothing hinders that the person of the Father be apprehended as constituted, before he generates, from the essence and from that property, or notion, of being unbegotten and fecund for producing, which elsewhere the same St. Bonaventure calls the fontal plenitude, as we saw in disputation 137, chapter 3; for we can apprehend the essence as of itself fecund, and by fecundity, as it were, contracted unto the being of a person, so that it may be able to produce; and

807. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 27, prima pars, q. 1.
808. Henry of Ghent, as reported by Scotus, In I Sent., d. 28, q. ultima.
809. St. Thomas, in this question, art. 4; and cf. I, q. 42, a. 3.

yet we do not as yet understand the expressed notion of father. But that the first person can be apprehended in this way, what hinders? Since, as fecund and unbegotten, he can be thought before he generates and before he is father.

These two modes of the constitution of the persons were not obscurely handed down by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure; for St. Thomas, in article 4 of this question, contends that one cannot conceive the person of the Father under the aspect of father before he is understood to have begotten, because paternity is founded in generation; therefore then he conceives the first person, not expressly under the aspect of father - because paternity is not yet understood - but under the aspect of a certain hypostatic form, which we express more by some quidditative, non-denominative name, such as unbegotten or fecund-for-producing, than by a denominative like paternity, while the hypostatic form is more expressed thereby.[809] Afterwards indeed, in q. 42, art. 3, he teaches that among the persons there is no priority of reason, because they are relatives; which would not stand with the foregoing doctrine, unless he had considered the person in another way. For if the first person is understood to be before he generates, he will be substantially prior, according to the notion by which the person of the Son is; how then would he afterwards deny that one person is prior to another in our consideration, unless he had considered him in another way, under the expressed notion of relation? But St. Bonaventure, in I, distinction 27, first part, question 1, to the second, admits that no one can fully and distinctly understand the person of the Father unless paternity be understood, although he plainly admits in the body that the person of the Father can be understood to be before he generates, and then not be conceived under the aspect of father, but of unbegotten. In two ways therefore St. Bonaventure considers the first person; what wonder, then, if likewise in two ways he is constituted by our consideration, as has been explained? Add that the things we have said are to be understood only of the constitution of the first person. And it must be said by way of distinction that the Father is understood distinctly under the expressed and formal concept of paternity and relation to the Son; for he is not understood distinctly, until another is understood from whom he can be distinguished: then, however, he is now actually referred to that other by the relation of paternity and of generation.

Satisfaction is given to the arguments of Scotus adduced in the first chapter.

The arguments of Scotus adduced in the first chapter are satisfied

It remains that, if there are any arguments opposed to this our opinion, we should refute them. First, however, satisfaction must be given to the arguments of Scotus adduced in the first chapter, on the occasion of which the present controversy has been disputed by us; then certain objections which can be proposed to us must be solved.

But to all the arguments of Scotus which contend that the person is understood to be before he generates, it is answered that it is so, provided that then he not be considered under the expressed concept of paternity; for thus they would plainly prove that origin is not necessary, nor that the person of the Father is the principle of generation. Nonetheless, it is not considered then that the

809. St. Thomas, in this question, art. 4; and cf. I, q. 42, a. 3.

person is constituted by something altogether absolute; for fecund-from-itself unto producing is conceived relatively. How, however, it be no hindrance that that relation be of reason and not real, will be explained below. Wherefore, of the arguments of Scotus there remains only the third, set in the former order, which has a special difficulty. By it indeed Scotus strives to prove that generation is terminated first to the absolute, and then to relation, because there is no motion toward relation: which is most strongly confirmed by this, that a relative cannot be terminated formally to another relative, but to the absolute: wherefore the Father regards the Son as first constituted by an absolute property before he is understood to be another.

I for my part admit that a relative in creatures is not referred formally to another relative, but to the absolute; in the divine, however, it must necessarily be referred to the relative. Concerning creatures, this I persuade myself from Aristotle: first, because in book 5 of the Metaphysics, chapter 15, he plainly teaches that sight is therefore not referred to the visible, nor intellect to the intelligible, because in their definition there would be a useless circle, as we have set forth at length above in disputation 104, chapter 2; with which doctrine St. Thomas agrees, above, q. 25, art. 3, he teaches that no power of God is rightly defined through the possible, for absolutely the same reason, because there would be a useless circle in the definition, and the very same thing in the very same way would be, if the father were referred to the son and were defined through him. Therefore, if in sight and intellect - which some say are relatives of a third genus, not mutual - Aristotle judged that inconvenience to be present, he ought to have thought the same in other relatives; or, if in others it is never present, it cannot be present in intellect and sense.

Third. Next, Aristotle in the Predicaments, in the chapter on relation, never said that it is proper to relatives that one cannot be known unless the other be known under the formal notion of relative; but that the relative cannot be known unless that to which it is referred be known - which is most true - concerning even the absolute terminus; so that the relative cannot be known unless the terminus to which it is related be known. For the same reason Aristotle, defining the relative, which is not only said, but is another, did not say that a relative is that which is another relative, but that whose whole being is being to another.[810]

Wherefore the opinion of Scotus pleases me in I Sentences, distinction 30, question 1, who asserts that relatives universally are terminated formally to the absolute, provided he understands that only in created relatives; for with regard to the divine persons there is another account, as we shall say in due course. From this it follows that relatives are much better defined through the absolute terminus; for if they are defined through the relative terminus, a useless circle is committed, while the one is defined through the other and conversely, and we would fall into a nugatory repetition by repeating the defined in the definition, placing the definition of the name set in the definition in the place of the very name itself in this way: sight is that of which there is sight, or sight through the visible; a nugation which Aristotle strives to avoid in that cited chapter 15. And although we truly say that one relative is of another relative, as half is the half of the double, and a father is the father of a son, and an intellect is the intellect of an intelligible - for this is what

810. Aristotle, Categories (Praedicamenta), ch. on Relation.

Aristotle signified in that chapter 15, when by a parenthesis he said, "even if it is true to say this," as I explained in disputation 104, in that chapter - nonetheless the nature of the relative does not become rightly known to us when it is defined formally through the other relative; and thus the mathematicians do not define the half in this way, that it is the half of the double; but thus, that taken twice it renders the whole, and so with other things. Aristotle also, in book 5 of the Metaphysics, chapter 12, defines active power not through passive power, which is the correlate, but thus, as a principle of transmutation in another, insofar as it is another. He did not say, to be the transmutative principle of the transmutable as the transmutable is; but, in another insofar as it is another. So also a father is not rightly defined as "one who has a son," because in turn we would have to say, "a son is one who has a father"; and thus one and the other would remain equally unknown after the definition. Rather we must say: a father is a living being that has produced another living being into the likeness of nature from a conjoined principle: thus too we employ the definition of generation, which is not delivered through an order to the begotten, but to the absolute substance produced in such a mode. But if the definition were given in the order to the begotten in this way, "It is the production of the begotten," it would be ridiculous, nor would it explain its nature: and since generation and father are referred in the same way, if generation is referred to the absolute and is defined through that, the same must be said of father.[811] [812]

Objection from Aristotle. But against the things we have said concerning nugation, Aristotle in book 2 of the Elenchi, chapter 6, seems to be opposed; for in the first book, chapter 3, he proposed a difficulty in this way: If it makes no difference to put a discourse in place of a name, that is, the explanation of it, men will easily be compelled to trifle, that is, to repeat the same thing twice in vain. For since "double," when explained by a discourse, is the same as "simply double," if someone says "of a simple [unit], double," it will be the same as if he were to say "of a simple [unit], of a simple [unit], double," taking, in place of that word "double" which was in the former discourse, its definition, namely, "of a simple [unit], double"; and if again, in place of "double" which was in that latter discourse "of a simple [unit], double," you put its definition, you will be able to say "of a simple [unit], of a simple [unit], of a simple [unit], double." He answers, however, in that second book, chapter 6, with words quite obscure, which give this sense: namely, that names relative to something do not signify the same when conjoined as when they are taken separately and are explained by a discourse in which the related terminus is set; as when we say, "A double is the double of a simple [unit]": but when they are set in a discourse together with the related terminus, they do not signify - that is, they must not be explained - in the same way, by adding again the related terminus; wherefore "double," put in a discourse with "simple," as when we say "the double of a simple [unit]," must not again be explained through "simple," by saying "it is the double of a simple [unit], of a simple [unit]"; therefore in the same way we can say that, even if one relative is defined by another relative, as the father by the son, it is not lawful to put, in place of the relative set in the definition, its definition, on which being put we would fall into nugation; because although that relative, taken by itself, is explained through another relative, yet, once set in the

811. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 15.
812. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 12.

definition and conjoined with others, it cannot be explained through another relative; since from Aristotle it is clear that one relative is not to be explained in the same way when taken by itself and when it is conjoined with others.

Reply. I reply that Aristotle did not say that whenever a name - even a relative - set in a definition or in a discourse has not yet been explained, it cannot be explained as if it were taken by itself; since he taught the opposite openly in Metaphysics V, chapter 15, as we recalled above in disputation 104, chapter 2; but he only taught this: that the relative, which is explained by a repetition of itself with its own related terminus, and thus set in a discourse is said to be of another relative, as we say "a double is the double of a simple [unit]" (for this is truly said, as in that first chapter from Aristotle I noted), cannot be expounded by repeating again the relative terminus through which it is explained; and thus, in place of what is said "a double is the double of a simple [unit]," it is not lawful - retaining that "simple" - to explain again the word "double," and to say "a double is of a simple [unit], of a simple [unit], the double." Therefore, in that place Aristotle is not disputing whether it is lawful that a relative terminus, through the order to which another relative is defined, when set in the definition may be explained - about which he had treated in that Metaphysics V, chapter 15, and had said that it can be done; and thus sight is not rightly defined by the visible, because that nugatory repetition would follow, but sight is better defined through something prior to the visible. The reason for the difference is this: because when a relative is explained through another relative by a repetition of it, together with the other relative in a discourse - as when we say "a double is the double of a simple [unit]" - we there take that [relative] as already explained by the "simple," and thus it is no longer to be explained by a new repetition of "simple," which truly would be of no moment, nor would it contribute anything to the explication of that; whereas when some relative terminus not yet defined or explained is put in a definition, reason itself seems to demand that it be explained and defined for the perspicuity of the definition itself. For if someone should ask what that terminus is which is put in the definition, its definition is not to be denied him. Wherefore, if the prior definition were of one relative through another relative, we would fall into a circle, as has been said. Therefore we rightly said that relatives must be defined through an absolute terminus. Hence you will understand that saying of Porphyry, in the chapter on species, that genus ought to be defined through species and conversely: for he does not understand (as the logicians think) that genus is to be defined through species, insofar as a species is correlated to a genus, that is, insofar as it is subjected to it - for thus a useless circle would be committed - but through species, insofar as a species also is predicated of several things differing in number. Thus it becomes known to us how a genus is predicated of those which differ by species, namely by that species which is such as to contain under itself several individuals at least. But enough on these things.[813]

Now indeed, as regards our undertaking, I say that the eternal Father is referred, not to the absolute, but to the Son under the aspect of filiation as the related; although in created things the account is different, because in created things substantial generation is terminated at the substance, not at the relation.

813. Porphyry, Isagoge, cap. de specie.

The relation, however, in no way, because that tends to the substance and to the person or begotten nature to which generation is terminated; but in the divine persons otherwise, because since the relation is subsisting, indeed the very hypostatic form according to the foregoing opinion, generation is terminated substantially at it as constituting the person. For that which is generated in God is a person, not a nature: therefore in the divinity the begetter, that is, the Father, is referred in the same way to the Son as the generation is to the Son, inasmuch as he is Son, as to its proper and per se terminus. And one who wished to define him as he is in himself, ought in this way to define him, and would in this way clearly behold the related as related. But we wayfarers, who understand divine things after the manner of created things, although we truly say that the Father in God is the Father of the Son, and conversely; nevertheless we better explain to ourselves the nature of the Father by an absolute term, as in human affairs, in this way: the eternal Father is he who from a beginning conjoined to himself produced a living person in the likeness of his nature. Thus also we defined the divine generation above, in disputation 113; nor would we so well define it by the correlated term in this way, "it is the procreative production of a Son."

In the same way it must be said concerning the notion (ratio) of the Holy Spirit, that it is terminated at the Son as spirator formally, yet in another respect, namely because by this sole respect the Son is distinguished from him, as was said in disputation 147; but a relation ought to be distinguished from its term. Of the Father, however, there is another account. For since he is distinguished from the Holy Spirit solely by paternity, and is constituted in the notion of a person by that, not by spiration, that [paternity] also can be the term of the Holy Spirit, not by reason of spiration. And thus the reasons of Scotus adduced in the first argument are satisfied.

Diluuntur alia argumenta, quae nobis opponi possunt.

Objections against our explanation that the eternal Father is conceived by us as existing before we conceive Him as generating

Moreover, some things can be objected against what we said in chapter 5, explaining, according to our own view, in what way the eternal Father is understood by us to be prior to our understanding him to generate. These, therefore, in this chapter it is necessary to resolve.

First, Scotus argues in Quodlibet 4, q. 9, against that way as follows: Innascibility is a mere negation; therefore the first person cannot be understood as constituted before he is understood to generate. But if someone should say, with the Antissiodorensis and St. Bonaventure, that it is something positive even if it is signified by a negation - namely, "to be from himself" - Scotus presses: either that phrase "from himself" denotes the ratio of a principle, and thus the Father is not from himself, because, as St. Augustine says, De Trinitate I, chapter 1, the same cannot be the principle of itself; or that phrase denotes "not to be from another," and so it signifies a mere negation. I answer in various ways: either by the negation of procession which "innascibility" denotes, or that by the phrase "from himself" there is signified the notion of first principle, which also by the name "fountain" of plenitude is denoted, not, however, by the name of paternity; and it is better expressed by a negation than by a positive, although the notion of this positive is constituted not by negation alone, as was noted in disputation 137, chapter 1.[814][815][816]

Next, the same Scotus argues thus. Either innascibility signifies a relation, or an absolute property, or the essence; if the essence, it cannot constitute a person, nor can it contract it; but it cannot signify a relation, because no other relation seems to exist except paternity, which belongs to the person alone, or else there will be more personal relations in God than four, which is absurd; therefore it remains that it signifies an absolute property, and consequently that a person is constituted in that prior, that is, in something absolute.

I answer that what we conceive by innascibility is a property conceived relatively; for by that word we signify a fontal plenitude, or the first principle of producing, which relation in God is certainly not real, because in him "to be able to generate" cannot be distinguished from "to generate actually"; and this suffices that it be understood as the property of the Father, the foundation of this first and fontal fecundity. Nor is it a wonder (since that comes from a different mode of conceiving) that that which actually generates "from itself," like a fountain, which is the Father innascible, is conceived by us after the mode of "being able to generate" before it is understood to generate. In this we do not multiply relations, but conceive the same one in a different way after the manner of created things: therefore Henry says that the first person is considered first as able to generate, rather than as actually generating. On that account, however, we do not constitute a different notion in God of innascibility, inasmuch as it signifies the first fountain and as actually emanating and as able to emanate; because it denotes the same dignity of fountain and of first origin. Nor does it hinder, if we say that that property of "innascible and fountain" is expressed by us by a relation of reason, from our conceiving the person under this concept as constituted. For since that constitution is by reason, it is not a wonder if, the same fecundity being conceived by us in a different way, the same person is apprehended as constituted in a different way.

Articulus III - Whether, the relations or properties being abstracted by the intellect from the persons, the hypostases still remain

Nevertheless, although Scotus in the place cited and Henry teach that the first person is conceived by us earlier as able to generate than as actually generating - for they think with all the other doctors that the person is understood before origin - Scotus nonetheless argues in the place cited, to prove that the first person cannot be constituted by that relation of "able to generate": both because the other persons are constituted by relations founded not in potency but in act; and also because, since it is a relation of reason, it cannot constitute a real person. It is answered, however, that the other persons cannot be conceived before the act of passive origin, and so they cannot be constituted by a relation founded in potency; but the first person can be conceived by us "to be" before he generates, and therefore then he can by our intellect be constituted by that relation of "able to generate," because by no other relation can he be constituted. That this relation is of reason does not hinder, as was said just before. Wherefore, since Scotus concedes that the first

814. Scotus, Quodlibet 4, q. 9.
815. The Antissiodorensis (William of Auxerre) and St. Bonaventure are here adduced.
816. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, c. 1.

person can be thought "able to generate" before he actually generates, yet says that then he is not constituted by that relation or property of "able to generate," we shall speak to this in the annotations of the following article.

And from this there is also defended the common doctrine which affirms that the absolutes in the divinity are common to the persons. For innascibility, in the mode conceived before the actual generation, is not altogether absolute in our concept. And although relations of reason which are founded in the naked essence are common to all the persons, as the essence, nevertheless relations founded upon a personal property and upon our mode of conceiving are not common. For by the name "Word" a respect of reason is denoted, and by the name "Gift" likewise, as we saw in disputation 144, chapter 2, and disputation 154, chapter 2; and yet they are not common to the persons. Therefore, since here this respect of first fecundity and of the fountain able to flow is founded upon the first person according to our way of conceiving, it ought not to be common to all the persons. If you ask what is the foundation of this relation, I answer: the very person conceived under the mode of being fecund, which fecundity is indeed the same in reality with the relation of paternity, but according to our way of conceiving it is then considered under the respect of "able" and as not yet actually generating.

It is asked:

Third, one proceeds as follows.[817] It seems that, when the properties or relations are abstracted by the intellect from the persons, nevertheless the hypostases remain. For that to which something stands related by way of an addition, can be understood with that which is added removed. Thus "man" stands to "animal" by an addition, and "animal" can be understood with "rational" removed. But "person" stands by an addition to "hypostasis." For person is a hypostasis distinct by a property that pertains to dignity. Therefore, the personal property being removed by the intellect from the person, the hypostasis is understood.

1. Further. The Father does not have from the same [thing] that he is Father and that he is "someone." For by paternity he is Father; if by paternity he were "someone," it would follow that the Son, in whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." Therefore, with paternity removed by the intellect from the Father, there still remains that he is "someone," which is to be a hypostasis. Therefore, the property removed from the person, the hypostasis remains.
2. Further. St. Augustine says in De Trinitate V, chapter 6, at the beginning: "This is not to say 'unbegotten' which is to say 'Father'." For if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent his being called "unbegotten"; but if he had not begotten the Son, there would not be in him paternity. Therefore, paternity being removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.[818]

817. The article proceeds in the manner of St. Thomas: cf. I Sent., dist. 26, q. 4, art. 2; Quodlibetal q. 5, art. 4; Opusculum 3, cap. 61, etc.

818. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 6, in the beginning.

But on the contrary: St. Hilary says in De Trinitate IV: "The Son has nothing except to be begotten; by nativity, however, he is Son." Therefore, filiation being removed, the hypostasis of the Son does not remain. And the same reason holds of the other persons.[819]

I answer that a twofold abstraction by the intellect is to be set down. One, according to which the universal is abstracted from the particular, as "animal" from "man." Another, according to which the form is abstracted from matter; as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from all sensible matter. Between these abstractions this is the difference: that in the abstraction which is made according to universal and particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain. For with the rational difference removed from man, there does not remain in the intellect "man" but only "animal." But in the abstraction which is considered according to form from matter, each remains in the intellect. For when the form of a circle is abstracted from bronze, there remain separately in our intellect both the intellect of a circle and the intellect of bronze. Although, however, in the divinity there is neither universal nor particular, nor form and matter according to the thing, nevertheless according to the mode of signifying there is found some likeness of these in the divinity, according to which mode St. John Damascene says that the "common" is substance, but the "particular" is hypostasis. If, therefore, we speak of an abstraction which is made according to universal and particular, with the properties removed, there remains in the intellect the common essence, but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is as it were the particular.[820]

But if we speak according to the mode of abstraction of form from matter, the non-personal properties being removed, there remains in the intellect the notion of hypostasis and of persons. Thus, with it being removed by the intellect from the Father that he is "unbegotten" or "spirating," there remains the hypostasis or person of the Father. But with the personal property removed by the intellect, the notion of hypostasis is taken away. For the personal properties are not understood to accrue to the divine hypostases like a form to a pre-existing subject; rather, they carry along with themselves their supposits, inasmuch as they themselves are the subsisting persons. Thus paternity is the Father himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in the divinity, since hypostasis is an individual substance. Therefore, since the relation is that which distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases (as was said), it follows that, the personal relations being removed by the intellect, the hypostases do not remain.

But (as was said) some say that the hypostases in the divinity are not distinguished by relations, but by origin alone, so that the Father be understood to be a certain hypostasis by this, that he is not "from another"; but the Son, by this, that he is "from another" by generation. But the relations, coming as it were as properties pertaining to dignity, constitute the notion of person; whence also they are called "personal." Hence, the relations of this sort being removed by the intellect, there remain indeed hypostases, but not persons. But this cannot be, for two reasons. First, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as has been shown. Second, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as is plain from the definition of Boethius, saying that a

819. St. Hilary, De Trinitate IV.
820. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, III, c. 6, in the beginning.

person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Hence, in order that there be a hypostasis and not a person, it would be necessary that rationality be abstracted on the side of the nature, not, however, that the property be abstracted on the side of the person.[821]

to the first: Person does not add above hypostasis a property distinguishing absolutely, but a property distinguishing and pertaining to dignity. For all this is to be received in the place of one difference. And the property which distinguishes pertains to dignity, according as it is understood to signify one subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, when the distinguishing property is removed, there does not remain a person, nor does there remain a hypostasis; but it would remain if rationality on the part of the nature were taken away. For person, as hypostasis, is an individual substance. Wherefore, in the divine, on account of both, there is a relation (*relatio*) distinguishing.

Reply to the second: By paternity, the Father is not only father, but he is a person, and is a "who," that is, a hypostasis. Nor, however, does it follow that the Son is not a "who," or hypostasis, just as it does not follow that he is not a person.

Reply to the third: The intention of St. Augustine was not to say that the hypostasis of the Father remains ingenerate when paternity is removed, as though unbegottenness constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father. For this cannot be; since "ingenerate" posits nothing, but is said negatively, as he himself says. Rather, he speaks in a common way: because not every ingenerate is a father. Therefore, with paternity removed, there does not remain in the divine the hypostasis of the Father as distinguished from the other persons, but as distinguished from creatures, as the learned understand.

Conclusion: With the personal relations removed by the intellect, neither do the hypostases remain nor the persons; yet with active spiration removed, the persons of the Father and the Son remain.

Notations concerning the article.

St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, dist. 6, q. 3 seems to approve the opinion of those who assert that, the relations abstracted, hypostases remain in God on account of origins alone: for there would be in God "one who is from another" and "one from whom another is." For relations are posterior to origins. Yet this opinion is easily refuted from disputation 138, where it was proved that persons are not constituted by origins, nor distinguished formally.

Scotus adds in Quodlibet 4, q. 5, that from these two, with the personal relations removed, at least one person would still remain, namely that of the Father; because the first person is understood by us as fecund and able to beget, as Henry says, whom he himself there reports, before he is understood actually to beget.[822] Nor indeed does Scotus attack Henry as though he had said that the first person could be understood in this mode before the generation; but that he had affirmed that the person is constituted by that relation of "able to beget," before he is understood to beget. But Scotus refutes that, in harmony with his doctrine: for since he himself thinks that the

821. Boethius, De duabus naturis, c. 3, in the beginning.

822. Scotus, Quodlibet 4, q. 5; he also reports Henry (of Ghent) on conceiving the first person as fecund and able to beget before actual generation.

persons are constituted from the nature of the thing, as I recalled in chapter 4 of the preceding disputation, and that that relation in God is only of reason - because in God there is no other relation in reality than the act of producing and the act of the produced - it was rightly inferred by Scotus that a person cannot be constituted by that relation; yet he could not deny that it can be conceived under the merely conceptual idea of being fecund and able to beget. But we, who in disputation 158, chapter 2, proved that the constitution of the divine persons is only through our intellect, have rightly inferred already in the preceding disputation, chapter 5, that not only can the first person be conceived by us as fecund and able to beget, before he is understood to begetting, but also that by that property conceived in the mode of relation - even if it be a relation of reason - the first person can rightly be constituted by us.

Wherefore, if St. Thomas were speaking of the person of the Father as it is conceived by us before he begets, he would not doubt to affirm that he can indeed be conceived as a person without the relation of father, as relation, being understood, since he himself openly admits this in the following article. Therefore, when he asserts in this article that with the relations removed the persons do not remain, he is speaking of the relations, that is, of the personal properties, whatever they may be, and in whatever way they are conceived.[823]

Articulus IV - Whether the notional acts are understood prior to the properties

It seems that the notional acts are understood prior to the properties.

1. For the Master says in I Sentences, dist. 27, that the Father always is, because he begot the Son. And it is further granted that generation, according to the intellect, precedes paternity.[824]
2. Moreover, every relation presupposes in the intellect that upon which it is founded: as equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation founded upon an action, which is generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.
3. Moreover, as active generation is related to paternity, so is birth to filiation. But filiation presupposes birth; for the Son is such because he has been born. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.

But on the contrary: Generation is an operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore, according to the intellect, paternity is prior to generation.

I answer: According to those who say that properties do not distinguish and constitute hypostases, but manifest hypostases already distinct and constituted, it is to be said absolutely that relations, according to the mode of understanding, follow upon notional acts, so that one may say

823. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 3.
824. The Master (Peter Lombard), I Sentences, dist. 27: "The Father always is, because he begot the Son."

simply: because he generates, he is Father. But, supposing that relations distinguish and constitute hypostases in the divine, it is necessary to make a distinction. For origin is signified in the divine actively and passively: actively indeed, as when generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passively, as when nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Spirit. Now the origins signified passively, simply speaking, precede according to the intellect the properties of the proceeding persons, even the personal ones. For a passively signified origin signifies, as it were, the way to the person constituted by the property. Likewise, the origin signified actively is prior, according to the intellect, to the relation of the originating person, which is not personal. Just as the notional act of spiration, according to the intellect, precedes the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the Son. But the personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold way. In one way, as it is a relation, and thus again, according to the intellect, it presupposes the notional act: because relation as such is founded upon an act. In another way, according to that whereby it is constitutive of the person. And thus it ought to be that the relation to the notional act is understood as presupposed, just as the acting person is understood as prior to the action.

Reply to the first: When the Master says that because he generates, he is Father, the name "Father" is taken according to that which designates the relation alone, and not according to that which signifies the subsisting person. For in that converse way it ought to be said that, because he is Father, he generates.

Reply to the second: That objection proceeds regarding paternity according to that which it is a relation, and not according to that which it is constitutive of the person.

Reply to the third: Birth is the way to the person of the Son. And therefore, according to the intellect, it precedes filiation also according to that which it is constitutive of the person of the Son. But active generation is signified as proceeding from the person of the Father; and therefore it presupposes the personal property of the Father.

Conclusion: Origin, understood passively, is prior, according to the intellect, to the property and relation which follow upon the origin; and, considered actively, it is prior, according to the intellect, to the relation of the producing person.

Concerning the doctrine of this article enough has been said by us in the preceding disputation, chapter 5; and also how the person of the Father is understood by us before he generates, and in what respect St. Thomas here also differs, has been sufficiently explained there.[825]

Quaestio XLI - On the persons in comparison to the notional acts

Therefore there is to be considered concerning the persons in comparison to the notional acts. And concerning this six things are asked.

825. Cf. the author's disputation 158, cap. 2; and the preceding disputation, cap. 5; see also St. Thomas's way of proceeding in similar places (e.g., Opusculum 3, cap. 63 - 64).

Articulus I - Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons

It seems that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.

1. For Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that when anyone turns the predication to the individual in any of the genera, in the divine they change the substance, except for relatives. But action is one of the ten genera. If therefore some action is attributed to God, it will pertain to his essence, and not to a notion.[826]
2. Moreover, St. Augustine says in De Trinitate that whatever is said of God is said either according to substance, or according to relation. But those things which pertain to substance are signified by the essential attributes; whereas those which pertain to relation, by the names of the persons and by the names of the properties. Therefore, beyond these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.[827]
3. Moreover, it is proper to action to infer from itself a passion. But in the divine we do not posit passions. Therefore neither ought notional acts to be posited there.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says at the beginning of the book De fide ad Petrum: It is proper indeed to the Father that he begot the Son. But generation is a certain act. Therefore notional acts are to be posited in the divine.[828]

I answer: In the divine persons there is observed distinction according to origin. But origin cannot be suitably designated except by certain acts. Therefore, in order to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, it was necessary to attribute to the persons notional acts. To the first, therefore, it must be said that every origin is designated by some act. But a twofold order of origin can be attributed to God. One indeed, according as the creature proceeds from him; and this is common to the three persons. And therefore the actions which are attributed to God to designate the procession of creatures from him, pertain to the essence. Another order of origin, however, is observed in the divine according to the procession of person from person. Wherefore the acts that designate the order of this origin are called notional, because the notions of the persons are the persons' mutual relations.

And concerning this six things are asked.

Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons

In the first we proceed thus. It seems that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.

826. Boethius, De Trinitate.
827. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 6.
828. [Pseudo-]Augustine, De fide ad Petrum, in the beginning.

For Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that all the genera of the divine when one turns them into individual predication change the substance, except the relatives. But action is one of the ten genera. Therefore, if some action is attributed to the persons, it pertains to their essence and not to the notion.[829]

Further, St. Augustine says in De Trinitate that everything which is said of God is said either according to the substance, or according to the relation.[830] But the things which pertain to the substance are signified by the essential attributes; while those which pertain to the relation are signified by the names of the persons and by the names of the properties. Therefore there are not, besides these, any notional acts to be attributed to the persons.[831]

Further, it is proper to action to infer from itself a passion. But in the divine we do not posit passions. Therefore neither ought the notional acts to be posited there.

But on the contrary: [Pseudo-]Augustine says at the beginning of De fide ad Petrum: "It is proper indeed to the Father that he begot the Son." But begetting is a certain act. Therefore notional acts ought to be posited in the divine.[832]

I answer that in the divine persons there is observed a distinction according to origin. Now origin cannot suitably be designated except by certain acts. Therefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons it was necessary to attribute notional acts to the persons.

Accordingly, first it must be said that every origin is designated by some act. Now a twofold order of origin can be attributed to God. One indeed according to which the creature proceeds from him; and this is common to the three persons. And therefore the actions which are attributed to God to designate the procession of creatures from him pertain to the essence. But another order of origin is observed in the divine, namely the procession of a person from a person. Wherefore the acts that designate the order of this origin are called notional, because the notions of the persons are the persons' relations to one another, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the second: Notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only according to the mode of signifying, but in reality they are altogether the same. Whence the Master says in I Sentences, distinction 26, around the beginning, that generation and nativity are called by other names paternity and filiation.[833]

For the understanding of which it must be noted that first we come to know the origin of something from another by motion. For when some thing was observed to be removed by a change from its own disposition, it was clear that this happened from some cause; and therefore, according to the first imposition of the name, origin imports motion. For just as motion, insofar as it is in the thing moved by another, is called passion; so origin itself, insofar as it begins from another and terminates in that which is moved, is called action. Motion therefore being removed, action imports nothing other than the order of origin according as it proceeds from some cause or

829. Boethius, De Trinitate.
830. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, c. 4 - 5.
831. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 2.
832. [Pseudo-]Augustine, De fide ad Petrum, in the beginning.
833. The Master (Peter Lombard), I Sentences, dist. 26.

principle into that which is from the principle. Wherefore, since in the divine there is no motion, personal action producing the person is nothing other than the relation of a principle to the person which is from the principle. Now these relations are themselves the relations or notions. However, because we are not able to speak of divine and intelligible things except according to the mode of sensible things, from which we receive knowledge, and in which actions and passions insofar as they imply motion are something other than the relations which follow upon actions and passions: it was fitting that the persons' relations be signified apart under the mode of act, and apart under the mode of relation. And thus it is clear that they are the same according to reality, but differ only according to the mode of signifying.

Reply to the third: Since action, insofar as it imports origin with motion, entails from itself passion, no action is posited in the divine persons in that way. Hence no passions are posited there, except in a grammatical way of speaking, as to mode of signifying: thus we attribute "to beget" to the Father, and "to be begotten" to the Son.

Conclusion of the article: To signify the order of origin it was necessary to attribute notional acts to the persons.

Notes around the article.

- That we may better understand all the things which are handed down in this article and in the whole question, certain things are to be noted. First, that origin, or the notional act, is the same. Origin is called the very way and act whereby a person produces, and whereby it proceeds: as generation, spiration, procession. Just as also in any agent, between it and the effect, we assign a certain middle act of production, as will be explained below. Now in the divine this origin is called "notional act"; for as "notions" are certain forms conceived by us by which the persons are known - about which in disputation 137 and the following it was said - so also these origins are called notional acts, because they conduce to recognizing the persons. And indeed the Fathers use indiscriminately them and the relations as the notions of the persons.
- Second, it must be observed that the notional act is not the relation of production alone, but also includes the operations of understanding and of loving. For, as was proved in disputation 112, generation in God is essentially intellection, and spiration is essentially love; but upon the nature of these operations there is added the relation of production. Wherefore he who would assert that origin is something absolute according to reality would err gravely: he would take away the real order of production to the thing produced. On that account, however, we ought not to add more real relations in God beyond the four which all the Scholastics grant: for active generation, since it is nothing other than paternity as it were in the way, and passive generation nothing other than filiation also "in becoming" and in the way, there ought not to be constituted distinct relations; but relative origins are constituted: for by the name of relation absolutely we understand that which is in the thing as a form in "fact of being."[834]

- Third, note that origin is the same according to reality with the essence and the person, not adequately with the essence but with the person. For we say that something is adequately the same with another which is also the same with the rest with which that thing has identity; and because origin thus is the same with the essence as not being with all the persons with whom the essence is the same, therefore we say that origin is not adequately the same with the essence. But it is adequately the same with the person, because whatever origin is the same with its own person - active with the producing, and passive with the produced - is not the same with another.
- Fourth, note the doctrine of St. Thomas in the solution to the second, where he says that origin is the same according to reality with the relation, and differs only according to mode of signifying. When he says "according to mode of signifying," it ought not to be understood as a merely nominal difference: for thus it would have to be said that "to beget" and "paternity," "to be begotten" and "filiation," are synonymous - which is absurd. They therefore differ in concept and in our ration if they differ in signification, as we said in disputation 159, cap. 4, because diverse signification is taken from our mode of conceiving. Add, from the mind of the holy Doctor in that solution, that active origin is the same with the relation of the producing person, and passive with the relation of the produced person - "to beget" with paternity, and "to be begotten" with filiation; and thus active and passive origin do not exist in the same person. Whereas in human things action and passion are in the same subject: active indeed is in the producer, passive in the produced, and thus they are really distinguished, just as the very persons and relations themselves. So think with the Master in the first of distinction 26, whom St. Thomas cites; Gabriel, Capreolus, and the other Scholastics; Durandus in that distinction, question 1; Scotus, distinction 28, question 3; the Ferrariensis, 4, against the adversaries, cap. 26; Cajetan, the Canarian, and the recent Thomists on this article. And it is gathered from the Fathers, who assign distinction among the persons from the distinction of the origins, namely "to beget" and "to be begotten," whom we have enumerated in disputation 158, cap. 4; whereas in the other created actions there is altogether the same, according to reality, action and passion in the same subject, as Aristotle teaches, Physics 3, chap. 3, text 18 and the following; because action in human things, which is production, is in the subject which is moved; and therefore it is received there, and is called "action" insofar as it is understood as an act between agent and produced term; but "passion" insofar as it is conceived as the middle act between the receiving subject and the received form, and it is called "reception." But in God there is only "to beget" and "to be begotten," which are called active generation and passive, and each is conceived as a middle act between one person and another - one, as of the producer into the produced, the other, as of the produced from the producer. In creation it would be in the same way: that is, in God there would be active creation, that is, to create; in the creature there would be passive, that is, to be created, if creation began in time. Yet because creation begins in time,

834. On the four real relations customarily admitted by the Scholastics, see the common doctrine; for the identification of action and passion in the same subject in created agents, see Aristotle, Physics III, c. 3, text 18 and following.

and nothing intrinsic is in God's will either from time or from eternity by his free will, as was shown in disputation 80, chapter 7, therefore God is said "to create" by an extrinsic denomination from the relation existing in the creature, not from the active origin existing in him. For the very act of his will and of his intellect is not itself creation and active origin, but the principle thereof. It must, however, be added against Cajetan and the Canarian on this article, that creation conceived as an action is the middle act and the way between the creator and the creature, just as in the divine it is origin. And although it is a pure relation, yet it is considered as in fieri and as a way, and not as in "fact of being": and therefore it ought to be constituted as a kind of middle act. Nor did St. Thomas teach the opposite, when he said that in the divine, the notion of way, which is wont to be in motion, being taken away, nothing remains except relation. For he understands that origin is altogether the same in reality with relation; yet it is signified and conceived under the mode of act, and therefore under the mode of way. For act, in its concept, is a way, although in motion one thing is the "way" according to reality, and another the relation thence arising: for relation remains when the motion ceases. And indeed St. Thomas in article 2 and article 4 of the preceding question therefore said that the persons cannot be constituted by origins, because they have the notion of a way as if tending, and not the notion of a form inhering. Therefore, since he grants that the way is to the thing produced according to its own rationale, he ought also to say that it is a middle act between the producing and the produced person.[835]

Articulus II - Whether the notional acts are voluntary

In the second we proceed thus. It seems that the notional acts are voluntary.

1. For Hilary says, book 1 On the Synod: "Not by a necessity of nature was the Father led to beget the Son." Therefore the Son was begotten by the Father's will.[836]
2. Further, the Apostle says, Col. 1: "He translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love." But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son is begotten of the Father willing.
3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as love. Therefore he proceeds voluntarily.
4. Further, the Son proceeds according to the mode of intellect as Word. But every word proceeds from the one speaking by will. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
5. Further, that which is not voluntary is necessary. If therefore the Father did not beget the Son by will, it seems to follow that he begot him by necessity - which is against Augustine in the book to Orosius.[837]

835. Cf. St. Thomas as cited on I Sent. d. 26; and see his handling in Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 2, and the author's disputations 137, 158 (cap. 4), and 159 (cap. 4). On creation and extrinsic denomination see also disputation 80, cap. 7; against Cajetan and the Canarian on this article the author adds the point about creation conceived as a middle "way."

836. St. Hilary, De Synodis, lib. 1.

837. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum vel ad Orosium (as cited by the author).

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the same book: that the Father begot the Son neither by will nor by necessity.[837]

I answer that, when it is said that something is or is done "by will," this can be understood in a twofold way. In one way, so that "by will" designates only concomitance: as I can say that I am a man "by my will," because namely I will that I be a man. And in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son "by will," just as one says "by will God is": because he wills to be God, and he wills to beget the Son.

In another way something is said to be "by will" so as to import the habitude of a principle. Thus it is said that the craftsman works "by will," because will is the principle of the work. And according to this mode it must be said that God the Father did not beget the Son by will, but by will he produced the creature. Whence in the book On the Synod it is said that if anyone says that by the will of God as though one of the creatures the Son was made, let him be anathema. And the reason of this is: because will and nature differ in causing in this respect, that nature is determined to one, but will is not determined to one. The reason of which is that an effect is assimilated to the form of the agent by which it acts. But it is clear that of one thing there is only one natural form by which the thing has being: whence, such as the thing is, such it will make. But the form by which the will acts is not one only, but are many, according as there are many rationes understood. Whence that which is done by will is not such as the agent is, but such as the agent wills and understands to be. Of those things therefore the will is the principle which can be thus or otherwise; but of those which cannot be except thus, the principle is nature. Now that which can be thus or otherwise is far from the divine nature; but this pertains to the ratio of the creature, because God is of himself necessary to be, whereas the creature is made from nothing. And therefore the Arians, willing to bring it about that the Son be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son "by will": according as for every creature the will of God brought in the substance of God, but gave to the Son nature from impassibility; and as not born, a perfect nativity. For all such things were created such as God willed them to be; but the Son was begotten to God; he subsists such as God is.

It is objected that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says in the first book On the Synods: Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son.[838]

Further, the Apostle, Col. 1: He has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love. But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son is begotten by the Father willing.

Further, nothing is more voluntary than love; but the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as love. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.

Further, the Son proceeds by way of the intellect as Word; but every word proceeds from the one speaking by will. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Further, what is not of the will is necessary; if, then, the Father begot the Son not by will, it seems to follow that He begot by necessity. But this is against Augustine in the book to Orosius.[839]

837. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum vel ad Orosium (as cited by the author).
838. St. Hilary, De Synodis, lib. 1.
839. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum vel ad Orosium (as cited by the author).

But on the contrary: Augustine says in the same book that the Father begot the Son neither by will nor by necessity.[839]

I answer: When something is said to be or to be made "by will," this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the ablative designates merely concomitance: thus I can say that I am a man "by my will," inasmuch as I will to be a man. And in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son "by will," just as He is "by will" God; for He wills Himself to be God, and He wills Himself to beget the Son.

In another way, so that the ablative imports a principle, as when one is said to work "by will," because will is the principle of the work. And in this way it is to be said that God the Father did not beget the Son by will, but by will He produced the creature. Hence in the book On the Synods it is said that if anyone says by the will of God, as by a kind of mean, that of the creatures the Son was made, let him be anathema.[838] And the reason for this is: will and nature differ thus in causing, because nature, determined by natural necessity, has begotten the Son, but will is not determined to one. The reason of this is that the effect is likened to the form of the agent by which it acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form, through which the thing has existence; hence, such as the thing itself is, such it makes. But the form by which the will acts is not only one, but many, according as there are many rational accounts understood. Whence what is done by will is not such as the agent is, but such as he wills, and he understands that it is from the agent. Therefore will is the principle of those things which can be thus or otherwise; but of those things which cannot be except thus, the principle is nature. Now what can be thus or otherwise is far from the divine nature; but this pertains to the notion of a creature, because God is of Himself necessary to be, whereas the creature is made from nothing. And therefore the Arians, wishing to deduce from this that the Son is a creature, said that the Father begot the Son "by will," inasmuch as will designates a principle. But we must say that the Father begot the Son not by will but by nature. Whence Hilary says in the book On the Synods: To all creatures the will of God brought being, but to the Son the nativity, from impassible and unborn substance, gave nature perfect. For all created things are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists such as God Himself is.[838]

Reply to the first: That authority is brought against those who even removed the concomitance of the paternal will from the generation of the Son, saying that the Father so begot the Son "by nature" that nevertheless there was not present to Him the will of begetting, just as we suffer many things by natural necessity against our will, as death, old age, and defects of this sort. And this is clear from the preceding and following in that place; for thus it is said there: "Not with the Father unwilling, nor compelled, nor led by natural necessity, did the Father beget the Son."

Reply to the second: The Apostle names Christ "the Son of the love of God," inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God, not because love is the principle of the generation of the Son.

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839. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum vel ad Orosium (as cited by the author).
838. St. Hilary, De Synodis, lib. 1.
838. St. Hilary, De Synodis, lib. 1.

Reply to the third: Even the will, inasmuch as it is a kind of nature, wills something naturally, as the will of man naturally tends to beatitude. And similarly God naturally wills and loves Himself. But concerning other things than Himself the will of God is disposed indifferently to either, as was said. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, inasmuch as God loves Himself; whence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds according to the mode of will.

Reply to the fourth: Even in intellectual conceptions there is a reduction to first principles which are understood naturally. But God naturally understands Himself; and according to this the conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply to the fifth: Something is said to be necessary per se and per aliud. Per aliud in two ways. In one way, as by an agent and compelling cause; and thus what is violent is said to be necessary. In another way, as by a final cause: thus something is said to be necessary in those things which are to an end, inasmuch as without this the end cannot be had. And in neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary. For God is not for the sake of an end, nor does coercion fall upon Him. But per se something is said to be necessary which cannot not be. And thus for God to be is necessary; and in this way for the Father to beget the Son is necessary.

From this article there are elicited conclusions. The first is: The notional acts are voluntary with concomitant will. The second: The notional acts are not voluntary by will as principle. And both are understood of each notional act, of generation as well as of spiration; for although in the body of the article St. Thomas makes mention only of the act of generation, in the reply to the third he also makes mention of spiration. The reason, moreover, of the second conclusion in St. Thomas is that those things which are voluntary by will as principle can be thus or otherwise; but generation and spiration cannot be thus or otherwise; therefore they are not voluntary by will as principle. Which reason plainly proves concerning each notional act.

Prior dubitatio circa textum. Furthermore, for a fuller explication of each conclusion and of the doctrine of the article, it must be explained what St. Thomas understands by the name "will." Now the reason for doubting, which Cajetan asserts, is this: either by "will" is understood that which He necessarily and naturally wills - and in this way the act of spiration is voluntary by will as principle, and thus the second conclusion would be false, and the reason which we have adduced from St. Thomas would not fit - or "will" is understood as free and indifferent, and thus, although the second conclusion be true, because no notional act is from free will as principle, nevertheless the first conclusion cannot be true, because no notional act is voluntary by free will, even as accompanying.

Cajetan answers that "will" is taken univocally in each conclusion, either for the very power of willing, or for the act of will, not determined in this or that way, but indiscriminately. Accordingly, in the first conclusion, when it is said, "The Father begets the Son with concomitant will," St. Thomas shows that the act of generation is referred to the act of will as to its object, not determined in this or that way, that is, not as free or as necessary, but confusedly to the act of will, of whatever sort it be. But when, in the second conclusion, he says that a notional act is not referred to will as to a principle, he signifies that the act of will, which is to will, abstracting from

free and necessary, is not the principle of any notional act. For that ablative, "by will," when it is joined to verbs signifying an act, denotes the notion of a principle of liberty; as if you were to say, "by will the Father begets or spirates."

Yet according to this exposition of Cajetan, we can hardly avoid the equivocation and variety of the same name. Wherefore St. Thomas can be more easily explained, if in each conclusion "will" is taken for act, not for power. For, as is clear from the same First Part of the Second, question 8, article 1, "will" can be taken in a twofold way: first, for the faculty itself of willing; next, for its act, which is the prosecution of the good, or complacency - for the flight of evil is not called "will." But if "will" be taken in the latter way, namely for the act of willing, the truth of each conclusion rightly stands. The first, indeed, is true, because every notional act pleases God and, therefore, He is said to will it; but in this way the act of will is not the principle of the notional act, but accompanies it. The second conclusion also is true in the same way, because both the act of spiration and of generation is not from the act of will as from a principle; for, therefore, the Father does not generate or spirate because He wills to spirate and to generate; therefore the act of willing is not the principle, although spiration is from will as it is a faculty.

Moreover, St. Thomas proves that the notional acts are not voluntary by will as principle by the same foundation and reason by which above, question 19, article 4, he showed that creatures are produced by God by will as principle; which is of this sort. That which acts by will as principle, that is, because it wills, and that which acts by nature as principle, that is, inasmuch as it is, differ in this, that the agent by will acts freely and indifferently to either; but the agent by nature acts necessarily and as determined to one part. But God necessarily generates and spirates; therefore not by will as principle.

Posterior Dubitatio. Hence Cajetan further doubts whether the reason of St. Thomas has place only in products outside God, or also in products within Him. The reason of doubting is that, if it has place in products within God, nothing will be produced within Him voluntarily, unless by a reflex will; for something in God is produced voluntarily only insofar as it is willed; but if it be understood only of products outside God, the labor of St. Thomas is idle, because the difficulty of the present article was only about notional acts.

Cajetan answers that the reason of St. Thomas is to be understood also of any product within God, such as the act of free will itself, which, although it is not a product in reality, is nevertheless conceived under the mode of a product. He therefore says that these acts too are voluntary and free, because in a certain way they are willed, not by another distinct and reflex act, but by the same. For every act of will, he says, is willed, by the reason of the object of willing. I do not know, however, who has brought Cajetan into these straits: for the reason of St. Thomas plainly proves that everything which is produced voluntarily, that is, freely and indifferently, is from will, that is, from the act of will, as from a principle, whether the product be within God or outside. From this, moreover, he concludes that there is nothing within God produced in this way, because no notional act is produced in this way. But concerning other free operations, which truly are not produced, but are conceived as operations, such as the free volitions of God, this reason of St. Thomas does not prove them to be free; but this can be proved by another reason. For now St. Thomas only strives to

show that no notional act is free; which he excellently concludes by the foregoing reason. Further, the acts of willing creatures, even if they be conceived as elicited by the faculty of will as by a proximate principle, and not by another distinct act of willing...

That the acts of willing are free by another easy argument has been shown above by St. Thomas in question 19, article 3, as we too have explained in disputation 79.

Disputatio CLX - Whether the act of will precedes, accompanies, or follows the notional acts

- The opinion of Gregory, Capreolus, and others. cap. 1.
- What Scotus and Cajetan thought. cap. 2.
- That whatever act of God's will concerns the notional acts is in no way prior to them, but posterior to them, is the truer view. cap. 3.
- How the Fathers spoke about this matter. cap. 4.

There was the opinion of Gregory in the First Book, distinction 6, question 1, article 3, where he attacks the opinion of Scotus; and of Capreolus in the same distinction, question 1, article 1, conclusion 6, and article 2 against the arguments for the same conclusion; of the Ferrarensis on Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 11, § virum autem; and of the Canariensis in the third part of his commentary on this article, that the voluntary notional acts cannot precede them, but necessarily accompany them. These seem to be the express view of St. Thomas in De potentia, question 2, article 3, to the second.[840] But Cajetan replies that St. Thomas only denied that the will precedes as a principle, and not in any other way. This interpretation, however, is excellently refuted by the Ferrarensis from the words of the holy Doctor, as anyone can see.

Moreover, the Ferrarensis's view is proved by reason.

First, before the individual act that proceeds necessarily from a supposit is in act, another act of the same supposit cannot be understood as prior according to the true order of intellect, because there cannot be any middle act between the supposit and the act that proceeds necessarily from the supposit; yet several acts can well be understood as proceeding at once and necessarily from the same supposit. But the notional acts proceed necessarily from the supposit: therefore the act of will cannot be understood to precede them; for here it would be a middle act between the supposit and the notional act, which is impossible.

Second, it is proved by the reasoning of the Canariensis. Even if there were no act of will concerning the notional acts, nonetheless the notional acts would exist: therefore the act of will concerning the notional acts does not precede them; for if it preceded, upon its removal the notional act would also be removed, because upon the removal of what is prior it is necessary to remove what is posterior.

He also confirms this from St. Thomas in this article, who only grants a concomitant will.

840. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2.

Third, it is proved by Gregory's reasoning. The Father's knowledge cannot be perfect before He generates: therefore neither can the Father understand before He generates; nor can He will to generate, because to will cannot exist without intellection. Or if it was first to will to generate, before actually generating, it follows that the Son had being after not-being.

Finally, it can be confirmed thus: if an act of will precedes generation, it cannot precede otherwise than by origin; but in this way it would follow that the notional acts are voluntary by a will as principle: therefore in no way does it precede.

Caput II - What Scotus and Cajetan thought

Scotus in the First Book, distinction 6, question 1 - if I may trust my memory - holds that there is some act of will prior according to reason to the origins, or notional acts. Cajetan embraces this opinion in commenting on this article; and in its confirmation Scotus notes that a twofold act of intellect and of will can be distinguished: one, an essential intellection, which is common to the three persons; another, a notional intellection, which is proper to the Father. In the will likewise there is one act of all the persons, and another of the Father alone and of the Son producing the Holy Spirit.[841][842]

Hence he proves that some act of intellect and will, namely the essential act, is prior to the origins and notional acts: for the person is understood at some instant of origin to be able to generate before he generates, as was proved in the preceding disputation; and at that instant the person of the Father stands to the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit as to a person to be produced and possible. And since at that instant the Father is perfectly God and perfectly blessed, He understands by an essential intellection, which is not a production, and He wills by an essential will - both of which He communicates to the Son by generation - therefore by that intellection He understands the notional acts as future or possible, and by the essential will He wills them to be future or possible, that is, it pleases Him that they be future or possible.

And from this it is clear how that act of will is not the principle of the notional acts, nor is God said thereby to produce because He wills; for it is only a certain simple complacency concerning a possible or future notional act that befits the Father in that instant of origin, before He generates. And in the same way all the arguments that have been brought for the first opinion could be solved by this. For they only prove that an act of will as the principle of the notional acts cannot be prior, not however in the other way explained. Wherefore Capreolus in the place cited, to the arguments against the sixth conclusion, finally concedes that from the imperfection of our intellect it comes about that the will of generating in God is considered prior to the very act of generation, although in reality it is not prior - this alone being what Scotus contends.

841. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1.
842. Cajetan, on this article.

In another way this opinion can be explained, so that that will is prior in the sense in which the essential attributes are said to be prior to the notional, namely because they are more common, and the common is prior to the particular according to the rules of Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter on the modes of the prior.

The Canariensis, however, replies that to will to generate is not essential, but notional and proper to the Father: for He alone wills to generate, just as He alone generates. He errs nonetheless: for although the Father alone wills to generate the Son, yet the other persons also will that the Son be generated by the Father, and thus this pleases them as it does the Father.

Moreover, the Ferrarensis answers otherwise, namely that only those essential attributes are prior to the notional which signify the essence itself, and not those which signify an operation, such as the will. Yet this is no less false, because just as deity is prior to filiation, so also by the same reasoning knowledge and will are prior in the way in which animal is prior to man. For just as without animal there could not be man, and rightly there can be animal without man: so the persons could not be understood without deity, knowledge, and will; whereas rightly the essence, knowledge, and will are understood without the three persons. But this mode of priority is different from the preceding one, which Scotus strives to prove.

Caput III - That whatever act of God's will concerns the notional acts is in no way prior to them, but posterior to them, is the truer view

This opinion is proved by the authority of Henry in the Summa, article 58, question 2, and in Quodlibet 5, question 4; and of Godefrid in Quodlibet 5, question 5; whom Scotus reports in the place cited. These authors in general maintain that every act of God's will which is conversant about the notional acts as about its object is posterior to the notional acts themselves according to reason.[843] From which two things follow against the two preceding opinions: one is that no such act of will is prior to the notional acts - in which we agree with the first opinion, and oppose the second. The other is that no such act of will accompanies the notional acts and is simultaneous with them, but is posterior to them in the intellect according to reason; for in reason they are not simultaneous. This is the opposite of the first opinion, unless its authors understand "accompaniment" to mean duration. We, however, since we deny priority, speak of every kind of it, such that neither by origin, nor by reason, nor in any other way is an act of will prior, but rather according to reason it is posterior.

Henry indeed proves this by the same reasoning by which Gregory also proved that the act of will is not prior: the notional intellection, insofar as it is the Father's, is an intellection; but in the Father intellection is prior to an act of will: therefore the notional act of generation is prior to the will concerning it.

843. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 58, q. 2; Quodlibet V, q. 4; Godefrid (Godfrey of Fontaines), Quodlibet V, q. 5; cited by Scotus in the place mentioned.

Yet to this argument, which in my judgment is weak, adversaries could easily reply: because in the Father there is not only notional intellection, which is generation, but before He generates He is conceived by us with the sole essential intellection which He has insofar as He is God; therefore from that He can also have an act of will before He is understood to have the notional act of intellect. Another way therefore must this opinion be proved.

In its confirmation, however, note first that the present question is about action and about acts that are truly in God. Among these we try to investigate an order of prior and posterior, either by priority according to reason or according to origin; for another kind of priority, such as by duration and by nature, is not found in God. By the name of priority according to reason I also understand that which is found between the essential and the notional, such as is found in creatures between universals, or common things, and particulars, which is called by Aristotle priority "a quo" - of which we shall speak in disputation 167, chapter 2.[844]

Second, it must be observed that only that is assigned as prior or posterior which has some order with that to which it is compared. For if it has no order with it, it is neither prior nor posterior; for these two are not without order. Wherefore that is prior by origin to another in the divine which has an order of origin with it. But an order of origin is had only by that which produces and is produced, and by those things which are per se required on the part of the producer or of what is produced; and conversely, what per se requires the product, or is a product, has an order with the producer and with production itself, inasmuch as such things are per se required. But those things which are in the product or in the producer per accidens have no order among themselves, nor with producer and product. In natural causes and effects this can be seen. For if a man is the cause of a man, and in the generating man there is whiteness, that whiteness is not prior as a cause to what the man producing effects, because it contributes nothing to the production of that; yet it is prior by duration, because it exists together with the generating man, who in time precedes the product.

Third, note that we ought not here to feign new acts in God, and new objects known and willed, which in reality are not, so that we may call those prior to others; but only among those things that are truly in God must an order be assigned either according to origin or according to our reason.

These foundations laid, the first part of the aforesaid opinion - namely, that an act of will is not prior to the notional acts - can rightly be proved, because an act of will, even of simple complacency concerning the act of generation or spiration as future or only possible, is not in God: therefore such an act cannot be prior either by origin, or even according to reason, to the notional act; and by the same reasoning neither will it be posterior nor simultaneous. For, as we have said, these orders are to be assigned only among those things that are truly in God. That there is no such act of will in God is clear, because God never considers His generation as future or only possible, as if by an abstraction of the intellect; indeed, neither can He consider those in that way. For this reason, in disputation 142, chapter 2, against Cajetan we said that the Word is not produced with cognition suspended, so as to be possible or future, because no such cognition is in God.[845] For God cannot

844. Below in this work, disputation 167, cap. 2.

abstract His intellection from His object so as to consider the Son or the Holy Spirit as future and only possible, in the way our mode of understanding does with things that are in the present to our intellect. We indeed, in our present state, understand first an essence as possible, before actual existence; or in another, we apprehend the very thing. But we must not consider Him as one who first, as an intelligent, has His own Son as merely possible before actually existing; for to ascribe such a sign to God in God Himself is only to make a mark remaining in our own intellect. Therefore God does not first understand His Son, or the Holy Spirit, as possible, than as actually existing; nor does He first have an act of will concerning them as possible than as existing, in our mode of understanding. Therefore the act of will is not prior by origin to the notional acts in God, nor prior by reason; since what is prior and posterior in God ought to be assigned, even according to our reason, only among those things which truly are in Him.

Tertio nota, we ought not here to feign new acts in God, and new objects known and willed, which in truth are not, so as to say that those are prior to others; rather, only among those things which truly are in God is an order to be assigned either according to origin (*origo*), or according to our reason.

With these foundations laid, the first part of the aforesaid opinion, namely that the act of will (*voluntas*) is not prior to the notional acts (*actus notionales*), can rightly be proved; because an act of will - of simple complacency also - about the act of generation or spiration as future or merely possible is not in God: therefore such an act cannot be prior either by origin, or even according to reason, to the notional act, and for the same reason it will be neither posterior nor simultaneous; for, as we have said, these orders are to be assigned only among those things which truly are in God. But that such an act of will is not in God is clear, because God never considers His generation as future or merely possible, as if by an abstraction of the intellect; indeed neither can He in that way consider it. For this cause, in disputation 142, chapter 2, against Cajetan, we said that the Word is not produced by a cognition of Himself under the aspect of possible or future existence, because there is no such cognition in God. For since God cannot, by an abstraction of the intellect, consider one of the things which are in Himself without another, nor can He understand that under any other state than under the present, in which necessarily He has always been, it is not to be said that God knows Himself or anything of Himself first as possible or as future than as present, even in our mode of understanding. We indeed understand in Him that the Son was first possible than actual; because we apprehend Him after the manner of other things: but we ought not to consider Him as one understanding His Son first according to possible existence than as actually existing; for to attribute this to God is to place a figment in God Himself: whereas for us to consider Him in various ways is a figment remaining only in our intellect. Therefore, if God does not first understand His Son, or the Holy Spirit, as possible than as actually existing, neither will He first have an act of will concerning them as possible than as existing and according to our mode of understanding: therefore the act of will is not prior by origin to the notional acts than the acts

845. Above in this work, disputation 142, cap. 2, against Cajetan.

themselves are in God, nor prior by reason; since what is prior and posterior in God ought to be assigned, even according to our reason, only among those things which truly are in God, as was said in the first and third notations.

But it is objected: since we apprehend God and the first person before He generates, and under the concept of being able to generate, do we not consider Him as understanding Himself first as powerful than as generating? I answer: by no means. We grant indeed that we understand God first as powerful than as actually generating: for this is natural to our intellect, which knows God after the manner of other things; yet we deny that we consider God in such a way that He understands Himself first as powerful than as actually generating, or that He first understands anything in Himself as future than as present: for this is absurd, and least of all befitting the divine intellection. And if God truly understands Himself as powerful, nevertheless He does not understand power unless as conjoined to act and as operating, not as about to operate afterwards in the future, or as powerful to operate in the future: therefore we do not think of Him in such a way that He first understands Himself as powerful alone, but we do consider Him first as present than as actually generating: which two are far different.

However, let us concede that God is by us considered as first thinking Himself as powerful than as actually producing the Son and the Holy Spirit; nonetheless it cannot be said that that will which would be about the notional acts as future or possible would be prior according to origin, but only in our mode of understanding. For priority according to origin is real, as we shall show below in disputation 187, chapter 1;[846] but that [priority] would not be real, but only through our intellect. Then too, priority according to origin is between producer and product, and between those things which of themselves pertain to producer and product: but those things which stand to either extrinsically have no order among themselves according to origin, as was proved in the second notation: but that will of generating or of spirating would not of itself pertain to the principle of such origin, because it could exist without that principle: therefore it would not be prior according to origin; it would, however, be prior in our mode of understanding, inasmuch as it would be conceived by us before the acts themselves: for when we conceive the notional acts as future or possible, they would not be future or possible unless there were an act of will about them as such; and the possible or future is conceived as prior to what is present in our mode of conceiving: therefore in the intellect that will is prior to the notional act as present. And these points concern the first part of that opinion.

The other part, which affirms that that will is posterior to the notional acts, and is not simultaneous with them nor accompanies them, except in duration, is easily proved from what has been said. For that will is about the acts as now present: but every act of simple will presupposes its object under that mode about which it is conversant, whether as possible, future, or present, otherwise than an efficacious act, which is the cause of its object. For example, if it pleases someone that rain be possible, rain is first as possible; if it pleases that it be future, it is first future; if it pleases that it be present, it is first present: therefore, since the origins please God as actually

846. Below in this work, disputation 187, cap. 1.

existing and present, they are first present than there is a will about them: for the reason they please, and by this simple complacency of will they are willed, is that they are present, not the other way around. And this our opinion agrees with St. Thomas in the places cited: he denied that an act of will as efficient is prior to the notional acts; but when he conceded a concomitant will, he did not deny the order which we have posited between origin, and will, and the act of that will, for this cannot be denied: he did not, however, wish to grant that priority of a principle which the Arians posited. For he adduces an example of a concomitant will: when I will to be a man, it is evident that it is first that I am a man, even in the order of nature, than that I will to be a man.[847]

What we have said is to be understood not only concerning priority according to origin, but also concerning that priority by which we said that the essential precede and are prior to the notional: for only those are prior to the notional which are not referred to the notional themselves as objects. For if in this manner they are referred to the notional, as the act of intellect and of will is referred, which reflect upon the notional acts, without doubt they are posterior to the notional.

From what has been said, the argument of Scotus for his opinion also remains solved. As to the arguments for the first opinion there is no need to respond; for they prove what we willingly admit, namely that the act of will by which it pleases to will to generate and to spirate is not prior to generation and spiration themselves. There remains, however, some sayings of the Saints to be interpreted, which seem to grant not only will as prior to the notional acts, but even as their principle.

Caput IV - How the Fathers spoke on this matter

Among the Fathers, however, Hilary seems to teach that there is in God a will of generating as the principle of generation: for in the book De synodis, in the defences of Catholic professions against Photinus, definition 25, he says: "If anyone says that the Son was born of an unwilling Father, let him be anathema: for the Father was not compelled, nor led by natural necessity, to beget the Son, but as soon as He willed." But this definition has no weight. For it is of the Council of Sirmium, which was Arian; and in it, as in many things, it expressed the very error of Arius. But further down the same Hilary reports from the Catholic Synod of Sardica these words: "But that neither by counsel, nor by will did the Father beget the Son, let him be anathema": and the holy and Catholic Church, that is, affirms this. Of which synod Hilary there testifies that it used brief, yet most absolute, definitions.[848][849][850]

But St. Jerome on that passage to the Ephesians, chapter one, "He predestined us," says: Of the Son indeed, that is, of our Lord Jesus Christ, it is written elsewhere that He was always with the Father, and that the paternal will never preceded Him so that He might be. Therefore that definition is to be understood thus: that the Father begot the Son with counsel and with will, not as a principle, but as accompanying according to duration, and as following according to reason:

847. St. Thomas, on this article.
848. St. Hilary, De synodis, in the defences of Catholic professions against Photinus, defin. 25.
849. The Council of Sirmium, which was Arian.
850. The Synod of Sardica; cited by Hilary in the same place.

because, to wit, seeing Himself generating by the force of nature and necessarily, He judged that to be supremely good and perfect, and it pleased Him. For although it was by the necessity of nature, nevertheless He begot, the will not resisting. And when Jerome denies a preceding will, he clearly speaks not as the Scholastics about a precedence only according to reason, but about time and duration.[851]

St. Augustine also, book 65, question 7, to Orosius asking whether the Father begot by will, answers: neither by will nor by necessity - this is, neither by will as a principle (he understands, indeed, not the faculty, but the act of will), nor by coercion. And in De Trinitate 15, chapter 20, he asserts: just as God is not God by will, nor by necessity, nor is God willing, nor not willing; so also neither by will, nor by necessity, neither willing, nor not willing did He beget. Which in the same manner, as above, is to be explained.[852][853]

Moreover, let us see whether that mode of speaking of the Council of Sardica, "God begot by will," is to be conceded. Marsilius, in the First Book, question 10, article 3, and Gabriel, distinction 6, question 1, said that that part, "by will," can be taken in two ways: either as an adverb, so that it is the same as "willingly," and thus the proposition is true; or in an effective sense, and thus it is false, because it seems to signify a principle as it were efficient. But St. Thomas in this article, and Scotus in the First Book, distinction 6, question 1, article 2, concede this proposition, "God begot the Son by will," with only this distinction made concerning a concomitant will, or a preceding one as a principle; in the former way they concede it, in the latter they deny it; and because it can bear the aforesaid true sense, they absolutely concede it with the Council of Sardica. And in what sense the Fifteenth Council of Toledo said, "According to the essence the divine will begot will," we have explained above, question 39, article 5.[854][855][847][856][857][858]

Disputatio CLXI - Whether the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily, or freely

- Henry judges that the Holy Spirit proceeds in a certain manner freely, and in a certain manner naturally. Caput I.
- Scotus holds that the procession of the Spirit is necessary, yet not free. Caput II.
- That the spiration of the Holy Spirit is not only necessary, but also natural and not free, and that "not free" is the truer opinion. Caput III.
- The arguments of Scotus are resolved. Caput IV.

851. St. Jerome, on Ephesians 1, "Praedestinavit nos".
852. St. Augustine, lib. 65, quaest. 7, to Orosius.
853. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 20.
854. Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 10, a. 3.
855. Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1.
847. St. Thomas, on this article.
856. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2.
857. Council of Toledo, XV.
858. Above in this work, quaestio 39, art. 5.

- The controversy in this matter, at least with Scotus, is one of words rather than of things. Caput V.

Caput I - Henry's opinion: the Holy Spirit proceeds in one way freely, and in another naturally

... whether namely His production ought to be called free, since it is through will, not by compulsion; or to say the same in another way, as others do: yet with Henry there seems to be even a disagreement about the thing itself; for in sum, as Scotus reports in the First Book, distinction 6, question ... and as to the second ... or to say that nature itself, by means of will as a middle, always operates; or to say ...

Caput II - On whether the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary, natural, and free

It is to be asked whether its production ought to be called free, since it is by the will; not all feel the same way, as also others: and even with Henry there seems to be disagreement about the matter itself. For he, in sum (as Scotus reports), in the first distinction 10, question 1, §§ as to the first, and as to the second, and in Quodlibet 16, art. 3, asserts that the Holy Spirit proceeds indeed naturally, with naturalness (as he himself says) only accompanying, and at the same time proceeds freely.[859] And that he may set forth this his opinion for us, he notes that a threefold act of will can be posited. The first is of will, as free choice is, tending to some good that is not the highest, and this act is altogether free. Of this sort is every act of will, even the divine, about any created object whatsoever. The second act is from the will toward God clearly seen, and it is said to be altogether natural, because it is from nature as principle, unchangeable and necessary. A third act can be called natural with nature only accompanying: for the will is a certain faculty existing in some nature, and from that has some natural mode accompanying in its operations. In this way he thinks the procession of the Holy Spirit is natural. For in the procession of the Holy Spirit this author considers a twofold respect of operation, one toward God clearly seen and beloved, the other toward the Holy Spirit as produced love. For the procession of the Holy Spirit is not only the production of love, but also the love of the highest good, that is, of the goodness of God. According to the former respect he says it is an act natural from nature as principle; according to the latter he says it is free, but accompanying-natural, on account of the accompaniment, so far as liberty of will has with nature. From which he gathers that God lives naturally by a necessity of nature, and understands naturally by a necessity also arising from the object, but breathes naturally on account of the accompaniment of nature, because nature is annexed to the principle of breathing.

It is refuted: Scotus refutes this opinion of Henry in two arguments of less moment, which therefore I deliberately pass over; for it can be attacked by this one easy argument. For Henry thinks that naturalness (as he speaks) is annexed to the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the will is in the divine nature itself as in a subject, and this does not hinder that act from being natural

859. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 10, q. 1, §§ ad primum et ad secundum; Quodlibet 16, art. 3.

as from a principle, because nature itself by means of will as a middle always operates; or he says that naturalness is annexed only to the act of breathing, because, so far as it is love, it is necessary, but so far as it is the production of Spirit, it is not necessary - which Henry himself seems to indicate; and by this reasoning it would follow that in fact the Holy Spirit is produced in such a way that he could not be produced: for that act which is the love of God could be borne toward God in such a way as not to be production, if, so far as it is production, it proceeds from no necessary principle. Thus the Father and Son, while necessarily loving themselves, could cease from production; nor would the necessity of love, as it is terminated to God loved, suffice, so that the same, so far as it is production referred to the Holy Spirit, should proceed necessarily unless from the force of its principle, even as it is production, it proceeded necessarily.

Moreover, with Scotus the contention is only about words. For he himself, in the first, distinction 10, question 1, at the second doubt, and in Quodlibet 6, art. 1, affirms that the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary also on the part of the principle, so that the Holy Spirit cannot not be produced, yet that it ought to be called free and not natural: that it is necessary, he briefly proves; both because God necessarily loves himself, and by loving produces love; and also because the Holy Spirit is necessarily God, so that he cannot not be: for the things that are within God are supremely necessary.[860]

Furthermore, that it ought to be called free, Scotus first proves in that Quodlibet 1, art. 2, and in that question 1, § against the same, near the end of it, from the sentence of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 105, where he says: "It was fitting that man should first be so made as to be able to will good and able to will evil; afterwards, indeed, he will be so as to be unable to will evil; nor therefore will he be without free will: much more free indeed will be the will which will be altogether unable to serve sin," - he understands, in beatitude, where he will not be able to sin. He adds: "For neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, if that by which we will to be blessed is not to be called free, since we so will to be blessed that we not only do not will, but in no wise are able to will, to be miserable."[861] Therefore, according to the sentence of Augustine, the will is then also free when it operates necessarily. The same is taught by Anselm, On Free Choice of the Will, ch. 7.[862]

Secondly: because the will infinite, such as God's is, about the infinite object, such as is love produced, conducts itself in the most perfect mode: but the most perfect mode is of operating freely and necessarily, because liberty is the perfection of will: therefore the Holy Spirit, who is produced love, proceeds freely and necessarily.

Thirdly, it can be proved from Scotus himself in this way: In the most perfect operation, such as is the will of the highest good, that which is of perfection can be together with the necessity of that same; but liberty is the perfection of operation; therefore it can be together with the necessity of that same in the same way in the spiration of the Holy Spirit.

860. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 10, q. 1, ad secundum dubium; Quodlibet 6, art. 1.
861. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 105.
862. St. Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch. 7.

Moreover, in Quodlibet 16, art. 2, to the one asking in what name of free that which can be together with the necessary should be understood, he answers that there is no reason to be given of the first principles; yet nevertheless he tries to explain this kind of liberty, and for its sake notes in the article that every sufficiently complete agent is divided into a natural agent and a free agent: because every agent either acts by nature, inasmuch as it is, or acts by purpose through an apprehended form, that is, through the intellect. Thus Aristotle seems to teach in the second of the Physics, text 48, and in the ninth of the Metaphysics, ch. 4, where he divides the power of acting into rational and irrational power, as if he were saying, into natural and free. St. Augustine agrees, City of God 5, ch. 9, after the middle, where he says that one cause is fortuitous, another natural, another voluntary. But the natural agent differs from the free (says Scotus) in that the natural is always first, or at least is moved by some prior agent, and does not move itself. Thus indeed all created agents, when they tend into their determined ends, are said to be moved by some rational cause; but the voluntary agent moves itself, only the form proposed being apprehended by reason; and therefore its mode of operating is called free, and not natural. And liberty is placed in this, that it operates delectably and electively (he says), even if necessarily: which he also affirms about the spiration of the Holy Spirit, and for that reason calls it free. However, he says that the reason of the necessary in the spiration of the Holy Spirit arises from a twofold head: first on the part of the object, which is the highest good and necessarily moves to love of itself; then on the part of the efficient principle: and thus, he says, there is no necessity which precedes spiration on the part of the principle, but one which only accompanies spiration. In which he seems in part to agree with Henry, because if some necessity on the part of the principle were to precede, the will in spiration would not act, but would be acted upon.

Nevertheless, in order that what Scotus teaches in his opinion about the liberty of the act of spiration we may leave to be impugned in the following chapter, that which he asserts about the necessity of the act of breathing must be refuted in passing by this reasoning. Just as the object itself so determines the will to breathe that it cannot not breathe, because it is the highest good, which cannot not move to love of itself, so also the very faculty of the will, so far as it is such, by its native power is of itself so determined to love the highest good clearly seen that it cannot not love; and since in the Father and the Son, by loving, he breathes, he cannot not breathe: therefore the necessity of operating on the part of the principle is not concomitant, but antecedent and direct to spiration; nor from this does it follow, which Scotus inferred, that the will is not moved by itself, because, since this necessity is nothing else than the very virtue of the will, even if it is moved necessarily, it will be moved by itself.

The procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary, but also natural and not free, is to be said, according to the truer opinion.

Caput III - The common sentence: the Holy Spirit's spiration is necessary, natural, and not free

The common and truer sentence of the Scholastics is that the spiration of the Holy Spirit is not only necessary by a necessity concurring on the part of the principle, but also that it is to be called natural and not free. Thus taught St. Thomas in this article, to the third, when he says that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, not as will, but as nature is; and with him Cajetan, and the more recent writers on this article, the Canarian in the second part of his Commentary, Gregory in the first, dist. 10, q. 1, art. 2, Capreolus, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, conclusion 5, and in art. 2, in the solutions of the arguments against the same, and dist. 10, q. 1, art. 1, conclusions 2 and 3, although he concedes that the procession of the Holy Spirit can in a certain way be called free with freedom from coercion, which we do not deny, just as St. Thomas also said in De potentia, q. 10, art. c., to the fifth; yet nevertheless absolutely it is not to be called free: for commonly free is said of that which is indifferent to either. And indeed, although the procession of the Holy Spirit can be called free, because it is free from coercion, in no way can it be denied to be natural: for natural and free from coercion are not repugnant, nay rather they agree, as will be evident from what is to be said below. [863][864]

This sentence is confirmed first by a refutation of the preceding opinion; then it is further explained. Cajetan uses this reasoning: Free and natural are not differences of powers, but can befit the same faculty; for differences of faculties are not taken from the various mode of their operating about the same object, but from the diversity of the primary object: for in the intellect there is found a twofold mode of operating, namely without discourse and with it; likewise in the will there is a twofold mode, one with choice and consultation, the other without that: therefore in the same power there can be a mode of operating naturally and freely, so that that is natural which is necessary in some way, but that free which is with indifference.

But Scotus does not deny that a diverse mode of operating can befit the same power: for he himself concedes in the will a necessary mode and an indifferent mode, especially in the divine; but he asserts that the necessary mode of operating is also called free and is not to be called natural; not because it is not necessary, but because it is from a principle of cognition. Wherefore in another way it must be proved against him that the spiration of the Holy Spirit cannot be said free, if it is necessary, as he admits: which can be deduced by this reasoning.

Either spiration is called free because it is without coercion and with delight; and in this way the actions also of natural agents, because they are without coercion, would have to be called free, or at least the operations of brute animals and of animal appetite, because they too are with delight - which is absurd. Or it is called free because it is indifferent to either part of contradiction, so that it can be and not be; or of contrariety, so that it can will this and its opposite: and in this way it cannot be called free, because this mode of liberty is the same as the mode of contingency, which is

863. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 10, ad 5.

864. Cajetan; the Canarian, Commentaries, part 2; Gregory, In I, dist. 10, q. 1, art. 2; Capreolus, In I, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 5; and in art. 2, solutions against the same; and dist. 10, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2 - 3.

opposed to the necessary. Or finally, thirdly, the will is to be called free in all its operation, as in truth Scotus contends, because it is determined by its own internal principle to act from cognition and an apprehended form: but this, besides being said without any foundation, is plainly false; for brutes also act through an apprehended form, and yet are not said to operate freely, because they act necessarily.

Moreover, when Aristotle in the second of the Physics, text 48, divides the agent, one according to nature, another by purpose, he judges that to be by purpose which from consultation operates indifferently to either part; and when in Metaphysics, book 4, ch. 4, he defined the irrational power, which he had distinguished from the rational, thus he says: It is necessary, when action is now approached, this indeed to act, that indeed to be acted upon; therefore if by the name of irrational power he understands the natural, sometimes it will also befit the will, because sometimes, an object being applied, it cannot not operate, which Scotus at least concedes in the divine will. And Aristotle defined irrational powers thus because he knew of no act in the will necessary as to exercise; for he did not know the love of the highest good clearly seen in the fatherland, toward which alone the will in this way tends necessarily; and thus he thought the rational faculty to be that which can operate to either by election. Finally, Augustine, in that same book of the City of God, ch. 9, distinguishes a natural cause from a voluntary one for this reason, that the natural has only the mode of operating of nature with determination and necessity to one part; but the voluntary, even if it sometimes operates naturally, yet can operate indifferently, which is commonly called to operate voluntarily.[865][866]

Then the sentence of St. Thomas is explained from an analogy to agents by nature, which are called natural because they operate in only one natural mode: for the proper mode of acting of nature is necessary and, as it were, bound to one part: therefore, when the will operates in this way, with some determination, it is rightly said to operate naturally, or to operate as nature: but on the contrary, since it is proper to a rational agent to operate indifferently to this or that part because of the indifference of reason, then it operates as will, when it operates to either: and since free is opposed to bound, and nature is as it were bound to operation, because it is determined of necessity to one part, therefore free is rightly and commonly said; which ...

What is indifferent is also then said to be free; and then the will is said to act freely, when it acts indifferently as will; but then naturally, when it acts as nature. Thus do St. Jerome, in his Epistle to Damasus on the Prodigal Son, which is 146; St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, book 3, chapter 3; St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 28; and St. Thomas, De veritate, question 22, article 6, and question 24, article 1, define liberty.[867]

Hence the holy Doctor rightly inferred in the Prima Secundae, question 10, article 1, that those things are desired naturally by the will, which are desired of necessity. Wherefore, when the will so necessarily desires certain things that it cannot hate them, although it may be unable to love them

865. Aristotle, Physics II, text 48; Metaphysics IV, ch. 4.

866. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, ch. 9.

867. St. Jerome, Epistle to Damasus on the Prodigal Son (Ep. 146); St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III, ch. 3; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, I, ch. 28; St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6; q. 24, a. 1.

(which is called necessity as to specification), this is also said to love naturally. Such are life, sense, and knowledge. For this reason Aristotle seems to have said in Metaphysics I, chapter 1: "All men by nature desire to know"; of which, and of the desire of seeing God, which for this reason is called natural, we shall say more in question 12, article 8. Much more fittingly will the will be said to act naturally, when it acts so necessarily that it cannot but act, which necessity is called as to the exercise: and since the Holy Spirit is breathed in this way, His spiration must in every respect be called natural, because it is from the will as nature.

That there is to be posited a certain natural will, and another free, Nicetas taught in book 3 of the Thesaurus of the Faith, chapter 19, in these words: "The natural will of man - or, as St. Basil and St. Cyril are its authors - is life-love; for to every man life and the enjoyment of light are dear. Behold, this is the common will. The gnomic, or knowing wills in our nature, are many: for one man wishes to transact private business with himself, another to build," etc. There, by natural will, which is in all with respect to life, he understands what is necessary at least as to specification; otherwise it would not be in all. By gnomic will (*voluntas gnomica*), however, he understands that which is born of gnome, that is, of decision and consultation, concerning other things which of themselves can be loved and can be held in hatred; and therefore about those things consultation is exercised, and thus he himself calls this gnomic will spontaneous, or spontaneous free will in the same chapter.[868]

Furthermore, when St. Thomas and Capreolus in the places cited say that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally, not by the mode of nature, but by the mode of will, by the mode of nature they understand that which belongs to the notion of generation, in likeness, namely, to nature - as was said in Disputation 113 - and not the mode of determination to one part; while by the mode of will they do not understand what is free and indifferent, which is wont to be said proper to the will; but a mode which is not in the likeness of nature, on account of which a procession by will is not generation; otherwise, in a few words he would contradict himself. Finally, when the same holy Doctor said above, question 27, last article, that the procession is not from nature but from will, he did not exclude a mode of acting naturally; but only wished to say that it is not proximately from the substance and nature of God, but from the intermediate faculty of the will: which is to be understood as it is conceived by us; for in reality, since the will and the nature of God are the same, it proceeds proximately from the very nature.[869]

Caput IV - The arguments of Scotus are dissolved

Again, all can be resolved. To the first, which we adduced in favor of Scotus's opinion - namely, from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 105 - I answer: It is for this reason that Augustine says our free choice will then be freer when it cannot sin, because, beyond the liberty of indifference which it will have with respect to a particular good, it will be free from the servitude of sin. Therefore he calls it freer, not because it is more indifferent, but because it is freer from sin.

868. Nicetas, Thesaurus fidei, lib. 3, cap. 19; citing St. Basil and St. Cyril.
869. St. Thomas, I, q. 27, last article.

Now we have already warned, near the beginning of chapter 3, that an operation is not called free absolutely because it is free from coaction, add also, or from the servitude of sin; but because it is indifferent. Here, however, Augustine says that choice is freer when it cannot sin, because now he himself seems to explain of what kind of liberty he speaks. Moreover, although we might call this mode of acting free, and thus we could call the spiration of the Holy Spirit free, nevertheless it ought to be called natural; for natural is always said from that necessary mode of acting which is proper to nature. Nay rather, Augustine immediately subjoins: "Either there is no will, or that will is not to be called free, by which we so will to be blessed, that we not only do not will to be miserable, but can in no way will it at all." Therefore he concedes that that will is not free; and by liberty he understands indifference, even if only as to specification, according to what we said in the preceding chapter.[870]

Reply to the second: The most perfect mode of acting is indeed both natural and free at once in the same potency; not in the same operation, for thus they are repugnant, as is clear from what has been said: but to be in the same agent is most perfect.

To the third I say in the same way: that perfection of liberty cannot be in just any operation, nor with respect to just any object; for we take liberty for indifference. In which sense even Scotus himself would say that it cannot be found in the same act. Nay rather, if it were found in this way in the procession of the Holy Spirit, there would be the greatest imperfection, because the Holy Spirit would be a creature. But in another way it could not be said to be free in the will, unless for such an explanation, or at least that it could at the same time be said to be natural, which has already been proved above. Thus therefore we ought to speak of spiration, that at least we in no way deny it to be natural.

Articulus III - Whether the notional acts are from something

The third proceeds thus. It seems that the notional acts are not from something. For if the Father generates the Son from something, either from Himself, or from something else. If from something else, since that from which something is generated is in that which is generated, it follows that something alien to the Father is in the Son. Which is against Hilary in book 7 On the Trinity, where he says: "There is nothing diverse or alien among these."[871] But if the Father generates the Son from Himself, that from which something is generated, if it be something permanent, receives the predication of that which is generated: as we say that "man is white," because man remains when newly white becomes white. It follows, therefore, that either the Father does not remain when the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son - which is false. Therefore the Father does not generate the Son from something, but from nothing.

1. Further, that from which something is generated is the principle of that which is generated: if, therefore, the Father generates the Son from His essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son: but not a material

870. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 105.
871. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, VII: "Nihil in his diversum est vel alienum."

principle, because matter has no place in the divine. Therefore it is a kind of active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the begotten. And thus it follows that the essence generates. Which in some manner has been disproved above.

2. Further, Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same essence, because essence and person are not different things. But the person of the Son is not other than the essence. Therefore the Son is not from the essence of the Father.

3. Further, every creature is from nothing: but in the Scriptures the Son is called a creature. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 24: "From the mouth of Wisdom I was begotten. I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before every creature." And afterwards from the mouth of the same Wisdom it is said: "From the beginning and before the ages I was created." Therefore the Son is not begotten from something, but from nothing. And similarly it can be objected about the Holy Spirit because of that which is said in Zechariah 12: "Thus says the Lord, stretching out heaven, and founding the earth, and creating the spirit of man within him." And Amos 4, according to another reading: "I form the mountains and create the spirit."

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 1: "God the Father alone, from His own nature, without beginning begot a Son equal to Himself."[872]

I answer that the Son is not begotten from nothing, but from the substance (*substantia*) of the Father. For it has been shown above that paternity and filiation and nativity are truly and properly in the divine. Now this is the difference between true generation, by which someone proceeds as a son, and making: that the maker makes something from exterior matter, as the craftsman makes a bench from wood; but a man generates a son from himself. And as the craftsman makes something from matter, so God makes from nothing (as will be shown below), not that nothingness passes into the substance of the thing, but -

But because by him the whole substance of the thing is produced, with no other presupposed. Therefore, if the Son were to proceed from the Father as existing from nothing, he would stand to the Father as an artifact to the craftsman; which manifestly cannot bear the proper name of sonship, but only according to some likeness. Whence it is left that, if the Son of God were to proceed from the Father as though existing from nothing, he would not be a true and proper son. The contrary of this is said in 1 John: "That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ." Therefore the Son of God is true not from nothing, nor made, but only begotten. If, however, those who are made by God from nothing are called sons of God, this will be metaphorically, according to a certain assimilation to him who is truly Son. Hence, inasmuch as he alone is the true and natural Son of God, he is called the Only-Begotten, according to that in John 1: "The Only-Begotten who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him." But inasmuch as by assimilation to him others are called adopted sons, he is, as it were metaphorically, called First-Begotten, according to Romans 8: "Whom he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren." It is therefore left that the Son of God is begotten of

872. St. Augustine (attributed), De fide ad Petrum, cap. 1 (t. 3).

the substance (*substantia*) of the Father, yet otherwise than a son of man. For a part of the substance of the begetting man passes into the substance of the begotten. But the divine nature (*natura*) is impartible. Whence it is necessary that the Father, begetting the Son, did not pour a part of the nature into him, but communicated to him the whole nature, the distinction remaining only according to origin, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the first: When the Son is said to be born of the Father, this preposition "of" (de) signifies a generating consubstantial principle, not a material principle. For what is produced from matter is by a transmutation of that of which it is produced into some form (*forma*).

The divine essence (*essentia*), however, is neither transferable, nor receptive of another form.

Reply to the second: When it is said that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, according to the exposition of the Master, 1 Sentences, it designates the habitude of a principle as it were active. Where he thus expounds: The Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, that is, of the Father's essence; on account of what St. Augustine says in the fifteenth book on the Trinity: "Such is what I say 'of the Father's essence,' as if I were more expressly to say 'of the Father's essence'."[873] But this does not seem to suffice for the sense of a locution of this kind. For we can say that a creature is from God essentially; yet not that it is from the essence of God. Hence it can be said otherwise that this preposition "of" (de) always denotes consubstantiality. Hence we do not say that a house is "of" the builder, since he is not a consubstantial cause. Yet we can say that something is "of" something whenever that signifies a consubstantial principle, whether it be an active principle, as a son is said to be "of" the father; or a material principle, as a knife is said to be "of" iron; or a formal principle, in those cases only in which the forms themselves are subsistent and not adventitious to another: for we can say that some Angel is "of" an intellectual nature. And in this way we say that the Son is begotten "of" the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the Father's essence, communicated to the Son by generation, subsists in him.

Reply to the third: When it is said, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father," something is added, with respect to which distinction can be saved. But when it is said that the three persons are "of" the divine essence, nothing is posited with respect to which distinction can be imported by the preposition so signifying. And therefore it is not similar.

Reply to the fourth: When it is said, "wisdom is created," it can be understood not of that Wisdom who is the Son of God, but of created wisdom which God has put into creatures. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus: "He himself created her, namely wisdom, in the Holy Spirit, and poured her out upon all his works." Nor is it unsuitable that in one context of speech Scripture should speak of wisdom as begotten and as created, since created wisdom is a certain participation of uncreated wisdom. Or it can be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be: "From the beginning and before the ages I was created," that is, I was foreseen to be united to a creature. Or by the fact that wisdom is named both created and begotten, the mode of the divine generation is insinuated to us. For in generation, that which is generated receives the nature of the generator, which belongs to perfection. But in creation, the creating agent is not changed, and the

873. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, ch. 13.

created does not receive the nature of the creator. Therefore the Son is said to be at once created and begotten, so that from creation the immutability of the Father may be apprehended, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. And thus the understanding of this Scripture is expounded by St. Hilary in the book On the Synods.[874] But the authorities brought forward do not speak of the Holy Spirit, but of a created spirit: which sometimes is called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also soul, or any invisible substance.

Conclusion of the Article. It is defined in the Council of Toledo that the Son is "of" the substance of the Father, namely in the Third and Fourth Councils, and in the Eleventh, in the confession of faith. The same is handed on by St. Augustine, book 13 on the Trinity, chapter 19, and in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 14; and by Fulgentius, book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 2; and by the Master in the First Book, distinction 5; and all the Scholastics there. How, however, the particle "of" (de) is to be understood is not altogether certain among them; of which the following disputation will treat.[875][876][877][878]

Disputatio CLXII - What the particle "of" (de) signifies, when it is said that the Son is "of" the substance of the Father

Part 1: That the particle "of" does not signify a material principle, against Henry and Durandus, is proved. cap. 1.

Part 2: The particle "of" in the aforesaid locution signifies a consubstantial principle. cap. 2.

Part 3: The formal terminus of procession is the divine essence, but the total terminus is the person. cap. 3.

Caput I - That the particle "of" does not signify a material principle, against Henry and Durandus, is proved

Henry in his Summa, article 5, question 3, as is reported by Scotus and by Capreolus in the places to be cited below, thinks that the particle "of," when we say "the Son is of the substance of the Father," signifies a principle as it were material, with every imperfection of matter excluded; just as we say "a knife is of iron." Durandus agrees in the First Book, distinction 5, question 2; indeed, Durandus seems in the same distinction, question 2, article 1, as Capreolus admits, and Cajetan interprets the Doctor there otherwise, because he only said that in the divine essence there is some property of matter, which will be examined in chapter 3; but he did not say that the particle "of" signifies a material principle.[879]

874. St. Hilary, De Synodis.
875. Councils of Toledo III and IV, and XI, in the confession of faith.
876. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, ch. 19; and Contra Maximinum, III, ch. 14.
877. Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2.
878. Peter Lombard, Sentences, I, dist. 5.
879. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 5, q. 3, as reported by Scotus and Capreolus; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 5, q. 2; Capreolus and Cajetan on I, dist. 5.

Durandus proves, first, that what in some way precedes the generation of something, and remains in the generated, if the thing is said to be of it or to be made of it, stands as the matter of that thing; but the divine essence precedes the generation of the Son according to reason, and remains in the Son, and of it the Son is said to be: therefore it stands as a material principle.

Second, whenever something is constituted from two things, one stands as matter, the other as form, because the one is determined by the other: but determination is proper to matter, as determining is proper to form. Now the person of the Son is constituted from two, namely from essence and relation: therefore, since the divine essence is, as it were, the subject of the relation, and is determined by it, it will rather stand as matter.

Third, that stands as matter in generation which receives the form of the begotten, namely relation, which is the form of the begotten: therefore, since the divine essence receives relation, it stands as matter. There are, however, conditions of matter (says Durandus) which do not befit the divine essence: namely, to be pure potency reduced into act by form; to be dissoluble; to be able to lose one form in order to acquire another. For he thinks that in the heavens there is no matter, but that the heavens are most simple bodies; because, since in them there is not that which can lose one form and receive another, he judges that there is in them no matter.

However, much truer is the common opinion of the Scholastics, which affirms that the particle "of" does not denote a principle as it were material, nor that the divine essence has any notion of matter on account of which the Son is said to be "of" the substance of the Father. Thus taught St. Thomas in this article, reply to the second; Cajetan, and the Canarian and more recent authors there; Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 5, question 1, article, conclusion 4; Scotus, question 2; St. Bonaventure, article 1, question 2; Gabriel, question 2, article 2; Gregory, question 9, article 2, to the eighth argument.[880]

Cajetan proves it by a reason taken from Scotus: for it is common both to form and to matter to be that of which something is said to be, or to be made, if the form precedes generation. Therefore in the resurrection a man will be said to be made "of" the soul, and that will suffice lest he be said to be made from nothing. Therefore, from the fact that the Son is said to be, or to be generated "of" the essence of the Father, a material principle is not necessarily denoted.

Then Scotus proves, because the formal terminus of the generation of the Son is the essence of the Father: therefore, if the Son is not said to be and to be generated "of" the essence of the Father as of matter; yet that the essence is the formal terminus must be proved in chapter 3. From these, the first argument of Durandus will easily be solved; the second and the third will be resolved in chapter 3.

Caput II - The particle "of" in the aforesaid locution signifies a consubstantial principle

St. Augustine, in the book On the Nature of the Good against the Manichee, chapter 26, notes that by the particles "from" (ex) and "of" (de) there is signified a reason of principle, but in a different way: for "of" signifies a consubstantial principle of the same nature, whereas "from"

denotes a principle of whatever kind. Wherefore all creatures are said to be "from" God, but not "of" God. The Scholastic theologians have followed this doctrine of Augustine in the authorities alleged. However, Driedo, book 3 On the Rules and Dogmas of Sacred Scripture, near the end, in the verse beginning "But this doctrine," does not approve this doctrine, this rule of Augustine: for he gathers the opposite from Scripture. For in Matthew 1 it is said, "that which is born in her is of the Holy Spirit," and in the Symbol Christ is said to be born "of" the Holy Spirit. Yet in both places Christ is understood according to the human nature: wherefore creatures too will be said to be "of" God, just as "from" God. Nevertheless, although what Driedo asserts concerning the particles "from" and "of" cannot be denied, yet because of that word "Father," in the way of speaking "the Son is of the substance of the Father," or "is begotten of the substance of the Father," is openly denoted consubstantiality with his principle and with his Father, as will be explained shortly.[881][882]

The Scholastics variously expound the aforesaid proposition, even if they concede that by it the origin of one from another is denoted. St. Thomas, in the solution to the second, interprets thus: that the particle "of" signifies a principle as it were formal; because the Son has the substance of the Father, which is as it were the formal principle of the Son. Against this, however, St. Bonaventure objects that by the same reason it could be said that the Father is "of" the substance of the Son, because in each the same essence is as it were the formal principle of each. But the Master, in the First Book in that same distinction, thus explains: "The Son is of the substance of the Father," that is, "of the Father, who is essence." But by the same reason, says St. Thomas, we could say that creatures are "of" the essence of God, because they are of God, who is essence.[883]

It pleases me to follow the interpretation of St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Gabriel, and Marsilius in the places cited, and from which St. Thomas does not dissent, namely that the particle "of" denotes a formal principle or consubstantial, which is the same thing, if it is referred to the essence; but if it is referred to the name "Father," it denotes at the same time a principle of origin; so that by both words there is signified a principle of the same nature. St. Thomas did not deny this; and for that reason we cannot say "the Father is of the substance of the Son," even if we say "the Father is of the same substance with the Son." From which it may also be gathered that the particle "of," referred to substance, does not denote only something common to both, whether that be material or formal, as some recent authors falsely suppose; but a formal principle only: both because the name substance and nature signifies this; and also because no ...

...nor can it be said that creatures are "of the substance" of the eternal Father; for in that way we should signify that creatures are begotten by the eternal Father consubstantial with him, even if we can say, according to the rule of Driedo, that creatures are "of God".[884]

St. Thomas moreover adds in the third reply that the three persons cannot be said to be "of the divine nature," because the particle "of" (de) indicates origin, which does not befit the three persons. But this seems difficult to the Canarian: for if we say, "Michael is of the angelic nature,"

880. St. Thomas, here ad 2; Cajetan; the Canarian; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art., concl. 4; Scotus, q. 2; St. Bonaventure, art. 1, q. 2; Gabriel, q. 2, a. 2; Gregory of Rimini, q. 9, a. 2, ad 8.

881. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 26.

882. John Driedo, De regulis et dogmatibus Scripturae sacrae, book 3, near the end.

why will not the Father be said to be of the divine nature, and the three persons similarly? For a supposit is wont to be said to be "of" such-and-such a nature, of which it is the supposit. And indeed, if it is true what we said, that the particle "of," referred solely to nature absolutely, does not signify origin, but only from that which is added - "of the Father," or of another person as it were producing - nothing seems to stand in the way why one may say "the Father is of the divine substance," and similarly all the persons; since by that manner of speaking only consubstantiality is signified, and a quasi-formal principle.

The begotten is said to be "of the substance" of the begetter not merely on account of the matter which it receives from him, but especially on account of the form which the begetter infuses into the begotten. Therefore, on this account one cannot say, "Creatures are of the substance of the eternal Father"; for thus we should signify that creatures are begotten by the eternal Father consubstantial with him - even if we can say, according to Driedo's rule, that creatures are "of God."

St. Thomas adds in the third solution: the three persons cannot be said to be of the divine nature, because the particle "of" indicates origin, which does not befit the three persons. But this seems difficult to the Canarian: for if we say, "Michael is of the angelic nature," why will not the Father be said to be of the divine nature, and the three persons similarly? For a supposit is wont to be said to be "of" such-and-such a nature, of which it is the supposit. And indeed, if it is true what we said, that the particle "of," referred solely to nature absolutely, does not signify origin, but only from that which is added - "of the Father," or of another person as it were producing - nothing seems to stand in the way why one may say "the Father is of the divine substance," and similarly all the persons; since by that manner of speaking only consubstantiality is signified, and a quasi-formal principle.

Caput III - The formal terminus of procession is the divine essence; but the whole terminus is the person

A first opinion of Aureolus, namely that the essence is not the formal terminus of generation or production, and a second that it is a property, is controverted also among the Scholastics. Aureolus, as Capreolus reports in the First Book, distinction 5, question 1, article 2, in the arguments for the contrary to the first conclusion, teaches that the essence is not the formal terminus of production.[885] He proves the first point thus: the formal terminus of some production has being through that production; but the divine essence does not have being through the production of any person: therefore it is not the formal terminus of such a production. He proves the major: because if the whole terminus produced receives being through the production, much more does the formal terminus of that production, by which a thing receives being. Whence he concludes that the soul in the resurrection is not the formal terminus, nor whiteness in whitening, if it had first been

883. St. Thomas, ad 2 of this article; St. Bonaventure's objection there; Peter Lombard, Sentences I in that distinction.
884. John Driedo, De regulis et dogmatibus Scripturae sacrae, book 3, near the end.
885. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art. 2, in the arguments for the contrary to the first conclusion.

separated and afterwards were joined to the wall; but he thinks that the formal terminus of some production is that which receives being according to itself as a whole through that production; and since such a thing would seem to be the relation, or property, in the person produced, this he says is the formal terminus.

With Aureolus agrees Durandus in the place cited in the first chapter, saying that the essence is as it were the matter, the relation as it were the form, in the person produced, as we reported in that chapter; and therefore that the formal terminus is the relation, but the essence is as it were the matter: he proves this moreover by the reasons adduced there.[886] Gabriel agrees in the First Book, distinction 5, question 3, article 1, note 4, and article 2, in that he says that the essence is the formal terminus by the same reasoning; he adds, however, that in the production of a divine person there is no formal terminus, but a terminus which he calls "total." For this reason he does not assert that the relation is the formal terminus, because he thinks it is not distinct from the origin itself.[887]

Gregory, however, in the same distinction, question 1, article 2, although he refutes this opinion of Aureolus by the best arguments, nevertheless himself teaches that the formal terminus of generation is not the essence. He proves this by the following reason: the formal and total terminus of a production is found only in those things which are constituted of several realities; but the divine persons are not constituted in that way: therefore in their production there is no total and formal terminus, since the one is not as form and the other as matter.[888]

But the common opinion is to be embraced, which affirms that the integral terminus of the production, which they call "total," is the person; but the formal terminus is the essence. Thus taught Scotus in the First Book, distinction 5, question 2; and Capreolus in question 1, article 1, conclusion 1; Caietan in this article; and the more recent authors commonly. The same distinction is gathered from St. Thomas in the same distinction, question 3, article 1.[889][890]

This opinion must first be confirmed by refuting the others, then by the arguments of Cajetan. First indeed, what Aureolus and Gabriel said - that the formal terminus cannot be prior in being to the generation - is rightly impugned by Gregory, because, he says, in the resurrection the formal terminus is the soul, by which the product, namely the man, is formally constituted; otherwise one would have to say that that production lacks a formal terminus. Nay more, if this were true in generation, then when first the rational soul begins to be, it would not be the formal terminus of the generation of man - which seems more absurd; because even then the soul does not have being through generation, but through creation, which at least in nature precedes: for by generation the soul is only joined to matter.

Secondly, it is proved thus. The notion of the formal terminus of production seems to be nothing else than to be the form of the thing produced, by which the thing itself, as by a form, in generation or production receives being, as will be more fully explained at the end of the chapter.

886. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 5, q. 2.
887. Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 3, art. 1, nota 4; and art. 2.
888. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art. 2.
889. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art., concl. 1; Cajetan on this article.

For just as every agent works through its form, so also through the form of the thing produced it communicates and bestows upon it being, which is to produce it; and yet this can occur even if the formal terminus precedes generation and production, and does not come to be through them, as is evident: therefore, from this side it is not repugnant that the divine essence be the terminus of the production of a person; from any other side it is not repugnant, as is clear: therefore it will be the formal terminus.

Thirdly, add against Gregory that, when we speak of the formal terminus of the production of a person, we do not understand a terminus, really distinct by the nature of the thing, from the person produced, but only according to our mode of understanding: therefore, although there is not granted a formal terminus by the nature of the thing in the person produced, because that is not constituted out of several realities by the nature of the thing; nevertheless, since it can be said to be constituted according to our reason, as we showed against that same Gregory in Disputation 158, chapter 2, what hinders us from being able to say that something is the formal terminus of the production of a person according to our mode of knowing? Thus the present question is to be understood. But it is not surprising that Gregory taught thus about the formal terminus, when, as we saw in chapter 1 of that disputation, he denies any constitution of the person.

Fourthly, Cajetan moreover proves this opinion by many arguments, of which this alone will suffice for us. In the production of a created person the formal terminus is the nature, not the personality: for in the second book of the Physics, text 14, it is said that generation is the way to nature, that is, to the form: therefore the form is the formal terminus, not the personality. For although the form of man is then produced when the human person is generated; and although the divine nature is not generated when the person is produced; nevertheless the form of man is not produced by generation itself, as we said above, but is created by God. Then also, from the notion of the formal terminus, as has been proved, it is not required that it be produced by that action of which it is said to be the formal terminus, but that it be communicated by that action: therefore, if the rational soul is the terminus of the production of a human person, the divine nature will be the formal terminus of the production of a divine person.

Objection. But you will say, the formal terminus of the production of a human person is not the nature, that is, the form or soul, but the humanity, which consists of soul and body, and is that by which the thing is produced, not that which is produced: but the whole supposit is the total terminus of generation, because it is that which is generated: for actions and passions belong to supposits, as Aristotle witnesses in Metaphysics, chapter 1.

Reply. But against this there is a manifest reason: because the whole nature composed of soul and body is not the formal terminus, which is called the terminus whereby of generation, but a total terminus, and what is called the terminus which: for in the assumption of the humanity there was truly a generation prior in nature to the assumption; but that was terminated not to the supposit but to the nature. As to what is adduced from that proposition, "Actions and passions belong to supposits," it is not rightly understood. For Aristotle did not say "of supposits," but

890. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 5, q. 3, art. 1.

"about the singular": which if we follow the rather common interpretation of those who think that Aristotle is speaking about the principle of actions and about the subject about which they are concerned, one must say that he distinguished not nature from supposit, but only singulars from universals: because neither are actions from universals, nor can they be concerned with universals: for he gives the example of curing, because the physician does not cure "man" in general, but "this man."

But some answer that Aristotle did not distinguish singular nature from supposit, because he did not know such a distinction, since he had not yet seen nature separated from its own supposit. I indeed grant that he did not know this distinction of supposit from nature; nevertheless, if he had known it, he would still have spoken only of singulars as they are distinguished from universals, not of natures as they differ from supposit. For he would rightly have known that curing is concerned not only, as about the subject which, with the supposit, but also with the nature: for the humanity of Christ, as it was a certain singular nature, could be the subject as which of curing: therefore in the same way Aristotle would have attributed to it to be the integral terminus as which, and the principle of operating: and about actions and passions he seems to have spoken in the same way as about curing; and to whom he attributes curing, he also concedes action.

Moreover, since Aristotle did not say that actions and passions are "of singulars," but that they are "about singulars," this should not be understood of the principle of action, but only of the subject and the matter about which, which must be singular: and this as much can be about a singular nature as about a supposit. But of this matter more fully in the Third Part, question 2, article 11.

Others say that the formal terminus of resurrection and of generation is union: but they are mistaken. For if union is taken for the relation of the union, or of the united, which has its foundation in the very unity of the composite, it cannot be the formal terminus; for it is posterior to generation. If, however, it is taken for some mode in the produced matter and form, similarly it cannot be: for that is not the form of the thing produced: therefore it is not the formal account of terminus, insofar as it is terminus: for the terminus of the generation or resurrection of man is man under the notion of man: therefore the formal terminus is that by which man comes to be and is formally constituted by generation; but this is the soul; for which reason Aristotle said that generation is terminated to nature; but by nature he understands not matter, but form, as we have explained above. Moreover, it can be proved by the reasons of Scotus, that from the opposite opinion it would follow that the production of a divine person is, as they say, univocal: for the univocity of generation with the begotten is taken from the formal terminus of that generation.[891]

To the reasons of Durandus, which remain from the first chapter, it is answered as follows. In what way the divine nature determines to the being of a person, and how it is received there as a mode in that of which it is the mode, and thus in a certain way they assign to the nature, to the essence of the divine Word, a desire for union: the formal terminus of generation is the nature, not

891. Scotus, ibid., arguing that univocity of generation is taken from its formal terminus.

relation; because nature is the form of the begotten person, not relation. As for the notion of the terminus of generation, it is to be the form of the thing begotten; and thus those two reasons of Durandus, which they require, can be dissolved.

But others object in this way: The formal terminus of generation ought to be that mode by which the whole terminus determines the action which the production is. But it cannot be such a terminus of action as produced, unless that also be produced which is the terminus: therefore a form also preceding generation cannot be the formal terminus. I answer: the thing which is the total terminus of an action does not terminate the action under the notion or relation of expressed product, but according to the absolute notion of such an entity; as generation is terminated by "man" under the absolute notion of man, or "horse," or some other thing: not, however, under the notion and denomination of what is produced. Therefore that which is the form of this thing will be the formal terminus of this action, because generation, by means of that form, not as by a producing principle, nor as by a nature to be produced, gives to it the being of such a thing, by communicating to it that same form: although the relation of the product is founded upon that union which these men say is the formal terminus.

Articulus IV - Whether in God there is potency with respect to notional acts

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that in the divine there is not potency with respect to notional acts. For every potency is either active or passive. But neither can befit here. For passive potency is not in God, as was shown above. Active potency, however, does not befit one person with respect to another, since the divine persons are not made, as was shown. Therefore in the divine there is no potency for notional acts.

Further: Potency is said with respect to the possible. But the divine persons are not among the number of possibles, but among necessary beings: therefore with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons are produced, no potency ought to be posited in the divine.

Further: The Son proceeds as Word, which is the concept of the intellect; the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, which pertains to the will. But potency in God is said by comparison to effects, not, however, by comparison to those things which are understood and willed, as was had above. Therefore...

Objicitur: 1) It seems that in God there is not potency with respect to notional acts. For every potency is either active or passive. But neither can belong here. Passive potency is not in God, as was shown above. But active potency does not befit one person with respect to another, since the divine persons are not made, as has been shown. Therefore in God there is no potency to notional acts.

2) Further, potency is said with respect to the possible. But the divine persons are not in the number of possibles, but of necessaries; therefore with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons proceed, potency ought not to be posited in God.

3) Further, the Son proceeds as Word, which is a conception of the intellect; but the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, which pertains to the will. Now potency in God is said by comparison to effects, not, however, by comparison to understanding and willing, as was had above. Therefore in God potency ought not to be said by comparison to notional acts.

Sed contra: St. Augustine says against Maximinus the heretic: "If God the Father could not beget a Son equal to Himself, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" Therefore in God there is potency with respect to notional acts.[892]

Respondetur: It must be said that, just as notional acts are posited in God, so too it is necessary to posit there a potency with respect to such acts, since potency signifies nothing else than a principle of some act. Hence, since we understand the Father as the principle of generation, and the Father and the Son as the principle of spiration, it is necessary that we attribute to the Father the potency of begetting, and to the Father and the Son the potency of spirating. For the potency of begetting signifies that by which the begetter begets; but every begetter begets by something. Hence in every begetter one must posit a potency of begetting, and in the spirator a potency of spirating.

Reply to the first: Just as, according to the notional acts, no person proceeds as made, so neither is potency to notional acts said in God by respect to some person made, but only by respect to the person proceeding.

Reply to the second: The possible, as it is opposed to the necessary, follows upon passive potency, which is not in God. Hence, in God there is nothing possible in that mode, but only in the mode in which the possible is contained under the necessary. In this way, however, it can be said that, just as it is possible that God be, so too it is possible that the Son be begotten.

Reply to the third: Potency signifies a principle. But principle imports a distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now a twofold distinction is considered in those things that are said of God: one according to the thing, the other according to reason alone. According to the thing, indeed, God is distinguished by essence from those things of which He is by creation the principle; just as one person is distinguished from another of which it is the principle according to a notional act. But action is not distinguished from the agent in God save according to reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore, with respect to those actions according to which things proceed distinct from God, either essentially or personally, potency can be attributed to God according to the proper notion of principle. And thus, just as we posit in God the potency of creating, so we must posit the potency of begetting or of spirating. But to understand and to will are not such acts as designate a procession of some thing from God distinct either essentially or personally. Hence, with respect to these acts, the notion of potency in God cannot be preserved, except according to the mode of understanding and of signifying only, inasmuch as intellect and understanding are signified in diverse modes in God, although the very understanding of God is His essence not having a principle.

892. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, near the end; cf. tom. 6, where he argues: "If God the Father could not beget a Son equal to Himself, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?"

Conclusio: The conclusion is affirmative. In this article nothing further peculiar occurs to be noted beyond what needs to be examined in the Disputation which follows, namely, whether in God there is a true notion of productive potency within Himself.

An in Deo sit vera ratio potentiae producentis intra ipsum. Disputatio 163.

Disputatio CLXIII - On whether in God there is a real productive potency with respect to the notional acts

Dua opiniones Aureoli, Gregorii, & aliorum.

First Book, distinction 7, question 1, article 2, as is reported by Capreolus in the place cited in the preceding Disputation, the last chapter, namely, that in God there is truly no productive potency, neither with respect to the notional acts, nor with respect to the person produced; but that the potency of God to beget or to spirate is nothing other than a non-repugnance of terms, in precisely the same way in which we are wont to say, "God has the potency to be God." He proves the first point thus: where there is not truly an elicited production, there is not truly a productive potency; for this potency is with respect to the product by means of an action or elicited production. But in God there is not an elicited production within Himself, since generation is altogether the same as the producer; whereas elicited production really differs from the eliciting agent, for "to elicit" denotes a real distinction. Therefore in God there is not a productive potency within Himself. Then he adds: for the Father to be in God is not of some productive potency, but of non-repugnance of terms; and so God can be Father, not indeed by a productive potency, but by non-repugnance of terms; to be Son is not of a productive potency, but of non-repugnance. These are his chief reasons.[893]

Convinced, however, by the first reason, Gregory [of Rimini] judged that in God there is not a real potency with respect to the notional acts, but only with respect to the person produced. Thus he taught in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, article 1, to the first of Aureolus; to whom Capreolus consents in the same distinction, question 1, article 2, to the second of Aureolus against the first conclusion; and Caietan and the Canarian in this article.[894] The same they teach of the potency of creating, namely, that between God the creator and the creature there is not a middle elicited action; similarly, neither between the Father begetting and the Son begotten. For there is only a relation either of producer or of product, after the mode of action; and therefore real potency is to be granted only with respect to the person produced, not, however, with respect to the production, which truly is not elicited, since it is nothing other than the thing produced. For just as, in order that there be a real potency with respect to the thing produced, the thing produced must be really distinguished from the producer; so, in order that there be a real potency with respect to the production, there must be an action truly and really intermediary between producer and

893. Aureolus, In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2; as reported by Capreolus in the place cited in the preceding disputation.

894. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, against Aureolus' first conclusion; Cajetan on the present article; the Canarian likewise.

product, so that the action also be elicited by the producer. This opinion St. Thomas seems to indicate above, question 25, article 1, to the third, where he grants in God a potency truly compared with the effect, yet not with the operation; for, he says, the operation of God is not distinguished from the very potency of God; and in this article, to the third; and in the Disputed Questions On Power, question 2, article 1, at the end, he seems to teach the same.[895][896]

Caput II - In God there is a true real productive potency, not only with respect to the person produced, but also with respect to the notional act; this is the more probable view.

I, however, judge it to be much more probable, and more according to the mind of the holy Doctor, that one ought to posit in God a true productive potency, real, not only with respect to the person produced, but also with respect to the production and to the notional act. This, in the first place, I seem to gather from St. Thomas in this article: for, since in the title he asked whether there were potency with respect to the notional acts, answering in the body he expressly grants it; and to the third he replies that there is in God such a potency with respect to those actions according to which certain things proceed from God distinct either essentially or personally; although in the same solution he says that there is not such potency with respect to the immanent essential operation, which is understanding and loving. Nor did he wish to say anything else in question 25, article 1, which Caietan and others report for their own opinion, as we noted in Disputation 101, chapter 1. For he says only this there: that in God there is not potency according to the thing with respect to the immanent operations of intellect and will; he understands, however, the essential operations.[897]

By reason it is proved thus. For to the notion of real potency it is not necessary that the action or production be distinguished from the thing produced and from the producer; because the action itself is not that which is produced, but is, as it were, the medium of the act by which the producer brings forth the product into effect; which, for our consideration, stands as a kind of middle, and differs only according to reason from the relation which is founded on the term produced. It is enough, then, that there be a real distinction between the producer and the product, so that the notion of a real productive principle be saved; while the production itself, according to the reality, can be identified either with the producer as an issuing forth on the part of the principle producing, or with the product as an issuing forth received on the part of the thing produced, and with both is really the same, though it import in reason a different relation - on the one side of the producer as origin, and on the side of the product as terminus of origin. Thus, in created productions indeed, an action distinct according to reality is sometimes posited, as when a quality is educed, or a movement proceeds from a moved mover; yet often it is not necessary to posit, beyond the agent and the effect, anything distinct according to reality, but only a relation considered under the mode of origin, or a certain mode inherent in the effect while it is being produced; and nevertheless we truly say there was in the agent an active potency with respect to such production. Therefore

895. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 3.
896. St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q. 2, a. 1, at the end.
897. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1.

neither does it hinder, if in the divine productions the production be not really other than the person produced or than the producer, that there be in God a real potency with respect to the notional act, inasmuch as He is the principle producing a person who is really distinct.

Now then, from what has been said, the arguments of Aureolus are solved.

To the first: We have already said that there is in God a true productive potency, even if there is not a production really distinct from the produced; nay rather, this notwithstanding, there is potency with respect to the notional acts, because for this it suffices that there be a distinction between the person produced and the producer, as has been explained.

To the second: It was said above in the preceding chapter that to be Father in God is indeed something positive, namely, a real principle with respect to the Son, although it include no composition nor imperfection; and that it is not merely a non-repugnance of terms. Moreover, when Aristotle in Metaphysics XII, text 30, teaches that there is no potency in God, he understands that potency which is sometimes in act and sometimes not in act; such a potency indeed is not in God with respect to the things which are within the divine Trinity. But the argument from "potency is said with respect to the possible" is resolved in the manner of St. Thomas in this article: that in God "possible" can be said as contained under the necessary; hence, just as it is possible that God be, so it is possible that the Son be begotten; and thus the notion of potency is saved without positing in God any passive potency.

In the foregoing, before the treatment of notional potency, note also the following:

Respondeo to the earlier doubt: The thing which is the total terminus of an action does not terminate the action itself under the notion or expressed relation of the product, but according to the absolute notion of such an entity; as generation is terminated by man under the absolute notion of man, or by horse, or by some other thing - not, however, under the notion and denomination of what is produced. Therefore that which is the form of this thing is the formal terminus of this action; because generation, by means of that form - not as by a producing principle, nor as by a thing produced, but as by the nature of the product - gives to it the being of such a thing by communicating to it that form; although the relation of the product is founded upon that union which those men say is the formal terminus.

Articulus V - Whether the power of begetting signifies relation, and not essence

It is answered to the arguments of Aureolus and of others, that there is no need that action itself be distinguished in reality from the thing produced and from the producer, because the action itself is not that which is produced, but is as it were a middle act by which the thing itself and the effect are produced; which is a middle only in our consideration, and differs from the relation of the product only by reason. Yet it seems sufficient to distinguish the product from the producer; for this very thing is truly elicited and proceeds from the agent, and its procession is a middle action between it and the producing principle. But in the divine, a twofold act of this procession is

understood: one, which is called the active origin, and is really the same as the relation of the producing person; the other, which is called the passive origin, and is really the same as the relation of the product. In the productions of created things this may indeed be contemplated; for the coming-to-be of a thing by a created agent seems, as to the thing, to be nothing other in reality than the relation of the product considered under the mode of a way, or, if one were to speak, some mode of that thing thus considered, which in things that do not depend upon an agent ceases at once to be as soon as they are once produced; whereas in other cases, as in light, and in an intellect eliciting an act of understanding, some seem not to distinguish it from the thing produced itself, just as creation itself is the creature created. Since therefore we say that in our intellect there is a real potency (*potentia realis*), not only toward the thing produced but toward its production, in the same way toward the light produced and toward the illumination, it follows that it is not necessary that there be a real distinction between the origin and the person produced, so that in God there be said to be a potency according to reality not only toward the person produced, but also toward the origin itself and the notional act.

Nor does anything stand in the way, so as to prevent this potency in God from being the same by nature with the divine essence and with the person producing; for in order that it be called a real potency toward some operation or toward some product, there is no need that it be really distinguished from that in which it inheres, but it suffices that it be really distinguished from the thing itself that is produced, as I noted above in disputation 120, cap. 1. Wherefore I judge that Aureolus plainly erred, when he asserted that the potency in God, that He be Son, is not other than that He be Father; for since the Son is truly produced in reality, but the Father is not, the potency that He be Son and be produced is real; but that He be Father, who is not produced, is not real.

But if Durandus had attended to the solution of St. Thomas, he would have found it altogether the same as his own: for he says that the possible in God is not the contingent, which Durandus also admits; he adds as well, that it is the necessary, just as it is necessary to be able to be God; nor does Durandus dissent in this: for he says, "The possible in God does not exclude the necessary." Hence however the holy Doctor rightly infers that there is in God a producing potency; for although from the fact that it is possible that God be God there follows a potency which is a mere nonrepugnance of terms, it does not follow that God, as God, can be produced; yet from the fact that it is not repugnant that there be a Son in God, even if this be necessary, it rightly follows that He can be begotten, and consequently that there be a producing potency toward Him who, by the very notion of Son, is to be produced and begotten; but by the notion of God, as He is God, He is not to be produced, but to be from Himself. The same that is said of the Son ought to be said of the Holy Spirit.

It must be observed, however, that there is a difference between the omnipotence of God, which regards creatures, and the producing potency, which regards the person produced within God Himself; for omnipotence is referred to creatures not under the notion and denomination of the "possible-to-be-produced" - for thus there would be a useless circle, as we showed in disputation 104, cap. 4 - but under an absolute notion, inasmuch as of themselves they do not imply a contradiction, that they be; from which it rightly follows that there is in God an omnipotence

related to creatures; and from omnipotence related there follows in turn that creatures are possible. In the same way, omnipotence as act producing is not referred to creatures under the relation of the product, but under the proper absolute notion of the creature existing; but the true producing potency within God, even if it be considered before it produces, under the notion only of being able to produce, is nevertheless referred to a person under the notion of relation, because a person is constituted as to subsistence relationally, and thus we said in disputation 199, cap. 6, that it is peculiar to the divine relations not to be referred to absolutes but to relatives. Wherefore it is rightly inferred that there is in God a producing potency, from this, that it is not repugnant that there be a Son and the Holy Spirit in God; for in these is included origin.

But to the fifth, the procedure is as follows. It seems that the power of begetting or of spirating signifies relation, and not essence. For potency signifies a principle, as is clear from its definition. For active potency is said to be a principle of acting, as is clear in Metaphysics V. But principle in the divine, with respect to a person, is said notionally.[898] Therefore potency in the divine does not signify essence but relation.

1. Further. In the divine, "to be" and "to act" do not differ; but generation in the divine signifies relation. Therefore so too does the power of begetting.
2. Further. Those things which signify essence in the divine are common to the three persons; but the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but is proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify essence.

But on the contrary: Just as God can beget a Son, so too He wills. But the will of begetting signifies essence. Therefore so too the power of begetting.

I answer that certain men have said that the power of begetting signifies relation in the divine. But this cannot be. For that is properly called potency in any agent by which the agent acts. But every producer by its action produces something like itself with respect to the form by which it acts. Thus a man who begets is like the generator in human nature, by virtue of which the father can beget a man. Therefore that is the generative potency in a generator, in which the begotten is made like the generator. But the Son of God is made like the begetting Father in the divine nature. Whence the divine nature in the Father is the power of begetting in him. Hence St. Hilary says in book 2 On the Trinity: "The nativity of God cannot fail to retain that nature from which it is perfect; for nothing subsists other than God, which does not subsist from God alone." Thus therefore it must be said that the power of begetting principally signifies the divine essence, as the Master says in I Sentences, dist. 7, not however relation alone; nor even essence insofar as it is the same as relation, so as to signify each equally. Although indeed paternity, as the form of the Father, is signified, it is nevertheless a personal property having itself to the person of the Father as an individual form to some individual created thing. But an individual form in created things constitutes the generating person, yet it is not that by which the generator generates; otherwise Socrates would generate Socrates. Wherefore neither can paternity be understood as that by which

898. "Potentia enim significat principium... in 5. Metaph."; cf. also "Lib. 1. Metaph. text. 17. tom. 3."

the Father begets, but as that which constitutes the person begetting; otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is made like to Him. And according to this St. John Damascene says that generation is a work of nature, not as of the one begetting, but as of that by which the one begetting begets. And therefore the power of begetting signifies in the direct case the divine nature, but in the oblique case relation.[899][900]

Reply to the first: Potency does not signify relation itself of principle, although indeed it is in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is the principle: not indeed as the agent is called a principle, but as that by which an agent acts is called a principle. Now the agent is distinguished from the thing made, and the generator from the generated. But that by which the generator begets is common to the begotten and to the generator, and the more perfect the generation will have been, the more perfect it is. Whence, since the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the generator begets is common to the begotten and to the generator, and the same in number, not only in species as in created things. By this therefore, that we say that the divine essence is the principle by which the generator begets, it does not follow that the divine essence is distinguished; just as it would follow if it were said that the divine essence generates.

Reply to the second: Just as in the divine the power of begetting is the same as generation, so the divine essence is the same thing as generation and paternity in reality, but not by reason.

Reply to the third: When I say "potency," the power of begetting is signified in the direct case, and generation in the oblique case; as if I were to say "the essence of the Father." Whence, as to the essence which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons. But as to the notion which is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.

Conclusion: The power of begetting signifies in the direct case essence (*essentia*), but in the oblique case relation (*relatio*).

Disputatio CLXIV - What the producing power is formally within God

Opinion of St. Bonaventure. Caput I.

Before we set forth the various opinions of the Scholastics, it must be premised that, in our way of understanding, a twofold producing principle must be assigned in God, after the manner of other things; for there is a principle by which the agent produces, and this is wont to be called the "principle by which" (principium quo), and there is a principle which produces, and this is called the "principle which" (principium quod). The "principle by which" is the same as the potency (*potentia*) about which we are now inquiring. It is a certain power by which some agent furnished with it operates as with an instrument; but the "principle which" is said to be the whole selfsame thing that, endowed with this power, produces another. In the divine, however, the "principle which" is called a person, but the "principle by which" is called the potency, about which there is now controversy among us as to what it is.

899. St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 2, near the end.
900. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 8.

Opinio Bonaventurae. Caput 1.

Five other opinions of the Scholastics are set forth. Caput 2.

That the potency which produces a divine person is the divine essence connoting a property is the truer opinion. Caput 3.

Corollaries of the foregoing opinion, and solution of the arguments of the other opinions. Caput 4.

Caput I - The opinion of St. Bonaventure

Further, this twofold principle does not clash with God's simplicity, as Gregory falsely taught in the First Book, distinction 7, question 2, article 2, who for the same reason denies in God those forms which the theologians call notions, as we recalled in Disputation 136, chapter 2.[901][902] For since by our consideration alone these things are distinguished in God, even if in him something be conceived as form and something in the manner of matter, we detract nothing from his perfection, but as we are able, we understand him. For this reason, since we have shown against Gregory and others in that chapter that there is for us only a distinction of reason by abstract and concrete names, and that the notions are to be established in God after the mode of forms, now the question is, what formally is the potency, in our mode of understanding - that is, the principle by which - in God with respect to the productions of the persons.

With this notation premised, the first opinion is that of St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, and of Durandus in the same question, number 29, who assert that the principle by which, or the potency, is formally a relation, that is, a property. Indeed, when speaking of the person of the Father, St. Bonaventure, who thinks that what is first understood by reason is a power to beget which, when he speaks of the generating act, he calls a property, not under the notion of the relation of paternity, but under the notion of the unbegotten; but Durandus, who held that the first person cannot be conceived except with an act of begetting, said that the potency is the very property under the notion of relation. Therefore both agree in this, that the potency is formally a personal property; yet they differ in the mode of expounding it, according to the various opinions which they followed about the principle constituting the person, as we saw in Disputation 119, chapters 4 and 5.[903][904]

This opinion is proved first as follows. Whenever some production or operation belongs to one supposit which does not belong to another - indeed even repugns it - the principle and potency of that operation ought to be something proper to that supposit; for if by reason of something common the potency were suitable, that operation would be attributed to both supposits. But

901. Gregory (of Rimini), In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 2, art. 2.
902. Vázquez, Disputatio 136, cap. 2.
903. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1, n. 29.
904. Vázquez, Disputatio 119, cap. 4 - 5.

generation, for the reason set out, belongs to the Father and to no other person. Therefore the principle of that is something proper to him, and this is nothing else than a property, considered in this or that way.

From the same principle it follows that the potency of breathing is not the essence, but a common property in the Father and the Son, since spiration proceeds from both.

Second, to attribute being to something and not to act is imperfection; but paternity attributes some being to the first person: therefore, unless it also attributed acting, it would be imperfect - which is absurd.

Third, finally, since the essence cannot be potency, as will be proved below, nothing else remains except a property which can be potency.

St. Thomas in this article impugns this opinion; and Scotus in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, speaking first from Anselm in the Monologion, chapter 54, where about the Holy Spirit he says thus: "He does not proceed from that in which the Father and the Son are many, but from that in which they are one." And lest anyone think that he proceeds from the relation of spiration, he immediately adds: "For not from their relations - which are many, for the relation of the Father is one, that of the Son another - but from their very essence, which does not admit plurality, do the Father and the Son emit the one good." And in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 25, he says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divinity of the Father, not from paternity. He repeats the same in chapter 30. St. Thomas also proves it from St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, chapter 8, a little after the middle, where he speaks thus: "Generation is indeed a principle unknown and sempiternal, which ought to be a work of nature, and from its very essence it produces"; and a little before: "Generation indeed consists in this, that from the begetter's essence there be produced an offspring of the same substance with the begetter." And a little earlier, defining fecundity itself, which seems to be nothing other than the power of generating, he writes thus: "Fecundity, moreover, is placed in this, that one from himself, that is, from his own essence, bring forth an offspring like in nature." Since they say that that from which something is produced or proceeds in the divine persons is the essence; and fecundity is placed in this, that from it the product comes forth, they plainly think that the potency is the very essence, not a relation.[905][906][907][908][909]

Wherefore those more recent writers are worthy of reproof who, striving to undermine these testimonies of the Fathers, assert that they are not speaking about the principle of producing, but only wished to show against Arius that the divine persons were not produced from nothing; for this indeed is excluded only if a material, or quasi-material, or a formal principle of production be supposed: but the Fathers cited clearly indicate the principle of producing, as has been proved.

905. St. Anselm, Monologion, cap. 54.
906. St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 25.
907. St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 30.
908. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 8.
909. St. Thomas, in this article, adducing the places of St. Anselm and St. John Damascene.

By reason, moreover, Gregory argues thus in the place cited: because if the principle by which, or the potency, were a property, the production of the person would be equivocal; for the effect is said to be equivocal when it is not made like to the principle of producing. For, as St. Thomas says, it is proper to the agent (he understands a univocal agent) to make the product like to itself in the principle of producing. Other reasons of Scotus being omitted, this very point can afterward be proved in this way: The procession of the Word is properly speaking a diction and an intellection, as was proved in Disputation 112, chapter 3; but relation is not a formal principle, and the potency of understanding, as is clear, therefore neither is the potency of generating.[910][911]

Caput II - Five other opinions of the Scholastics are set forth

The second opinion is that which Durandus reports in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, number 18, of certain men who said that the essence and the property are equally the principle by which, or the potency, yet with respect to different things. For in the divine production there are two things, the communication of the essence and generation: with respect to the former, the essence is the potency; with respect to the latter, the property, or relation. They prove it thus: the principle of communication ought not to be distinguished from that which is communicated, because the same can communicate itself; yet the principle of production ought to be distinguished from the thing produced, because nothing produces itself: therefore rightly is the essence posited as the principle, or potency, of communication, but the property as the [principle] of production.[912]

Durandus impugns this opinion with this reason: In the divine there is not one action of communicating and another of generating; add also, in our mode of understanding, because the same action - processio verbi, properly speaking, is a diction and an intellection; relation, however, is not a formal principle, and the potency of understanding, as is evident - therefore neither [is it] of generating.

The third opinion is that which Scotus in the place cited thought to be St. Thomas's in this article, and some judge that it was the Master's in the First Book, distinction 7: namely, that the potency of generating, or of spirating in God, is only the essence, without any property in any way. Gabriel also follows this in the First Book, distinction 7, questions 1, 2, and 3.[913][914][915]

For the explanation of which he notes in that first question, article 1, notation 2, that the eliciting principle of some operation is that which is of itself necessarily required for the production, and it is not the production itself formally, nor is it constituted by it: therefore, since paternity and the other property cannot be the eliciting principle, because it is the production

910. Gregory (of Rimini), loc. cit., arguing from the univocity of the effect to the nature of the principle.
911. Vázquez, Disputatio 112, cap. 3.
912. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1, n. 18.
913. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1.
914. The Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., dist. 7.
915. Gabriel (Biel), In I Sent., dist. 7, qq. 1 - 3.

itself, it follows that the essence is such a principle. Yet, he says, the producing principle is the person, because she is the one who produces, not the essence: therefore he distinguishes between the eliciting principle and the producing [principle], as is clear from what has been said.

However, this opinion can be no less easily impugned than the preceding. First, because from it there follows that in the Son there is a potency of generating, because in him there is the essence, and this is the potency of generating. And if you say that some condition requisite is lacking, this will shortly be impugned against Scotus. Second, Gabriel vainly distinguishes the eliciting principle from the producing principle. For if the eliciting principle, as he himself admits, is the principle of the action, it will also be the principle of the thing produced by means of the action; for action is the middle way to the thing produced. Third, because nothing seems to prevent relation, or property, from being the eliciting principle and a potency. For, although relation and active origin are the same in reality, yet because they differ by reason, it seems sufficient that relation can be a potency and the principle of origin; otherwise it would be necessary that the essence could be [that principle], which according to the truer opinion is distinguished from origin by reason alone. Add, that since the producing person is not really distinguished from the active origin, she could not be the principle of it, if relation cannot be [that principle] for this reason - that it differs from it by reason alone.

The fourth opinion is Scotus's in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, in the reply to the question: and in the section "But who adduces other arguments," namely, that the potency in God is only the divine essence in itself absolute, while the necessary condition in order that it produce is the property of this or that person. Nor does it stand in the way, he says, that the name "potency" is relative, but the divine essence absolute: for we use this relative name when in no other way can we explain this perfection; but we wish to signify its foundation, which is absolute. And this occurs in many other names of God.[916]

Scotus proves that the essence is the potency in this way, namely, that that which is of the greatest perfection in a principle or potency does not impede the notion of principle or potency; but under the common acceptance the identity of nature is of the greatest perfection: therefore it does not impede the notion of principle and potency. If God were to produce another God and communicate to him another nature, his essence would be a producing principle and potency; therefore now it will be the same; for although he does not produce another God, he does produce a person in the same nature, and to communicate himself in the same nature does not impede the notion of potency and principle, as has been proved. Then he confirms the same thing, because the testimonies which earlier we cited show formally that the principle is the essence; therefore the principle, or potency, is the essence: for the one is found together with the other according to the same testimonies. Moreover, relation or property he was forced to call a condition requisite by necessity, lest he be compelled to assert that the essence, in whatever person it be, generates and breathes.

916. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1, ad quaest.; and in the section "Quis autem alia argumenta" on the same question.

Yet by vicissitude he also refutes the reasons of the previously stated opinion, because from that opinion it would follow that the very divine essence in any person whatsoever would generate and breathe. For where there is a principle of actions or productions, to that there does not belong an impediment; therefore the action or production follows. But the essence is in any person whatsoever, and there is in it no impediment; therefore in any [person] it generates and breathes. Scotus will say that there is an impediment in some, because to them the necessary condition is lacking, which is such a relation, or personal property. But he does not say this rightly: for, as is correctly said, any potency which by its nature posits an act cannot have a perpetual impediment from the nature of the thing, unless perhaps from accident; and the divine essence by its nature posits being in three persons: therefore in none of them can it have an impediment from the nature of the thing; and an accidental impediment, and one arising from without, it cannot have: therefore in every person there cannot be lacking to it any condition whatsoever required for acting; otherwise it would naturally demand to be in that same person who naturally would have an impediment to his act - which is absurd.

Fifth, finally, Henry in Quodlibet 3, question 3, teaches that both the essence and the relation are per se and directly required for the notion of potency, so that each pertains directly to the thing; yet more principally the property. Scotus reports this same opinion from Henry in the Summa, article 57, whose reason is this: because in every generation there are two [aspects], one is to produce the like, the other to produce the distinct; more principal, however, in generation is that it be terminated to something distinct so that it be like, than that it be terminated to something like so that it be distinct. Therefore in the potency of generating the principal thing is the property, by reason of which the distinction between the begotten and the begetter is attended to; but the essence is the principal with respect to likeness by reason of which there is a likeness in nature.[917][918]

However, if this opinion were true, no distinction, not even according to reason, between the person and the potency could be assigned. For since the person includes nothing other than the essence and relation, and likewise the potency; they will be entirely the same, and there will be only a difference of name. But if someone should say that there can be a distinction, not of reason, but only from the mode of signifying, against this was said in Disputation 159, chapter 4: we say that the mode of signifying is nothing unless in the thing there be some distinction signified, at least of reason.[919]

Caput III - That the potency which produces a divine person is the divine essence connoting a property is the truer opinion

A more probable and more true opinion in the schools is that which asserts that the potency producing within God a person is the essence connoting a property.

917. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 3.
918. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 57.
919. Vázquez, Disputatio 159, cap. 4.

Probabilior, and, in the schools, the truer opinion is that which asserts that the power (*potentia*) producing a person within God is the divine essence (*essentia*) connoting a property which itself modifies the essence so that it be a power. Cajetan and the Canarian teach this in this article; Capreolus in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, article 1, conclusions 2 and 3; Marsilius in the First, question 11, article 2, conclusions 3 and 4; and Ferrarensis, IV Contra gentes, cap. 13, § Considerandum etiam.[920] [921] [922]

Wherefore the personal property will not only be a condition required for the power, that it may produce and pass into act, but also that it be a power formally; although, to be sure, it does not pertain in the thing to the concept of that power, nevertheless it is connoted essentially in an oblique case by the name of power, and is included per se in its concept. But for the explication of this opinion it must be noted with Cajetan first, that by the name of power the proximate principle of generation is not understood: for this is the Father's intellect, as the will of the Father and the Son is the proximate principle of spiration; rather, what is understood is the first and remote principle. Yet one must philosophize in the same proportion about each: so that the essence, signified in the direct case, with the personal property connoted in an oblique case, is the first principle; the proximate principle, however, is the intellect or will signified in the direct case, with the personal property connoted in an oblique case. Moreover, everyone concedes that, at least in intellection and volition, both this proximate and first principle concur, because not only the intellect or will concurs in these operations, but also the divine nature itself, as happens in created things.

Then observe that, since the person of the Father is understood by us as prior with the power of generating than as having generated, and "Father" is a connotatum which of itself pertains to the power of generating, therefore the condition connoted is not paternity under the express concept of paternity, but the property of the first person, as it is conceived by us before generation, according to those things which we said in Disputation 159, cap. 5.[923]

However, it could seem to someone that it is easier to assign the condition of the power of spiring also as considered before the act of spiration: on the ground that the condition connoted by this power is not the relation of spirator, but paternity and filiation under the express concept of these relations. For when we conceive the Father and the Son before they spirate, we can rightly understand the divine essence or the will determined by these relations in such a way that it is able to spirate, so that this determination not be had merely nominally by the person. Yet I for my part judge that the condition of the power of spiring, which is connoted by the name of such a power, is not paternity and filiation, but the relation of spirator. For since the power of spiring is one and integrally common to the Father and the Son, it is necessary that in each of them there be the integral connotatum which is required in order that it be a power; but if the connotatum were paternity and filiation, or both together, it would be one integral connotatum, and thus such a

920. Cajetan and the Canarian, on this article; Capreolus, In I, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 2 - 3.
921. Marsilius, In I, q. 11, a. 2, concl. 3 - 4.
922. Ferrarensis, IV Contra gentes, cap. 13, § Considerandum etiam.
923. Vázquez, Disputatio 159, cap. 5.

power would not be integrally in each person, because in each there would not be the integral connotatum - as is clear. Or else any relation whatsoever would be a sufficient connoted condition for such a power; and thus the same power of spiring would not be in the Father as is in the Son, because the same connoted condition would not be in each.

Wherefore it must be said that the condition connoted by this power is the common relation of spirator, which is whole in the Father, whole in the Son. If, however, we speak of the power as it is conceived by us before the act of spiring, the same must be said of it as of the power of generating, which demands that the condition be connoted by paternity, so that the relation of spirator is not then conceived under the express concept of spirator, but confusedly, as we said of paternity when it is conceived as the condition connoted by the power of generating before the act of generation.

From this doctrine about the power of generating and spiring we shall at once very well infer how in one person there may be a power producing a person which is not in another.

But indeed, since the concrete names of nature, such as "God," signify the nature directly, but connote the supposit, and this very thing has been said of the generating power, a difference must be assigned between these two, lest they be easily confused. Therefore the first difference is that the concrete name "God" connotes a supposit vaguely, not this or that one; whereas the name "power" connotes the property of this singular supposit, as we have explained. Further, the name "God" connotes the supposit in which the nature subsists; the name "power" signifies the property such that the essence is modified and determined by it to produce what in another person it would not be determined to produce.

Corollaries in favor of the foregoing opinion, and a solution of the arguments of the other opinions.

Caput IV - That the power of generating or of spiring is not in all the persons

From this doctrine it is rightly inferred that the power of generating or of spiring is not in all the persons, but in those whose properties are connoted. In this opinion those agree with us who assert that the power is either the property of the person or the essence, or not the essence alone; which manifestly follows from what has been said. Hence Gabriel erred in the First Book, distinction 7, question 3, when he asserted that the Father communicates to the Son that by which he generates; he understands, however, the power of generating; but, he says, in the Son it does not generate because it is perpetually impeded. Nor is it a wonder, because this author, as we related in cap. 2, thought that the power of generating or the principle, which he calls elicitive, is the essence alone. It must be wondered, however, why Marsilius, in the First, question 11, articles 3 and 4, said that the power of generating is in all the persons, just as the essence is - although he himself teaches, as we saw in cap. 3, that the power is not the essence alone, but that to its ratio there pertains a property, as something connoted; yet he adds that this power does not generate in every person, not on account of Gabriel's reason, but for a different cause: for as, in a certain way, if the same color were in fire and in water, fire would heat by it, not however water; likewise, if the same

faculty of seeing were in the eye and in the bone, the eye would see, not the bone; so also the same essence existing in the Father and the Son, in the Father it generates, in the Son it does not generate.

However, the opinion of these men is easily refuted from what has been said: for since the bare essence is not the power, as has been proved, but the person determined by a property, the same cannot be in all the persons. Moreover, the reasons by which the aforesaid authors teach that a power does not generate in every person in which it is, are trifling. The first, which Gabriel asserts, has already been sufficiently impugned in cap. 2. But the second can be impugned more easily, first, because the example about heat is altogether inept: for heat in water is in a subject contrary to nature, and therefore the action of heat in water cannot be derived from it; but the divine essence is per se in any person: therefore, if the essence is in one person a natural power of generating, in another it can also be. Then, if the faculty of seeing were naturally in the bone, the bone would see, because it would be in a natural subject - namely, in the soul - and just as by its own nature it could be in that, so it could cooperate in the act. For it is impossible that a faculty by its own nature reside in some part in which it would have a perpetual and natural impediment, as we said in cap. 2. But if, besides nature, a seeing faculty were in the bone, it would not see on account of the impediment which it would have besides nature; but the divine essence is not besides nature in the Son, but equally natural as in the Father; therefore, if that alone is the faculty of generating, and in the Father it generates, in the Son likewise it will generate.

Of the arguments, however, which were adduced in caps. 1 and 2, two only remain: one of Durandus in I, cap. 15, and another of Scotus in cap. 2, to which it is necessary to respond.[924] [925]

Reply to the first, of Durandus. We say that the Father generates according to that which is proper to him; but what is proper is not only the relation or personal property, but also the essence determined by such a property; and this we said is the power of generating.

As to the second, it is of no moment, nor does it prove anything against the mystery of our faith. For if for that reason paternity should be called imperfect, because it gives being and does not operate, and therefore we ought to assign to it generation as to a generating faculty, it would follow that procession, which is posited as the property of the Holy Spirit, is an imperfect form, because in no way does it ascribe any operation to the Holy Spirit, since it is not a principle of producing anything either outside or within God. We answer, therefore, that even if a property does not ascribe an operation to the person, it is nonetheless a perfection of that person, because it pertains to the complement of the person according to our mode of understanding; for not every perfection of something ought to bestow upon it the power of producing.

As to the third argument of Durandus, from what has been said the solution is clear.

But to the argument of Scotus adduced in that cap. we say: if God were to produce another God, then indeed the essence of God would have to be assigned as the faculty of generating, because producing another God he would produce another essence of which it could be the principle. For

924. Durandus, In I, cap. 15.
925. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 1, ad quaest.; and in the section "Quis autem alia argumenta" on the same question.

the principle must be distinguished from the thing produced: for the same thing cannot produce itself. Now, however, because God produces God in the same nature, the nature itself, in itself, cannot be the principle, because it is not distinguished from the thing produced. We add, therefore, that by that determination of the personal property, according to which the person is distinguished from the person produced, it can be a principle.

But that the three persons are equal in all power, see Disputation 166.

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Earlier opinions and their impugnation

Fourth opinion. The fourth opinion is Scotus's, in the First Book, distinction 7, question 1, ad quaestionem "Quis autem alia argumenta," namely, that the principial power in God is the divine essence alone, the whole essence, absolute; but that the necessary condition, in order that it produce, is the property (relation) of such or such a person. Nor does it stand in the way, he says, that formally a power is relative, but the divine essence is absolute: for we use this relative name when we cannot explain this perfection in another way; but we mean to signify the foundation of that perfection, which is absolute - something which happens in many other names of God.

Scotus proves in truth that the essence is a power in this way: that which is of the greatest perfection in a principle or power does not impede the notion of principle or power; but to communicate oneself in identity of nature is of the greatest perfection; therefore it does not impede the notion of principle and power. Moreover, if God were to produce another God and communicate to him another nature, his essence would be the producing principle and power; therefore, now too it will be, even though he does not produce another God, but another person in the same nature; since to communicate oneself in the same nature does not impede the notion of power and principle, as has been proved. Then he confirms the same, because the essence is the least formal; therefore both the principle and the power are the essence: for the one seems to correspond to the other. Furthermore, he had to say that relation or property is a condition required necessarily, lest he be compelled to assert that the essence, in any person whatsoever, would generate and spirate.

But the aforesaid opinion is refuted by one reason only, because from it there would follow that the divine essence, in any person whatsoever, would generate and spirate. For where there is a principle of action or production, unless an impediment be present, action or production follows; but the essence is in any person, and there is no impediment at all; therefore, in any person it generates and spirates. Scotus would say that in some there is an impediment because they lack the necessary condition, which is such a relation or personal property. But this is not rightly said, because wherever some power by its own nature demands to be, it cannot have a perpetual impediment from the nature of the thing, unless perhaps by accident; but the divine essence by its own nature demands to be in three persons; therefore none of them can have an impediment from the nature of the thing; nor can it have accidental and extrinsic impediments; for a person cannot lack anything required for acting; otherwise it would naturally demand to be in that person in such wise that it would naturally have an impediment of its act, which is absurd.

Fifth opinion. Finally, Henry in Quodlibet 3, q. 3 teaches that both the essence and the relation are per se and directly required for the notion of power, so that each pertains in recto to it; yet more principally the property.[926] He reports the same in the Summa, art. 57.[927]

The reason is, because in every generation there are two things: one is to produce something similar; the other is to produce something distinct; but the more principal thing in generation is that it be terminated to the distinct as it is similar, rather than to the similar as it is distinct; therefore in the power of generating the principal thing is the property, by reason of which the distinction between the begotten and the begetter is intended. That this be principal, by reason of which the distinction follows, he proves, because Peter does not on that account generate this man because he generates man; but, on the contrary, he generates man because he generates this man.

But if this opinion were true, no distinction, even according to reason, could be assigned between person and power. For since the person includes nothing other than essence and relation, and power likewise, they will be absolutely the same, and there will be only a difference of names. But if someone should say that there is a distinction not of reason but only of mode of signifying, against this is what was said in Disputation 159, cap. 4: a diverse mode of signifying is not had unless in the thing signified there is some distinction, at least of reason.[923]

Disputatio CLXVI - On whether omnipotence is equally in the three divine persons and whether it includes the potencies of generation and spiration

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

This controversy, from the foregoing and from what we said in Disputation 104, could easily have been dispatched; but because the Scholastics, perhaps differing only about a word, have been of various opinions, it was necessary in this chapter to enumerate their positions and in the following to say something briefly by way of a true explanation.

First opinion. Marsilius, on I, q. 23, a. 2, part 2, holds that under omnipotence is contained the potency of generating and spiring; and since he says that the potency of generating and spiring is in all the persons, as we reported in the last chapter of the preceding disputation, he further asserts that omnipotence, insofar as in this way it includes under itself the potency of generating and spiring, is in all the persons, although in all it is not possible to generate and to spirate. With Marsilius agrees the Canarian, in his commentary on article 6 of the following question. When he asserts that the same omnipotence which the Father has is in the Son, although the Son cannot by those means generate as the Father. And, in order to explain this, he uses the examples employed by Marsilius in the last chapter of the preceding disputation, to explain how there could be in the Son the potency of generating and yet he could not generate; and he adds another of this sort: if the

926. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 3.
927. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 57.
923. Vázquez, Disputatio 159, cap. 5.

same heat were in a man and a woman, in the woman it would generate milk, in the man it would not; nonetheless, he says, the potency for generating, which they call generative, ought not to be granted to the Son.[928]

However, since it was already proved above in that chapter that the generating potency is not in the Son, nor the spirating in the Holy Spirit, if omnipotence were to comprehend under itself every potency, even that which produces within God, it would follow that omnipotence is not in each person, because some potency is not in some person. Moreover, those examples which Marsilius used in that same chapter have been sufficiently impugned, and in the same way there can be refuted that to which the Canarian has recourse. For the same heat in a man and in a woman would not have the same power of operating, because it would not be conjoined to the same substance of which it is the instrument; for heat is not the entire cause of producing milk, but because it is conjoined to such a form, or at least to such a temperament, which is also required as a per se cause. But the divine essence differs only in that it is in diverse supposits (*supposita*); wherefore, if it were the whole rationale of the generating potency, it would follow that wherever it were, there also generation would take place. I am surprised, however, that the Canarian should say that omnipotence, even if under itself it comprehends the potency that produces within God, is in each person, although he does not grant the generating and the spirating potency in each.[929]

Second opinion. St. Thomas, on q. 42, a. 6, ad 3, and Ferrarensis, IV Contra gentes, c. 13, in order to defend that the three persons are equal in potency, concede that the potency which is in the Father is in the Son, but under a different respect: for in the Father it is so as to generate, in the Son however so as to be generated; and that this suffices so that they may be said to be of equal potency.[930][931] But since the difficulty proposed concerns only the potency for acting or producing, which is called active, not the passive, so that something be produced, it does not seem that a sufficiently fitting answer is being given. For if some active potency is not in the Son, it follows that all the persons are not equal in potency to act; and indeed every potency about which we ask whether it is equally in all the persons is not for suffering (being acted upon), but for acting, as the same St. Thomas admits above, q. 25, a. 3, ad 1. Convinced by this reasoning, Durandus thinks that the proposed difficulty must be satisfied in another way.

Third opinion. Thomas of Argentina and Aegidius of Rome, as Scotus relates in the place to be cited below, assert that omnipotence is in the Son just as in the Father and in the Holy Spirit, even if the Son cannot generate, nor the Holy Spirit spirate; not because omnipotence has regard only to those things which can be outside of God, but even if it be with respect to those which can be produced within God, since omnipotence universally extends only to those things which do not imply a contradiction. Nor is omnipotence at all derogated from or its power diminished if it cannot produce those things which imply a contradiction; therefore, since it implies a contradiction that another divine Son be generated by the Son, and that another Holy Spirit be produced by the

928. Marsilius, In I, q. 23, a. 2, pars 2.
929. The Canarian (Canariensis), commentary on article 6 of the following question.
930. St. Thomas, I, q. 42, a. 6, ad 3.
931. Ferrarensis, IV Contra gentes, cap. 13.

Holy Spirit, nothing will stand in the way, considering their omnipotence universally, that they cannot generate or spirate; because omnipotence has respect to those things which do not imply a contradiction.

He assigns, moreover, a distinction between a transient act (*actus transiens*) and an immanent act (*actus immanens*): because every transient act, or its effect, which considered in itself absolutely, not with respect to the agent, does not imply a contradiction, falls under omnipotence; yet, in order that an immanent act be said to fall under omnipotence, it is not enough that, considered in itself, it does not imply a contradiction and can be done by another, but its possibility, in order that it fall under omnipotence, must be considered with respect to the agent. Therefore, since the generation of the Son is an immanent act and is possible only with respect to the Father generating, it ought to fall only under the omnipotence of the Father, not under omnipotence insofar as it is the Son's. By this reasoning, then, from the Son's omnipotence it does not follow that he can generate another Son - nothing stands in the way of his being omnipotent nonetheless. Furthermore, that alone is called impotent, or is said to lack some potency (*potentia*) for operating, which, although it have from itself a form fitting for operating, is nevertheless unable to operate; but that which cannot operate because it does not have a form from itself fitting, is not called impotent. Wherefore that the Son cannot generate another Son is not a mark of impotence, because he cannot generate for the reason that he does not have a form from himself fitting; therefore this will derogate nothing from his omnipotence.

This opinion is refuted by Durandus, on I Sent., dist. 10, q. 1, n. 6: because omnipotence is said with respect to those things which do not imply a contradiction absolutely in themselves, not with respect to the efficient cause; as St. Thomas most excellently noted above, q. 25, a. 3. For if it were referred to that which does not imply a contradiction with respect to the potency and to the efficient, there would result a certain useless circle, as St. Thomas noted there, and we also explained in Disputation 104, c. 4. Moreover, if the aforesaid opinion were true, any man, indeed any animal whatsoever, would truly be said omnipotent, at least with respect to immanent actions; because he can do any action possible to be done by himself. Then Scotus impugns the same opinion, on I Sent., distinction 20, question 1, by this reasoning: If we do not compare the Son and the act of generation to some supposit in particular, but in common, generation is possible, and likewise a Son; therefore with respect to that there is some potency; wherefore, if that potency is not in the Son, it follows that in the Son there is not every potency, and hence that he is not omnipotent.[932][933]

But someone will object against Scotus: bodily vision is a certain act which in itself does not imply a contradiction - for instance, that it exist; yet only God can bring it about, and nonetheless he is called omnipotent; therefore omnipotence ought not to be compared to all those things which in themselves do not imply a contradiction absolutely, but also with respect to omnipotence itself. Scotus most fittingly responds that omnipotence is said with respect to all those things which absolutely in themselves do not imply a contradiction, yet in such a way that that be produced by

932. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 10, q. 1, n. 6.
933. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 20, q. 1.

omnipotence as its nature requires to be produced. For if it is a substance, as it is by nature apt to subsist of itself, so it must be produced, not in another; but if it is an accident necessarily depending on a subject, insofar as it is a vital act, so by God it must be produced together with the subject also concurring; and thus God reaches by his power the existence of that thing.

Finally Scotus argues: although that which has a limited form cannot be called impotent, just as fire is not called impotent because it does not produce cold, nevertheless it will not for that reason be called omnipotent, because it can do all those things for which it has a form; therefore the aforesaid Doctors do not argue rightly.

Caput II - The true opinion

Much easier and more probable is the opinion of Scotus and of Durandus in the places cited, and of Gab. on I, that distinction 20, q. 1; of Gregory, quaest. 1, art. 2; of Cajetan above, q. 23, art. 3; of Major on I, dist. 42, quaest. 1, proposition 4; namely, that the three persons are equally omnipotent. For they take the attribute of omnipotence not for any and every potency which even within God can produce, but with respect to creatures outside God, as Fulgentius took it, in the book On the faith to Peter, c. 7, where he says thus: "In this God's omnipotence is understood, that he made every visible creature out of nothing." Durandus proves this by the following reason: omnipotence is the same as a potency to act, not however that something be; wherefore God is not called omnipotent because he can be, but because he can operate; therefore with respect to that operation there is not the potency which is the being (*esse*) of the operator; but generation is God's being; therefore with respect to that there is not omnipotence. But this reason destroys what we set down in Disputation 163, namely that in God there truly is a potency with respect to notional acts.

Scotus, however, proves it thus: the correlative of omnipotence is the possible; but the possible is that which can be and not be; therefore, since within God there is no person who is possible, there is not omnipotence with respect to that. Yet, although in common it is said that that is possible which can be and not be, nonetheless that is also called possible which is in act, and the necessary is called possible which is in act; and with respect to notional acts there truly is potency; therefore nothing stands in the way why there should not also be omnipotence.

The true reason, therefore, of the aforesaid opinion - indicated by St. Thomas, q. 25, a. 3, and in the following question, a. 6 - is this: that omnipotence is said only with respect to creatures, and that this is commonly used for that which can be given in this way. In the same fashion God is said to be omnipotent as he was said to be before the mystery of the Trinity was revealed; before this revelation, omnipotent fell only with respect to creatures, and no potency with respect to notional acts was known; therefore now it is so said in the same way. But if one were to take omnipotence for the potency of producing absolutely everything, both within God and outside, I do not see by what reasoning we could say that omnipotence is in the three persons, as the arguments made in the preceding chapter show. Wherefore I would not use "omnipotence" for just any potency, but for the potency of all things which can be produced outside God, just as the ancients accepted it before the mystery of the Trinity was revealed.[934][935][936][937]

Objection from St. Augustine. Yet there is an argument taken from the words of Augustine, book 3 against Maximinus, c. 14: "If the Father," he says, "begot a lesser Son, either he could not or he did not wish to beget an equal. But if it is said that he did not wish, as though envious, he destroys himself; but if he could not, where is the omnipotence of the Father?" And a little later: "If he could not, he was inhuman." In order, however, that Augustine's argument have any force, the potency of generating must be contained under omnipotence; for if it is not contained, one could easily answer Augustine's question in his argument - "But if he could not, where is the omnipotence of the Father?" - that the Father's omnipotence is about creatures, not about producing persons equal to himself.[938]

To this argument Scotus replies in the cited place and in the third doubt, 9: to the first argument, that Augustine is arguing ad hominem from Maximinus's concessions, not absolutely from the nature of the thing; because he conceded to the Son deity, yet lesser than he himself had. From this, therefore, he infers that the Father would not be omnipotent, because it would follow that the deity is not infinite, since some deity would be greater, some lesser; but the infinite is not greater and lesser. If, however, the deity is not infinite, neither will he be omnipotent, because omnipotence is born of the infinity of the nature. But Scotus clearly twists the force of Augustine's argument another way; for Augustine does not infer, as Scotus thought, in that way, but rather thus: "But he could not beget an equal; therefore there failed him some potency; therefore he is not omnipotent."

Gregory, moreover, on I Sent., dist. 20, art. ..., expounds the force of this argument against Maximinus to the same effect. He says, therefore: Maximinus asserts - as is clear from that same chapter - both that the Son is a creature and yet is truly of a like nature with the Father. On these positions Augustine (Gregory says) argues that he breaks the Father's omnipotence: as if those who are by their nature equals to the fathers of whom they are begotten; whose God - the Son - was not equal to the Father; either because the Father did not wish, and thus the begetter was envious; or

934. Gregory, Quaestio prima, art. 2; and In primum Sent., dist. 20, art. ...
935. Cajetan, on I, q. 23, a. 3.
936. Major, In I Sent., dist. 42, quaestio 1, propositio 4.
937. Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, cap. 7.
938. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, cap. 14.

because he could not, and thus not omnipotent. But Augustine (Gregory says) took "omnipotence" with respect to creatures; for Maximinus was saying that the Son of God is a creature. And yet Maximinus could easily have replied that God could not beget a Son equal to himself if he were a creature; for no creature can be equal to God; and so nothing would have been derogated from his omnipotence.

For my part I think Augustine did not use "omnipotence" for the attribute of the divine essence, which we admit to be common to the three persons - for then the argument would be of scarcely any moment - but that by the name "omnipotence" he understood the full and second potency (*potentia secunda*) for generating and acting, in this way: if by his nature the Son could be equal and consubstantial to the Father - as we see in created things, where, when we ascribe second potency for generating, it follows that one begets a like and equal son - then, if he did not beget when he could, he was envious; or he was not fully in second act for generating, as a father created for generating is, which is absurd. Hence, therefore, he urges, when he says: "But if he could not, where is omnipotence?" - that is, where is the Father's full fecundity? I pass over what St. Thomas replies in the following question, article 6, ad 3; for the proposed difficulty does not seem thereby to be satisfied.

Articulus VI - Whether a notional act can terminate in several persons

To the sixth, one proceeds thus. It seems that a notional act can terminate in several persons, such that there are several persons begotten or spirated in the divine. For whatever has the power of begetting can beget; but the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore he can beget - not, however, himself. Therefore another Son. Therefore there can be several sons in the divine.

1. Further, St. Augustine says against Maximinus: The Son did not beget the Creator; not because he could not, but because it was not fitting.[939]
2. Further, God the Father is more powerful to beget than a created father. But one man can beget several sons. Therefore so can God - especially since the Father's power is not diminished by one Son having been begotten.

But on the contrary: In the divine there is no difference between to be and to be able. If, therefore, in the divine it could be that there are several sons, there would be several sons; and thus there would be more than three persons in the divine. Which is heretical, as is clear from the symbol of faith.

I answer: As Athanasius says, in the divine there is only one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit. The reason for which can be assigned in four ways. First, on the part of the relations, by which alone the persons are distinguished. For since the divine persons are the subsistent relations themselves, there could not be several fathers or several sons in the divine, unless there were several paternities and several filiations; which could not be, unless according to a material

939. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, cap. 14.

distinction of them. For forms of one species are not multiplied except according to matter; which is not in the divine. Hence in the divine there can be only one subsistent filiation, just as a subsistent whiteness could be only one.

Second, from the mode of the processions: because God understands and wills by one simple act. Whence there can be only one person proceeding by way of word, which is the Son, and only one by way of love, which is the Holy Spirit.

Third, from the mode of proceeding, because the persons themselves proceed naturally, as has been said; but nature is determined to one.

Fourth, from the perfection of the divine persons. For the Son is perfect from this, that the whole divine filiation is contained in him, and that there is only one Son; and similarly must it be said of the other persons.

Reply to the first: Although it must be conceded without qualification that the Son has the power which the Father has, nevertheless it must not be conceded that the Son has the power "of begetting," if "of begetting" is taken as the gerund of an active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has a power to beget - just as, although the being is the same of the Father and of the Son, nevertheless it does not befit the Son to be Father on account of the notional adjunct. If, however, "of begetting" is taken as the gerund of a passive verb, the power "of being begotten" is in the Son, that is, that he be begotten; and similarly, if it is the gerund of an impersonal verb, the sense is "a power of being begotten," that is, by which some person is begotten.

Reply to the second: Augustine in those words does not intend to say that the Son could beget a Son, but that this, that he does not beget, is not from an impotence of the Son, as will be made clear below.

Reply to the third: The immateriality and divine perfection require that there cannot be several sons in the divine, as has been said. Hence that there are not several sons is not from an impotence of the Father to beget.

Conclusion of the article denies it, and it is expressed as of faith in the Athanasian symbol: "One Son, not three sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits." St. Thomas proves this by four fitting reasons; Scotus at Quodlibet 2 and Aureolus on the First Book, distinction 7, question 2, attack them at length; as is reported by Capreolus on the first article, Cajetan and the Canarian, Ferrarensis, Henry, and other more recent authors defend them in this article.[940][941][942][943][944][945][946] On occasion of one of those reasons Cajetan disputes more fully about the principle of individuation. Henry in Quodlibet 6, question 1, and Scotus in the place cited, adduce other reasons; yet none of

940. Scotus, Quodlibet II.
941. Aureolus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 2.
942. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 2, art. 1.
943. Cajetan, on I, q. 41, a. 6.
944. Canariensis (Canarian), on the same article.
945. Ferrarensis, IV Contra gentes, cap. 13 (in principio).
946. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VI, q. 1.

them concludes demonstratively, but all only congruently prove this truth. For it has a supernatural reason, and can be established only by faith, just as the very mystery of three persons in one nature.

Quaestio XLII - On the equality and likeness of the divine persons among themselves

Then there must be considered the comparison of the persons among themselves. And first as to equality and likeness; second as to mission. Concerning the first, six things are asked. On this matter the Doctors treat in the First Book, distinction 19.

Articulus I - Whether equality has a place in the divine

Objicitur 1. It seems that equality does not befit the divine persons. For equality is considered according to one thing in quantity, as is clear from the Philosopher, Metaphysics V. But in the divine persons there is found neither an intrinsic continuous quantity, which is called magnitude; nor an extrinsic continuous quantity, which is called place and time; nor, according to discrete quantity, is equality found in them, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality does not befit the divine persons.

Objicitur 2. Further, the divine persons are of one essence (*essentia*), as was said above. But essence is signified after the mode of a form (*forma*); now agreement in form does not make equality, but likeness. Therefore in the divine persons there should be said likeness, not equality.[947]

Objicitur 3. Further, in whatever equality is found, those things are equal to one another; for the equal is said equal to the equal. But the divine persons cannot be said equal to one another. For, as St. Augustine says, in the sixth book On the Trinity, if an image perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, it is itself coequal to it; not that which is the original to its image. But the Son is the image of the Father. And thus the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not found in the divine persons.[948]

Objicitur 4. Further, equality is a certain relation (*relatio*). But no relation is common to all the persons, since according to relations the persons are distinguished from one another. Therefore equality does not befit the divine persons.

But on the contrary: Athanasius says that the three persons are coeternal and coequal to one another.[949]

I answer: It is necessary to posit equality in the divine persons. For according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics X, the equal is so called as by negation of the less and the greater. But we cannot posit in the divine persons anything greater and less. For, as Boethius says in the book On the

947. St. Thomas, I, q. 39, a. 2.
948. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6, cap. 10 (at the beginning).
949. Athanasian Creed: "coeternal and coequal."

Trinity, the difference of deity accompanies those who either increase or diminish it, as the Arians, who by grades of numbers distort the Trinity and lead it into plurality. The reason for which is that one quantity in number cannot be of unequals. But in the divine, quantity is nothing other than its essence. Whence it follows that, if there were any inequality in the divine persons, there would not be one essence in them; and thus the three persons would not be one God. Which is impossible. Therefore it is necessary to posit equality in the divine persons.[950][951]

Reply to the first: Quantity is twofold. One is what is called bulk-quantity, or the quantity of dimensions, which is only in corporeal things. Whence there is no place for it in the divine persons. But there is another, the quantity of power or virtue, which is considered according to the perfection of some nature or form. And this quantity is designated inasmuch as something is said to be more or less hot, inasmuch as it is more or less perfect in such heat. Now such a quantity of virtue is considered, first, in the root, that is, in the very perfection of the form or of the nature; and thus we speak of a spiritual magnitude; we say that heat is great on account of its intensity and perfection. And thus says Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity, that in God those things which are not great by mass are greater by being, namely that it is better-being; for we say that what is better is more perfect. Second, the virtual quantity is considered in the effects of the form. Now the first effect of the form is existence (*esse*). For every thing has existence according to its form. The second effect is operation. For every agent acts through its form. Therefore the virtual quantity is considered both according to existence and according to operation: according to existence, inasmuch as those things which are of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; according to operation, inasmuch as those which are of a more perfect nature have greater power to act. Thus therefore, as Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter, equality is understood in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as none of these either precedes in eternity, or exceeds in magnitude, or surpasses in power.[952][953]

Reply to the second: Where equality is considered according to virtual quantity, equality includes likeness in itself, and something more; for it excludes excess. For whatever communicate in one form can be called like, even if they participate that form unequally, as when air is called like to fire in heat; but they cannot be called equal if one participates the formal perfection more than the other. And because not only is there one nature of the Father and of the Son, but it is also equally perfect in each, therefore we not only say that the Son is like to the Father, so as to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that he is equal, so as to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply to the third: Equality or likeness can be signified in the divine in a twofold way, namely by nouns and by verbs. According to that which is signified by nouns, mutual equality is said in the divine persons, and likeness: for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. And this for this reason, that the divine essence is no more the Father's than the Son's. Whence it is said that the Son has greatness from the Father, which is to be with an equal to the Father; and likewise the

950. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, texts 15 - 17.
951. Boethius, De Trinitate.
952. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6.
953. Fulgentius (under Augustine's name), De fide ad Petrum, cap. 7.

Father has greatness of the Son, which is to be with an equal to the Son. But with respect to creatures (as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 9) the conversion of equality and likeness is not admitted: for effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have a form from their causes; but not conversely, because the form is primarily in the cause and secondarily in the caused. But the verb signifies equality with motion. And although motion is not in the divine, nevertheless there it is received in its proper sense, because the Son receives from the Father, whence he is equal to him; and not conversely.[954]

Reply to the fourth: In the divine persons there is to be considered nothing except the essence, in which they communicate, and the relations, in which they are distinguished. But equality imports both: namely the distinction according to supposits, and the unity according to the essence. Therefore equality befits the divine persons.

It is answered: Among things unequal there cannot be one quantity numerically. But quantity in the divine is nothing other than its essence (*essentia*). Whence it follows that, if there were any inequality among the divine persons, there would not be one essence in them. And thus the three persons would not be one God. Which is impossible. It is therefore necessary to posit equality in the divine persons.

Reply to the first: Quantity is twofold. One, namely, which is called quantity of bulk, or dimensional quantity, which exists only in bodily things. Hence it has no place in the divine persons. But there is another, the quantity of power, which is attended to according to the perfection of some nature (*natura*) or form (*forma*). And this quantity is designated according to the fact that something is said to be more or less hot, insofar as it is more or less perfect in such heat. Now this virtual quantity is attended to, first, at the root, that is, in the very perfection of the form or nature: and thus there is said to be spiritual magnitude, just as there is said to be great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And therefore St. Augustine says in De Trinitate 6 that in those things which are not great by bulk, to be greater is to be better; for the better is said of what is more perfect.[955] Secondly, virtual quantity is attended to in the effects of the form. Now the first effect of a form is existence (*esse*). For every thing has existence according to its form. The second effect is operation. For every agent acts through its form. Therefore virtual quantity is attended to both according to existence and according to operation. According to existence indeed, insofar as those which are of a more perfect nature are of greater duration. According to operation, insofar as those which are of a more perfect nature are more powerful for acting. Thus, as Augustine says in the book De fide ad Petrum, equality (*aequalitas*) is understood in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as none of these either precedes in eternity, or exceeds in magnitude, or surpasses in power.[956]

Reply to the second: Where equality is attended to according to virtual quantity, equality includes within itself likeness (*similitudo*) and something more: because it excludes excess. For whatever things communicate in one form can be called like, even if they participate in that form

954. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 9.
955. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 6, cap. 8.
956. Fulgentius (under Augustine's name), De fide ad Petrum, cap. 7.

unequally, as if air is said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be called equal if the one participates in that form more perfectly than the other. And because not only is there one nature of the Father and the Son, but it is also equally perfectly in each: therefore we not only say that the Son is like the Father, to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that he is equal, to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply to the third: Equality or likeness can be signified in the divine in a twofold way, namely, by nouns and by verbs. According to what is signified by nouns, mutual equality and likeness is said of the divine persons. For the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. And this for the reason that the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Hence just as the Son has the Father's magnitude, which is to be equal with the Father, so the Father has the Son's magnitude, which is to be equal with the Son. But as to creatures (as Pseudo-Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus, ch. 9), there is no conversion of equality and likeness received. For effects are said to be like their causes insofar as they have the forms of their causes, but not conversely, because the form is principally in the cause and secondarily in the effect. But verbs signify equality with motion. And although motion is not in the divine, there is nevertheless there, to receive. For the Son receives from the Father, whence he is equal to him; and not conversely.[957]

Reply to the fourth: In the divine persons nothing is to be considered except the essence, in which they communicate, and the relations (*relationes*) in which they are distinguished. Now equality imports both, namely, the distinction of the persons, because nothing is said to be equal to itself; and the unity of essence, because from this the persons are equal to one another, since they are of one magnitude and essence. But it is manifest that the same is not referred to itself by any real relation. Nor again is one relation referred to others by means of some other relation. For when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, the opposition is not a relation midway between paternity and filiation. For in either way relation would be multiplied to infinity. And therefore equality and likeness among the divine persons is not some real relation distinct from the personal relations, but in its own concept it includes both the relations that distinguish the persons and the unity of essence. And on this account the Master says in I, dist. 31, that in these cases the appellation is only relative.[958]

The conclusion is affirmative, expressed in the Athanasian Creed, that the three persons are coeternal and coequal. Still, certain points concerning a fuller explanation of this and of the whole doctrine of the article must be noted in the following disputation.[959]

Whether the relations of equality, likeness, and identity among the persons are real

Scotus thinks that these relations are real. cap. 1.

These relations are only of reason; the more probable opinion says so, though it is proved in various ways. cap. 2.

957. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 9.
958. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences, I, dist. 31.
959. Athanasian Creed: "coeternal and coequal."

The preceding opinion is confirmed by the best reason. cap. 3.

An opposition against the foregoing reason. cap. 4.

Corollaries of this controversy. cap. 5.

Caput I - Scotus holds that these relations are real

Before we come to the disputation, it must be premised, from the doctrine of Durandus in I, dist. 19, q. 1, and from Scotus in the first question, that three relations of the first genus, which in creatures arise as distinct from various foundations, are found to be conjoined in God. For in creatures the first is the relation of equality, founded upon the unity of quantity; the second the relation of likeness in the unity of quality; the third the relation of identity, founded upon the unity of nature and substance. All of which are enumerated in the first genus by Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 5, chapter 15. But according to our way of understanding, we consider first in the divine essence the notion of substance, namely, that it is; and thence arises the relation of identity and consubstantiality; then we consider the same as under the mode of quality, namely, under the mode of truth and wisdom; and thence arises the relation of likeness; lastly, we consider in the divine essence a certain notion of quantity, insofar as we say that God is great; and upon this is founded the relation of equality. About these relations the question is, whether they are real in God, or only of reason.[960]

In this controversy the opinion of Scotus was, who in Quodlibet 6, art. 2, and on I Sent., dist. 31, in the first opinion of the first article, affirms that the relations are real. His sole reason is that in these relations there are found all the things that are required for real relations; therefore they are real. First, it is required that the extremes of the relation be real; but here they are real, namely, the persons. Second, it is necessary that the foundation be real, and the term of the relation likewise; but here each is found: for the foundation is the unity of the essence considered under that various mode, and the term is the other person. Third, it is necessary that from the nature of the foundation and of the extremes the relation arise to this extent, that it be real: and this suits these relations, as is manifest: it remains, therefore, that they are real, and so it is said.

Moreover, Scotus persisting in his opinion, namely, that the attributes are distinguished among themselves and from the essence by the nature of the thing and not only by our consideration, teaches in the cited Quodlibet that, as has been said, the foundation of these relations is real, not only insofar as it founds the relation of identity, but also of likeness and equality, because in it there is the notion of an attribute under the mode of quality, although it is not really a quality - for wisdom and goodness are of this sort - and of a certain quantity, as magnitude, which can found relations distinct by the nature of the thing from the relation of identity. He calls these relations "of the same account" in each extreme, which the Logicians call equiparantiae (equivalent relations); otherwise than the relations of origin: for these are of a different account in each extreme, and are called by the Logicians relations of disquiparation (disparity).

960. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. 5, cap. 15.

Finally, he notes in the cited Quodlibet, article 2, section "Secondly it is objected," and says therefore, that these relations are posterior to the relations of origin, so that the extremes, namely the persons, are first distinct; for the persons are first distinguished by origins, or by opposed relations.

Caput II - These relations are only of reason; the more probable opinion, proved in various ways

The common and much more probable view is to be embraced, which affirms that these relations in God are only of reason. Thus affirm, with St. Thomas in this article, Cajetan, Canariensis, and more recent Thomists, Durandus in I, dist. 31, question 1, Capreolus, question 1, on the first conclusion 3; Marsilius on I, dist. 33, art. 1, conclusion 1 and notation 8; I omit Gabriel in the same distinction, question 1, who seems to incline to this view. The Nominalists indeed scarcely seem to admit relations of reason, just as neither distinctions of reason: but they think that all relations and distinctions of this sort are located in names. Add that, although one of these relations were real in God, nevertheless there would not be so many relations to be distinguished among themselves by the nature of the thing in the same way as was said about the attributes and the essence in Disputation 116: because only the relation of identity founded on the unity of substance would seem to be posited in God; but the relation of likeness and of equality would not be distinguished from this.

Yet this view is wont to be confirmed in various ways by the Doctors, and so in this chapter we shall survey the reasons of others, so that at length in the following we may bring our own reason, and also set forth some other noteworthy points. Therefore Durandus, in the cited question, num. 4, relates the reasoning of certain persons in this way: The relation of identity, which is founded on the unity of substance, is in creatures only of reason; although the relation of equality and of quantity is real: but all these relations, translated to God, are relations of identity, since in God there is no quality nor quantity: therefore in God these relations are of reason. Yet I for my part do not know why the relation of identity in creatures is of reason, whereas the relations of equality and likeness are real. For if identity is a relation of reason because unity in substance is by reason, so also unity in quality and quantity is by reason: for two qualities and quantities, really diverse in themselves, are united by reason, and are said to be one quality so as to make a like, and one quantity so as to make an equal.

The second reason is that of Henry in Quodlibet 5, q. 1, which Scotus reports in the place cited; it only proves that equality and likeness in God are not real relations, because in God there is not quality according to the thing, but only according to our mode of understanding: this reason, however, does not prove about the relation of identity, since this is founded upon substance, which according to the thing is in God.

The third reason is that of Durandus in the cited question, num. 9, which is as follows: These relations in God are founded upon substance: but the substance of God does not require plurality insofar as it is substance, but according to the origins in the persons: therefore, according to itself,

it cannot be the foundation of a real relation, which requires a plurality of correlatives. This reason, however, does not sufficiently prove why the plurality of persons in the same nature does not sufficiently constitute the extremes of a real relation: for certainly there are persons who are said to be equal and like.

Fourth, some prove thus, because they think that not only must the extremes be distinguished in a real relation, but also the foundations of the relations; here, however, although the extremes are distinguished, the foundations nevertheless are not distinguished. However, although some foundations of relations ought to be distinguished, this is not necessary universally. For the relations of the second genus, which are said to be founded upon an action present, past, or future, do not have distinct foundations, but paternity and filiation in human beings are founded in the same generation: for in that generation I think these relations are founded, not in potency reduced to act; and this is more consonant with the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, ch. 15. I grant that in the relations which he calls of the first genus, namely, equality, likeness, and identity, the foundations are always distinguished: yet that happens for another reason, not because they are foundations, as we shall see in the following chapter.

The fifth and last reason is that of Canariensis, who asserts that these relations in God cannot be real by reason of the essence, because it is one, and excludes a real relation toward itself; nor by reason of the relations...

By reason of the persons, because the persons are really distinguished by the relations of origin, and one relation cannot be the foundation and cause of another real relation. Wherefore this author would concede that these relations in God would be real, if the persons were not distinguished by relations, but by absolute properties. For thus they could found real relations of equality and similarity, because then that obstacle which he alleged would not stand. Accordingly he concedes that, if in diverse men there were the same whiteness, there would also be a real relation of similarity; because the persons who would be referred would not be constituted and distinguished by relations, as the divine persons are.

The foregoing opinion is confirmed by a most apt reason.

But the extremes, according to the opinion of all, ought to differ really; whereas the foundations of the relations which are called of the first genus, namely of equality, similarity, identity, are first referred; for quantity is first said to be equal to another, quality similar to another, substance the same as another: therefore these foundations themselves likewise ought to be distinguished, in order that the relation be real. And since the divine persons are said to be equal, similar, and, in the account of that which they have in common, of the same number of nature, it follows that the aforesaid relations are not real but of reason.

And from this foundation the chief arguments for the first opinion of Scotus which were adduced are solved; indeed also the various reasons which the Doctors who favored our opinion brought forward can be refuted, especially that of Canariensis lately mentioned. For although the divine persons be constituted by absolute properties, nevertheless the aforesaid relations would not be real, because the foundations which are first referred would not be really distinguished, since

the divine nature would be one. Likewise, if in two created subjects there were one and the same whiteness, the relation of similarity would not be real, because there would be a single foundation, and hence the primary extremes of the relation would not be distinguished. Therefore it matters little that the persons in the divinity are constituted by relations, so that we should say that they cannot be referred by a real relation of similarity, quality, and identity.[961]

But in very truth, if Scotus's opinion concerning the distinction of the divine attributes among themselves and from the essence were true, it would follow that there are in God more real relations than are commonly enumerated. For in God there would be as many relations of equality as there are distinct magnitudes; but as many magnitudes would by nature be distinct as there are attributes. This he himself freely admits on I Sentences, dist. 31, question 1, as to the third, in the solution of the second. Wherefore he would not refuse to concede more than twenty real relations, which Canariensis in the fourth part of his commentary on this article strives to elicit against him. Yet all these things are frivolous and against the common doctrine of the Scholastics, who concede only four real relations in God.[962][961]

Opposition against the foregoing reason.

It is answered from the doctrine of St. Thomas in this article in the solution to the fourth, that no relation can be the foundation of another relation, especially of that which is first referred: otherwise there would be a process to infinity, which can be proved in this way. Just as there cannot be another action of one action, because an action is not that which is made, but an act and a way by which something is made: and just as there is not another habit of one having or habit, because a habit is, as it were, an act and a way between the haves and the thing had, and therefore the very habit by which we have a garment is not itself had: so also there cannot be another relation of one relation, because a relation is, as it were, an act and a way by which one relative is referred to another - something which I judge to be so true, that neither by the intellect can there be distinguished an action of an action, a habit of another habit, and a relation of another relation; for the intellect, standing between the act and the thing of which it is the act, cannot conceive another act.

But someone will still object: just as the persons of the Father and the Son, once constituted by their relative properties, yet receive another relation of spirator, why can they not receive another relation of diversity and distinction?

I answer that the case is different. For the persons of the Father and the Son receive the relation of spiration, not by the mediation of another constituting relation, nor are the constituting relations referred by that relation of spirator, nor are they the foundations of it; rather, the foundation and, as it were, the cause of that relation is origin. Now that which is first referred by that relation is a person, not a personal relation: but a person, even constituted by relation, can be referred first by another relation, because it can have two active origins. But if the relation of diversity were so founded first on a personal relation, that the personal relation itself were first

961. Canariensis, on I, q. 42, a. 1.
962. Scotus, Quodlibet VI, art. 2; and on I Sent., dist. 31, prima opinio prima.
961. Canariensis, on I, q. 42, a. 1.

referred, this is impossible; because the foundations of these relations are first referred, as by the reasoning of Cajetan has been shown. It would also follow, as St. Thomas said, a regress to infinity, because a relation of another relation would be required.[963][963]

But again someone may say that a regress to infinity does not follow; because, although the relation of paternity and filiation be referred by another relation of diversity, which is of another genus, nevertheless the relation of diversity could not be referred by another relation, because it would be of the same species and in the same subject, and thus the same in number. Yet altogether the same would follow concerning this relation of diversity as concerning the others. For although it would be in the same subject, nevertheless, because it would not have the same foundation nor the same terminus, but a different one, as is clear; nor the same proximate subject, because it would proximally refer that relation which previously referred the substance, at least this relation would be posterior in number, different from the prior; and so of the others.

Finally, from the same principle of the holy Doctor there is gathered an excellent reason why there is no motion to relation, just as there is to action and to habit; because relation has itself after the manner of a certain middle act between the relative and the terminus, as having is between the haver and the thing had, informing between form and matter; and since action too is a middle act between the agent and the effect, it follows that one cannot conceive as the terminus of the agent's act another act, which is relation, but rather that the terminus be conceived as a certain thing which does not have the character of act. Therefore neither in the predicament of habit can there be motion, nor in the predicament of posture (situs), because this too is signified after the mode of act, as to lie, to sit.

Corollaries of this controversy.

The doctrine is that of Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 9, which St. Thomas followed above, I, q. 4, art. 3, ad 4, and in the Contra Gentiles I, cap. 29, and Ferrarensis in the same place.[964][963] For, as St. Thomas noted in the aforesaid places, likeness is found in one way in those things which are of another order, and in another way in those which are of the same. For those things which are of the same order, as two white things, are said to be mutually similar; because this kind of likeness is nothing other than equality or unity in quality; and therefore the Father and the Son are said to be mutually similar, because they are of the same nature of the same order; cause also and effect, which are univocal, are said to be mutually similar. But among those things which are of another order, as between effects and causes of a different account, and equivocal things, since there is not a nature of the same account, for that reason they are not said to be mutually similar; but effects are said to be similar to causes, although they are of an inferior nature. For effects in a certain way imitate the cause and strive to be made like to it. By the same reason the image of Caesar is said to be similar to Caesar, not conversely: therefore in like manner a creature, which is an effect of God of an inferior order, is said to be similar to God, because in some way it imitates

963. Cajetan, on I, q. 42, a. 1.
963. Cajetan, on I, q. 42, a. 1.
964. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 9.
963. Cajetan, on I, q. 42, a. 1.

His perfections, but God is not said to be similar to a creature. The Son indeed among created things is said to be similar to the father in two ways: by reason of nature, because he has the same nature with him according to species; and by reason of the individual properties by which he imitates the father, by reason of which he is said to have been made to his image.

However, although these things are so, sometimes Scripture says that none is like to God: for it speaks of the likeness which is between those which share the same nature and quality.

Another thing to be noted concerning the same solution to the third is that St. Thomas teaches that the Son is said to be equalled and assimilated to the Father, but not the Father to the Son; and, finally, that every person proceeding is said to be assimilated to Him from whom he proceeds, not conversely. In this sense St. John Chrysostom seems to have spoken on that text in Hebrews 1: "Who being the brightness..." where he asserts that the Son is equal to the Father, yet not the Father to the Son; and St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana I, cap. 2, when he says: in the Father unity, and in the Son equality; for thus he ascribes equality to the Son alone; Chrysostom also understands the Son after the manner of a way.[965][966]

St. Thomas gives the reason, because these words seem to signify motion: for one is said to be assimilated or equalled to another whenever he becomes like by the very production received in himself, which, as it were, tends to the likeness of the producer; and since the Son by His production, as it were, tends to the likeness of the Father, He is said to be assimilated; but the Father, because He does not tend, nor is, as it were, on the way, since He is not produced, is not said to be equalled to, or assimilated by, the Son. Scotus agrees on I Sentences, dist. 19, q. 1, ad tertium, and gives the same reason: because to equal and to assimilate signifies the action of the one assimilating and equalling; but to be assimilated and to be equalled signifies a passion. And since the Son is produced, not producing, while the Father produces, not being produced, therefore it is said that the Father equals and assimilates the Son to Himself, but the Son is equalled and is assimilated to the Father. Capreolus, however, in I Sentences, dist. 19, question 2, in the last article against Aureolus's argument, judges these two reasons wholly different; yet he concludes with St. Thomas, that these words do not so much signify an action as a certain tendency or way toward likeness, which befits the person who is produced; while the other expressions befit the producer. Bonaventure likewise proves the same in I, dist. 19, part 2.

Articulus II - Whether a person proceeding is coeternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a person proceeding is not coeternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. Arius assigns twelve modes of generation. The first mode is according to an efflux, where the equality of simplicity is lacking. The second mode is according to the emission of rays from the sun, where equality of nature is lacking. The third mode is according to a character or impression from a seal, where consubstantiality and the power of efficiency are

965. St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on Hebrews 1.
966. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, lib. 1, cap. 2.

lacking. The fourth mode is according to an infusion of good will from God, where too consubstantiality is lacking. The fifth mode is, according to the going forth of an accident from a substance; but to an accident subsistence is lacking. The sixth mode is, according to the abstraction of a species from matter; although sense receives a species from a sensible thing, nevertheless here equality of spiritual simplicity is lacking. The seventh mode is, according to the excitation of will by thought, which excitation is temporal. The eighth mode is...

It is objected that a person proceeding is not coeternal with his principle, as the Son with the Father. Arius assigns modes of generation. The first mode is according to the flux of a line from a point, where equality of simplicity is lacking. The second mode is according to the emission of rays from the sun, where equality of nature is lacking. The third mode is according to a character or impression from a seal, where consubstantiality and sufficiency of power are lacking. The fourth mode is according to the emission of good will from God, where likewise consubstantiality is lacking. The fifth mode is according to the going forth of an accident from a substance; but an accident lacks subsistence. The sixth mode is according to the abstraction of a species from matter: just as sense receives a species from the sensible thing; where equality of spiritual simplicity is lacking. The seventh mode is according to the excitation of will by thought, and this excitation is temporal. The eighth mode is according to transfiguration, as an image is made out of bronze; which is material. The ninth mode is motion from a mover, and here too effect and cause are posited. The tenth mode is according to the eduction of species from a genus. This does not befit the divine things, because father is not predicated of the son as genus of species. The eleventh mode is according to ideation: as an external ark from that which is in the mind. The twelfth mode is according to being born: as a man is from a father. Where there is a before and an after according to time. Therefore it is clear that in every mode according to which something is from another, either equality of nature, or equality of duration, is lacking. If therefore the Son is from the Father, one must say either that he is lesser than the Father, or posterior, or both.

1. Moreover, whatever is from another has a beginning; but nothing eternal has a beginning. Therefore the Son is not eternal, nor the Holy Spirit.
2. Moreover, whatever is corrupted definitively ceases to be; therefore whatever is generated begins to be. For this it is generated, that it may be. But the Son is begotten of the Father. Therefore he begins to be and is not coeternal with the Father.
3. Moreover, if the Son is begotten of the Father, either he is always being begotten, or some instant of his generation must be given. If he is always being begotten (but while something is in generation, it is imperfect; for it is in successions, which are always in a state of becoming, as time and motion are), it follows that the Son is always imperfect. Which is altogether unfitting. Therefore some instant of the Son's generation must be given. Before that instant, the Son was not; therefore he is not coeternal.

But on the contrary: Athanasius says that all three persons are coeternal with one another, "not made, nor created, but begotten."[967]

I answer: It must be said that the Son is coeternal with the Father. For the understanding of which one must consider that something exists from its principle posterior to its principle in two ways: in one way on the part of the agent; in another way on the part of the action.

On the part of the agent indeed, one way in voluntary agents, another in natural agents. In voluntary agents, because of the choice of time. For just as it is in the power of a voluntary agent to choose the form that it will confer upon the effect, as was said above, so too it is in his power to choose the time in which he produces the effect. But in natural agents this happens because some agent does not from the beginning have the perfection of natural power for acting, but it comes to it after some time; as a man cannot generate from the beginning

On the part of the action however there is an impediment for that which is from a principle to be simultaneous with its principle, because the action is successive. Hence, granted that some agent begins to act with such an action as soon as it exists, nevertheless the effect would not exist at once in the same instant, but in the instant to which the action is terminated

But it is manifest according to the foregoing that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and again that the nature of the Father was perfect from eternity; and again that the action by which the Father produces the Son is not successive: because thus the Son of God would be generated successively, and his generation would be material and with motion, which is impossible. It remains therefore that the Son existed whenever the Father existed. And thus the Son is coeternal with the Father, and similarly the Holy Spirit with both.

Reply to the first: As Augustine says in the book On the Words of the Lord, Sermon 38, no mode of procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence it is necessary to collect a likeness from many modes: so that what is lacking in one may in some manner be supplied from another. And on this account it is said in the Synod of Ephesus: "Let the coexisting, ever-coeternal Son to the Father be declared to you by 'splendor'; let 'Word' show the impassibility of the nativity; let the name 'Son' insinuate the consubstantiality of the Son."[969][970] Among all, however, the procession of the word from the intellect represents most expressly. Yet this is not posterior to that from which it proceeds, unless there be such an intellect as goes out from potency into act; which cannot be said in God.

Reply to the second: Eternity excludes a beginning of duration, but not a beginning of origin.

Reply to the third: Every corruption is a certain change. And therefore everything that is corrupted begins not to be and ceases to be. But the divine generation is not a transmutation, as was said above. Hence the Son is always being begotten, and the Father always begets.

Reply to the fourth: In time, one thing is indivisible, namely the instant, and another is that which is duration, namely time. But in eternity the "now" itself is indivisible and ever-standing, as was said above.[971] But the generation of the Son is not in a now of time or in time, but in eternity.

967. Athanasius, in his symbol of faith.

969. St. Augustine, De verbis Domini, serm. 38.

970. Synod of Ephesus: "Coexistere semper coeternum patri filium, splendor tibi denuntiet; impassibilitatem nativitatis ostendat verbum; consubstantialitatem filii, nomen insinuet."

971. St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 4.

And therefore, to signify the presence and permanence of eternity, it can be said, as Origen said, that he is "ever being born"; but (as Gregory and Augustine say) it is better that it be said "ever born": that "ever" may designate the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the begotten. Thus therefore the Son is not imperfect, nor was there a time when he was not, as Arius said.[972]

Conclusion affirming, and without controversy among Catholics, defined by the Church in the very same places in which against Arius the consubstantiality of the Son was defined, about which we spoke at greater length in Disputation 109.

Articulus III - Whether in the divine persons there is an order of nature

Third, it is proceeded thus. It seems that in the divine persons there is not an order of nature. For whatever is in the divine things is either essence, or person, or notion. But order of nature does not signify the essence, nor is it any one of the persons or of the notions. Therefore order of nature is not in the divine things.

1. Moreover, in whatever things there is an order of nature, one is prior to another, at least according to nature and intellect: but in the divine persons there is nothing prior and posterior, as Athanasius says. Therefore in the divine persons there is not an order of nature.[973]
2. Moreover, whatever is ordered is distinguished; but nature in the divine things is not distinguished. Therefore it is not ordered; therefore there is no order of nature there.
3. Moreover, the divine nature is the same as the essence. But in the divine things an order of essence is not said. Therefore neither an order of nature.

But on the contrary: Wherever there is a plurality without order, there is confusion; but in the divine persons there is not confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore there is order there.

I answer: Order is always said through a comparison to some principle. Hence just as "principle" is said in many ways, namely, according to position, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to the individual causes; so too is "order" said. But in the divine things "principle" is said according to origin without priority, as was said above. Hence there must be there an order according to origin without priority. And this is called "order of nature" according to Augustine: not that the one be prior to the other, but that the one be from the other.[974][975][976]

Reply to the first: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in common, not however in particular.

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972. Hom. in e... ad amed. tom. 3; St. Augustine on Psalm 2, "Hodie genui te," tom. 8; St. Gregory, Moralia, lib. 19, c. r. (as clustered in the margin).
973. Athanasius, as cited above.
974. St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 3, ad 3.
975. Ex l. 4 super Gen., c. 34 et 35, 10, 3 (as cited).
976. Ex oratio de quinque haeresibus, a med., tom. 7 (as cited).

Reply to the second: In created things also, when that which is from a principle is coeval with its principle according to duration, nevertheless the principle is prior according to nature and intellect, if one considers that which is the principle. But if the relations themselves of cause and caused, and of principle and principiate, are considered, it is manifest that relatives are simultaneous by nature and intellect, insofar as the one is in the definition of the other. But in the divine things the relations themselves are subsistent persons in one nature. Whence neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part of the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even according to nature and intellect.

Reply to the third: It is called order of nature, not because the nature itself is ordered, but because order in the divine persons is attended according to natural origin.

Reply to the fourth: "Nature" in a certain manner imports the notion of a principle, but "essence" does not. And therefore the order of origin is better named "order of nature" than "order of essence."

Conclusion of the article, and explanation: The conclusion of the article is: in the divine things there is an order of nature without priority. For whose explanation it is to be noted from St. Thomas in the solution to the third and from Cajetan on this article, that the question is not whether among the divine persons there is an order of nature, as if the divine nature itself were that which is ordered; but whether there is an order of nature, that is, a natural order, or not. It is called rather an order of nature than of essence; as St. Thomas in the reply to the fourth teaches, because "nature" in a certain way denotes origin, not however "essence": but order in the divine things is according to origin. I, however, understand here the order of nature, that is, real and from the nature of the thing, which St. Thomas calls "natural," which is not fittingly explained by the efficient notion: for "natura" among the Latins rather means "birth" than "essence." But concerning this order and priority we shall speak in the following disputation.

Disputatio CLXVII - Whether among the divine persons there is an order of prior and posterior according to reality

What the Scholastics hold. Caput I. That among the divine persons there is not only order, but that one is prior according to reality by origin to another, the more probable opinion teaches. Caput 2.

Caput I - What the Scholastics hold

The present controversy is not whether the essential predicates in God are prior to the notional ones; for of these it has been said often that they are indeed prior in our consideration, just as the common are prior to the particular, as animal to man; for that is prior which can be understood without another. Nor is the question whether some person, at least not expressly related to others, can be thought by us prior in reason to the others; of this indeed we spoke in Disputation 159, especially in chapter 5. St. Thomas plainly admits in q. 40, a. 4 that something can indeed be

understood first, although in this article he says that there is order among the persons without priority. But the difficulty is about the persons mutually related in act; whether among them there is some order natural and real with priority. I will therefore in this chapter report the opinions of the Scholastics; and in the next I will set forth my own judgment.

All indeed the Scholastics admit that among the persons mutually and their relations there is a natural and real order. For, as Durandus says in I, dist. 20, q. 1, order is the habitude of many to one first; with whom St. Bonaventure agrees in I, dist. 2, and in the First Question, and so too in the Third. But in the divine persons, even mutually related in act, there is a real habitude to one first; and a real habitude to one first, or to one principle; for one is said to be relatively to another; therefore among the others there is a natural and real order. Cameracensis (Augustine of Ancona) defines order in this way... (text to be continued).

Caput II - Whether among the divine persons there is not only order, but that one is prior in reality according to origin

St. Thomas in this article and St. Bonaventure in the places cited, especially in Question 1 and 2, in the body and to the first, do indeed concede a real order, which they call according to nature, but without a before and after. To these Durandus agrees in the place cited, adding that this order is between first, second, and third (for by his very definition first and second in an order cannot be denied), yet that this order is not between prior and posterior. He therefore concedes what others would not deny, namely a first, a second, and a third person; but not a prior and a posterior; because in the divine things there is nothing before or after, according to Athanasius in the Creed. [977]

Second opinion, that there is priority of origin according to the thing. Scotus, in II, distinction 1, question 1, everywhere calls the Father prior in origin to the Son, and both prior to the Holy Spirit. And in I, distinction 10, question 1, toward the end, he grants a priority of origin among the persons, and that one can be understood before another in origin. But in those places he is speaking of a prior according to our intellect by reason of origin; because the person from whom another proceeds can be conceived before the one proceeding, not conversely. Now, however, the question is not about prior and posterior in our consideration, even by reason of origin; but about prior and posterior according to the thing among the persons, even as mutually related in act. Our consideration indeed merely conceives one person before another, before it understands it as related; for it could not conceive one as related before another, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Moreover, the same Scotus in I, distinction 28, question 3, § Ad quaestionem istam, and in Quodlibet 4, article 1 and 9, maintains, against arguments to the contrary, that the Father and the Son, even as they are mutually referred in act, have between them an order of prior and posterior according to origin. Which kind of prior and posterior, he says, is real, not according to reason, nor according to nature; because relatives are together by nature and by intellect. As to intellect, this is quite manifest; as to nature, it is clear from Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 16 and chapter 11, where

977. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 20, q. 2; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 2, art. 2, q. 1 - 2; Athanasian Creed.

he says that is prior by nature which can be without the posterior; as, in creatures, the cause is prior to the effect. He proves, moreover, that among relatives there is not a prior by nature nor by intellect. First, by reason that Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, chapter 7, text 15, says that the more perfect are prior, and thus he establishes a certain genus of prior according to perfection; and one correlate can be more perfect than another, even under the ratio of a correlate; therefore also prior. But this can happen only in relatives that are of diverse ratio, such as in the divine the Father and the Son, which logicians call non-equiparant correlatives (relata disquiparantiae). Yet this reason does not prove that among the divine persons there can be this kind of prior, since one cannot be said more perfect than another, even as correlatives. It does prove, however, that there is no repugnance for there to be among relatives in general something prior and posterior in reality. Wherefore it is not surprising if in the divine also, under another ratio, a prior and a posterior be assigned.

Next, he confirms the same, because, as he himself says, simultaneity, which is opposed to one kind of priority, can co-exist with another to which it is not opposed: now to be together in intellect and in nature is not opposed to what is prior according to origin; therefore one person can be together in intellect and in nature with another, and prior in origin to it. The opinion of Scotus pleases the Canarian in this article, although he says it is against St. Thomas, or at least that it differs from him only in name. Cajetan also admits that Scotus in reality agrees with St. Thomas; but, he says, let him hold the opinion and restrain his tongue: because, when he concedes prior and posterior in the divine according to the thing, he seems to assert that one is older than another.[978]

Inter divinas personas non solum esse ordinem, sed unam priorem secundum rem origine, quam aliam, probabilior sententia docet.

Although the present controversy is not of things but of words, and concerns the mode of speaking that St. Thomas and others have followed, which is not without great probability; nevertheless, the way of speaking and the sentence of Scotus seem to me to be asserted and proved in this chapter, in so far as he affirms that among the divine persons one is, according to the thing, prior in origin to another; which I think I can gather both from the ratio of prior and posterior, and from the manner of speaking of the holy Fathers.

It is proved first from the Fathers. Epiphanius, whom St. Thomas cites at length in the Opuscule Contra errores Graecorum, cap. 2, and Gregory Nazianzen, whom he adduces in cap. 9, assert that the Son is a mean between the Father and the Holy Spirit; which mode of speaking Basil also preserved. Basil, Against Eunomius, book 3, at the beginning, concedes a first, second, and third person in the Trinity in dignity and in origin; and from him John the Theologian took it up in the Council of Florence, session 20, past the middle.[979] But someone will say that Durandus does not deny first, second, and third in the divine persons according to a natural and real order; but only a

978. John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1; In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1; In I Sent., d. 28, q. 3, § Ad quaestionem istam; Quodlibet IV, a. 1, 9; Cajetan, In S. Thomae I, q. 42, a. 3 - 4, ad loc.

979. Epiphanius, as cited by St. Thomas, Opusc. Contra errores Graecorum, c. 2; Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 9; Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 3 (init.); idem, Contra Eunomium, lib. 1 (fine); Council of Florence, sess. 20; Author of De triplici habitaculo apud Augustine, c. 6; St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, c. 14. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, c. 7, text 15; VI, text 16; XI.

prior and posterior according to that same order. Yet from this we shall at once, by an easy reason, collect that there is a prior and a posterior; it must be observed, however, in the meantime, that when Basil calls the Father first in dignity, he does not so name him because he is more perfect and of greater dignity, but because he has the authority of the first principle.

More clearly, however, the same Basil establishes our sentence in book 1 against Eunomius, far toward the end, where, treating of the order of origin between the cause and that which is from the cause, he says thus: "For in these things we say the cause is prior, and posterior that which is from it, not by interval but" - not as if they were mutually separated by intervals of duration, but in our thought, when we first understand the cause of causes. Since therefore such a position obtains, to deny order in those things wherein there is a before and after is not to deny our positing, but a certain natural consequence. And after many things he explains that statement, John 10: "The Father is greater than I," of the prior according to origin, so that he is called greater because he is prior, inasmuch as he is cause, as the Greeks speak: for thus some of the Fathers, even the Latins, by the name of greater and less, understand in the divine a prior and posterior according to origin; whom we reported in Disputation 122, cap. 3. Basil therefore affirms that among the divine persons there is a before and after, not by our positing, but by a natural consequence; which is tantamount to a natural and real order: for if it were only an order of reason, it would indeed be by our positing. Nor does it stand in the way that he a little before said, "but in our thought, when we first understand the cause of causes": for he said this only to show that the cause and the caused are not separated by any interval of duration, but by our thought; this, however, does not hinder that there be also a prior not only by thought, but also by a natural and real order.

In the same way Gregory Nazianzen is to be understood, in the Oration on the Dogma and Constitution of Bishops, which is Oration 9, at number 13, where he says: "Thus the Father's essence concurs with the generation of the Only-begotten, who indeed is from him, yet not after him, or at least only by the ratio of principle:" for he does not mean that the Son is after the Father by our consideration alone, but by the consideration of principle alone; that is, not posterior in duration (about which he had spoken much earlier there), but by the ratio of principle, namely in that way by which what is from a principle is said to be posterior to the principle itself. The author also of the book De triplici habitaculo, apud Augustine, cap. 6, near the end of the book, says: "The Father does not precede the Son in time, but in origin." Therefore, since Augustine himself, Contra Maximinum, book 3, cap. 14, thus writes: "For it was fitting that the Begotten be sent by the Begetter, not the Begetter by him whom he begot; but this is not an inequality of substance, but an order of nature, not whereby one would be prior to the other, but whereby one would be from the other"; and Athanasius in the Creed, when he says, "In this Trinity nothing is before or after," plainly speak of a prior and posterior according to duration. For these are what are commonly signified when one says absolutely "before" and "after"; but when we add "according to origin" or "according to the natural order and consequence," as Basil said, it is not necessary to understand this priority of duration.

Second, I prove this sentence by reason; for in the Trinity it cannot be denied that there is a first, a second, and a third person, not only by the numbering of our intellect, but from the nature of the thing, according to a real order. For the first is in such wise the Father, and the second the Son, and the third the Holy Spirit, that it cannot be otherwise: but if it were only by the numbering of the intellect, the Holy Spirit could be called first, the Father second, and the Son third; for the one who counts can as well begin from this unity as from that, and can end in this as in that. From this very order of first, second, and third - besides the testimonies of the saints alleged - the very definition of order shows it. For order is the habitude of many to one first, as Durandus says; or to one principle, as St. Thomas said: but "one principle" and "one first" seem to be the same; for every principle is first in some order, from which the rest [are]; but in the divine there is a real and natural order, as all the Schoolmen admit, and that John the Theologian above mentioned; therefore from the nature of the thing there is a first, second, and third person. For if "first," "second," and "third" were only by the numbering intellect, there would not be order among them according to nature, but according to our intellect.

Add also that up to now no one has denied that in the Trinity there is a first, a second, and a third person: indeed we commonly speak thus. And we always call the Father the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Spirit the third, and not otherwise. But if first, second, and third among the persons were only according to number, this one would not be more first than that one, as we just said; rather, in every order every first is prior to the second, and the second posterior to the first, and so with the rest. Therefore, in the real order of the Trinity the first person will be prior to the second, and the second will be posterior according to reality; for whatever is first in its order is prior to the second.

Moreover, that this kind of prior and posterior may be better understood, first the doctrine of Aristotle must be recalled to mind, in Metaphysics V, chapter 11, where he assigns several modes of the prior: the first is according to nearness of place; the second is according to time; the third is according to motion, according to which those things are called prior which are nearer to the mover, as the boy to the man; the fourth is according to potency, for that which surpasses others in potency and is stronger is said to be prior to the rest; the fifth is according to order of place. From these things it is evident - especially that third mode - that the Son seems, as it were, nearer to the Father as mover than the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds from him first, which seems to be a mode of the prior according to origin. But because Aristotle seems to have understood nearness according to the duration of the moving principle, this mode of the prior does not square with the divine persons unless that imperfection of nearness according to duration is removed. For if nearness of origin alone be considered, the Son seems nearer to the Father, because from him he emanates in origin sooner than the Holy Spirit, who by the nature of his own origin presupposes the Son as already produced, that he may proceed from both. The sixth mode of the prior is according to reason, and these are the universals, and the singulars according to sense, and those which according to their nature can exist without others. From these it follows, in my judgment, that things which are really distinguished must not only be said to have an order of prior and posterior according to reason, but also according to reality and nature, as cause and effect: for

things that differ only by reason cannot have an order except that of reason, just as they do not have plurality except by reason, as are animal and man; for animal is prior to man, because it can exist without man; and, in general, that from which the consequence of reciprocation does not hold, as the same Aristotle noted in the Categories, the chapter On the Modes of the Prior.[980] But this order and mode of the prior according to reason is assigned among the common predicates in divine matters, both essential and personal; among the persons, however, as related, it cannot be, because relata are known together. It remains, therefore, that in another mode - which Aristotle did not know nor number - the prior and the posterior among related persons must be assigned, namely according to origin, which can be among those things which are together in nature and in cognition, although not all relata are together in nature. Moreover, this order can be reduced to the fifth which we numbered from Aristotle, with the imperfections removed, as was explained, so that he is called prior by origin - even under the relative concept - who is from no other, and posterior, who is from another. And from these points any arguments that can be brought to the contrary are solved.

Then it must be noted that, even if there be among the persons an order of prior and posterior according to reality, as was explained, still it is not lawful absolutely to call one person prior to another, unless with the addition, "according to origin." For when we do not add "according to origin," but speak absolutely, in that we say one person is absolutely prior according to reality than another, we seem to signify some priority of duration, which cannot agree to the divine persons; but with that addition we do not signify that. And indeed with that addition St. Thomas would not deny this mode of speaking.

Disputatio CLXVIII - Whether opposed origins, distinct according to reality, have among themselves an order of prior and posterior

Caput I - The opinions of St. Bonaventure and Durandus

It seemed that concerning the origins there remained difficulty in excess; for from the things said about the order of the persons one could easily judge what should be said about the order of the origins. But because some have thought variously, a special disputation had to be instituted.

First opinion. St. Bonaventure therefore, on the First Book, distinction 12, question 4, teaches that the procession of the Word is prior according to the intellect to the procession of the Holy Spirit; whence also it follows that one origin is prior to another according to the intellect.[981] For where there is order, there is a before and an after, as we said in the preceding disputation, chapter 2. Yet in question 2 he denies that one origin is by nature prior to another; and whether there be an

980. Aristotle, Categories, ch. On the Modes of the Prior; Metaphysics V, c. 11.
981. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 12, q. 4; cf. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 12, q. 1; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4.

order according to nature he does not determine. Perhaps he would also grant this order without a "prior" and a "posterior," just as among the persons he granted it in the preceding disputation, chapter 1.

Second opinion. Durandus indeed, on the First Book, distinction 12, question 1, mentions this opinion of Bonaventure, which posits order among the origins, and he confirms it in this way: the Holy Spirit proceeds per se from the Son; therefore the procession per se presupposes the generation of the Son, from whom he proceeds; and so the procession per se presupposes generation. But he disapproves this mode. For Aristotle, in the First Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, chapter 4, teaches that the same thing does not belong per se and according to what the thing is in a different way; but to "breathe forth" (spirare) does not belong to the Son according to that he is Son; therefore to breathe forth does not belong per se to the begotten, and consequently the procession of the Holy Spirit does not per se presuppose generation. Wherefore, in number 8 of that question, he himself asserts that between generation and procession there is indeed an order of origin natural, that is, according to reality, as among the persons; yet that it is not per se, but per accidens.

For the explanation of which, it must first be noted that no action depends upon another action or has an order per se with it, unless because the terminus of the preceding is per se the principle of the subsequent. Now the preceding action can be compared to the subsequent in a twofold way. In one way, so that it produces a terminus which is per se the principle of the following, as the prior calefaction produces heat which is per se the principle of the following calefaction. In another way, so that the preceding action produces a terminus which is per accidens conjoined to the principle of the following action, as refrigerating and the disgregation of sight stand; for refrigerating per se tends to cold, which is per accidens conjoined to whiteness, which disgregates sight. Next he notes that the preceding action remains conjoined to the terminus whenever the terminus depends upon the agent both for its coming-to-be and for its conservation.

From these two notes Durandus gathers this reasoning: whenever the preceding action produces such a terminus as, precisely as it is such, and per se, is the principle of the following, those two actions have a per se order, such as can be among actions; for one action has no order with another, just as neither does one depend upon another, except by reason of the terminus produced. But when the preceding action only produces a terminus that is per accidens conjoined to the principle of the following, and the preceding action does not remain with the following, for a twofold reason they have among themselves an order per accidens, both because the terminus is per accidens conjoined to the principle, and because the preceding action does not remain. Now, however, in the divine things the origins have among themselves only in one respect an order per accidens, because the first produces a terminus to which it happens to be the principle of the following, since to the Son, precisely as he is Son, it does not belong to breathe forth, although, precisely as he is Son, he is the terminus of generation.

Not less per se is there a real order of prior and posterior among the origins than among the persons: this is the truer opinion.

Caput II - The author's thesis

The position to be embraced is the one which affirms that among the passive origins there is a real order of prior and posterior, no less per se than among the persons. For the reasoning of Durandus is frivolous, as will presently be clear. The Schoolmen do not expressly hand down this opinion; yet in my judgment they presuppose it as a known point - not, indeed, as regards the notion of the prior and the posterior (for about this the controversy is the same concerning the origins as it was concerning the persons), but as regards the natural and real order per se. About "prior" and "posterior" nothing need be said now; but this thesis ought to be proved in the same way as in the preceding disputation that about the persons was proved. About the order itself per se, what we said above can easily be confirmed in this way.

It is proved. A per se order between two actions can be considered in a twofold way. In one way, because the preceding action produces a terminus according to that notion to which it belongs per se to be the principle of the subsequent: and thus the preceding calefaction and the subsequent are per se ordered, because the preceding produces heat which is per se the cause of the subsequent calefaction; and the generation of a son among men and of a grandson who is generated by the son have a per se order: indeed, even refrigerating and the disgregation of sight are ordered in the same way at least remotely, because refrigerating tends to cold, which is per se the cause of whiteness, which then disgregates sight. In another way, when the prior action is terminated at a cause to which the following action is essentially subjected; for which reason philosophers call the causes essentially subordinated to the generation of a man universal causes, and the man (namely, the generator); but the other men who have preceded the generator - grandfather, great-grandfather, and the rest - are called causes per accidens of the subsequent generation. Now the procession of the Holy Spirit in the divine things has a per se order with generation in both ways: both because generation is terminated in the Son, to whom it belongs per se to breathe forth; and also because these processions are essentially ordered among themselves, that is, in the way in which philosophers call causes subordinate, one procession following upon the other. But that the Son per se breathes forth is manifest; for although to filiation - which Durandus falsely thought to be the formal terminus of generation - it does not belong to breathe forth, yet to the person of the Son, who is per se the terminus produced, it does belong to breathe forth, and he is truly said to breathe forth "insofar as he is Son," not because filiation breathes forth - that the particle "insofar as" (inquantum), or "according to that" (secundum quod ipsum), or "per se," does not signify - but because such a characteristic property is produced that he has the fecundity of breathing forth. For he has this by the force of his origin, which takes the nature that is the formal terminus of generation, as was said in disputation 162, chapter 3, thus determined by a property that by its very nature he breathes forth. Therefore, although it cannot be said, "the Son breathes forth by that by which he is Son," we nevertheless say, "he breathes forth according as he is Son," or "insofar as he is Son," which is the same as if we should say, "the Son per se breathes forth, not per accidens." The

difference between the particles "insofar as" (inquantum), "in a certain respect" (secundum quid), and "per se," and the particle "by that by which" (eo) we assigned above in the annotations to article 6, question 39.

Lastly, it must be observed that although among persons actually related there is a real and natural order and a priority according to origin, nevertheless one is not prior to another according to reason, as was noted above; among the passive origins, however, not only is one prior to another by a real and natural order, but also by reason, as St. Bonaventure taught, because the passive origins are not mutually related, namely, to be generated and to be spirated; and thus also by the intellect we conceive prior "to be generated" than "to be spirated," although we do not understand the Father as related prior to our understanding the Son.

Articulus IV - Whether the Son is equal to the Father according to magnitude

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in magnitude.

For he himself says in John 14: "The Father is greater than I." And the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15: "The Son himself will be subject to him who put all things under him."

Further, paternity pertains to the dignity of the Father; but paternity does not belong to the Son; therefore not whatever dignity the Father has does the Son have. Therefore he is not equal to the Father in magnitude.

Further, wherever there is a whole and a part, several parts are something greater than only one or fewer, as three men are something greater than two or than one. But in the divine things there seems to be a universal whole and a part. For under relation or notion several notions are contained; therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, but in the Son only two, it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father.

But on the contrary:

But on the contrary: It is said Philippians 2: "He did not deem it plunder to be equal to God."[982]

I answer that it is necessary to say that the Son is equal to the Father in magnitude. For the magnitude of God is nothing other than the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very notion of paternity and filiation that the son, by generation, arrive at having the perfection of the nature that is in the father, just as the father has it. But because in men generation is a certain transmutation of what goes forth from potency into act, a man who is a son is not from the beginning equal to the begetting father, but is led to equality by due increase - unless it happen otherwise on account of a defect of the principle of generation. It is, however, manifest from the things said that in the divine there is properly and truly paternity and filiation. Nor can it be said that the power of God the Father was defective in begetting, nor that the Son of God came to perfection successively and by transmutation. Hence it is necessary to say that from eternity He was equal to the Father in magnitude. Whence also St. Hilary says in the book De Synodis: "Take

982. Philippians 2.

away the infirmities of bodies, take away the beginning of conceptions, take away sorrows and every human necessity: every son, according to the nature of his nativity, is the equality of the father; for he is also the likeness of nature."[983]

Reply to the first: Those words are understood to be said of Christ according to the human nature, in which He is less than the Father and subject to Him. But according to the divinity He is equal to the Father; and this is what St. Athanasius says: "He is equal to the Father according to the divinity, less than the Father according to the humanity."[984] But according to St. Hilary, in the ninth book On the Trinity, "by the authority of the giver the Father is greater, yet He is not less to whom it is given to be." And in the book De Synodis he says that "the subjection of the Son is a natural piety, that is, a recognition of the paternal authority." The subjection, however, of the rest is a weakness of creatureliness.[985]

Reply to the second: Equality is considered according to magnitude. But magnitude in the divine signifies the perfection of nature (as has been said), and pertains to the essence. And therefore in the divine equality and likeness are considered according to what is essential; nor can inequality or dissimilarity be asserted according to the distinction of relations. Whence St. Augustine says against Maximinus: "The question of origin is, of what is from what; but the question of equality is, of what sort or how great it is."[986] Therefore paternity is the Father's dignity, just as is the Father's essence. For dignity is absolute and pertains to the essence. Accordingly, as the same essence which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so it is truly said that whatever dignity the Father has, the Son has. Nor does it follow, "the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity." For something is changed into the mode of "toward another." For the essence and dignity of the Father and of the Son are the same; but in the Father they are according to the relation of giving, in the Son according to the relation of receiving.

Reply to the third: Relation in the divine is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of like relations; because all the relations are one according to essence and existence, which is repugnant to the notion of a universal, whose parts are distinguished according to existence. And similarly the person (as was said above) is not a universal in the divine. Whence neither are all the relations something greater than only one, nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature is in each of the persons.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative, concerning which nothing need be noted besides those things which we have said about the relations of equality and likeness among the persons in Disputation 169.

983. St. Hilary, De Synodis.
984. St. Athanasius, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, c. 18 (tom. 6).
985. St. Hilary, De Trinitate IX; De Synodis.
986. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum.

Articulus V - Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely

It is objected first that the Son is not in the Father, and conversely. For the Philosopher in Physics IV sets down eight modes of something's being in something; and according to none of these is the Son in the Father, or conversely, as is clear to one running through the several modes. Therefore the Son is not in the Father, nor conversely.[987]

1. Further, nothing which has gone forth from another is in it; but the Son from eternity went forth from the Father, according to Micah 5: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
2. Further, one of opposites is not in the other. But the Son and the Father are opposed relatively. Therefore the one cannot be in the other.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 14: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me."

I answer that in the Father and the Son there are three things to consider, namely the essence, relation, and origin; and according to each of these the Son is in the Father, and conversely. For according to the essence the Father is in the Son, because the Father is His essence, and communicates His essence to the Son not by any transmutation of Himself. Whence it follows that, since the essence of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son. And likewise, since the Son is His essence, it follows that He is in the Father, in whom His essence is. And this is what St. Hilary says in the fifth book On the Trinity: "His nature (so to speak) the immutable God, begetting the immutable God subsistent, follows. Therefore we understand the nature of God to be in Him, since in God God is within."[988] Likewise, according to the relations, it is manifest that one of relatives is in the other according to the intellect. Also according to origin it is manifest that the procession of the intelligible word is not something outside, but remains in the one speaking. That also which is said by the word is contained in the word. And the same reason holds of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the first: The things that are in creatures do not sufficiently represent the things that are of God. And therefore according to none of those modes which the Philosopher enumerates is the Son in the Father, or conversely. Yet that mode according to which something is said to be in its originating principle comes nearer to this - except that in created things there is lacking the unity of essence between the principle and that which is from the principle.

Reply to the second: The going forth of the Son from the Father is according to the mode of an interior procession, as a word goes forth from the heart and remains in it. Hence this going forth in the divine is according to the mere distinction of relations, not according to any essential distance.

Reply to the third: The Father and the Son are opposed according to relations, not however according to essence; and yet one of relatives is in the other, as has been said.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative, and of faith. John 14: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me."

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987. Aristotle, Physics IV.
988. St. Hilary, De Trinitate V.

By what ratio one person is said to be in another. Disputation 169.

One person is not in another according to the whole, holds Henricus. Caput I.

One person is wholly in another, and conversely, is a probable opinion. Caput II.

Disputatio CLXIX - By what ratio one person is said to be in another

Caput I - The sense of the doubt; Henricus; the first opinion

No Scholastic denies that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son, and in the same way that one person is in another, since in John 14 it is said, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me." But whether truly one person is in another according to the whole self, or according to some part of itself, is a matter of controversy among the Scholastics. Henricus in his Summa, as is reported by Scotus on the First Book, distinction 19, question 4, article 2, and question 5, on the first point, judges that one person is not in another according to the whole self, but according to something of itself, that is, according to the essence; to which Durandus seems to consent on the First Book, distinction 19, question 3.[989] For the explanation of whose opinion Henricus notes that something is in another in two ways: first, according to the whole self, as wine is in a jar; then according to a part which is not common to both, as a bird is said to be in a snare according to its feet, which are parts of that bird; in another way, according to something which is common to both, as if there were a monster (he says) having two heads, and two bodies to which only two feet served, one of these animals would be in the other according to a part common to both. Thus therefore he says that one divine person is in another not according to the whole self; for then it would be according to essence and according to relation; and thus not only would the essence be in the Son but also paternity, which seems absurd, because thus the Son would be Father and the Father Son; but according to something of itself, namely according to the essence which is common to both. He then confirms this by the following reason: it is impossible that one, according to the whole self, seem to be contained in another, and then, in turn, that that should be shown to be also according to the whole self; therefore neither can one divine person be in another according to the whole self, and conversely, but only according to something of itself. This opinion Scotus refutes in that question.[990]

Then he (Scotus) attacks Henricus better in this way. When something is in another by reason of a part, it is not in it in any other way than by reason of that part; for example, if a part of one thing is in another as in a place, the whole will be said to be in it by the same reason. If therefore one person is said to be in another by reason of essence only, that is, because only the essence of that person is in the other, one person will not be in another in any other way than essence itself;

989. Henricus of Ghent, Summa; Scotus, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, art. 2; q. 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 3.
990. Scotus, loc. cit.

but essence is said to be in the person as that person's nature, and not by circumincession (as it is wont to be said); therefore one person will not be in another by circumincession. Then also the same person would be said to be in itself.

One person wholly to be in another, and conversely, is a probable opinion.

We prove the opinion of Scotus, which Cajetan and the Canarian without doubt follow in this article, and St. Bonaventure seems to consent on the First Book, distinction 19, question 4, and Gabriel, question 2, article 1, and Capreolus, question 1; and others of the third (order), and the Ferrariense; and the Fourth book Contra Gentes, chapter 9, at the beginning; and also the Master on the First, question 2, article 2, seem to say that one whole person is in another by circumincession, so that not only the one essence be in the other - although the essence be in the other thus as common essence - but that also one person be said to be in the other person.[991] It is proved first from St. Hilary, who in the seventh book On the Trinity, near the end, thus speaks: "To be in Himself before He is in another, as body in body - not so, but to be as subsisting, as a subsistent in a subsistent, as living as it is, as He Himself subsists." In which words, while explaining the mode in which one person is said to be in another, he has expressed our very sentences. For since persons primarily contain their being, and are in another person as a subsistent in a subsistent, it follows that they are in it according to the whole self. Then the series of praises given by the Church in the hymn of St. Ambrose declares this: "In the Father the Son is whole, and whole everywhere the Father." For he who is in another according to something is not said to be whole in another. In this sense Scotus notes the ordering of the sentence, that something of them agrees in one of two ways: either according to the whole self, or according to a part; according to a part, as for example when the eye is healed, the man is said to be healed by that part first, since the part ...[992]

Durandus rightly meets this reason in the place cited; for he says that the relation which Scotus alleges is not of the same notion in either extreme: in one person there is a relation as of the contained, in the other a relation as of the containing, although each relation be found in one person with respect to the other. Yet from the relation of container and contained, on which Scotus seems to argue, he does not rightly infer what he contends.

Then he attacks Henricus better in this way. When something is in another by reason of a part, it is not in it otherwise than that part is: for instance, if a part of one thing is in another as in a place, the whole will for the same reason be said to be in it. If therefore one person is said to be in another by reason of the essence only, that is, because the essence alone of that person is in the other, one person will be in the other in no other way than the essence itself is: but the essence is said to be in the person as its nature, and not by circumincession, as it is said; therefore one person will not be in another by circumincession. Then too the same person would be said to be in itself.

That one whole person is in another, and conversely, is the more probable opinion.

991. Cajetan and the Canarian (on this article); St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4; Gabriel, q. 2, art. 1; Capreolus, q. 1; Ferrariense; St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 9 (at the beginning); the Master, In I, q. 2, art. 2.

992. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII; Ambrose (Ambrosian hymn): "In Patre totus Filius, et totus ubique Pater."

The opinion of Scotus is proved by many, and without doubt it is followed by Cajetan and the Canarian in this article, and St. Bonaventure seems to consent in I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, as do Gabriel in q. 2, art. 1, and Capreolus in q. 1.[993] Ferrariense also on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 9 at the beginning, and Marsilius on I, q. 22, art. 2, hold that the whole one person is in another by circumincession, so that not only is the essence of one said to be in another, although the mode of existing be only the common essence, but also that one person is said to be in another.[994]

It is proved first from St. Hilary, who in De Trinitate VII near the end speaks thus: "To be in another is not as a body is in a body, but to be and to subsist so that, subsisting, it be in the subsisting; for to be in the 'to be' is that it itself subsist." In these words, by explaining the mode in which one person is said to be in another, he expressed our very opinion. For since it belongs first to the person to subsist, and it is in another person as subsisting in the subsisting, it follows that it is there according to itself wholly.[995]

Then the Church sings in the Ambrosian hymn at Lauds on Monday: "In the Father the whole Son, and the whole Father in the Word." But one who is in another according to something is not said to be wholly in another.[996]

In confirmation of this opinion Scotus notes that something agrees to a whole in one of two ways: either according to the whole self, or according to a part. According to a part, as when the eye is healed, the man is also said to be healed; yet in the first instance this agrees to the part, and by reason of it to the whole. Aristotle mentions this in Physics, book I, chapter 1. But that agrees to something according to the whole self which does not agree first to a part, as it agrees to a triangle, according to the whole self, first to have three angles equal to two right angles. In the same way, to be in something agrees to something in these two modes: either according to the whole self, because the whole is in another; or according to a part, or according to something of itself, because something of itself is in another; and so it agrees first to the part to be in another. But the whole Father is in the Son, and conversely, and each person whole is in the other; therefore this mode of existing does not agree to the persons according to something of themselves. That the whole Father is in the Son, besides the sayings of the Saints which we have alleged, is confirmed by the common way of speaking; for the person as subsisting exists in another as subsisting; but to subsist belongs first to the whole; therefore also to exist in this mode.

Yet Scotus, Cajetan, and the others who follow the latter opinion concede the reason and foundation on account of which one person exists in another to be the common essence, the three persons, however, being connoted; so that this mode of existing does not agree first to the essence (as in Henricus's example, to be caught in a snare agrees first to the feet of the animal, and by reason of them to the whole), but so that it agrees first to the whole supposit, while the foundation is the common essence. By which Henricus seems to have been deceived so as to follow the earlier

993. Cajetan and the Canarian (on this article); St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4; Gabriel, q. 2, art. 1; Capreolus, q. 1.

994. Ferrariense, on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 9 (at the beginning); Marsilius, on I, q. 22, art. 2.

995. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII (near the end).

996. Ambrosian hymn: "In Patre totus Filius, et totus in verbo Pater."

opinion. Rightly therefore did St. Bonaventure say in the place cited, that to exist in this way by circumincession is thus denoted by unity with distinction, that the unity is undivided and the distinction without confusion. When therefore Henricus argues against this opinion that the relation of the Father is in the Son, if the Father is, according to the whole self, in the Son, it must be conceded in such wise that the mode of existing of paternity in the Son is not as of an inhering form, but as of one subsisting with the Father in the subsisting Son, which is called the mode of circumincession.

Nor is it against this that St. Thomas taught in this article, when he said that one person is in another also by reason of relation. For, as Cajetan very well noted, the holy Doctor did not wish to say that one person is in another by reason of relation in that mode of circumincession; for the sole reason of this is the essence, as we have explained; but as one correlate is in another, to wit, in concept and intellection. Wherefore Durandus and Scotus labor in vain when they try to impugn this doctrine. And what St. Thomas also said, namely that one person is in another by reason of an immanent operation, is excellently defended by Cajetan against the Author's arguments, which are of no moment.

But someone will ask whether there is a different foundation for the relation by which one person is said to be in another and to be contained by it, and for the relation of that person who is said to contain and in whom the other is. Durandus judges that the reason and foundation on account of which one person is said to contain another is the person according to the whole that is in it, that is, according to property and essence together; but that the foundation on account of which one person is said to be in another is the essence alone: because that which contains is compared to that which is contained as exceeding it. Nor is this surprising in Durandus's opinion, who with Henricus thinks that one person is in another according to something of itself, but is contained by the other as a whole. However, I deem it truer that the very same thing is the foundation, namely the common essence, with the persons connoted; and that it is at once the foundation of a diverse relation in distinct persons, namely of the containing and of that which is contained; which respects nevertheless agree first to the whole person, not to the essence. This foundation of circumincession Hilary seems to have explained in De Trinitate II near the end, with these words: "For the Father to remain in the Son is not [the property] of one who is solitary or unique," as if to say, this mode of existing denotes plurality.[997]

Finally note that this relation is not real, but by everyone's judgment of reason. First indeed, if it agreed first to the essence, as the prior opinion seems to assert, it would not be real, just as neither is the relation of similarity and equality real; then also even if it agrees first to the persons, because still it agrees to them insofar as they are distinct and are distinguished by real relations, and one real relation cannot be referred to another real relation, as was said in Disputation 166, chapter 4, it cannot be real, but only of reason; by which we wish to signify nothing else according to the thing than one absolute essence in three persons. We use, however, names of relation, because it is proper to us in this life almost to know all things relatively.

997. St. Hilary, De Trinitate II (near the end): "Manere in Filio Patrem non est singularis aut unici," etc.

Articulus VI - Whether the Son is equal to the Father according to power

The text proceeds thus. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father according to power. For it is said in John 5: "The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he sees the Father doing." But the Father can do of himself. Therefore the Father is greater than the Son according to power.

1. Moreover, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son, according to John 14: "As the Father has given me commandment, so do I." The Father also teaches the Son, according to John 5: "The Father loves the Son, and shows him all things that he himself does." Likewise the Son hears, according to John 5: "As I hear, so I judge." Therefore the Father is of greater power than the Son.
2. Moreover, it pertains to the omnipotence of the Father that he can beget a Son equal to himself. For St. Augustine says in Contra Maximinum: "If he could not beget an equal to himself, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as was shown above. Therefore not everything that pertains to the omnipotence of the Father can the Son do; and thus he is not equal to him in power.[998]

But on the contrary is what is said in John 5: "What things soever the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner."

I answer that it is necessary to say that the Son is equal to the Father in power. For the power of acting follows upon the perfection of nature. We see indeed in creatures that the more someone has a more perfect nature, the greater is his strength in acting. Now it has been shown above that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness, that is, in the perfection of nature. Whence it remains that the Son is equal to the Father in power. And the same reason holds of the Holy Spirit with respect to each.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in this which is said, "The Son cannot do anything of himself," there is not taken away from the Son any power which the Father has, since there is immediately subjoined, "What things soever the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner"; but it is shown that the Son has power from the Father, from whom he has nature. Whence St. Hilary says in De Trinitate IX: "Such is the unity of the divine nature, that the Son so perfectly acts what he does not act from himself."[999]

To the second it must be said that in the showing of the Father and the hearing of the Son nothing is understood unless that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as also essence. And to the same can the command of the Father be referred, in that from eternity he gave to him knowledge and will of the things to be done in generating. Or rather it is to be referred to Christ according to the human nature.

998. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, cap. 7.
999. St. Hilary, De Trinitate IX.

To the third it must be said that just as the same essence which in the Father is paternity is in the Son filiation, so the same is the power by which the Father begets and by which the Son is begotten. Whence it is manifest that whatever the Father can, the Son can; yet it does not follow that he can beget, but the quid is changed into an ad aliquid. For generation signifies a relation in the divine things. The Son therefore has the same power as the Father, but with another relation: because the Father has it as giving. And this is signified when it is said that he can generate. But the Son has it as receiving. And this is signified when it is said that he can be generated.

The conclusion is affirmative, about which we have already disputed sufficiently above in Disputation 169 on this article.

Quaestio XLIII - On the Mission of the divine persons

Then it must be considered about the mission of the divine persons. Concerning this eight things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether it befits any divine person to be sent

First, it seems that it does not befit the divine persons to be sent.

1. One who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.[1000]
2. Further, whatever is sent is separated from the sender. Hence St. Jerome says on Ezekiel that what is conjoined and coupled in one body cannot be sent; but in the divine persons nothing is separable, as St. Hilary says; therefore one person is not sent by another.[1001]
3. Further, whoever is sent departs from one place and goes anew to another place. But this does not befit a divine person, since a divine person is everywhere. Therefore it does not befit a divine person to be sent.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 8: "I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me."

I answer: In the notion of mission two things are imported. One is the relation of the one sent to the one by whom he is sent. Another is the relation of the one sent to the term to which he is sent. By the fact that someone is sent there is shown a certain procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command, as a lord sends a servant; or according to counsel, as a counselor may be said to send a king to wage war; or according to origin, as when it is said that a flower is emitted by a tree. There is also shown a relation to the term to which he is sent, so that he begins in some way to be there: either because previously he was in no way there to which he is sent; or because he begins there to be in some way in which previously he was not. Therefore the mission of a divine person can befit, insofar as on the one hand it imports a procession of origin

1000. The objection presupposes the common axiom that the one sent is subject to or less than the sender; cf. the scholastic loci ad 1 q. 15, art. 1, and related places.

1001. St. Jerome, Commentarius in Ezechielem; St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII.

from the sender; and insofar as on the other hand it imports a new mode of existing in another. Thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as he began to be in the world by the assumed flesh; and yet beforehand he was in the world, as is said in John 1.

Reply to the first: Mission does import a kind of diminution in the one who is sent, insofar as it imports a procession from a principle that sends, whether according to command or according to counsel; for one who commands is greater, and one who counsels is wiser. But in divine things it imports only a procession of origin, which is according to equality, as was said above.

Reply to the second: That which is sent in such a way as to begin to be where previously it in no way was, is by its mission moved locally. Whence it must be that it is separated by place from the sender. But this does not happen in the mission of a divine person, because the divine person sent, just as he does not begin to be where previously he was not, so neither does he cease to be where he was. Whence such a mission is without separation, but has only a distinction of origin.

Reply to the third: That objection proceeds from a mission which is according to local motion, which has no place in divine things.

Conclusion: Mission can befit some divine person, insofar as on the one hand it denotes a procession of origin from the sender; and on the other hand a new mode of existing somewhere, which is called being sent. From this conclusion we shall easily gather the mind of the holy Doctor, which, together with others, we shall examine at length in the following disputation.

What the mission of a divine person is.

Disputatio CLXX - Various opinions of the Scholastics

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

Once the nature and definition of mission has been unfolded, the remaining points which St. Thomas disputes in this question will be easily illustrated; for when the true definition of the thing is unknown, the other things which follow from it must needs be unknown. But concerning the nature of mission the Scholastics are of various opinions.

First opinion. The Master (in I Sent., dist. 15), when speaking of the donation by which the Holy Spirit is given, says it is nothing other than an operation of God outside himself concerning the creatures; and he seems to feel the same about mission; for since he teaches that any person can be given by any other, thus also he thinks that any person can be sent by any other and by himself. Yet he adds, on the authority of St. Augustine, that nowhere is it read that the Father was sent by another person or by himself; but he assigns no reason for this. Indeed Augustine himself, who in De Trinitate II, c. 5 teaches that the Son is given by himself and is sent by the Holy Spirit, never renders a reason why the Holy Spirit is not said to send the Father, or why the Father does not send himself. However, in De Trinitate IV, c. 20 he contends to adduce some reason, as we shall say below. For my part I do not doubt that, according to this opinion of the Master, it follows plainly

that the Father is sent by himself: for if mission is nothing other than an operation outside God, according to which a person begins in a new way to be, or to appear, in the creature, then indeed, if the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, I do not see why also the Father could not be sent by him.

Second opinion. St. Bonaventure (in I Sent., distinct., part I, questions 3 and 4), while in that place defending the opinion of the Master, affirms that for mission it is not necessary that there be authority in the sender with respect to the one sent, but only the procession of the person sent, and the manifestation of him in time. He says moreover that procession absolutely is necessary - not indeed a procession from the person who sends, but from whatever other. Wherefore, he says, a person proceeding can be sent by himself or by any other, if he is manifested by himself or by any other; and since the Father proceeds from none, even if he be manifested by himself or by another person, he is neither sent by himself nor by another person. He proves this from Augustine, De Trinitate IV, c. 20, about the middle, where he speaks thus: just as "to be begotten" is to the Son "to be from the Father," so "to be sent" is to the Son "to be known to be from him"; and he subjoins almost the same words about the Holy Spirit. Now the principle of this, namely that the Son be known to be begotten of the Father, is whatever person of the Trinity; therefore whatever person has the character of sender, and consequently, according to Augustine's opinion, mission will be a temporal manifestation by which one person is known to proceed from another. According to which doctrine he says in De Trinitate II, c. 15 that the Son was sent into the world by the Holy Spirit when he assumed flesh. He proves it from that of Matthew 1: "She was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit."

To this opinion St. Thomas seems to give assent in article eight of this question, when he concedes that one person can in some manner be sent by whatever other, when mission is taken only for the temporal effect, not for the eternal procession of one from another. But he embraces it in express words himself in I Sent., dist. 15, q. 3, a. 1. Scotus does so in I Sent., dist. 14, questions 1 and 4; Gabriel in question 1; and Marsilius in I, question 18, articles 1, 2, 3, and 4.[1002] The reason, moreover, can be proved thus: A person is said to be sent only in time, not from eternity; therefore mission is only temporal, not the eternal procession. But the whole Trinity is the cause of any temporal effect whatsoever; therefore also of the mission of each person.

Third opinion. That of Cajetan on this article, and of the Ferrarian on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 23, who teach that "mission" can be used in a twofold way: strictly and properly for the eternal procession connoting a new mode of existing in creatures; and also in a broader signification for mere temporal manifestation. In the former way only the person proceeding can be sent by that one from whom he eternally proceeds; in the latter way anyone can be sent by anyone else, as the Canarian admits in his commentary on article 8 of this question: thus they think that the Son, when he assumed flesh, was sent by the Holy Spirit. He proves this moreover from the Council of Toledo I, in the confession of faith, where it is said: "Nevertheless the Son is to be believed to be sent not only by the Father, but also by the Holy Spirit," in that which is said by the prophet, "And now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit."[1003]

1002. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 15, q. 3, a. 1; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 14, qq. 1, 4; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., q. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, In I, q. 18, arts. 1 - 4.

Caput II - That mission is only the eternal procession connoting a temporal effect; this is the truer opinion

So that all the things handed down in Scripture and the Fathers about the mission of the divine persons may more easily stand together, if we say that mission is taken only in that first way which Cajetan posited - though if it were nothing other than that, this would suffice for us to judge that opinion to be much more probable than the rest - indeed not only does this confirm it, but also the manifest reason which we shall set forth in this chapter. Therefore the truer opinion is that mission is the eternal procession of a person, with the connotation of some temporal effect by reason of which the person who is sent is said to appear. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in this article, who in this way alone defines mission, declaring that its ratio is a procession from the sender, and that there is no other in divine things than the eternal one.[1004] It is also that of Durandus in I, dist. 15, q. 3. Now the first point is proved by the testimonies of the Fathers, then by reason.

From the Fathers: first, St. Hilary, De Trinitate, col. 13 near the end, explaining that of John 16, "Because I went forth from God; I went forth from the Father; I came into the world," speaks thus: "For he had come into this world from the Father, because he had gone forth from God. For that he might be understood in his going forth to have signified his nativity, he subjoined that he had come from the Father; and since by that he came from the Father, because he had gone forth from God, his going forth is an absolute nativity from God, which paternity in no way less confers upon him on his own behalf." Surely nothing clearer could be said for our opinion.

Second, Pope St. Gregory the Great said the same thing no less clearly in Homily 26 on the Gospels, on those words, "As the living Father has sent me." For there, after he shows that those words can be understood of Christ according to his humanity, so that according to it he would be said to be sent by the Father, he adds: "Although 'to be sent' can also be understood according to the nature of the divinity: for the Son is said to be sent by the Father precisely in that he is begotten by the Father; and likewise the Holy Spirit also - for although he is equal to the Father and the Son, yet he was not incarnate - the Son declares that he himself sends the same, saying, 'When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father.'" For if "to be sent" ought to be understood only of being incarnate, surely the Holy Spirit would by no means be said to be sent, who in no way was incarnate; but his mission is his very procession, by which he proceeds from the Father and the Son.[1005]

Third, Bede, in book 2 of the Homilies, homily 2 (for the first Sunday after the Ascension), used almost the same words: "When the grace of the Holy Spirit is given to men, then assuredly the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and by the Son - by the Son, because he proceeds from the Son, and by the Father, because his mission is his very procession."

1003. Cajetan, on this article; Ferrariense, on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 23; the Canarian, on article 8 of this question; Council of Toledo I, in the confession of faith: "Missus tamen filius non solum a patre, sed ab Spiritu sancto esse credendus est," adducing Isaiah 48:16: "Et nunc Dominus misit me, et spiritus eius."

1004. St. Thomas, in this article, defining mission solely as a procession from the sender, and acknowledging no other in God than the eternal procession.

1005. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, Hom. 26; cf. John 16:28; John 15:26.

Finally, we proved from this in Disputation 147, chapter 2, against the Greeks, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because he is sent by the Son: which, if the very procession were not of the notion of mission, even if only the person proceeding were said to be sent, would not rightly be proved from thence; for a person proceeding could be sent by one other than the one from whom he proceeds. From these testimonies of the Fathers this is certain, that mission is the very eternal procession of the person; but because mission is eternal, yet is in time, St. Thomas, Durandus, and those who follow this opinion rightly added, beyond procession according to nature, some temporal effect connoted by the very name of mission, by which the person begins to appear, and to be in some new manner in the things to which he is said to be sent - which will at once be made clearer.

Moreover, by reason also this foregoing opinion can easily be confirmed, in this way.

First, the notion of mission does not require that he who is sent proceed substantially from someone. Although this is found in all who are sent, nevertheless it is not necessary to the notion of mission: for even if some man were understood to proceed substantially from no one, he could nonetheless be understood to be sent by another by command, and there would be a true mission of him. Therefore, to mission considered universally, it is accidental that the thing sent proceed from someone according to substance.

Second, neither is it of the notion of mission in general that the procession according to substance be from the sender: for there is some mission by one from whom the thing sent does not proceed, as in a mission according to command. Wherefore, when they say that it is of the notion of mission that the thing sent proceed from someone according to substance, as they thus defend that the Father cannot be sent, they assert it without foundation.

Third, it is of the notion of the mission of a divine person that the one who is sent proceed substantially from the sender; nor is it sufficient that he be said to be sent if he proceed from another person rather than from the one by whom he is said to be sent.

Caput III - Corollaries of the preceding opinion

From this opinion, as from a most certain first principle, many points worthy of note, consonant with Scripture and the Fathers, can be deduced.

First, although all the persons are said to come to the creature by reason of a new effect produced in it, according to that of John 14: "We will come to him," nevertheless only the person who proceeds is said to be sent, because only that person is said to go forth. Now going forth is of the essence of mission; and hence it is clear why, as St. Thomas says in article four, the Father is never said to be sent, neither in Scripture nor in the holy Fathers, because he does not proceed.[1006]

Second, it is gathered why mission is said simply to be temporal, as the holy Doctor rightly taught in article two. For although procession is of its nature eternal, nevertheless by this alone the idea of mission is not completed; a temporal effect must also be added on the part of the terminus

1006. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 43, a. 4.

to which. But that something be called temporal, it is enough that something of it be temporal, as Durandus rightly noted on the First Book, distinction 14, question 1, number 7: by contrast, for something to be called eternal, every part of it must be eternal. For if the soul were eternal, and in time were united to the body, the man would be temporal.[1007]

Third, it follows that temporal procession and eternal procession are not two processions, but one and the same, constituted only by a diversity with respect to the effect that the temporal connotes: for the eternal procession is of the essence of the temporal. Thus taught Durandus on that distinction 14, question 2; and, what is marvelous, St. Bonaventure in the same distinction, article 1, question 2, likewise judges that there are not two processions, eternal and temporal, although he himself defines the temporal otherwise than Durandus, lest he seem to teach that something eternal belongs to the essence of the temporal.[1008]

Fourth, from what has been said it follows that one person can be sent without another. For when one proceeding person alone begins to be manifested without the other, that one alone is said to be sent, as the Son in his Incarnation, the Holy Spirit in the dove, and in the figure of tongues, and the like; because in a peculiar manner then one person begins to be in the creature in which the other is not - either by terminating, as in the humanity; or by appearing, as in the dove and other cases. But by the effects of grace, by which the Trinity begins to be in a new mode in the creature, one person is not sent without another; for one without the other does not begin to be in it in a new mode, even as to manifestation. Nevertheless, by the whole Trinity, then at once the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be sent, because, since they are the proceeding persons, and begin in a new mode to be in the creature, nothing is lacking to them whereby they be sent: the Father, however, is not sent, because he goes forth from no one; but together with the Son and the Holy Spirit he is said "to come," according to that of John 14: "We will come to him, and will make our abode with him."

Fifth, it is gathered that the person sent is always distinguished from the sender: for mission ought to be some going forth; but this properly is not except between persons really distinct: therefore the person sent must be distinct from the sender. By the same reasoning one ought to philosophize concerning gift and giving in the Godhead, of which we spoke in disputation 113, on the gift, namely, that what is by its nature a gift (*donum*), that indeed, by its origin, by which it proceeds, ought to be given by another, as we explained there; and therefore, when a person is said to have given himself, about the gift an accidental understanding must be had. Hence, when St. Augustine - adduced by us in the first chapter - said that the Son is given by himself, it must be understood about the gift which is accidentally a gift; but when he says that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, either he speaks of mission not properly, but in a broader signification; or he speaks of the Son according to the humanity. But if there is not speech of mission strictly taken for that which truly is an exit (*exitus*) from someone, I do not see why the Father would not be sent by any person whatsoever, just as the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, when Augustine - cited in the same place - says that there is nothing else for a person to be sent than to be known to

1007. Durandus of St. Pourçain, In I Sent., dist. 14, q. 1, n. 7.
1008. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 14, q. 2; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 14, a. 1, q. 2.

proceed from another, he must be understood in such a way that, together with this temporal effect on the part of the terminus to which, there is also included in the very mission the exit according to origin.

Finally, it is inferred, speaking absolutely, that mission (*missio*) is something notional, just as also giving (*donatio*) and gift (*donum*), which by their nature are gifts, not only divine but also passive. For although mission itself and giving include a temporal effect, which is common to the whole Trinity; nevertheless, insofar as it is conjoined to the eternal origin, and with it constitutes the idea of mission, it is so determined by what is notional that it belongs only to one or the other person, not to the whole Trinity: for mission is the very eternal procession, with a temporal effect connoted; but this, even with the connotation, is not attributed to just any person, as those things which are essential are. Wherefore Durandus, on the First Book, distinction 15, question 2, ought not to have said that in mission there are both an essential and a notional element: for although each taken separately is as he said, nevertheless, taken together they constitute one notional predicate; in which Durandus also rightly said in the same place that the principal element is the temporal effect, not because it directly pertains to the idea of mission, but because the temporal modifies that which is notional, namely origin (*origo*), so that it may have the complete idea of mission; and thus it stands as a difference with respect to a genus.[1009]

Moreover, lest anyone object against the foregoing doctrine: "The person who is sent does not begin to be in a new mode in the creature by the force of his procession, but by reason of the effect which the whole Trinity works; therefore procession according to origin cannot be of the idea of mission," - I answer: the temporal effect is not joined wholly per accidens, nor as it were merely accompanies the origin itself. For just as the person who proceeds from another receives from that person the nature, so also from that person he receives the power according to which he outwardly produces the effect, and by reason of which he begins to be in a new mode in the creature: therefore, since he goes forth from the producing person, and has from that person the operation in the creature, deservedly his origin, with that temporal effect connoted, is called mission.

Again, the foregoing sentence can easily be confirmed also by reason, in this way.

First indeed, the notion of mission (*missio*) does not require that the one who is sent proceed substantially from someone. This, although it be found in all who are sent, nevertheless is not necessary to the notion of mission: for even if a certain man were understood to proceed substantially from no one, he could nonetheless be understood to be sent by another by command, and that would be a true mission of his. It follows, therefore, that to mission, considered universally, it is accidental that the thing sent proceed substantially from someone.

Second, it is not of the general notion of mission that there be a procession according to substance from the sender. For there is a mission from one by whom the thing sent does not proceed, as in mission according to command. Wherefore, when they say that it is of the notion of mission that the thing sent proceed from someone according to substance, so that thus they may defend that the Father cannot be sent, they assert it without foundation.

1009. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 15, q. 2.

Third, it is of the notion of the mission of a divine person that that which is sent proceed substantially from the sender; nor is it sufficient, in order that it be said to be sent, if it proceed from another person than from that by whom it is sent. But procession according to substance is for this sole reason of the notion of mission in the divine, in order that mission be a certain going forth (*exitus*), or issuing forth, as Hilary said; for by no other mode can there be an exit or procession, and consequently no mission. For every mission is an exit and a certain procession of the one who is sent from the sender; and the exit ought to be, as St. Thomas said in the first article, either according to place (as when someone is sent by the sender's command or counsel only), or it ought to be in some other way; and the former kind of exit cannot be in the divine, because no person exits from another according to place, or counsel, or the command of the sender. It remains, therefore, that in another way the person who is sent go forth from the sender; otherwise its mission will not be an exit. But no other mode of going forth can there be than according to origin: therefore it is necessary that the mission of a divine person be an exit from the sender according to origin. Nor is it enough if it go forth substantially from another; for mission is the exit of the sent from the sender, not from another; indeed, an origin from another in no way is essentially included in its notion, as above has been proved. Therefore rightly did Christ in John 16, when he wished to show his mission from the Father, say: "I went forth from the Father, and came into the world: again, I leave the world, and go to the Father." By "I went forth," he denoted the exit and procession which are of the notion of mission; by "I came," he signified the terminus to which mission is made, which, as I said above, ought to be an effect connoted, by which the eternal origin is completed in order that it be mission, and from which also it has that it be temporal: for a bare exit without a terminus to which would not be mission.

- Moreover, the testimonies of the Fathers confirm the same. First, St. Hilary, On the Trinity, column 13, explaining that of John 16, "Because I went forth from God; I went forth from the Father and came into the world," thus speaks: for he declared that he went from the Father into this world, what had gone forth from God. For he signified his birth in the going forth; and he subjoined that he had come from the Father; and since he had come from the Father, because he had gone forth from God, that birth from God is absolute, which afterwards was followed by profession among men. This could be said more surely for our opinion. Second, St. Gregory the Great very clearly said the same in Homily 26 on the Gospels, on those words, "As the Father sent me." There, after he shows that it can be understood of Christ according to the humanity, so that according to that he be said to be sent, he subjoins: "Yet 'to be sent' can also be understood of the nature of divinity; for the Son himself is said to be sent by the Father, in that he is begotten by him; likewise the Holy Spirit, who, although he is equal to the Father and the Son, was not incarnate - himself the Son promised that he would send, saying, 'When the Paraclete shall have come, whom I will send to you from the Father.' For if 'to be sent' ought to be understood only of being made incarnate, in no way would the Holy Spirit be said to be sent; but his sending is the very procession whereby he proceeds from the Father and the Son." Third, the Venerable Bede, Book 2 of Homilies, homily 2, which is for the First Sunday after the Ascension, used almost the same words: "When the

grace of the Holy Spirit is given to men, assuredly the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and by the Son; from the Son he proceeds, and from the Father, because his sending is his very procession." Lastly, from this we proved in disputation 147, chapter 2, against the Greeks, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because he is sent by the Son; which, if procession itself were not of the notion of mission, even though to be sent were proper to a proceeding person, would not rightly be proved from thence: for it could be that a person proceeding from one be sent by another.[1010]

Antonius de Corduba, Book 1, question 41, at the beginning, teaches that the Holy Spirit is never sent without the Son, except by appropriation. He proves it thus: to be sent without the Son cannot belong to the possession of any real relation (as is clear, because relation is not the cause of mission), nor by reason of any peculiar effect (because every effect ad extra is of the whole Trinity); therefore it is said to belong to him only by appropriation, according to which certain effects which are really common are attributed to him, such as the effects of grace. However, this author is mistaken: for although every effect outside God be common to the Trinity, nevertheless the whole Trinity is not said to be sent by reason of that effect, as was said a little above. Moreover, although, by reason of each effect outside God, the whole Trinity be, by essence, presence, and power, in the thing in which it operates, if the opinion is true which asserts that by reason of operation God is intimately present to things; nevertheless, by reason of some effect one person is said to be in a special mode without the other, as the Word in the assumed humanity and the Holy Spirit in the dove; because in these he so appeared and was manifested that the other person was not manifested: therefore for this reason one person is said to be sent without the other.

Articulus II - Whether mission (*missio*) is eternal, or only temporal

To the second it is proceeded thus.

Objection 1. It seems that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says that the Son is sent in that he is begotten; but the generation of the Son is eternal; therefore mission is eternal.

Objection 2. Further, whatever a temporal property befits is changed; but a divine person is not changed. Therefore mission, if it befits the divine person, is not temporal, but eternal.

Objection 3. Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore also mission.

But on the contrary: Galatians 4 says: "When the fullness of time came, God sent his Son."

I answer: In those things which import the origin of the divine persons, a certain difference must be observed. For some, in their signification, import only a relation to a principle, as procession and exit (*exitus*). Others, together with the relation to the principle, determine the terminus of the procession. Of these, some determine an eternal terminus, namely generation and spiration. For generation is the procession of a divine person into the divine nature; and spiration,

1010. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 26; Bede, Homiliae, lib. 2, hom. 2; see also Vazquez, Disputatio 147, c. 2, contra Graecos.

taken passively, imports the procession of love in subsisting. But others, together with the relation to a principle, import a temporal terminus, as mission and giving (*dation*). For something is sent in order that it may be in something; and it is given in order that it may be had. Now for a divine person to be had by some creature, or to be in it by some mode of existing, is something temporal. Whence mission and giving in God are said to be only temporal. But generation and spiration only from eternity. However, procession and exit are said in the divine both eternally and temporally: for the Son proceeded from eternity in order that he might be God; temporally, however, in order that - if man by a visible mission - or likewise in order that he might be in man by an invisible mission.

Reply to the first: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from the Mother; or because from this very fact the Son has that he can be sent, namely that he is begotten from eternity.

Reply to the second: That a divine person be had in some way in, or by, another temporally is not on account of a change in the divine person, but on account of a change in the creature; just as God is said to be Lord temporally on account of a change in the creature.

Reply to the third: Mission does not only import a procession from a principle, but determines a temporal terminus of the procession. Whence mission is only temporal; or, if "mission" include the eternal procession, it adds something, namely a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to his principle is only from eternity; whence a twofold procession is spoken of, eternal namely, and temporal: not because the relation to the principle is thereby duplicated, but the duplication is on the part of the terminus, temporal and eternal.

Conclusion: Mission is said to be only temporal; about which enough has been said above in this disputation.

Articulus III - Whether the invisible mission of a divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*)

It is objected: 1. A divine person to be sent is for that very person to be given. If, therefore, a divine person is sent only according to the gifts of sanctifying grace, the divine person himself will not be given, but only his gifts. But this is the error of those who say that the Holy Spirit is not given, but his gifts are.

1. Further, this preposition "according to" denotes the habitude of some cause; but the divine person is the cause that the gift of sanctifying grace is had, and not conversely, according to that saying of Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us." Therefore it is incongruous to say that a divine person is sent according to the gifts of sanctifying grace.

2. Further, St. Augustine says in the fourth book On the Trinity, chapter 10, in the middle, that the Son, when he is perceived in the mind as something temporal, is said to be sent.[1011] But the Son is known not only through sanctifying grace, but also through grace freely given, as through faith and through knowledge. Therefore a divine person is not sent only according to sanctifying grace.

3. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Spirit was given to the Apostles for the working of miracles. But this is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but of grace freely given. Therefore a divine person is not given only according to sanctifying grace.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the third book On the Trinity, chapter 4, near the end, that the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally to sanctify the creature; but mission is a temporal procession. Since, therefore, the sanctification of the creature is brought about only through sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of a divine person is only through sanctifying grace.[1012]

I answer: It befits a divine person to be sent, in that he exists in something in a new mode; and to be given, in that he is had by someone; but neither of these takes place except according to sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens). For there is a common mode by which God is in all things by essence (*essentia*), power, and presence, as a cause in effects participating its goodness. Over and above this common mode there is a special one, which befits a rational nature: in which God is said to be as the known in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And because by knowing and loving the rational creature by its own operation attains to God himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to be in the rational creature, but also to dwell in it as in his temple. Thus, therefore, no other effect can be the reason why a divine person is in a new mode in a rational creature, except sanctifying grace. Hence it is only according to sanctifying grace that a divine person is sent and proceeds temporally. Likewise, we are said to have only that which we can freely use or enjoy. Now to have the power of enjoying the divine person is only according to sanctifying grace. Yet in the very gift of sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit is had and indwells man. Wherefore the Holy Spirit himself is given and sent.

Reply to the first: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected to this end, that it freely use not only the created gift itself, but that it enjoy the divine person himself. And therefore the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet the divine person himself is given.

Reply to the second: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to have the divine person. And this is signified when it is said that the Holy Spirit is given according to the gift of grace. Yet the very gift of grace is from the Holy Spirit. And this is signified when it is said that the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the third: Although through certain effects the Son can be known by us, nevertheless through no effects does he dwell in us, or is he had by us.

1011. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 4, c. 10, in medio.
1012. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 3, c. 4, circa finem.

Reply to the fourth: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace, as also does the gift of prophecy and any grace freely given (gratia gratis data). Hence 1 Cor. 12: "To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good." Thus the Holy Spirit is said to have been given to the Apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with a manifesting sign. But if only the sign of sanctifying grace were given without the grace, the Holy Spirit would not be said to be given simply, unless perhaps with some determination, as when it is said that the spirit of prophecy or of miracles is given to someone, inasmuch as from the Holy Spirit he has the power of prophesying or of working miracles.

Dubitatio concerning the doctrine of the Article.

The conclusion is affirmative. For the explanation of which Cajetan notes that, besides the eternal origin, a necessary effect or sign belongs to the ratio of mission: to visible mission, indeed, a visible effect or sign; but to invisible mission, an invisible effect or sign.[1013]

He nonetheless doubts whether an invisible mission is brought about solely through the gift of sanctifying grace; and he answers that it is also brought about through the gift of unformed faith, indeed through any thought and love of God whatsoever, on the ground that by these effects in some manner God comes to be in the rational creature. Then he adds that St. Thomas did not deny this: for he only said that God's existence in the rational creature through sanctifying grace pertains to the fourth mode among those by which God is said to be in things; for besides that he is in all things by essence, presence, and power, he is said to be in a fourth mode in the rational creature as in the knower, because he is, as it were, in the temple where he is worshiped: under this mode there is one way through sanctifying grace, another through faith alone.

Durandus favors this opinion in the first book of the Sentences, distinction 14, question, when he says that the Holy Spirit is given with the gifts of grace perfectly; with the gifts of nature, imperfectly; with the gifts of glory, most perfectly.[1014] St. Bonaventure also agrees, Distinction 15, article 2, question 1: for he asserts that the Holy Spirit and the Son are given either simply through the gift of sanctifying grace alone, or in a qualified way through other gifts, because they are given for some use or help.[1015] However, St. Thomas in this article clearly teaches that an invisible mission into the soul is brought about only through sanctifying grace; more clearly above, question 8, article 3, in the body and to the fourth, where he says: "To the fourth it must be said that no perfection superadded to substance makes God to be in something, as an object known and loved, unless grace; therefore it is grace alone that makes a singular mode of God's being in things." He also adds a peculiar other mode not contained under this fourth, namely through the hypostatic union.[1016]

For my part, with St. Thomas it seems one should hold, if we speak absolutely and simply: for it is not customary to say in general that God is, or that he dwells, in the hearts of men, beyond those three modes of existing in things, until a man is just with God; for of the just alone is God said to

1013. Cajetan, on the ratio of mission (ad rationem missionis), ad loc.
1014. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 14, quaest.
1015. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 15, art. 2, quaest. 1.
1016. St. Thomas, in this article; and above, q. 8, a. 3, in corp. and ad 4.

dwell in them. Yet in a qualified sense Cajetan's opinion can be conceded, as St. Bonaventure and Durandus also seem to concede: because in some manner God is in man through faith. And so much on the invisible mission.

Articulus IV - Whether it befits the Father to be sent

It is objected: 1. It seems that it also befits the Father to be sent. For to send a divine person is to give him; but the Father gives himself (since he cannot be had unless he give himself), therefore it can be said that the Father sends himself.

1. Further, a divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us, according to John 14: "To him we will come, and we will make our abode with him." Therefore each of the divine persons is sent.
2. Further, whatever befits one person befits all, except the notions and the persons. But mission does not signify any person, nor any notion either, since there are only five notions, as was said above. Therefore it befits each divine person to be sent.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the second book On the Trinity that the Father alone is never read as sent.[1017]

I answer: Mission in its very notion imports procession from another; and in divine things according to origin, as was said above. Wherefore, since the Father is not from another, in no way does it befit him to be sent, but only the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom it befits to be from another.

The conclusion is negative, about which we have discoursed in the foregoing disputation.

Articulus V - Whether it befits the Son to be sent invisibly

To the fifth it proceeds thus. It seems that it does not befit the Son to be sent invisibly. For the invisible mission of a divine person is considered according to the gifts of grace; but all the gifts of grace pertain to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12: "All these are the work of one and the same Spirit." Therefore invisibly only the Holy Spirit is sent.

1. Further, the mission of a divine person takes place according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts that pertain to perfections of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be had without charity, according to 1 Cor. 13: "If I should have prophecy, and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and should have all faith, so as to move mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing." Since therefore the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, ...

I answer: Therefore, according to the mode of charity the mission of the Holy Spirit is attended to. But the Son is the word, not just any sort, but breathing forth love. Hence St. Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 9: "But the word which we intend to intimate is knowledge with love."[1018]

1017. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 2.

Therefore the Son is not sent according to just any perfection of the intellect, but according to such an institution or instruction of the intellect as bursts forth into an affection of love, as it is said in John 6: "Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me"; and in the Psalm: "In my meditation a fire shall burn." And therefore Augustine says pointedly that the Son is sent when he is known and perceived by someone. Now "perception" signifies a certain experiential knowing; and this is properly called wisdom, as it were a "savory" knowledge, according to Ecclesiasticus 6: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to its name."

Reply to the third: Since mission imports the origin of the person sent, and indwelling through grace (as was said above), if we speak of mission with respect to origin, thus the mission of the Son is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Spirit, just as generation is distinguished from procession. But if we speak with respect to the effect of grace, thus the two missions share in the root of grace; yet they are distinguished in the effects of grace, which are the illumination of the intellect and the inflaming of the affection. And thus it is manifest that one cannot be without the other, because neither exists without sanctifying grace, nor is one person separated from the other.

Conclusion: It is affirmative, about which matter dispute has been held in the same place.

Articulus VI - Whether the invisible mission is made to all who are participants in grace

Objicitur 1. It seems that the invisible mission is not made to all who are participants in grace. For the fathers of the Old Testament were participants in grace. But to them the invisible mission does not seem to have been made. For it is said in John 7: "The Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not made to all who are participants in grace.

Objicitur 2. Further, progress in virtue is only through grace. But the invisible mission does not seem to be attended to according to progress in virtue, because progress in virtue seems continuous, since charity always either advances or declines. And thus mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not made to all participants in grace.

Objicitur 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have grace most fully. But to them mission does not seem to be made, because mission is to something distant. But Christ, inasmuch as he is man, and all the blessed, are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not made to all participants in grace.

Objicitur 4. Further, the sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and yet the invisible mission is not said to be made to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not made to all things that have grace.

But on the contrary: according to St. Augustine, an invisible mission is made for the sanctification of the creature.[1019] But every creature having grace is sanctified. Therefore to every creature of this sort an invisible mission is made.

1018. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 9, in medio.
1019. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 4 (as cited in the article).

I answer: As was said above, mission by its notion imports that the one who is sent either begins to be where previously he was not (as happens in created things), or begins to be where he was before, but in a certain new mode, insofar as mission is attributed to the divine persons. Thus, therefore, in that to which mission is made, two things must be considered, namely the indwelling of grace and a certain renovation through grace. Therefore an invisible mission is made to all in whom these two are found.

Reply to the first: An invisible mission was made to the fathers of the Old Testament. Hence Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 4, that, insofar as the Son is sent invisibly, he is "in men, or with men." But this had been done before in the fathers and prophets. Therefore when it is said, "the Spirit had not yet been given," we understand this of that giving with a visible sign, which was done on the day of Pentecost.[1020]

Reply to the second: Also according to progress in virtue, or increase of grace, an invisible mission is made. Hence Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 4, that then the Son is sent to someone "when he is known and perceived by someone, as much as he can be known and perceived according to the capacity either of a soul advancing toward God or of a rational soul having advanced in God." Yet, nevertheless, the invisible mission is especially attended to according to that increase of grace when someone advances into some new state of grace: for instance, when someone advances into the grace of miracles or of prophecy, or into this, that out of the fervor of charity he exposes himself to martyrdom, or renounces the things he possesses, or undertakes any arduous work.[1020]

Reply to the third: To the blessed an invisible mission was made in the very beginning of beatitude. Afterwards, however, an invisible mission is made to them, not according to an intensifying of grace, but according to the fact that some mysteries are newly revealed to them - and this will be even to the day of judgment. And this increase is attended to according to the extension of grace as it extends itself to more things. But to Christ an invisible mission was made in the beginning of his conception; not, however, afterwards, since from the beginning of his conception he was full of all wisdom and grace.

Reply to the fourth: Grace is in the sacraments of the New Law instrumentally, just as the form of an artifact is in the instruments of an art, according to a certain transitus from the agent into the patient. But mission is not said to be made except with respect to the terminus. Hence the mission of a divine person is not made to the sacraments, but to those who through the sacraments receive grace.

Conclusion: To all who are renewed by sanctifying grace, an invisible mission is made.

Doubt concerning the doctrine of the article.

Concerning the conclusion and the doctrine of the article, there is a difficulty, whether the Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to the just when their grace and justice are increased. St. Thomas, on the second objection, teaches that then the Holy Spirit is not sent, nor when some gift is intensified.

1020. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 4.
1020. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 4.

And it is gathered likewise from the article, where he teaches that mission is then only made when there is a renovation through grace.[1021] Durandus seems to agree in I Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, num. 12: because, in order that some person be sent to someone, he ought to begin to be in him when previously he was not; but when the gifts of grace are increased, a person does not begin to be in a just man, because previously he was in him: therefore then he is not sent to the just man.[1022]

To me the opinion of St. Bonaventure is proved in I Sent., dist. 15, art. 2, q. 3, who asserts that then a person is sent invisibly as often as he begins to be in a creature in a new mode; but he is not sent by reason of an intensification of the habits of grace alone, because then he does not begin to be in a creature in a new mode - just as neither by an intensification of natural endowments is he sent or does he begin to be in a creature in a new mode. But by other gifts of grace, which are conferred for various effects, a person is said to be sent, as to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, not by reason of an increase of the habit of grace, but by reason of other gifts. Both opinions Corduba judges probable, lib. 1, q. 41, at the end.[1023] I add that even then a person is in a special manner sent to the rational creature when, by the power of the sacrament, grace is intensified in him, in which grace is perfected - for that would not be sufficient, as we were saying - but because the same grace is given for a special effect, by reason of which it is called "sacramental," although here this is a certain respect of reason.

Articulus VII - Whether it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly

Objicitur 1. It seems that it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly. For the Son, insofar as he is sent visibly into the world, is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Spirit is never read to be less than the Father. Therefore it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly.

Objicitur 2. Further, a visible mission is attested according to some assumed visible creature, as the mission of the Son according to the flesh. But the Holy Spirit did not assume any visible creature. Hence it cannot be said that in some visible creatures he is otherwise than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as he is also in the sacraments and in all the legal figures. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly; or one would have to say that according to all such things his visible mission is attended to.

Objicitur 3. Further, any visible creature and effect manifests the whole Trinity. Therefore through other visible creatures the Holy Spirit is not more sent than any other person.

Objicitur 4. Further, the Son was sent visibly according to the dignity of a visible creature, namely according to the human nature. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit is sent visibly, he ought to have been sent according to some rational creatures.

1021. St. Thomas, in this article, ad 2.
1022. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, n. 12.
1023. Corduba (González de Alcañiz), Lib. 1, q. 41, in fine.

Objicitur 5. Further, the things that are visibly from God are dispensed by the ministry of angels, as Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 3. If, therefore, certain visible species appeared, this was done through the angels. And thus the angels themselves are sent, and not the Holy Spirit.

Objicitur 6. Further, if the Holy Spirit is sent visibly, this is only to manifest the invisible mission, because invisible things are manifested through visible things. Therefore to those to whom the invisible mission was not made, neither should the visible mission have been made; to all, therefore, to whom the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, was made, the visible mission ought to be made. Which is evidently false. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly.

But on the contrary: it is said in Matthew 3 that the Holy Spirit descended upon the Lord when he was baptized in the form of a dove.

I answer by saying that God provides for all things according to the mode of his universe. But the mode connatural to man is that through visible things he be led by the hand to invisible things, as is clear from the foregoing. And therefore the invisible things of God had to be manifested to man through visible things. Therefore, just as God showed, as it were, to men himself and the eternal processions of the persons through visible creatures according to certain indicators, so it was fitting that even the invisible missions of the divine persons be manifested according to certain visible creatures; yet differently for the Son and for the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit, insofar as he proceeds as love, began to be the gift of sanctification; but the Son, insofar as he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, began to be the author of this sanctification. And therefore the Son was sent visibly as the author of sanctification, but the Holy Spirit as a sign of sanctification.

Reply to the first: The Son assumed, in the unity of person, the visible creature in which he appeared, so that what is said of that creature can be said of the Son of God. And for this reason, by reason of the assumed nature, the Son is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Spirit did not assume a visible creature in which he appeared in the unity of person, so that what belongs to that would be predicated of him. Hence he cannot be said to be less than the Father on account of a visible creature.

Reply to the second: The visible mission of the Holy Spirit is not attended to according to a vision of the imagination, which is a prophetic vision. For, as Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 2, a prophetic vision is not an exhibition to the bodily eyes through bodily forms, but in the spirit through spiritual images and the images of bodies. But that dove and the fire were seen by the eyes of all who saw. Nor again did the Holy Spirit stand in such a relation to those species as the Son to the rock of which it is said, "The rock was Christ."

The seventh proceeds as follows. It seems that it does not befit the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly. For the Son, inasmuch as he was sent visibly into the world, is said to be less than the Father. But it is never read that the Holy Spirit was less than the Father. Therefore it does not befit the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly.

1. Further. A visible mission is attended to according to some assumed visible creature, as the mission of the Son is according to the flesh. But the Holy Spirit did not assume any visible creature. Hence it cannot be said that he is in some visible creatures otherwise than in others, unless perhaps as in wood, as he is also in the sacraments and in all the legal figures. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly; or it must be said that according to all such things his visible mission is attended to.
2. Further. Every visible creature is an effect that manifests the whole Trinity. Therefore, through those visible creatures, the Holy Spirit is not sent more than any other person.
3. Further. The Son was sent visibly according to the most dignified of visible creatures, namely according to human nature. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit is sent visibly, he ought to have been sent according to some rational creatures.
4. Further. The things that are done visibly by divine power are dispensed by the ministry of angels, as St. Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 3. If, therefore, certain visible species appeared, this was done through the angels. And thus the angels themselves are sent, and not the Holy Spirit.[1024]
5. Further. If the Holy Spirit is sent visibly, this is only in order to manifest an invisible mission, since invisible things are manifested through visible. Therefore, for all to whom an invisible mission was not made, neither ought a visible mission to have been made; and for all to whom there was an invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, a visible mission ought to be made. But this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly.

But on the contrary: it is said in Matthew 3 that the Holy Spirit descended upon the Lord when he was baptized in the form of a dove.

I answer that, God provides for all things according to the mode of each. And the connatural mode of man is that he be led by visible things to invisible things (as is clear from what was said above). And therefore the invisible things of God ought to be manifested to man through visible things. Accordingly, just as God himself and the eternal processions of the persons have been in some way shown to men through visible creatures according to certain judgments: so it was fitting that the invisible missions of the divine persons also be manifested through certain visible creatures. Yet the Son and the Holy Spirit were manifested differently. For to the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he proceeds as love, it befits to be the gift of sanctification; but to the Son, inasmuch

1024. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 3.

as he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it befits to be the author of this sanctification. And therefore the Son was sent visibly as the author of sanctification, but the Holy Spirit as the indication of sanctification.

Reply to the first: The Son assumed into the unity of person the visible creature in which he appeared, so that what is said of that creature could be said of the Son of God. And thus, by reason of the assumed nature, the Son is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Spirit did not assume a visible creature in which he appeared in the unity of person, so that what belongs to that would be predicated of him. Hence he cannot be said to be less than the Father on account of a visible creature.

Reply to the second: The visible mission of the Holy Spirit is not attended to according to a vision of the imagination, which is a prophetic vision. For, as St. Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 2, a prophetic vision is not an exhibition to the bodily eyes through bodily forms, but in the spirit through spiritual images and the images of bodies. But that dove and the fire were seen by the eyes of all who saw. Nor again did the Holy Spirit stand in such a relation to those species as the Son to the rock, of which it is said, "The rock was Christ." For that rock already was a creature, and by way of action it was called by the name of Christ whom it signified. But that dove and that fire suddenly came to be only for signifying these things. They seem, however, to be like the flame that appeared in the bush to Moses, and like the pillar which the people followed in the desert, and like the lightnings and thunders which took place when the law was given on the mountain. For the bodily species of those things existed to signify and to foreshow something. Thus, then, it is clear that visible mission is attended to neither according to prophetic visions, which were imaginary and not bodily, nor according to the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, in which certain pre-existing things are assumed for signifying something. But the Holy Spirit is said to be sent visibly inasmuch as he was shown in certain creatures as in signs made specially for this.

Reply to the third: Although the whole Trinity produced those visible creatures, nevertheless they were made to show forth this or that person specially. For, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are signified by diverse names, so too they could be signified by diverse things; although among them there is no separation or diversity.

Reply to the fourth: It had to be shown through the person of the Son - as was said - that he is the author of sanctification. And therefore it was necessary that the visible mission of the Son be made according to a rational nature, whose office it is to act and to which it can befit to be sanctified. But an indication of sanctification could be made through any other creature. Nor was it necessary that the visible creature formed for this be assumed by the Holy Spirit into the unity of person, since it was not assumed for doing something, but only for indicating. And for this reason neither was it necessary that it should last, except so long as it fulfilled its office.

Reply to the fifth: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of angels, not however to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the person of the Holy Spirit. And therefore, because the Holy Spirit was in those visible creatures as the thing signified in a sign, for this reason according to them the Holy Spirit is said to be sent visibly, and not an angel.

Reply to the sixth: It is not of the necessity of invisible mission that it always be manifested by some outward visible sign; but, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to someone unto the utility" of holy Church. And this utility is that by such visible signs faith may be confirmed and propagated. This indeed was done principally through Christ and through the Apostles, according to that of Hebrews 2: "When it had begun to be announced by the Lord and was confirmed to us by those who heard." And therefore a visible mission of the Holy Spirit ought specially to have been made to Christ, to the Apostles, and to certain other first-fruits of the saints, in whom in a way the Church was being founded; yet in such wise that the visible mission made to Christ should show the invisible mission - not then, but made to him at the beginning of his conception. Now a visible mission was made to Christ: in his baptism under the appearance of a dove, which is an animal, to show in Christ the authority of giving grace through spiritual regeneration (whence the voice of the Father thundered, "This is my beloved Son"), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the Only-begotten. In the Transfiguration, however, under the appearance of a bright cloud, to show the abundance of doctrine. Whence it was said, "Hear him." But to the Apostles, under the appearance of breath, to show the power of the ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments. Whence it was said to them: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." But under fiery tongues, to show the office of teaching. Whence it is said that they began to speak with various tongues. But to the fathers of the Old Testament a visible mission of the Holy Spirit ought not to have been made, because first the visible mission of the Son ought to have been perfected rather than that of the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit manifests the Son as the Son the Father. There were, however, visible apparitions of the divine persons made to the fathers of the Old Testament. These missions cannot be called visible missions, because they were not made (according to Augustine) to designate the indwelling of a divine person by grace, but to manifest something else.[1025]

Conclusion. Concerning that dove in which the Holy Spirit was seen, St. Thomas disputes in the Third Part, question 39, article 7, and Canariensis in the commentary on this article, and Durandus in the First Book, distinction 16, question 3, and others; but let us reserve his treatment for that place of the Third Part. This, however, must be certain for all, that a true dove, or a visible effigy of a dove, appeared outwardly; nor did this happen by an imaginary vision alone. The other things which Canariensis notes in this article are very easy.[1026]

Articulus VIII - Whether any divine person is sent except by that from whom he proceeds eternally

The eighth proceeds as follows. It seems that no divine person is sent except by that one from whom he proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 4, the Father is sent by no one because he is from no one. If, therefore, some divine person is sent by another, it must be that he is from that one.[1027]

1025. Augustine, De Trinitate 2. See also 1 Cor. 12; Heb. 2.

1026. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q.39, a.7; Melchior Canus (Canariensis), commentary on this article; Durandus, In Sent. I, dist. 16, q.3.

Further. The sender has authority with respect to the one sent; but with respect to a divine person authority cannot be had except according to origin. Therefore it is necessary that the divine person who is sent be from the person sending.

1. Further. If a divine person can be sent by one from whom he is not, nothing will prevent our saying that the Holy Spirit is given by a man, although he is not from him. But this is against Augustine in De Trinitate. Therefore a divine person is not sent except by the one from whom he is.[1028]

But on the contrary is that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, according to Isaiah 48: "Now the Lord God has sent me, and his Spirit." But the Son is not from the Holy Spirit. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from whom he is not.[1029]

I answer that, concerning this some are found to speak in different ways. For according to some, a divine person is not sent except by him from whom he is eternally. And according to this, when the Son of God is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, this must be referred to the human nature, according to which he was sent to preach by the Holy Spirit. But Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 2, that the Son is sent and also by himself and by the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit too is sent both by himself and by the Son; so that in things divine it does not befit just any person to be sent, but only a person existing from another; yet to send befits any person. Each view has truth in some way: because when a divine person is said to be sent, both the person existing from another is designated and the visible or invisible effect, according to which the mission of the divine person is attended to. If, therefore, the sender is designated as the principle of the person who is sent, then not just any person sends, but only that one to whom it befits to be the principle of that person. And thus the Son is sent only by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. But if the sending person be understood to be the principle of the effect according to which the mission is attended to, then the whole Trinity sends the person sent. Yet not on this account does a man give the Holy Spirit, because he cannot cause even the effect of grace. And by this the solution to the objections is evident.

Quaestio XLIV - On the procession of creatures from God, and on the first cause of all beings

The whole Trinity sends the person sent. Yet not on this account does a man give the Holy Spirit, because he cannot cause even the effect of grace. And by this the solution to the objections is evident.

1027. Augustine, De Trinitate 4.
1028. Augustine, De Trinitate 15.
1029. Isa. 48:16.

Concerning the conclusion and the doctrine of this article, we shall treat in the following disputation. Therefore here nothing else is to be noted, except about the title prefixed to the article: it is not to be read, "Some person," but "No person," as is gathered from the words of the first argument; and the particle "unless" clearly indicates it. Thus far St. Thomas has treated of God in himself, according to the division set forth by us above into questions.

Articulus I - Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God

But on the contrary: It is said in Romans 11: "From him and through him and in him are all things."

I answer that it is necessary to say that every being, which in whatsoever way is, is from God. For if something is found in another by participation, it must be caused in that thing by that to which it belongs essentially; as iron is made fiery by fire. But it was shown above, when divine simplicity was treated, that God is his very existence (esse) subsisting through himself; and again it was shown that subsisting existence could not be more than one, just as if whiteness were subsisting, it could be only one, since whitenesses are multiplied according to recipients. It remains therefore that all other things besides God are not their existence, but participate in existence. Therefore it is necessary that all things which are diversified according to a diverse participation of existing - so as to be more perfect or less perfect - be caused by one first being which most perfectly is. Hence also Plato said that it is necessary, before every multitude, to posit unity; and Aristotle says in the second book of the Metaphysics that that which is most being and most true is the cause of every being and of every truth, as that which is most hot is the cause of all heat.[1030]

Reply to the first: Although the relation to a cause does not enter into the definition of a being which is caused, nevertheless it follows upon those things which are of its notion; because from this, that something is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. Wherefore such a being cannot be without being caused, just as a man cannot be without being capable of laughter. But because to be caused is not of the notion of being simply, on that account there is found some being that is not caused.

Reply to the second: From this reason certain men were moved to posit that that which is necessary does not have a cause, as is said in the eighth book of the Physics. But this appears manifestly false in demonstrative sciences, in which necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says in the sixth book of the Metaphysics that there are certain necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. Therefore it is not only for this reason that an efficient cause is required, because the effect can fail to be; but because the effect would not be if the cause were not. For this conditional is true, whether the antecedent and consequent are possible or impossible.

1030. Romans 11:36. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 4; VI, 3.

Reply to the third: Mathematical things are taken as abstract according to existence. But to each thing it belongs to have an efficient cause according as it has existence. Therefore although things which are mathematical have an efficient cause, nevertheless, according to the relation which they have to an efficient cause, they do not fall under the consideration of the mathematician. And therefore in the mathematical sciences nothing is demonstrated through an efficient cause.

Notes concerning the Article.

The conclusion is: Every being, in whatsoever way it is, is from God. The reason and doctrine of this whole article we shall examine in the disputation. Concerning the article itself, however, first it must be noted with Cajetan in his commentaries, that here there is not the question whether God is the cause of all things by creation: for from those things which will be said in the following question, on the nature of creation, one can easily gather which beings were produced by God through creation; but it is asked universally whether every other thing, besides God, is from God, as from an efficient cause. This is clear from the very text, where no mention of creation is made; and more clearly from the conclusion with which St. Thomas answers to the title of the article. Wherefore that word "Created" (says Cajetan), which St. Thomas uses in the title of the article, does not signify that which is produced by true creation, but that which, in whatsoever way, has been effected. And for this reason, in the distinction of the titles of this question, St. Thomas sets it under this form: Whether God is the efficient cause of all things.[1031]

Yet I for my part think that the participle "created" in the title prefixed to this article signifies that which is produced through creation. For the question is not whether it is necessary that a created being be from God, but whether it is necessary that every being be created by God, or not; as appears from the beginning of the first argument, from which the title is taken. Nevertheless St. Thomas does not respond that every being is created by God, but that every being, in whatsoever way it is, that is, in whatsoever way it is produced, is from God: and he understands this as from an efficient cause; for about the exemplar and final cause, which can befit God with respect to creatures, he disputes afterward in articles 3 and 4; now therefore he responds in general that every being is from God, as efficient cause, in whatsoever way it comes to be.[1032]

Next it must be observed that St. Thomas is not here disputing about the operation of God with all causes, that is, whether God works all things through himself, or with second causes. For this he disputes in questions 104 and 105; and especially, concerning created substances, he teaches in question 104, article 1, that all are preserved by God proximately: but concerning all the operations of creatures he says that they are not only from second created causes, but also from God, the first of all causes: not only remotely, that is, by preserving the created causes; but also proximately, by working with them the very same effect altogether individual. About this we should not dispute

1031. Cajetan, Commentary on this article: he notes that the question is not "whether God is the cause of all things by creation," but "whether God is the efficient cause of all things," and that "created" in the title is taken broadly.

1032. See below, articles 3 - 4, on exemplar and final causality; and compare what was said above on divine simplicity and unity: q. 3, a. 4; q. 11, a. 3 - 4.

here, but in 1 - 2, question 79, articles 1 and 2. Now therefore it is to be inquired only whether one true God is the cause of all things, whether by creation, or by some other mode; whether proximately, or remotely.

Disputatio CLXXI - Whether one God is the author of all things

Various errors of the heretics, cap. 1. The Catholic doctrine is set against the heretics, cap. 2.

Caput I - Various errors of the heretics

Before we bring forward and confirm the Catholic doctrine, it will be worthwhile to recount various errors. The first heresy, then, was that of Simon Magus, who, as Tertullian is the author in the place cited below, was the first heretic out of the Gospel. He said that this visible world and men were not made by God, but by Angels; and that the Angels had been generated from himself and from a certain strumpet woman, whom he called Helena. For he boasted that he was the Holy Spirit and God. Thus write St. Irenaeus in the first book Against Heresies, chapters 20 and 21; St. Epiphanius, Heresy 21; Theodoret, in the first book of the Fabulous Histories of the Heretics, chapter 3; and Tertullian in the book On Prescriptions, chapter 46, who adds that this Simon called himself infinite wisdom, and that he appeared to the Jews as the Son; but to the Samaritans as the Father he had descended; and to other nations he had approached as the Holy Spirit, as he boasted.[1033]

The second heresy was that of the Saturnilians, who are so called from Saturnilus. These said that God was the author of all the Angels; yet that by seven of them, without the consent of God himself, this visible world had been formed, and that in the production of man they had used those words of Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Thus report, among the Greeks, St. Epiphanius, Heresy 23, and Theodoret, book 1 of the Fabulous Histories of the Heretics, chapter on Saturnilus; St. Irenaeus likewise, book 1, chapter 22: among the Latins, Tertullian, On Prescriptions, chapter 46, and St. Augustine, On Heresies, chapter 3, who call this heretic Saturninus.[1034]

The third heresy is that of Basilides, who, according to the witness of St. Epiphanius, Heresy 24, and of Theodoret, book 1 of the Fabulous Histories of the Heretics, chapter on Basilides, and of Tertullian in the cited book, the same chapter 46, and of St. Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 23, and of St. Augustine in the same book, chapter 4, when he asserted that there are 365 heavens and a multitude of Angels, said that all were produced in this way: that from God, whom he called Abraxas, mind was created; from mind, word; from that, providence; from providence, power and wisdom; from these in turn, principalities and powers and Angels. By these Angels, he affirmed, the heavens were procreated in this order: that the first heaven was founded by Virtues and Powers

1033. St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, 20 - 21; St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 21; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, 3; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 46.

1034. Genesis 1. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 23; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, De Saturnilo; St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, 22; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 46; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 3.

and Angels, and with it other Angels were created, who in turn produced the second heaven and other Angels with it; who then made the third heaven with other Angels; and so up to the last; and finally that the lower world and man flowed forth from the makers of the last heaven.[1035]

The fourth heresy, that of Carpocrates and Cerinthus and of their disciples, who were called Gnostics, that is, "knowing ones," agrees with the foregoing. For it asserts that Angels, produced by the supreme virtue, fell away and founded the visible world, as St. Epiphanius writes, Heresies 27 and 28, Theodoret in the cited book, chapter on Carpocrates, St. Irenaeus, book 1, chapters 24 and 26. These are not only manifest heresies, but also fables or dreams full of figments, which anyone can easily refute by Scripture and by reason. However, these dreamers did not entirely deny that God is the author of all things, whether proximately and through himself, or remotely and by the secondary causes established by him. In this, nevertheless, they raved manifestly: that they asserted the world to have been effected by God without God's own beck and will, as Cerinthus and those who followed him said. For since all things subsist and are preserved by his nod, as we shall show below in Disputation 174, it cannot be that any cause operates without his concurrence: for although sin, insofar as it is evil, is done without his beck and consent, nevertheless the substance of the act cannot be produced without him, as we shall see in 1 - 2, question 79, articles 1 and 2.[1036]

Moreover the Gnostics, who sprang either from Nicolaus or from Carpocrates, asserting that there are two Gods, one good, the other evil, seem, just as Manichaeus, to have taught that this visible world was produced by the evil God. Recent theologians attribute this error in this way to these heretics, because St. Augustine, in the book On Heresies addressed to Quodvultdeus, chapter 6, says these words about them: "They say also that a good God and an evil God are contained in their dogmas." But in St. Epiphanius, Heresies 26 and 27, where about these ...[1037]

Caput II - Catholic doctrine is established against the heretics

When he treats of the Gnostics, he could find nothing of the sort; rather, in heresy 27 concerning Carpocrates, from whom he also said the Gnostics flowed, he recounts only that heresy lately mentioned about the production of the world by Angels; nor does St. Augustine report from Epiphanius that the Gnostics said this visible world was created by an evil God.[1038]

Accordingly, the first who posited two principles, the one a good God, the other an evil, was Apelles, as Epiphanius in heresy 44 and Augustine in heresy 23 testify, from whom those called Apelleians took their name; he said that the visible world was made by an evil God, so that the good God took no care of it. Yet since Apelles said, as Epiphanius and Augustine likewise report, that the evil God was made by the good God, and did not posit two equally first principles; at least remotely he referred this world to the good God as to its author. Wherefore he is not so directly opposed to the doctrine of this article.[1039]

1035. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 24; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, De Basilide; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 46; St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, 23; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 4.

1036. See Disputatio 174; and 1 - 2, q. 79, a. 1 - 2 of St. Thomas, on God's concurrence with second causes.

1037. St. Augustine, De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum 6; St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 26 - 27.

1038. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 27 (on Carpocrates); St. Augustine, De haeresibus 27.

At length Manichaeus, as Epiphanius in heresy 66 and Theodoret in book 1, last chapter, of the Compendium of Heretical Fables, writes, not only posited two principles or two Gods, the one good, the other evil; but also affirmed them to be unbegotten, coeternal, and mutually opposed. Therefore, when he said that this visible world, in so far as it pertains to evil natures, was created by the evil God, and that the good God was not the author of all things, neither proximately nor remotely, he fought directly against the Catholic doctrine which St. Thomas holds in this article; and what natures were good and evil Augustine relates in the place cited.[1040]

Moreover, before Manichaeus, Cerdon, in the time of Pope Hyginus, as Epiphanius in heresy 41 and Augustine, chapter 21, Irenaeus book 1 against heresies chapter 28 and Tertullian in the book On the Prescription of Heretics chapter 51 bear witness, introduced also two Gods, one unknown to the world, whom they said to be the Father of Christ; this one he called good: but the other, the maker of the whole creation, fierce and cruel, and well enough known to men. Thus must Irenaeus be understood, whose words are obscure, when he says: one indeed just, the other good, according to the opinion of Cerdon; for by the name of just he means fierce and cruel. Clearer are the words of Irenaeus in Eusebius, book 4 of the History, chapter 10. He therefore agreed with Manichaeus by positing two principles, one good, the other evil: except that he attributed all creatures to the evil God as their author, whereas Manichaeus reserved some good ones to the good God. The Priscillianists in Spain agreed with Manichaeus, who drew their origin from Priscillian of Avila, as Pope Leo I writes in Epistle 91, which is to Turibius, chapter 14, where he condemns their error: then the Albigenses, the new Manichaeans in Gaul in the time of Innocent III, as Antoninus is authority, part 3 of the History, title 19, chapter 1.[1041]

Catholic doctrine is that one God, supremely good, in the beginning of time created from nothing both the corporeal and the spiritual creature; namely the angelic spirits, the heavenly bodies, and the elements. For fishes, birds, trees, brute animals, and man he produced from the matter of these elements, as is clear from the first chapter of Genesis: then in this way all things also that were afterwards generated must be referred back to God as author: so that at least God produced them by means of created causes. Whether, however, he actually concurs and operates with them, or only preserves them, is not to be disputed now, but in 1 - 2, question 79, articles 1 and 2; nor indeed does St. Thomas discuss this matter here, as I said in the notations on the article.

This truth is so manifest from Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers, that it would be superfluous to recount their testimonies one by one. It remains, therefore, that we confirm it by philosophical reason. Among others the best is that which St. Thomas asserts in this article in this manner. Whatever is such by participation must be from that to which it belongs to be such essentially: as heated iron, because it is hot by participation, has this from fire, which is such by essence: but all things other than God are not their own existence (*esse*), but participate in it: therefore they must

1039. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 44; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 23.

1040. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 66; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, cap. ult.; St. Augustine, De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum, locus citatus.

1041. St. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. 41; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 21; St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses I, 28; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 51; Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica IV, 10; St. Leo the Great, Ep. 91 ad Turibium, cap. 14; St. Antoninus, Chronicon, pars 3, tit. 19, cap. 1.

have existence from him who has existence by his essence: that is, to whom it is essential to be and to exist; such an entity is God: therefore all things have existence from God. This reasoning plainly demonstrates that all things are from God, at least remotely: for here we do not contend to prove that God operates proximately in all things: for St. Thomas treats that matter elsewhere and we also will prove it elsewhere, as we promised.[1042]

On the first cause of all beings

Omitting, however, many things which must be noted in the explication of this reasoning, this alone is to be observed with Cajetan, that St. Thomas thence gathers that to exist is of the essence (*essentia*) of God, and that God is his own existing; because in him essence and existence (*esse*) are entirely the same. Thus he proved in question 3, article 4; and hence also he deduced in question 7, article 1, that God is infinite by essence, for the reason that he does not have existence received in essence, but his essence is his existence; whereas in article 2 he shows that every being, other than God, is not infinite according to essence, because it is not its own existence, but has existence received, either as a form received in matter, or as an existence and to-be in an essence. But because it cannot so easily be proved that in created things existence is distinguished from essence and is received in it; indeed the opposite is not less probable, as we shall show in the Third Part, question 17, article 2: therefore this reasoning can be framed by an easier route, in this way. That which is so actually that it cannot not be, exists by essence; that is, to be is essential to it as any other predicate: and hence it is from itself, needing no other: and this we said is to be infinite by essence, which is proper to God himself: for that which is thus of itself that it cannot not be, and needs no other, is the supreme being, which we call God: but there cannot be unless one God, as is shown in question 11: therefore all other things, besides this being, will not be beings actually existing by essence, but such as can of themselves be and not be: but that which is of this sort is from another: for of itself nothing can be, being indifferent to be and not be: nor can there be a process to infinity: therefore at length we must come to that one being which is by essence, from which we must admit that all other things are either remotely or proximately; and this St. Thomas in this article strives to demonstrate. What indeed Aristotle holds on this matter I have briefly said in Disputation 81, chapter 1.

Articulus II - Whether prime matter is created by God

Objection 1. It seems that prime matter is not created by God. For everything that comes to be is composed out of a subject and something else, as is said in Physics 1; but there is no subject of prime matter. Therefore prime matter cannot be made by God.

Objection 2. Further, action and passion are divided against one another. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and prime matter are two principles divided against one another, of which neither is from another.

1042. See 1 - 2, q. 79, a. 1 - 2 of St. Thomas, on God's concurrence with second causes.

Objection 3. Further, every agent acts something like itself. And so, since every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act, it follows that everything made is in some way in act. But prime matter is only in potency as such. Therefore it is contrary to the notion of prime matter that it be made.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says: "Thou hast made two things, Lord: one nigh unto thee, namely the angel; another nigh to nothing, namely prime matter."[1043]

I answer that it must be said that the ancient Philosophers entered little by little, as it were step by step, into the knowledge of truth. At the beginning, as it were being cruder, they did not think there were beings except sensible bodies. Of these, those who posited motion in them did not consider motion except according to certain accidents, for instance according to rarity and density, by aggregation and segregation. And supposing the very substance of bodies to be uncreated, they assigned certain causes of such accidental transmutations, for instance friendship, strife, intellect, or something of this sort. Advancing further, they distinguished by the intellect between substantial form and matter, which they posited uncreated; and they perceived transmutation to be made in bodies according to essential forms. Of which transmutations they posited certain universal causes, for instance the oblique circle, according to Aristotle,[1044] or, according to Plato, the ideas.

But one must consider that matter is contracted by form to a determinate species, just as the substance of some species is contracted by an accident supervening to a determinate mode of being, as man is contracted by white. Therefore they considered being as particular under a certain consideration: either inasmuch as it is this being, or inasmuch as it is such a being; and thus they assigned such particular agent causes. And further some recurred to consider being inasmuch as it is being; and they considered the cause of things not only according as they are these or such, but according as they are beings. Therefore that which is the cause of things inasmuch as they are beings must be the cause of things not only according as they are such by accidental forms, nor according as they are these by substantial forms, but also according to whatever pertains to the being of them in any way. And thus one must also posit prime matter created by the universal cause of beings.

Reply to the first: The Philosopher in Physics 1 speaks of becoming in particular, which is from form to form, whether accidental or substantial; but he is not speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter is not excluded, although it is excluded from the first mode of making.

Reply to the second: Passion is the effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle be the effect of the first active principle. For every imperfect thing is caused by the perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 12.

1043. St. Augustine, Confessiones XII, 7 (in fine): "Duo fecisti, Domine, unum prope te, scilicet angelum; aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam primam."

1044. Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione II, text. 16; Plato, on the ideas.

Reply to the third: The argument proves not that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form. For although every created thing is in act, it is not, however, pure act. Hence it is necessary that even that which has itself on the side of potency be created, if everything that pertains to its being is created.

Notations concerning the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is affirmative, and no less of faith than the preceding. This is clear from all that we said in the preceding disputation. And indeed when in the preceding article the Doctor had proved this very point, that God is the efficient cause of all the rest of things which are besides himself, this same point had already been sufficiently proved concerning prime matter. But because there have not been lacking heretics who have erred specifically about prime matter, therefore it was fitting first to institute a new article concerning it. There were indeed at the beginning philosophers, who, although they clearly felt that the world was made in the beginning of time, nevertheless asserted that prime matter was unbegotten and coeternal with God. Thus Plato held, as Plutarch writes in book 1 On the Opinions of the Philosophers, and most others, and St. Ambrose in book 1 of the Hexaemeron. So too the Stoics taught, as we shall immediately report from Tertullian. And the philosopher Zeno, Tertullian himself attests in the book On the Prescription of Heretics, chapter 7. Among the heretics, however, the first who followed this error was Hermogenes, as Tertullian is authority in the book Against Him, chapter 1, following (as he himself says) the Stoa, that is, the school of the Stoics. The same error Tertullian attributes to the same Hermogenes in the On the Prescription of Heretics, chapter 33, and to Marcion in book 5 Against Him, penultimate chapter. Theodoret likewise charges the same error in book 1 of the Compendium of Heretical Fables, in the chapter On Hermogenes and in the chapter On Marcion. Isidore also makes mention of Hermogenes in book 8 of the Etymologies, chapter 5, and Rabanus in book 3 On the Instruction of Clerics, chapter 8. St. Gratian likewise takes certain things concerning this in the Decretum, cause 19, question 4, canon Quare fallitur. Gabriel Prateolus is mistaken in the Elenchus of Heresies, when he makes Hermogenes a follower of Sabellius in the time of the Emperor Gallienus; for he was much earlier. Whether indeed Sabellius, concerning the Trinity, later followed this error is another matter; as I said elsewhere, in Disputation 109, chapter 1. In the same error Sabellius himself wavered, as is clear from Eusebius, book 7 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 8. Then the Seleucians and Hermians, as St. Augustine writes, De Haeresibus 59; and Hermias; and indeed St. John Chrysostom believed that even Valentinus and the Manichaeans taught the same, Homily 21 on Genesis, halfway through. Thus he says.[1045]

Reply to the first: The Philosopher in Physics I speaks of a particular coming-to-be, which is a transition from form to form, whether accidental or even substantial; but here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being, from which emanation matter is not excluded, although it is excluded from the first mode of making.

1045. Plutarch, De placitis philosophorum I; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron I; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 7, 33; Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem 1; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem V, penult.; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, De Hermogene; ibid., De Marcionis; Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae VIII, 5; Rabanus Maurus, De institutione clericorum III, 8; Gratian, Decretum, causa 19, q. 4, can. Quare fallitur; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica VII, 8; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 59; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 21 in Genesim.

Reply to the second: Passion is the effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle be the effect of the first active principle. For every imperfect thing is caused by a perfect one; for the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics XII.[1046]

Reply to the third: That reasoning does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form. For although everything created is in act, it is not, however, pure act. Hence it is necessary that even that which stands on the side of potency be created, if everything that pertains to its existence is created. For matter is contracted by form to a determinate species, just as a substance of some species is contracted by an accident supervening to it to a determinate mode of being - thus a man is contracted by whiteness. Accordingly, both parties considered being with a certain particular consideration: either insofar as it is this being, or insofar as it is such a being; and thus they assigned to things particular efficient causes. And further, some rose up to consider being insofar as it is being, and they considered the cause of things, not only according to the fact that they are these or such, but according to the fact that they are beings. Therefore, that which is the cause of things insofar as they are beings must be the cause of things, not only according to the fact that they are such by accidental forms, nor according to the fact that they are these by substantial forms, but also according to everything that pertains to their existence in any way whatsoever. And thus it is necessary to posit that even prime matter is created by the universal cause of beings.

A few notes around the doctrine of this article. The conclusion is affirmative, and no less of faith than the preceding. It is clear from all that we said in the preceding disputation. And indeed, since in the foregoing article St. Thomas had already proved that God is the efficient cause of all the others which are apart from Himself, the very same had already been sufficiently proved regarding prime matter. But because heretics have not been lacking, who have erred especially about prime matter, it was therefore worth the effort to institute a fresh article on it. There were, to begin with, philosophers who, although they clearly held that the world was created in the beginning of time, nevertheless asserted that prime matter was unbegotten and coeternal with God. Thus thought Plato, as Plutarch writes in book I On the Opinions of the Philosophers, and very many others, and St. Ambrose in Hexaemeron I. So too the Stoics taught, as we shall immediately report from Tertullian; and Zeno the philosopher, as Tertullian himself attests in the book On the Prescriptions against Heretics, chapter 7. Among the heretics, the first to follow this error was Hermogenes, as Tertullian testifies in the book Against him, chapter 1, who (as he himself says) followed the portico, or school, of the Stoics. The same error Tertullian ascribes to this same Hermogenes in the book On the Prescriptions against Heretics, chapter 33, and to Marcion in book V against him, the second-to-last chapter. Theodoret likewise imputes this error to them in book I of the Compendium of Heretical Fables, in the chapters On Hermogenes and On Marcion. Mention of this same error of Hermogenes is made by Isidore, Etymologies VIII, by Rabanus, On the Institution of the Clergy III, 18, and by Gratian in the Decree, cause 24, question 3, the canon "Quare fallitur." Gabriel Prateolus, in the Elenchus of Heresies, makes Hermogenes a partisan of Sabellius under the Emperor Gallienus, although he was much earlier. Whether indeed he followed

1046. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.

the error of Sabellius against the Trinity of persons was discussed in Disputation 109, chapter 1. In this same error Sabellius is found, as is clear from Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel VII, 8 and following; then Seleucus, from whom the Seleucians, and Hermias, from whom the Hermians, as St. Augustine writes, De haeresibus 59. Nay rather, if we believe St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 on Genesis, after the middle, Valentinus and the Manichees taught the same. For thus he says: If a Manichaean approach you saying that matter pre-existed - or Marcion, or Valentinus, or a Gentile - say to him: "In the beginning God made heaven and earth" (Gen. 1:1). And for this reason the Albanians, or Albigensians, the new Manichees in Gaul, thought the same, as Alphonsus de Castro reports against the heresies under the word "mundus."[1047]

Against this error there is the manifest definition of the Church in the Lateran Council, reported in the chapter Firmiter, On the Most Holy Trinity and the Catholic Faith, where it is defined that God created from nothing both kinds of creatures. Many Fathers also have written the same: Lactantius, Divine Institutes II, 9; Tertullian in the place cited; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron I; St. Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, 1 and 5; the same, Literal Commentary on Genesis I, 14; and De vera religione 18; and Contra Faustum X, 14; and Confessiones XII, 4; Origen too has a fragment on this in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel VII, 8 - 9, where Eusebius himself also discusses it; Epiphanius, Haeresis 66, where he attributes this error to the Manichees; St. Gregory of Nyssa, On Man; St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word. From Scripture too it can be refuted: for in Genesis 1 it is said that God in the beginning made all things, nor is it expressed from what He produced them, although it is said when He produced man from the slime of the earth, that He made the fishes from the water, and so on; then also because in Psalm 145 it is said that He made "heaven, earth, the sea, and all things that are in them" (Ps. 145[146]:6); Isaiah 41: "Behold, you are of nothing, and your work is of that which hath no being" (Isa. 41:24); and 2 Maccabees 7: "I beseech you, look upon heaven, and earth, and all that is in them, and consider that God made them out of nothing, and men also" (2 Macc. 7:28); and Romans 11: "For of him, and by him, and in him are all things" (Rom. 11:36)

Moreover, by natural reason the same is most excellently proved. For that which is from itself, and needs nothing outside itself in order to be, is so perfect as to be God, and is infinite according to essence - for we said this is the ratio of the infinite according to essence in Disputation 25. If therefore matter were not from another, it would not only not be the most imperfect being, but indeed it would be God. Or by what reason could it come about that prime matter, which is the most imperfect being of all, should not need a cause in order to be produced, while the rest are produced? Will it be that from a second cause, by means of a form which they efficaciously induce, it proceeds, but is conserved by God? We shall speak of this below in Disputation 147. For now, regarding matter, let these points suffice.

1047. Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica VII, 8 - 9; St. Augustine, De haeresibus 59; St. John Chrysostom, Homilia 2 in Genesim (post medium); Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus haereses, s.v. "mundus"; Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 7, 33; Adversus Hermogenem 1; Adversus Marcionem V (penult.); Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium I, De Hermogene; ibid., De Marcionis; Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae VIII; Rabanus Maurus, De institutione clericorum III, 18; Gratian, Decretum, causa 24, q. 3, can. Quare fallitur; Plutarch, De placitis philosophorum I; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron I.

Articulus III - Whether God is the exemplar cause

It is asked thus for the third. It seems that the exemplar cause is something other than God. For the exemplified thing has a likeness of the exemplar; but creatures are far from a divine likeness. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.

1. Moreover, everything that is by participation is reduced to something existing per se, as what is ignited is reduced to fire, as has already been said. But whatever things are in sensible realities are only by participation in some species. This is clear from the fact that in none of sensibles is found only that which pertains to the notion of the species; rather, to the principles of the species there are adjoined individuating principles. It is therefore necessary to posit the species themselves as existing per se, as a man existing per se, and a horse existing per se, and so forth. And these are called exemplars. Therefore there are certain exemplars outside God.
2. Moreover, sciences and definitions are about the species themselves, not according to the way in which they are in particulars, because there is neither science nor definition of particulars. Therefore there are certain entities which are species not in singulars. And these are called exemplars. Therefore as before.
3. Moreover, the same seems to follow from Pseudo-Dionysius, who says in Divine Names V that being itself, considered according to itself, is prior to that which is life itself and to that which is wisdom itself.

But on the contrary: An exemplar is an idea. But the ideas, according to what St. Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, are principal forms which are contained in the divine intelligence. Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.[1049]

I answer that God is the first exemplar cause of all things. For the understanding of which, it must be considered that to the production of any thing it is necessary to have an exemplar, so that the effect may follow with a determinate form. For the craftsman produces a determinate form in matter on account of the exemplar to which he looks, whether it be an exemplar which he contemplates outside, or an exemplar conceived interiorly in the mind. But it is manifest that the things which come to be naturally obtain determinate forms. Now, this determination of forms must be reduced, as to the first principle, to the divine wisdom, which devised the order of the universe, an order which consists in the distinction of things. And therefore it is necessary to say that in the divine wisdom are the reasons, that is, the rationes, of all things: which we have already called ideas, that is, exemplar forms existing in the divine mind. These indeed, although they are multiplied according to their relation to things, are nevertheless not really other than the divine essence, insofar as its likeness can be participated in different ways by diverse things. Thus, then,

1049. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46 (and cf. q. 28): "Ideae... sunt formae principales, quae continentur in divina intelligentia."

God Himself is the first exemplar of all. Yet in created things certain ones can be called exemplars of others, inasmuch as some are to the likeness of others - either according to the same species, or according to an analogy of some imitation.

Reply to the first: Although creatures do not attain to this - that they be like God according to His nature by a likeness of species, as a homogeneous thing to the human generator - yet they do attain to His likeness according to a representation of the pattern of reason conceived by God; as the house which is in matter is to the house which is in the mind of the craftsman.

Reply to the second: Of the notion of man it is that he be in matter, and thus a man cannot be found without matter. Therefore although this particular man is by participation in the species, nevertheless he cannot be reduced to some thing existing per se in the same species, but to a species exceeding it, as are the separated substances.

Reply to the third: Although any science and definition is solely about beings, it is not necessary that the thing have in existing the same mode which the intellect has in understanding. For by the power of the agent intellect we abstract universal species from particular conditions; yet it does not follow that universals subsist apart as exemplars of particulars.

Reply to the fourth: As Pseudo-Dionysius says in Divine Names XI, "life itself" and "wisdom itself" sometimes name God Himself, and sometimes the perfections given to things; but not certain subsisting things, as the ancients posited.

Conclusion: God, by reason of the ideas which He has in Himself, is the exemplar cause of all things. About the ideas enough, and more than enough, has been said by us throughout Question 15.

Articulus IV - That God is the final cause of all things

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to belong to one who is in need of an end. But God is in need of nothing. Therefore it does not befit Him to act for an end.

1. Moreover, the end of generation is the form of the generated; and the end and the agent do not fall under the same in number, as is said in Physics II. But God is the first agent of all. Therefore He is not the final cause of all.
2. Moreover, all things desire an end. But not all things desire God, because not all know Him. Therefore God is not the end of all.
3. Moreover, the final cause is the first of causes. If therefore God be both efficient cause and final cause, it follows that in Him there is a prior and a posterior. But that is impossible.

But on the contrary: It is said in Proverbs 16: "The Lord has wrought all things for himself."

I answer: Every agent acts for an end. Otherwise, from the consideration of the agent it would not follow this rather than that, unless by reason of a cause. Now the end of the agent and of the patient, as such, is the same, but in different ways. For one and the same thing is what the agent

intends to impress, and what the patient intends to receive. There are, however, certain things which act and suffer at the same time, which are imperfect agents; and to these it belongs that even in acting they intend to acquire something. But to the first agent, which is agent only, it does not belong to act for the acquisition of the end of another, but it intends only to communicate its own perfection, which is its goodness. And each creature intends to attain its perfection, which is a likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Thus the divine goodness is the end of all things.

Reply to the first: To act on account of indigence belongs only to an imperfect agent, which is of a nature to act and to suffer. But this does not befit God. And therefore He alone is supremely liberal, because He does not act for His own utility, but only for His own goodness.

Reply to the second: The form of the generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is a likeness of the form of the generator, who intends to communicate its likeness. Otherwise the form of the generated would be nobler than the generator, since the end is nobler than the things that are for the sake of the end.

Reply to the third: All things desire God as an end by desiring whatever good, whether by an intelligible appetite, or by a sensible appetite, or by a natural appetite which is without cognition. For nothing has the character of good and of the appetible except according as it partakes of the likeness of God.

Reply to the fourth: Since the final cause is the first of causes, if therefore God were both the efficient and the final cause, it would follow that there is a prior and a posterior in Him. Which is impossible.

Notationes circa articulum. - The conclusion is affirmative and of faith, as appears from that, "The Lord has wrought all things for himself," Proverbs 16. Here first observe that St. Thomas does not inquire in this whole question whether God is the formal cause of things; but he inquires only about the other genera of causes: because already in question 3, article 8, he had proved that God cannot enter into the composition of anything; but the formal cause always composes that of which it is the cause. Next note that God is not the end "for whose sake" (finis cuius gratia); for this end is obtained by operation, and God is not obtained; but He is the end "to whom" (finis cui), because all things issue in the praise and glory of Him which are done in this world. We spoke of the distinction between the end "for whose sake" and the end "to whom" in book 3 On the Cult of Adoration, disputation 1, chapter 6; and we shall speak in disputation 2, chapter 3. But how God is happy, and regards Himself as the end; and whether anything created can be compared to Him as end or not, we said above in disputation 82.

Quaestio XLV - On the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle

Next, there is inquiry about the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle, which is called creation.

Of which eight things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether to create is to make something from nothing

Objection 1. It seems that to create is not to make something from nothing. For Augustine says against the adversary of the Law and the Prophets: "To make is to cause what before was not at all; but to create is to establish something by drawing it out from that which already was."[1050]

Objection 2. Further, the nobility of an action and of motion is considered from the termini. Therefore a more noble action is that which is from good into good, and from being into being, than that which is from nothing into something. But creation seems to be the most noble action, and the first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing into something, but rather from being into being.

Objection 3. Further, this preposition "from" (ex) imports the relation of some cause, and chiefly of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is from bronze. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of a being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something "from nothing."

But on the contrary is what is said upon that text of Genesis 1:1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": the Gloss says that "to create is to make something from nothing."[1051]

I answer: As was said above, one must consider not only the emanation of some particular being from some particular agent, but also the emanation of the whole being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation (*creatio*). But what proceeds according to particular emanation does not presuppose emanation. Thus, if a man is generated, there was not previously a man, but a man is from a non-man, and something white from a non-white. Hence, if there be considered the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle, it is impossible that any being be presupposed to this emanation. But the same is "nothing" as "no being." Thus, as the generation of a man is from a non-being which is a non-man, so creation, which is the emanation of the whole existence (*esse*), is from non-being simply, which is nothing.

Reply to the first: Augustine uses the name "creation" according to that usage by which those things are said to be created which are reformed unto the better, as when someone is said to be "created" into a bishop. But we are not speaking here thus of creation, but as has been said.

Reply to the second: Changes receive their species and dignity not from the terminus from which, but from the terminus to which. Therefore the more perfect and prior some change is, the more the terminus to which of that change is nobler and prior, even if the terminus from which, which is opposed to the terminus to which, be more imperfect. Thus generation simply is nobler and prior than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form: yet the privation of substantial form, which is the terminus from which in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the terminus from which in alteration. And similarly, creation is more

1050. St. Augustine, Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum I: "Facere est quod omnino non erat; creare vero est ex eo quod iam erat educendo aliquid constituere."

1051. Gloss (ascribed to Bede) on Genesis 1:1: "Creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere."

perfect and prior than generation and alteration, because its terminus to which is the whole substance of the thing. But that which is understood as the terminus from which is simply non-being.

Reply to the third: When it is said that something is made "from nothing," the preposition "from" does not designate a material cause, but only order, as when it is said, "from morning it becomes midday," i.e., after morning it becomes midday. But one must understand that this proposition "from" can include the negation that is conveyed in what I call "nothing," or it can include it from itself. If in the first way, then the order remains affirmed, and it shows the order of that which is to non-being preceding. If, however, the negation include the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is: "It is made from nothing," that is, it is not made from anything; just as if it be said, "this man speaks," one can say "from nothing" because he does not speak from anything. And in both ways it is verified when it is said that something is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" imports order, as has been said. In the second way it imports a relation to the material cause, which is denied.

Conclusion: Creation, which is the emanation of the whole being, is from non-being, which is nothing. In the text of St. Thomas nothing else occurs to be noted, beyond the explication of this definition, upon which many things that are to be said about creation depend; and this will be handed on in the following disputation.

Disputatio CLXXII - Whether creation is a production from nothing

Caput I - The opinion of Wyclif

The verb "to create" (creare), and the noun "creation" (creatio), are wont to be used both in the broader signification for that which is "to make something"; and properly for that which is "to produce something from nothing." For although sometimes in Scripture and the holy Fathers creation is taken for renovation and spiritual regeneration, as St. Basil noted on Psalm 32 in the words "He spoke and they were made; he commanded and they were created," and in the homily, "That God is not the author of evils," column 3;[1052] yet that occurs because the renovation of the interior man is, in that genus, a certain production from nothing, that is, from the mercy of God, with no proper works of ours preceding from us; whence we are said by the Apostle to the Ephesians to be "created in Christ in good works"; and in chapter 4, "the new man according to God is said to be created"; and to the Galatians, "neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature."[1053] For this reason our justification could be called a certain moral, not physical and natural, creation. But whether the infusion of grace itself, or of other supernatural gifts, be creation, we shall say below in disputation 174, chapter 2.

1052. St. Basil, In psalmum 32 (33): "Ipse mandavit, et creata sunt"; and Homilia: Quod Deus non est auctor malorum, col. 3.

1053. Eph. 2:10; 4:24; Gal. 6:15.

But concerning physical and natural creation, all the Scholastics affirm that it is the production of something from nothing, although in explaining this definition they vary among themselves. Therefore, first, Scotus, in the second book, distinction 1, question 9, article 2, so far as concerns this article, explaining this definition, asserts that creation is the production of something from nothing, that is, not from anything according to the existence of existence (esse existentiae), and therefore not from anything according to the existence of essence (esse essentiae): because, as he says, proved in distinction 36 of the first book, the existence of essence is never separated from the existence of existence. For Scotus thinks existence to be altogether the same according to reality, as we more fully showed in the third part of St. Thomas, question 17, articles 1 and 2. He adds then that no thing is created from nothing, that is, from no mode of being, neither simply nor in a qualified way: because all things that are created previously have an intelligible being in the mind of God, and a willed being, which is the possible being of things, and elsewhere Scotus himself calls it the diminished being, and the objective being, of creatures. A similar opinion is that of Wyclif, which Walden reports in the first tome of the Doctrinale fidei antiquae, book 1, chapter 17; for thus (he says) Wyclif defined creation: it is a production from pure intelligible being to essential being outside God. The same Walden also reports in the same book, chapter 20, that Wyclif in the aforesaid definition explained the terminus a quo of creation, so that it would not be altogether nothing, but the ideal being of the thing; because, as that man used to say, God cannot tend unto that which is pure nothing. In this opinion Walden cites the man's words in Trialogus I: "If you ask why God did not forbid man to sin thus, it is easy for me to answer that for this reason, because this was not forbiddable, since it was not; nor does the power of God extend to nothing and the void"; in which words Wyclif seems to assert that which Scotus taught, namely, that no thing is created from nothing, that is, from no mode of being, neither simply nor in a qualified way.

Caput II - The foregoing opinion is refuted

Walden keenly pursues both positions of Wyclif in the places cited; but for us to impugn them, it is necessary first to explain what each intended; for Wyclif did not err in all the things which Walden thought. One must first set down this, which we reported from the same Wyclif in disputation 70, chapters 1 and 2: namely, that according to his opinion this proposition is true, "the creature is God," even without that addition "according to intelligible being"; whereas according to the rules of truer logic it is altogether false, as we proved there more closely. Secondly, since this proposition, "Man, and any creature whatsoever, according to intelligible or ideal being, is God Himself," in some sen -

Now, what in Wyclif's opinion is worthy of reproof, and what censure it deserves, can easily be shown; for it is not fitting that truth be confused with falsehood, nor that it be attacked indiscriminately, as Valdensis attacks it. First, then, when Wyclif asserts that the "term a quo" is not "absolutely nothing," he has for companion in his doctrine Scotus, as is clear from what has been said; yet I do not see on what ground this can be blamed. For by "absolutely nothing" each understands - just as Scotus explained - that which the Ferrariensis called "non-being essentially," and which St. Thomas above, question 45, article 3, called "the non-being opposed to the notion of

being," which is the object of the divine omnipotence: and this is most true.[1054] For God does not so create something from nothing that He makes something out of that which involves a contradiction and is impossible, and is called "absolutely non-being," or "non-being essentially": who does not see this? In this doctrine St. Thomas also agrees in that article, as we noted in the place cited. For he asserts that about non-being in this way omnipotence is not conversant. Henry likewise asserts this in his Summa, article secundo, questions 23 and 24.[1055] Therefore, when Wyclif - as cited by Valdensis in that chapter 20 - said, "The divine power does not extend to nothing and to the vacuum," he is not denying that God can fill a vacuum, that is, a place not filled - who would deny this? - but he only says that God cannot make that what implies a contradiction and is non-being essentially should be something; and that a vacuum, which is nothing, should also be something - which is most true. Wherefore the testimonies of the Saints which Valdensis there piles up, by which he proves that God made all things from nothing, are not against Wyclif: for by "nothing" the Fathers understand that which actually is not, but can be and exist.

Next, whether the intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*) of creatures, which some call "ideal," is the very essence (*essentia*) of God - what theologians call the ideas of things, as we saw in disputation 71 - or rather is the very formal being (*esse formale*) of creatures according to their proper determinations, existing objectively in the intellect, is not sufficiently clear in Wyclif, as we proved in that same disputation. Moreover, if by that "intelligible being" he himself understands the essence of God, inasmuch as it has the nature of an idea, he plainly errs in faith, when he asserts that God produced all things out of that intelligible being, as Valdensis very well refutes in the cited chapter 17.[1056] For just as it is against the doctrine of the Fathers and against reason that God made any creature out of His own substance, since He produced only the Son and the Holy Spirit out of His substance; so likewise he plainly errs when he asserts that a creature was produced by God out of that intelligible or ideal being, which is God Himself. For thus every creature would be produced out of the nature of God and out of His substance. And since Wyclif concedes this proposition, "The creature is God according to intelligible or ideal being," as we reported there, he seems to have taken in this former way the intelligible being of creatures, out of which he said creatures were produced. For only in this way can it be said with that addition, "According to intelligible being, the creature is God," as we noted in that place. But it is the same manifest error to assert that God created something "out of His substance" or "out of His own substance": because the particles "out of" (de) and "from" (ex) do not denote an efficient principle only, but at the same time a principle that pertains to the constitution of the produced thing, when something is said to be produced "from" something; although the efficient cause without a preposition denotes only the principle of causing. And what the particle "out of" (de) signifies, when it is joined to the verb "is" (sum), as when we say, "The Son is out of the substance of the Father," we discussed in disputation 163.[1057]

1054. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3.

1055. Henry of Ghent, Summa, article secundo, questions 23 - 24.

1056. Valdensis' refutation of Wyclif on production "out of intelligible being," cited at cap. 17.

1057. On the sense of "out of the substance" in the formula "the Son is out of the substance of the Father," see Vazquez, disputation 163.

In this sense, however, it is certain that Scotus was not speaking, when he said that "things were produced by God not from nothing, that is, from no mode of being, neither simply nor in a qualified sense, since previously things had had some being understood and willed in God." For Scotus did not think that this intelligible being was the very essence of God, but the essence of the creature, possible and objectively present to the divine intellect. Wherefore, even if he says that things were made "out of that intelligible being," he does not on that account hold that they were made out of the very substance of God, as Valdensis was inferring against Wyclif.

But if Wyclif understands by "intelligible being" that objective being of creatures according to their proper determinations, as Scotus understands it, and as Valdensis himself does, who also grants that this is the diminished being of things, as we said in that disputation 70; and in this sense says that all things were produced by God, not out of "nothing at all," but out of "non-being existing," and out of that intelligible and diminished being; he does not err in faith. Yet from the principles of philosophy he can easily be refuted. For either a thing is said to be made "out of that possible being" as out of some constituent, and this cannot be said; because the possible being of a thing does not constitute the thing actually existing, but is altogether the same as that which is possible and that which actually exists. For "possible being" is nothing other than "not implying a contradiction that it be"; but this is not something out of which the thing itself that is actually produced is constituted, nor is it any principle of it.

If he should say that a thing is made "out of that possible and intelligible being" as out of a term a quo (terminus a quo), it can be more easily attacked: and in this sense Valdensis attacks him in that chapter 17. For just as Aristotle in Physics I, chapter 5, text 43, ridicules the philosophers, whose opinion he had reported in chapter 4, text 34, asserting that "out of sweetness comes whiteness" and "out of brightness comes magnitude": because although what is not white may have been sweet, and out of non-white white may come, nevertheless this is per accidens, and therefore only per accidens does white come from sweet; so also the per se term a quo of creation will be the non-being of the thing; but "possible" and "intelligible" being will be a per accidens term, just as "sweet" is the term of white, of which it is not to be said absolutely that out of it white comes.[1058]

Yet this argument of Valdensis is weak. For although from a positive which is joined per accidens to the negation that is the term a quo of production, nothing is said to be made except per accidens; nevertheless, out of a positive which is joined per se to the negation that is the term a quo, something also is said to be made: for example, a tree is made out of seed, and a man out of an embryo, and white out of black, and so of others. Thus Wyclif could say that that intelligible being is not per accidens conjoined to non-being, as sweet is conjoined accidentally to non-white, and therefore that it is not the same case.

However, by this argument Wyclif can be refuted. For that diminished or possible being is nothing other than a thing's not implying a contradiction that it be: but this remains even when the thing itself is produced, nor is it in any way distinguished from it. Wherefore we do not rightly say, "out of that which does not imply 'man' comes a man," as we say that a tree comes from seed;

1058. Aristotle, Physics I, c. 4, text 34; c. 5, text 43.

rather, this is brought about when the man is produced, namely, that man, who does not imply being, actually be. Therefore "possible being" cannot have the character of a term a quo; and thus, although it be conjoined per se with the negation out of which a man comes, nevertheless he is not said to come out of it, nor any other thing; because that out of which a thing comes, as out of a term a quo, does not remain with the thing itself which is made. And just as in disputation 71, chapter 2, we said that the idea is not the objective concept of a possible thing, because it is altogether the same thing that is made; so, with much less reason, can it be the term a quo of the same production, because it is the same thing that was objectively present and that actually is made. Therefore Anselm rightly, in the Monologion, chapter 8, near the end, after he had said that creation is a production from nothing, that is, not from something, explains what that "nothing" was, and says: "All created things existed indeed in the uncreated mind of God, but they were not what they now are, that is, they did not have the existence which they now have. They were, however, something, with respect to the account of making, by which, and according to which they would be made." He did not say "out of which" they would be made, but "by which" and "according to which," which is proper to the idea and to the efficient cause. Therefore Wyclif did not rave at that point, as Valdensis thought.[1059]

In this part also Scotus seems to have taught the same as Wyclif: for he says that nothing can be created "from nothing," that is, from no mode of being, neither simply nor in a qualified sense, because nothing is created which did not first have being understood. By which words, if Scotus wishes to teach that creation is "from some intelligible being," he is mistaken, as has been proved. But if he only says that the term a quo is not "non-being," that is, what is impossible, and non-being essentially, this is most true. Yet in what he immediately adds, he clearly slips: for he says that something can be produced, though not created, "from non-being simply," that is, "from not-something according to essence and existence": he does not speak of "the impossible," but of "the not-possible" - that it can, I say, be produced, not according to the being of existence, but according to possible being: for he thinks - just as we reported in disputation 104, chapter 2 - that all things are produced by the divine intellect according to the notion of the possible; which we sufficiently impugned in that place. But if by the divine intellect things were possible, the doctrine of Scotus would be true.

Exposition is given of the aforesaid definition of creation.

Caput III - Exposition of the definition of creation

It remains that, from the foregoing, we gather in general the true exposition of the definition which above we handed on concerning creation; for to which productions the notion of creation pertains peculiarly, will be said in the following disputations. Creation, therefore, is the production of something out of nothing, not because "nothing" is as it were matter, or anything pertaining to the constitution of the thing produced; but because it is the term a quo (*terminus a quo*) of the production. And it comes to the same, that a thing be produced out of nothing as out of a term a

1059. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 8.

quo, and that nothing pre-exist before the production which in some way pertains to the constitution of that thing; or, which is the same, that the thing be made according to its whole self. For when something in the thing has preceded, and by that production is not made, it is not creation; because that thing is made, not out of nothing, but out of something - whether that be a form or matter; for a thing is said to be made out of everything by which it is constituted. Wherefore, if the form of the thing has preceded, it is said to be made out of it, not out of nothing. Hence creation is wont to be called the production of being, as being (*ens qua ens*), that is, according to the whole notion of that which is produced; and St. Thomas, in the first article of this question, called it the "emanation of the whole universal being": and therefore he argues rightly as follows. Just as the emanation of man, according to the notion of man, ought to be "from non-man," so also the emanation of the whole of being ought to be "from non-being," which is "nothing," not from such a non-being as "from non-man," which is something. Thus do the Scholastics, to be cited below, understand the aforesaid definition, and they gather it from Anselm in that chapter 8 of the Monologion, where he thus explains "from nothing": that is, "not from something."[1059]

But indeed, concerning the particle "from" (ex), some vary in their understanding. Marsilius, in the Second Book, the first question, article 2, in the fourth part of the article, at the words "Whence it follows that the eternal emanation," and a little below, thinks it necessary for the notion of creation that that "nothing" should precede in duration: whence he infers that a simple eternal emanation cannot be creation, and therefore that nothing can be created by God from eternity.[1060] The reason for this opinion, by which also Marsilius is led to say that nothing can be created from eternity, we shall adduce in disputation 179, chapter 3. The same seems to be the opinion of St. Bonaventure, in the Second Book, distinction 1, article 3, question 1; and from this he also taught, in article (or question) 2, that no thing could have been created from eternity.[1061]

Much more probably, however, the particle "from" (ex) signifies not a priority of duration, but a priority of nature, as Scotus plainly teaches in the Second Book, distinction 1, question 2, in the respondeo; and all who assert that some creature could have been created by God from eternity ought to admit this: for then the non-being would precede, not in duration, but only in nature. For, besides the fact that the opinion that some creature could be created from eternity is much more probable, even if that should be repugnant for some other reason, nevertheless, so far as pertains to the notion of creation, it could well be understood "from eternity," although "nothing" itself had not previously in duration preceded. For just as we now understand the continual conservation of things by God to be a true creation out of nothing - not because previously in duration nothing had preceded, but because in this way, as to their whole being (*esse*), things depend upon God, so that of themselves they would be absolutely nothing if they were left by God - so in the same way a creation from eternity could rightly be understood, which would be a production out of nothing.

1059. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 8.
1060. Marsilius (of Inghen), In II Sent., q. 1, a. 2, pars 4 (versus "Ex quo sequitur quod aeterna emanatio ...").
1061. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 1, art. 3, q. 1; and q. 2.

Moreover, Durandus - who teaches that something could have been created from eternity, as we shall see in disputation 179 - nevertheless affirms that creation is not a production out of nothing as out of a term a quo: thus he asserts in the Second Book, distinction 1, article 1, numbers 5 and 6. He gives the reason: because there cannot be two terms in one action, which ...[1062]

... unless both terms have a common subject. He said this on account of transubstantiation, which is the conversion into the Body of Christ, in which there is no subject common to both terms. And he proves it thus: Whenever an action has two terms, one a quo and the other ad quem, they must be so opposed that the term a quo precede the term ad quem either by nature or by duration; but the nothing which is said to be the term a quo of creation cannot precede the being of the created thing either by duration or by nature: not by duration, because a negation has no duration; not by nature, because a negation is not some nature, except by reason of the subject in which it is, and by reason of that subject it can precede by duration, as the subject in which it is: but this only happens when the subject is common to both terms. Therefore the term a quo of creation cannot be that negation of all being, or nothing. Wherefore Durandus understands that phrase, out of nothing, set in the definition, negatively, so that to be made out of nothing is the same as not to be made out of anything.

But although the definition can be understood in one way or another (for it is the same that what is made out of nothing, as out of a term a quo, is not made out of anything), nevertheless there is no reason why we should not say that very nothing is the term a quo of creation, either preceding by duration, or only by nature: for in either way creation can be. First indeed by duration: for although the negation of being has no duration, nevertheless, compared with being, it is said to precede or to follow not only by reason but also by duration. For we say that first the angel was nothing, or did not exist, before he was; and of the universe likewise: for there was a time or duration when it was not. Moreover, if the universe or an angel were annihilated, it would be said that in reality it was first before it ceased to be; and yet there would be no common term. Therefore, just as annihilation is from being to non-being, although there is no common term, so also creation could be from non-being to being. We say, moreover, that one thing precedes another by duration, not because a negation has duration in itself, but because there can be some real duration by which we measure the negation and the very being of the thing; and thus we say that the non-being of the thing has preceded from eternity, and afterwards in time it began to be after non-being. For who would dare to deny that all things produced by God had being after non-being? The priority of time, however, we said is entirely accidental and extraneous to the notion of creation, and that a priority by nature alone suffices. This Scotus rightly noted in the place cited, in such a way that the nothing of the thing is said to be prior by nature to the thing itself, not positively, but privatively; and this suffices for it to be the term a quo of creation. For we say to be prior by nature not only of that which primarily befits something by its own nature, but also of that which befits a thing of itself unless it be impeded, it is said to belong to it prior by nature; just as to prime matter privation befits prior by nature than form, not because they are together, or because it truly always has privation, but because of itself, unless it were impeded from elsewhere, it would

1062. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In II Sent., dist. 1, art. 1, nn. 5 - 6.

be deprived. In the same way, since anything whatsoever, if it were left by God, of itself alone would not be, we say that non-being befits it prior by nature than being, because being befits it from an efficient cause; of itself, however, it would not be unless it were produced by an efficient cause. And this would be enough even if the thing had existed from eternity, for it to be said to have been brought forth out of nothing into being; that is, produced from eternity so that it might exist, which of itself alone from eternity would not exist. Why transubstantiation is not creation - whether because it is from a positive term a quo, that is from the substance of bread or wine, or for another reason - we shall say below in disputation 177, at the last chapter; but concerning annihilation it must be said that it is the deletion of some thing into nothing, so that the term ad quem is nothing: and by nothing I mean the non-being of the thing, which by its nature is not conjoined, by force of the deletion, with any entity; for if it were conjoined, the thing would not be said to cease into nothing, but into something. Whether this so happens in transubstantiation will be said in its proper place.

Articulus II - Whether God can create something

It proceeds thus. It seems that God cannot create anything.

1. For according to the Philosopher, in the first book of the Physics, the ancient philosophers received as a common conception of the mind that out of nothing nothing is made. But the power of God does not extend to things contrary to first principles; for instance, that God make that the whole not be greater than its part, or that an affirmation and a negation be true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make or create anything out of nothing.
2. Moreover, if to create is to make something out of nothing, then to be created is for something to be made; but every being-made is a being-changed: therefore creation is a change. But every change is from some subject, as is clear from the definition of motion. For motion is the act of a being existing in potency: therefore it is impossible that something be made by God out of nothing.
3. Moreover, what has been made, it is necessary that it at some time be made. But one cannot say that that which is created is at once being made and has been made: for in permanents, what is being made, is not; but what has been made, already is: therefore at once something would be and not be. Therefore, if something is being made, its being-made precedes its having-been-made. But this cannot be unless there pre-exist a subject in which the very being-made be sustained. Therefore it is impossible that something be made out of nothing.
4. Moreover, it is not permitted to traverse an infinite distance. But there is an infinite distance between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something be made out of nothing.

But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, where the gloss says that to create is to make something out of nothing.

I answer that not only is it not impossible that something be created by God, but it is necessary to posit that all things have been created by God, as is had from the foregoing. For whoever makes something out of something presupposes in his action that out of which he makes, and it is not produced through the same action. Thus the craftsman works from natural things, as from wood and bronze, which are not caused by the action of art, but are caused by the action of nature. And nature itself too causes natural things as to the form, but presupposes matter. Therefore, if God acted only from something presupposed, it would follow that that presupposed thing were not caused by Him. But it has been shown above that nothing can be in beings which is not from God, who is the universal cause of the whole of existence (*esse*). Hence it is necessary to say that God produces things into existence out of nothing.

Reply to the first: The ancient philosophers, as was said above, considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which must presuppose something in their action. And according to this, their common opinion was that out of nothing nothing is made. Yet this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.

Reply to the second: Creation is not a change except according to the mode of understanding alone. For it belongs to the notion of change that the same thing be otherwise now than before. Sometimes indeed it is the same actual being that is so disposed now and before, as in motions according to quantity and quality. Sometimes, however, it is the same being only in potency, as in change according to substance, of which the subject is matter; but in creation, by which the whole substance of things is produced, one cannot take anything the same as otherwise disposed now than before, except according to the intellect alone; as when one understands that some thing before was not at all, and afterwards is. But since action and passion agree in the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations, as is said in the third book of the Physics, it must be that when motion is removed there remain only diverse relations in the creator and the created.[1063] But because the mode of signifying follows the mode of understanding, as has been said, creation is signified under the mode of change. And for this reason it is said that to create is to make something out of nothing; for to make and to be made agree more in this than to change and to be changed: because to make and to be made import the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause; but change does so only consequently.

Reply to the third: In those things which are done without motion, to be being-made and to have been made are simultaneous, whether such a making be the terminus of a motion, as illumination - for at once something is illuminated and is illuminated - or whether it be not the terminus of a motion, as at once a word is formed in the heart and is formed. And in these, what is being made, is, while it is said to be being made. But its being and that it was not before are signified by different aspects. Hence, since creation is without motion, at once something is created and has been created.

1063. Aristotle, Physics, book 3, text 10.

Reply to the fourth: That objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were some infinite medium between nothing and being. This is plainly false. But this false imagination arises from the fact that creation is signified as a kind of change existing between two terms.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative, and it clearly follows from the doctrine set forth above, as the Holy Doctor most aptly deduces it by this reasoning: if God could not create, this would be because something would be presupposed to the operation of God which would not be made by God Himself; but this cannot be, because then there would already be something which would be coeternal with God, or would not be made by Him, which is contrary to the doctrine delivered above: therefore God can so produce something that He brings it about according to the whole of its entity, which is to create.

Articulus III - Whether creation is something in the creature

It proceeds in order. It seems that creation (*creatio*) is not something in the creature.

1. For just as creation taken passively is attributed to the creature, so creation taken actively is attributed to the creator; but creation taken actively is not something in the creator. For if it were so, it would follow that there were something temporal in God. Therefore creation taken passively is not something in the creature.
2. Moreover, there is nothing intermediate between creator and creature. But creation is signified as something intermediate between the two. For it is not the creator, since it is not eternal; nor the creature, because then by the same reasoning one would have to posit another creation by which that very creation were created, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not something.
3. Moreover, if creation is something besides the substance created, it must be an accident of it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore the created thing would be the subject of creation, and thus the same would be the subject of creation and the terminus. But this is impossible. For the subject is prior to the accident, and conserves the accident. The terminus, however, is posterior to the action and passion of which it is the terminus; and, when that action and passion cease, it ceases to exist: therefore creation itself is not some thing.

But on the contrary, it is a greater thing for something to come to be according to the whole substance than according to a substantial or accidental form. But generation simply, or in a qualified sense, by which something comes to be according to a substantial or accidental form, is something in the generated. Therefore, much more is creation, by which something comes to be according to the whole substance, something in the created.

I answer that creation posits something in the created only according to a relation (*relatio*). For what is created does not come to be by motion or change. What comes to be by motion or change comes to be out of something pre-existing; which indeed happens in the productions of particular beings; but it cannot so happen in the production of the whole of existence by the universal cause

of all beings, which is God. Hence God creates, that is, He produces things without motion, with motion subtracted both from action and from passion; nothing remains but a relation, as has been said.

Reply to the third: In things which are made without motion, the coming-to-be and the having-been-made are simultaneous, whether such a making be the terminus of motion, as illumination is (for at once something is illuminated and has been illuminated), or whether it be not the terminus of motion, as when a word is at once formed in the heart and has been formed. And in those things which are made, the thing is, when it is said to be made. But it is signified by something else to have been from another and previously not to have been. Hence, since creation takes place without motion, at once something is created and has been created.

Reply to the fourth: That objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were some infinite medium between nothing and being, which is clearly false. And this false imagination proceeds from the fact that creation is signified as a certain change existing between two termini.

Conclusion: Creation in the creature is nothing other than a certain relation of the creature to God, upon whom it depends; just as in passion, which is a motion, there is a certain relation to the principle of the motion. The points in the doctrine of this article that are worthy of special notation we shall set forth in the following disputation.

Disputatio CLXXIII - Whether creation is a pure relation, or something absolute

- Creation to be a real and absolute influx of God into creatures, is the view of some recent writers. Caput I.
- Creation to be only the relation of the creature to the creator, is the true and common opinion. Caput II.
- The relation of creation is distinguished from the thing created by reason alone. Caput III.
- The arguments of the former opinion are dissolved. Caput IV.

Caput I - The recent opinion: creation as a real and absolute influx

Concerning the nature of creation there still remains to be investigated whether the ratio of production which is in creation be nothing else than a certain relation, or whether besides relation it contains something absolute. Some more recent theologians have said that creation is not a change, properly speaking - in which all the Scholastics agree, because a change ought to have a common subject to both termini, which passes from the one terminus into the other. They add, however, first, that something absolute belongs to the ratio of creation, namely a real influx, by which creatures are said to emanate in time from God. Secondly, that in the creature there is the action and passion of creation in the same way as in a patient there are said to be an action and a passion; and that by it not only is the thing denominated created, but also God denominated

creator and creating, just as from the motion existing in the mobile the agent is said to move and to act, and the mobile to be moved and to suffer. Thirdly, finally, that creation truly belongs to the predicament of action by name, as heating does, and any action which is a motion.

That there is something absolute of the ratio of this production, on which the rest follow, they prove first thus: either creation is the divine willing and understanding, by which God is said to create; or it is a certain respect of reason; or it is a real influx into the creature, by which God is also denominated creating, and which has the ratio of action. Not the first: for to will and to understand in God are the principles of creation; for by them, as by form and power, God creates; therefore they are not the very action of creating. As when an angel by his will moves a stone, the will of that angel is not the motion and action, but the principle of acting; whereas the motion and action are in the thing which is moved. Nor can it be the second: for who would say that action in God is a respect of reason? It will therefore be the third, namely a real influx in the creature.

They prove, moreover, that this is not the very relation of the creature, but something absolute and prior to the relation, in a second way: because the relation of the produced thing in the creature, which is the relation of the creature, is posterior to the creature; but the action which is creation is prior to the creature, because it is the way to it; therefore, besides the relation, there is something else which is rightly called influx, and is something absolute. This they more strongly confirm in a third way: the relation of the creature to God as cause is real, as all grant; therefore it has some real foundation among those which Aristotle assigns in Metaphysics V, chapter 15. And this can be nothing else than an influx and action having an absolute character; both because the relation of the creature is of the second genus, and also because one relation cannot be the foundation of another real relation; therefore there must be a real absolute influx. Fourthly, action and passion, since they constitute a peculiar predicament, are not relations according to being, nor are they essentially completed by relations according to being; otherwise they would not be in another predicament than that of relation; but creation is in the predicament of action; therefore it is neither relation according to being nor completed by relation.

They confirm this, because if the character of motion and transmutation be withdrawn from action, nothing else seems to remain than pure relation; nor can it be explicated by us otherwise, or even understood, than by the concept of relation alone. What the adversaries assert, namely that there is a certain real influx or production which is as it were a way to being, we do not deny. But that this be something absolute they cannot prove; nay rather, against them we have an efficacious argument drawn from the divine processions. For, as I said in the annotations on the first article of question 41, the productions of the divine persons are nothing else than the relations themselves of the persons - active indeed in the producing persons, passive however in the produced persons - so that to generate is nothing else than paternity conceived in one way; and to be generated is nothing but filiation under a different concept; nevertheless they are truly productions, and have the true character of active and passive influx, the imperfections of created things being set aside. Therefore in the same way in creatures one can understand a true ratio of action and passion and of influx, even if the thing itself be nothing but relation.

Whether this kind of action and passion be in the predicament of action and passion, we shall say shortly. For the present I do not dispute whether there be something absolute besides relation and terminus; for this does not pertain to our present purpose.

There is, moreover, a difference between the action and passion which are motions by their genus, on the one hand, and the action and passion which by their genus are not motions, on the other. For action and passion which are motions are in the patient; but an action which is not a motion is in the agent, and the passion, however, is in the patient. Wherefore the action which is creation would indeed be in God the creator, just as also the relation of the creator, unless He Himself were capable of some relation in time. But because He cannot receive that relation, He is denominated creating and creator from the creation existing in the creature; whereas the begetter and the father are denominated the first person from the relation existing in Himself. All these matters have been more at length explained in the place cited.

Caput II - The true and common opinion: creation is only the creature's relation to the creator

Now I add first, that the action of creation is not in the predicament, not because it does not have the true character of a production, or because it is not a motion, but because an action of the predicament ought to be not only by our consideration but in reality an accident. But in order to be an accident it must really be something that happens to a substance; and to this it is necessary that it be distinguished from the substance itself by the nature of the thing. For if it be the same as that substance, it does not really happen to it, even if it be conceived by us after the manner of an accident. Since therefore creation is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from the thing created, as we shall presently say, it will not be a true accident, nor in the predicament of action. By the same reason neither will a relation, which is the same as the substance, whatever that substance be, be in the predicament of relation; not because all the predicaments ought to be distinguished at least formally by the nature of the thing (for a distinction of reason suffices), but because the predicaments of accidents ought to be distinguished from substance by the nature of the thing, in order that they be truly accidents. Moreover, if there were some action and passion which were not a motion nor a transmutation, and yet were not the same in reality with the substance - as is the illumination of the air together with the body of the illuminating source - it would be in the predicament of action. For nothing seems to be lacking for its placement in that predicament, since it is the act of agent and patient; whence it is also gathered that the character of motion does not pertain to the predicament, nor is there something common to action and passion - not because it is (as Logicians say) an incomplete being and a way (for both action and passion are also a way), but because there can be an action and a passion which are not motions nor a transmutation, as in the example given. Wherefore, since motion is not something common to these predicaments, nor is it contained under any of them, it will not be in any predicament.

Next, notice that since every action is a certain medium between the thing produced and the producer, because it is the act by which the producer produces, creation likewise is a medium between God and the creature produced. I have of set purpose added "produced": because, since creation is the end in respect of essence and nature, it is contained under the universality of creatures which are distinguished from God. But if one speak of creatures which have the ratio of a produced terminus, creation is rightly compared to the author's medium by which creatures are produced; yet it is not itself to be called a production, because a production is not produced. For that reason, however, it does not have the character of God.

Caput III - More probable: the relation of creation is not really distinct from the substance of the creature

The more probable opinion is that the relation of creation is not really distinguished from the substance of the creature, as Scotus most aptly proves in that question: as often as relation and substance or the absolute stand in such a way that the one, even by the absolute power of God, cannot be without the other, they cannot be really distinguished; or at least we have no argument to prove a real distinction between them. But so it is with creation and the creature; therefore we cannot assert that they are distinguished by the nature of the thing. And universally, a real distinction cannot be gathered between those things which are in the same subject and cannot be separated even by absolute power.

Wherefore it is false what Cajetan in this article, Ferrariensis and Capreolus in the places alleged, teach, namely that creation is distinguished according to the thing from the thing created.[1064] From which Cajetan, above on question 27, article 2, and Ferrariensis, Contra gentiles IV, against chapter 14, in the little verse "Ad alias rationes," hold that every real relation is distinguished from the absolute and from the subject in which it is.[1065] But their common reason is this: because every kind of accident is of itself distinguished from substance; and also because the genus of relation has a different being from the other genera of accidents.

Further, we say: Creation is a real and absolute influx of God into creatures, according to the sense of some recent writers; they confirm their view by authorities who suppose that if the character of motion and transmutation be lacking to action, nothing remains but pure relation - Richard, In I Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1; and again, Durandus, In I Sent., q. 2, n. 19; as also is supposed by Scotus, In I Sent., q. 5; Gregory of Rimini, In the same distinction, q. 6, concl. 2 and 3, when he asserts that creation and conservation are not distinguished from the thing created and conserved.[1066] But, as noted above, the relation of the creature to God is real and has a foundation; yet from this it does not follow that there is some absolute action in addition to the relation, as has been shown.

1064. Cajetan, on ST I, q. 45, a. 3; Ferrariensis, secundo Contra gentiles, cap. 16 and 18; Capreolus, In II Sent., distinctions as cited in the text.

1065. Cajetan, on ST I, q. 27, a. 2; Ferrariensis, In IV Contra gentiles, cap. 14, ad alias rationes.

1066. Richard of Middleton, In I Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1, and elsewhere; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., q. 2, n. 19; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 5; Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., the same distinction, q. 6, concl. 2 - 3.

Note also: when it was said above, while treating of the divine names, that the relation of the creature to God is real, this was distinguished from the relation in God to the creature, which is not real but according to reason only.[1067] And this very point shows how creation, in the creature, is nothing other than a relation to the Creator as the principle of its existence.

Finally, that the relation of the creature to God has a real foundation, Aristotle teaches by enumerating in Metaphysics V, chapter 15, the ways in which relations are founded in realities; from which it follows, however, not that there is some absolute action distinct from the creature itself, but rather that the relation has its foundation in that which is identical with the creature's substance.[1068]

Creation is not in a category, not because it does not have the true notion of production, or because it is not motion; but because the action of a category ought to be not only by our consideration, but in reality an accident (*accidens*). Now, in order for it to be an accident it must in reality befall some substance (*substantia*); and for this it is necessary that it be distinguished from the substance itself by nature of the thing. For if it be the same as that, it does not really befall it, even if by us it be conceived after the mode of an accident. Therefore, since creation is not distinguished by nature of the thing from the created thing, as we shall presently say; it will not be a true accident, nor in the category (*praedicamentum*) of action (*actio*). For the same reason, neither will a relation (*relatio*), which is the same as the substance, whatever that substance be, be in the category of relation; not because all the categories ought to be distinguished at least formally by nature of the thing (for a distinction of reason suffices); but because the categories of accidents ought to be distinguished from substance by nature of the thing, in order truly to be accidents.

However, if there were some action and passion which would not be motion (*motus*) nor change, and yet would not be the same in reality as the substance - such as the illumination of the air beginning at the same time with the very body of the air - it would be in the category of action. For nothing seems lacking, by which it should not be placed in that category, since it is the act of an agent and of a patient: whence it is also gathered that the notion of motion does not pertain to a category, nor is it something common to action and passion; not because it is, as the Logicians say, an incomplete being and a way; for action also and passion are a way: but because there can be action and passion which are not motion nor change, as in the example proposed. Wherefore, since motion is not something common to these categories, nor is it contained under any of them, it will not be in any category.

Next, note that every action is a certain medium between the thing produced and the producer, because it is the act by which the producer produces; so creation too is a medium between God and the creature produced. I have expressly added "produced," because, since creation belongs to a finite essence (*essentia*) and nature (*natura*), it is contained under the universality of creatures, which is distinguished from God. But if we speak of creatures which have the notion of a produced terminus, as that about which we speak; creation is rightly compared as the middle act, by which

1067. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7.
1068. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, c. 15.

the creature is produced: the production itself, however, is not said to be produced; because production is not produced. For this reason it does not have the notion of God. Disputation 116, chapter 5. And since thus creation and the created thing stand, the same must be said of them. Moreover, as for the relation of creation, it is distinguished from the created thing only by reason.

It cannot be "multiplied" in beings that perfectly subsist by their nature, as is manifest in spirits and in matter; or at least we do not have a foundation for devising various modes of creation, each of which could be separated from the created thing, that is, that the created thing could be created in one or another mode: and since such things cannot by God be put forth otherwise than by creation, it is rather to be said that there is one creation of these things, without which they themselves cannot exist. A difficulty could arise in those forms which can be produced in a subject and outside a subject; of these, however, we shall speak at the end of the following chapter.

But when Cajetan says that creation is therefore distinguished from substance, because creation is an accident, since it is a relation; and that an accident ought to be distinguished from substance; he supposes that which in truth had to be proved. For this relation in reality is not an accident of substance, since it implies a contradiction that the substance be without it; but it is apprehended as an accident only by our mode of conceiving, whereas in truth it is substance.

Moreover, Scotus, on the First Book, distinction 1, that question, section 5, Second member, according to the common doctrine of his school, added that creation and the created thing are distinguished by nature of the thing formally, just as he philosophizes concerning the attributes of God and many other things; he himself gathers this distinction in the present matter, as among many others, from various enunciations. For we enunciate many things of creation which cannot be predicated of the thing itself created. However, we have shown sufficiently that this reason is frivolous, disputation 120, chapter 6, where we have shown that, by reason alone, which is contained in the various names imposed by us, contrary things can be enunciated of the same thing, named and conceived in a diverse mode.

Finally, from what has been said it is gathered that creation is not an influx really distinct from the created thing after the mode of a way in the category of action: for thus it would be an accident distinct by nature of the thing from the very thing produced: and since it would previously be outside causes in the real order of the nature by which the thing is produced, by it it would have to have a subject previously; since its existence by its very nature is to be in another. Some reply that creation indeed has for its subject the created thing itself, not that in which it inheres, but that to which it adheres; and although the subject of the inhesion of some accident ought to be considered together with the accident, nevertheless they say the subject of adhesion can be subsequent. Further, they collect a difference between the subject of adhesion and of inhesion, because in a different mode the point is in the line, and the part in the whole, and the substantial mode (*modus substantialis*) in the thing, of which it is the mode; than an accident is in a subject. But this response seems frivolous: and first, that distinction seems to have been fabricated only in words, to elude, unless we attend to the force of the word; for no less properly can it be said that whiteness adheres to the wall than that it inheres; and conversely, no less properly can it be said that a point inheres than that it adheres. But if in the thing itself there is some difference, it is only this, that a

point in a line is not as an accident in a substance, but as a mode in a thing, and a substantial mode in a substance. Therefore, in the same way, since creation, in the adversaries' view, is truly an accident, it will, no less than other accidents, require for itself a subject of inhesion. Therefore, since the existence of an accident by its very nature is in another; in that which is prior by nature, in which creation precedes the created thing, it ought to have some subject: for this reason we proved in the following disputation that accidents are not created; because they cannot fail to be made in a subject, unless when by God they are produced really separate. But creation, in that prior, cannot have a subject, as is evident; therefore it is not a real accident. Moreover, since an accident depends on matter as on a cause, it cannot be in anything real prior, even by nature, without a subject.

Caput IV - The arguments of the prior opinion are resolved

The arguments of the prior opinion are most easily resolved from what has been said thus far. To the first, we say that creation is not an action of the will of God, nor understanding; for these are the principles of creating, not creation itself: and the action of creation is no other than the relation in the created thing; otherwise, it would have to be in the created as an active origin is in the producing person; and from it God would be denominated in the creature by an extrinsic denomination real: but which be the cause of this we have shown above. Moreover, it is not difficult, without any mutation in God himself, nor of a real relation, that now by creation something should flow from him which previously did not emanate, solely by the mutation of the thing produced.

Reply to the second: one must philosophize in the same way, by our mere mode of understanding, about creation as action and passion, and about the relation of the creature compared with the creature produced, as about passive origin and relation compared with the person produced. For just as, by our mode of understanding alone, active and passive origin is pre-understood as a way before the person, and then relation and the person which is constituted by relation, although in reality relation and origin are the same; so too we first understand, after the manner of other things which come to be little by little, the creature as it were on the way and in becoming; and this is creation with respect to God, and passion with respect to the creature produced: then we understand the thing itself produced, and finally the relation of the produced and the creature as in actual being, because we do not understand it as a property constituting, as we do the divine relation with respect to the person. But this order is not real, nor in duration, nor in nature; but by reason alone: because all these things which we have said are distinguished by our mode of conceiving and naming alone.

Reply to the third: a real relation is not real because it really differs from its foundation; but because by nature of the thing it is referred to another: which is apparent in the divine relations, which are truly real, and yet are distinguished neither from that in which they are, nor from the foundation by reason of which they are said to arise: nor indeed is there any need that these two be distinguished from the relation: nor did Aristotle teach this, but in Metaphysics, chapter 15, when

enumerating the kinds of relations, he assigned various accounts which philosophers have been wont to call foundations, although Aristotle never used this name.[1069] He took the first kind according to number, that is, according to unity or plurality in substance, quality, or quantity: and sometimes a relation is not really distinguished from the substance, quality, and quantity in which it is founded. I said sometimes, namely when it cannot be separated from them, nor quality and quantity from relation. For when these foundations can remain without the relation, it must be certain that the relation is distinguished in reality from its foundation, as a mode is distinguished from the thing of which it is the mode, as is established from what was said above, disputation 116, chapter 5. He took the second kind according to powers and their actions: and yet the relation of a power, which is founded in a power, is not really distinguished from it. The third kind is of those related things which by name alone are referred to others, because others are really referred to them; which does not pertain to our present purpose. Incidentally, however, it is worth noting that these are called "related according to saying" (*secundum dici*), because by name alone they are referred, although in reality they are absolute things, says Henry; and he says that these and other similar things, which are referred by name alone, are nevertheless in reality absolute; and he says that they were defined by Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter on relation, by the prior definition, which is at the beginning of the chapter in this way: "Those are said to be relative which are what they are of others, or are said to be to something in some other way"; where he only defines the relative by this, that it is said "to another": for afterwards, in the same chapter, because Aristotle saw that this definition was not rightly given of relatives which are placed in the category, but also suited others, he adduced another of those which are not only said, but really are, "to another." Which is this: "Those are relative whose being is the same as having their being disposed to another in some way."[1070]

I observe well that not a few Thomists call that relation "according to saying" which is of the essence of some absolute thing; such as, in their opinion, is the relation of a power: even if such a relation be truly real. They distinguish, moreover, a real relation into a relation "according to saying" and a relation "according to being." I for my part consider this division inept. For a real relation cannot fail to be a relation according to being and according to nature. Moreover, a relation which is real is not only a relation according to saying, which is not merely according to name. Nor indeed has the aforesaid opinion and division a foundation in the holy Doctor: for he, in Prima Pars, question 13, article 7, to the first, only said that some relative names were imposed to signify the very relative habits: as lord, father, etc.; and these, he says, are relative according to being, that is, the thing signified by this name, namely lord, father, etc., is a relative according to being. But he says that some were imposed to signify the things which relations and habits follow: as mover, moved, head, "headedness," and others of this sort, which are said to be relative according to saying; where St. Thomas does not call the relations themselves "according to saying," but the absolute things themselves, which habits follow, he calls "relatives according to saying,"

1069. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 15.

1070. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 7 (On Relation). See also Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 4. On St. Thomas, see Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, ad 1.

because of themselves they are not referred really "to another," although they have the name; and perhaps that and other things of this sort, which are said to be relative according to saying, does not refer to all those which he had said, namely to mover and to moved, but to head and "headedness." The aforesaid Thomists, however, call a relation "according to saying," even if by nature of the thing, and not by name alone, it exists and befits things, that relation which does not require that its terminus exist at the same time with it; but is referred to a non-existent thing, in the way that knowledge is referred to the knowable which is not yet. For Aristotle, in the Categories, in the chapter on relation...

Among the properties of the relative of that predicamental order he set down this, that the things related are simultaneous by nature. Yet this foundation is slight, so that we should call those relatives, which are referred to a thing not yet existing, relatives according to saying; although they could be called relatives which do not pertain to the real predicamental order: because, although they are referred to a non-existent terminus, nevertheless in reality they are referred, and are not said to be "to another" by name alone. Why, then, are they to be called relatives according to saying, if indeed they are not said to be predicamental, but relatives, and truly are relatives?

Add that Aristotle both constitutes and numbers relation to a non-existent terminus among the relatives of the category "to something" in Metaphysics V, chapter 15, namely the efficient to that which is makeable or to be made; and in the same chapter he says that the knowable is said to be relative to another from this, that another thing, namely knowledge, is referred, that is, in reality, to it. Finally, in the Categories, in the chapter on relation, when he had adduced as a property of relatives that they are simultaneous by nature, at length, because he saw that many things related are referred to a non-existent terminus, as knowledge to the knowable, he does not admit this condition as a true property of the relatives of this category; and he assigns only one true property of this category in the last place, namely that one cannot know the relative determinately unless one also knows that to which it is referred - a property which also befits those relatives that are referred to a non-existent terminus. And therefore these relatives ought to be placed in this category: because to that to which the passion in the fourth mode of some category befits, the essence of that category also befits. We have therefore the foundation, which is the reason out of which relation arises, that by the nature of the thing it is not always distinguished from relation itself.[1071][1072]

To the fourth I answer first, that creation is not in the category of action, as I noted in chapter 2; and therefore it matters little if it be entirely the same in reality as the relation of the creature. Then I say that, in order that some things be in diverse categories, it is enough if by our reason they are distinguished; nor is a distinction by the nature of the thing between them necessary for this: wherefore, if other things necessary were present, that creation be an action, it would be in a category, and nothing would hinder its real identity with the relation.

1071. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 15.
1072. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 7 (On Relation).

Nevertheless, certain more recent authors, in order to prove that creation is really distinguished from the created thing, argue from separation, from which this real distinction is rightly gathered, in this way: Although the created thing cannot be without some creation, just as quantity cannot be without "where," which is one of the ten categories; nevertheless it can be without this determinate creation, with another; just as quantity can be without this "where," with another. Which is quite enough, they say, for us to say that it is distinguished as a mode is distinguished from the thing, and "where" from the body in which it inheres. That the creature can be without this creation, but with another, and thus that creation can vary, they indeed cannot gather from all the forms that are created; for in simple things and in matter itself this variation of creation does not appear, as they themselves frankly admit; but in forms which, if they were produced by God outside a subject, would be said to be created, but if produced in a subject, would not be created, but would be produced by generation.

Some, overwhelmed by this argument, said that these forms are always created, whether in a subject or outside a subject. But in the following disputation we shall show amply enough that forms which by their nature cannot of themselves subsist, when they are produced in a subject, cannot be created. I answer, therefore, that although in forms which by their nature require to be in matter and cannot subsist of themselves, the production is not the same when they are produced of themselves and when they are generated in a subject; nonetheless it is not permitted from this to infer that any form which subsists of itself, as an angel and the soul, can be created by various creations. For in other forms it has not yet been proved, nor can it be proved, that they can be created by one and by another creation, but only that they can be produced by various productions: because the thing itself can be in various ways, both by itself and in another. But when it is produced by itself, since it always is in the same way, there is no basis from which we can gather that it can be produced by various creations: for if the thing produced itself is varied neither as to substance nor as to mode, by no reason can we gather that it can be created by diverse creations. But that the same form, being in a different way, namely either by itself or in another, is produced by diverse productions, of which one is creation, the other generation, the very different mode of the form's existing seems to demand. Wherefore it does not follow from this that, in forms which always are in the same way, creation is distinguished from the created thing: for the inference, that it could be produced now by this, now by that creation, does not hold.

Nor does it follow in forms which, being in a different way, are produced in a different way. For when they are created, they always are in the same way. Wherefore the creation of them does not seem able to be separated from those things, as they are in that way.

But if it is separated from them and is really distinguished, it is by reason of a real mode which is varied in them; by reason of which variation the same thing can be really distinguished from itself, as we showed above in the disputation, chapter on modes.

Nay, from what has been said, against the opposite opinion such a line of reasoning can be formed. When an accidental form is produced outside a subject, that creation cannot be separated from the terminus, nor the terminus from that creation: therefore there is no cause why we should say that it is really distinguished. Further, that the terminus cannot be separated from that

creation, or conversely, is proved thus: An accidental form existing of itself cannot be separated from the creation by which it is then created; but the terminus of creation is an accidental form existing of itself: therefore the terminus of creation cannot be separated from that creation by which it is then created. This form of arguing is syllogistic; the premises indeed are most well known; and if any of them need confirmation, it is the minor: but that is proved thus. That creation cannot be terminated at an accidental form considered as separated, insofar as it is form only, not considered with separation and existence of itself - whether that mode of existing of itself be a negation or be positive - otherwise any accidental form, when it is in a subject, could by a prior nature be conceived as produced by God by creation, before being conjoined to a subject and made by the generation of a created agent. This, however, besides the fact - which we shall demonstrate in the following disputation - that it is false, would altogether remove the difficulty of the argument proposed against our opinion, by which our adversaries strove to prove that the creation of forms which by their nature depend on a subject is really distinguished from them, from the fact that creation could be separated from them when by a creation outside a subject they can be created and without creation be produced in a subject: but this would by no means follow, if creation were terminated at this form according to substance, before it were considered in a subject or outside; and thus it would always depend on God in the same way whether in a subject or outside.

Add that, since St. Thomas says that creation is of subsistents, as will be proved in the following disputation, a separated accidental form cannot be the terminus of creation, unless with the mode of per se subsistence; but creation cannot be separated from a form with this mode; and thus in no way ought it be distinguished from it: for that it would be separated from it when the mode of per se subsistence were separated, does not argue a distinction from the terminus.

Here it is also to be observed that this mode of per se, in an accidental form, is not produced by a production distinct from the production of the form. For although some mode is produced by a different production than the production of the thing of which it is the mode, as where; nevertheless the mode of existing, since it does not have any existence other than the thing of which it is the mode, as we showed in Disputation 126, chapter 3, is not therefore produced by a different production; otherwise, when an accidental form is produced in a subject with the mode of inherence, the form itself ought to be produced according to itself by one production, and the very mode whereby it inheres by another distinct production: which is false. But the mode of a thing then does not have a different existence and production, when it is a mode of the very existence; but if it be another mode, as where, it has a different existence.

You will say that the terminus of creation is the form, not with the positive mode of per se subsistence, but with the negation of being in another; and thus, if it were the same as the substance negated, it could not be separated from it, even if later it were to have a positive mode in another. But this solution is weak, first because when an accident is per se, it has no less a positive mode than when a substantial nature is per se: but that the mode of the substantial nature's existing per se is something positive, we shall prove in the prologue to part 3, question 4, article 2; and the Thomist school readily admits it. And otherwise, when God were preserving accidents outside a subject, he would effect nothing new or more in them, but would only remove the prior

mode of preserving them in a subject. Then also, even if that mode of per se were a negation, nonetheless it would not follow that creation is distinguished from the created thing: because when that accidental form produced per se were conjoined to a subject, creation would then no longer remain; for this would happen because to the production of that form there would be added a new mode of inhering and depending on a subject, which all concede to be positive. Wherefore from the created thing, without some additional real mode being added, it would not be distinguished; but from the created thing with the addition of a new mode it would be distinguished; because by reason of the mode the same thing is really distinguished from itself.

Articulus IV - Whether to be created is proper to composites and subsistents

Fourthly one proceeds thus. It seems that to be created is not proper to composites and subsistents. For it is said in the book On Causes: The first of created things is existence. But the existence of a created thing is not subsistent and composite. Therefore creation is not properly of what is subsistent and composite.[1073]

1. Further: What is created is from nothing. But composites are not from nothing, but from their components. Therefore it does not befit composites to be created.
2. Further: That is properly produced by the first emanation which is presupposed in the second. Thus natural things are by natural generation, which presupposes the operation of art. But that which is presupposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter is what is properly created, and not the composite.

But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But heaven and earth are composite, subsistent things. Therefore creation is proper to these.

I answer that to be created is a certain becoming, as has been said; but becoming is ordered to the existence of the thing. Whence to those things it properly befits to become and to be created, to which it befits to be. But this properly belongs to subsistents, whether they are simple, as separated substances, or composite, as material substances. For to these it properly befits "to be," which have existence and which are subsistent in their own existence. But forms and accidents, and other things of this sort, are not called beings as if they themselves were something, but because something has them: thus white is said to be a being because the subject is white; whence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly said to be a being by co-existence than to be a being. Therefore, just as accidental forms and the like which do not subsist are more co-existences than beings, so they ought rather to be called co-created than created. But subsistents are properly created.

Reply to the first: When it is said that the first of created things is existence, the term "existence" does not import a created substance, but it imports the proper notion of the object of creation. For from this a thing is said to be created, that it is an ens, not from this that it is this ens;

1073. ps.-Aristotle, Liber de Causis, prop. 1 (as commonly cited).

since creation is the emanation of the whole existence from the universal being, as has been said. And the mode of speaking is similar to this: if it were said that the first visible is color, although that which is properly seen is the colored thing.

Reply to the second: Creation does not signify the constitution of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but a composite is said to be created, which is produced into existence together with all its principles.

Reply to the third: That line of reasoning does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter is not except from creation. For creation is the production of the whole existence, and not of matter alone.

The conclusion is: Creation is properly of subsistents; but forms which by their natural necessity are in another are not properly created, but co-created. The truth of this conclusion and the whole matter of this article the following disputation will examine.

Disputatio CLXXIV - On whether grace and the supernatural gifts are created or co - created in us

Caput I - Many Scholastics judged that grace and the supernatural gifts in us are created

Although it is certain among the Scholastics that no natural form, whether accidental or substantial, which by its very nature depends, in order to be, upon matter (*materia*), is produced by a creation (*creatio*) proper to it; nevertheless, concerning grace and all the supernatural gifts, all the ancient Scholastics who made mention of this matter think that they are produced by no production proper to them other than creation. Thus expressly taught Alexander,[1074] St. Bonaventure,[1075] Richard,[1076] and Scotus.[1077]

Against that opinion Gabriel, Capreolus, Peter Ailly, Major, and Conrad, in the places noted, set themselves. Likewise Dominicus Soto, Vega, Ledesma, and the Ferrariense, in part agree with Paludanus and Cajetan when they assert that grace is not created, but co - created, that is, that it cannot be produced by any production other than creation, or co - produced along with it; for the others affirm absolutely that it is created

The foundation of this position, in so far as it asserts that grace is created, is this: because it is produced by God alone, like the rational soul, and from nothing; and because in man there do not precede merits, nor is there any natural potency toward such a form, of which it might be said that it is educed; for the opposite seemed to them to agree with the error of Pelagius. Wherefore, for the same reason, they reckon grace to be a quality infused by God alone and created by Him. Add the places of Scripture in which man is said to be created in grace, which we reported in Disputation

1074. Alexand., c. p. q. 9, m. 8.
1075. Bonavent., II Sent., dist. 26, art. 1, q. 4; et in IV Sent., dist. ...
1076. Ricard., in II Sent., dist. 26, art. 1, q. 2; et in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 5.
1077. Scotus, in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 5.

173, chapter 1.[1089] But Cajetan and Paludanus, since they saw, according to the opinion of St. Thomas in this article 4, that creation is only of subsistents (*subsistentia*), said that grace is not created, but co-created, while the man who is in grace is created; and from this it is thought probable in this matter: although something is supposed in the production of grace - namely, the soul and the man who is made gracious - yet that which precedes grace itself and is compared to it as subject (*subiectum*), is continually conserved by God as a whole, which is to be created; for the continual conservation of the whole existence is a certain production from nothing and, therefore, is creation. Hence the whole man in grace is created, and grace with him, which Cajetan and Paludanus call grace's being co-created; just as if a horse were created, its soul would be co-created, not, however, said to be created. And likewise, when an Angel in the first instant was produced as to substance, and in grace, his grace was co-created together with his nature. As, however, it is now also said that grace is co-created in the soul, nothing seems to stand in the way because the soul temporally preceded; since it is continually produced by God from nothing in the same way as in the first instant. If, therefore, in that first instant grace would be created, now too at whatever time it would be said to be created.

Caput II - That neither grace nor any accidental or substantial form that by its nature depends on a subject or on matter is created or co - created is proved by authority

If we rightly inspect the definition of creation, explained by us in Disputation 173, it will be easy to conjecture that the opposite opinion, which we set down in the previous chapter, is much more probable - namely, that neither grace nor any accidental or substantial form, which by its nature depends upon a subject (*subiectum*) or upon matter, is created or co-created, but is produced by a peculiar action of eduction from the potency of matter. This I deem altogether true, not only when grace begins later in time than the subject, but also when it begins together with something else.

As to other forms besides grace, I find no mention among the Scholastics; but from the very nature and definition of creation, what I have said I will confirm in the following chapter. But with respect to grace and the supernatural gifts, it is proved by the authority of St. Thomas that they are not created.

First, because in 1-2, question 110, article 2, to the third, he teaches that no accident (*accidens*) is properly corrupted or made, but is made or corrupted according as the subject begins, or ceases, to be actually through it; and for this reason St. Thomas says that grace is not created because it is an accidental form, unless from this, that men are said to be created according to it, that is, to be established in a new existence from nothing, that is, not from merits.[1090] By these words, first, he plainly denies that grace is created, because its being is an in-being, as is that of other forms; and he openly indicates that it is educed from the innate potency of the soul itself, as other accidents are from the potency of the subject. Then he also denies that grace is co-created, against Cajetan and Paludanus, because he explains that phrase, from nothing, in such a way that it does not

1089. Vázquez, Disputatio 173, cap. 1.
1090. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.

exclude any kind of being from which grace is said to be made, but [excludes] merits. But whether merits precede or do not precede is of no moment to the notion of natural creation, but only of moral creation, about which we spoke in Disputation 173, chapter 1. He therefore holds that grace is not co-created. For since in the definition of creation it is said, from nothing, merits - one's own or another's - are not excluded, but something pertaining to the constitution and natural being of the thing to be produced. For who does not see that moral merits are only compared to the thing produced naturally, or contribute nothing? Whence it also is clear that the testimonies of Scripture which we alleged in that first chapter do not prove the opinion of Cajetan and the others mentioned above, as we shall explain there.

Moreover, from the doctrine of the same St. Thomas, according to the understanding of many Thomists, the same thing is gathered: for St. Thomas himself thinks, in the following article, that no instrument (he understands a physical instrument) can be assumed for creating; and yet he himself, in the Third Part, question 62, article 1, as many Thomists think, asserts that the sacraments of the New Law are physical instruments of grace.[1091] Therefore he could not have thought that grace in the soul is created or co-created; for thus already an instrument would be assumed for creating. For even if grace itself were co-created, and the sacraments worked to co-produce it, they would also have to concur to the creation of the whole, in which at the same time grace itself is created.

But Dominicus Soto, Paludanus, and Capreolus, in order to defend their opinion and at the same time to uphold with St. Thomas that the sacraments of the New Law are God's instruments in the production of grace, have contrived certain evasions. First, Dominicus Soto, in the place cited and in IV, distinction 1, question 3, article 1, asserts that grace is indeed by one action created by God alone without any instrument; but by another action, through the sacraments as instruments, it is united to the soul; and this union is not creation: just as the rational soul, according to itself, is produced by creation, but by another action, which is generation, it is infused into, and conjoined to, the body. This evasion Andreas de Vega endeavors to bar, in the place cited, by this reasoning: It cannot be that some agent, or instrument, can join together two things, unless it has power and potency over both; but the humanity of Christ and the sacraments have no power over the very substance of grace, since, according to Soto's opinion, they do not touch its production; therefore neither will they be able to unite grace with the subject. However, by this reasoning Andreas de Vega strikes down Dominicus Soto rather than shuts him off. For just as a man by generative power joins the soul to the body, although he has no power concerning the production of the substance of the soul, so also it could happen that the sacraments would join grace to the soul, even if they had no power concerning the production of the substance of grace, if nothing else stood in the way.

Therefore, by another reasoning, which the same Vega hints at briefly, Dominicus Soto can be refuted more easily: because the production of grace is the production of an accident; but every production bestows being on the thing produced; therefore, since the being of grace is an in-being

1091. St. Thomas, III, q. 62, a. 1.

in a nature as subject, it will be the same thing that grace be produced and be conjoined to the subject. Wherefore, if the sacraments attain by their instrumental efficacy to the being of grace, they pertain also to the conjunction of it with the soul. Paludanus and Capreolus, however, to defend their opinion, say that the sacraments do not produce grace, but a certain previous quality, which they call the adornment of the soul. But besides the fact that this quality seems without any foundation and fabricated merely to evade, the opinion of these men is easily refuted by Scotus and Gabriel. For if that adornment is the ultimate disposition which grace most nearly follows, it ought to be of the same supernatural order with it; wherefore there will be the same account of it as of grace, and its production will be creation in the same way as the production of grace; or neither will be, but each will be educed from the potency of the subject.

Finally, Cajetan and Conrad take refuge in saying that grace is not created, but co-created; for they do not think it absurd, or contrary to the mind of the holy Doctor, that the sacraments be assumed as instruments for co-creating, although they cannot be assumed for creating. Yet, against each of these there are not less effective considerations available.

Caput III - The preceding opinion is confirmed by reason

A single line of reasoning, drawn from the very definition of creation, by which the opinion set forth in the preceding chapter can be proved universally, is this. Creation is the production of a being as being, that is, of the whole of a thing's existence (*esse*), not of this or that sort of being. Therefore, whether a thing is made by God alone or with [another], if nevertheless that [which is made] is not according to the whole existence, but is made according to such-and-such an existence, it will not be creation. For this reason the conjunction only of soul and body - although it can be brought about by God alone - is not creation; because that conjunction is not according to the whole existence of the being, but, which is something else, [is according to] its being such-and-such an entity, namely, a human. Whence the restoration is not from non-being, but from non-man; and, finally, the production of such an entity, as such an entity, is not from non-being, but from a non-such entity, which is always something. This is clearly the definition of creation handed down by St. Thomas in article 1 of this question,[1092] and explained by us in Disputation 173. Therefore, wherever some form (*forma*) comes to be in a subject or in matter, which by its nature depends upon a subject or upon matter, since as to its being it is not produced as a substance, but [produces] such-and-such an entity whose natural being of that form is to be in another, or to inform another, not to be through itself; therefore when such a form is produced, it is not created, nor co-created, but is generated together with the whole which it composes, or is produced according to some other common account. Of this sort are all substantial forms, except the rational soul, and all accidents, even the supernatural ones; because by their very nature they require to be in a subject, since by their very nature they depend upon that by which and in which they establish such-and-such an existence of such-and-such [a thing]. Hence, it is not from non-being, but from a non-such being, which is some [being].

1092. St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 1.

This is clearly shown by that opinion which Scotus sets down in IV, distinction 1, question 1: for this reason, he says in conclusion 3, that no material form can be created, because, in order that it be created, it must first in nature be before it is an in-being in a subject; but since its being is an in-being depending on a subject, it does not exist first before it is in a subject.[1093] And Durandus, in the second book, against Scotus teaches that by nature the natural forms are in the thing before they are in matter; for indeed their being is an in-being, depending on a subject or on matter.[1094]

In its own kind, this must be understood so that, before the whole composite is considered of which it is the form, the form itself is conceived as a ratio, not, however, as something existing and produced in itself; the same is to be said, for example, of accidental forms. Wherefore it must also be said that they are educed from the native potency of the subject (*subiectum*), because their being depends on the subject as on a proper cause.

But if the discourse be about grace (*gratia*), and other supernatural accidental forms, the same must be said; and it has nothing in common with Pelagians or Semipelagians. For they never contended with Catholics about this, but about other diverse heads which we have rehearsed in Disputation 89, chapters 4 and 5; and thus St. Augustine, although he strongly opposes both, especially in the books On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Good of Perseverance, nevertheless in the first book, chapter 5, toward the end, says thus: "To be able to have faith, as to be able to have charity, is of the nature of men (and in this he acknowledges no grace); but to have faith, in the way that to have charity, is of the grace of the faithful." He therefore grants a native potency in man so that he may be able to have faith and charity, not only by the operation and infusion of God alone, but also by his own cooperation; for he speaks of the acts of these virtues, which are vital operations. Wherefore there is in the soul also a native potency of receiving from God alone the habits of these virtues. And although this potency cannot be called natural, but obediential (for these appellations are taken from the order to the form which the potency receives), nevertheless it can be called native or inborn, because it follows upon nativity itself and the natural constitution of man; for thus it is referred only to the nature which it follows, not to the form which it receives. Therefore the ancient Scholastics feared in vain to concede that grace and other supernatural gifts are educed from the potency of the soul, thinking that, if they asserted this, they would be agreeing with Pelagius, since indeed against Pelagius the Church teaches only that by the proper powers of our will, without the help of grace, a man cannot observe the law, overcome temptations, be justified, persevere, and merit the kingdom of heaven; but against the Semipelagians, that we cannot by our own powers, without the help of grace, offer some beginnings to God of our justification, as was explained in the place cited.[1095]

1093. Scotus, in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1 (conclusio 3).

1094. Durandus, in II Sent., d. ..., q. 4, n. 39, contra Scotum.

1095. Vázquez, Disputatio 89, cap. 4 - 5; cf. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum; De bono perseverantiae, lib. 1, cap. 5.

And so in Disputation 173, chapter 1, we called our justification a certain moral creation, because in injustice we are created from nothing, that is, from no proper work. For this reason also it is said, Psalm 55: "For nothing will he save them," as I explained according to the mind of St. Augustine and Prosper, Disputation 91, chapter 14, at the end.[1096]

On the contrary, among the remaining substantial forms, the rational soul alone is by a certain peculiar reason created as its own and produced from nothing. For although it confers upon the matter to which it is conjoined the being of man, which is such a being; yet because it is by itself by nature apt to subsist and to be per se without matter, therefore it is produced by creation, and cannot be educed from the potency of matter, because its being is absolute being (*esse absolute*), nor does it depend on another. Whence it is also clear that Soto does not argue rightly from the rational soul to grace, in order to prove that by nature grace is created by God alone before it comes to the subject; for the difference is manifest: that the rational soul in its production does not depend upon matter, and so its being is simply being; but grace, since it is an accident (*accidens*), depends no less upon the subject in order that it may be, than any other accidental form, because its being is the being of another; and hence its being is not simply being, but such a being, as was explained above by us. But if substantial and accidental forms were produced without a subject, they would indeed be created, because then simply being would come to be according to the whole in a way other than when they are produced in a subject or in matter; for thus their being is to be in another or to inhere; and so the being which results from them is made not from nothing but from matter. Wherefore, since it is commonly said that forms are not produced as what, but are co - produced by the same production with the whole, it follows that forms inhering in a subject or in matter are neither created nor produced, but are co - generated, if the whole which coalesces from them and the subject or matter is said to be generated; which will be more fully explained in the following chapter

Some, however, assert that every accidental form, even if it is produced in a subject, essentially depends upon God, and that this reason of dependence on God cannot be separated from it, because it is essential to every creature to depend on God; and therefore by this reason it proceeds by nature from God before it is produced in a subject by a second cause. They say moreover that this which they call dependence on God always remains in the form itself, whether it is produced in a subject or outside a subject; but that it has the notion of creation only when it is outside a subject, not, however, when it is produced in a subject, because to be created is not only to depend on God in that way, but also not to be produced at the same time in a subject by another action.

Yet it is not to be wondered at that in theological and philosophical matters new and unheard-of opinions are devised daily, if once the very definition of the thing is not rightly held. The falsity of this opinion is clear first from what has been said: because, since the being of an accidental form is to inhere (*inesse*), it cannot, as we were inferring above, be produced in the order of nature in any way prior to being in a subject, unless when in reality it remains without a subject. But if it were first produced in reality, like the rational soul, in that earlier instant it would be produced from

1096. Vázquez, Disputatio 173, cap. 1; Disputatio 91, cap. 14; cf. Psalm 55: "Pro nihilo salvos faciet eos"; St. Augustine; Prosper.

nothing, and its being would be simply being; and hence it would be created, as is clear from what has been said. Next, if by nature that form were first produced by God, it could not then be produced by a second cause, but only be conjoined to a subject, as the rational soul is: because it was previously produced, and then in the following instant of nature it cannot be understood to be produced by a second cause, but to be united to matter by generation; whereas an accidental form not only is united to a subject by the second cause, but is also by it produced according to its essence: for fire not only unites heat to wood, but in the wood produces the heat itself. Moreover, from this opinion it would follow that the actions of our will, because they are creatures, are first produced by God alone than by us; from which it would follow that no liberty would remain in us, as is clear from those things which we said above in Disputation 92. But what the adversaries were saying, that every thing, besides God, depends essentially on God, must be understood thus, that it cannot be, unless from God in some way, either by creation, as if the form be outside a subject; or, if by its nature it does not depend on the subject, at least by generation, by which it is produced in the subject upon which by its own nature it depends: whether in this way it be produced by God alone, as grace, or together with a second cause, as other natural accidental forms.

From what has been said in this chapter it follows that the destruction of an accidental form in a subject is not annihilation, but corruption; even if something can be done by God alone, such as is the destruction of grace. The reason is indeed that, just as the production of it is not creation, because it is not the production of being absolutely, but of such a being, so also the destruction of it is not annihilation, because such a form does not fail into nothing simply, but into such a non-being; for indeed the subject remains under such a non-being. Wherefore the sentence of St. Bonaventure in 4, distinction 26, article unico, question 4, of Richard in the same article unico, question 3, of Scotus in 4, distinction 16, question 2, number 9, and of Gabriel in 1, distinction 17, question 4, article 3, doubt 3, proposition 3, who teach that the destruction of grace is annihilation, does not please me.[1097] The sentence of these can also be impugned thus, because, as we shall prove in I-II, question 71, article 4, by mortal sin a man attains as a physical efficient cause to the destruction of grace; but no created cause can in this manner attain to the annihilation of any form.[1098]

Caput IV - Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine

By what reason creation (*creatio*) is said to be only of subsistent things, as the Holy Doctor affirms in the conclusion of this article, can be gathered from what has been said. First indeed, this must not be understood in that sense in which it is commonly said that actions and passions are of supposits; for already above, in Disputation 163, chapter 3, we showed that this is not true, nor according to the mind of the Philosopher; but that actions and passions are also of natures, so that they are said both to come to be and to operate, as it is commonly said, "that which." Secondly, not only of composites, but also of simples, there can be creation, as St. Thomas expressly noted: for

1097. St. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 26, ar. unico, q. 4; Richard, artic. unico, q. 3; Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 2, n. 9; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 17, q. 4, ar. 3, dub. 3, prop. 3.

1098. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 4; see also Vázquez, Disputatio 92.

the rational soul and the Angel are created, and yet they are not composites; nevertheless creation is proper to subsistent things, whether substances or forms. I say forms subsisting (*subsistentes*), not because they are actually per se and subsist (for the rational soul in the body is not per se, but in the whole; and thus it does not subsist: for to be in another and to subsist, or to be per se, are mutually repugnant), but I say subsisting which are by nature apt to be per se. For what some say, that the rational soul subsists per se in the body, because it has a proper existence distinct from the whole, but other forms do not subsist in matter because they do not have a proper being, but exist by the existence of the whole - this is false. For every form, since it has a proper entity in act, has...

It has also its own proper existence; for this is nothing other than entity in act (entity: entitas): therefore the rational soul, of itself apt by nature to subsist, even if in act it is in matter, suffices to be said to be created: because its being is simply being, in that it can exist of itself without another; and so it is not made from matter; for according to its own proper substance it does not depend on that, nor is it educed from its potency. It is only educed from the potency of matter (potency: potentia), and on it depends the being of the man, which proceeds from the soul conjoined to matter.

There is added that the humanity of Christ does not subsist per se, but in the Word; nevertheless it could first then have been created whole out of nothing, that it might be assumed, when it was generated from the womb of the Virgin; indeed, and in a certain respect, as referred to God, it is said to be created, as below will be explained of all other things. Therefore creation is not only the act of subsisting things per se, but also of those which by their own nature can subsist without another: because the being of such things is to be simply, not to be an inherence, or another's being.

Third, in any thing of the world composed of matter and form (form: forma), we can consider the composition, and the being which results from the parts, and the whole composite according to each part: but there are singular productions of the individual parts, and another of the whole; because it consists from the composition. Now we say of the composite, according to that notion of the composite by which it is distinguished from its parts, that no composite can be created. I explain this doctrine from the nature and definition of creation: for it is the production of something out of nothing. Then, as was set out in Disputation 173, chapter 3, we expounded that it matters little whether that "nothing" preceded in duration, or were first only in the order of nature; for this reason, the conservation of a thing according to itself as a whole is true creation and production out of nothing, not because what preceded in duration is nothing, but because it would be of itself, if the thing were not conserved. In the same way, the eternal emanation of a creature would be creation and production from nothing; because, since it would be made according to itself as a whole, it would be from nothing, or not from anything. Again, in order that something be said to be made from something, it is not required that that, from which it is made, precede in time, as Gabriel very well noted in the second book, distinction 1, question 4, article 1.[1099][1100]

1099. Vázquez, Disputatio 173, cap. 3.
1100. Gabriel, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 4, art. 1.

From this I gather that the composite, according to the notion of the composite and of the union, is never created, even if according to itself as a whole it should wholly begin. And concerning conservation one must philosophize in the same manner: so that the conservation of that union and of the composite, as it is a composite, inasmuch as it is something distinct from the parts, is not a continued creation. The reason is, because every being which is from something and is constituted, is also said to be made from something: but whatever is made from something, either as from a subject, or as from a constitutive principle which is only by nature prior, is not said to be created: because creation is from nothing: and nothing excludes every subject, or even a constitutive principle which is at least by nature prior: therefore neither that composition, nor the composite as composite, is said to be created; but to be produced from something. For which reason also, when God concurs with man in generating a man, He is said to generate him; not because God supposes matter and form, as the man who generates truly supposes, since God from nothing conserves matter, and the soul He makes from nothing; but because that union, which is by generation, is from something; just as also it is constituted from something. And this is not only true in that moment of time in which the man begins, but also in the whole time in which he is conserved by God. Therefore that conservation by which that union is continuously sustained by God is not true creation: which must be said likewise of the conservation of any other composite. And for the same reason, if a man were produced by God alone, no matter and form having been previously supposed in duration, the composite, as it is a composite, would not be created, nor according to that union of the parts which we have mentioned: the same must be said in the same way, and for the same reason, of all composites.

Fourth, if we speak of the component parts, we must philosophize otherwise. Of the rational soul we have already proved in the preceding chapter that it is always created: but other substantial forms and accidental forms are not created unless when, separated from the subject or from matter, they are produced, because the subject or matter is the cause of their substance. For since all forms are substantially, through the mediation of matter as a sustaining subject, already they are from something, and what is from something must also be made from something: and hence we say that all forms, except the rational [soul], are educed from the potency of matter, or of the subject; because from that they are produced: from which also they are effected. For to be educed from the potency of that is nothing other than, from it as it is potency, to be made and to be.

But of matter one must judge in a certainly opposite way. For that, according to its own natural and partial entity which it has, cannot be produced otherwise than by creation: for although naturally it never exists without some form, nevertheless it depends on no form according to its own entity. First, because it would be impossible to depend on a form, and with the form substantially changed, itself not to be changed: for a different form effects a different formal effect. Then also, whatever natural agent introducing a form would reach even to the conservation, or substantial production, of matter itself: for that which produces some form, causes not only that it be, but also that which is through it; for the same cause produces the form and the formal effect of it: whether this be the primary or secondary effect matters little: for all the effects which the form attains in the genus of formal cause must also be attained, in its own genus, by the efficient cause of

that form. Moreover, if God conserves matter by means of the form as a principle, and matter is from it: it will not be created by God as often as, conjoined to some form, it is produced: and thus no composite except man will be said to be created. First, not according to the notion of the composite, nor according to the form, as was proved above. Then not according to matter: because it would be made from the form, as we were just saying: therefore in no way would it be created. For neither according to itself as a whole would that be said to be created which would be created neither according to any part of itself, nor according to the notion of composition: since in one composite there is no other production than of the singular parts per se, which by their nature precede the union, and of the union itself, or composition. Now I suppose that matter has some existence which they call entitative, and that it is not pure potency in the genus of being; which now seems more probable to not a few. And with this hypothesis premised, the things we have just said must be understood.

Fifth, hence it is clear why the rational soul and matter are by God alone, but substantial and accidental forms, and any composite in the notion of a composite, can be produced also by created causes. For since matter is produced only by creation according to its own proper entity, and the rational soul likewise, as it remains proved, they can be made by no creature: for it belongs to God alone to create, as will be shown in the following disputation: but the composite from matter and any form, according to the substance (substance: substantia) of the composite, is produced by a created cause, because according to those it is not created. I said according to the substance, because in one or another manner it cannot also be made by a created cause, namely, once the soul has been separated from matter, it cannot be united again: but that we may say that the composite, in the notion of a composite, is not created by God, is sufficiently proved from this, that that composite, in the notion of a composite, can be made by a creature, I except accidental forms, namely supernatural habits, which, even if they are not created in the soul, but are educed from its native potency, nonetheless cannot be produced by a created cause: because they are of a higher order. Nor do we contend that all things which are not created can be made by a created cause; but on the contrary, that all things which according to substance are produced by a created cause, according to substance are not created by God.

Sixth, from what has been said it follows in what sense St. Thomas said that creation is only of subsisting things. For either it is of those forms which by their own nature demand to subsist per se, as is the rational soul, or of simple forms, which by nature always subsist, or of composites from matter and form: nor does anything hinder, if by reason of the hypostatic union with a foreign person it does not subsist per se, from their being said to be created by God according to the whole being, as was explained above. But in composites from matter and form it must be observed that creation befits them not according to the notion of a composite, nor according to the notion of the form (unless it be the rational soul), but according to matter, which, since it is the first foundation and as it were a hypostasis, and therefore is from nothing, as we were saying a little before, is created by God alone and is conserved by a certain continued creation: and by reason of that, it is also of subsisting things to be created. It also befits man to be created by reason of the rational

soul. Wherefore, if we speak of composites collectively, comprehending their individual parts, all things are in fact created by God, by a continued creation whereby in the beginning He created common matter.

Finally, it is to be added that in precisely the same way prime matter was created by God in the beginning, and is now conserved by a continued creation out of nothing, and not from something, as the soul: yet so that although it needs nothing as a formal or material cause of its entity, but only the efficient power of God, as the rational soul, nevertheless there is a difference between it and the rational soul, namely, that this latter, the order of natural causes being preserved, cannot be produced unless conjoined to a body: for since by its nature it is a part of man, by its nature it can be produced only for the constitution of that.

Articulus V - Whether it belongs to God alone to create

To the fifth, we proceed thus. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to create. Because according to the Philosopher, it is proper to what is perfect that it can make something like itself. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which make something like themselves: for fire generates fire, and man generates man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like itself. But an immaterial substance cannot be brought to be except by creation, since it has not matter from which it may be made. Therefore some creature can create.

Further, the greater a thing that is made is on the part of the maker, the greater a power is required in the maker. But a contrary cuts more than nothing. Therefore it is of a greater power to make something from a contrary (which nevertheless a creature does) than to make something from nothing. Much more, then, could a creature do this.

Further. The power of the maker is considered according to the measure of that which it is. But a created being is infinite, as was proved above when there was discussion of the infinity of God. Therefore, in order to produce by creation some created thing, nothing more is required than a finite power. But to have finite power is not against the notion of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the third book On the Trinity, that neither good nor evil Angels can be creators of any thing. Much less, then, can other creatures.[1101]

I answer that it is God's alone to create; and this appears partly, at first view, from what has been premised, since to create cannot be the proper act [of any cause other than God].

Objicitur primo: Because, according to the Philosopher, that is perfect which can make its like. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which make their like: for fire generates fire, and man generates man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like itself. But an immaterial substance cannot come to be except by creation, since it does not have matter out of which it may be made. Therefore some creature can create.

1101. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 3.

Objicitur secundo: Further, the greater the resistance on the side of the thing made, the greater the power required in the maker. But a contrary resists more than nothing. Therefore it belongs to a greater power to make something from a contrary (which nevertheless a creature does) than to make something from nothing. Much more, then, can a creature do this.

Objicitur tertio: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of that which is made. But a created being is finite, as was proved above when there was discussion of the infinity of God. Therefore, in order to produce by creation some created thing, nothing more is required than a finite power. But to have finite power is not against the notion of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

Sed contra est, quod St. Augustine says in book 3 On the Trinity, that neither good nor evil Angels can be creators of any thing. Much less, then, can other creatures.[1102]

Respondeo dicendum, quod it sufficiently appears at first view, according to what has been premised, that to create cannot be the proper action except of God alone. For it is necessary to reduce the more universal effects to more universal and prior causes. But among all the most universal effects, the most universal is existence (*esse*) itself. Hence it must be that this is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God. Wherefore it is also said in the Book of Causes, that neither an intelligence nor a noble soul gives existence, except inasmuch as it operates by a divine operation.[1103] Now to produce existence absolutely, not inasmuch as it is this or such, pertains to the notion of creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper action of God Himself.

However, it happens that something may share in another's proper action, not by its own power, but instrumentally (*instrumentaliter*), inasmuch as it acts in the power of another: as air, by the power of fire, has the ability to heat and set on fire. And according to this, some have thought that, although creation is the proper action of the universal cause, nevertheless some of the inferior causes, inasmuch as they act in the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna held that the first separated substance created by God creates other things after itself, and the substance of the heaven and its soul, and that the substance of the heaven creates the matter of the lower bodies. And according to this same mode the Master also says in book IV of the Sentences, distinction 5, paragraph 3, that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that it may create by ministry, not by its own authority.[1104]

But this cannot be. For a secondary instrumental cause does not share in the action of the higher cause, except inasmuch as, by something proper to itself, it operates dispositively (*dispositive*) to the effect of the principal agent. If, therefore, it were doing nothing there according to what is proper to itself, it would be employed to act to no purpose. Nor would it be necessary for instruments to be determinate to determinate actions. For thus we see that an axe, by splitting the wood - which it does by the property of its own form - produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. But that which is the proper effect of God creating is that which

1102. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 3.
1103. Liber de causis.
1104. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences, book IV, dist. 5, par. 3.

is presupposed to all other things, namely existence absolutely. Hence nothing can operate dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not out of anything presupposed that could be disposed by the action of an instrumental agent. Thus, then, it is impossible that creating should belong to any creature, neither by its own power, nor instrumentally, that is, by ministry. And it is especially incongruous to say this of any body, that it creates, since no body acts except by touching or moving. And thus its action requires something pre-existing which can be touched and moved. Which is against the notion of creation.

Ad primum dicendum, that something perfect, sharing in some nature, makes its like, not indeed by producing that nature absolutely, but by applying it to something. For this man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because thus he would be the cause of himself; but he is the cause that human nature is in this man generated. And thus he presupposes in his action determinate matter, through which this man is this man. But as this man shares in human nature, so every created being shares, so to speak, in the nature of existing; because God alone is His existence, as was said above. No created being, therefore, can produce some being absolutely, except inasmuch as it causes existence in this thing. And thus it must be pre - understood, to the action by which it makes its like, that by which something is this; but in an immaterial substance nothing can be pre - understood by which it becomes this, because it is this by its own form, by which it has existence, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like itself, as to its existence, but as to some perfection superadded: as when we say that a higher angel illumines a lower, as Dionysius says. According to which mode, too, in the heavens there is paternity, as is clear from the Apostle's words, Eph. 3: "from whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named." And from this it also clearly appears that no created being can cause anything unless something is presupposed. Which is repugnant to the notion of creation

Ad secundum dicendum, that from contraries something is made per accidens, as is said in Physics I. But per se something is made from a subject that is in potency (*potentia*). Therefore the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it hinders the potency from being reduced to the act (*actus*) to which the agent intends to reduce the matter. Thus fire intends to reduce water to an act like itself, but it is hindered by the contrary form and dispositions, by which the potency is, as it were, bound lest it be reduced to act. And the more the potency is bound, the greater power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Whence a much greater power is required in the agent if no potency pre - exists. Thus it is evident that it belongs to a much greater power to make something from nothing than from a contrary

Ad tertium dicendum, that the power of the maker is considered not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of making. For a greater heat not only heats more, but also heats more quickly. Although, therefore, to create some finite effect does not show an infinite power, nevertheless to create it from nothing shows an infinite power. Which is clear from what has been said. For if so much the greater power is required in the agent, by how much the potency is more remote from act, it follows that the power of an agent which acts with no presupposed potency - such as an agent creating - must be infinite: because there is no proportion of no potency

to any potency, such as the natural agent's power presupposes, just as there is none of non - being to being. And because no creature has simply an infinite power, just as neither an infinite existence, as was proved above, it follows that no creature can create

Conclusio articuli est: Thus it is proper to God to create; it can belong to no creature, neither as to a principal cause, nor as to an instrument. Each part of the conclusion will be elucidated in the two following disputations.

Disputatio CLXXV - Whether a native power of creating can belong to a creature

"By absolute power this can be done," holds Durandus.

Caput I - Durandus asserts that by absolute power this can be done

There is no Catholic who asserts that there actually has been created by God some nature to which, as to a principal cause, it belongs by proper and native power to create; for the testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture, which we shall cite below, at the least denote that it is now God's alone to create. But whether some creature is possible which, as a principal cause, would have in itself the power of creating, there is disagreement among the Schoolmen. Of these, Durandus, in his Second Book on the Sentences, question 4, affirms that there can be produced by God some creature to which it would belong by native virtue to create. And Durandus is led to this opinion because the reasons which are wont to be adduced to prove that this is repugnant can easily be solved. From which it appears...

But on the contrary: It is likewise in the heavenly orders as Pseudo-Dionysius says: a superior angel illumines an inferior; and in this manner there is even in the heavens a paternity, as is clear from the Apostle's words, Ephesians 3: "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which it is also clearly evident that no created being can cause anything unless something is presupposed. Which is repugnant to the notion of creation.

It appears, then, that there is no contradiction implied in this, that a creature as principal cause could create, just as also it could generate. I will, however, in this chapter set down two reasons to which Durandus, at number 23 and the following, reduces the whole contradiction; for another reason of Scotus, which we approve exceedingly, we shall adduce in the following chapter, and we shall refute Durandus's solutions.

The first reason, then, is Albert's, in the Second Book of the Sentences, distinction 1, article 7, which St. Thomas used in solution 3, and Henry in his Summa, article 25, question 6. It is of this sort. The power of one producing is to be considered not only from the substance (essence) of the thing made, but also from the mode of making it: for the greater the cause is, it not only works better, but also more swiftly. Although, therefore, to create a finite effect is not an indication sufficient for an infinite power (potency), nevertheless to create itself from nothing is a manifest

argument of infinite power. For if the potency of the subject is more remote from act, a greater power of the agent and of one that educed an act from such a potency ought to be; and consequently it is necessary that the faculty which produces a form or an effect from no potency of a subject be infinite, because there is no proportion of no potency to some act, just as there is none between being and not-being.

However, this reason does not seem to convince those asserting the contradictory. For first Scotus, in the Fourth Book, distinction 1, question 1, § The second reason, and Durandus at number 24, respond that between non-being and finite being there is not an infinite distance, because finite being cannot exceed non-being except by the whole of its latitude of being, which, since it is finite, the distance and excess will only be finite - especially since creation (says Durandus) does not proceed from nothing as from a terminus; rather, it is said to be "from nothing" because "not from something." Thus, from the sole perfection of the thing produced, without any comparison with a terminus a quo, the power of the agent ought to be weighed; and since the perfection of the thing produced is finite, from it the infinite power of the agent cannot be inferred. Yet since we have already conceded, in Disputation 173, chapter 3, that the terminus a quo of creation is nothing itself, the first part of Durandus's reasoning satisfies us; for, this supposed, it also has force: because since an infinite distance between non-being and being is not proved, I do not see how from creation, which is a production from nothing, one may infer infinite power for creating. However, Cajetan, in this article, around solution 3, tries to weaken the reasoning of Scotus and Durandus, and to strengthen the reasoning of St. Thomas. He notes, therefore, that the aforesaid reasoning rests on a common Peripatetic principle, which is of this sort: whenever two extremes are so related to each other that as much as the one is diminished the other increases, if the one is diminished down to the "non-" grade of itself, that is, down to nothing, the opposite grows beyond every grade, that is, to infinity. An example of this seems to be brought by Cajetan from Aristotle, Physics IV, text 7: thus motion and a plenum of space are compared, that the more the resistance of the space decreases, the swifter the motion is. Therefore, if there be no resistance, because there is a vacuum, it follows that the motion is in non-time, which is in an instant; and so the velocity of motion increases to infinity.

Yet, besides the fact that Aristotle's doctrine proceeds only by supposing the opinion of certain philosophers who said that the whole succession of motion, its speed and slowness, should be taken from the greater or lesser resistance of the space - which, however, is false, as will be explained in Disputation 197, chapter 2 - the aforesaid example, even if it contained true doctrine, would prove nothing. We concede indeed that motion would be in an instant, if the resistance of the medium were to vanish altogether. Nevertheless, between motion in an instant and motion in any determinate time there would not be an infinite distance nor an infinite excess. They could differ only, at most, as one species differs from another. Hence, therefore, one would not argue an infinitely powerful potency for moving in non-time; since the distance is not infinite - unless from elsewhere motion in non-time were repugnant. For although motion, as philosophers say, can become faster to infinity, that, however, is understood according to proportional and

communicating parts; for according to non-communicating parts, the speed could finally increase so much as to be in non-time, if from elsewhere it were not repugnant, as in truth it is repugnant, as we shall say in that disputation.

Cajetan, in the same place, tries to confirm in another way this reasoning of St. Thomas, namely because it would follow that the power able to produce from nothing and the power able to make from some potency could be equal; which is absurd. For let the finite power producing from nothing be A, for example; and let the power producing from some potency be B; and let the power A, working from nothing, exceed the power B, producing from some potency, which we call C, in a tenfold proportion. Then some potency of a subject is taken which is itself tenfold less than C; then it plainly follows that the power which would educe an effect from that potency lesser by a tenfold proportion than C, is ten times greater than the power B, because it educes an effect from a potency ten times less. It will therefore be equal to the power which produces from nothing, since we said that this is only ten times greater than the power B.

By this reasoning Cajetan seems to himself to gain praise against his adversaries, which, in my judgment, is no less weak than the preceding. For, that it may prove anything, he must necessarily suppose that this increase and decrease of power, from the increase or decrease of the potency of the subject, happens according to the grades of the same form by intensification or remission, in which way that tenfold proportion of one to the other could be assigned, and the argument would have force. But this is not to be granted to him. For we can say that the power which educes an effect from no potency is finite and greater than any other which produces an effect from some potency; yet it exceeds it neither in a tenfold proportion nor in any other geometrical way, but after a manner "infinitely," as one species exceeds another, because that power is of a distinct species from any other virtue that educes an effect from some potency; just as the power of the intellect differs from the power of sense, and yet does not exceed it in a tenfold or greater proportion, but by such a specific grade that, however much sense may grow to infinity, it never attains to the perfection of the intellect. The same is to be said, in like manner, of all species. How, therefore, does Cajetan infer that the power educing its effect from some potency of a subject would be equal to the power producing from nothing, if this latter were finite?

Some other more recent authors, who confirm St. Thomas's reasoning, frame it in this way. A greater power is required to produce an effect from nothing than to produce from some potency, however much that potency may be distant from the effect; but if a potency be infinitely distant - either on account of impediments or some other cause - an infinite power is required: therefore, to produce an effect from nothing, an infinite power will be necessary. But besides the fact that this is not to confirm St. Thomas's reasoning but to form a new one, the aforesaid line of argument has no strength. First, St. Thomas never spoke of an infinite effect, but of a finite one. For he holds in question 7 that an infinite effect cannot be made, even by God, neither in multitude nor in magnitude. Wherefore, from the mode of making, not from the thing made, ceteris paribus, he wished to collect the infinity of the power - namely by this, that the same thing is brought about either from nothing or from something. For he said that the power of the agent is considered not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of making. But if some potency

of a subject were infinitely distant from the effect to be produced from it, by reason of extrinsic impediments, the infinity of the agent's power would have to be considered only from the substance of the thing done, that is, from the removing of impediments which would be infinite. And if the effect were infinitely distant by its own nature, the infinity of the power would have to be considered from the substance of the fact. And if all these things were done from nothing, the power also would be infinite - not from the mode of making (because, to wit, it made from nothing) but from the substance of the thing made.

Accordingly, when more recent authors assume in their argument, "A greater power is required to produce an effect from nothing than to produce from some potency, however much that be distant from the effect," if they mean a finite effect from nothing and an infinite from some potency, it must be denied, because the other circumstances are not equal. But if they mean a finite effect, so that the only difference be in the mode of making, it can be conceded; yet nothing follows from this, as has been sufficiently proved up to now.

The subsequent reason by which it is wont to be proved that to create belongs to God alone is St. Thomas's, in the body of this article, and in the second book Contra Gentiles, chapter 21, in this way.[1107] More universal effects require more universal causes; but among all effects the most universal is being (existence) itself: therefore it requires the most universal of all causes, which is God. Now "to produce being," not insofar as it is this or that being but insofar as it is being, is "to create": therefore it belongs to God alone to create; to whom alone also it belongs to produce being, insofar as it is being.

Scotus, in the Fourth Book, distinction 1, question 1, § But these reasons, disproves this argument in this way: whatever agent generates a composite, the being of the composite is also made; but a composite is made by a created agent; therefore, so too its being: yet not by creation; therefore being is not the proper terminus of creation.

However, Cajetan in this article, at Ad evidentiam horum, and Ferrariensis, in the second book Contra Gentiles, chapter noted there, deride Scotus as not having understood the mind of the holy Doctor. They assert, therefore, that St. Thomas did not ascribe to God "being" merely as any effect whatsoever, but as proper and per se first; whereby it is denoted that God is the cause of whatever pertains to "being," and that being itself, simply insofar as it is being, is referred to God as to the object adequate to His power. Since, then, "being as being" is the ratio according to which something is created, and according to which it is referred to God as to the universal cause, it follows that creation can belong to God alone. Very well, they say, do they infer this, says Cajetan, from the identity of the terminus on the part of creation, that it belongs to God alone.

Yet to me, although Scotus's argument is not proved, nevertheless the defense of Cajetan and Ferrariensis does not please. First, Scotus does not argue rightly; for St. Thomas does not deny that the being of the composite is made by the efficient cause of the composite itself; for the very composition, which terminates in the unity of that, is the terminus of generation. I say, however, that the "being of the composite" is not taken according to any and every conjunction of its parts,

1107. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 21.

but according to that whereby it is a third thing resulting from the parts; for this is what is generated. Hence neither is "being" referred, in that sense, to the universal cause as if the particular being of this composite were universal; rather, as the blessed Thomas says, "being" is attributed to God according to its common notion, as to the proper and universal cause; but, in creatures, being is received under determinate thisness and contracted to particular natures, and thus its production belongs to secondary causes in their own order - not, however, as creating, but as educing or composing under presupposed principles.

Again, the defense of Cajetan and Ferrariensis does not seem sufficient. For to say that "being" according to the common and universal notion which it has with respect to things can be attributed as an object to God alone as to the proper cause, and that no created cause can be conversant about that, would on the opposite supposition plainly follow that some created cause could create itself; for what would hinder, if under the common ratio of "being" an effect falls as object, that a created power, acting within the compass of that same ratio, should cause itself? Yet although a color, because it falls under the common notion of the visible, is seen, it does not therefore follow that color, as such, sees; but sight sees. I reply in like manner: even a thing colored can see itself, if either by reflection in a mirror, or by receiving a species of itself, or in some other way it be made a knower; but a bare color never sees. So too a creature, although it be under the common ratio of "being," does not therefore create; to create belongs to that power to which "being as being" is the adequate object as caused. Wherefore, although every created cause produces some being, it produces it only under a contracted mode and with presupposed principles; to produce being as such, without any presupposition, is proper to the first universal cause alone.

Concerning this proposition, they deride Scotus as one who did not understand the mind of the holy Doctor. For they assert that St. Thomas did not merely attribute to God "being" as an effect in any manner whatever, but as something proper, of itself, and first; in which it is noted that God is the cause of whatever pertains to being; and that being itself simply, insofar as it is being, is referred to God as the adequate object of His power. Therefore, since being as being is the ratio according to which something is created, and according to which it is referred to God as to the universal cause, it follows that creation can belong to God alone. For, says Cajetan, from the identity of the term per se primo of creation, it is most rightly inferred that creation belongs to God alone.[1108]

For my part, however much Scotus's argument does not persuade, nevertheless the defense of Cajetan and Ferrarensis does not please. First, to be sure, Scotus does not argue rightly. For St. Thomas did not deny that the being of a composite is made by an efficient cause of the composite itself: for both the composite, and its being, is the terminus of generation. Now I say "the being of the composite" not according to any constituent part of it, but according to that which is a third thing resulting from the parts; for this is what is generated. Wherefore this being is not to be reduced to a universal cause; since it is not a universal, but a particular. Blessed Thomas only said that being according to the common ratio is attributed to God as to its proper and universal cause.

1108. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 21.

Next, the defense of Cajetan and Ferrarensis seems less sufficient: for we concede that being, according to the common and universal ratio which it has with respect to all things, is attributed to God alone as to its proper cause; nor can any created cause be conversant about that. For from the contrary it would plainly follow that some created cause could create itself. For just as, because color universally is the proper and adequate object of sight, any color can be seen, inasmuch as it is contained under that common ratio; so also that creature, whose power would be conversant about being according to the whole community thereof, could create itself, because it would be contained under it; or if it could not produce itself, its power could not embrace being according to the whole latitude.

But if you object that the eye is conversant universally about the ray of light and the colored, and yet cannot see itself; although it is both lighted and colored: I answer, that even the eye can see itself, if either by reflection in a mirror it receives the species of itself, or in some other way. Wherefore it too is contained under the ratio of the object, except that it is not always in a due position so as to emit a species; but a creature can in no way be understood to produce itself.

This being supposed, which we readily grant to Cajetan and Ferrarensis, it is not rightly inferred that creation is to be attributed to God alone. For when they subsume thus: The cause, in order that something be created and be referred to God as to the universal cause, is being according to the ratio of being simply and universal; it follows that creation can belong to God alone: either they subsume falsely, or they can infer nothing therefrom. For if they speak thus, that the formal ratio of the term of creation is being according to the common ratio, that is, as it embraces under itself all beings, they assert manifest falsehood. For the one who creates does not, when he creates, produce every being, but a particular being. But if they speak thus, that the formal ratio of the term of creation is universal, and is the whole entity of the thing produced, that is, the thing itself according to its every part, this is most true; yet it does not follow therefrom that the terminus of creation is universal by the ratio of being, or of being insofar as it is being; nor does it follow that, if some creature were to produce an Angel from nothing, or some composite out of matter and form according to the whole of it, it could by the same power make every creature. For one might say that the power of that cause would embrace the whole being of this thing, but not the whole being of another thing according to its every part: whence it would follow that it could create this thing, not that. But God can so create the whole entity of a thing that He can do so not only in this thing, but in any other whatsoever; and thus, with respect to the creating power in Him, the adequate object is being according to its whole community; not, however, with respect to a created power in some creature. These are especially the reasons which seem to prove that the universal power of creating cannot befit a creature. Many others, which Durandus also solves because they are easier, I pass over.[1109]

Thus teach, together with St. Thomas in this article, Cajetan and the more recent Thomists; likewise in the second book of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 21, and Ferrarensis there; Aegidius in Quodlibet 5, question 1; Henry in Quodlibet 4, the last question; Scotus on the fourth book,

1109. Durandus, in the place cited on this article, solves many others; the present reasons are his chief ones.

distinction t., question 1; to the question therefore and the following, Ockham in Quodlibet 2, question 9, and on the second book, first distinction, question 7; Gabriel, question 4, article 2. It is also reported by Scotus that Varro in the second book, first distinction, question 6, asserts that this cannot be proved by any natural reason; yet from the testimonies of Scripture and of the Saints it is rightly deduced; with whom some more recent authors agree, to whom it is difficult to find a contradiction in things, but they judge that all can easily be composed together. In which matter this is first to be observed, that when we assert something to be able to be done by God, it is not always sufficient that no contradiction appear to us; for in reality a contradiction may be present, even if it does not appear to us.

From Scripture indeed I do not see how this sentence can be gathered; for the testimonies all only indicate that it is proper to God to have created all things. Which does not hinder that some creature could be, which would be able to create something. But from the holy Fathers it seems much more to be gathered. For Athanasius, in Sermon 3 against the Arians, says: "To administer belongs to creatures and to servants; but to found and to create belongs to God alone, and to His Word and Wisdom: but any creature whatsoever which would be produced would be a servant; therefore it would not befit it to create." Cyril, book 2 against Julian, says: "Those things which are properly of the one and supremely highest substance alone, which we say is one, are inaccessible to nature, namely, to be able to act efficaciously as creator, and to produce things which at some time were not." He understands those things which, according to no part of them, were before: for in another way things which were not can be produced by a creature, as is plain; the rest are manifest for our sentence. Next, this is reported by Augustine, On the Trinity III, chapters 8 and 9; upon the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 15; and City of God XII, chapter 24; and by Prosper in the Book of Sentences of Augustine, sentence 146; and by Cyril in the place cited; and by Damasus, book 3 On the Faith, chapter 1, at the end, who think it heretical to assert that anything was created by angels. But they seem to deduce this, because by their nature they are creatures, not creator. For He alone is God who, being uncreated, is the creator of all.[1110] Moreover Basil, book 4 against Eunomius, from this proves that the Son is true God, because He can create.[1111]

Further, by reason we confirm this sentence. Among the rest, the reasons of Scotus persuade me; for the other two by which the Thomists more frequently use do not seem effective, as is clear from the preceding chapter. Yet I have decided to reduce them all to this one.

If some creature could create, it ought to be the most noble of all, because creation is the most perfect transient action which can be attributed to any nature; but no nature can be more perfect than a spiritual one: therefore, if any nature could create, it would be spiritual. But this would not create proximately by its nature, insofar as it is; for thus it would create necessarily. Now the most perfect transient production, which is attributed to the most perfect nature, ought to befit it not

1110. Athanasius, Sermon 3 against the Arians; St. Cyril, Contra Julianum, lib. 2; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, III, cc. 8 - 9; De Genesi ad litteram, c. 15; De Civitate Dei, XII, c. 24; Prosper, in the Book of Sentences of St. Augustine, sent. 146; St. Cyril, loc. cit.; Damasus, De fide, lib. 3, c. 1 (at the end).

1111. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 4.

necessarily, but freely, and to proceed from it not insofar as it is, but insofar as it understands and wills. But by a created intellection and will nothing can create. Therefore in no way can a creature create.

But Scotus proves that no created nature can create by a mediate intellection and volition: because intellection and volition are an accident; therefore they cannot be the principle of creating a substance. Nor can they be an instrument: for this ought to be natural; but a natural instrument ought to have some prior operation, as is made clear by induction. I speak of a natural instrument; for of one voluntarily assumed the case is different, as we shall say presently. Wherefore, if an Angel were to create by a mediate volition and intellection, and, these posited, the effect would follow, and, these removed, it would be taken away, nor would it have any prior disposition, they would be principal causes of creation.

To this reason Durandus replies at numbers 35 and following. First, that intellection and volition are not the formal principle of creating, but only directing to creation: as in an artist with respect to the work of art. But this is trifling: for in an artist, since there is an executing potency distinct from the intellect and will, intellection and volition are posited in order to direct to operation; but a spiritual substance has no such executing faculty, besides the intellect and will themselves, as we shall say in Disputation 105, chapter 3: therefore intellection and volition would be the principles of creation. Next, at number 37 Durandus says that it is not rightly proved that intellection and volition in an Angel are an accident.

Passing over Scotus's proof, this can easily be shown in this way. That intellection and will of an angel, by which he would create a creature, would be conversant about the creature itself as about its object, not naturally, but freely; for there would be no cause why we should say that an Angel is necessarily conversant about creatures and by his substance; therefore from that operation he could cease: therefore it would be an accident of him, as in us any intellection and volition is.

1. Moreover, if no creature could create any substance which by its nature is per se, neither could it create an accidental form: because, in order that such a form be created, it must have existence per se; which for it is beyond nature. But if no creature can create a thing according to nature, much less ought we to attribute to it a creation beyond the nature of the thing created.

Finally, since no created intellection and will seems possible other than that which in fact is in Angels; and these are not principles of creating; in vain shall we suspect that there can be created by God some things which would have such a power.

Disputatio CLXXVI - On whether a creature can be assumed by God as an instrument for creating

Caput I - The opinion that a creature can be assumed as an instrument for creating

That a creature can be assumed as an instrument of creation, some have held together with the Master. For the Master in IV, distinction 5, last chapter, seems to assert that this can most fittingly be done; whose sentence St. Thomas followed in IV, dist. 5, q. 1, art. 3, quaestiuncula 3, ad 4, and in II, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 3; and not a few recent writers in our time in the schools defend this.[1112][1113]

It can be proved, first, because a greater power is necessary for effecting the Incarnation than for creating; but for the Incarnation something can be assumed as an instrument: therefore for creation also. Second, the priest by the words of consecration efficiently attains the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ: therefore he efficiently attains the whole substance of the body of Christ, as if he were creating it: why then could he not concur to its creation? Third, the fire of hell produces a quality in spirits as an instrument of the divine power: therefore it could also be an instrument of creation. Finally, it can be confirmed, because no reason appears which would draw those who assert this sentence to a manifest contradiction: therefore we shall say in vain that it so repugns the divine power and omnipotence that it cannot be done by God.

Caput II - The opposite, truer opinion

The opposite opinion is truer, yet it is wont to be proved in various ways. The more probable and more common conclusion is the opposite opinion, which affirms that no creature can be assumed by God as an instrument of creation. This sentence was followed by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists in this article and in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21; and by Ferrarensis there; by Albert in II, dist. 1, art. 7; by Scotus in IV, dist. 1, q. 1 ("Ideo dico potest," not far from the end); by Richard in IV, dist. 5, q. 1, art. 2; by Herveus in the same distinction, q. 2.[1108][1113][1114][1115] Yet many reasons are commonly brought forward in confirmation of this sentence, which, in my judgment, have little weight. We shall therefore set forth some of them in this chapter, so that in the following we may assert what we hold.

The first reason is of Richard, in this way. Creation requires an infinite power: therefore no creature can cooperate to it. But this reason either proves that instruments cannot be assumed by God for the production of grace, or proves nothing in the present question: not because the

1112. The Master (Peter Lombard), IV Sent., dist. 5, cap. ult.
1113. St. Thomas, IV Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, q. 3, ad 4; II Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3; Cajetan, in this article; Ferrarensis there.
1108. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 21.
1113. St. Thomas, IV Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, q. 3, ad 4; II Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3; Cajetan, in this article; Ferrarensis there.
1114. Albertus Magnus, II Sent., dist. 1, art. 7; Scotus, IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1 ("Ideo dico potest," near the end).
1115. Richard of St. Victor, IV Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, art. 2; Herveus, eadem dist., q. 2.

production of grace is creation, as Richard there falsely thinks, but because, since it belongs to God alone to infuse grace and to remit sins, this effect by its nature no less requires an infinite power than creation. Which, although it is true, the reasoning

Caput III - The preceding opinion is shown by the best reason, with no innate virtue posited in the instrument

But the reason proposed proves neither side. For though the effect be of such a nature that in the principal cause it requires an infinite virtue, it does not seem to follow that in the instrument it likewise requires the same. Since an instrument does not act by its own virtue, but by the virtue of the principal agent, and (as they say) being elevated by it, it operates. It must therefore rather be proved that a creature cannot be elevated by the power of God, nor can a creature so obey God as to cooperate with him to creation.

Second. The second reason of St. Thomas in this matter is of this sort. Every instrument, in order to operate with the principal cause to the effect, ought of itself to have some prior operation. This proposition is established by induction in the saw and other instruments of art, and in the natural heat of the animal for generating flesh, and in the heat of fire for producing another fire. But no creature can have a prior operation unto creating anything, because since nothing precedes that which is created, there is no subject about which by its prior operation an instrument might operate: therefore it cannot concur to creation.

However, this reason of the holy Doctor is not without difficulty, both in his own doctrine and absolutely. First indeed, in his own doctrine. For it cannot be denied that the intellect can see without the habit of the light of glory being acquired with God's help, as with a principal cause, just as an instrument with the principal cause; and yet it does not have a prior operation. Then he also affirms that the phantasm is an instrument of the agent intellect for impressing the intelligible species on the possible intellect, and yet it has no prior operation upon the intellect itself. But come, let us see what prior operation St. Thomas attributes to all instruments, that from this it may be inferred whether it is necessary. First indeed, he asserts, with the opinion of many, that the sacraments are physical instruments of grace, in III, q. 62, a. 1,[1116] and yet he attributes to them no other prior operation than a natural one, namely the washing of baptism by water, the sounding also by words, and so of the others. But these operations are of no other virtue and moment for producing grace; and the infinite power of God could no less assume water at rest as an instrument of grace than water washing by its motion; since that motion, and speech itself, and touch, have of themselves no virtue ordered to such an effect. This he teaches in III, q. 13, a. 2,[1117] about the power of working miracles in Christ: but the prior operation here, such as was speech or touch, contributed nothing of itself to the effect and the miracle; therefore St. Thomas vainly requires it as something necessary to the notion of an instrument. For the other natural instruments there is a different account: for the prior operation which their nature has serves as a disposition to the effect

1116. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 62, a. 1.
1117. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 13, a. 2.

of the principal cause, as is clear in the instruments of the arts, however those be said to concur and operate (in this I do not linger), and in the natural heat for generating flesh, and in the heat of fire for producing fire.

Wherefore Andreas de Vega, book 7 upon the Council, cap. 13, teaches that a prior operation is not necessary in an instrument in order that it be assumed: he understands freely, in which sentence he adduces Scotus, whose mind he does not seem sufficiently to have understood. For that man in IV, distinct. 1, q. 1, to the first question then around the middle, and in distinct. 6, question 5, § Circa tertium principale, at the little verse ad primum dico solvi, affirms that certain things are called instruments which do not act; and he thinks all the instruments of the arts are of this sort, because of themselves they have no efficacy - which he there more fully proves. But of instruments which he calls living, he thought it necessary that they have prior operations to the principal effect, in order that they be called instruments; indeed he thinks they are not therefore called instruments because they are elevated to the principal effect, as the heat of fire to fire, the heat of animals to flesh, but he thinks they are called instruments only by that reason because by their own virtue they effect something prior, which posited, the effect follows without their concurrence. Wherefore in IV, distinct. 1, q. 1, therefore it can be said, near the end, he concludes that for this reason he thinks no creature is assumed as an instrument, because it does not have the virtue of effecting something prior; which reason, in my judgment, is effective, as we shall see in the following chapter.

However, if we wish to interpret St. Thomas thus, that he is not speaking of an instrument physically operating to the effect, but only of an instrument operating morally, his reasoning will not be difficult. It must therefore be said that the holy Doctor is not here inquiring whether there can be an instrument physically concurring to creation - for this could by no reason be defended, as we shall see below - but whether there can be a moral instrument; and he answered rightly, that nothing can be assumed as an instrument of that sort: he understands however a moral one, because there is nothing that would have any prior operation around the thing to be created, or around anything of it. For God's moral instrument is not called that which only obtains something from God by praying; but that which obtains by doing something around the thing in which the effect is derived from God: as when someone touches a sick man and by his touch obtains from God health, etc. For since that which obtains something from God is called an instrument only inasmuch as it is likened to a natural separate instrument, or an instrument of art, which of itself has some prior operation around the subject, therefore not every moral cause which obtains something from God is called God's instrument, but only that which by first doing something around the subject, obtains from God the principal effect about the same thing, as in the example set and in the sacraments. And because no created cause can operate anything prior around the thing which is created, nor around anything of it, therefore no created cause can be called even a moral instrument of creation; although there can be some impetratory cause. Wherefore when Christ's humanity and holy men first did something around the thing, and by their deed obtained a

miracle from God about the same thing, they were rightly called God's instruments, even if they were only moral and impetratory. Nor indeed do I see it necessary to assert that they were physical instruments, as I shall show in its place.

But when in that place, q. 13, a. 2, St. Thomas teaches that Christ's soul cannot be assumed by God as an instrument to annihilate, this too must be understood about a moral instrument. For although it could be an impetratory cause of annihilation, nevertheless it cannot be called God's instrument, even moral. Because annihilation consists only, as the Doctor says there, in this, that God denies the influx by which he was conserving the thing. But to this nothing seems to concur by any prior operation by way of an instrument, although one could obtain this from God; because along with this there would not be to effect something in the thing itself, but for God to deny it conservation. For whatever takes place in the thing before it is annihilated, does not have the status of a prior operation in order to deny conservation. For that it be in the manner of an instrument, rather this prior operation ought to be in the very one who denies conservation. Wherefore we do not say that God in any way uses an instrument to deny the conservation of a thing, just as we say that in a certain way he uses a moral instrument to effect something, if there could be an impetratory cause of annihilation.

Third. The third reason that is wont to be brought is of this sort. Creation is the production of being as being; but that which produces being as being can produce every being: therefore it can produce itself; just as a finite and limited being. But every created instrument is of that sort: therefore if God were to assume it to create something, it could also serve to create itself; which is absurd.

But this reason proves little. For as we said in the superior disputation, c. 1, in order that some creature have the power of creating, it would not be necessary that it be able to deal with every being universally; but it would suffice that in some particular thing it produce the whole entity of that thing, namely matter and form; from which it would not follow that it could create itself: which follows far less in an instrument. Since it would not operate by native virtue, but only by the will of God who assumes it, from the fact that it would produce the whole entity of this being there would not follow that it could effect itself, even as an instrument.

Here indeed there seems to be one single, and better, reason which not only in the present difficulty, but also universally, convinces that no thing can be assumed by God at his will as a physical instrument to whatever effect; but that the instrument must be of such a nature and virtue that it have of itself a prior operation, not just any, but one required by its very nature to the effect, or at least that by its native virtue it do something in that effect: that is, that the effect according to some formal account answer to the instrument as to a proper cause operating by native virtue. By this line of reasoning Scotus seems to have been moved in IV, distinct. 1, q. 1, in that place Therefore it can be said, near the end, where he demands universally a prior operation in an instrument.[1118] He differs however from the Thomists, because Scotus requires a prior operation naturally requisite to the effect; the Thomists, however, think it suffices to have any prior

1118. Scotus, IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, near the end ("Ideo dici potest"); see also dist. 6, q. 5.

operation, even if of itself it contributes nothing to the effect, as we saw above: which we said in the preceding chapter is not necessary; but if by that a thing could be freely assumed as an instrument, in the same way it could also be assumed while at rest and without that prior operation. From which principle indeed it has come about that Scotus and some Thomists judged differently about the sacraments. For the Thomists, III, q. 62, art. 1, teach that the sacraments are physical instruments, because they have a prior operation,[1116] even if of themselves they do not fit nor are required to such an effect; but Scotus in the places cited said that they are not physical instruments, because they do not have a prior operation. There is, therefore, no force in such a reason.

- If some thing is assumed as an instrument in order to effect something, there is not only an order of efficient and effected between the effect and the principal cause, but also between the effect and the instrument itself. For the effect does not proceed wholly from the principal cause alone; rather in part it proceeds from the cause through the instrument; and the instrument in very fact does what before it did not do. Wherefore that a thing which by God is referred to the effect by means of an instrument, be referred also as an effect to the instrument itself, it is necessary either that by its very nature it be referred to it, or that by some equal change it be rendered such as to be referred to it, either in itself or in the instrument, as is wont to happen when the very substance is changed, which either becomes fire or becomes flesh. But if we suppose that by the very use of the instrument no change at all is wrought either in the instrument or in the effect, I do not see by what reason, or in what way, the effect will be referred to the instrument as to its proper cause.

Therefore, if anyone says that God uses a creature as an instrument for creation or for any effect without any real change either in the instrument or in the effect, nothing will be assigned whereby the effect be referred to that instrument. And if some change be feigned, it must be placed either in the instrument or in the effect.

In the instrument. For whether it be said that in it there is some quality permanent, or transient and impressed by God after the manner of a motion, as some imagine; however that be, either that is a proper virtue for producing such an effect, and thus the thing is not constituted an instrument but its own proper and principal cause - which, as was proved in the superior disputation, cannot ever be posited in order to create, and we may boldly assert it - or that virtue is of a much inferior sort than that it be able of itself to produce the effect; and therefore it needs a new elevation; it will not be able from itself to produce such an effect; accordingly, neither from that will the effect be referred to it; therefore that change will not be sufficient for the instrument to be referred to the effect. From which kind of argument it is proved that it is superfluous to posit in the instrument this elevating quality from the efficient cause in order that it exercise a virtue beyond its proper and native status to the effect: since beyond this quality there would be required another new elevation, as has been proved.

1116. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 62, a. 1.

Or let the whole change be in the thing produced: and even on this ground it cannot be that the effect be by a motion referred to the instrument. First, because it is not evident what change could be introduced into the same substance which God alone conserved; for he could conserve it with no instrument intervening that has any virtue or influence at all. For when the same thing is conserved successively by other and diverse causes, or the same light by diverse lamps, the mode of that production does not vary from the fact that it is referred now to this, now to that as an instrument; rather it is always referred to God alone as the principal conserver. Second, because if some quality be posited in that thing produced, which is not from the nature of the instrument, nor is referred to the instrument by any intrinsic reason, it will be referred to the producer alone, who nevertheless by will alone has given it. Something also accrues from this, that such referring would be accidental and extrinsic, and from its own nature it would not be referred, just as the whiteness of a dove is not referred to the water which cleanses it, because God willed that the water be an instrument when he gives to it some quality of the same nature. Wherefore to refer the change to some accident impressed in the water by a divine act is one thing; but to refer it to the instrument as to an intrinsic principle from which it proceeds is another: which nevertheless this change does not have unless by the will of God. It follows also that sometimes the same thing is referred to diverse instruments, sometimes to none at all; which is alien to the mode of production of any change.

One might say: it does not seem necessary to place such a change either in the effect or in the mode of producing; but that the Lord can proceed in diverse functions in the same way; and in the same way, as the light proceeds from diverse lamps, so God can, without any change on the part of the instrument itself, refer the thing produced to a subordinate instrument merely by his will; and because the whole virtue proceeds from the principal agent, and the instrument of itself contributes nothing - for medicated things have in themselves some qualities and forms from which they act - hence from this it seems that God, by various and certain instruments by mere assistance (as they say), impressing nothing in them, either new or old, can produce the same thing, and the principal influx in the same way remains.

But this assertion does not stand. For then the relation in the effect, inasmuch as it is produced, would not be referred to the immediate productive cause as to an intrinsic principle, but only to the principal as to the whole; and the instrument would remain entirely extrinsic, contributing nothing of its own, either as disposed by a quality or form, or as changed by a new elevation. From which it follows that, outside of a mere extrinsic denomination from the order of operation on the part of God, there would be nothing whereby the effect be referred to the instrument as to a true partial cause. And this is repugnant to the very notion of instrument, which of itself, and not merely by extrinsic denomination, must be ordered to its effect, either by a prior operation or by a native virtue doing something in that effect.

Therefore we conclude: in creation, in which there is no subject preexisting, and in which nothing is effected save the whole entity of the thing produced, it is impossible for any created thing to be assumed by God as a physical instrument, since neither can there be a prior operation naturally required to such an effect, nor can any native virtue of an instrument do anything in that effect so that the effect should be referred to it as to a proper partial cause.

But even this would not be without difficulty: for it does not seem that in the produced light there is altogether the same relation of dependence to one luminous body and to another; because illumination is not really the same as the light produced. For God, with one luminous body present, can bring it about that the produced light does not depend upon it, if He should will not to concur with it in illuminating, but Himself alone should will to produce the light. But this would not seem able to be done, if illumination were an action altogether by the nature of the thing the same as the light produced, and the light produced, by its very essence and without any other distinct thing, were referred to the luminous body by the relation which they call dependence.

But grant, then, that so many unfounded mutations be devised in the thing produced by God on account of diverse instruments: still these are not yet sufficient for the mutual relation of effect and instrument. For if this effect, produced in such a way, is referred by its own native aptitude by the relation of something produced to the instrument, it is a sign that the instrument is of such a nature as to produce such an effect of itself. For an effect is not referred by its nature except to that in which there is the power of producing, not by another's will, but naturally, if indeed it is referred naturally; therefore, since in the instrument there is no power, it will come about that the thing produced is not referred to it.

Someone will say: the effect is not referred according to its substance to the instrument, but according to the mode which it has of being produced by means of such an instrument. But this is manifestly false. For an instrument does not produce a mode in the effect for the sake of which it is assumed; and if there is any mode in it, it is the very production by which the effect depends upon the instrument; but the very substance of the effect has the notion of something produced, and it is that which is referred: then the foregoing reason takes place. For if this effect by its own native aptitude is referred to this instrument, it follows that in the instrument there is a native power for the production of it: which is absurd.

Next someone will reply that the effect is not referred to the thing which is the instrument, taken nakedly, but to it as elevated by the agent - which elevation indeed is nothing other than to be ordained to such an effect, and to have as to that effect a divine concurrence in readiness. But who does not see that this is mere verbiage? For that God is ready to concur with the instrument presupposes also that the cooperation of the instrument will be future; but now we ask whence this future operation of the instrument is to be. First, certainly not from the fact that God is going to cooperate: for the concurrence of both supposes a principle in each. Next, if the elevation be from God's ordinance alone, who will not say that it is only a matter of respect in the instrument, with nothing received in it? What, then, is the variation in it by which it is assumed and concurs to the effect, when from what it has by its own apt nature it could not concur?

This single reason proves that no instrument, which by its own nature is not required for some effect, having some prior operation either with respect to that effect or to something produced in it, can be assumed indiscriminately by God as an efficient instrument to any effect whatever. From this principle in the Third Part, q. 13 and 62, we shall say that neither the power of the humanity of Christ for the working of miracles, nor the sacraments for producing grace, concur physically, but are only moral instruments by way of impetration, as will be explained there.[1119] And if an instrument could be assumed indiscriminately by God to various effects, I should not doubt that it could in the same way be assumed for creating: for I do not find any special reason proving that it cannot be assumed for creating. But how it is necessary that there be in the instrument some prior operation from a native power, or that it should effect something in the very effect of which it is the proper cause, we shall say in chapter 5.

Moreover, according to the opinion which we followed in Disputation 174, namely that creation is not distinguished from the created thing save only by reason, it necessarily follows that no instrument can be assumed for creating. For if it were assumed, creation would vary, as is clear from what has been said, and consequently it would be distinguished from the created thing.

There are also special reasons which prove that the power of the soul of Christ for miracles and the efficacy of the sacraments are not physical; and many other things must be said in their places against the various ways of philosophizing among the theologians. For the present, however, let what we have said suffice for our purpose. But this is to be observed: it is much more repugnant that anything be assumed as an instrument for conserving itself. For then that which is the instrument must be prior to its operating: if it conserves itself in this instant, it must first be before it conserves itself. But if it is prior by nature, it cannot be the effect of itself. Wherefore they are mistaken who, in order to defend transubstantiation in the Eucharist, say that the body of Christ is conserved by the words of consecration; and since the words have efficacy from the humanity of Christ itself, that that very humanity is also assumed for the conservation of itself. But even for that reason the opinion of these doctors ought deservedly to be refuted; since for safeguarding the true rationale of transubstantiation, it makes no difference whether the humanity of Christ be produced physically, or conserved according to substance by the words of consecration, or by itself; but the mystery of our faith can be explained on a much easier rationale, as we shall say in passing in chapter 5; whereas they wished to defend it by a rationale so difficult that, in right philosophy, it appears incredible.

The same opinion is confirmed against the potency which they call "obediential."

Caput IV - On the so-called "obediential potency" and recent opinions

Down to our own times it used to be defended, in one of the ways set forth in the preceding chapter, that any creature whatever can be assumed for producing any effect whatever, as the sacraments for producing grace: either by some quality derived into the creature itself in a permanent mode, or in a transient mode; or by God's assistance alone without any change at all in

1119. See below in this work on the Third Part of St. Thomas, q. 13 and q. 62.

the creature; and we attacked both ways in the foregoing chapter. But now, within the last few years, certain more recent authors teach that any creature whatever can be assumed by God as an instrument for any effect at all, even for creation, by reason of a certain potency which they call "obediential" (*potentia obedientialis*). And they say that this potency is not complete, but a certain inchoate power for producing any effect whatever, not distinct from the entity of the thing, but being the very substance or nature itself. And to such a degree do some attribute this inchoate power to all things, that they do not hesitate to attribute it even to relations.

Furthermore, they affirm that whatever thing is assumed as an instrument operates the effect from within, and contributes something of its own to it - not by a borrowed power, or one derived from the principal cause, not even from God - but by a native power, insofar as it is such a created nature. And they call it an inchoate power because no natural concurrence of God is owed to it for acting; but it is completed by a supernatural concurrence and of a higher order, so that it may produce an effect not proportioned (as they speak) to itself.

The authors of this opinion devised it chiefly for this reason: it seemed necessary to them to grant to the sacraments of the New Law an instrumental power which would physically produce grace; and a physical instrumental power, as they judged, could not be defended in any better way than the one just mentioned. Those from among the Thomists who assert that there is derived by God into physical instruments some quality, either permanent or transient, by which they are elevated; or that instruments are elevated by God's assistance alone without any change in them - seemed to these doctors, and rightly, not to have a solid foundation in philosophy; and we have confuted them, as much as is sufficient, in the preceding chapter. It remains, therefore, that they say there is in instruments a certain native inchoate power, as has been explained above. And since no manifest repugnance is apparent, indeed since we see that in other things there is this power which they call obediential - in the subject, that it may receive a supernatural form; in a form, that it may inform two matters at once; in a body, that it may be in two places at once - there is no reason why we should deny the same power for working miracles, for producing grace, and for the other things which can be done by God alone.

In my judgment this opinion has no firm foundation either in theology or in philosophy. Not in theology, first: because to none of the mysteries of our faith does a physical concurrence of an instrument seem necessary; and consequently, if, with the due and entire reverence owed to the mysteries, we can do theology without this or any other physical instrumental power, there is no reason why we should force the wits of students into these straits. For, wishing to extol the mysteries of our faith, we shall, without necessity, make them harder.

Moreover, that it is not necessary to concede any physical concurrence of instruments with God for defending our mysteries of faith will be evident from what we shall say below on the Third Part, q. 13, a. 4, disputing about the power of the humanity of Christ for working miracles, and q. 60, a. 4, disputing about the efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law: where we shall show that neither the councils, nor Scripture, nor the testimonies of the Fathers indicate anything more, even slightly, than a moral efficacy in the humanity of Christ for working miracles, and in the sacraments for producing grace.[1120]

Deinde I show by this reasoning that this instrumental power, which they call obediential (potentia obedientialis), is at odds with right philosophy. If such an instrumental power were in things, it would have to be native (nativa) to any given thing, since it would not be derived from something extrinsic. I did not say it would be natural (naturalis); for one may call that natural which would not have a complete order of efficient cause to a natural effect, but would be so referred to a supernatural effect that it ought to be completed by the supernatural concurrence of God. Therefore, lest we contend about a name, when I said natural, I meant native: for something is called native to a thing which arises from that thing's own principles. Wherefore much more ought this instrumental power to be called native, because it would not be distinct from the substantial nature of the thing. But no power native to creatures can extend itself to any effect whatsoever: therefore neither is the instrumental obediential power found in them.

Further, that there is no native power to any effect whatsoever of creation is proved thus. Either that power is complete, or inchoate. I call complete that to which there corresponds not only some aspect in the effect, but adequately the whole of what is produced in the effect, and is attributed to it according to every aspect. Inchoate, on the contrary, is that to which the effect does not correspond according to every aspect, but only according to some; as we said above in disp. 43, c. 5, [1121] that the clear vision of God is attributed to the native power of our intellect, not according to the whole being which the vision has, but according to that whereby it is an intellection - a power indeed inchoate, which ought to be completed by some proximate principle helping and cooperating, as the intellect is helped by the intelligible species to understand any object proposed, and by the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) to see God clearly. Now it must be that this instrumental power is a cause in one of these two ways. That it should need God's common concurrence belongs both to a complete and to an inchoate power, since God is the first cause of all, which, precisely as first, must concur by a certain universal power. But in neither way can that power be such as to extend to any effect whatsoever: therefore, in no way, not even as an instrument, can it concur.

First, it cannot be a complete power for operating in the manner explained: for if any effects whatsoever proceeded according to every aspect from the native power of each creature, there would be no need of another second and proximate cause for such an effect, but only of the first, in that universal way in which it cooperates with the creature. For, the created cause of some effect being posited according to every aspect which is in it, there is not another proximate necessity; as we showed above in that disp. 43, 4, 5.[1121] But then no such creature would be an instrument, but a

1120. See below in this work on the Third Part, q. 13, a. 4, and q. 60, a. 4.
1121. See above, this work, disp. 43, c. 5.

principal cause, as are other second causes which cannot operate without the concurrence of the first. And the concurrence by which God would concur with any creature to any effect whatsoever would not be supernatural: because it would be to that which, according to every aspect, the creature's native power works of itself. For a creature which by its native power has force so that, the first cause concurring, it works something according to every aspect, cannot be called an instrument, unless in a broader signification, inasmuch as every second cause is called an instrument of the first. Add that, for another reason which will be proved below, the concurrence of God with the native power of a creature is not supernatural: therefore such a power of a creature cannot be complete.

Nor indeed can it be an inchoate power, as we have explained above: for if a creature concurred by its native power to some aspect in the effect, it would concur to that as a proper cause, if, namely, it needed another second cause, or the concurrence of the first in place of that other, so that the effect might be made complete according to every aspect. For a cause which by its proper and innate power contributes something to an effect, and produces it according to some aspect, is a principal cause with respect to that which it produces; although it may need another second cause, or the concurrence of the first in place of that other: by another, I mean a helping or supernatural cause, by which the power of the intellect is completed with the light of glory to see God, or another second natural cause helping, as the intellect is helped by the intelligible species to know this object or that. But this does not seem to be conceded in a creature for any effects whatsoever: because it does not appear what ratio of producing in any given effect is to be attributed to the native power of a creature which is said to be assumed as an instrument. Then too, if any such were assigned to it, it could be conjoined to it with another second created natural cause that would complete its efficacy for any effect not supernatural according to substance, as for the restoration of an eye: for this effect is natural according to substance, and only supernatural as to the mode of producing, because, since it is produced by God alone without any natural cause being required, it is said to be supernatural, as we shall note in disp. 214.[1122] Wherefore, if for this effect and similar ones any creature had an inchoate native power, that inchoate power could be completed by another second created cause helping: because that effect is natural according to substance.

In vain, moreover, does an inchoate native power seem to be ordained to an effect natural according to substance which cannot be completed by another second natural cause, so as to produce the effect integrally and according to every aspect; but to an effect supernatural according to substance, as to produce grace, it could be completed through a second created cause, which would be a supernatural form, and by which its efficacy would be completed so as to produce the effect integrally. For it seems futile to posit an inchoate native power for producing an effect supernatural according to substance, which cannot be completed by some supernatural form.

But if God were to supply in place of another second natural cause, or of a supernatural cause completing that inchoate efficacy, this would not hinder the inchoate power of the creature from being the proper cause of any effect whatsoever according to that peculiar aspect; just as the

1121. See above, this work, disp. 43, c. 5.
1122. See below, this work, disp. 214.

intellect is the proper cause of the vision of God according to the aspect of intellection and of vital action, even though its power is completed by a peculiar concurrence of God supplying in place of light.

But someone will say that in any creature there is a native inchoate power for any effect whatsoever; not because it can concur as a proper cause to any effect whatsoever according to some aspect, but because it concurs by its own proper power to every aspect of the effect in such a way that it can operate only with supernatural help of God not owed to it; and therefore it is called an inchoate power, not because it can produce any effect according to some aspect proper to it, but because to every effect it meets with its own proper power in such wise that it can operate only with a supernatural help of God not owed to it.

But this evasion can easily be cut off. First, because, as we were saying above, if any creature by its native and proper power can contribute something to any effect whatsoever, nothing can be lacking to it to keep it from being the proper cause of such an effect, and for a natural concurrence of God to answer to it that it may operate: for the concurrence corresponding to a native power is natural; and such a power ought to be called not obediential, as they speak, but natural; and the effect corresponding to it ought to be called natural. Then too, many effects produced through any creatures whatsoever would not be supernatural according to substance, but natural, such as the restoration of an eye: for if there were a native power for these effects in any creature to which it corresponded, and if some concurrence of God were given for producing those same effects, there would undoubtedly be a natural concurrence: for the influx of God is said to be supernatural in one of two ways, as we shall show in that disp., either with respect to substance, because it is given to an effect supernatural according to substance, or with respect to the mode, because, no cause requiring it by its native power, God works something; as when he restores an eye to a blind man. But if in any creature there were a native power for restoring an eye, then that influx would be neither supernatural with respect to substance, as is clear, nor supernatural with respect to mode, because it would be to concur with the native power of a created cause. Wherefore without foundation that power would be said to be obediential in a creature, since it would truly be a second cause.

Then the adversaries say that by that obediential power it is therefore instrumental, and that the concurrence of God which is conferred upon it is supernatural at least with respect to the mode, because that power is not proportioned to the effect, nor is it adequate to it by its own nature; if, however, it were proportioned, the consequences which we have set out thus far would rightly follow. But those who so reply either do not solve the difficulty proposed, or else they destroy what they had posited in their aforesaid opinion. For either they mean by "not proportioned and adequate to the effect" only this, that it cannot operate without the concurrence of the first cause - and this is not sufficient for it to be instrumental, for all causes need that concurrence; or else they mean that that native power is so inferior that what ought to be produced as an effect cannot correspond to it as to its cause - and this is just as much as to deny a native power for any effect whatsoever. For a power which of itself contributes something to the production of an effect cannot but be proportioned and adequate to that which it produces; but if it is not proportioned and

adequate to something that is produced in the effect, then of itself it can contribute nothing; and it amounts to the same as not being proportioned, as it does to being nothing. And therefore, if we are to defend an instrumental power in any creature, it ought not to be innate in the instrument, but derived in some way from the principal agent, either through a quality, or through motion, or through assistance. But if even in this way it cannot be defended, as we have seen, it is better utterly to deny such a kind of instrument.

The arguments of the adversaries are clarified in cap. 6.[1123]

Caput V - How the other instruments have a prior operation, or something produced in the effect by their proper power

Whatever are commonly called instruments are said to have some prior operation, or to produce something in the effect by their proper and natural power.

We can show this by induction. Scotus, in the Fourth Book, d. 1, q. 5, ad primam; and in d. 6, q. 9, concerning the third principal point, enumerates in his judgment all the things that are wont to be called by this name.[1124]

First: Secondary causes, even if they are principal in comparison with other inferiors, when compared with God, who is the first cause of all, are wont to be called his instruments, although in themselves they have a native power of producing their own effect: they are, however, called instruments only for this reason, that they are subject to the motion of the first cause, and in their operation depend essentially upon it.

Second, an accidental form is called an instrument, because as a proper cause it produces the ultimate disposition, which the substantial form straightway and naturally follows: although Scotus thinks that for the production of the substantial form itself that instrument does nothing, but is called an instrument only for this reason, that it produces the prior disposition - about which mode we need not now dispute: it is enough for the present that this kind of instrument is by its nature ordered to such an effect on account of the prior disposition which it produces by its own power, so that by its very nature it is referred to that effect. Instruments of this sort are the heat of fire for producing fire, the animal heat for generating flesh, and other things of this kind.

Third, some part of the agent is called an instrument, through which it derives immediately its power and operation, as the hand for writing, the eye for seeing; although in such a part there is a proper and innate power equal to such an effect. Thus Aristotle, On the Soul II, c. 4, called the hand a conjoined instrument, but the oar a separated instrument for the steering of a ship. By the same reasoning he called natural heat an instrument of the animal for nutrition.[1125]

Fourth, there are the instruments of art, which, although they do not properly have the power for operating, as Scotus at length pursues in the place cited, nevertheless of themselves and by their own nature contribute something.

1123. See below, cap. 6.
1124. Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 5, ad primam; and d. 6, q. 9, circa tertium principale.
1125. Aristotle, On the Soul II, c. 4.

Fifth, to all these we can add, if you please, another fifth kind of instrument, namely the faculties of the intellect and of the will for supernatural acts, as the intellect for believing, and the will for loving, and for other things of this sort: for in relation to God moving, and by his help alone and concurrence supplying what would be the concurrence of the supernatural habit rather than on the part of the habit itself, a natural faculty can be called an instrument for the whole operation; although not without reason some call it a partial cause. In all these cases we see that instruments of themselves contribute something by their native power, and on that side they can be called proper and principal causes; and therefore it is no wonder if by their very nature they are referred to the effect, and the effect to them. For, to omit the other kinds of instruments in which what we say is manifest, in this last case the same is openly proved. For intellection, however supernatural, such as is the clear vision of God, is effected by a supernatural light, or by God himself supplying the place of light, in such wise that the intellect too contributes something by its native power: for that (intellection) answers to the intellect in the ratio of vision and of a vital operation. But the kind of instrument which the adversaries are trying to establish can contribute absolutely nothing of itself to the effect: therefore it is no wonder if we say that the intellect and the will, in which there are certain beginnings of those operations, can be elevated by God when he completes their inchoate efficacy; whereas the other instruments, in which there is nothing of native power with respect to the effect, cannot at all be elevated. Moreover, since in the intellect and the will there is for supernatural acts a certain inchoate power, of itself accommodated and sufficient to produce in the effect some ratio, namely either of intellection or of volition, as we have shown above in this disputation and in disputation 43, c. 5; thus we ought to call the intellect or the will instruments for supernatural acts, so as not to deny that they are proper and principal causes - what they call partial causes - with respect to that ratio which in the effect corresponds to them. Whether, however, one ought to call the intellect or the will an instrument for supernatural acts is not a great matter, but a small disagreement about words, which matters little, provided we say, as was noted in the preceding chapter, that the intellect by its own natural power of itself contributes something to a supernatural act, and the will likewise.[1126]

But some object in this way. Although the intellect of itself has the power to produce some intellection under the common notion of intellection, nevertheless it does not have the power to produce an intellection as it is contracted by a supernatural difference, such as is vision; or certainly, if it suffices to have a power about intellection in general so as to be elevated to such an intellection, so also any thing whatsoever which has the power of producing some being will be able to be elevated and to produce this being: for already it has from itself some beginning; and especially any quality and substance will be able to be elevated so as to produce grace; since, whereas of itself it has an inchoate power of producing a quality, it can be completed so as to produce such a quality.

But this objection is easily dissolved. For in our intellect we posit an inchoate power of producing intellection in such wise that it not only regards of itself universal intellection, as intellection is, as an act adequate to itself; but that any intellection whatsoever, even a supernatural

1126. See above in this disputation; and see below, disp. 43, c. 5.

one, cannot come to be without the cooperation of the intellect, since essentially it depends upon it. Whence also we have proved in disp. 43, c. 4, that that supernatural intellection flows in part from the native faculty of the intellect; nor is the whole virtue for operating given by the light, and this must necessarily be admitted. The intellect therefore has from itself an inchoate power which, some peculiar power being added, can be completed for producing such a supernatural effect; and not only can it produce any other intellection, but also, helped by a supernatural principle, it can by its proper power cooperate to elicit that intellection which is supernatural: indeed that cannot be effected by the light alone, unless also the intellect by its natural efficacy cooperates; otherwise, if the intellect by its native power contributed nothing of itself, some other instrument could be assumed: but any other thing, as iron for example, or water, which of itself can produce some quality or some being, is not for that reason to be elevated to produce any being whatsoever. First, because the primary power of such a thing does not regard being or a universal quality, but something particular determined, as heat; it regards heat as its per se and adequate effect. Then too, not every quality, nor every being, can by nature be elicited by iron or by water, just as every intellection is elicited by the power of the intellect. Therefore there is not the same efficacy in these things for being instruments of any effect whatsoever as there is in the intellect for being an instrument of any intellection whatsoever.[1127]

The same judgment is to be made about the will. But what some object, that from this opinion something follows that favors Pelagius, namely that our will, as a proper partial cause, concurs to supernatural acts, is indeed frivolous. For the errors of Pelagius are manifest, which we have exactly reported in disp. 98, c. 4. To affirm, however, that to acts of grace and to supernatural acts we cooperate on our part by our native and proper virtue - what has this in common with Pelagius, who did not even utter a word on this matter? Nay rather, the Catholic doctrine of the Council of Trent, Session 6, c. 5 and canon 4, is that the free choice of man cooperates by its liberty to the acts of grace, nor is it as an inanimate instrument: but liberty is the native power of our will, and the proper cause of consent, as consent, although insofar as it is of such an order it is from grace. This mixture, therefore, of proper efficacy and of grace in our works is most in accord with our faith. [11281129]

Finally, others argue thus. It is much more the case that the intellect is elevated by God to the vision of God and to supernatural acts than that heat as four should be elevated by God to produce heat as eight; but if heat were elevated in this way, it would in no way be the proper cause of heat as eight according to the excess: therefore likewise neither is the intellect in any way the proper cause of the vision of God. But this argument is easily dissolved: first, because the comparison is useless, in that heat as four cannot be elevated by God to produce the excess of heat as eight, as has already been sufficiently said; but our intellect can be elevated to see God by this alone, that the power which it has for understanding is completed by some supernatural principle: the comparison adduced in the argument is therefore useless. Then too, even if heat could be elevated in that way,

1127. See above, disp. 43, c. 4.
1128. See below, disp. 98, c. 4.
1129. Council of Trent, Session 6, c. 5; can. 4.

there would not be the same reasoning in both cases: for heat as four would not have an inchoate power to that excess, nor would that excess by nature require to be produced by heat as four; but the intellect certainly has from itself an inchoate power for understanding, so that the vision of God cannot be produced without the natural power of the intellect; and therefore the intellect is less distant from the vision in the ratio of acting than heat as four is from heat as eight.

But the arguments of the prior opinion have no difficulty. To the first and the third we say, that neither for the Incarnation can there be assumed an instrument physically concurring, nor the fire of hell for imprinting a quality in the demons, for the reason already stated, that we have universally disproved, namely that a thing cannot be assumed as a physical instrument which does not have of itself some prior operation, or an inchoate power to such an effect: but no creature has this for the Incarnation and the union of the divinity with the humanity, nor has fire for that quality. Add that that quality impressed upon the angels is fictitious, as we shall show below, disp. 242, c. 5; wherefore from it no argument can be drawn. In the same way we say to the second, namely that the words of the Priest in the consecration (and the same judgment must be made in general of any sacrament) do not operate physically to the transubstantiation, or to the effect of the sacrament, but only as moral instruments by way of impetration, for the same reason. And hence appears a solution to the third, namely that it implies a contradiction for something to be assumed as an instrument for creating, as was shown in cap. 3.[1130][1131]

Moreover, with regard to the second argument it must be observed that, even if the words of the consecration were physical instruments of the transubstantiation (which brings with it also other new difficulties, as will be seen in its proper place), still for no reason should it be said that those words operate physically the substance of the body and blood of Christ, as some confuse. First, because to defend the nature of true and proper transubstantiation this is altogether superfluous. For as it is defined in the Council of Trent, Session 13, c. 4, from the mere truth of the words true and proper transubstantiation is gathered: and therefore, since the mere truth of those words can suffice, even if the words did not physically produce the substance itself of the body of Christ, nevertheless they would be true: therefore there would be a true and proper transubstantiation. For if, the words being uttered, Christ were there, and at the same time bread were not, the words would be true: therefore without their producing the substance of the body of Christ, they could be true. Wherefore it seems superfluous to feign such physical efficacy of the words about the substance itself of the body. The words of the Council are: "Now since Christ our Redeemer said that to be truly his body which he offered under the appearance of bread, it has been the persuasion in the Church of God, and this holy Synod now again declares, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine there is made a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood; which conversion is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called transubstantiation." Who, moreover, would dare to assert that, for inferring the true transubstantiation, anything else is necessary besides that truth, which the Council sufficiently

1130. See below, disp. 242, c. 5.
1131. See above, this work, cap. 3.

gathers from it, and the Church has always gathered? With this argument I made use, in theological disputations fourteen years ago, so as to prove that for true transubstantiation a physical production of the substantial term, which by the nature of the thing is connected with the destruction of the bread, is not necessary: which various very acute and learned theologians, in order to defend the contrary opinion, afterwards tried to dissolve in various ways.

First they answer that the Church did not gather the transubstantiation from the sole virtue of the words, but also, as known, supposed that God effected this mystery in a mode most fitting to the truth of the words; and this was by a substantial action, whereby the term To which would be produced; wherefore also the Church gathers that the substance of the bread was destroyed, though the words could be true, if the substance of the bread remained separated from the accidents and placed in its own place: because it was not fitting that the substance of the bread be thus reserved, but altogether destroyed; and thus the Church did not gather from the mere truth of the words that the consecration had been made. I confess indeed that the Church supposes that the consecration is made in a fitting mode, so that the words be verified. But the fitting mode ought to be reckoned that which we posit: for if from this alone, that by the force of the words the body of Christ is under the species, and this presence is signified by these words, the bread is destroyed, the words obtain their truth; much more fitting will it be to assert that the conversion was made in this way: since this mode is much easier than to assert that the body of Christ is produced by such a substantial action, which by its very nature of itself entails the destruction of the bread; which manner of philosophizing, newly devised, contains insuperable difficulties; whereas that mode which is easier ought to be judged more fitting for this mystery.

Second, some answer, the Council ...[1132]

Second, some reply that the Council did not gather transubstantiation from the mere truth of the words, because to do so it would have had to suppose that those words could not be true if the substance of bread and of wine remained under the accidents - an assumption that is very weak; but that it gathered transubstantiation from the tradition of the Church, which, not by natural reasoning alone, but as divinely enlightened, understood that, because Christ in a true and proper sense said that what He was offering was His body, therefore at the same time He effected a conversion of one substance into another. But this solution can be refuted from the words of the Council cited, and it seems not to cohere with itself. For in the cited words it is said that the Church always had it as a persuasion for itself that transubstantiation takes place here from this, that Christ said His body truly to be what He was offering, and that now anew the Council itself defines the same; therefore, since the Council assigns as the cause of this mind of the Church the truth of the words, by no other reason did the Church have this as a persuasion for itself, unless because the words could not be true if the substance of bread and of wine remained there. Add that, if by this line of reasoning the Church could not be sufficiently induced so as to judge this, it could not have believed that transubstantiation takes place there from the fact that Christ said in a true and proper

1132. Council of Trent, Session 13, c. 4.

sense that what He was offering was His body and blood, as the aforesaid Doctors affirm; rather, it would have had to believe that from elsewhere. Therefore the aforesaid theologians in this solution are not sufficiently consistent with themselves.

Third, some respond that from the mere truth of the words the Council did not gather a substantial conversion, but a conversion of substances, which although it called transubstantiation, it did not call a substantial conversion. They say, moreover, that in this sacrament one must concede not only a conversion and transubstantiation, but also a substantial change, which cannot be understood without the production of the substance into which the conversion is made. Yet I for my part do not see by what reason the aforesaid theologians contend not only to defend in this sacrament a true conversion of one substance into another, which is properly called transubstantiation, but also to add another very difficult sort of substantial action by which the terminus of the conversion is produced; since no reason seems to require such an action in this sacrament. For although it were possible, still it should only be asserted to the extent that it were necessary for defending the true and proper conversion of one substance into another, which conversion is truly and properly called transubstantiation; for this must be taught thus by all, since it has been defined by the Church. But if true transubstantiation is rightly defended without such a substantial action, on what, I beg, will we found the devising of such a substantial action? Or what necessity could compel us to assert it, especially since such an action, if it were possible, could not be without a great miracle? Now miracles that are not necessary for defending the mystery of this sacrament ought not to be conceded; for in that case many others would be allowed to occur. Moreover, the Council from the mere truth of the words not only gathered that a conversion of one substance into another takes place, but also added that it is fittingly and properly called by the Church transubstantiation. Let us, then, be content with this alone, and reject all other things, even if they might somehow seem possible and could be defended in some way, as superfluous.

Fourth, some respond that the Council did not gather transubstantiation from a wholly speculative truth, but from a practical one, which effects what it signifies; but what is signified by these words is a true transubstantiation, which necessarily requires the production of the terminus to which. I indeed grant that the truth of these words is practical, and not merely speculative: not because practical truth is placed in anything other than speculative - for each, insofar as it is truth, formally consists in its enunciating that what is, is, which is wont to be called the conformity of words with the thing enunciated - but because practical has this peculiarity, that the words of enunciation also at the same time bring about in reality that which they signify, for which truth it suffices that, within the line of an integral utterance, the effect be posited; whereas speculative truth presupposes this. However, in order that the aforesaid words be true with practical truth, I do not see what else is required than that the body of Christ and the blood by the power of the words become present under the species in such a way that thereby the bread is destroyed; and if this suffices for the words to be true, it will assuredly be superfluous to assert that the body of Christ is there produced in reality; even if otherwise the words would produce it, if they did not find that

which is to be produced - of which in its place it will be said. Wherefore even the true account of transubstantiation, which is gathered from the mere truth of the words, ought to be granted, without the terminus to which thereof being produced.

Second reason. If the words physically effected the substance of the body of Christ, they would not effect anything other than that which they signify, and that which is said to be in the sacrament by force of the words; but this could not be the terminus of a physical production, because it would be necessary that it be a body with soul, and not dead; for the soul is there by concomitance; and the form of a corpse, if it were there, would in the same way be - therefore there would not be something that of itself could terminate the physical action and the production of the substance of the body of Christ. To this reason more recent authors reply in various ways; for us, however, it is enough to touch on them now; the rest we shall set forth more fully in its proper place, where we shall also impugn each solution.

Likewise, if it were so, the substance of the bread would not be expelled by the same words and by the same individual signification, nor would transubstantiation be asserted, nor that bread passes into the body. For by one part of the sentence the presence of the body of Christ would be signified, which could remain with the bread, and by another part the ceasing of the bread would be signified; but now by the same words and by the same individual signification the presence of the body of Christ is so signified that, by that very fact, without an expressed mention of the ceasing of the bread, the substance of the latter necessarily ceases; otherwise it would not be a true proposition. For the mode of effecting morally by mere signification is assimilated to the mode of effecting naturally; for a natural agent so induces a form that, by that very induction, it expels the contrary, and not in any other way. Wherefore we ought not to say that the terminus of transubstantiation is the presence itself, although this is required for transubstantiation, but [we ought to say that it is] the substance of the body and blood. For from that order of signification which we have explained it follows that we say: the bread passes into the body of Christ, because when the body of Christ is signified as present, by force of signification the bread is expelled.

Third reason. Either that production would be a continuation of the pre-existing being of Christ, as some assert - and it seems altogether superfluous - or it would be a new production, as some say, namely that the same thing can be produced twice and thrice in different places. And this is impossible: for although the same thing can be in different places by reason of different modes, as we shall say immediately, nevertheless a thing existing in two places does not have two substantial existences, nor [are they] substantially diverse; and therefore it cannot be produced by so many new productions, as will be treated more fully in its place.

I pass over that argument which is wont to be made against the aforesaid opinion, because from it there would follow that the same [thing] would produce itself: for the humanity of Christ would be the physical instrument of transubstantiation, as the aforesaid doctors admit, and it would produce itself; this argument, however, we shall pursue more fully in its own place.

But indeed, although it may seem aside from the matter, let us briefly explain the matter of transubstantiation which the Church maintains. For we have said that for it that substantial production is not necessary. Therefore transubstantiation is nothing else than an order between the ceasing substance of the bread or of the wine and the substance of the body and blood of Christ, inasmuch as the presence of the substance of the body and blood, not physically but by the force of the signification of the words (that is, so that the words be true), by that very fact that it is present, removes the substance of the bread and of the wine from the midst. And although, if either that [mode], or if this form existed in the consecration - namely, that here there be the body of Christ and that there be no bread - in reality the same effect would follow as regards the presence of the body of Christ and the destruction of the bread; nevertheless, because by the force of the presence, as of signification, the bread is expelled, [it suffices as said].

Moreover, from what has been said it follows that not every succession of substances deserves the name of transubstantiation, such as is [a succession] in the same place or under the same accidents, unless by force of the presence of one the other ceases; a thing which can be brought about only by the truth of the words. Otherwise there would be only a succession of substances, in which indeed one would not be said to pass into another; nor would it be called a substantial succession, wherein not only does one succeed another in any way whatsoever, but it succeeds substantially, that is, by the force of its presence it makes the other cease; for which reason also that which ceases is said to pass into the present [thing]. But of this more at large in its place.

From all these things I infer what pertains to our purpose: that transubstantiation is not creation, not because it passes from some positive terminus, but because creation is not a production of the terminus to which, whereas transubstantiation is not a production, but a certain order of one passing into another, as has been explained. But if it were a production of the whole entity according to matter and form and according to the whole existence of that [thing], I say first, in my judgment, that it would be creation, even if the terminus from which were something positive, namely the substance destroyed, because creation is produc...

A production of a thing according to its whole entity; and thus that phrase, "from nothing" (ex nihilo), which is set down in the definition of creation, would not be understood on the part of the terminus from which (terminus a quo); but "from nothing" would be the same as "not from some constituting principle," as Durandus, cited above in Disputation 173, chapter 3, used to say.[1133] Now however, since transubstantiation for another reason is not creation, we can well say that "from nothing" can be put for the terminus from which of creation. Then I say, even the terminus from which of creation would then be nothing, as will be explained below.

But someone will ask, if such a transubstantiation were effected, such that by the force of the production of the terminus to which (terminus ad quem) according to itself as a whole, the preceding substance, which is the terminus from which, would be destroyed - namely, when transubstantiation would be effected not into a thing previously existing, but into a thing then produced - would it then be true creation? For then there would be a production of the whole entity

1133. Durandus, Disputation 173, cap. 3.

according to itself; but "from something" on the part of the terminus from which, which would seem to take away the notion of creation. I answer: if such a transubstantiation could be, it would indeed be creation, and I would understand that phrase "from nothing," together with Durandus, not for the terminus from which, but for that which is "not from some constituting principle in any way whatsoever"; for a positive terminus from which would seem to stand in the way, such that that transubstantiation would not be creation, since it would be a production of the whole entity. But someone will say: if by the force of the production of one substance another were physically destroyed, the destruction of that other would not be annihilation, because it would not be into absolute nothing, but into "not-being of such a kind"; therefore, conversely, the production of the other would not be a production of entity simply, but of such-and-such an entity. I answer: therefore in that case the ceasing of one substance would not be annihilation, because its not-being would be causally conjoined with the being of the other substance, and thus it would not be nothing absolutely, but a not-being of such a kind; but truly the substance which would begin to be, and by the force of its production would destroy the other, would begin according to its whole existence, and therefore the production of that would be a production of entity simply, because it would be of the whole entity according to every substantial part of it - which properly belongs to the notion of creation: for that the terminus from which be nothing is required only to this extent, inasmuch as nothing of it remains in the composition of the terminus to which.

Moreover, I think that no such transubstantiation is possible: because I do not see what connection a production of being from itself and by its nature has with the destruction of another pre-existing substance according to itself as a whole, as I shall say more at large in its place; and I judge that the connection can only be on the part of the truth of the words so signifying one thing, that by this very fact another is destroyed - which connection indeed could not suffice for the thing that ceases to be the physical terminus from which of the production; for to this it would be necessary that with the ceasing of that, the inception of the other be naturally connected, and not only by the will of the One establishing the words: but then only would that positive terminus from which be said to be the terminus of transubstantiation, and of the order of one substance passing into another, in the account of the words; which transubstantiation formally would not be a production, although it would be conjoined to a production.

Wherefore, if by the truth of the words alone it were brought about that, upon one substance beginning under the accidents of another, that other should cease, and the substance beginning to be there were then produced according to its whole entity, we ought there to consider and distinguish two things. One is the order of one substance destroying another by its presence by force of the words; and this would be transubstantiation of the same kind as it now is, resting only upon the truth of the words, and not upon a physical opposition of substance to substance so as to destroy it. The other is creation, inasmuch as it would be a physical action producing the substance in the terminus to which, according to the whole entity; and to this we should assign for the terminus from which, nothing (nihil), because that production, inasmuch as it is a production according to the whole substance, would physically proceed from nothing, and not from that substance which would be said to be the terminus from which of the transubstantiation. For this

terminus from which would be only of the order of transubstantiation, inasmuch as it would correspond only to the truth of the words, and not to the physical production of the substance in the terminus to which. And now indeed in fact we must concede two things in transubstantiation. One is the conservation of the substance of the body of Christ; and this has physically for a terminus from which, nothing, and is by God alone: because God alone conserves the body of Christ from nothing, even as from a terminus, according to what was noted above in Disputation 173.[1134] The other is the order of two substances: and this has only by force of the words for a terminus from which the substance of bread; and thus we say, that from bread the Body of Christ is made, not because it is produced physically from it, but because by its presence it destroys the bread by the mere truth of the words. Let this be enough to have said here - more exactly indeed than the matter demands - for in its own place we shall treat these things more at large, so that from this at least we may understand the nature of creation. Whether the bread in the sacrament is annihilated will be explained there.

Finally, some object in this way. In a creature there is a potency which they call obediential, to receive some supernatural form, and in the same body, that, while remaining in itself entirely unaltered, it be in diverse places, and be referred to them; finally, that a soul inform a greater body than its nature could inform: therefore in any creature there will be this, that it be assumed as an instrument for creating, and for annihilating.

I answer, the case is altogether different. For a creature is a subject for receiving a supernatural form in such wise that its own natural potency concurs for receiving, nay rather, it is the first cause of receiving, and for receiving it is prior to the other, by a virtue because of which it is said to be made apt for receiving. For that it needs a supernatural agent infusing the form, this is not to be alleged so that it may be able to receive in its own genus; but it is to be alleged, that is, that it be perfected by the agent so as to be capable of it, to have that which it can receive of itself. For to receive is the proper act of matter; but efficiency does not correspond as a proper cause of the act of receiving, but of infusing, as we shall say below at Question 102, Question 113, Article 8. But a creature cannot be an instrument for that effect to which it neither supplies any beginning of efficacy, nor contributes of itself anything to its production, as has been proved.

Next, a body cannot be in two places, and be referred to diverse things, unless some change be made in it according to mode: for things remaining in the same manner cannot, by God's will alone, be mutually referred; therefore, when some body is constituted in diverse places, it receives in itself some mode of thus being disposed, from which it follows that it is in diverse places: but in an instrument no change can be made which is apt for such an effect, as has been proved.

Lastly, if a form can inform a greater matter, and a greater, it is necessary that that matter be disposed, so that the form be naturally united to it; otherwise, although it could be in the whole matter according to presence, it will not be able to be an informing: for informing must be by its own virtue, not by another's; because a form, for informing, is a first cause, nor can a form as an instrument be assumed for informing: for the kind of instrument belongs only among efficient

1134. See above, Disputation 173.

causes. But that a thing whatsoever be assumed as an instrument by an efficient cause, neither the effect nor the thing itself can be so fitted that by its own virtue at least in part it concur to it: therefore the account is far different.

Finally, to all these things it must be added: even if something could be assumed as an instrument for the physical act of creation, it could nowise be assumed as an instrument of annihilation. For, as St. Thomas very well noted in the Third Part, Question 13, Article - annihilation can only be brought about when the agent, previously conserving a thing, withdraws the influx by which the thing was sustained. And yet, although an agent could influence an effect by a mediating instrument, and thus by that medium create, nevertheless, since it would not withdraw the concurrence of the mediating instrument, but by itself, and by its own virtue and will alone would deny it, therefore for annihilating no instrument can be assumed.[1135]

On creation and its attribution to the divine persons

Articulus VI - Whether to create is proper to some person

To the sixth it proceeds thus. It seems that to create is proper to some person.

- For that which is prior is the cause of that which is posterior, and the perfect is the cause of the imperfect. But the procession of a divine person is prior to the procession of a creature, and more perfect, because a divine person proceeds in the perfect likeness of his principle, whereas the creature [proceeds] in an imperfect [likeness]. Therefore the processions of the divine persons are the cause of the procession of things. And thus to create is proper to a person.
- Moreover. The divine persons are not distinguished from one another except by their processions and relations. Whatever therefore is differently attributed to the divine persons, this agrees to them according to the processions of the persons and the relations. But the causality of creatures is attributed in a diverse mode to the divine persons. For in the Symbol of faith it is attributed to the Father that he is the creator of all things invisible and visible; but it is attributed to the Son that through him all things were made; and to the Holy Spirit, that he is Lord and life-giver. Therefore the causality of creatures agrees to the persons according to the processions and relations.
- Moreover. If it be said that the causality of the creature is considered according to some essential attribute which is appropriated to some person, this does not seem sufficient. For every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute, namely power, goodness, and wisdom; and thus it does not pertain more to one than to another. Therefore some determined mode of causality ought not to be attributed to one person more than to others, unless they were distinguished in creating according to the relations and processions.

1135. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 13, art., on annihilation as the withdrawal of conserving influx.

But on the contrary is what Dionysius says in the second chapter of On the Divine Names, that all the creatables are common to the whole divinity.[1136]

I answer that to create is properly to cause, that is, to produce the existence (esse) of things. But since every agent acts in likeness to itself, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action: for fire is that which generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to his existence, which is his essence, which is common to the three persons. Whence to create is not proper as to a person, but is common to the whole Trinity. Yet, nevertheless, the divine persons according to the account of their procession have a certain causality with respect to the creation of things. For, as was shown above when it was being treated of God's knowledge and will, God is the cause of things through his intellect and will, just as an artisan is of artificial things. But the artisan works through the word conceived in the intellect, and through the love of his will as referred to something. Whence also God the Father fashioned the creature through his Word which is the Son, and through his Love which is the Holy Spirit; and according to this the processions of the persons are the reasons of the production of creatures, inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, which are knowledge and will.[1137]

Reply to the first: Therefore it must be said, that the processions of the divine persons are the cause of creation, as has been said.

Reply to the second: It must be said that, just as the divine nature, although it is common to the three persons, yet in a certain order befits them, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both; so also the power of creating, although it is common to the three persons, yet in a certain order befits them. For the Son has it from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. Whence "to be creator" is attributed to the Father, as to him who does not have the power of creating from another. But of the Son it is said, "through whom all things were made," inasmuch as he has the same power, but from another. For this preposition "through" is wont to denote a medial cause, or a principle from a principle. But to the Holy Spirit, who has the same power from both, it is attributed that, by ruling, he governs and vivifies the things that are created by the Father through the Son. There can also be taken a common reason for this attribution from the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as was said above, power is attributed and appropriated to the Father, which is most manifest in creation, and therefore "to be creator" is attributed to the Father. But wisdom is appropriated to the Son, through which an agent works by intellect. And therefore it is said of...

It is said of the Son, "Through whom all things were made." But to the Holy Spirit there is appropriated goodness, to which it pertains to govern by leading things to their due ends, and to vivify: for life consists in a certain interior motion. Now the first mover is the end and goodness.

1136. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 2.
1137. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, qq. 14 and 19, esp. q. 19, a. 4.

Reply to the third: Although an effect of God proceeds from any of the attributes, nevertheless each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it has affinity according to its proper notion. Thus the ordering of things is reduced to wisdom, and the justification of the ungodly to mercy and to goodness diffusing itself superabundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to power (potency, *potentia*).

Confirmation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion of the article is, Creation is a common action of the whole Trinity. Moreover, it is a truth of faith defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith, where the three persons are said to be consubstantial, coequal, and co-omnipotent; and thus that the essence of God is the principle of all things, according as it is found in the three.[1138] The same conclusion is clearly had in the Sixth Council of Toledo, cap. 1, and in the eleventh, in the confession of faith, and in the Letter of Agatho, which is in the Sixth Synod, action 4, and in action 17 it was received by the whole Council.[1138] It is also the common doctrine of the Fathers: Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, and St. Augustine, book I On the Trinity, cap. 4 and 5, and frequently in other places. From which doctrine the axiom of the theologians flowed, The works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided. The reason, moreover, is manifest; for since omnipotence is a common and essential attribute, and since God works by the medium of intellect and will, as we have shown in Disputation 102, cap. 3; and since these are also common to all the persons, it follows that all concur to creation: for we suppose that which, against the Arians and Eunomians, we proved in Disputation 109 and Disputation 110, namely, that the three persons are substantial, and we take away the grades of "omnipotence, semipotence, and no power," which Abelard contrived out of his own brain: hence the aforesaid doctrine rightly follows. Wherefore, when the notion of "idea" is attributed to the Son of God, whereby the Father works, it is not to be understood so that the notion of idea belongs to Him alone, and power to the Father alone, but these things are to be understood by appropriation. And in this same way I would often understand the opinion of Henry,[1139] who otherwise plainly errs when he assigns to the Son the formal and proximate principle by which the Father operates, and to essential intellection the remote principle. In this same sense must also be explained those other Fathers who say that the eternal Word ministered to the Father in creation, or was His minister. In this manner the Apostles speak in the Apostolic Constitutions, book 5, cap. 19, near the end; Justin Martyr in the Dialogue with Trypho, where he calls the Son's works ministries; Clement of Alexandria, in the Exhortatory Oration to the Greeks, page 2, where he calls the Son the instrument of the Father; St. Cecilia in Metaphrastes, in her Life, when he asserts that the Father produced the Son that He might produce the rest, and the Holy Spirit that He might vivify all; Eusebius of

1138. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica; Sixth Council of Toledo, cap. 1; eleventh Council of Toledo, confessio fidei; Letter of Pope Agatho read in the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Third Council of Constantinople), actiones 4 and 17.

1138. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica; Sixth Council of Toledo, cap. 1; eleventh Council of Toledo, confessio fidei; Letter of Pope Agatho read in the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Third Council of Constantinople), actiones 4 and 17.

1139. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, a certain question, on the formal and proximate principle in the Son.

Caesarea, in book 9 of the Demonstratio Evangelica, cap. 5, and in the first book of the History, cap. 1. All which and the remaining testimonies of the Fathers I think ought to be understood by appropriation, as I noted above concerning the notion of idea which is attributed to the Son. But St. Basil, in the book On the Holy Spirit, cap. 8, explains in another sense how the Son receives from the Father the power of creating, namely, not as a servant and subject, but by reason of origin, whereby He receives the same nature from the Father. And in that manner of speaking by which it is said that the Father made all things "through the Son," he says is denoted that the Father is the principal cause, that is, such that as from an origin and fountain the Son has all things. In the same way Athanasius understood it in Sermon 3 against the Arians, about the middle. So too must we interpret those Fathers who attribute to God the Father "to command," and to the Son "to do": so St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Trinity against the Jews; St. Jerome, on that of Amos 6, "For behold the Lord has commanded"; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6 and Catechesis 11, near the end: to the same also looks Lactantius, book 4 of the Divine Institutions, cap. 6, at the end, when he concludes, from the philosophers Trismegistus and the Sibyls, that God the Father made use of the Son as counselor and of means by which the world might be fashioned.[1140]

Articulus VII - Whether in creatures it is necessary to find a vestige of the Trinity

It is argued to the contrary. It seems that in creatures it is not necessary to find a vestige of the Trinity. For by its own vestiges each thing can be investigated; but the Trinity of persons cannot be investigated from creatures, as was said above. Therefore the vestiges of the Trinity are not in the creature.

1. Further, whatever is in the creature is created. If therefore the vestige of the Trinity is found in the creature according to some of its properties, and every created thing has a vestige of the Trinity, it is necessary that in each one of those there be found also the vestige of the Trinity. And thus to infinity.
2. Further, an effect represents only its cause. But the causality of creatures pertains to the common nature, and not to the relations by which the persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature there is not found a vestige of the Trinity, but only of the unity of the essence.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in book six On the Trinity, that the vestige of the Trinity appears in creatures.[1141]

I answer: Every effect in some way represents its cause, but diversely. For some effect represents only the causality of the cause, and not its form, as smoke represents fire; and such a representation is called the representation of a vestige. Now a vestige shows the motion of

1140. Apostolic Constitutions V.19; Justin Martyr, Dialogus cum Tryphone; Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus (Oratio exhortatoria ad gentes); the Life of St. Cecilia in Symeon Metaphrastes; Eusebius of Caesarea, Demonstratio Evangelica IX.5 and Historia Ecclesiastica I.1; Basil, De Spiritu Sancto c. 8; Athanasius, Contra Arianos, sermo 3; Gregory of Nyssa, De Trinitate adversus Iudaeos; Jerome on Amos 6; Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses 6 and 11; Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones IV.6, concluding from Hermes Trismegistus and the Sibyls.

something passing by, but not what it is like. But some effect represents the cause as to the likeness of its form, as a generated fire represents the generating fire, and the statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is the representation of an image. Now the processions of the divine persons are attended according to the acts of the intellect and will, as was said above. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; the Holy Spirit as the love of the will.

Therefore in rational creatures, in which there is intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as in them there is found a conceived word and a proceeding love. But in all creatures there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of vestige, inasmuch as in each creature there are found certain things which it is necessary to reduce to the divine persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its existence (existence, *esse*), and has a form by which it is determined to species, and has an order to something else. Accordingly, inasmuch as it is a certain created substance, it represents a cause and principle; and thus it shows the person of the Father, who is a principle not from a principle. Inasmuch as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word, according to which the form of the work of art is from the conception of the artisan. But inasmuch as it has order, it represents the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He is love: because the order of an effect to something else is from the will of the creator. And therefore Augustine says, in book six On the Trinity, that the vestige of the Trinity is found in each creature, according as it is one thing, and according as it is formed by some species, and according as it holds some order. And to these also are reduced those three - number, weight, and measure - which are set down in Wisdom 11. For measure is referred to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, number to species, weight to order. And to these three are reduced those other three which Augustine sets down, mode, species, and order. And those which he sets down in the book 83 Questions - what stands, what is discerned, what accords. For something "stands" by its substance, is "discerned" by its form, "accords" by its order. And in the same way what things soever are thus said can easily be reduced.[1142]

Reply to the first: The representation of a vestige is attended according to appropriation; in which manner from creatures one can come to the Trinity of the divine persons, as was said.

Reply to the second: A creature is a thing properly subsisting (subsistence, *subsistentia*), in which it is that those three be found; nor is it necessary that in any of those things which are in it these three be found, but according to them the vestige is attributed to the subsisting thing.

Reply to the third: Also the processions of the persons are in some manner the cause and reason of creation, as was said.

The conclusion is affirmative, which the Holy Doctor (St. Thomas) unfolds at length according to the mind of Augustine.

1141. Augustine, De Trinitate VI.
1142. Wisdom 11:21; Augustine, De natura boni (on mode, species, order); Augustine, 83 Quaestiones, q. 18.

Articulus VIII - Whether creation is admitted in the works of nature and of art

The eighth proceeds thus. It seems that creation is admitted in the works of nature and of art. For in every operation of nature and of art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter does not have a part of itself; therefore it is produced from nothing. And thus in every operation of nature and of art there is creation.

1. Further, an effect is not prior to its cause; but in natural things there is not found anything acting except an accidental form, which is an active or passive form. Therefore by the operation of nature a substantial form is not produced. It remains therefore that it be by creation.
2. Further, nature makes what is like itself. But some things are found to be generated in nature not by something like themselves, as is evident in animals generated by putrefaction. Therefore their form is not from nature but from creation. And the same reason holds for others.
3. Further, what is not created is not a creature. If therefore in those things which are from nature creation be not adjoined, it follows that those things which are from nature are not creatures. Which is heretical.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says upon Genesis according to the letter, that he distinguishes the work of propagation, which is the work of nature, from the work of creation.[1143]

I answer that it must be said, that this doubt is introduced on account of the forms, which certain men posited not to begin by the action of nature, but previously to have existed in matter, positing a "latency of forms." And this befell them from ignorance of matter, because they did not know how to distinguish between potency (potency, *potentia*) and act (act, *actus*). For because forms pre-exist in matter in potency, they posited them to pre-exist simply in act. But others granted that forms are given by a separate cause in the manner of creation. And according to this they adjoin creation to every operation of nature. But this hap -

I answer that this happened to them from ignorance of form, for they did not consider that the natural form of a body is not subsistent, but is that by which a thing is what it is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created properly belong only to a subsistent thing, as was said above, it is not proper to forms to be made, nor to be created, but they are made together with [the composite]. But that which is made properly by a natural agent is the composite, which is made from matter. Hence in the works of nature creation is not mixed in, but something is presupposed for the operation of nature.

Reply to the first: Forms begin to be in act when the composites are made - not that they themselves come to be per se, but only per accidens.

1143. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, where he distinguishes the opus propagationis (nature) from the opus creationis.

Reply to the second: Active qualities in nature act by the power of substantial forms; and therefore a natural agent produces not only a like to itself according to quality, but according to species.

Reply to the third: For the generation of imperfect animals the universal agent suffices, which is the power of the heavens, to which they are assimilated not according to species but according to a certain analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. But for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice; rather a proper agent is required, which is a univocal generator.

Reply to the fourth: The operation of nature is only from a presupposition of created principles, and thus the things which are done by nature are called creatures.

Conclusion: Natural and artificial forms are not said to be produced by creation, but to be created together with [the composite]; thus in the works of nature creation is not mixed in, but is presupposed. St. Thomas understands the conclusion concerning forms other than the rational, about which enough has been said by us in disputation 173, chapters 2 and 3.

Quaestio XLVI - On the principle of the duration of created things

Consequently it must be considered concerning the principle of the duration of created things. And about this three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the universe of creatures has existed always

Objection 1. It seems that the universe of creatures, which is now called by the name "world," did not begin, but has been from eternity. For whatever begins to be, before it was, it was possible for it to be; otherwise it would have been impossible for it to come to be. If therefore the world began to be, before it began it was possible for it to be. But what is possible to be is matter, which is in potency (potency, potentia) to being, which is through form; and to non-being, which is through privation. If therefore the world began to be, before the world there was matter. But matter cannot be without form. But the matter of the world with form is the world. Therefore the world was before it began to be. Which is impossible.

Objection 2. Further, nothing which has the power to be always is at one time and is not at another time; because as far as the power of a thing extends, so long it is. But every incorruptible thing has the power to be always; for it does not have the power for a determined time of duration. Therefore nothing incorruptible is at one time and is not at another. But whatever begins to be, at one time is and at another time is not. Therefore no incorruptible begins to be. But there are many incorruptibles in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to be.

Objection 3. Further, nothing ungenerated begins to be. But the Philosopher says in Physics I that matter is ungenerated; and in On the Heavens and the World I that the heaven is ungenerated. Therefore the universe of things does not begin to be.

Objection 4. Further, a vacuum is where there is no body, but it is possible for it to be. But if the world began to be where now the body of the world is, previously there was no body, and yet one could have been there; otherwise now there would not be one there. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum. Which is impossible.

Objection 5. Further, nothing begins to be moved anew except because the mover and the mobile are disposed otherwise now than before. But that which is otherwise disposed now than before, is moved. Therefore before every motion beginning anew, there was some motion. Therefore motion always existed. Therefore also a mobile: because motion is only in a mobile.

Objection 6. Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary; but neither begins to move unless some motion pre-exists. For nature always operates in the same way; hence unless some change precedes either in the nature of the mover or in the mobile, there will not begin to be from a natural mover a motion which was not before. But the will, without a change in itself, delays to do what it intends; but this is not except by some change which is imagined at least on the part of time itself. For as one who wishes to build a house tomorrow and not today awaits something that will be tomorrow which is not today; and at least he awaits that the day of today pass and tomorrow come - which is not without change, because time is the number of motion. It remains therefore that before every motion beginning anew there was another motion. And thus the same as before.

Objection 7. Further, whatever is always in the beginning and always in the end can neither cease nor begin. For what begins is not in its beginning; and what ceases is not in its end. But time is always in its beginning and end; because there is nothing of time except the now, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time can neither begin nor cease; and consequently neither can motion, whose number time is.

Objection 8. Further, God is prior to the world either by nature only or also by duration. If by nature only, then since God is from eternity, the world is from eternity. But if He is prior by duration, the before and after in duration constitute time. Therefore before the world there was time. Which is impossible.

Objection 9. Further, when a sufficient cause is posited, the effect is posited. For a cause to which the effect does not follow is an imperfect cause, needing another in order that the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world - final by reason of His goodness, exemplary by reason of His wisdom, and efficient by reason of His power, as is clear from the foregoing.[1144] Since therefore God is from eternity, the world is from eternity.

Objection 10. Further, whose action is eternal, its effect is eternal. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world also is eternal.

1144. Q.44, a.3 - 4.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 17: "Glorify me, Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was made." And Proverbs 8: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning."

I answer that it must be said that nothing besides God could have been from eternity. And to posit this is not impossible. For it was shown above that the will (will, voluntas) of God is the cause of things. Thus therefore some things must be, as it is necessary that God will them; since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause, as is said in Metaphysics V.

But it was shown above that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God will anything except Himself. Therefore it is not necessary that God will that the world be always; but there is only this necessity about the being of the world, inasmuch as God wills it to be, since the being of the world depends on the will of God as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary that the world always be. Whence neither can it be proved demonstratively. Nor are the arguments which Aristotle brings for this demonstrative simply, but only in a certain respect, namely, for contradicting the reasonings of the ancients who posited that the world begins according to certain modes impossible in truth. And this appears from three things. First, because both in Physics VIII and in On the Heavens I he allows certain opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, against whom he introduces contradictory arguments. Second, because wherever he speaks about this matter he adduces the testimonies of the ancients - which is not the way of one demonstrating, but of one persuading probably. Third, because he expressly says in Topics I that there are certain dialectical problems, about which we do not have demonstrations, for instance, whether the world is eternal.

Reply to the first: Before the world existed, it was possible for the world to exist - not indeed according to passive potency, which is matter, but according to the active potency of God; and also according as something is said to be absolutely possible, not according to some potency, but from the mere habitude of terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics V.

Reply to the second: That which has the power to be always has that power from this, not that it is at one time and is not at another; but before it had that power, it was not. Hence the argument which is set down by Aristotle in On the Heavens I does not conclude simply that incorruptibles did not begin to be, but that they did not begin to be according to the natural mode by which generable and corruptible things begin to be.

Reply to the third: Aristotle in Physics I proves that matter is ungenerated by this, that it does not have a subject which is in first act; and in On the Heavens and the World he proves that the heaven is ungenerated by this, that it does not have a contrary from which it is generated. Hence it is clear that by both it is concluded only that matter and the heaven did not begin by generation, as some asserted, especially concerning the heaven. But we say that matter and the heaven were brought into being by creation, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the fourth: For the notion of a vacuum it does not suffice that there be nothing there; but it is required that there be a space capable of a body in which there is no body, as is clear from Aristotle in Physics IV. But we say that before the world there was neither place nor space.

Reply to the fifth: The first motion always was disposed in the same way; but the first mobile was not always disposed in the same way, for it began to be when previously it had not been. But this was not through change, but through creation, which is not a change, as was said above. Hence it is clear that this argument which Aristotle sets down in Physics VIII proceeds against those who posited that the mobiles alternated, but that motion was not eternal, as is clear from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that, once mobiles began, there was always motion.

Reply to the sixth: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although it has an eternal will of producing some effect, nevertheless it did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary that any change be presupposed which is on account of the imagination of time.

Reply to the seventh: As it is said in Physics IV, "before and after" are in time according as "before and after" are in motion. Hence beginning and end must be taken in time just as in motion. But if the eternity of motion is supposed, it is necessary that any moment taken in motion be the beginning and the end of motion - which is not necessary if motion begins. And the same reasoning holds of the "now" of time. And thus it is clear that that argument, about the instant "now" always being the beginning and the end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and of motion. Hence Aristotle adduces this reasoning in Physics VIII against those who posited the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of motion.[1145]

Reply to the eighth: God is prior to the world in duration. But "prior" does not designate priority of time, but of eternity. Or it must be said that it designates the eternity of imagined time, and not of time really existing; just as, when it is said "above the heaven there is nothing," "above" designates only an imagined place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions superadded to the dimensions of the celestial body.

Reply to the ninth: Just as the effect proceeds from a natural agent according to the mode of its form (*forma*), so it proceeds from an agent by will according to the form preconcept and determined by that agent, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, although God from eternity was a sufficient cause of the world, it is not necessary to posit that the world was produced by Him except according as it is in the predestination of His will, namely, that it have existence (*esse*) after not-existing, in order more manifestly to declare its author.

Reply to the tenth: Once the action is posited, the effect follows according to the exigency of the form which is the principle of the action. Now in agents by will, what is conceived as predetermined is taken as a form which is the principle of the action. From the eternal action, therefore, of God there does not follow an eternal effect, but such an effect as God willed, namely, that it have existence after not-existing.

Conclusion: Nothing besides God has been from eternity.

1145. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 10 (tom. 20).

Articulus II - Whether the world's having begun is an article of faith

It is asked thus. It seems that the world's having begun is not an article of faith, but a demonstrable conclusion.

1) For every made thing has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the efficient cause of the world; and the more probable philosophers posited this. Therefore it can be proved demonstratively that the world began.

2) Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, then either from nothing or from something. But not from something; for thus the matter of the world would have preceded the world - which is contrary to the arguments which Aristotle sets down, who posits the heaven to be ungenerated.[1146] Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing. And thus it has existence after non-existence. Therefore it must be that its existence began.

3) Further, everything that works through intellect works from some principle, as is clear in all artificial things. But God is an agent through intellect. Therefore He works from some principle. Therefore the world, which is His effect, was not always.

4) Further, it is manifest that certain arts and the habitations of regions began at determinate times. But this would not be the case if the world had always been. Therefore it is manifest that the world was not always.

5) Further, it is certain that nothing can be equated to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equated to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world has not always been.

6) Further, if the world had always been, infinitely many days would have preceded this day. But the infinite cannot be traversed. Therefore we would never have come to this day - which is manifestly false.

7) Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was from eternity. Therefore one man was begotten from another to infinity. But the father is the efficient cause of the son, as is said in Physics II. Therefore in efficient causes there is a proceeding to infinity - which is disproved in Metaphysics II.

8) Further, if the world and generation were always, infinitely many men would have preceded. But the soul of man is immortal. Therefore infinitely many human souls would now exist in act. But this is impossible. Therefore it can be known of necessity that the world began, and is not held by faith alone.

But on the contrary: The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively; because faith is of things not appearing, as is said to the Hebrews 11. But that God is the creator of the world, in such wise that the world began to exist, is an article of faith. For we say, "I believe in one God," etc. And again St. Gregory says in Homily 1 on Ezekiel, that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the

1146. Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 20; cf. "De Caelo" and "De Mundo" loci cited in the margin.

beginning God created heaven and earth"; in which the newness of the world is handed down. Therefore the newness of the world is had only through revelation. And so it cannot be proved demonstratively.[1147]

I answer: That the world has not always existed is held by faith alone, and cannot be proved demonstratively; just as was said above concerning the mystery of the Trinity. The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot receive a demonstration on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the "what-it-is" (quidditative account). But each thing, according to the intelligible account of its species, abstracts from "here and now"; wherefore it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or the heaven, or a stone, has not always been. Likewise neither on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will (*voluntas*) of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which it is absolutely necessary that God will. But such are not the things which He wills concerning creatures, as was said. The divine will, however, can be manifested to man by revelation, upon which faith rests. Hence that the world began is a thing to be believed, not to be demonstrated or known scientifically. And it is useful to note this, lest perhaps someone, thinking himself able to demonstrate that the world began, bring forward non-necessary arguments, which furnish unbelievers with matter for deriding us as though by such arguments we were compelled to believe what is false.

Reply to the first: As St. Augustine says in the City of God XI, some of the philosophers who posited the eternity of the world nevertheless asserted that the world was made by God - some saying that He made it from pre-existing things, as an artisan from matter; others that He made it from nothing. And according to this latter position, it would not be incongruous to say that the world always existed, for "made" is said not only of what begins now to be, but of whatever in any way has being from another. And thus, even if the world had always been, its being would nevertheless be from God. Therefore the major premiss is not simply true if "made" is taken to mean "that which has being from a maker."

Reply to the second: We grant that the world was made from nothing - not so that it was "after nothing," as if nothing were a prior subject, but so that it was made with no thing presupposed. For the creation by which the world was produced is not a successive change, as was said above.

Reply to the third: That is the reasoning of Anaxagoras which he sets down in Physics III;[1148] but it does not conclude of necessity, except concerning an intellect which, by deliberating, investigates what it should do - and such inquiry is like motion. Such indeed is the human intellect, but not the divine, as was said above.

Reply to the fourth: Those who posited the eternity of the world say that some regions, over an infinite time, have been changed from being uninhabitable to being habitable, and conversely. Likewise they posit that the arts, on account of various corruptions and accidents, have infinitely

1147. Hebrews 11:1; "Credo in unum Deum" (Symbol); St. Gregory, Homily 1 on Ezekiel: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram."

1148. Aristotle, Physics III, where the argument of Anaxagoras concerning acting "from a principle" is reported.

often perished and have again been corrupted. Hence Aristotle says in the Meteorologica that it is ridiculous, from such particular changes, to form an opinion concerning the newness of the whole world.[1149]

Reply to the fifth: If the world had always existed, it would not thereby be equated to God in duration. For, as Boethius says, eternity is "the total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life," whereas temporal duration is successive. Therefore there is not the same ratio of duration, and so no equality.[1150]

Reply to the sixth: To "traverse the infinite" is necessary if one must pass from one extreme to the other through all the intermediates. But in the present case no such traversal is required if motion or time were without beginning. And the same reasoning applies to the now of time. Thus it is clear that the argument from the instant "now," that it is always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and motion; and so also the cavil about "passing through infinite days" proceeds as if there were a first day set as one extreme. Since there is no such first extreme, it does not follow that an infinite has been traversed.

Reply to the seventh: In efficient causes there is no proceeding to infinity per se - for example, if all were simultaneously and essentially ordered to one effect. But the series of fathers and sons proceeds per accidens, since individuals of this kind are generable and corruptible and do not remain simultaneously. Therefore an infinite series per accidens is not repugnant.

Reply to the eighth: Those philosophers who posited the eternity of the world denied that the human soul remains after the body; or some posited one single intellect for all men. Hence their position did not require that there be infinitely many human souls existing in act at once.[1151]

For the divine will cannot be investigated by natural reason except about those things which it is absolutely necessary that God should will. But such are not the things which He wills concerning creatures, as has been said. Yet the divine will can be made manifest to man by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began is a matter to be believed, not, however, demonstrable or knowable. And it is useful that this be considered, lest perhaps someone, presuming to demonstrate what pertains to faith, should bring forward non-necessary arguments which furnish matter for derision to unbelievers, who think that we believe on account of such arguments those things which are of faith.

Reply to the first: As St. Augustine says, XI On the City of God, the philosophers who posited the eternity of the world held a twofold opinion. Some indeed asserted that the substance of the world is uncreated by God; and this is an intelligible error, and so is easily refuted. But others posited the world to be eternal in such a way that nevertheless they said the world was made by God. For they did not wish the world to have a beginning of time, but a beginning of its creation, so that in a certain scarcely intelligible way it was always being made. And how they understand this, they have set forth, as Augustine relates in the same book of the City of God. For, as they say: if a

1149. Aristotle, Meteorologica (the "lib. Meteor." cited in the margin).

1150. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae V, prose 6: eternity as the "tota simul" possession of interminable life.

1151. On ancient denials of personal immortality and theories of a single intellect: cf. positions alluded to by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XI.

foot had always been in dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint, which no one would doubt to have been made by the foot; so too, if the world has always existed, it has always existed with the one existing who made it. And this is to be understood by considering that an efficient cause which acts through motion of necessity precedes in time its effect, because an effect is only between the termini of an action; but every agent must be the principle of its action. If, however, the action be instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary that the agent be prior in duration to the effect, as is clear in illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow of necessity, if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration, because the creation which He produced is not a successive change, as was said above.

Reply to the second: Those who posited the eternity of the world said that the world was made by God from nothing - not that it was made after nothing in the sense in which we understand by the name of creation, but because it was not made from anything. And thus some also do not refuse to use the name of creation, as is clear from Avicenna in his Metaphysics, book XII.[1152]

Reply to the third: That is the argument of Anaxagoras which is set down in the third book of the Physics. But it does not conclude of necessity, except concerning an intellect that, by deliberating, inquires what ought to be done, which is like to motion. Such indeed is the human intellect, but not the divine, as is clear from what has been said above.[1153]

Reply to the fourth: Those who posit the eternity of the world also posit that some region has been changed infinitely from uninhabitable to habitable and conversely. And similarly they posit that the arts, on account of diverse corruptions and incidental events, have been invented infinitely many times and again lost. Hence Aristotle says in the book of the Meteorologica that it is ridiculous from such particular changes to take up an opinion about the newness of the whole world.[1154]

Reply to the fifth: Even if the world had always existed, nevertheless it would not be equated to God in eternity, as Boethius says at the end of the De consolatione, because the divine existence is "the whole simultaneously" without any succession; not so that of the world.[1155]

Reply to the sixth: A transit is always understood from one terminus to another. But whatever past day is marked off, from that to this present day there are finite days that can have been passed through. The objection proceeds as if, the extremes being posited, there were infinite intermediates.

Reply to the seventh: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se; for example, if a cause which is required per se for some effect were multiplied to infinity. Thus, if a stone were moved by a stick, and the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity per accidens in efficient causes is not judged impossible. For example, all causes which are multiplied to infinity do not retain any order except to one cause, but their multiplication is per accidens. Thus an artisan works by many hammers per accidens, because one after another is

1152. Avicenna, Metaphysics XII.
1153. Aristotle, Physics III, where the argument of Anaxagoras is set down.
1154. Aristotle, Meteorologica I.
1155. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae V, prose 6.

broken. Thus it happens per accidens that this hammer acts after the action of another hammer. And similarly it happens to this man, insofar as he generates, that he be begotten by another. For he generates insofar as he is a man, and not insofar as he is the son of another man. For all generating men have one degree in efficient causes, namely the degree of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible that man be generated by man to infinity. But it would be impossible that the generation of this man should depend on this man, and on the elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply to the eighth: Those who posit the eternity of the world avoid this argument in many ways. For some do not deem it impossible that there be actually infinite souls, as is clear in the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says this is an empty assertion. But this has been refuted above. Others say that the soul is corrupted with the body. Others, that of all souls there remains one only. Others again, as St. Augustine says, posited because of this the circuit of souls, namely, that souls separated from bodies after determined periods of times return again to bodies. About all which there is to be treated in what follows. It must be considered, however, that this is a particular argument. Hence one could say that the world was eternal, or at least that some creature, as an angel, was from eternity, but not man. We, however, intend universally whether any creature was from eternity.

Conclusion: That the world began in time is established solely by divine faith.

Articulus III - That the creation of things was in the beginning of time

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.

1) For what is not in time is not in any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation of things their substance was brought into existence. Now time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.

2) Further, the Philosopher proves that everything which becomes, becomes in time; and so it has a before and an after. But at the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no before and after. Therefore, since to be created is a certain becoming, it seems that things were not created in the beginning of time.

3) Further, time itself was created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, whereas the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.

But on the contrary: Genesis says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

I answer: That word of Genesis 1, "In the beginning God created," is expounded in three ways, to exclude three errors. For some posited that the world always was, and that time has no beginning; and to exclude this it is expounded: "In the beginning," namely of time. Others posited two principles of creation, one of goods and another of evils; and to exclude this it is expounded: "In

the beginning," that is, in the Son. For just as the principle of an effect is appropriated to the Father on account of power, so the exemplary principle is appropriated to the Son on account of wisdom; so that, as it is said, "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," so it may be understood that God made all things "in the beginning," that is, in the Son, according to that of the Apostle to the Colossians: "In Him," namely in the Son, "were all things created."[1156] Others said that corporeal things were created by God by means of spiritual creatures; and to exclude this it is expounded: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," that is, before all things. For four are said to have been created together, namely the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, which is understood by the name "earth," time, and the angelic nature.

Reply to the first: Things are not said to be created "in the beginning of time" as if the beginning of time were the measure of creation; but because simultaneously with time the heaven and the earth were created.

Reply to the second: That statement of the Philosopher is to be understood about a becoming which is through motion, or which is the terminus of motion. For in every motion there is to be taken a before and an after, before any sign marked in the motion - since, namely, something is in being moved, and becoming; and there is to be taken something before it, and also something after it. For that which is in the beginning of a motion, or at its terminus, is not in being moved. But creation is neither motion nor the terminus of motion, as was said above. Hence it can be that something is created which was not previously being created.

Reply to the third: Nothing is except according as it is. But of time there is nothing except the now. Hence it cannot begin except according to some now. Not that in the very first now there is time, but because from it time begins.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative, which St. Thomas proves from that first of Genesis: "In the beginning God created," etc. Moreover, the doctrine of all these articles is to be examined more deeply in the following disputation.

Disputatio CLXXVII - Whether the world could have been from eternity

- The world to have begun at the beginning of time is what the Catholic faith teaches. Caput I.
- That no creature, even a permanent and incorruptible one, could have begun from eternity, was the view of Albert and others. Caput II.
- That a permanent creature, even if corruptible, yet, apart from the corruption itself, could have existed from eternity, the more probable opinion holds. Caput III.
- About the eternity of motion and of generations, whether it is possible, the Scholastics have taught variously. Caput IV.
- That this universe, apart from substantial and accidental generations, with respect to all other things, could have been from eternity, is the more probable opinion. Caput V.

1156. Colossians 1:16; cf. "Omnia in sapientia fecisti" (Ps 104[103]:24).

Caput I - The Catholic faith teaches that the world began at the beginning of time

Concerning the beginning and the duration of this universe of things, the ancient philosophers did not have the same opinion. For many, as Aristotle relates, Physics VIII, chapter 1, and On the Heavens I, chapter 10, and Metaphysics XII, chapter 6, whom he himself follows, said that the world was from eternity in the same mode; but many more thought that it at some time began, as Aristotle himself attests in On the Heavens I, text 102. But among the heretics no one to date has taught that the world lacked a beginning of duration; although some have posited matter coeternal with God, whom we have recalled in Question 44, article 2. Moreover, the Catholic faith holds that, in the beginning of time or of duration, God created all things, as is clear from that of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," etc.; wherein, first, by the particle "In the beginning," the beginning of time is signified, as we have noted elsewhere.

Caput II - Whether a creature could have been from eternity

The same truth is declared in Proverbs 8: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything"; and in John 17: "Glorify me, Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was made"; and in Ephesians 1: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world." And the same is defined in the chapter Firmiter on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.[1157]

It can be confirmed as follows. Since all the reasons that seem to prove that the world was from eternity are frivolous, as our Benedict Pererius rightly shows in book 15 On the Principles of Natural Things; and since, on the other hand, almost all the nations of the world believe that the world had a beginning of duration, even according to right philosophy this ought to be certain for us.[1158]

Albert and others held that no creature, even a permanent one and an incorruptible one, could have begun from eternity.

Moreover, among the Scholastics and Christian philosophers it is controverted whether it is proved by sufficient reason that the world could not have been from eternity, or whether it is established for us only by faith and revelation that it was not eternal. In this controversy the first position is that of Albert in the second part of his Summa, tractate 8, question 4, member 2, toward the end, in the second incidental question; and in Henry in Quodlibet 1, questions 7 and 8; Marsilius in II, question 1, article 2, and in IV, the same author; and Clicthoveus in chapter 8 of the first book De fide; and Damascene: they affirm that absolutely no creature could have been produced from eternity.[1159] To this same position belongs also St. Bonaventure in II, distinction 1, part 1, article 1, question 2; for he asserts simply that it is impossible that the world was from

1157. Fourth Lateran Council, cap. Firmiter (on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith).

1158. Benedict Pererius, De principiis rerum naturalium, lib. 15.

1159. Albert the Great, Summa, pars II, tract. 8, q. 4, memb. 2 (in 2a quaest. incidente); Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, qq. 7 - 8; Marsilius of Inghen, II, q. 1, a. 2, and in IV; Josse Clichthove, De fide, lib. I, cap. 8; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 8.

eternity, if it was to be produced from nothing, as in fact it had to be produced; but if matter were presupposed as coeternal with God, Bonaventure grants that God could have induced forms into it from eternity. He understands by "matter" the uncreated matter which was posited by certain heretics recalled above in question 44, article 2. And this follows from his reasoning: otherwise his distinction would be superfluous; since therefore faith teaches that no matter can be uncreated, and Bonaventure also held thus, it clearly follows that he taught the world could not, simply speaking, have been from eternity.[1160]

But the aforesaid position is proved first by the testimonies of the Fathers. Among the Greeks, St. Athanasius, in the second oration against the Arians, solidly proves that the creature cannot be coeternal with God, because it is of another nature than the Creator.[1161] Secondly, St. Basil, book 2 against Eunomius, a little before the middle, says thus: "But for our part, to ascribe what is eternal to creatures, and by this profession to deprive the Creator of it, we declare to be the same madness."[1162] Thirdly, St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 8, a little after the middle, speaks thus: "But since creation in God proceeds from the will, it is assuredly not coeternal with God; for it is by no means compatible with this nature that that which is brought forth into origin from nothing should fall under that which is without principle and sempiternal, so as to have eternity."[1163]

Among the Latins, first, St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron 1, chapter 3, says: "How then do they assert the world to be coeternal with God, and associate the Creator of all with it, and dispute that the creature is equal?"[1164] Then St. Augustine, City of God 12, chapter 15, strives to demonstrate by these words that the angels were not from eternity: "How then are they coeternal with the Creator, if they always were to him, if they always were for him? How are they to be said 'created,' if they are understood always to have existed?" And in the book against the Arian Felician, chapter 7, he defines the creature thus: "For a creature is the substance of any thing whatever, made by the will of God the Father almighty, which is from that which as yet is not, or at some time was not, corruptible, as far as it lies in itself."[1165]

Furthermore, Marsilius confirms it thus by reason. If any creature were to proceed from eternity, it would have to be by creation; but creation is the production of something from nothing; therefore "nothing" ought to precede on the part of the terminus a quo; therefore that thing could not have been created from eternity. This argument seems also to be Bonaventure's. Wherefore when Bonaventure says that the world could have been from eternity, if matter were eternal, he is speaking of uncreated matter. For if it had to be created, and consequently from nothing, then in the same way, according to his view, it could not be eternal, just as neither any other creature.[1166]

1160. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 1, pars 1, art. 1, q. 2; cf. above, q. 44, a. 2.
1161. St. Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos, or. II.
1162. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. II (circa medium).
1163. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. I, cap. 8.
1164. St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, lib. I, cap. 3.
1165. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, cap. 15; idem, Contra Felicianum Arianum, cap. 7.
1166. Marsilius of Inghen, see above, II, q. 1, a. 2; cf. St. Bonaventure as cited.

Secondly, just as it is repugnant that God produce something equal to himself in infinity according to existence (*esse*), and according to potency, and according to immensity, so by the same reasoning it is repugnant that he produce something equal to himself in eternity: for all these are equally God's attributes and his proper perfections; but it is repugnant that anything be produced by God equal to him in all the others, as is clear; therefore it is also repugnant in eternity.

Thirdly, if God acted naturally, and produced an effect altogether like himself outside himself, he would do nothing greater than what is eternal; but now God, acting by intellect and will, cannot produce the same as he would produce if he acted by force and necessity of nature; therefore by his will he cannot produce anything eternal.

Fourthly, because God works freely outside himself, and is so indifferent by intellect and will to work; but he could not be indifferent with respect to that which he would produce from eternity. For, in order that a cause be indifferent, the effect must first be "not to be" rather than "to be," so that, while the effect is not, the cause can determine itself to one side. These are Marsilius's reasons, to which we can add a fifth: because if some creature were made from eternity, it would have to remain incorrupt through an infinite duration, which seems absurd. But if you say that after a finite duration it could be corrupted - let us posit after 100 years - then, since this corruption will have had a beginning, from that point of corruption onward any duration whatsoever will be finite; if you add those 100 years during which it endured, the whole duration will be finite, and with a beginning; and hence it cannot be eternal, to whose notion it belongs to lack a beginning.

Not a few adherents of our position - on account of the testimonies cited - admit that the Fathers were of the contrary opinion; nevertheless they contend that there is no manifest reason that would force us to embrace it. And indeed, if no reason were forthcoming, it ought not to be asserted that a thing repugns God on account of a manifest reason, but that there is some hidden contradiction which the holy Fathers seem to have scented. Yet I judge that the Fathers alleged do not favor the preceding opinion at all, if their context and words are weighed. Wherefore they each must be explained by us in detail.

As to St. Athanasius: he says nothing about God's power - namely, whether he could make a creature coeternal with himself - but only says that it does not befit the Son of God to have "at some time not been," which is proper to creatures. The words of his which could be brought for the opposite opinion are these: "If he, namely the Son, is not one of the order of the remaining creatures, then indeed they say of him, 'he was,' that is, 'he was not before he was made': for such expressions have their congruity in created things, whereas the Son is such as the Father." By which he only signifies that "not to have been at some time" is proper to creatures. And that is most true; but he does not say that it is so proper that God cannot do the opposite. And, after a few words interposed: "For all other things, as having been made, have nothing like the substance's ration with their Creator, but are outside him, having been founded by God through the grace of his will by his word, so that, in any case, they can be set where he who made them shall will" - in which I see nothing that could favor the opposite opinion.

To St. Basil I answer in the same way, that he says nothing about ...

Caput III - That a permanent creature, even a corruptible one, but without corruption, could have been from eternity; the more probable opinion holds

Now, the universe of things consists of two kinds, namely, of permanent things, such as substances and accidents; and of successive things, such as motion. Therefore, in order to show, in accordance with each part, that this universe could have been from eternity, let us speak severally of each. And now, as to permanent things, against Albert and others we assert that any permanent thing could have been from eternity; yet with the qualification that, if by its own nature it is corruptible, it would not be corrupted except after an infinite duration. For this is clearly proved by the reason adduced in the last place. This opinion is handed down, together with St. Thomas and Cajetan, in these articles, commonly by more recent authors; and in the Second Contra Gentiles, chapter 8, and there by the Ferrariensis; Hervaeus in the second distinction, question 1; Capreolus, question 1; Gregory of Rimini, question 3; Ockham in the second book, question 8, and in Quodlibet 3, question 3; Durandus, question 2; and Scotus seems to agree, questions 3 and 5; while those who hold the first position defend it lastly in that place.[1167]

The chief and sole foundation of this position is that there is no evident reason which convicts the asserters of this opinion of contradiction: wherefore we ought not to assert that it repugns, lest the mysteries of our faith be made ridiculous to philosophers - "when we strive to demonstrate them more than is just by reason," as St. Thomas says - nor should we deny to the divine power what does not contain a manifest contradiction. Therefore it will be necessary to meet one by one the reasons brought by the prior position, which seem to be the principal ones in this matter.

I answer in the same way, that he [Ambrose] disputed nothing about the power of God, but only said that it is equally foolish to assert a creature to be eternal - he is speaking of those things which were produced by God with a beginning of duration - and to deny that God is eternal: for each is against the Catholic faith. For he was disputing against Eunomius, who said that the Holy Spirit is a creature and had a beginning of duration, as the other creatures had.

To St. John Damascene I say that he only assigned a difference between the Son of God, produced by eternal generation, and the remaining creatures, namely, that the Son of God, since He is begotten of the substance of the Father, must be coeternal with Him; otherwise the essence (*essentia*) of God would undergo change, since in time He would begin to be Father, and before He would not be. And unless we grant (he says) that the Son existed together in the beginning with the Father, in which He was begotten, we shall introduce a conversion in the paternal substance: because when the Father was not, later He became Father. But this does not follow from the production of creatures in time, as he proves in this way. For as regards created things, although they were afterwards made, nevertheless they did not arise from the essence of God; but by His will

1167. St. Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan, in these articles; cf. Contra Gentiles II, c. 8, and the Ferrariensis there; Hervaeus Natalis, II, dist., q. 1; John Capreolus, q. 1; Gregory of Rimini, q. 3; William of Ockham, II, q. 8, and Quodlibet III, q. 3; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, q. 2; John Duns Scotus, qq. 3, 5.

(*voluntas*) and power (*potentia*), when previously they were not, they were brought into being; nor does a change on that account befall the nature of God. Therefore he gathers that the difference between creation (*creatio*) and generation (*generatio*) is that generation must be without beginning, but creation, since it proceeds from will, is not eternal to God: he understands, however, not that it is necessarily eternal, as it is necessary that the generation of the Eternal be eternal. He gives the reason with these words alleged for the opposing position: "Since this is by no means proportioned to nature, that what is brought forth from nothing into being should have the same eternity with that which is without beginning and sempiternal"; that is, it is not necessary and natural to a creature to be eternal, as it is to one begotten. For that is said to be proportioned to nature which, from the intrinsic principle of a thing, naturally befits some thing: but thus eternity does not befit a creature. For all that, Damascene does not deny that by the will of God this can be communicated to a creature.

To St. Ambrose it is answered in the same way, that he only proves against the Philosophers that the world had a beginning of duration: for to this his arguments tended; and he said nothing about the power of God. Therefore, after many things, he concludes with the words alleged in the preceding chapter, against the philosophers, saying: "How then coeternal," etc. Add that Ambrose disputes against Aristotle and other Philosophers, who used to say that matter, generable and corruptible, was unbegotten and unproduced, and that the higher bodies likewise were so; as is clear from the first chapter of that book, where he reports their opinions: he rightly concludes that it is foolish to make a corporeal creature an eternal mass, both without beginning of duration and without an efficient principle of substance. But Ambrose disputes nothing against those who say that matter and other substances could indeed have been eternal, yet produced by God.

Moreover, that we may explain the mind of St. Augustine in that book De civitate, chapter 15, note that in that place Augustine, among other things, unfolded and revolved how an Angel is said always to have been, although he is not eternal. He proves that he has always been, because he existed at every time: for time itself began, which according to Augustine consists in the motions of creatures; and before the Angel there was no time, because there was no motion at all. But when he had said this, he objects to himself in this way: "But if I answer this, it will be said to me: how then are they not coeternal with their Creator, if He always was, and they also always were? How also are they to be said created, if they are understood to have always been?" By which words, first, he does not say that Angels could not be created from eternity, but, against those who say that they have always been, he infers that they were not created; because every created thing de facto began in time, as he had supposed from those words of Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Furthermore, these words are not of Augustine's own opinion; but he objects them against those things which he had adduced to prove that Angels had always been, so as to render the question difficult on both sides. Afterwards he answers, and with consent says that Angels can be said always to have been, because they were at every time: and that "at every time," because in no way were there times without them. From which he also gathers that they were created (he understands "in the beginning of duration") like the rest, according to the text of Genesis alleged:

because "to be always," that is, "at every time," can rightly stand together with a beginning of duration. But whether God could create Angels from eternity, Augustine does not have so much as a word in that chapter.

To the other testimony I answer that that book is not received by all as Augustine's; but, whoever its author may be, that testimony is of no moment for the prior position: for there Augustine only defines a creature, in so far as it is de facto produced, so that from this he may gather against that Arian that the Son is not a creature. Now, a creature is that which at some time was not and afterwards was made by God: for thus all the Arians granted that every creature had a beginning of duration; since he admitted the Scriptures: and therefore, since they asserted that the Son is a creature, they also conceded that He at some time was not. Therefore, that Augustine may show that the Son is not a creature, he premits that definition of a creature received by all, about those creatures which de facto are; without meanwhile caring whether God by His power could make some creature eternal.

The other head, by which our position was to be confirmed, is the solution of the opposing reasons. From this it will be clear that no contradiction is implied, if we say that God could have made the world from eternity.

Against the reasons of the opposing position enough has been said

To the first reason I answer, from the doctrine set down in disputation 174, chapter 3, that there is nothing whence it follows that what is created must, in duration, precede its creation; as is there explained: and thus an eternal creation can well be understood from this alone, that the thing produced from eternity would proceed from God in such wise that it would, of itself, tend into nothing if it were left to itself: just as the conservation of a thing according to the whole of itself is called a certain continuous creation, not because nothingness in duration preceded the thing itself before it began, but because it would be reduced to nothing continually unless it were conserved by God.

To the second I say that it is repugnant that something be produced by God eternal by its very nature, that is, from an intrinsic principle, as infinite according to essence would be: but just as it is not repugnant that what is infinite according to quantity be produced, so neither is it repugnant that what is eternal according to duration be produced; yet so that by its nature it can cease, and even begin in time: for eternity in this mode is not a proper attribute of God. And although an infinite in quantity would be repugnant on account of other reasons peculiar to quantity, nevertheless nothing seems to stand in the way whereby something eternal in this mode should not be produced. Whence also the solution of the third reason is plain. For if God were to act naturally, and to produce something equal to Himself, He would make something greater even in duration than eternal: not because it would endure more than what is eternal, but because that would be essentially eternal, so that it could not not be from eternity; whereas now, if He were to make some

creature eternal, it would not have such duration essentially; but it could cease, and it could have not been from eternity: therefore, by creating by His will a creature eternal, He would not make something equal to that which He would produce naturally, as such.

The fourth reason seems to have its foundation in a certain doctrine of Hugh of St. Victor, which we reported in disputation 69, chapter 7, namely, that it is necessary, in order that an agent be said to act freely, that duration should precede the operation itself: for concerning a natural agent the adversaries grant that it can be simultaneous in duration with its effect. But we refuted this doctrine in that place; and we there explained in what way an agent can act freely, even if it begins simultaneously with the free effect. And although in man that would be necessary, in God, however, it would not be: because just as one rightly understands one who wills freely, so also one can understand one who produces freely.

Caput IV - On the eternity of motion and of generations: whether it is possible, as various Scholastics have taught

It was the position of no few Theologians, not only that some creature could, in the way said in the preceding chapter, be from eternity, but also that the whole universe could be so in exactly the fashion in which Aristotle thought de facto it was, that is, the heavens and their perpetual motion, the elements and mixed bodies, generations and corruptions succeeding one another from eternity, among which there would be no first. Thus teach Gregory of Rimini in II, dist. 1, q. 3, art. 2; Gabriel [Biel], q. 3; Ockham in II, q. 8, and in Quodlibet, q. 5; to which add St. Thomas in article 2 of this question along with the solutions of the arguments, especially the seventh and eighth, and there Cajetan; and in Contra Gentiles II, c. 38, and the Ferrariensis there; Hervaeus Natalis in II, dist. 1, q. 1; and Capreolus, q. 1. For, apart from the generations of men, they have thought that the remaining things which now are in the world - whether motions, or mutations, or substantial generations, and things of other kinds - could have been from eternity, because in no other case did they see any contradiction, except in human generations, and that for this sole reason, that it would follow that there is now an infinite multitude of souls; which they think absurd. Wherefore, unless souls were to pass from one body to another through the death of men, they judge it impossible that there be infinite generations of men; although St. Thomas in that chapter 38 does not judge this infinite multitude of souls to be impossible.[1168]

To others, however, Durandus seems to have philosophized more probably, when he asserts in II, dist. 1, q. 3, that neither could corporeal motion be eternal, nor generations without a beginning; although in q. 2 he plainly granted that a permanent creature could be from eternity. Each of these uses his own reasons, which we shall examine in the following chapter. Concerning this matter Scotus seems to define nothing: he only disputes whether some creature could have been from eternity, as we saw above.

1168. Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 3, art. 2; Gabriel [Biel], q. 3; William of Ockham, In II Sent., q. 8, and Quodlibet III, q. 5; St. Thomas Aquinas, this question, a. 2, especially solutions to obj. 7 - 8; Cajetan there; Contra Gentiles II, c. 38, and the Ferrariensis there; Hervaeus Natalis, II, dist. 1, q. 1; John Capreolus, q. 1.

This whole universe, apart from the generations of substances and of accidents, as regards all other things, could have been from eternity: the more probable opinion.

Caput V - That this whole universe, apart from the generations of substances and of accidents, as regards the rest, could have been from eternity: the more probable opinion

I, for my part, think it much more probable that this whole universe could have been from eternity, not only as to substances and the things that remain without corruption through an infinite duration, but also as to motion; not, however, as to generations, whether of substantial forms or of accidents. But before we show that the motion of bodies could have been from eternity - which to Durandus seemed impossible, though to others alleged in the preceding chapter it seemed possible - let us prove against them that a series of generations from eternity could not have been; in which point we agree with Durandus.

As to the generations of men, St. Thomas seemed to himself to prove it by a single special reason, which Caietan, the Ferrariensis, Hervaeus, and Capreolus embrace: namely, because there would be an actual infinite in things separated from matter: for there would be an infinite number of souls, because they are immortal and, according to true philosophy, do not pass from body to body; and therefore they say that, unless God by His omnipotence were willing to have the same soul inform diverse bodies, generations could not be from eternity. But they do not think that a process to infinity in generations is absurd, because among causes essentially ordered, which are both particular and universal, we must arrive at one first; but among causes ordered per accidens, such as are in a series of generations, it is not necessary that there be a first. The reason of the difference is that essentially ordered causes all actually concur to the effect, and one from another; and therefore it is necessary that there be one first, from which the whole operation and motion begins: but causes ordered per accidens do not all actually concur to the effect: for, in order that Peter may beget a son, it is not required that Peter's father and grandfather and other progenitors operate, but it is enough that they begot in their own time. Wherefore the aforesaid Doctors do not judge it absurd to concede generations from eternity of other things, in which in truth there does not follow that inconvenience which we were inferring about human souls.

But I, for another reason, think that generations not only of men, but also of other things, whether of substances or of accidents, could not have been from eternity; nor do I judge an infinite multitude of souls to be impossible, nor contrary to the mind of Aristotle, as I proved above in disputation 26, chapter 3; nor does St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles II, c. 38, deem it impossible. The reason is that, since God is the first being through essence (*essentia*), and the cause of all the rest, so we must concede that some things proceed from Him by means of secondary causes, so that at length every existence (*esse*) be referred to Him as to the first and proximate cause. Therefore it is necessary to come to some being produced by God alone, and from which the others are derived. But this being posited, generations could not be from eternity: for either infinitely many men would be produced immediately by God from eternity - and this would not suffice for one man to beget another from eternity and without a beginning - or a finite number would be produced by

God, and thus, since they would have to beget others in an order and series of succession, there could not be infinite generations, because at length we would arrive at that first man from whom the whole succession would take its beginning.

... the first, who was not begotten from another, but was produced immediately by God.

But to assert that generations were from eternity in that order which Aristotle posited, so that no first being was produced by God alone, amounts to asserting that God by His omnipotence was not the cause that there be generations, but that they were constituted thus by nature or by chance. For how can it be that God made there to be generations in the world from nothing, and yet we are unable to assign some first thing created by Him? I say that He made generations from nothing, not this one or that one, but that by His omnipotence He gave from nothing the cause that there be generations; for by this consideration alone He Himself could be the entire cause that there be generations; whereas in another way He would have been only a helping cause to generations. This reason proves concerning any series of generations, as we proposed at the beginning. And for this reason Aristotle posited generations from eternity, as I noted in disputation 26, chapter 3, and disputation 87, chapter 1, because he thought that this universe, without an author, was constituted by its own nature in this way. But if he acknowledged God to be the free author of all things, and thought that every kind of produced thing must be reduced unto Him; he would neither have said that the world necessarily existed from eternity, nor have judged that that series of generations was possible. I pass over the argument of Durandus, by which he attempts to show this very point in the second book, distinction 1, that question 3, number 14, for it has little weight.[1169][1170]

Now what remains is only that we prove not only that permanent things could have existed from eternity, but also the continuous motion of the heavens, as Aristotle posited. This will be clear if we solve the reasons which are wont to be opposed to this opinion.

The first reason is, that an infinite past and elapsed would follow. I answer that it is not absurd, if the infinite is toward the beginning, yet has an end. Thus it is not wondrous, if a motion which begins without a beginning has traversed infinite spaces, at least by repetition.

The second reason: it would follow that one infinite would be greater than another; because time up to the past year would have been infinite, to which if the present year were added, it would become greater. But we satisfied this argument in disputation 26, chapter 2, where we also noted that these things were not unknown to Aristotle; and nonetheless he posited an eternal motion, because he thought nothing absurd was inferred from it.[1171]

The third reason. Wherever there is an order of prior and posterior, we must assign some one first: but then the days would be ordered; therefore among them there would be one first. I answer: in a finite order this is true; but in an infinite series it is enough if before any given one there be another, so that we may say that in that multitude there is order. And this is to be understood of

1169. As I noted in disputation 26, chapter 3, and disputation 87, chapter 1.
1170. Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 3, n. 14.
1171. Disputation 26, chapter 2.

those things which have only an order of duration and of ordered succession; for if they had the order of causality, since in causes there is no process to infinity, one would have to come to some first cause.

The fourth reason. If the heavens were created as to substance from eternity together with motion, let us speak of the sun and the moon: either the moon was created in opposition, or in conjunction. If in conjunction, how long did it last until opposition? Surely not an infinite time; because the space was finite, and had to be traversed by finite revolutions: but if a finite time, since the whole motion that followed afterwards would be finite, it would be finite, because it had a beginning; added to a prior finite, it would not make something infinite and eternal.

I answer. The argument plainly supposes what it ought to infer. For it supposes that the heaven was produced with a first of its existence, in some determinate position; which ought to have been concluded in the argument. We say, therefore, that that creation from eternity does not have a first of its existence, but is as it were a certain continued conservation, which truly is creation, as was explained in disputation 173, chapter 3; whence it is that the heaven, which would be continually conserved by God, would in every position and situation be produced out of nothing; not that a nothingness preceded, but because by its nature it would pass into nothing, if it were not continually conserved. Therefore when you argue, Either the heaven of the moon was created in opposition, or in conjunction; a distinction must be made. Either you speak of the first point of creation; and thus it was produced neither in one position nor in the other, for there was not a first existence of production: or you speak of production absolutely; and thus we say that in any position whatsoever it was produced by God by a continued creation, just as now also it is produced. Since, therefore, there is no manifest contradiction, we ought not to assert that God could not create the world in the manner we have described; but to believe by faith alone this article concerning the creation of the world, as St. Thomas in this question, article 2, admonished. [1172]

Quaestio XLVII - On the distinction of things in general

After the production of creatures into existence, there is to be considered their distinction. And this consideration will be threefold. For first we shall consider the distinction of things in general. Second, the distinction of good and evil. Third, the distinction of spiritual and corporeal creature.

Articulus I - Whether the multitude and distinction of things is from God

It seems that the multitude and distinction of things is not from God.

1) For the one is always of a nature to make one. But God is supremely one, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore He produces only one effect.

1172. St. Thomas, this question, art. 2.

2) Further, the exemplar is assimilated to its exemplar; but God is the exemplary cause of His effect, as was said above. Therefore, since God is one, His effect is only one, and not distinct.

3) Further, those things which are for an end are proportioned to the end. But the end of the creature is one, namely, the divine goodness, as was shown above. Therefore the effect of God is only one.

But on the contrary: it is said in Genesis 1 that God distinguished the light from the darkness and divided the waters from the waters. Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

I answer that some have assigned the cause of the distinction of things in many ways. For some have attributed it to matter either alone or together with the agent: to matter alone, as Democritus and all the ancient natural philosophers, who posited only the material cause, according to whom the distinction of things comes about by chance according to the motion of matter. To matter and agent together Anaxagoras attributed the distinction and multitude of things, who posited an intellect distinguishing things by extracting what was mixed together in matter. But this cannot stand for two reasons. First, because it was shown above that matter itself also was created by God. Hence one must reduce even the distinction, if there is any on the part of matter, to a higher cause. Second, because matter is for the sake of form, and not conversely; but the distinction of things is through proper forms. Therefore the distinction is not in things on account of matter, but rather conversely in created matter there is a lack of uniformity, so that it might be accommodated to diverse forms.

Others, however, have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as Avicenna, who said that God, by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, because its existence is not its essence, of necessity there falls a composition of potency and act, as will be made clear below. Thus, therefore, the first intelligence, insofar as it understands the first cause, produced the second intelligence; but insofar as it understands itself according as it is in potency, it produced the body of the heaven, which it moves; and insofar as it understands according to that which it has of act, it produced the soul of the heaven. But this cannot stand for two reasons. First, because it was shown above that to create is God's alone. Hence those things which cannot be caused except by creation are produced by God alone. And these are all things which do not lie under generation and corruption. Second, because according to this supposition the universality of things would not come from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many agent causes: but such a thing we say comes about by chance. Thus, then, the complement of the universe, which consists in the diversity of things, would be from chance, which is impossible.

Hence it must be said that the distinction and multitude of things is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For He produced things into existence for the sake of communicating His goodness to creatures, and of being represented through them. And because by one creature the divine goodness cannot be sufficiently represented, He produced many and diverse creatures, so that what is lacking to one for representing the divine goodness may be supplied from another. For the goodness which is in God simply and uniformly, in creatures is manifoldly and divisibly.

Whence the whole universe more perfectly participates in the divine goodness and represents it than any creature whatsoever. And because the divine wisdom is the disposer of the distinction of things; wherefore Moses says that they were distinguished by the word of God, which is the conception of wisdom; and this is what is said in Genesis 1: "God said: Let there be light" and He divided the light from the darkness.

Reply to the first: An agent by nature acts through the form by which it is (and that one form is but one); and therefore it produces but one. But a voluntary agent - such as God is, as was shown above - acts through an understood form. Since, therefore, God does not cease to understand many things, it follows, consistently with His unity and simplicity, as was said above, that although He is one, He can make many things.

Reply to the second: That reasoning holds for the exemplified which perfectly represents its exemplar, which is not multiplied except materially; whence an image, if it be perfect, is only one. But no creature perfectly represents the first and most perfect exemplar, which is the very act of existence (*esse*); and therefore it can be represented by many. And yet it must be said that the ideas are called exemplars: the plurality of things corresponds in the divine mind to a plurality of ideas.

Reply to the third: In speculative matters the middle term of demonstration, which perfectly demonstrates the conclusion, is only one; but probable middles are many. And similarly in practical matters, when that which is for the end equals (so to speak) the end, it is not required that there be more than one only. But a creature is not such as to equal the end, which is God. Hence it was necessary that creatures be multiplied.

Conclusion: The divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things.

Articulus II - Whether the inequality of things is from God

It seems that the inequality of things is not from God.

1. For of the best it is to produce what is best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore for God, who is best, it is to make all things equal.[1173]
2. Further, equality is an effect of unity, as is said in the Metaphysics. But God is one. Therefore He made all things equal.[1174]
3. Further, it belongs to justice to give equal things to equals. But God is just in all His works. Therefore, since no inequality of things is presupposed to His operation by which He communicates existence (*esse*) to things, it seems that He made all things equal.[1175]

But on the contrary: It is said in Ecclesiasticus 33, at the head of the chapter: "Why does one day excel another day, and one light another light, and one year another year?" and a little after: "By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished."[1176]

1173. Cf. St. Thomas, this question, art. 2.
1174. Metaphysics, book 5 or 8, on unity and equality; cf. St. Thomas, ibid., ad 2.
1175. Cf. St. Thomas, ibid., obj. 3 and ad 3.
1176. Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 33:7 - 11.

I answer that Origen, wishing to exclude the position of those who assert that the distinction of things in the world arose from the contrariety of the principles of good and evil, maintained that all things created by God from the beginning were equal. For he said that, at first, God created only rational creatures, and all of them equal. In these, first, an inequality arose from free choice, in that some were turned to God more and less; some also, according to a greater and a lesser turning away from God: namely, those rational creatures which, having turned to God by free choice, were advanced to diverse orders of angels according to the diversity of merits. Those, however, which turned away from God, were bound to diverse bodies according to the diversity of sin; and he posited this as the cause of the creation and the diversity of bodies. But according to this, the universe of corporeal creatures would not exist for the goodness of God to be communicated to creatures, but for the punishing of sin. Which is contrary to what is said in Genesis 1: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." And as St. Augustine says in book 11 of the City of God: "What more foolish can be said than that this sun should have arisen in one world, not for the adornment of beauty, or for the health of corporeal things, the craftsman being God, but rather that this befell because one soul sinned; and thus, if a hundred souls had sinned, this world would have had a hundred suns?" Therefore it must be said that, just as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, so also of inequality. Which is clear as follows. For a twofold distinction is found in things: one, formal, in those that differ in species; the other, material, in those that differ only in number. But since matter is for the sake of form, material distinction is for the sake of formal. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of one species: because a species is sufficiently conserved in one. But in generable and corruptible things there are many individuals of one species for the conservation of the species. From which it is evident that formal distinction is more principal than material. But formal distinction always requires inequality: because (as is said in book 8 of the Metaphysics) the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity. Whence in natural things the grades of species seem to be ordered: as mixed bodies are more perfect than the elements, and plants than mineral bodies, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these, one species is found more perfect than others. Therefore, just as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the perfection of the universe, so also of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect, if in things there were only one grade of goodness.

Reply to the first: It belongs to the best agent to produce its whole effect as the best, yet not to make each part of the whole best simply, but best according to its proportion to the whole. For the goodness of an animal would be taken away, if every part of it had the dignity of the eye. Thus, then, God constituted the whole universe as most excellent according to the mode of the creature: but not individual creatures, rather He made one better than another. And therefore, of individual creatures it is said in Genesis 1: "God saw the light, that it was good," and similarly of the other individual things. But of all together it is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good."

Reply to the second: The first thing that proceeds from unity is equality, and then multiplicity proceeds. And thus from the Father (to whom, according to St. Augustine, unity is appropriated) proceeds the Son, to whom equality is appropriated; and then the creature, to which inequality is suited: yet even from creatures there is participated a certain equality, namely of proportion.[1177]

Reply to the third: The reasoning which moved Origen has no place except in the retribution of rewards, whose inequality is owed to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is not an inequality of parts from any inequality preceding, whether of merits or even of the disposition of matter, but for the perfection of the whole: as is evident also in the works of art. For the roof does not differ from the foundation because it has different matter: but in order that a house be perfect from diverse parts, the craftsman seeks diverse matter, and he would make it if he could.

Conclusion: The wisdom of God is the cause of the inequality of things, just as it is of their distinction.

Annotation concerning both articles.

The doctrine of both articles must be understood thus, that in certain things produced proximately by God, God is the whole cause of distinction and inequality; but in others, indeed, God is the efficient cause, yet, in addition, the nature of the things themselves requires distinction and inequality, such that otherwise not even by God Himself could it be made. Wherefore, of this distinction and inequality the very nature will be as it were the formal and intrinsic cause. The former occurs in homogeneous things and those of the same account, and those are multiplied only by division of the continuum. The latter occurs in those only which differ in species; indeed, even in those which are so diverse by number alone that they are not made by mere division of the continuum. For this reason the division of rivers and of the sea, and, in the very sea, the divisions and inequalities of waters, were made solely by the will of God, which otherwise He could have gathered into one, or divided altogether equally. But the division of man from angel, of light from darkness, of the sun from the moon, of one angel from another, of one man from another man, and inequality too, were made not only by the will of God, but were also so consonant to the nature of the things themselves, that they could not have been otherwise: because these things by their very nature differ formally of themselves, and are unequal. For things are not such in their essence by the will of God, although by the divine will alone they are produced, as was said in disputation 104, chapter 3. Therefore God only as efficient distinguished the light from the darkness, the man from the horse, and made them unequal: but formally, and by their proper nature, they are distinct and unequal.

1177. Cf. Lib. de doctrina Christiana? Here cited as "2 Christ. c. f. infin. co." i.e., the Augustinian appropriation: to the Father, unity; to the Son, equality; to the Holy Spirit, concord - equality of proportion is participated by creatures.

Articulus III - Whether there is only one world

The third proceeds thus. It seems that there is not only one world, but many.

1. Because, as St. Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions, it is incongruous to say that God created things without reason. But by the same reason by which He created one, He could have created many: since His power is not limited to the creation of one world, but is infinite, as was shown above. Therefore God produced many worlds.[1178]
2. Further, nature makes what is better, and much more God. But it would be better that there be many worlds than one: because more goods are better than fewer. Therefore many worlds were made by God.
3. Further, whatever has a form in matter can be multiplied according to number while the species remains the same: because multiplication according to number is from matter. But the world has a form in matter. For as when I say "man," I signify the form; but when I say "this man," I signify the form in matter: so when "world" is said, the form is signified; but when "this world" is said, the form in matter is signified. Therefore nothing prevents there being many worlds.

But on the contrary is what is said in John 1: "The world was made by Him." Where he named "world" in the singular, as if only one world existed.

I answer that the very order existing in things created by God manifests the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, according as some things are ordered to others. But whatever things are from God have an order to each other and to God Himself, as was shown above. Therefore of necessity all pertain to one world. And for that reason those were able to posit many worlds, who did not posit as the cause of the world some wisdom ordering, but chance: as Democritus, who said that from the concourse of atoms this world came to be, and others infinite.

Reply to the first: This is the reason why the world is one, because all ought to be ordered by one order and to one. On which account Aristotle, in book 12 of the Metaphysics, from the unity of the order existing in things concludes to the unity of the God governing. And Plato, from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as of the exemplified.[1179]

Reply to the second: No agent intends material plurality as an end: because material multitude has a certain terminus, but of itself it tends to the infinite. But the infinite is repugnant to the notion of an end. Moreover, when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this is said according to material multitude; but such a "better" does not fall within the intention of the divine agent, because it falls under the notion of quantity. And if it were so that God could make better, then if He had made more, that which exceeded would again be such; and so on to infinity.

1178. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46; cf. St. Thomas, q. 47, a. 3.
1179. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII; Plato, Timaeus, on the unity of the exemplar and the unity of the world as exemplified.

Reply to the third: The world consists of its whole matter; for it is not possible that there be another earth than this one: because every earth would by nature be borne downwards to this middle, where this one is. And the same reasoning holds for the other components which are parts of the world.

Conclusion: The answer is affirmative, and of faith: for thus Scripture in Genesis 1 supposes it. For making mention of the creation of things, where it ought to have enumerated all produced by God, it said only that He made this world and its parts. But whether He could have made another world, we have already spoken in disputation 27.[1180]

Quaestio XLVIII - On the distinction of things in particular

Next, consideration must be had of the distinction of things in particular. And first, of the distinction of good and evil. Then, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Concerning the first, it is to be asked about evil, and about the cause of evil.

Articulus I - Whether evil is some nature

To the first, thus it proceeds. It seems that evil is some nature. Because every genus is some nature. But evil is a certain genus. For it is said in the Predicaments that good and evil are not in a genus; but they are genera of others. Therefore evil is some nature.

1. Further, every difference constitutes some species; and a nature is said thereby. But evil is the difference constituting in morals: for there is the distinction of species of habits from the good, namely virtues, and from the evil, namely vices; and likewise liberality is distinguished from prodigality by contrariety. Therefore evil signifies some nature.
2. Further, each contrariety is in some nature. But evil is contrary to good. Therefore evil is some nature.
3. Further, what is not, does not act. But evil causes something, and acts; for by evil good is diminished, and many harms are effected. Therefore evil signifies some nature.

Objicitur 1. It seems that evil is a certain nature. For every genus is a certain nature. But evil is a certain genus; for it is said in the Predicaments that good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera. Therefore evil is a certain nature.

Objicitur 2. Furthermore, every constitutive difference of some species is a certain nature. But evil is a constitutive difference in moral matters. For an evil habit differs in species from a good one, as illiberality from liberality. Therefore evil signifies a certain nature.

1180. As I noted in disputation 27, article 8; and q. 25, art. 6.

Objicitur 3. Furthermore, each of contraries is a certain nature. But good and evil are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher proves in the Predicaments by the fact that between good and evil there is something intermediate, and that a return to good can be made from evil. Therefore evil signifies a certain nature.

Objicitur 4. Furthermore, what does not exist does not act. But evil acts, because it corrupts good. Therefore evil is some being and a certain nature.

Objicitur 5. Furthermore, nothing pertains to the perfection of the universe of things except what is a being and a certain nature. But evil pertains to the perfection of the universe of things. For Augustine says in the Enchiridion that from all things there is constituted the admirable beauty of the universe, in which also that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the goods more eminently. Therefore evil is a certain nature.[1181]

Sed contra est, what Dionysius says, On the Divine Names, book 4, chapter: Evil is not existing, nor is it good.[1182]

Respondeo dicendum, that one of a pair of opposites is known through the other, as darkness through light. Hence also what evil is must be taken from the notion of good. But we said above that good is everything that is appetible, and therefore, since every nature desires its own existence (*esse*) and its own perfection, it is necessary to say that the existence and perfection of any nature has the notion of goodness. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies some existence, or some form, or nature. It remains, then, that by the name of evil there is signified a certain absence of good; and for that reason it is said that evil neither exists nor is good. For since being, inasmuch as it is such, is good, the removal of the one is the removal of the other.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that Aristotle is speaking there according to the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who thought that evil is a certain nature, and accordingly they posited good and evil as genera. For Aristotle was wont, especially in the logical books, to set forth examples which were probable in his time according to the opinion of some philosophers. Or it is to be said, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV, that the primary contrariety is habit and privation; because, namely, in all contraries it holds that one of the contraries is imperfect with respect to the other, as black with respect to white, and bitter with respect to sweet. And for this reason good and evil are called genera, not simply, but of contraries: for just as every form has the notion of good, so every privation, inasmuch as it is of this sort, has the notion of evil

Ad secundum dicendum, that good and evil are not constitutive differences, except in moral matters, which receive species from the end, which is the object of the will, on which moral matters depend. And because good has the notion of end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral matters: good per se, but evil inasmuch as it is the removal of the due end. Nor, however, does the removal of the due end constitute a species in moral matters, except insofar as it is conjoined to an undue end; just as neither in material matters is the privation of a substantial form found except conjoined to another form. Thus therefore the evil which is a constitutive difference

1181. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 10, at the end; cf. also the Comparison in tom. 3.
1182. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV, cap. 4.

in moral matters is a certain good conjoined to the privation of another good. Thus the end of the intemperate man is not indeed to be without the good of reason, but the sensible delectation without the order of reason. Hence evil, insofar as it is evil, is not a constitutive difference, but only by reason of the good that is adjoined

Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium. For there the Philosopher speaks of good and evil according as they are found in moral matters. Thus indeed a mean is found between good and evil, in that good is said to be what is ordered, but evil what is not only without order, but is also harmful to another. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics IV that the prodigal is indeed foolish, but not evil.[1184] From this evil also, which is according to custom or moral manner, it sometimes happens that there is a return to good; but not from every evil: for there is not from blindness a return to sight, although blindness is a certain evil.

Ad quartum dicendum, that something is said to act in a threefold way. In one way, formally, in the mode of speaking in which one says that whiteness makes white. And thus evil even by reason of its very privation is said to corrupt good, because it is the very corruption or privation of good. In another way, something is said to act effectively, as the painter is said to make the wall white. In a third way, after the mode of final cause, as the end is said to cause by moving the efficient cause. But in these latter two ways evil does not act on anything per se, that is, according as it is a certain privation, but according as a good is adjoined to it. For every action is from some form, and everything that is desired as an end is some perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says in book 4, chapter On the Divine Names, evil neither acts nor is desired except by the power of an adjoined good. Per se, however, it is infinite, and outside will and intention

Ad quintum dicendum, that, as above was said, the parts of the universe have an order toward one another in that one acts upon another, and is the end of another, and its exemplar. But these, as was said, cannot befit evil except by reason of an adjoined good. Hence evil neither pertains to the perfection of the universe, nor is it included under the order of the universe except per accidens, that is, by reason of the adjoined good

Notationes circa Articulum.

Conclusio est, Evil is the absence of good.

For the explication of this article, and of this whole question, it is to be observed first, that here we are not disputing about evil universally, as it is something common to moral evil, that is, sin, and to natural evil, but only about natural evil; and even of this we speak in a twofold way, as of good, as we noted in disputation 23, chapters 2 and 5: for either we speak of evil in itself and absolutely, or with respect to another. In the former way Augustine everywhere contends against the Manichee, to prove that no nature, that is, substance, is evil: for Augustine takes nature for substance whenever he proves against the Manichee that no nature is evil, as we will show below, q. 71, a. 6, and q. 79, a. 1. For the Manichee did not err in saying that some act, or some quality, is evil for someone; but because he thought that certain substances, insofar as they are substances, are substantially evil. And against this Augustine argues in book 2 On the Morals of the Manichees,

1184. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, c. 1 (at the middle).

from chapter 1 to 8, and in the book On the Nature of the Good, chapter 16. In this same sense Dionysius, book 4 of On the Divine Names, Ambrose, in the book On Isaac and the Soul, chapter 7, Nyssenus in homily 2 on the Canticles, Basil, in the homily That God Is Not the Author of Evils, and the other Fathers are to be understood, when they assert that evil is not some subsisting thing, nor some nature. For they speak of evil which is opposed to the good reciprocated with being, and to its affection. For since this is the integrity of the thing itself, as we showed in disputation 23, evil must be in the privation of mode, or of species, or of order, as in the same place, cap. 4, we proved out of Augustine.[1185][1186]

Then note from Augustine, book 2 On the Morals of the Manichees, chapter 8, that no nature, that is, substance, is evil in itself; but something can be evil with respect to another, because it harms it: he understands this from the event, because it does something against the natural disposition of that thing. Whether this relative malice is found also in natural qualities, so that those qualities are not only said to be evil for something by reason of the privation which they effect in the subject, but also in themselves, because in themselves they are contrary to that thing, we shall say in the Prima Secundae, q. 71, a. 6.

Articulus II - Whether evil is found in things

Objicitur 1. It seems that evil is not found in things. Whatever is found in things either is some being, or is a privation of something, which is non-being. But Dionysius says in book 4, chapter On the Divine Names, that evil is distant from what exists, and yet more distant from non-being. Therefore evil in no way is found in things.[1182]

Objicitur 2. Furthermore, being and thing are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is some thing. Which is against the foregoing.

Objicitur 3. Furthermore, that is better which is more unmixed with its contrary; as is said in book 3 of the Topics of Aristotle: therefore also that is better which is less mixed with evil. But God makes a thing according to what is better, much more than nature. Therefore in things created by God nothing evil is found.[1187]

Sed contra est, that according to this all prohibitions and penalties would be removed, which are nothing but of evils.

Respondeo dicendum, that, as was said above, the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, so that all degrees of goodness may be filled up. Now one degree of goodness is that something be so good that it can never fail; another, that something be so good that it can fail from good, which degree also is found in existence itself. For there are some things which cannot lose their existence, as the incorruptible; and there are others which can lose it, as

1185. Vazquez, Disputatio 23, esp. c. 2 and c. 4, where he treats good and evil under mode, species, and order, with Augustine's texts.

1186. St. Ambrose, De Isaac et anima, c. 7; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Homilia II in Canticum; St. Basil, Homily Quod Deus non est auctor malorum; cf. also St. Augustine, De moribus Manichaeorum, l. 2, cc. 1 - 8; De natura boni, c. 16.

1182. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV, cap. 4.

1187. Aristotle, Topics III.

the corruptible. Thus therefore the perfection of this universe requires that there be not only incorruptible beings, but also corruptible beings; likewise the perfection of the universe requires that there be certain things which can fail from goodness, and that which follows upon this, that they sometimes do fail. But in this consists the notion of evil, namely, that something fails from good. Whence it is manifest that evil is found in things, as also corruption; for corruption itself is a certain evil.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that evil is distant from being simply, and from non - being simply: for neither is it, as being is; nor is it pure negation, as non - being simply is; but it signifies a privation, which indeed is non - being, yet in a subject

Ad secundum dicendum, that, as is said in Metaphysics V, being is said in a twofold way. In one way, according as it signifies the entity of a thing, as it is divided by the ten predicaments, and thus it is convertible with thing. And in this way no privation is a being; and thus neither is evil. In another way, being is said to signify the truth of a proposition, which consists in composition; whose mark is this verb "is." And this is that "is" which is answered to the question "whether it is." And thus we say that blindness is in the eye, or any other privation. And in this way also evil is called a being. But through ignorance of this distinction, some, considering that certain things are called evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that malice was some thing

Ad tertium dicendum, that God is nature, and, as any agent, makes what is better in the whole; but not what is better in any given part, except by an order to the whole, as was said above. But the whole itself which is the universe of creatures is better and more perfect if in it there are those things which can fail from good, than if this were not permitted. And thus providence is not to destroy nature, but to save it, as Dionysius says, book 4, chapter On the Divine Names. Nature itself before the nature of things has this, that those which can fail, do sometimes fail. Both because, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, God is so powerful that He can even make good things out of evils. Whence many goods would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist. For fire would not be generated unless air were corrupted. Nor would the life of the lion be preserved unless animals were slain. Nor would justice be praised, if iniquity did not exist; nor patience bearing [injury], if injustice did not exist

Conclusio est affirmans.

Articulus III - Whether evil is in good as in a subject

1. Furthermore. Being and thing are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a certain thing. Which is against what was said above.
2. Furthermore. The whiter is that which is more unmixed with black, as is said in the Topics, book 3; therefore that is also better which is more unmixed with evil. But God makes that which is better, and much more than nature. Therefore, in the things created by God, no evil is found.[1190]

1190. Aristotle, Topics III; cf. also the common maxim that the purer white is the less mixed with black.

But on the contrary: according to this, all prohibitions and punishments would be removed, which are nothing but of evils.

I answer that, as was said above, the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, that all the grades of goodness may be filled. Now one grade of goodness is that something be so good that it can never fail. Another grade of goodness, however, is that something be so good that it can fail from the good; and this grade too is found in being itself. For there are some things which cannot lose their being, as incorruptible things; and there are others which can lose it, as corruptible things. Therefore, just as the perfection of the totality of things requires that there be not only incorruptible beings, but also corruptible ones, so too the perfection of the universe requires that there be certain things which can fail from goodness, from which it follows that they do sometimes fail. But in this consists the notion of evil, namely that something fails from the good. Whence it is manifest that evil is found in things, just as also is corruption. For even corruption itself is a certain evil.

Reply to the first: Evil is distant from being simply and from non-being simply: because it is neither like a habit, nor like a pure negation, but like a privation (privatio).

Reply to the second: As is said in Metaphysics V, "being" is said in two ways. In one way, according as it signifies the entity of a thing, as divided by the ten categories; and thus it is convertible with "thing." And in this way no privation is a being; hence neither is evil. In another way something is called a being, which signifies the truth of a proposition, which consists in composition, whose sign is this verb "is"; and this is the being by which one answers the question "whether it is." And thus we say that blindness is in the eye, or any other privation whatsoever. And in this way even evil is called a being. Because of ignorance of this distinction, some, considering that certain things are called evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a certain thing.[1191]

Reply to the third: God and nature, and whatever agent, make that which is better as regards the whole, but not that which is better in each single part, except through an order to the whole, as was said above. But the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is better and more perfect if in it there are certain things which can fail from the good; and these sometimes do fail, God not hindering this. First, because it is not of providence to destroy nature, but to save it, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in book 4 of On the Divine Names. And the very nature of things has this, that those which can fail do sometimes fail. Next, because, as St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, God is so powerful that He can also make good out of evils. Hence many goods would be taken away if God permitted no evil to be. For fire would not be generated unless air were corrupted; nor would the life of the lion be preserved unless the ass were killed; nor would avenging justice be praised, nor patience that endures, if iniquity did not exist.[1192]

The conclusion is affirmative.

1191. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, on the manifold senses of "being."
1192. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, c. 4; St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 11.

Whether evil is in good as in a subject

Objection 1. It seems that evil is not in good as in a subject. For all things that are good are beings. But Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, book 4, that evil is neither a being nor in beings. Therefore evil is not in good as in a subject.[1193]

Objection 2. Furthermore. Evil is not a being; but good is a being. But non-being, taken negatively, does not require a being in which it may be as in a subject. Therefore neither does evil require a good in which it may be as in a subject.

Objection 3. Furthermore. One of contraries is not the subject of the other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil is not in good as in a subject.

Objection 4. Furthermore. That in which whiteness is as in a subject is said to be white. Therefore also that in which evil is as in a subject is evil. If therefore evil is in good as in a subject, it follows that the good is evil, against that which is said in Isaiah 5: "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil."

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion that evil is not except in good.[1194]

I answer that, as was said above in the first article of this question, evil imports the removal of good. Not, however, is every removal of good called evil. For the removal of good can be taken both privatively and negatively. The removal of good, taken negatively, does not have the character of evil. Otherwise it would follow that those things which in no way are, would be evil; and again, that any thing would be evil from this, that it does not have the good of another thing: as if a man were evil because he does not have the swiftness of the roebuck or the strength of the lion. But the removal of good, taken privatively, is called evil, as the privation of sight is called blindness. Now the subject (subiectum) of privation and of form (forma) is one and the same, namely a being in potency (potentia): whether it be a being in potency simply, as prime matter, which is the subject of the substantial form and of the opposite privation; or a being in potency in a certain respect and in act (actus) simply, as a diaphanous body, which is the subject of darkness and of light. But it is manifest that the form by which something is in act is a certain perfection and a certain good; and thus every being in act is a certain good. And likewise every being in potency, as such, is a certain good, insofar as it has order to the good: for as it is a being in potency, so too it is a good in potency. It remains therefore that the subject of evil is good.

Reply to the first: Pseudo-Dionysius understands that evil is not in beings as a part, or as the natural property of some being.

Reply to the second: Non-being, taken negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is a negation in a subject, as is said in Metaphysics IV. And such a non-being is evil.[1195]

Reply to the third: Evil is not in the good which is its opposite as in a subject, but in some other good. For the subject of blindness is not sight, but the animal. It seems, however, as Augustine says, that here the rule of the dialecticians fails, which says that contraries cannot be together.

1193. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV, c. 4.
1194. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 13 - 14.

This, however, must be understood according to the common acceptation of good and evil, and not according to that whereby this good and this evil are taken specially. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and contraries of this sort are taken only specially, because they are in certain determinate genera. But "good" runs through all genera. Hence one good can be together with the privation of another good.

Reply to the fourth: What the Prophet imprecates, "Woe to them who say that what is good, as it is good, is evil," does not follow from the premises, as is clear from what has been said.

The conclusion is affirmative, and it is to be understood of evil absolutely, and not relatively, which consists in the privation (privatio) of some entity. For since this privation is in some entity as in a subject, it follows that evil is in good, not indeed in that good which is its opposite, but in another, as in a subject.

Articulus IV - Whether evil corrupts the whole good

Objection 1. To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that evil corrupts the whole good. For one of contraries is wholly corrupted by the other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil can corrupt the whole good.

Objection 2. Furthermore. Augustine says in the Enchiridion that evil harms inasmuch as it takes away good. But good is like itself and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

Objection 3. Furthermore. Evil, as long as it is, harms and takes away good; but that from which something is always taken away is at some time consumed, unless it be infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

But on the contrary: Augustine says in the Enchiridion that evil cannot wholly consume good.[1196]

I answer that, evil cannot wholly consume good. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that there is a threefold good. One is the good which is wholly taken away by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil: as light is wholly taken away by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another good is that which is neither wholly taken away by evil, nor diminished, namely the good which is the subject of evil: for by darkness nothing of the substance of air is diminished. Yet another good is that which is indeed diminished by evil, but not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of the subject for act. Now the diminution of this good is not to be taken according to subtraction, as is diminution in quantities, but according to remission, as is diminution in qualities and forms. And the remission of this aptitude is to be taken as contrary to its very intention. For such an aptitude is intended by the dispositions by which matter is prepared for act: which the more they are multiplied in the subject, the more apt it is to receive a perfection and a form; and conversely, it is remitted by contrary dispositions. And the more these contrary dispositions are multiplied in matter and more intensified, the more the potency to act is remitted. If therefore contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only up to a certain term, neither

1195. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV; cf. also V and X, on negation, privation, and contraries.
1196. St. Augustine, Enchiridion.

is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted to infinity, as is clear in the active and passive qualities of the elements. For coldness and moistness, through which the aptitude of matter for the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be multiplied to infinity. But if, on the other hand, contrary dispositions can be multiplied to infinity, and the aforesaid aptitude is diminished or remitted to infinity, still it is not wholly taken away: because it always remains in its root, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies are interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air for light will be diminished to infinity; yet it will never be wholly taken away so long as the air remains, which according to its nature is diaphanous. Likewise, an addition of sins can be made to infinity, by which the aptitude of the soul for grace is ever more and more diminished. And these sins are, as it were, obstacles interposed between us and God, according to that of Isaiah 59: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude is not wholly taken away from the soul, because it always remains in its root, which is the substance of the soul.

Reply to the first: The good which is opposed to the evil is taken away totally; but the other goods are not taken away totally, as has been said.

Reply to the second: The aforesaid aptitude is a mean between the subject and the act. Hence on that side on which it touches the act, it is diminished by evil; but on that side on which it keeps with the subject, it remains. Therefore, although the good in itself is uniform, nevertheless, on account of its comparison to diverse things, it is not taken away totally, but in part.

Reply to the third: Certain persons, imagining the diminution of the aforesaid good after the likeness of the diminution of quantity, said that as the continuum is divided to infinity by a division according to the same proportion - so that, for instance, the mean of the mean is taken, or the third of the third - so in the present matter it happens. But this reasoning has no place here, because in a division in which the same proportion is preserved, that which is subtracted is always less: for the mean of the mean is less than the mean of the whole. But the second sin does not of necessity diminish the aforesaid aptitude less than the preceding, but perhaps equally, or even more. Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is something finite, nevertheless it is diminished to infinity, not of itself, but per accidens, according as the contrary dispositions also are increased to infinity, as has been said.

Conclusion: Evil wholly consumes the good to which it is opposed; not, however, the good in which, as in a subject, it is. You have this conclusion explained above in Disputation 23, chapter 5; and in what sense moral evil consumes every moral goodness to which it is opposed, so that there is malice in the thing done, will be explained in I - II, question 72, article 2. Moreover, in what way the place of Aristotle is to be understood, Ethics, book 4, chapter 5, where he says: if evil were entire, it would be intolerable, we shall say in volume 2, question 73, article ...[1197]

1197. Disputation 23, c. 5; cf. also I - II, q. 72, a. 2. As to Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 5, "if evil were entire, it would be intolerable": see volume 2, q. 73, a....

Articulus V - Whether evil is sufficiently divided into fault and punishment

It is objected that: It seems that evil is not sufficiently divided into punishment and fault. For every defect seems to be a sort of evil. But in all creatures there is a certain defect, namely, that they cannot conserve themselves in existence, which, however, is neither punishment nor fault. Therefore evil is not sufficiently divided into punishment and fault.

1. Further, in irrational things neither fault nor punishment is found; yet in them corruption and defect are found, which pertain to the notion of evil. Therefore not every evil is punishment or fault.
2. Further, temptation is a certain evil. Yet it is not fault, because a temptation to which consent is not given is not sin, but the matter for the exercise of virtue, as is said in the Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12. Nor is it punishment, because temptation precedes fault; but punishment follows upon it. Therefore evil is insufficiently divided into punishment and fault.[1198]

But on the contrary: It seems that the division is superfluous. For St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion that evil is so called because it hurts; but whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil is contained under punishment.[1199]

I answer that: Evil (privation) is a privation (*privatio*) of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above; it is constituted principally and per se in perfections and act (*actus*). Now act is twofold, first and second. The first act is the form and integrity of the thing; but the second act is operation. It happens, therefore, that evil is twofold. In one way, by the subtraction of the form or of some part which is required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, and the being without a member. In another way, by the subtraction of due operation: either because it is altogether lacking, or because it does not have its due mode and order. But since the good simply is the object of the will, the evil which is the privation of good, according to a special notion, is found in rational creatures having will. Therefore evil which is by the subtraction of the form and integrity of the thing has the nature of punishment; and especially on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above.[1200] For it belongs to the notion of punishment to be contrary to the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of due operation in voluntary matters has the nature of fault. For this is imputed to someone as fault, when he fails in perfect action of which he is master according to his will. Thus, therefore, every evil considered in voluntary matters is punishment or fault.

Reply to the first: Because evil is a privation of good, and not pure negation, as was said above, not every defect of good is evil, but the defect of a good which is naturally apt and due to be had. For the defect of vision is not an evil in a stone, but in an animal; because it is contrary to the

1198. Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12; cf. the Glossa ordinaria ad locum.
1199. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 12.
1200. See above, q. 22, a. 2, on the subjection of all things to divine providence and justice.

nature of a stone to have vision. Similarly, it is contrary to the nature of a creature to be conserved in being by itself, because the same that gives being also conserves. Hence that defect is not an evil of the creature.

Reply to the second: Punishment and fault do not divide evil simply, but evil in voluntary matters.

Reply to the third: Temptation, insofar as it imports a provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in him who is tempted it is not evil properly, except insofar as he is in some way changed. For thus the action of the agent is in the patient. But insofar as the tempted is changed into evil by the tempter, he falls into fault.

Reply to the fourth: It belongs to the notion of punishment that it hurts the agent in himself. But it belongs to the notion of fault that it hurts the agent in his action. And thus each is contained under evil, according to what it has of the notion of hurt.

Note on the article.

The conclusion is affirmative. Concerning it, however, it must be observed that when we say that evil is sufficiently divided into fault and punishment, this is not to be understood as though punishment in the other member were to be taken formally according to its relation to fault; for many evils can be natural which are not anyone's punishment. Rather, punishment ought to be taken for an evil which can be punishment, if it be inflicted on someone for fault: for fault is such an evil that it is not itself punishment by reason of moral malice, as will be explained in I - II, question 87, article 1.

Articulus VI - Whether punishment has more of the notion of evil than fault

To the sixth we proceed thus. It seems that punishment has more of the notion of evil than fault. For fault bears itself to punishment as merit to reward. But reward has more of the notion of good than merit, since reward is its end. Therefore punishment has more of the notion of evil than fault.

1. Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But punishment, as has been said, is opposed to the good of the agent, fault however to the good of action. Since, therefore, the agent is better than his action, it seems that punishment is worse than fault.
2. Further, the very privation of the end is a certain punishment, which is called the lack of the divine vision. But the evil of fault is through the privation of order to the end. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

But on the contrary: A wise craftsman introduces a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater, as a physician cuts off a member lest the body be corrupted. But the wisdom of God inflicts punishment in order to avoid fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than punishment.

I answer that: Fault has more of the notion of evil than punishment. And not only than sensible punishment, which consists in the privation of bodily goods, of which kind many understand punishments; but even taking punishment universally, according as the privation of grace or of glory are certain punishments. Of this there is a twofold reason. The first indeed is that from the evil of fault someone becomes evil, but not from the evil of punishment, according to that of Pseudo-Dionysius: "To be punished is not an evil, but to become deserving of punishment."[1201] And this is because, since the good simply consists in act, and not in potency, and the ultimate act is operation or the use of whatever things are had, the good of man simply is considered in good operation, or in the good use of things had. Now we use all things through the will. Hence from a good will, by which a man uses well the things he has, a man is called good; and from an evil will, evil. For one who has an evil will can also make bad use of the good which he has, as if a grammarian were to speak incongruously voluntarily. Therefore, since fault itself consists in a disorderly act of the will, but punishment in the privation of some of those things which the will uses, fault has more perfectly the notion of evil than punishment. The second reason can be taken from this, that God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of fault. The reason of which is that the evil of punishment deprives the creature of a good, whether you take the good of the creature to be something created, if it be blindness depriving of sight; or the uncreated good, as by the lack of the divine vision the uncreated good is taken from the creature. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to the uncreated good. For it is contrary to the accomplishment of the divine will, and to the divine love, by which the divine good is loved in itself, and not only according as it is participated by a creature. Thus, therefore, it is clear that fault has more of the notion of evil than punishment.

Reply to the first: Although fault is terminated at punishment, as merit at reward, nevertheless fault is not intended on account of punishment, as merit on account of reward; but rather conversely punishment is induced that fault may be avoided. And thus fault is worse than punishment.

Reply to the second: The order of action which is taken away by fault is a more perfect good of the agent, since it is a second perfection, than the good which is taken away by punishment, which is a first perfection.

Reply to the third: The comparison of fault to punishment is not as of the end and of order to the end: because each can be privated in some way both by fault and by punishment. But by punishment indeed, according as the man himself is removed from the end and from order to the end. By fault, however, according as that privation pertains to the action which is not ordered to its due end.

Conclusion: The greater evil is fault than punishment. The holy Doctor proves the tail-piece by a double reason which he has in the text.

1201. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV, c. 4: "Puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum."

Quaestio XLIX - On the cause of evil

Consequently it is asked concerning the cause of evil. And about this three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the good can be the cause of evil

Objicitur: It seems that the good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said in Matthew 7: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruits."

1. Moreover, one of contraries cannot be the cause of the other. But evil is contrary to good. Therefore the good cannot be the cause of evil.
2. Moreover, a deficient effect does not proceed except from a deficient cause; but evil, if it have a cause, is a deficient effect. Therefore it has a deficient cause. But every deficient thing is evil. Therefore the cause of evil is nothing but evil.
3. Moreover, Pseudo-Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus IV that evil has no cause.[1202] Therefore the good is not the cause of evil.

Sed contra: Augustine says against Julian: "There would not at all have been any whence evil could arise, except from good."[1203]

Respondeo: I answer that it is necessary to say that every evil has a cause in some way. For evil is the privation of a good that is naturally had and ought to be had. But that something fall short of its natural and due disposition cannot come about except from some cause that brings the thing outside its disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upward unless by something impelling it. Nor does an agent fail in its action except because of some impediment. Now to be a cause can belong only to the good, because nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is a being. But every being, as of this sort, is good. And if we consider the specific notions of causes, the agent and the form and the end import a certain perfection which pertains to the notion of good. And even matter, insofar as it is potency (*potentia*) to good, has the notion of good. And as regards the material cause, it already follows from what has been said that the good is the cause of evil by the mode of material cause; for it has been shown that the good is the subject of evil. But evil does not have a formal cause; rather it is more the privation of form. And similarly it does not have a final cause; rather it is the privation of order (*ordo*) to the due end. For not only does the end have the notion of good, but also the useful which is ordered to the end. But evil has a cause by the mode of an agent, not however per se, but per accidens. To make this evident, one must know that evil is caused in one way in an action and in another way in an effect. In action, indeed, evil is caused because of a defect of some principles of action, whether of the principal agent or of an instrument. Thus a defect in the movement of an animal can occur either because of weakness of the motive power, as in children, or because of sheer unfitness of the instrument, as in the lame. But evil is caused in a thing, yet not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes from the power of the agent,

1202. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV.
1203. St. Augustine, Contra Iulianum.

sometimes from the defect of the agent itself or of the matter. From the power or perfection of the agent, when along with the form intended by the agent there follows of necessity the privation of another form; as along with the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Thus, the more perfect the fire is in power, the more perfectly it impresses its own form, and likewise the more perfectly it corrupts the contrary. Whence the evil and corruption of air and water is from the perfection of fire; but this is per accidens, because fire does not intend to deprive water of its form, but to induce its own proper form; yet in doing this it also causes that other thing per accidens. But if there be a defect in the proper effect of fire, for example that it fail in heating, this is either because of a defect of the action, which redounds into the defect of some principle, as has been said, or from the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the acting fire. But even this very fact, that something is defective, happens to the good, to which it belongs per se to act. Whence it is true that evil has no cause except in the good, insofar as it is a being.

Conclusio: The good is the cause of evil per accidens; and this indeed is to be understood also absolutely of natural evil. For since it is a corruption, and this happens per accidens, evil too in this way is per accidens. But moral evil, under the formal aspect of evil, is also per accidens, as we shall say in I - II, q. 79, a. 1 - 2.[1204]

Ad primum: As Augustine says against Julian, the Lord calls an evil tree the evil will, and a good tree the good will. From a good will, however, a morally evil act is not produced, since from the will itself being good the moral act is judged good. Yet the very movement of a bad will is caused by the rational creature, which is good. And thus it is a cause of evil

Ad secundum: The good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but a certain other. Thus the goodness of fire causes the evil of water, and a man good according to his nature causes an evil act according to morals. And this itself is per accidens, as has been said. And it is also found that even one of contraries causes the other per accidens, as when the cold external ambient heats, insofar as heat is withdrawn to the interior

Ad tertium: Evil has a deficient cause differently in voluntary matters and in natural. For a natural agent produces its effect such as it is itself, unless it be impeded by something extrinsic; and this itself is a certain defect of it. Whence evil never follows in the effect unless some other evil pre - exist in the agent or in the matter, as has been said. But in voluntary matters the defect of action proceeds from a will defective in act, insofar as it does not subject itself to the rule of its act. Yet such a defect is not fault (*culpa*), but fault follows from this, that with such a defect one acts

1204. See I - II, q. 79, a. 1 - 2.

Ad quartum: Evil does not have a cause per se, but only per accidens, as has been said

Articulus II - Whether the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil

Objicitur: It seems that the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil. For it is said in Isaiah 45: "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil"; and in Amos 3: "Shall there be evil in the city which the Lord has not done?"

1. Moreover, the effect of a secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But the good is the cause of evil, as has been said. Since, therefore, every good cause is God, as was shown above, it follows that every evil is also from God.
2. Moreover, as is said in Physics II, "the same thing is the cause of a ship's safety and its peril."[1205] But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore he is himself the cause of every perdition and evil.

Sed contra: Augustine says in the book On 83 Questions that God is not the author of evil, because he is not the cause of tending to non-being.[1206]

Respondeo: I answer that, as is clear from what has been said, the evil which consists in a defect of action is always caused from a defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but supreme perfection, as was shown above. Whence the evil which consists in a defect of action, or which is caused from a defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as cause. But the evil which consists in the corruption of certain things is reduced to God as cause; and this is clear both in natural and in voluntary matters. For it is distinct that some agent, insofar as by its own power it produces some form, along with which there follows corruption and defect, by its power causes that corruption and defect. Now it is manifest that the form which God principally intends in created things is the good of the order (*ordo*) of the universe. But the order of the universe requires, as was said above, that there be certain things which are able to fail, and that sometimes they do fail. And thus God, in causing the good of the order of the universe in things, consequently and as it were per accidens causes the corruptions of things, according to that which is said in 1 Kings 2: "The Lord kills and makes alive." But it is said in Wisdom 1: "God did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the destruction of the living." Now to the order of the universe pertains the order of justice, which requires that punishments be inflicted on sinners. And in this respect God is the author of the evil which is punishment (*poena*), not however of the evil which is fault, for the reason set out above.

1205. Aristotle, Physics II.
1206. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus.

Ad primum: The authorities speak there of the evil of punishment, not however of the evil of fault

Ad secundum: The effect of a secondary deficient cause is reduced to the first cause, so far as what it has of entity and of perfection is concerned; not, however, so far as what it has of defect is concerned. Thus any motion in a limp is reduced to the motive power; this is obliquity in itself, not from the power of movement, but from the crookedness of the leg. And likewise, whatever there is of entity and of action in a sinful action is reduced into God, insofar as he is its cause; but what there is of defect is not reduced to God as cause, but to the deficient secondary cause

Ad tertium: As is said in Physics II, the same thing is the cause of a ship's safety and its peril, yet per accidens. But the things that are from us called evil are not from God per se, but per accidens as regards the intention of the agent. For God does not fail in acting so that what is necessary for salvation be lacking. Whence it is not similar

Notatio circa articulum. Conclusion: God is the cause of evil which is, or can be, punishment, but he is not the cause of evil which is fault. Of the latter part something must be said in that question 79, a. 1 and 2. As to the former, note that God is so the cause of punishment that nothing which is not fault proceeds from him, and directly from his will, as we explained above in Disputation 75, the last chapter, except that the evils which are to some a punishment God is not said to will by a preceding will and in himself, but by a consequent will, with the occasion taken from us, as was said above in Disputation 83, chs. 4 and 5.[1207]

Articulus III - Whether there is one highest evil which is the cause of all evil

Objicitur: It seems that there is one highest evil which is the cause of all evil. For the effects of contraries are contrary. But in things contraries are found, according to Ecclesiasticus 33: against the greatest good is the greatest evil, and against life is death; so too against the highest virtue is the sinner. Therefore there are set two first principles: one of good and one of evil.

1. Moreover, if one of contraries is in the nature of things and of religion, as is said in 2 On the Heavens and the World, then the highest good is in the nature of things, which is the cause of all good, as was shown above. Therefore there will also be a highest evil, opposite to it, the cause of all evil.[1208]
2. Moreover, just as in things are found good and better, so also evil and worse; but good and better are said with respect to adoption; likewise evil and worse are said with respect to some highest evil. Therefore one should find some highest evil which is the cause of all evil.

1207. Above, Disputation 75, last chapter; and Disputation 83, chs. 4 - 5.
1208. Aristotle, De caelo et mundo II.

3. Moreover, everything which is reduced by participation to another is reduced to that which is per se and by essence. But the evils which are found among us are not evil by essence, but by participation. Therefore one should find some evil which by essence is the cause of all evil.

This is evident both in natural things and in voluntary ones. For it is one thing that some agent, insofar as by its own power it produces some form to which there follows corruption and defect, should by its own power cause that corruption and defect. Now it is manifest that the form which God principally intends in created things is the good of the order of the universe. But the order of the universe requires, as was said above, that there be certain things which can fail, and sometimes do fail. And thus, in causing the good of the order of the universe, God consequently, and as it were per accidens, causes the corruptions of things, according to that which is said in 1 Kings 2: "The Lord kills and makes alive." But what is said in Wisdom 1, that "God did not make death," is to be understood as meaning that He did not intend it as per se. Moreover, to the order of the universe pertains the order of justice, which requires that to sinners punishment be inflicted. And according to this, God is the author of the evil which is punishment, but not of the evil which is fault, for the reason stated above.

Reply to the first: Those authorities speak of the evil of punishment, not, however, of the evil of fault.

Reply to the second: The effect of a secondary deficient cause is reduced to the first cause not deficient, as to that which it has of entity and perfection; but not as to that which it has of defect. Thus, whatever there is of motion in a limp is caused by the motive power; but that which is of obliquity in it is not from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And similarly, whatever there is of entity and action in an evil action is reduced to God as its cause; but that which there is of defect is not caused by God, but from a secondary cause deficient.

Reply to the third: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as cause, from the fact that he did not do what was required for the ship's safety. But God does not fail in doing what is necessary for salvation. Hence the case is not similar.

Note around the article: The conclusion is that God is the cause of the evil which is punishment, yet not of the evil which is fault. Concerning the latter part it must be said in its proper question. As to the former, note that God is the cause of punishments in such wise that whatever things are a punishment to someone are not willed by Him by antecedent will, but by consequent will, on the occasion taken from our sins, as was said above.

Whether there is one highest evil, which is the cause of all evil

It is proceeded to the third as follows. It seems that there is one highest evil which is the cause of all evil.

1. For of contrary effects there are contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 33: "Against evil is good, and against life death. So also against a just man a sinner." Therefore the principles are contraries: one of good, and another of evil.[1209]
2. Moreover, if one of contraries is in the nature of things, so also the other, as is said in On the Heavens and the World II.[1210] But the highest good is in the nature of things, which is the cause of all good, as was shown above. Therefore there is also a highest evil, opposed to it, the cause of all evil.
3. Moreover, just as in things are found good and better, so also evil and worse; but good and better are said with respect to the best; therefore evil and worse are said with respect to some highest evil.
4. Moreover, everything which is by participation is reduced to that which is by essence. But the things which are evil among us are not evil by essence, but by participation. Therefore there must be found some highest evil which is the cause of all evil.
5. Moreover, everything which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se. But good is the cause of evil per accidens. Therefore one ought to posit some highest evil which is the cause of evils per se. Nor can it be said that evil has no cause per se, but only per accidens; for it would follow that evil would not be as it were in the more frequent case, but only in the less frequent.
6. Moreover, an evil effect is reduced to an evil cause: because a deficient effect is from a deficient cause, as was said above. But it does not proceed to infinity. Therefore one ought to posit one first evil which is the cause of all evil.

But on the contrary: The highest good is the cause of all being, as was shown above. Therefore there cannot be some principle opposed to it which would be the cause of evils.

I answer that: From the foregoing it is clear that there is not one first principle of evils, as there is one first principle of goods. First indeed, because the first principle of goods is good by essence (*per essentiam*), as was shown above. But nothing can be evil by its essence. For it has been shown that every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, and that evil is only in good as in a subject. Second, because the first principle of goods is the highest and most perfect good, which possesses beforehand in itself every goodness, as was shown above. But the highest evil cannot be; for, as was shown, although evil always diminishes good, nevertheless it can never totally consume it. And thus, good always remaining, there cannot be anything entirely and perfectly evil. Hence the

1209. Ecclesiasticus 33:15 - 16.
1210. Aristotle, De caelo et mundo II, text 18.

Philosopher says in Ethics IV that if evil were complete, it would destroy itself: because when all good is destroyed which is required for the integrity of evil, evil itself is also taken away, whose subject is good.[1211] Third, because the notion of evil is repugnant to the notion of a first principle: both because evil is caused from good, as was shown above, and because evil cannot be a cause except per accidens. And thus it cannot be a first cause, because a cause per accidens is posterior to that which is per se, as is clear in Physics II.[1212] But those who posited two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same root whence also other alien positions had their rise: namely, because they did not consider the universal cause of the whole of being, but only particular causes of particular effects. For this reason, if they found something to be harmful to any thing by the virtue of its nature, they judged the nature of that thing to be evil; for instance, if someone should say that the nature of fire is evil, because it burned the house of some poor man. But judgment about the goodness of any thing is not to be taken according to its order to something particular, but according to itself, and according to the order to the whole universe, in which each thing most orderly holds its own place, as is clear from what has been said. Similarly also those who found, for two particular contrary effects, two contrary particular causes, did not know how to reduce the particular contrary causes to a universal common cause. And therefore they judged that contrariety in causes extends up to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in one common thing, it is necessary that in them, above the proper contrary causes, there be found one common cause. Thus, above the contrary qualities of the elements there is found the power of the heavenly body. And similarly, above all things which are in whatever way, there is found one first principle of existing (*essendi*), as was shown above.

Reply to the first: Contraries agree in one genus, and also agree in the notion of being. And therefore, although they may have particular contrary causes, nevertheless one must come to one first common cause.

Reply to the second: Privation and habit are naturally constituted about the same thing. But the subject of privation is being in potency, as was said. Hence, since evil is the privation of good, as is clear from what has been said, it is opposed to that good to which potency is adjoined, not however to the highest good, which is pure act.

Reply to the third: Each thing is intended according to its proper notion. But just as form is a certain perfection, so privation is a certain removal. Hence every form and perfection and good is measured by access to the perfect term; but privation and evil by recession from the term. Hence evil and worse are not said by access to a highest evil, as good and better are said by access to the highest good.

Reply to the fourth: No being is said to be evil by participation, but by the privation of participation. Hence there is no need for a reduction to something that is evil by essence.

Reply to the fifth: Evil cannot have a cause except per accidens, as was shown above. Hence it is impossible to make a reduction to something which is per se the cause of evil. But what is said, that evil is as it were in the more frequent case, is simply false. For generable and corruptible things, in

1211. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea IV, cap. 5: "If evil be complete, it destroys itself."

which alone it happens that there is evil of nature, are a small part of the whole universe. And again, in each species the defect of nature happens in the fewer. Only in men does evil seem to be as in the more frequent case: because the good of man according to the sense of the body is not the good of man as man, but according to reason. But more follow sense than reason.

Reply to the sixth: In the causes of evil it is not to proceed to infinity, but all evils are to be reduced to some good cause, from which evil follows per accidens.

Conclusion denies: as to the error of the Manichees we spoke above, disputation 17, chapter 1; and what the Philosopher means in Ethics IV, chapter 5, when he says "if evil be complete, it destroys itself," will be explained in I - II, question 73, article 2.[121312111214]

Praefatio - Into the treatise on the Angels

After the Holy Doctor has treated of creation in general, he now begins to dispute about the works themselves of creation in particular. And since in this universe the chief creatures are the angels, he begins this whole disputation from their treatment. For this matter, good in part as it was, pertained rather to the philosopher and metaphysician than to the theologian. But because it is handed down so copiously and accurately by the Scholastics that they teach not only all theological matters, and those which subsist solely by revelation, but also philosophical points more exactly than any philosopher, whether Aristotelian or even Platonic, has ever treated them, we will omit nothing of what they have carefully written, but will examine each point by our customary disputations. Nor indeed should this be imputed to us as a fault, since many of those things which seem philosophical can be conducive to understanding those which are theological and of greater moment. Also, because in this matter we must defer much to our Scholastics, for that they have handed down to us things wholly unknown to the philosophers, and worthy to be known, about the nature of the angels and their properties. From which one thing especially becomes clear, namely what we said in the first disputation, that sacred doctrine is necessary as a science not only for supernatural things, but even for acquiring without error the knowledge of natural things: without which the most learned philosophers have left us few writings not altogether free of errors. But since many of those things which the Scholastics have taught about the angels were set down as opinion, nor are they sufficiently certain among them, the plan of our institute demands that, running through particulars as far as can be done, we should warn (and this has also been diligently observed by others in our own time) whether there might be any danger against Holy Scripture or the dogmas of the faith in certain opinions of the Scholastics.

1212. Aristotle, Physica II.
1213. On the Manichaeans, see above, disputation 17, chapter 1.
1211. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea IV, cap. 5: "If evil be complete, it destroys itself."
1214. On Aristotle's saying "if evil be complete, it destroys itself," see below, I - II, question 73, article 2.

Quaestio L - On the substance of the angels absolutely

After these things it must be considered about the distinction of the corporeal and spiritual creature. And first about the purely spiritual creature, which in Holy Scripture is named "angel." Second, about the purely corporeal creature. Third, about the creature composed of the corporeal and the spiritual, which is man.

But concerning the angels there is to be considered first the things which pertain to their substance; second, the things which pertain to their intellect; third, the things which pertain to their will; fourth, the things which pertain to their creation. Now concerning their substance, it must be considered absolutely and in comparison to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely, five points are asked.

Articulus I - Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal

It is proceeded thus to the first. It seems that an angel is not altogether incorporeal.

1. For that which is called incorporeal in relation to us, if when compared to God it is found to be corporeal and material, is not incorporeal simply. But Damascene says in book 2 that an angel is called incorporeal and immaterial in relation to us; but compared to God he is found corporeal and material.[1215] Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.
2. Moreover, nothing is moved save a body, as is proved in Physics VI. But Damascene says in the same place that an angel is an intellectual substance always mobile. Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.[1216]
3. Moreover, St. Ambrose says in the book On the Holy Spirit: "Every creature is circumscribed by the fixed limits of its nature; but to be circumscribed is proper to bodies." Therefore every creature is corporeal. But the angels are creatures of God, as is clear in Psalm 148: "Praise the Lord, all his angels," and afterwards is added: "For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." Therefore the angels are corporeal.[1217]

But on the contrary is what is said in Psalm 103: "Who makes his angels spirits."

I answer that: It must be said that it is necessary to posit some incorporeal creatures. For what God chiefly intends in created things is the good, which consists in assimilation to God. But a perfect assimilation of an effect to its cause is observed when the effect imitates the cause according to that by which the cause produces the effect, as what is hot makes hot. Now God produces the creature by intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*), as was said above. Therefore it was necessary that there be creatures endowed with intellect and will, and hence incorporeal.

After these things it must be considered concerning the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creature. And first, concerning the purely spiritual creature, which in Sacred Scripture is named Angel; second, concerning the purely corporeal creature; third, concerning the creature composed

1215. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 2.

of corporeal and spiritual, which is man. But concerning the Angels, it must be considered first about those things which pertain to their substance; second, about those which pertain to their intellect (*intellectus*); third, about those which pertain to their will (*voluntas*); fourth, about those which pertain to their creation. Moreover, about their substance it must be considered absolutely, and in comparison to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely five things are asked.

Whether an Angel is altogether incorporeal

Objicitur, that an Angel is not altogether incorporeal. For that which is incorporeal only with respect to us, not with respect to God, is not simply incorporeal. But St. John Damascene says in book 2 that an Angel is called incorporeal and immaterial with respect to us; but, compared to God, he is found corporeal and material.[1218] Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.

Further, nothing is moved unless it is a body, as is proved in Physics VI, text 32.[1219] But Damascene says in the same place that an Angel is an intellectual substance always mobile. Therefore he is a corporeal substance.

Further, St. Ambrose says in the book On the Holy Spirit that every creature is circumscribed by its own sure limits; but to be circumscribed is proper to body: therefore every creature is corporeal. But Angels are the creatures of God, as is clear in Psalm 148: "Praise the Lord, all his Angels," and later: "He himself said, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." Therefore Angels are bodies.[1220]

But on the contrary: it is said in the Psalms: "Who makes his Angels spirits."

I answer: It is necessary to posit that there are some incorporeal creatures. For that which God chiefly intends in created things is the good, which consists in assimilation to God. But the perfect assimilation of an effect to its cause is observed when the effect imitates the cause according to that by which the cause produces the effect, as what is hot makes hot. Now God produces the creature by intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*), as was shown above. Whence for the perfection of the universe it is required that there be intellectual creatures. But to understand cannot be the act of a body, nor of any bodily power, because every body is determined to the here and now. Hence it is necessary to posit, for this, that the universe be perfected, that there be some incorporeal creature. But the ancients, ignorant of the power of understanding and not distinguishing between sense and intellect, thought that there was nothing in the world except what falls under sense and imagination; and because what does not fall under imagination they thought to be a body, they held that nothing is a being except a body, as the Philosopher says in Physics IV. And from these proceeded the error of the Sadducees, saying there is no spirit. But this very thing, that intellect is higher than sense, reasonably shows that there are some incorporeal things, comprehensible only by intellect.

1216. Aristotle, Physica VI; St. John Damascene, as above.
1217. St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto.
1218. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 2, chapter 3.
1219. Aristotle, Physica VI, text 32.
1220. St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto; Psalm 148:2, 5.

Reply to the first: Incorporeal substances are a mean between God and corporeal creatures. Now a mean, compared to one extreme, seems to be the other extreme, as tepid, compared to hot, seems cold; and for this reason it is said that Angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not because there is in them anything of the nature of body.

Reply to the second: Motion there is taken as understanding and willing are called, in a certain way, motions. Hence an Angel is said to be a substance always mobile, because he is always in act understanding; not sometimes in act and sometimes in potency, as we are. Whence it is clear that the argument proceeds on an equivocation.

Reply to the third: To be circumscribed by local limits is proper to bodies; but to be circumscribed by essential limits is common to every creature, as well corporeal as spiritual. Whence Ambrose says in the book On the Holy Spirit, that although certain things are not contained in bodily places, nevertheless they are not without circumscription of substance.[1221]

The conclusion of the article is affirmative. For the confirmation of which we shall say some things in the following disputation.

Now: Whether Angels are incorporeal. Disputation 178.

- Besides the visible creatures there are certain beings abstracted from sensible matter, which we commonly call an Angel. Chapter 1.
- Who have thought Angels to be corporeal. Chapter 2.
- The truer opinion is proved by authority. Chapter 3.
- The same opinion is shown by Scripture and by reason. Chapter 4.
- The foundations of the former opinion are dissolved. Chapter 5.

Disputatio CLXXVIII - On Angels being incorporeal

Caput I - Besides the visible creatures there are certain beings abstracted from sensible matter, which we commonly call an Angel

"Angel," in Greek ἄγγελος, is not, as Hilary in book 5 On the Trinity and Isidore in book 1 of the Sentences, chapter 12, testify, a name of nature but of office; for ἄγγελος in Greek is the same as "nuntius" in Latin, as St. Augustine hands down in expounding the words of Psalm 103: "Who makes his Angels spirits." Dionysius agrees, who in chapter 4 of the Celestial Hierarchy, a little before the middle, says that they are so called because a divine illumination is first in them, and through them it comes to us.[1222] But the ministry of Angels is expressed by Paul to the Hebrews 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister?" Therefore priests too have been called Angels, as if they were go-betweens between God and us: Malachi: "The lips of the priest keep knowledge, for he is the Angel of the Lord of hosts." And John the Baptist for the same reason in

1221. St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto: "quod licet quaedam locis corporalibus non contineantur, circumscriptione tamen substantiae non carent."

1222. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, c. 4; St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 103.

Matthew 11 was called by Christ the Angel of the Lord, according to that of Malachi 3: "Behold I send my Angel before your face," as Tertullian says in the book Against the Jews, chapter 9, after the middle.[1223] God is wont to call Angels those whom he has set over the manifestations of his power as ministers. Nay more, Christ himself, Isaiah 9, has been called the Angel of great counsel, as the same Tertullian noted in the book On the Flesh of Christ, chapter 14, by the word of office, not of nature. This is more clearly explained by Dionysius, chapter 4 of the Celestial Hierarchy at the end, because, as Christ himself said, "All things that I have heard from the Father I have announced to you."

Yet the ecclesiastical writers, by the name Angel, understand the spiritual nature itself, besides the rational soul. In this signification Acts 23 uses the same name. But Aristotle and the Peripatetics call Angels separate substances; the Platonists, however, call good angels "daemones," and evil ones "cacodaimones," that is, evil daemons; and so much about the signification of the name.

But that there are such separate substances the Sadducees denied, as Luke relates in Acts 23: they used to say that neither Angel nor spirit exists; and therefore they also denied the resurrection. This was also the error of certain philosophers, as Aristotle testifies in Physics IV, texts 52 and 57.[1224] But it is clear that Angels are of a higher substance than men; although concerning their nature the matter is not so manifest. Thus in Psalm 8: "You have made him a little less than the Angels," and elsewhere very often. And among the ancient Fathers of the Church the matter is beyond controversy. The philosophers also admitted these substances, as Cyprian relates in the book On the Vanity of Idols; thus Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, chapters 6, 7, and 8, called them eternal, immobile, and without magnitude. The same also, On the Heavens book 1, chapter 9, teaches that there are many other intelligences besides the movers of the spheres, as we shall see in disputation 180, chapter 1; and others also, whom we shall report presently.[1225] Blessed Thomas proves the matter in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 46, by many physical reasons, which, in my judgment, suitably persuade the matter, although they do not clearly demonstrate it.[1226]

But by this reason alone, taken from experience, it can be shown efficaciously. For many things every day we see done by the possessed beyond their own powers: therefore we are forced to concede that they are moved in all those things by some higher substance; not immediately by God himself - for we shall resort in vain to the first of all causes, if it does not repel the being done by the ministry of another - especially since we see the possessed to be sometimes cured by medicines and by music, at least for some interval of time; certainly not by any other cause than that the demon cannot torture them, unless by stirring up their evil humors; which, if he did not use them, neither could he vex them nor work many wonders in them; but if God were immediately doing those things, he would not be hampered by the humors of bodies; and therefore neither medicine

1223. Tertullian, Adversus Iudaeos, c. 9; cf. Malachi 2:7; 3:1; Matthew 11.
1224. Aristotle, Physica IV, texts 52, 57.
1225. St. Cyprian, De vanitate idolorum; Aristotle, Metaphysica XII, cc. 6 - 8; De caelo I, c. 9.
1226. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles II, c. 46.

nor any other bodily remedy would impede the effect of him. But the same is shown still more efficaciously from the works of magicians and enchanters: for the things which we have heard to be done by them, not by slight matters set a-going and by words also uttered, surpass all the power of words and manifestly that of body of any substance whatsoever. Lactantius uses this reason in book 2 of the Divine Institutions, chapter 15; and indeed these things in our own time in Gaul and in England have recalled very many from atheism, who previously, with the Sadducees, used to believe that nothing exists except corporeal things.[1227]

But although Aristotle, besides the intelligences moving the orbs, also teaches that there are other ones: yet concerning demons, who are evil Angels, he seems nowhere to concede. Rather, in section 30 of the Problems, question 1, in the middle, speaking of those who are said to be stirred by divine inspiration, or to grow hot with a lymphatic spirit, he asserts that it happens from a natural intemperance. But Plato in the Politicus about tyrants, and in the Symposium, Xenocrates in the book On Death, Hermes Trismegistus in the Pimander, acknowledged evil angels. And among the ancient Fathers of the Church very many did so. And although it is only by faith that it is evident to us by what reason the demons became evil: yet from their works, which by us in no way can be done, being wicked, we can easily conjecture that there are also some that are evil.[1228]

Caput II - Who have thought Angels to be corporeal

That Angels are corporeal, that is, that their essence consists of body, was taught not only by earlier Fathers, among whom the matter was still somewhat obscure; but also a few years ago, when now it seemed to be beyond controversy, Cajetan held this in chapter 2 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, and Augustine Eugubinus in book 8 of the Perennial Philosophy, chapter 27; who, since he had asserted this concerning demons, must affirm the same also concerning good Angels. For this reason, in chapter 30, he thinks that they delight in the odors of sacrifices, dwell in moist places, and the like. Nay, Rupert, an abbot much more ancient and graver than these two, asserted the same in book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 11.[1229]

Of the Fathers indeed, both Greek and Latin, very many. Origen in book 1 of the Periarchon, in the proemium near the end, where he notes that Angels are said to be in some way incorporeal because of the subtlety of body, because their body is as it were air. Wherefore it is no objection that he taught in book 5 Against Celsus a little before the end bodily things, namely, tears, to belong to angels: nor that in book 1 of the Periarchon, chapter 7, he calls Angels incorporeal virtues; for in the same book, chapter 6, at the end, he had taught that it is proper to God to subsist without body. But the former two things could truly be said, if the bodies of Angels were subtle, as has been explained. In the same opinion were Caesarius, brother of Nazianzen, in the first Dialogue, page 1467, which is had in the second tome of Nazianzen; Elias of Crete explaining the

1227. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones II, c. 15.

1228. Aristotle, Problemata, section 30, quaest. 1; Plato, Politicus and Symposium; Xenocrates, De morte; Hermes Trismegistus, Pimander.

1229. Cajetan, on Ephesians c. 2; St. Augustine Eugubinus, De perenni philosophia VIII, cc. 27, 30; Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate I, c. 11.

first Oration of Nazianzen, on those words, "Silence to me," etc.; and John, bishop of Thessalonica, whose testimony is reported in the seventh Synod, action 5, not far from the beginning: from this indeed he proves that Angels can be painted, because they are corporeal; to whose opinion the whole Synod seems to have assented. For it responded, "Yes, Lord:" nay, in his opinion that man alleged Athanasius and Basil and Methodius. From the Latins, Tertullian taught that same thing. In book 2 Against Marcion, chapter 8, he says that Angels are constituted of a material spirit. But when in the book On the Flesh of Christ, chapter 6, he says that it is proper to angelic power to assume a body to itself from no matter, he understands it from our visible and gross matter: for he had just said, "It is certain that Angels bore a flesh not their own, as being of the nature of a spiritual substance, and yet of some body, indeed of its own kind." By which words he concedes that Angels are endowed with a body, but of their own kind, that is, very subtle and spiritual.[1230]

The same opinion is handed down by Hilary, canon 3 on Matthew, when he says that nothing is created which in its own substance is not corporeal. St. Augustine in book 3 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 10, seems to suppose that. But he clearly thought thus in letters 111 and 115, in book 3 On the Trinity, chapter 11, on Psalms 85 and 145, in book 3 of the City of God, chapter 23, and in book 15, chapter 23; although in letter 28 On the Rational Soul he says that it is not corporeal, if body is understood as that which occupies place; yet that it is corporeal, if body signifies whatsoever substance. Wherefore, in the Enchiridion, chapter 59, when the difficulty was proposed, Whether Angels have bodies tractable, or more subtle ones which cannot be handled, he answered: "For what need is there that such things be argued, that I affirm or deny or define them, since sooner shall I suspect myself of rashness than deem myself free from fault?" In which place Augustine does not doubt whether Angels are corporeal, but whether their bodies can be handled. The same Cassian taught, Conference 7, chapter 13. Bernard in sermon 5 on the Canticle inclines to the same opinion, although he remains there in doubt: yet in book 5 On Consideration he assigns to them an ethereal body.[1231]

They also follow this opinion who affirm that Angels had intercourse with women and begot giants. Thus thought Lactantius in book 2 of the Divine Institutions, chapter 19; but in book 4, chapter 8, he calls Angels spirits because they have more subtle bodies. So too Tertullian in the book On Idolatry, chapter 9, and On the Veiling of Virgins, chapter 7; and Ambrose seems to agree, book On Noah and the Ark, chapter 4. And Irenaeus indicates this, book 4, chapter 70, although book 3, chapter 23, plainly teaches that Angels are without flesh. In the same opinion are Josephus in book 1 of the Antiquities, Justin in the Apology to the Roman Senate, a little from the beginning, and in the Apology to Antoninus the Pious not far from the beginning, Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, books 3 and 5, Eusebius of Caesarea, book 5 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 4, and Methodius in the Sermon on the Resurrection. And thus they interpret that of Genesis 6: "The sons of God saw the daughters of men, that they were fair." For the ancient reading, which they

1230. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem II, c. 8; De carne Christi, c. 6.

1231. Origen, Periarchon (De principiis) I (proemium), c. 7; Contra Celsum V; Caesarius (frater Nazianzeni), Dialogus I; Elias Cretensis, in orationem I Nazianzeni; John of Thessalonica, Acta VII synodi, act. 5; Hilary, In Matthaeum, can. 3; St. Augustine, Epistt. 111, 115; De Trinitate III, c. 11; Enarr. in Ps. 85, 145; De civitate Dei III, c. 23; XV, c. 23; Ep. 28 De anima rationali; Enchiridion, c. 59; Cassian, Collationes VII, c. 13; St. Bernard, Sermo 5 in Canticum; De consideratione V.

themselves seem to have followed, thus translated: "But the Angels of God saw the daughters of men." Which reading Eusebius, St. Ambrose, and Augustine expressly have, in the Questions on Genesis, questions 3 and 15, and in the City of God, book 15, chapter 23. Nor does it seem to be an objection that in the Septuagint codices which we now have it reads not "Angels of God," but "sons of God." For we can interpret "sons of God" as "Angels of God," according to the common phrase even of Scripture. For in Job, chapter 2, "Angels of God" are called "sons of God." It is said: "When on a certain day the sons of God had come," and a little after: "when the morning stars praised me together, all the sons of God shouted for joy." St. Jerome translates in both places "sons of God" from the Hebrew; but the Septuagint renders "Angels of God." Wherefore without cause did St. John Chrysostom in homily 22 on Genesis think that never in Scripture are Angels called sons of God. Nor, indeed, is that an objection in Hebrews 2: "For nowhere does he say to the Angels, 'You are my Son, today I have begotten you'"; for Paul speaks there of sonship by nature, and shows that no Angel is the Son by this very thing. This very testimony, then, Paul could also bring forward in confirmation of this opinion. Then St. Bernard, in the sermon already cited, handles this opinion in some way, where he thinks that Angels cannot assume any local corporeal substance, unless the Angel be moved in place and interval: therefore he is corporeal.[1232]

Caput III - The truer opinion is proved by authority

Positing the opinion which says that angels are incorporeal, it appears not only more probable, but also more common among the Fathers and the Scholastics, and as it were defined by the Church. Among the Scholastics, all taught thus with the Master in II Sentences, dist. 3, and St. Thomas, Cajetan, and other Thomists in this article; among the Fathers, Pseudo-Dionysius, book 4, chapter On the Divine Names at the beginning; Nazianzen, Oration 34, which is the second On Theology - nor does he remain in doubt, if he be read attentively, as some have falsely supposed; Athanasius, in the book On the Common Essence of the Father and the Son near the end, defining the angel; and in the Questions to Antiochus, questions 19 and 98. Nor does it stand in the way that, in question 12, he said that the angelic essence was seen by the Blessed Virgin in the salutation: for he understands that of the keenness and eye of the mind, by which a spirit also can be seen by some light communicated from above. The same is taught by St. Basil in the homily That God is not the author of evils, around the middle, where he distinguishes corporeal and spiritual creature; by St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Lord's Prayer on the words "Thy will be done," before the middle of the commentary; by St. Cyril, book 4 on John, chapter 10, and in places to be cited below; by Theodoret on that of Zacharias 1 "I saw by night," and in the Questions on Genesis, q. 43; by St. John Chrysostom, homily 22 on Genesis, on the words "And the sons of God saw"; by Nicetas in the eighth oration on Nazianzen, on the words "Thus indeed the holy things"; by St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 17, and book 2, chapter 3. And when he says

1232. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones II, c. 19; IV, c. 8; Tertullian, De idololatria, c. 9; De velandis virginibus, c. 7; St. Ambrose, De Noe et arca, c. 4; St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses IV, c. 70; III, c. 23; Josephus, Antiquitates I; Justin, Apologia I (to the Senate), near the beginning; Apologia II (to Antoninus Pius), near the beginning; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata III, V; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica V, c. 4; Methodius, Sermo de resurrectione; Genesis 6:2; Job 2:1; 38:7; St. Jerome (Hebrew text); Septuagint; St. John Chrysostom, Homilia 22 in Genesim.

that an angel is called "incorporeal" with respect to us, yet "corporeal and material" in comparison with God, he does not say that because he thinks an angel consists of some matter, but to show that his spirit is far inferior to the Spirit of God, so that, by comparison with Him, it would scarcely seem a spirit; otherwise Damascene would not have denied, in the places cited, that an angel is in a bodily place with dimensions, if he thought the angel truly corporeal. Hence St. Gregory asserted, book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 19; nor does that stand in the way which he said, book 2 of the Morals, chapter after the middle, otherwise chapter 3, that angels are circumscribed by place: for he understands them to be "circumscribed" not by quantity, but to be defined by a particular place; in which sense Damascene also spoke in the places cited, as we noted in Disputation 187, chapter 1. With all these agrees Richard of St. Victor, book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 25, whose reason we shall adduce in the following chapter. Finally, some confirm this from the Sixth General Synod, action 11, where angels are called intellectual and invisible; likewise Cyprian so calls them in the preface on the cardinal works of Christ; yet nothing can be proved for the proposal from this. For those who assert that angels are corporeal also say that they are invisible - because they have certain more subtle bodies - and intellectual, just as man is, who nevertheless consists of body. This truth moreover seems defined by the Church in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, On the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith, where it is said: "God from nothing created both natures, spiritual and corporal, to wit the angelic, and the mundane." Where clearly he calls "spiritual" the angelic, to which he opposes the "mundane"; but "corporal," which consists of body alone, he calls "mundane"; he adds immediately: "Then the human," as something common, constituted from spirit and body. Nevertheless they excuse from the note of error the opposing opinion, Bartholomew Carranza in the Summa of Councils in the annotations on the Seventh Synod, and Sixtus of Siena, book 6 of the Sacred Library, annotation 8, that the matter still seems doubtful among the Fathers, and the mind of the Council was not directly to define what creature was corporeal and what spiritual, but that God in the beginning of time created all things; and that it used the more common way of speaking, when it distinguished one creature from another.[1233]

However, although this is true, no one now could defend the opposing opinion without the note of rashness. There is added the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, chapters 6, 7, and 8, who expressly proves that intelligences are separated from all matter and magnitude.[1234]

1233. Master (Peter Lombard), II Sentences, dist. 3; St. Thomas, ad loc.; Cajetan and other Thomists; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV (init.); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 34 (II De theologia); Athanasius, De communi essentia Patris et Filii (ad fin.); Quaestiones ad Antiochum 19, 98; St. Basil, Quod Deus non est auctor malorum (circa medium); St. Gregory of Nyssa, De oratione dominica, on "Fiat voluntas tua"; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem IV, c. 10; Theodoret, In Zachariam 1:8; Quaestiones in Genesim 43; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 22 in Genesim; Nicetas, Or. 8 in Nazianzen; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I.17; II.3. On the Sixth Ecumenical Council, action 11; "Cyprian" (the preface De operibus cardinalibus Christi is spuriously ascribed). On the Lateran Council IV (Innocent III), cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica.

1234. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII (Lambda), chs. 6 - 8, on the immaterial and unmagnitudinal separate intelligences.

Caput IV - The same opinion is shown by Scripture and by reason

This opinion too can be confirmed by Scripture. First, because nowhere does it call angels "corporeal"; on the contrary, it frequently calls them "spirits": and in Scripture, "spirit" signifies an incorporeal reality, John 4, "God is spirit," and Acts 23, Luke reports that there was the heresy of the Sadducees who asserted there is no resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit, that is, that there is no incorporeal reality; whence they inferred that the soul perishes with the body. And indeed Luke reckons it the same thing to deny a spirit and to deny an angel; although "spirit" extends more widely than "angel," because a rational soul is also a spirit. That an angel is called "spirit" in Scripture is evident from many things: some prove it from that of Psalm 103, "Who makes your angels spirits, and your ministers a burning fire," as St. Augustine and St. John Damascene interpret it, 2 On the Faith, c. 3. More recent writers, however, with Eugubinus, take it thus: "Who makes your angels swift like the wind; your ministers (to wit, those same angels) like lightning," on account of the same swiftness: for just as he does not make his angels true "fire," but in likeness, so he does not make "spirits"; therefore "spirits" in that place is taken not for a substance separated from body, but for wind, so that in that place angels are not said to be spirits, but to be like spirit, that is, wind; just as they are not said to be fire, but to be assimilated to fire. Elsewhere, however, in Scripture good or evil angels are called "spirits," Hebrews 1, "All are ministering spirits sent for an inheritance"; Luke 6, and elsewhere often, the demons are called "unclean spirits."[1235]

This opinion also can be commended by reason. Passing over those reasons which St. Thomas employs, and which Cajetan explains at length - for they congruently only show this much - first, it is proved from the utmost swiftness of motion, whereby they are said to traverse and to go around the earth, which could not agree to a body. Second, because spirits enter into human bodies and penetrate other similar things; but a body cannot be penetrated by a body. You will say that they enter only through pores: but this is ridiculous, both because an angel could not have fallen from heaven, since the heavens have no pores; and because either the same angel would enter through one single pore only, and so he would be of the least quantity, and thus in the genus of body most imperfect and of the least efficacy; or he would enter through many at once, and thus the body of the angel would be divided into pieces, so that he would enter partly through one pore, partly through another: for between one pore and another there is a solid part, which cannot be penetrated by a body. Third, Richard of St. Victor proves: for if angels were corporeal, a "legion" of them could not, without miracle, be in one possessed body, as is related in Luke 8; for a legion contains six thousand six hundred and sixty-six; but to concede a miracle in this matter, that those angelic bodies might penetrate one another, would be frivolous; therefore it must be said that they are incorporeal: because, although their bodies might be subtle, nevertheless between place and place they would have to occupy some space: wherefore they would have to be certain minimal bodies, so that so many thousands could be in so small a body of one man. I pass over other reasons, which are of less moment, as that they would need food if they were corporeal, would have

1235. Psalm 103(104):4; St. Augustine's interpretation; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.3; St. Augustine Steuchus (Eugubinus). Hebrews 1:14; frequent "unclean spirits" in Luke.

organs for the operations of life, and would grow weary in moving a celestial body. For one could easily reply that such bodies would be subtle and of another kind than those of animals, and therefore would neither need food, nor have instruments for the operations of life, nor be wearied by any labor.[1236]

Caput V - The foundations of the prior opinion are dissolved

It remains to refute the arguments of the prior opinion. And first indeed we confess that the Fathers alleged for the same opinion teach so openly: I except Ambrose, whom some attempt to explain in such a way that he only thought that giants were begotten by angels, not by their own power, but by the seed of a man brought from elsewhere - which I do not doubt can naturally be done. But truly, if it were permitted to interpret Ambrose thus, we should in the same way have to explain all the others also. There is, however, an easier way to excuse him: for since he uses only the words of Scripture according to that ancient reading of the Seventy, in the same way he himself, as well as Scripture, seems to have spoken: but Scripture, even according to that reading of the Seventy, has an easy sense, as we shall immediately see, which he himself also - Ambrose - seems to have explained, as will appear below. The same Ambrose is also cited for the proper opinion, book 1 On Virgins, somewhat near the end, where he says thus: "Nor is it a wonder if angels fight for you who fight by the morals of angels: the virgin's chastity merits their protection, whose life you imitate; and why should I pursue at greater length the praise of chastity? for chastity made angels: for he who kept it is an angel; he who lost it, a devil." But there he does not speak of the angel and the devil according to nature, but according to morals. Wherefore when he says that "he who keeps chastity is an angel," he signifies that he is like an angel: on the contrary, he who does not keep it is made like to a demon. Nor did Ambrose think that the first sin of the angel, by which he was made a devil, was carnal lust; since he plainly says in Psalm 118, and in sermon 7, and in epistle 84, that he fell by pride.[1237]

To that which we adduced from the Seventh Synod I reply, that that John, whose book was read, was of that opinion; but that opinion was received and approved by the whole Synod only in so far as it says that angels can be depicted: although his reason would not prove that, as is shown more at large in book 2 On Adoration, disputation 3, chapter 5. Nor did that Father bring forward only this reason of theirs, namely, that they are corporeal, but also that they deigned to appear under a human figure: which we said in that chapter is most certain, even that God Himself can be portrayed. But where Athanasius and Basil handed down that opinion, whom that John alleges for it, I have not hitherto found; nay rather, I have already alleged them for the opposing opinion.[1238]

To that of Genesis 6, according to the translation of the Hebrews, the place can be rendered thus: "sons of God"; for in Hebrew it is said bene ha-Elohim. But by "sons of God" they understand the descendants of Enosh, who, it is said in Genesis 4, "began to call upon the name of the Lord."

1236. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV.25.

1237. St. Ambrose, De virginibus I, near the end; on the devil's first sin as pride: Enarr. in Ps. 118; Sermo 7; Ep. 84.

1238. Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II), act. 5 (and its reception of authorities alleged by John of Thessalonica); Vazquez refers to his own treatment in De adoratione, lib. 2, disp. 3, cap. 5.

And therefore all who draw their origin from him are rightly called sons of God: just as Christians are now so called, who call upon Christ, and the sons of Christians, who remain in the same faith. These therefore took wives to themselves from the stock of Cain, who were called "daughters of men," not "daughters of God," because they imitated the manners of their parents, their affections being fastened on earthly things, as also was the case with their offspring. When therefore these women were beautiful, men from the lineage of Enosh took them as wives, and giants were begotten. Thus that place is interpreted, first, by some of those who assert that angels are corporeal - Caesarius, the brother of Nazianzen, Dialogue 1, p. 1467 in the second tome of Nazianzen; Augustine, City of God 15, c. 23; Cassian, Collation 8, c. 21 - for these grant to angels bodies so subtle that they were not apt for generation. Then, from others who said that angels are incorporeal, the aforesaid place is thus explained by Chrysostom, homily 22 on Genesis; Athanasius, in the Questions to Antiochus, question 79; Theodoret on Genesis, question 47; Cyril, book 9 Against Julian a little from the beginning, and book 3 on Genesis at the beginning. Philaster, moreover, in his catalogue of heresies, chapter 108, recounts among the heresies the opinion which says that giants were begotten by angels. Euthymius also attests in the Panoplia, title 13, that this was a heresy of the Bogomili, asserting that the demons took wives for themselves because they had heard it said to Lucifer that the seats of heaven are to be filled from the race of men. Nor is our exposition alien to Ambrose, book 4 On Noah: although he said that angels with women begot giants, yet he subjoins these words: "The Jews are persuaded - and Scripture calls angels 'gods' - because they are not generated from man; and faithful men it calls 'sons of God'." This interpretation is not only easy, whether we follow the Hebrew text or the Vulgate, nay even that of the Seventy which is commonly circulated, in which it is said "sons of God," not "angels of God"; but even if we read "angels of God," it could be explained, as Scripture elsewhere calls men "angels," as in Matthew 11, where, according to the prophet Malachi, John is called an "angel," and in Deuteronomy 32, in the Canticle, according to the translation of the Seventy it is said, "He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God," while the Vulgate has, "according to the number of the sons of Israel," who were called sons of God; which reading Ambrose followed when he called "angels of God," that is, "sons of God," faithful men.[1239]

Then we can interpret the aforesaid place in another way, so that "sons of God" are called the sons of the mighty; but "daughters of men," the daughters of the common people; and the sense is: nobles and plebeians; and from those the giants were begotten. This agrees with the Hebrew text; for "sons of God" are called bene ha-Elohim, but "daughters of men," bene ha-Adam: and Elohim, although plural in form, can be rendered in the singular and in the plural. Wherefore we can say: "sons of God," that is, "sons of gods," i.e., of judges or potentates. And St. Augustine, in the place cited, and St. Jerome, book 3 in the Hebrew Questions, translate "gods" in the plural according to the Hebrew phrase; but by that Hebraism are often signified nobles, the mighty, or judges among the people, as in Psalm 81(82), "I said, you are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High," and again, "God has stood in the synagogue of gods." Therefore Symmachus, as Jerome reports,

1239. St. Ambrose, De Noe et arca, c. 4; on Genesis 6:2; Matthew 11:10 (Malachi 3:1); Deuteronomy 32:8 LXX versus Vulgate.

renders "sons of the mighty." Nay more, this exposition has a place even if we read that of the Seventy, "angels of God": for in Scripture the powerful are sometimes called "angels," as in Job 41, "the angels shall be afraid," that is, the mighty tremble; he speaks of the proud and over-powerful men, who also fear the whole strength of Leviathan; so too the deserts grew, as is elsewhere discussed.[1240]

To that which we brought forward from the Seventh Synod I answer, that that John, whose book was cited, held that opinion; but that it was received and approved by the whole Synod only in so far as he said that angels could be painted, although his reason did not prove this, as is shown more at length in book 2 De adoratione, disputation 3, chapter 5.[1241] Nor did that holy Synod adopt it only because he said that they were corporeal, but also because they deigned to appear under a human figure; which we said in that chapter to be the most powerful reason, on account of which even God himself can be depicted. But where Athanasius and Basil, whom that John alleges for himself, handed down that opinion, I to this point have not found; nay rather, I have already adduced them on the opposing view.

As to that of Genesis 6 according to the Septuagint translation, I answer that it is much better rendered "sons of God" than "angels of God"; for in the Hebrew it says bene ha-Elohim. Now the Fathers understand by "sons of God" the sons of Enos, who, as is said in Genesis 4, "began to call upon the name of the Lord"; and therefore all who draw their origin from him are rightly called sons of God: just as those are now called Christians who invoke Christ, and their sons who remain in the same faith. These, then, took wives for themselves from the stock of Cain, who were called daughters of men, not daughters of God, because, imitating the ways of their parents, they were devoted to earthly things; whereas their progenitors, the men of the line of Enos, took them as wives, and begot giants. Thus is that passage interpreted, first by those who assert that angels are corporeal - Caesarius, the brother of St. Gregory Nazianzen, Dialogue I (in the second tome of Nazianzen); St. Augustine, City of God XV, c. 23; Cassian, Conference 8, c. 21 - for these attribute to angels a body so subtle that it would not be apt for generation; and then by others, who said that angels are incorporeal - thus St. John Chrysostom on Genesis, Homily 22; St. Athanasius, Questions to Antiochus, q. 19; Theodoret, Questions on Genesis, q. 47; St. Cyril, Against Julian IX a little from the beginning, and Book III On Genesis at the beginning; Philaster too in his Catalogue of Heresies, c. 108, where he lists among the heresies the opinion that giants were begotten by angels. Euthymius likewise bears witness in the Panoplia, title 13, that this was a heresy of the Bogomils, who asserted that demons had taken wives to themselves, because they had heard it said to Lucifer that the thrones of heaven were to be filled from the race of men.[1242]

1240. Augustine, De civitate Dei XV, c. 23; St. Jerome, Quaestiones Hebraicae; Symmachus's rendering reported by Jerome; Psalms 81(82):1, 6; Job 41 (on the fear of the "angels," i.e., the mighty); on the Bogomils: Euthymius Zigabenus, Panoplia, tit. 13; Philaster, De haeresibus c. 108; Caesarius, the brother of St. Gregory Nazianzen, Dialogus I; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 22 in Genesim; Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum 79; Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim 47; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum IX; In Genesim III.

1241. Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II), act. 5 (and its reception of authorities alleged by John of Thessalonica); Vazquez refers to his own treatment in De adoratione, lib. 2, disp. 3, cap. 5.

Nor does our exposition shrink from St. Ambrose, Book 4, chapter on Noah; even if he said that angels from women begot giants. For he subjoins these words: "Very often Scripture calls the sons of God 'angels,' because they are begotten of no man; and thus God has not disdained that faithful men be called his sons." This interpretation is not only easy, if we follow the Hebrew text and the Vulgate, indeed also the Seventy, which are commonly compared, in which it is said "sons of God," etc., not "angels of God"; but even if we were to read "angels of God," as the old Latin version of the Seventy has. For St. Augustine proves in that same chapter 23 that holy men are called "angels" in Scripture, from Matthew, where according to the prophecy of Malachi 3, John is called an angel; and Deuteronomy 32, in the Canticle according to the translation of the Seventy, says: "He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God"; whereas the Vulgate edition has "according to the number of the sons of Israel," who were called sons of God. Following that reading, St. Ambrose understood that "angels of God," or "sons of God," which he takes to be the same, are called faithful men.[1243]

Then we can interpret the aforesaid passage in another way, namely, that the sons of God be called the sons of the mighty; but the daughters of men, the daughters of the common folk; and the sense be: the noble and powerful took wives for themselves from the middle sort of the populace, and from them begot giants. This agrees with the Hebrew text. For bene ha-Elohim is said; now Elohim can be translated both in the singular and in the plural. Wherefore we could say, "sons of God," "sons of the gods," as Aquila translates it, according to St. Augustine in the place cited, and St. Jerome, tom. 3, in the Hebrew Questions; and "gods" in the plural, according to the Hebrew idiom, means nobles, the powerful, or judges among the people; as in Psalm 81(82): "I have said, You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High"; and again: "God stood in the assembly of gods." Hence Symmachus, as Jerome reports, renders it "sons of the mighty." Indeed, this exposition has place even if, according to that reading of the Seventy, we read "angels of God." For in Scripture the powerful are also called "angels": Job 41: "The angels shall fear, they shall be terrified." He speaks of the powerful and robust men, who even before the beast Leviathan will so fear as to void their excrements; as will be explained below, disputation 225, chapter five.

It is clear, therefore, that in no way were giants begotten by angels. But if you ask by what reason giants could first be generated by men of common stature, St. Augustine answers excellently in that same chapter 23, that this is not to be wondered at, because a few years before the Roman destruction wrought by the Goths, at Rome there was born a woman of gigantic size from a father and mother of common stature. Wherefore it was not necessary that giants were first begotten by angels. But whether in an assumed body an angel can have intercourse with a woman and generate, we shall see in the next question, article 3.

1242. Augustine, De civitate Dei XV, c. 23; the Caesarius passage is Dialogus I in the second tomus of St. Gregory Nazianzen; John Cassian, Collationes 8, c. 21; Psalms 81(82):1, 6; Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim 47; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 22 in Genesim; Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum 79 (scil. q. 19 in many editions); St. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum IX; In Genesim III; Philaster, De haeresibus c. 108; Euthymius Zigabenus, Panoplia, tit. 13, on the Bogomils; Job 41 (on the fear of the "angels," i.e., the mighty).

1243. St. Ambrose, De Noe et arca, c. 4; on Genesis 6:2; Matthew 11:10 (Malachi 3:1); Deuteronomy 32:8 LXX versus Vulgate.

To the argument of St. Bernard I reply, that even if angels are spiritual, nevertheless they can be moved in place and corporeal space: just as the rational soul, although it is spiritual, nevertheless exists whole in a body. But how angels are in a place and are moved will be explained below.

Articulus II - Whether an angel is composed of matter and form

It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form.

1. For whatever is contained under some genus is composed of genus and difference, which, coming to the genus, constitutes the species. But genus is taken from matter, and difference from form, as is evident in Metaphysics VIII. Therefore whatever is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is found. But the properties of matter are to receive and to underlie. Hence Boethius in the book On the Trinity says that a simple form cannot be a subject. But this is found in an angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.
3. Further, form is act (*actus*). Therefore what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act. This belongs to God alone. Therefore he is not form only, but has form in matter (*materia*).
4. Further, form is properly limited and bounded by matter. Therefore a form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of the angel is not infinite, because every creature is finite. Therefore the form (*forma*) of the angel is in matter.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 4, that the first creatures are understood to be, as they are incorporeal, so also immaterial.

I answer that, certain men posit that angels are composed of matter and form, and to establish this opinion Avicebron strives in the book Fountain of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished according to the intellect, are distinct also in reality. Now in an incorporeal substance the intellect apprehends something by which it is distinguished from a corporeal substance, and something by which it agrees with it. Whence from this he wishes to conclude that that by which an incorporeal substance differs from a corporeal is, as it were, its form; and that which is subjected to this distinguishing form, as something common, is its matter. And for this reason he posits that there is one and the same universal matter of spiritual and of corporeal things: so that it be understood that the incorporeal form of a substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, just as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But at first glance it appears impossible that there be one and the same matter of spiritual and corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form be received in one and the same part of matter; because thus one and the same thing numerically would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it remains that one part of matter is that which receives a corporeal form, and

another which receives a spiritual form. But to divide matter into parts does not befit it, except according to that which is understood under quantity; which removed, there remains an indivisible substance, as is said in Physics I. Thus it follows that the matter of spiritual things would be a substance subject to quantity, which is impossible. It is therefore impossible that there be one matter of corporeal and of spiritual things. But yet further, it is impossible that an intellectual substance should have any matter at all. For the operation of any thing is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an operation utterly immaterial. This appears from its object, from which every act receives its species and ratio. For a thing is understood inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter, because forms in matter are individual forms, which the intellect does not apprehend as such. Whence it remains that the substance of the intellect is altogether immaterial.

Nor is it necessary that those things which are distinguished according to the intellect be distinct in reality, because the intellect does not apprehend things according to the mode of the things, but according to its own mode. Hence material things, which are beneath our intellect, exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. But angelic substances are above our intellect. Whence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them as they are in themselves, but according to its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things. And thus also it apprehends God, as was said above.

Reply to the first: Difference is that which constitutes the species. Now each thing is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade in beings; for the species of things are like numbers, which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as is said in Metaphysics VIII. But in material things one thing is that which determines to a special grade, namely, the form; and another is that which is determined, namely, matter. Whence from the one is taken the genus, and from the other the difference. But in immaterial things there is not one that determines and another that is determined, but each of them according to itself holds a determined grade among beings. And therefore in them genus and difference are not taken according to one thing and another, but according to one and the same; which, however, differ according to our consideration. For inasmuch as our intellect considers that thing indeterminately, the notion of genus is taken; but inasmuch as it considers it determinately, the notion of difference is taken.

Reply to the second: That reasoning is proposed in the Fountain of Life; and it would be necessary, if the mode according to which the intellect receives were the same as that according to which matter receives. But this is evidently false. For matter receives form so that, according to it, it be constituted in the being of some species - of air, or of fire, or of any other. But thus the intellect does not receive a form; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles would be verified, who posited that we know earth by earth and fire by fire. Rather, the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very notion of form: for in this way it is known by the intellect. Whence such reception is not the reception of matter, but is the reception of an immaterial substance.

Reply to the third: Although in an angel there is not the composition of form and matter, yet there is in him act (*actus*) and potency (*potentia*). This indeed can be made clear from a consideration of material things, in which a twofold composition is found. First, that of form and matter, from which some nature is constituted. Now a nature so composed is not its own existence (*esse*), but existence is its act. Hence that very nature is related to its existence as potency to act.

To the first, it must be said, as is said in the 8th book of the Metaphysics, that in material things one thing is that which determines to a special grade, namely the form, and another is that which is determined, namely the matter. Whence from the one is taken the genus, from the other the difference. But in immaterial things there is not one thing determining and another determined; rather each thing according to itself holds a determinate grade among beings. And therefore in them genus and difference are not taken according to one thing and another, but according to the same and the same, which nevertheless differ according to our consideration. For our intellect considers that thing indeterminately, and thus the notion of genus is taken in them; but insofar as it considers it determinately, the notion of difference is taken.

To the second it must be said that that reasoning is set down in the book Fons vitae. And it would be necessary, if the mode by which the intellect receives and the mode by which matter receives were the same; but this is clearly false. Matter receives form so that according to it it be constituted in the existence (*esse*) of some species, as of air, or fire, or any other. But the intellect does not receive thus; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles would be verified, who held that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the ratio of form; for thus it is knowable by the intellect. Hence such reception is not the reception of matter, but is the reception of an immaterial substance.

To the third it must be said that although in angels there is not a composition of form and matter, yet in them there is act (*actus*) and potency (*potentia*). This can be made manifest by a consideration of material things. In things there is found a twofold composition: one, of form and matter, from which some nature is constituted. A nature thus composed is not its existence, but existence is its act. Whence the nature itself is compared to its existence as potency to act. Therefore, matter being subtracted, and supposing that the form itself subsist not in matter, there still remains the comparison of the form to existence itself as potency to act. And such a composition is to be understood in angels. And this is what is said by some, that an angel is composed of that by which it is and of that which is, or of existence and that which is, as Boethius says. For that which is is the subsisting form itself. But existence is that by which the substance is, as a run is that by which the runner runs. But in God there is not one thing, existence, and another, that by which He is, as was shown above. Whence God alone is pure act.

To the fourth it must be said that every creature is finite simply speaking, insofar as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it accrues. But nothing prevents some creature from being in a certain respect infinite. Now material creatures have infinity on the part of matter, but finitude on the part of form, which is limited by the matter in which it is received. But created immaterial substances are finite in that their forms are not received in another, as if we were to say that a separated whiteness existing by itself were infinite with respect

to the notion of whiteness, because it is not contracted to some subject. Yet its existence would be finite, because it is determined to some special nature. And on account of this it is said in the book of Causes that an intelligence is finite above, insofar, namely, as it receives existence from its superior; but it is infinite below, insofar as it is not received into some matter.

Observations concerning the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion of the article is that an angel is composed of no matter and form.

This article will seem superfluous to someone: for since it was shown above that an angel is not corporeal, by what reason could it be doubted whether it were constituted of matter and form? Yet certain ancient Scholastics gave some occasion of this disputation to St. Thomas. For Alexander,[1244] and St. Bonaventure,[1245] whom Richard follows,[1246] said that an angel indeed is not corporeal; nevertheless it is constituted from a certain matter and form, that is, from potency, which they call matter, and act which they call form. They do not agree among themselves, however, whether that matter is univocally matter with corporeal and visible matter. But much better do St. Thomas, his disciples, and Henry teach that an angel is not composed of matter and form, although it does consist of act and potency.[1247] For not every potency is matter, nor is every act the form of matter. Cajetan thinks that St. Thomas established the present article for another reason, namely that he might show that an angel cannot be divided, not only by extension and quantity, as was shown in the first article, but also according to substance, because it does not consist of substantial composition from matter and form.[1248] Moreover, unless the forementioned Scholastics had provided occasion, there was no need to demonstrate by another reason that an angel does not consist of matter and form, except because it is incorporeal. Wherefore the present article would be superfluous. For up to now no one seems to have granted matter except corporeal. For which reason Pseudo-Dionysius, and the other Fathers alleged in the previous disputation, just as they teach that angels are incorporeal, also assert that they lack matter, following the doctrine of Aristotle, who called them intelligences separated from matter: indeed, unless in material things we saw changes take place with some body remaining, no one could suspect that in them there is matter distinct from form. For which cause Henry and Durandus think that the heaven is not constituted of matter and form, although it is corporeal, because we do not see in it any substantial change to be made with some common body remaining; the opposite of which I do not see can easily be proved.[1249]

1244. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 20, memb. 2, q. 1.
1245. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, pars 1, art. 1, q. 2.
1246. Richard (of St. Victor), In II Sent., d. 3, pars 1, art. 1, q. 1.
1247. St. Thomas and his disciples; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 4, q. 16.
1248. Cajetan, on this article of St. Thomas.
1249. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 1 (post medium); Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 4, q. 16; Durandus, In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, n. 16.

Disputatio CLXXIX - Whence genus and difference are taken in angels

Caput I - The opinion of Durandus

Concerning the solution of the first, it must be seen in what way in angels genus and difference are taken, since in them there is not matter and form, from which, according to the common opinion of the Dialecticians, genus and difference seem to be taken. The discourse is about genus and difference, as the Ferrarian well noted on the Second Book Against the Gentiles, chapter 95, not about relations which the Logicians call intentions, but about the concepts of universal things which receive the denomination of genus and difference.[1250] Durandus, on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 1, number 12, teaches that angels are in a genus, yet are not composed of genus and difference: because, in order that something be placed under a genus, it suffices to have finite existence; and hence, because God is infinite, He is not contained under a genus. But for a thing to consist of genus and difference, there must be some composition from parts making one essence. Wherefore, since neither in angels nor in accidental forms is there composition, there will not be genus and difference.

But he proves that in these there is not a genus in which they agree, and a difference by which they are distinguished. First, because difference signifies the quale of the thing itself; for this reason it is said by Porphyry to be predicated in quale; but in angels and in accidental forms there is not that which signifies the quale of their thing: because whatever is found in them is the whole nature itself and the form of the thing; therefore in them nothing is found which has the notion of difference. Second, in simple natures there is no greater reason why something should be genus and something else difference: because whatever befits them is the whole substance and nature of those things themselves; therefore in them it is in vain that we distinguish these two. Third, simple things differ by their wholes, because they are simple, and they do not have that in which they agree with others, and that in which they differ; for if they had these, they would not be simple: but the genus of a thing is that in which it agrees with others; the difference, that by which it differs from others: therefore in simples there is not genus and difference. Wherefore, in the opinion of Durandus, there is no need to labor to assign something from which the notion of genus is taken, and another thing from which difference is taken.

Caput II - What Henry and other Scholastics think

Henry, in Quodlibet 7, question 8, reports the opinion of certain men asserting that angels are not in a genus, because they do not have matter from which that is taken. But how improbable this opinion is will be made clear in the following chapter. Henry himself distinguishes a twofold genus, one natural, the other logical. The former, which he also calls a praedicabile, he asserts to be taken from matter, not excluding form; the latter from form, not excluding matter. But how in angels

1250. The Ferrarian (Ferrariensis), on St. Thomas, Contra gentiles II, c. 95.

genus and difference are taken, he does not explain. Nevertheless, by the same proportion he will say that genus is taken from something which is as matter, not excluding that which is as form; and difference from that which is as form, not excluding that which is as matter.

But some Thomists, since they assert that in material things genus is taken from matter and difference from form, as St. Thomas taught and the Ferrarian in the same place, by the same proportion say that in angels genus is taken from that which is as it were matter, and difference from that which is as form. They assign, however, in angels essence (*essentia*) in place of matter, and existence (*esse*) in place of form; which two they think by their own nature are distinct in them prior to the operation of the intellect, so that they do not concede a composition from genus and difference, even if it be only through the intellect, without a real composition from something as matter and something as form, which would be, as it were, the foundation of that [intellectual composition]. But that essence and existence are distinct by nature in angels and in simple things, St. Thomas in this article in the reply to the third, and St. Bonaventure in the Second Book, distinction 3, first part, article 1, question 1, teach; Richard in the first article, question 1, adds, that the existence of an angel is only the relation of the creature to the Creator; but the nature is something absolute. As to genus being taken from matter and difference from form, the Thomists hold it to be the sentence of Aristotle in the 8th book of the Metaphysics, chapters 2 and 3, and of Porphyry in the book On the Properties of Genus and Difference.[1251] The Ferrarian, however, adds that genus is not taken properly from matter and difference from form, but remotely, and for no other reason unless because genus is as it were potency, but difference as act: and the root of all potency is matter, just as of the whole act is form.[1252]

Caput III - The true position

I, however, think that neither in things composed of matter and form, nor in simple substances, nor even in accidents, must we seek something real from which the notion of genus be taken, and something distinct from which the difference be taken; but concerning the whole thing itself, considered in a different way, we conceive the generic notion, insofar as it seems to agree with other things; and the specific difference, insofar as it is dissimilar to others. St. Thomas teaches expressly thus about genus and difference in angels in the reply to the first. Wherefore it is not necessary in material things to take genus from matter and difference from form; and so in vain shall we philosophize otherwise in material things. I understand, moreover, that these two are not to be taken from matter and form only proximately, but not even remotely, for this reason: for in order that I conceive in a thing the common notion together with another, and the particular notion of that by which it is dissimilar to another, I ought not specifically to look to matter and form; but it suffices to conceive the whole thing in a different mode, as is clear in angels, and St. Thomas admits; therefore neither proximately nor remotely do I take genus from matter and difference from form. And surely what the distinction is between proximately and remotely I do

1251. Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII (books Z - Θ), chs. 2 - 3; Porphyry, On the Properties of Genus and Difference.
1252. Ferrariensis, loc. cit.

not grasp, or by what reason matter is the root of every potency, which is found only in concepts, and form of the whole act, which is only in the intellect. For animal, which is the genus of man and of horse, in its concept includes a composition from soul and body according to a common notion, and reason; and man, which is the difference, in the same way according to a particular notion; in vain shall we say that genus is taken from matter, and difference from form, in the order of being. Moreover, not only in spiritual things, but also in material things, existence and essence are distinguished, as is set out more fully in First Part, question 3, article 4, and question 17, article 2; therefore from thence genus and difference cannot be taken. How nevertheless angels can be destroyed and corrupted by God we shall say below.[1253] And although nature and supposit be distinguished, nevertheless the notion of genus and difference cannot arise from there: for each is considered and found in nature alone, without its proper supposit, as is clear in the humanity of Christ. And what have been said we understand about genus and difference which are called by the Logicians metaphysical, that is, about the very objective concepts of nature by a common and a particular mode. For the distinction which Henry uses - of natural genus and logical - is scarcely able to be conceived, nor by Logicians can it be used.

Finally, if it were necessary in every thing to distinguish matter, or something in the place of it, from which genus would be taken, and form, or something ...

... something from which the difference is taken, was put forward on the authority of Aristotle and Porphyry. But they teach nothing of the sort, nor do they even lightly insinuate it. Aristotle, in that third chapter, says thus: "This indeed (namely the notion of genus) is as matter; but that (namely the difference) is as form, because it is act"; and in the second chapter he has something similar: "It is necessary" (he says) "that this be as matter, but that as form." Porphyry, moreover, says: "Genus, furthermore, is like matter; difference, like form." This, however, is most true, even if in the same thing to which genus and difference are appropriate there are not those two [constituents] which the aforesaid doctors posited, from which genus and difference are taken. For genus, for this reason, is like matter, because it is common to many and is contracted by the difference, through which it becomes proper to this or that thing; wherefore by the logicians it is called something potential, whereas the difference determines the genus to this species, as form [determines] matter; and therefore it is called the act of the genus.[1254]

1253. See below, disputation 182, cap. 5.
1254. Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, chs. 2 - 3; Porphyry, Isagoge, on genus and difference.

Articulus III - Whether the angels are in any great number

It is proceeded thus to the third. It seems that the angels are not in any great number. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of the continuum. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above. Therefore the angels cannot be in any great number.

1. Furthermore, the nearer something is to the one, the less is it multiplied, as appears in numbers. But the angelic nature among the created natures is nearer to God. Therefore, since God is maximally one, it seems that in the angelic nature there is found the least of multitude.
2. Furthermore, the proper effect of separated substances seems to be the motion of the celestial bodies. But the motions of the celestial bodies are according to some determinate small number, which can be apprehended by us. Therefore the angels are not in a greater multitude than the motions of the heavenly bodies.
3. Furthermore, Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that, on account of the rays of divine goodness, the intelligible and all intellectual substances subsist. But a ray is not multiplied except according to the diversity of recipients. Now it cannot be said that matter is receptive of the intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above. Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances cannot be except according to the requirement of the first bodies, namely the celestial, so that in some way the process of the aforesaid rays be terminated at them. And thus the same as before.

But on the contrary: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him" (Dan 7).]

I answer that, concerning the number of separated substances, different men have proceeded by different ways. Plato indeed posited that separated substances are the species of sensible things - as if we were to posit human nature itself to be separate; according to this one would have to say that separated substances are according to the number of sensible species. But Aristotle rejected this position from the fact that matter belongs to the notion of the species of sensibles. Whence separated substances cannot be exemplar species of these sensibles, but have certain natures higher than the natures of sensible things. Yet Aristotle posited that those more perfect natures have an order to these sensibles according to the notion of mover and of end. And therefore, according to the number of the first motions, he strove to find the number of the separated substances. But because this seems to be at odds with the documents of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to reconcile both, posited that the angels, insofar as they are called immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of the motions or of the celestial bodies, according to Aristotle. But he posited that in Scripture the name "angels" is also given to men announcing divine things, and again to the powers of natural things which manifest the omnipotence of God. But it is foreign to the usage of Scripture that the powers of irrational things

be called angels. Wherefore one must say that the angels too, insofar as they are immaterial substances, are in a certain very great multitude, exceeding all material multitude. And this is what Dionysius says in the fourteenth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy: "Many are the blessed armies of supernal minds, surpassing the weak and tight commensuration of our material numbers." And the reason of this is that, since the perfection of the universe is that which God especially intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, the more they are created by God in greater excess: and as in bodies an excess is observed according to magnitude, so in incorporeal things an excess can be observed according to multitude. Now we see that incorruptible bodies, which are more perfect among bodies, exceed almost incomparably in magnitude the corruptible bodies. For the whole sphere of agents and patients is something small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Whence it is reasonable that immaterial substances exceed in multitude material substances almost incomparably.

Reply to the first: In the angels there is not number which is discrete quantity, caused by division of the continuum, but [a number] caused by the distinction of forms (*formae*), in that multitude is among the transcendentals, as was said above.

Reply to the second: From the fact that the angelic nature is near to God, it must have the minimum of multitude in its own composition; yet not such that it be saved in few.

Reply to the third: That reasoning in Aristotle, in the thirteenth book of the Metaphysics, would conclude of necessity if the separated substances existed on account of the bodily substances. For thus immaterial substances would be in vain, unless from them some motion in bodily things appeared. But it is not true that immaterial substances are for the sake of corporeal ones; for the end is more noble than the things that are for the sake of the end. Whence Aristotle also says in the same place that this reasoning is not necessary, but only probable. He was compelled, however, to use this line of reasoning because we cannot come to the knowledge of intelligible things except through sensibles.[1255]

Reply to the fourth: That reasoning proceeds according to the opinion of those who posited matter to be the cause of the distinction of things. But this has been refuted. Wherefore the multiplication of the angels is to be taken neither according to matter nor according to bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising diverse orders of immaterial substances.

Conclusion of the article: It is consonant with reason that substances separated from matter be in greater number than bodies. Concerning the text of the article I see nothing particularly worthy of notation. But we shall examine that doctrine in the following disputation.

1255. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII - XIII.

Disputatio CLXXX - Whether the multitude of angels exceeds the number of bodily things

Error concerning the number of the angels. Caput I. That it is not evident that the number of angels is greater than that of bodies. Caput II. That there are more angels than men. Caput III.

Caput I - Error concerning the number of the angels

St. Thomas relates in this article that it was the opinion of Aristotle, in Metaphysics XII, chs. 7 and 8, that the intelligences are only forty-seven, according to the number of the celestial orbs; and Rabbi Moses followed that opinion, as the Doctor testifies in this article. But that there are many more, Scripture plainly says: Daniel 7, "Thousands of thousands were ministering to him," etc.; from which place Dionysius in the fourteenth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy gathers a great multitude of angels; and Matthew 26, "He will furnish me more than twelve legions of angels"; Job 25, "What is the number of his soldiers?" Which words Gregory, in Moral. XVII, c. 9, treats thus: "The number of the heavenly host is infinite; a definite number is expressed, that, as it is numerable to God, so it may be shown to be innumerable to men."[1256]

But Rabbi Moses replies to these places of Scripture that "angels" there are not called spiritual substances, about which we are now disputing, but the powers of irrational things, or even men, and thus they are in great number. But that exposition is frivolous, both because, as St. Thomas noted, the powers of irrational things are nowhere in Scripture called "angels"; and although men are sometimes called by this name, nevertheless in the cited places and in countless others in which the angels are said to be in great number, Scripture manifestly speaks of substances separated from matter.

Moreover, that Aristotle conceded other intelligences besides the movers of the spheres was well noted by Eugubinus: for in On the Heavens I, ch. 9, near the end, he teaches that outside the heaven, or above its summit, there are separated substances living a blessed life; he clearly understands, besides the movers of the orbs, which in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics he assigns.

Nevertheless some object that passage in Tobit 12, where Raphael says: "I am one of the seven angels who stand before the Lord." From this it seems to be inferred that the angels are not more than seven, who, enjoying the clear vision of God, are said to stand by him.

Some answer, from the doctrine of Gregory the Great, Hom. 25 on the Gospels, that in Scripture the number seven signifies universality, and thus there are more angels not only from the higher hierarchies and orders, but even from the lowest order of angels, who are sent to us daily.

Yet although in other places of Scripture the number seven is put for some great multitude, nevertheless in this place, and in all the others in which mention is made of the seven spirits who stand before the Lord and are sent into the whole earth, the definite number seven is signified.

1256. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 14; Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XVII, c. 9; Matthew 26:53; Job 25:3.

Now these are the seven angels who, as princes, are set over the whole earth, of whom one was Raphael. They are said to stand in the sight of God, not because others do not stand there, but because, although the care of the universe is committed to them, nevertheless they always stand by and behold his face. They are called seven princes of the whole earth, and seven spirits sent into the whole earth. John bears witness that he saw these seven spirits, who have the care of the whole world, in Apocalypse 8 with these words: "And I saw seven angels standing in the sight of God." He makes mention of the same in chapters 15, 16, and 17; finally, in chapter 1 he says of them: "And from the seven spirits who are in the sight of his throne."[1257]

Some recent writers rightly think that the seven eyes in Zechariah 3, which the prophet saw in the stone - that is, in Christ - which in chapter 4 of the same prophet are said to go to and fro through the whole earth, signify these same [angels]; although Jerome and Rupert on that place, and Bede, Haymo, St. Ambrose [Autpertus], Ansbertus, and Aretas on the first chapter of the Apocalypse, understand the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. For also John, Apocalypse 5, seems to have interpreted in this way the similar vision of the seven eyes of the lamb: "Which," he says, "are the seven spirits of God, sent into all the earth." Therefore, even if only seven are the princes set over the whole earth, nevertheless there are more not only from the other hierarchies and orders, but also from the lowest order of angels. It remains to see whether the multitude of the angels surpasses the number of bodily things.

St. Thomas in this article constantly affirms that the multitude of the angels is greater than the number of bodily things. Certain of his disciples understand this of the number of individual bodies, in such wise that the angels exceed in number the sands of the sea and every tiniest body. But Cajetan on this article, and Ferrarensis in the second book Contra Gentes, ch. 92, interpret St. Thomas of the number of bodily species, not of individuals: for thus even the holy Doctor himself seems to have explained himself in that chapter, and in On Power, q. 6, a. 6, and in this Part, q. 112, a. 4; for he expressly said that the multitude of angels is greater than the multitude of bodily natures, that is, by natures understanding the species of things, not their individuals.

I, however, do not see that anything certain in this matter can be defined either by reason or by authority. Not by reason: because, since the number of angels was produced from the sole will of God, it can be made known to us by no reason unless by revelation. Wherefore Durandus, in the Second Book, dist. 3, q. 4, dares to define nothing on this, but is wholly taken up with refuting the arguments of St. Thomas and of others who prove that the multitude of angels is greater than the number of other things: which can be easily dissolved. Nor can we bring forward anything certain by authority: for if there were any, it would especially be in Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 14; yet in truth he taught nothing of this sort, as from the following words it is lawful to gather. For after he had cited Daniel 7, that millenary number was set down, "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him," to show that Scripture would have it that the angels cannot be numbered by us, he adds: "For many are the blessed armies of heavenly minds, who surpass and transcend the feeble and contracted mode of

1257. Tobit 12:15; Revelation 8:2; 1:4; 15 - 17; Zechariah 3:9; 4:10; Jerome; Rupert of Deutz; Bede; Haymo; St. Ambrose Autpertus; Ansbert; Aretas; Revelation 5:6.

corporeal numbers which we use, and are exactly defined by the sole clear and supreme heavenly intellect which is happily granted to them by the productive wisdom of the divine providence." By which words he does not signify that the multitude of angels is greater than the number of bodies, but that it cannot be numbered by us by any multiplication of number which we are wont to use in numbering corporeal things, as by the hundred or the thousand, etc. For this he signifies when he says, "the feeble and contracted mode of corporeal numbers which we use": that is, the brief and small number which we use for numbering things; therefore he speaks not of the things numbered, but of number itself. He concedes, however, that their own multitude is well known to the angels themselves, by the light granted to them by God. Thus do Albert and the Bishop of Lincoln explain the latter words cited in that place; although Hugh of St. Victor there refers them to the knowledge of God, to whom, he says, the multitude of angels is known - an exposition which does not square with the words cited.[1258]

Caput III - There are more angels than men

If we compare the number of the angels with the multitude of men, the matter still remains so obscure that we can make no certain conjecture about it either by reason, or by Scripture, or by the authority of the Fathers. For, first, that there are more angels than men seems to be proved from the fact that individual cities, kingdoms, or at least men, have each their angels appointed for their guardianship, as we shall show below in Disputation 245: nor is it likely that the same angel should successively have the care of different men. Therefore there are more angels than men; especially since guardian angels, as we shall there say, are taken from the lowest order of the inferior hierarchy.

Dionysius the Carthusian also reports on that chapter 14 of the Areopagite's Celestial Hierarchy that it was revealed by God to St. Bridget that there are so many more angels than men that for each of men ten can be assigned in custody: I omit the evil angels, who are of the same nature with the good.[1259]

However, that there are more men seems to be gathered from that Apocalypse 12, where it is said that the Dragon drew with him the third part of the stars, that is, of the angels, who, imitating him, became devils: but these ruins are to be repaired from men, as St. Augustine testifies in City of God 22, ch. 1, midway, and in the Enchiridion chs. 28, 61, and 62; Bede on Ephesians 1, "To reestablish all things in Christ"; Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, ch. 18, although he adds that without peril to faith the opposite can be defended: therefore the multitude of men is greater than that of the angels.[1260]

Nevertheless, when Athanasius had proposed this question in the Book of Questions to Antiochus, q. 2, he left it undefined: he merely relates that some asserted that the number of angels is greater than that of men by ninety-nine parts, because they said that in that parable of the sheep

1258. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 14; Albert the Great and Robert of Lincoln (Grosseteste) ad loc.; Hugh of St. Victor, ad loc.

1259. Dionysius the Carthusian on Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 14; Revelationes S. Birgittae (St. Bridget).

1260. Augustine, City of God 22.1; Enchiridion 28, 61 - 62; Bede on Ephesians 1; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo I.18.

which the shepherd left in the desert (Luke 15) the multitude of angels is signified: and they were ninety-nine; but that the one sheep which the shepherd sought denotes men. He also relates that others said the numbers of the two are equal, according to that Deuteronomy 32: "He established the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God," as the Seventy read.

Wherefore I also judge that nothing certain can be had in this matter: yet I deem of less moment those things that were adduced in the latter place. I say, then, granted even that it is certain that the sees of the angels are to be supplied from men, it is nevertheless uncertain whether as many men are to be assumed into them as angels fell. Wherefore Isidore, On the Sovereign Good, book 1, ch. 12, n. 13, when he teaches that the number of angels diminished by the ruin of the wicked is to be supplied from men, adds that that number is known to God alone. Moreover, it is not settled whether it was a third part of the angels who fell: for that third part of the stars which the dragon with his tail drew from their place does not signify the angels who fell with Lucifer, but the third part of men who will shine in the Church of God like stars; thus that place Apocalypse 12 is interpreted by Richard, book 4 on the Apocalypse, ch. 1, gloss 1, and by Nicholas on that place; while Bede explains it of men or of angels, and from the context he gathers that there is not there described a battle between good and evil angels in heaven, but between the demon and the faithful men in the Church, as we shall more at length show below in Disputation 225, ch. 2. For the former side I see nothing of moment except St. Bridget's revelation, to whose sanctity much deference is due. Therefore I think that more probable. Yet if one had to proceed either from the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, or from reason alone, we could conjecture nothing in this matter, as has been shown. For how could it be certain to us that the same angel is not again and again appointed to the guardianship of many men?

Articulus IV - Whether the angels differ in species

Objicitur. To the fourth, the procedure is as follows. It seems that the angels do not differ in species.

1) For, since difference is more noble than genus, whatever agree according to that which is most noble in them agree in the ultimate constitutive difference, and thus are the same according to species. But all the angels agree in that which is most noble in them, namely, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

2) Moreover. More and less do not diversify a species. But the angels do not seem to differ from one another except according to more and less: namely, in that one is more simple and of more perspicacious intellect than another. Therefore the angels do not differ in species.

3) Moreover. Soul and angel are divided by opposition; but all souls are of one species. Therefore so too are the angels.

4) Moreover. The more perfect something is in nature, the more it ought to be multiplied. But this would not be if in one species there were only one individual. Therefore many angels are of one species.

But on the contrary: In things that are of one species, there is not found a prior and a posterior, as is said in Metaphysics 3. But among angels even of one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius said in chapter 10 of the Angelic Hierarchy. Therefore the angels are not of the same species.[1261]

Respondetur: It must be said that some said that all spiritual substances are of one species, even souls. Others, that all the angels are of one species, but not the souls. Others, that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of one species. But this is impossible. For those things which agree in species and differ in number agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels are not composed of matter and form, as was said above, it follows that it is impossible that there be two angels of one species: just as it would also be impossible to say that there are several separated "whitenesses" or several "humanities"; for whitenesses are not several except according as they are in several substances. Even if, however, the angels had matter, not even so could there be several angels of one species. For then it would be necessary that the principle of the distinction of one from another be matter: not indeed according to division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to diversity of powers. And this very diversity of matter causes a diversity of species and of genus.

Reply to the first: Difference is more noble than genus, as the determined than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, not however as one nature than another nature. Otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of one species, or that there be in them some other more perfect form than the sensitive soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the different determined grades of sensitive nature. And similarly all the angels differ in species according to the different grades of intellectual nature.

Reply to the second: More and less, insofar as they are caused by the intensification and remission of one form, do not diversify species. But insofar as they are caused by forms of diverse grade, in that way they diversify species: as if we say that fire is more perfect than air. And in this way the angels are diversified according to more and less.

Reply to the third: The good of the species outweighs the good of the individual. Hence it is much better that species be multiplied among the angels than that individuals be multiplied in one species.

Reply to the fourth: Multiplication according to number, since it can be extended to infinity, is not intended by the power of the agent; but only multiplication according to species, as was said above. Hence the perfection of the angelic nature requires a multiplication of species, not, however, a multiplication of individuals in one species.

Conclusion: Thus it is true that all angels are diverse in species; whether, however, it be possible that under the same species there be several angels differing only numerically - this is the whole difficulty of the present article, which must be weighed in the following disputation.

1261. Aristotle, Metaphysics III; Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 10.

Disputatio CLXXXI - Whether individual angels by their very nature differ in species

Caput I - Two opinions of St. Thomas and of his disciples

In the present controversy not only were there various positions of other Scholastics, but even St. Thomas himself and his disciples are not entirely in agreement. The first opinion is that of St. Thomas, who in the solution to article 4 teaches that individual angels differ from one another by species, and cannot be multiplied within the same species; which opinion Cajetan amplifies in his Commentary, yet does not determine whether by God's absolute power angels could not be multiplied under the same species and differ only numerically: that, however, he expressly teaches, On Being and Essence, ch. 4, question 7, as being the mind of the holy Doctor. The same seems to be the view of Peter of Bergamo in his Concordance of St. Thomas, dist. 115; and of Hervaeus in the Second Book, dist. 3, q. 3, article 2; and it is the opinion of Giles, who was St. Thomas's disciple and hearer, in book 2, q. 7. And this also seems to be gathered from St. Thomas's reasoning, which is of this sort: according to Aristotle's doctrine in many places, the multiplication of individuals under the same species proceeds from matter; for, first, in On the Heavens I, ch. 9, he teaches that "being this" pertains to matter, but being simply, to form; and he uses the example of the circle, of which he says that the being of the circle comes from the form, but the being of this circle from matter; from which doctrine it is gathered that where there is no matter, as in angels, there cannot be a multiplication of individuals under the same species, but only a multiplication of species.[1262]

The second opinion is that of certain Thomists, who assert that angels can differ by number alone, and be multiplied by God. Thus opine Capreolus on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 1, article 3, to the second against Durandus's fifth conclusion, in solution 4; and Ferrariensis on Second Contra Gentiles, chapter 93. To this it must be said that even St. Thomas himself expressly taught this in Opuscule 16, which is against the Averroists, when he solves an argument for the contrary side: for he affirms that the human intellect could have been multiplied by God, even if by its nature it did not have a principle of multiplication; for that which some thing does not have from its nature and from native principles, it can have from another cause, and especially from God; just as a heavy thing does not of itself have to be moved upwards, and yet this can befit it from another cause throwing it. From which doctrine it is plainly concluded that angels, at least by the absolute power of God, could be multiplied; and even if in themselves they did not have an inborn principle of multiplication, by God's absolute power they could be multiplied. That this stands with the doctrine of St. Thomas himself in this article is clear: for he neither here nor elsewhere said anything about the absolute power of God. Ferrariensis adds, perhaps now too angels under the same species differ in number, though the cause of the distinction be hidden from us: yet neither St. Thomas, nor Capreolus, nor any other Thomist ever said this.[1263][1264]

1262. Cajetan, Commentary on St. Thomas; St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4; Petrus de Bergamo, Concordia S. Thomae, dist. 115; Hervaeus Natalis, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, a. 2; Giles of Rome, In II Sent., q. 7; Aristotle, De caelo I.9.

1263. John Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; Durandus of St. Pourçain, against the fifth conclusion, in the fourth solution; Francis of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), In II Contra Gentiles, c. 93.

This was the opinion of Alexander, II, question 20, member 6, article 1; and Gabriel on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 1, article 2, conclusions 2 and 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, question 3; and Marsilius on the Second, question 3, article 1. Its reason can be what Alexander asserts, namely that since there are diverse grades and offices of angels in diverse hierarchies, a specific difference seems rightly to be gathered, just as indeed from diverse accidents in material substances we gather it.[126512661267]

Others, however, judge that all angels, of whatever order and hierarchy, differ in number alone under the same species. Thus taught Albert, part II, tractate 2, question 8; St. Bonaventure on II, distinction 9, article 1, question 1, when earlier in distinction 3, first part, article 2, question 1, he had only taught that all, or many, are of the same species; which opinion Marsilius in the place cited confesses to be more common; and Thomas of Argentina on II, distinction 3, question 2, article 2; these authors do not sufficiently explain which opinion they themselves follow. Richard of St. Victor is cited in favor of it, De Trinitate IV, chapter 25; but if he be read attentively, he did not teach this; nevertheless there are some fathers who not slightly insinuated it. First, St. Basil, book 3 On the Holy Spirit against Eunomius, not far from the beginning, speaks thus: "All angels, just as by appellation they have one, so also they have altogether the same nature." That Basil speaks of the unity of nature according to species is clear, both because he adds, "altogether the same nature" - for who would say that a man and a horse, because they are called by the same name "animal," have altogether the same nature, although we assert this plainly of Peter and John? For the difference of individuals does not suffice for us to say that their nature is different - , and also because Basil strives to prove that among the divine persons there is an order, even if they are of the same nature, by the example of the angels, who have order among themselves, although they have the same nature: therefore he must be speaking of specific nature, and of individuals; otherwise he would prove nothing.[1268126912701271]

Secondly, Athanasius, in the book of Questions to Antiochus, question 4, after he had asked whether angels are of the same nature, answers: "One and the same is the essence, just as there is only one essence of men." He did not say "of animals," but "of men," who are contained under the same lowest species.

Thirdly, St. Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, chapter 21, in order to show that one angel could not have been saved by another, as men were redeemed by one man, says: "Although all (namely, the angels) are of one nature, they are not of the same kind as men are." Here, while he concedes that they are of the same nature, he also admits that they are of the same species as individuals; for, as

1264. St. Thomas Aquinas, Opuscule 16, Contra Averroistas.

1265. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologiae II, q. 20, memb. 6, a. 1.

1266. Gabriel (commonly taken as Gabriel Biel), In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 2 - 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, q. 3; Marsilius (of Inghen), In II, q. 3, a. 1.

1267. The appeal is to the way specific difference is gathered from accidents in material substances.

1268. Albert the Great, Part II, tractate 2, question 8.

1269. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 9, a. 1, q. 1; and earlier d. 3, prima pars, a. 2, q. 1; Marsilius in the place cited; Thomas of Argentina (Thomas of Strasbourg), In II Sent., d. 3, q. 2, a. 2.

1270. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV.25.

1271. St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto (against Eunomius), near the beginning.

we were saying above, a horse and a man are not said to be of the same nature simply, but with the addition "generic"; yet he says they are not of the same "kind," not because they are not contained under the same predicament - for thus they would not be of the same nature, but of an altogether diverse order - , but because, as he immediately explains, not all angels are from one angel, as all men are from one man: for the same reason, therefore, he uses "to be of the same kind" and "to be of the same stock."

Fourthly, St. John Damascene, in the book of First Institutions, chapter 7, writes thus: "It must be understood that those which contain only individuals are called lowest species, of which sort are an angel, a man, and a horse, etc."[1272][1273][1274]

But the reason is proved thus: since there do not appear to us effects or accidents of angels more diverse than those of the souls of men - and these do not differ by species - why ought we to judge that angels differ from one another more than by number?

The more probable opinion is that angels indeed can differ by number alone; whether however they now differ thus is hidden.

The other is that the mode in which those angels who are now created by God differ among themselves is unknown to us.

The former part of this opinion is handed down by Scotus on the Second, distinction 3, question 7; Durandus, question 1; Gabriel, question 1, article 2, conclusions 2 and 3; Richard, article 5, question 1; Thomas of Argentina, question 2; Marsilius, article 2, conclusion 1; Marsilius on the Second, question 1, article 1, conclusion 3; Henry, Quodlibet 1, question 1; and Quodlibet 2, question 8; to whom are to be numbered the authors of the third and fourth opinions. But the first opinion is said to have been condemned at Paris by Bishop Stephen and by the Doctors of the Sorbonne, as Richard and Henry attest, although the condemnations of the Parisian articles are not believed to be of great moment.[1275][1276]

Moreover, before I confirm this part by reason, against that opinion which St. Thomas seems to have handed down in that little work, it must be presupposed that by no manner of reasoning through divine power can angels be multiplied within the same species, unless in individuals there be a native and proper principle of distinction, whose effect God by no means can supply. For although motion and other things which can be impressed into some thing solely by the efficacy of a superior cause without a native principle - God can by his sole power bring about, as the motion of a heavy thing upwards, or its rest in a higher place - nevertheless a distinction without an internal principle of the thing which is distinguished, by his sole power he cannot bring about. For this effect depends upon a principle as upon an intrinsic and essential form, which God cannot supply by his power. For it is a well-known axiom of theologians and philosophers that God can

1272. Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum, q. 4.

1273. St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo I.21.

1274. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I.7 (cited as "liber primarum institutionum," cap. 7).

1275. John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 7; Durandus, q. 1; Gabriel, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 2 - 3; Richard of Middleton, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, q. 1; Thomas of Argentina; Marsilius; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. 1; Quodlibet II, q. 8.

1276. The Paris condemnations of 1277 by Bishop Stephen Tempier and the Doctors of the Sorbonne.

supply the place of an efficient cause, but not the place of a formal or material cause, which are intrinsically and essentially required; for even the place of the subject of accidents, upon which accidents do not essentially depend, he can also supply, not indeed by sustaining, but by conserving an accident without that in which it inheres. But the principles of distinction are intrinsic and essential: for things are not distinguished by the will of God, but by their own nature, and such principles are they. Wherefore the authors of the first opinion, when they deny in angels a distinction according to number under the same species, consequently assert that not even by absolute power can angels be distinguished. We, however, in confirmation of the first part of our opinion, must prove that there is in angels a principle by which they can be distinguished by number alone; and thus not above nature, but naturally, they can differ by number. The reason is this.

The principle of individuation under the same species ought not to be something really distinct from the very nature and species itself, as much in simple things as in composites: otherwise in all species there ought to be a distinction of individuals according to number, or in none. For if in any way in simples there were not a multiplication according to number, it would be because the principle of distinction were not something distinct, as in bodies matter designated by quantity is posited, either preceding, or subsisting under, generation; which is not found in simples: and on that account the principle of individuation is not this "to subsist"; but altogether the same according to reality with the specific principle, and only different by reason; and therefore it can be found equally in all species: therefore there is no reason why in simples and in things separated from matter there should not be a distinction according to number under the same species.

Furthermore, that the principle of individuation is not matter designated by quantity, or in any other mode, Scotus proves in many ways, in the six preceding questions; from which he rightly infers what he strives to prove about angels. I, however, by this single argument alone, omitting many others which philosophers use, show this same thing. Just as in the same man the same thing is a genus, species, and individual, and these differ by reason alone; so also is it with the principle of genus, species, and individuation: for these three are the same altogether according to reality, and differ only by our mode of conceiving, as we have shown in Disputation 113, chapter 4. For the notion of genus or species is not some reality which is at once in a man and in a horse, in Peter and John: rather, by our thought abstracted from all these is named the common concept, whose foundation is a singular nature, as it is found in many similars. Thus in each thing altogether the same and most simple according to account, we can assign principles - the generic, the specific, and the individuating. It is true that in composites besides the form there is also matter; this does not suffice, however, that it be said to be the principle of distinction according to number; and a different thing is specific according to reality from both. For both matter and form, constituted physically, establish the account of genus, species, and individual; for from either is this triple account taken.

Besides, just as for genus to be multiplied according to species it is not necessary that the principle and the specific difference which contracts the genus be distinct according to reality from the genus itself, so also, for a species to be multiplied according to number, it does not seem

necessary that the principle of individuation be distinct in reality from the notion of the species: for the accounts of each seem to be the same, since they are gathered in the same series and order of predications of metaphysics, and from these alone is made a metaphysical composition far different from a physical composition, which is from matter and form cohering.

To Aristotle, indeed, whom the Thomists think they have as a defender of their opinion, Scotus replies in the places cited, that when he says that a thing is one which has one matter, he is not speaking of matter, nor of understanding the other physical part of the composite, but of that concept of the individual which Scotus calls "thisness" (haecceity), because it contracts the species to a determinate individual; which is, as it were, material with respect to the species. I, however, candidly admit that Aristotle in the passages alleged spoke expressly of matter, which is the other part of the composite. Nevertheless some learned men argue thus: Multiplication according to number cannot take place without division; but division cannot be without quantity; and this neither without matter: therefore neither can distinction according to number be without matter. I answer that by that argument is proved only this, that multiplication according to number which arises by reason of the division of a continuum cannot be without matter and quantity: but a substantial multiplication which is not a division and scission of a continuum, but is from the nature of the thing itself, just as is multiplication according to species, is found without matter and quantity. This suffices for the first part of our opinion.

The second part is proved by the testimony of Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, chapter 3, where he writes thus about the angels: "As to whether their natures are equal among themselves or unequal, we by no means comprehend; only He knows who created them - God, who has all things perfect and in readiness." The same is said by St. Augustine, Against the Origenists and Priscillianists to Orosius, where from their offices and from the order of their definite course we can gather things of this sort. For the differences of ministries and of orders are entirely had from grace; whether also at the same time from nature - this too may be the case; yet it may also be that one surpasses another by grace alone, while the nature remains one and the same.[1277][1278]

illuminate naturally, not because his intellect is of a superior species, but because within the same order he has a more perfect intellect, as among men. Finally, from whatever side we consider them, the matter is quite uncertain; nor should this seem strange, since even among the things we see we cannot always with certainty assign a distinction according to species.

Articulus V - Whether the angels are corruptible

Objicitur primo: It seems that angels are not incorruptible. For Damascene says of the angel that he is a substance intellectual, receiving immortality by grace and not by nature.[1279]

1277. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.3.

1278. St. Augustine, Contra Origenistas et Priscillianistas ad Orosium (cap. cited).

1279. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.3 (on the angels), who says that they receive immortality by grace, not by nature.

Objicitur secundo: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, of whom I am the craftsman and father; my works indeed are dissoluble by nature; yet by my will indissoluble."[1280] But by "gods" he can understand nothing other than angels. Therefore by their nature angels are corruptible.

Objicitur tertio: Further, according to St. Gregory, all things would tend into nothing unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them.[1281] But what can be reduced to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since angels are made by God, it seems that they are corruptible according to their nature.

Sed contra: Pseudo-Dionysius says that intellectual substances have life unfailing, free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation, existing as pure.[1282]

Respondeo: I answer that it is necessary to say that angels are incorruptible according to their nature. The reason is that nothing is corrupted except inasmuch as its form is separated from its matter. Hence, since an angel is subsisting form itself, as was said above, it is impossible that his substance be corruptible. For what belongs to something according to itself cannot be separated from it; but what belongs to something by another can be separated, once that by which it belonged is separated. Roundness cannot be separated from a circle, because it belongs to it according to itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, by the fact that the circular figure is separated from the bronze. Now "according to itself" belongs to form. For each thing is actually being according to that whereby it has form; whereas matter is actually being by the fact that it has form. Therefore, if the form itself subsists in its own existence, as in angels, as has been said, it cannot lose its form. Hence the immateriality of the angel is the reason why the angel is incorruptible according to his nature. And a sign of this incorruptibility can be taken from his intellectual operation. For since each thing operates according as it is in act, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. But the species and ratio of an operation are grasped from its object. Now the intelligible object, as being above time, is sempiternal. Whence every intellectual substance is incorruptible according to its nature.

Ad primum: To the first, it is answered that Damascene takes immortality as perfect, which includes every kind of immutability, because every change is a kind of death, as St. Augustine says. But angels attain perfect immutability only by grace, as will be made clear below

Ad secundum: To the second, it is answered that by "gods" Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he thought to be composed of the elements. And therefore according to their nature they were dissoluble; and according to the divine will they were always preserved in being

Ad tertium: To the third, it is answered that, as was said above, something is necessary in such a way as to have the cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to the necessary nor to the incorruptible, that its existence should depend on another as on a cause. Therefore, by the statement that all things would fall into nothing unless they were held together by God, and angels

1280. Plato, Timaeus 41a - b (address of the Demiurge to the "gods").

1281. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XVI.18, on divine conservation preventing all things from tending to nothing.

1282. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, on intellectual substances having an unfailing life free from corruption, death, matter, and generation.

too, one is not given to understand that in angels there is some principle of corruption, but that the angel's existence depends on God as on a cause. Nor is a thing said to be corruptible because God can reduce it to non - being by withdrawing His conservation, but because it has in itself some principle of corruption - either contrariety, or at least the potency of matter

Conclusio: The angels by their very nature are incorruptible.

Hence there will be for us a disputation on this question: Whether angels are incorruptible by their nature, or by the grace of God only.

Disputatio CLXXXII - Whether angels are by nature, or by grace, incorruptible; and whether other things are or are not so by the power of God alone

- What St. Thomas, Cajetan, and certain Thomists have held. Caput I.
- The more probable opinion is contrary. Caput II.
- Corollaries from the preceding doctrine. Caput III.
- The latter, more probable opinion is confirmed. Caput IV.
- The arguments of the former opinion are dissolved. Caput V.

Caput I - What St. Thomas, Cajetan, and certain Thomists have held

St. Thomas in this article 5, and above in question 9, article 2, and there Cajetan, and in book 2 Contra Gentiles, chapters 30 and 55, and there Ferrarensis; Petrus Bergomensis in the Concordances of doubtful places, no. 122; and Durandus, in the first book, distinction 8, part 1, question 3, affirm that angels are by their nature incorruptible and immortal; whereas they say "mortal" and "corruptible" not on any other account than that they can be reduced to non-being, not by any passive potency which is in them, but only by the active power of God, by which, as they were produced, they can in the same way be annihilated. Whereas the other composites out of matter and form, which are corruptible, are such not only by the power of God, but also by an intrinsic potency of the matter of which they consist, to be corrupted. And in order more fully to unfold the doctrine of St. Thomas, Cajetan, on that article 2, notes that there is a twofold potency, one real, the other logical. The real potency is that which inheres in things themselves, that they may be this or that; and this is with some appetite and inclination. But because every appetite and inclination is not first and per se to existence, but to some particular existence, from which it follows that there is not therefore any real potency proximate to non-being - this is the one that is found in the matter of corruptible things. The logical potency, however, is what is wont to be called non-repugnance; and as often as something does not repel being, we say that there is in it a logical potency to be. The former potency is not in angels or in spiritual things, because there is not in them anything that could receive a contrary form, by the introduction of which they would cease to be. The latter potency befits angels that they may not be, not because that is some real potency in them, but solely in respect to the efficient cause, by which they can be destroyed. And therefore it is

rightly said that the angel is by nature incorruptible, because in himself he has no real potency whereby he would be corrupted or cease to be; whereas these lower bodies are said by their nature to be corruptible, because they have in themselves a real and physical potency not to be. For the same reason an angel is said to be a necessary being, with a physical and real necessity, because he lacks a real potency not to be; but he is not a being necessary with a logical necessity, because it is not repugnant for him not to be. This is what the holy Doctor seems to signify in this fifth article, in the reply to the third, when he calls the angel a necessary being, yet so that he has the cause of his necessity, namely God, by whom he can be annihilated and destroyed.

Accordingly, that angels are immortal and incorruptible by their nature is proved first from the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8; in the bull of Leo which is placed there at the beginning of that session, it is defined that the rational soul is immortal.[1284] Therefore, since angels are not of an inferior condition, they will likewise be immortal. But if the soul and the angel were by their nature mortal and corruptible, although by the divine will...

Caput II - On corruptible and mortal, and likewise on incorruptible and immortal, taken relatively to a power

[Preceding position summarized and distinguished.] There is a twofold potency (*potentia*), one real, the other logical. The real is that which is found in material corruptibles; the logical is that which is commonly called a non-repugnance. Therefore an angel does not have in itself any real potency, as if there were in it something able to receive a form by whose introduction it would cease; rather, only by respect to an agent, by which it can be destroyed. For this reason the angel is said by nature to be incorruptible, because in itself it has no real potency that it be corrupted or cease; whereas these lower things are corruptible by their very nature, because they have in themselves a real potency not to be. And thus the angels are said to be beings by a physical and real necessity, because, although they do not have in themselves a real potency not to be, nevertheless they are not beings by a merely logical necessity. This is what St. Thomas seems to signify in this fifth article, where he calls the angel a being of necessity, yet so that the cause of its necessity is God, by whom it could be annihilated.

It is proved first from the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, where it is defined that the rational soul is immortal. Therefore, since the angels are not of an inferior condition, in the same way they are immortal. But if the soul and the angel were by their nature mortal and corruptible, although by the will and grace of God they should endure forever, nevertheless they would be in the strict sense mortal and corruptible.[1285]

Second, Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV not far from the beginning, says that our souls are like the angelic powers. Showing, however, in what they are like, he says: that they are masters of themselves, that they have life in themselves and their own essence (*essentia*), and that they have it free from destruction. By these words he also seems to have indicated the reason of St.

1284. Fifth Lateran Council (1513), session 8, Apostolici regiminis, defining the immortality of the rational soul.
1285. Fifth Lateran Council (under Leo X), session 8, defining the immortality of the rational soul (Apostolici regiminis).

Thomas in this article: he therefore asserts that angels are incorruptible because they are forms subsisting of themselves; whereas other things composed of matter and form are for that reason corruptible, because in them the form can be separated from matter - a reason which will be examined below.[1286]

Third, St. Basil at the beginning of Psalm 44 teaches that the angels do not grow old, and that the substance (*substantia*) of their nature is immutable. Fourth, Julian, Archbishop of Toledo, book 1 De futuro saeculo, cap. c (found in the third volume of the Bibliotheca sacra), asserts that the angels were so created that, even if they should sin, they could not die; but that men on account of sin incurred the penalty of death. Fifth, Athanasius, in the book of Definitions, shortly after the beginning, teaches that the angel and the rational soul are immortal. Finally, St. John Damascene, in the book of Institutions, cap. 7, says that immortality is the differentia of the angelic nature and of any other incorporeal substance.[1287]

By reason it is proved as follows. If anything stood in the way, by which angels could not be called incorruptible by their nature, it would be this: that by their nature they depend on God as first cause, by whom they are conserved. But this cannot be an impediment. For fire, by its nature, is said to have the power to heat even if its power necessarily depends on the influx of God cooperating, in order that it may heat. Therefore the angel can be said by its nature to be incorruptible, even if its existence depends on the influx of God conserving it.

Probabilior sententia.

If corruptible and mortal, and likewise incorruptible and immortal, are said relatively to some acting power, a certain distinction must first be premised. For either we speak with respect to the power of God, or we speak with respect to a created power; and according to this division our sentence must be divided into two parts.

The first part is this, if we speak with respect to the power of God, and the names Mortal and Corruptible are taken for that which can cease through destruction and annihilation, and Immortal and Incorruptible signify the opposed negation: then no creature is by its nature immortal and incorruptible. Nay rather, by its nature, from a real potency in its very existence (*esse*), it is corruptible and mortal - which is the same as if we were to say that by its nature it is subject to the power of God, so that it can be annihilated by it.

The second part is this: with respect to a created power, the angel and the rational soul are incorruptible and immortal, in whatever way incorruptible and immortal are taken.

We can confirm the first part by authority and by reason. By authority, indeed, of the Scholastics who clearly taught it: Alexander, first part, question 14, member 3; St. Bonaventure on the First Book, distinction 8, first part of the distinction, article 2, question 2; Richard, article 2, question ...; Scotus, question 5, 6, Ad quaestionem ..., and on the Fourth Book, distinction 49, question 6; Ockham on the Second Book, question 7; Gabriel on the Second Book, distinction ...,

1286. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, near the beginning.

1287. St. Basil, In Psalmum 44, in principio; Julian of Toledo, De futuro saeculo, lib. 1, cap. c (in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 3); Athanasius, Liber definitionum, initio; St. John Damascene, Institutiones, cap. 7.

question 1, article 2, conclusion 6; all of whom pronounce that every creature is mutable of itself not only according to accident, but also according to substance, by failing; and that this befits a creature by its very nature; and what befits a thing by its nature, befits it intrinsically. St. Bonaventure and Richard distinguish a threefold immutability. The first they call invariability, and they say that this, by nature, belongs to no one except God, nor by grace either; they take immutability in this mode for a negation not of the potency of change, but of the act, and they say that this in fact belongs to no creature, since even the blessed angels are changed according to various thoughts. The second immutability they call incorruptibility, and they say that this exists in some things by nature, as in angels and in the rational soul, but in others by grace, as in the glorious human body; and they take incorruptible as signifying the negation of corruption from a second cause through the separation of matter and form. The third immutability they call inconvertibility, inasmuch as it signifies an impotence with respect to the negation of existence itself by annihilation and destruction, or a ceasing simply, about which the present controversy is; and they say that this belongs by nature to no creature, but only by grace, as will be explained below.[1288]

In the second place there are many testimonies of the Fathers, which seem to confirm this. Justin, in the book of Questions which the Gentiles propose to Christians, De eo, quod corpore vacat, q. 13, cap. 20; St. Gregory the Great, book 16 of the Moralia, cap. 19 not far from the beginning; and Damascene, book I De fide, cap. 3, thus: by the nod of God all things are conserved, even spiritual things, so that if God were unwilling to conserve them, they would fall into nothing. St. Cyril, book 2 contra Julianum, teaches the same; and the same is what Julian himself, according to the opinion of Plato, confessed, as Cyril a little before reports; and in the Thesaurus, book 8, cap. 2, in the middle, he says that the angel and the rest are immortal, but by the grace of God, not by nature. Damascene, book II De fide, cap. 3, agrees; Elias Cretensis on the first oration of St. Gregory Nazianzen on those words "Maker, King, Head," etc.; and Sophronius in his Epistle, a little after the middle, which was recited in the Sixth Synod, action 11, and approved in action 13, who speaks thus about spiritual things: "In no way do they die, nor are they corrupted, as sensibles flow down and pass away; nevertheless, they are not immortal by nature, nor do they pass into an incorruptible essence, but grace has been bestowed on them that restrains from that corruption and from death: thus the souls of men remain uncorrupted, thus the angels persevere immortal, not really having, as some assert, an essence properly immortal, but they have by lot from God the grace which bestows immortality, and provides them with incorruption." Isidore is also cited, book 1 De summo bono, cap. 12; there, however, he only teaches about the mutability of sin, that the angel by his nature is mutable, and remains incorrupt by charity.[1289]

1288. Alexander [of Hales], Prima pars, quaestio 14, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 8, pars prior, art. 2, q. 2; Richard [of St. Victor], art. 2, q. ...; Scotus, q. 5, 6, Ad quaestionem ...; In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 6; Ockham, In II Sent., q. 7; Gab., In II Sent., dist. ..., q. 1, art. 2, conclusio 6.

1289. Justin, Quaestiones, quas gentes Christianis ponunt, De eo, quod corpore vacat, q. 13, cap. 20; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 16, cap. 19; St. John Damascene, De fide, lib. 1, cap. 3; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum, lib. 2; Thesaurus, lib. 8, cap. 2; Damascene, De fide, lib. 2, cap. 3; Elias Cretensis, In primam orationem Nazianzeni; Sophronius, Epistola (recited in Sixth Ecumenical Council, act. 11; approved, act. 13); Isidore, De summo bono, lib. 1, cap. 12; cf. also Acts 17:28; Wisdom 11:25.

But Cajetan and others who follow the former opinion explain similar testimonies of the Fathers about that potency which they call logical, not natural and real; yet they plainly concede that the angel is not by his own nature immortal, but only by the grace of God, if immortality and incorruptibility are referred to the power of God conserving and able to destroy. This, indeed, I take to be a matter of faith, and one that can in no way be denied. Wherefore certain more recent writers, who affix the note of error to theologians asserting that angels are not by their nature immortal, should have taken notice that no Catholic up to now has asserted this without making a distinction; but all have spoken of immortality and incorruption while making a comparison with the power of God. But to assert that, with respect to that power, some created thing is immortal, in the explained sense, deserves the note of error; both because the Fathers alleged hand on that point to us as a dogma of faith, and also because, as is clear from the doctrine of St. Augustine, book V on Genesis, cap. 20, of St. Gregory the Great, book 16 of the Moralia, cap. 19, not far from the beginning, and of Damascene, book I De fide, cap. 3, thus by the nod of God all things are conserved, even spiritual things, so that if God should will not to conserve them, they would fall into nothing - as Scripture plainly says in Acts 17, "For in him we live, move, and are," and in Wisdom 11, "How could anything remain, unless you willed it? or that which was called by you be preserved?" The only controversy can be with Cajetan and other Thomists, whether the mortality and corruptibility which we concede to angels with respect to God is only from the active power of God, from which that logical potency to corruption and annihilation is said to arise, or whether by their very nature they have this intrinsically through some real and native potency; and only on this point will we have a controversy with the Thomists alleged: for as to the rest there is no one who dissents.

Accordingly, I gather not obscurely this native potency on the part of the angel and of its very nature from the testimonies of the Fathers. For when they say that nothing is immortal by nature, but by grace, it clearly follows that all things by their nature are mortal and corruptible with respect to the power of God. For if by grace they obtain immortality, by their nature they are corruptible; for grace removes what would befit them by nature.

But someone will say that by their nature they are neither immortal nor mortal, but are immortal by the grace of God. Yet this answer is easily refuted, because mortal and immortal are opposed without a middle, in the same manner as mortal and not-mortal. Therefore either the nature of the angels is of itself mortal or immortal; that is, either it has of itself a real potency to cease, or it does not have it. If it does not have it, then it is not of itself mortal, and consequently it is immortal; but if it has it, it will be mortal.

Moreover, let us prove our sentence by reason, and deduce it from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For he, above, question 25, article 3, teaches that all possible things are by their own nature objects of the divine omnipotence, not from the fact that they are possible to be made by the omnipotence - for thus there would arise a useless circle, as we fully developed in disputation 104, chapter 4 - but before the divine power regards them and denominates them possible, they are said of themselves to be of such a nature that they can be produced by God and be the object of the divine omnipotence, from the fact that in themselves they do not imply a contradiction as to being. Yet so,

that if they are not, nor are produced, no force is properly inflicted on them; for what as yet is not cannot strive to be, and consequently can suffer no force, if it is not produced. Therefore, although there is not a physical potency as in a subject for receiving a form, but only a potency (which we may call logical), that is, a non-repugnance, that it exist; nevertheless that potency ought not to be said to be altogether extrinsic to things, coming only from the productive power, but to be truly real and native to the thing, from which it arises that it is subject to the power that makes.

In the same manner we must philosophize about corruptibility, that is, about the potency of things that they not be and be destroyed: namely, that any thing whatsoever has from itself, according to the thing, a potency that it not be; not indeed what they call physical, as in some subject to receive a contrary form, nor only from the virtue of the agent (as Cajetan contrives), but a real and native [potency], even if we not inaptly call it logical, because it is only a non-repugnance. For in the same way the omnipotence of God is engaged with respect to non-being, as we explained in that disputation, chapter 5, as it is with respect to being: that is, it makes a thing not to be, just as it produces and makes it to be. Therefore, since angels and rational souls are objects of the divine omnipotence as to not being, it follows that also from themselves, before the omnipotence is referred to them, they can not be; and consequently, in them there is that native non-repugnance, that they not be. And this indeed seems intrinsic and essential to every creature no less than the non-repugnance that they be and be produced. Now when the holy Doctor said that they are only corruptible by the power of the Creator and agent, not from themselves, he only asserted this in order to deny a passive potency in them with respect to a created agent; for this, as we shall say in chapter 4, is not present in spiritual creatures. Yet for that reason he does not deny an innate and real non-repugnance in all creatures that they not be; for since he concedes that by the acting power of God they are corruptible, he could not but concede in the very object of the power an aptitude and an innate and real non-repugnance by which by their nature they are subject to such a power, according to what he had handed down in that question 25, article 3.

Caput III - Corollaries from the preceding doctrine

From the former part of our sentence, which we confirmed in the foregoing chapter, certain conclusions follow worthy of remark, which will also more clearly illuminate the preceding doctrine.

First, all created things do not perish - that is, are not annihilated - by the favor and grace of God. For since they do not have this of necessity by their nature, whenever they have it, they have it by the favor of him by whom they are conserved. The Fathers commemorated in the preceding chapter called this benefit - which is in no way owed to them either by justice or by condign gratitude - "grace," when they say that no human creature is immortal, but by the grace of God. They speak with respect to the power of the Creator, by the name "grace" not understanding the grace through Christ, but the gift of creation, which, when Pelagius had confessed it in the Council of Diospolis, as we reported in disputation 91, chapter 9, the African Fathers in Epistle 95, as found

in St. Augustine, conceded could not inaptly be called grace by reason, yet that it is not sufficient for living rightly and piously and for overcoming temptations, nor is it called grace in Holy Scripture.

Moreover, although by the grace of God the angels have immortality, as also the bodies of the blessed, yet here they have grace in a different manner than bodies, which obtain the endowment of incorruptibility and impassibility. For these latter have incorruptibility because some quality has been communicated to them against every action of contraries, by which otherwise they would be corrupted; but the angels, for this sole reason, that they are freely conserved by God, on whom alone they depend, since by him they can be corrupted. Yet both are a benefit and grace of God.

Second, note that the grace of incorruptibility which we say was communicated to the angels is not a negation of passive potency, but only a negation of act; that is, it is grace for them not to be destroyed and not to be annihilated, though not an inability to be destroyed.

Caput IV - The latter, more probable part of our opinion is confirmed

Second, note that the grace of incorruptibility which we say was communicated to the angels is not the negation of passive potency, but only the negation of act; that is, it is a grace to them not to be destroyed and not to be annihilated. But that they cannot be destroyed is no grace to them, nor can it in any way be communicated. For either the discourse is about a potency of incorruptibility with respect to a created agent - and this, by their very nature, they so possess that it altogether repugns that they be corrupted by a created agent - or we speak of a potency of incorruptibility with respect to God - and this in no way can be communicated to them. It remains, therefore, that the grace done to the angels is nothing other than not to be corrupted by God and to be preserved by Him perpetually.

Third, it is to be observed that, if an angel were annihilated, his destruction or annihilation would be in a certain manner supernatural and in a certain manner not. For with respect to naturally acting causes, and to the common concurrence and order of things, it would be called supernatural, because he would be annihilated above the powers of created causes and above the order which God maintains. But neither with respect to God as agent nor with respect to the angel himself would it be above nature: with respect to God, this is obvious; with respect to the angel himself it is clear, because the not-being of an angel is not above his nature, as grace is - indeed rather it seems to be against it, as will be explained below. And although it would be above nature in the first manner just said, nevertheless it is not above nature in the same manner as the restoration of an eye: for this is so done by God that although the eye is by nature apt to be produced by a proper cause, yet for its restoration some created cause is not sufficient, but it must be done by God alone; whereas annihilation would be done by God as by a proper cause, and so would be more natural than the restoration of an eye; none the less, for another reason just mentioned, it would be called above nature.

Fourth, note that annihilation is in a certain manner against nature and in a certain manner not. For if we consider the nature of a thing as existing, annihilation is opposed to it as not-being, just as negation is opposed to affirmation. But if we look at the nature itself according only to its essential predicates and according to possible existence, annihilation is not contrary to it: for thus it is indifferent that it be or not be; that is, among its essential predicates existence is not more to be counted than non-existence. But you will say: according to its essential predicates it has an inclination that it be preserved, therefore to be annihilated is against its natural appetite. I answer that in the essence, under possible existence, there is not a real inclination in the mode of a potency toward existence; for the essence is not really distinguished from existence, and thus it does not have a real inclination. But when the essence does not exist, it has nothing other than to be able to exist; that is, not to imply a contradiction that it exist in act, which is a logical potency, though a real one. This however it also has, that it not be; for it is indifferent according to the essential predicates to exist and not to exist.

From this it is clear that it does not follow, from the fact that in angels existence is not distinguished from essence, that they are not corruptible; because it is not required that in them existence be separated from essence. For the reason of corruptibility comes only from this, that this essence, which at some time exists in act, depends on God and by His will is preserved so as to exist.

It remains to explain that place, 1 Timothy 6: "Who (namely God) alone has immortality," from which also it will appear in what way things other than God are mortal and corruptible. There are, however, four expositions of that place, taken from the Fathers. The first is St. Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, cap. 39, and in Epistle 28, and St. Jerome in his larger Commentaries on the Epistle to Titus at those words of the first chapter, "which He promised," etc., who interpret that place in such a way that no one is immortal as God is, in the same sense in which it is said in Mark 10: "No one is good except God alone." Wherefore they say that the rational soul is immortal in its own way; and they seem to understand, as we explained above, with respect to a created cause, not with respect to God; but that God is absolutely so with respect to anyone whatsoever.[1290]

The second exposition is about the immortality of sin, which without doubt St. Ambrose understands, 3 De fide ad Gratianum, cap. ..., of which kind of immortality he said that the angel is immortal whose immortality is in the will of the Creator; and this interpretation St. Ambrose embraces below in question 63, article 5, at the end.[1291] "The earth," he says, "has this immortality, or rather immutability, which removes every change, whether into better or into worse." Thus also St. Augustine, On the Trinity I, cap. ...; and On Genesis ad litteram, at the very last chapter at the end; and St. Anselm on that place of Paul. The fourth is St. John Chrysostom on that place, that God is said to have immortality frequently in preference to those titles "King" and "Lord," of which Paul had made mention above; and as he had said above that God alone is mighty. The words of Paul are: "Keep the commandment without spot, irreprehensible, until the appearing of our Lord

1290. St. Augustine, De natura boni, cap. 39; Epistola 28; St. Jerome, Commentaries on Titus, at chap. 1, "Quam promiserat," etc.

1291. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, lib. 3, cap. ...; cf. also below, q. 63, a. 5, in fine.

Jesus Christ," and he subjoins immediately: "which in His times He shall show, the only mighty, King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality," that is, "which He shall show in its own times." For in Greek it is hen, that is, "which."[1292]

Caput V - The arguments of the former opinion are dissolved

The other part of our opinion was this: if "corruptible" and "mortal" be taken with respect to a created power that corrupts, angels and rational souls by their own nature are so immortal, that no creature can be produced by God able to corrupt them. For no created cause can corrupt anything by annihilating it (for this is God's alone), but only by inducing in matter or subject a contrary form; it follows that angels and rational souls can be corrupted by no created cause. But that annihilation is God's alone is evident, because it is the corruption of the whole existence, and therefore it is altogether opposed to creation; and in this alone does it consist that the creation of a thing ceases to be continued. But God alone can create and continue creation, as was shown in disputation 176; therefore He alone can annihilate something. Now that angels or souls cannot be corrupted by the induction of a contrary form is manifest, although this is proved in a different way: for an angel cannot be corrupted by the induction of a contrary form, because he is not a form that can be united to some matter as to a subject (as we shall say in disputation 183); therefore he does not have a contrary form by which he can be expelled from some subject. Rational souls, however, since they are forms of matter, can be expelled from it; but because by their own nature they are united to matter in such a way that they do not depend on it with respect to existence, therefore, when a contrary form is induced, there is only a dissolution of the composite, which is its corruption, but the soul separated from matter remains of itself; whereas the other substantial forms of the same thing, once the composite is dissolved, perish, because they depended on matter with respect to existence. Therefore, we rightly said with a distinction that angels and souls are corruptible by their nature in comparison to the power of God; but with respect to a created cause they are incorruptible and immortal.

A distinction of this sort was employed by St. Cyril, cited by us above, cap. 2, in these words: "For the things which are chiefly in natures are nothing with respect to the Creator. Wherefore, just as fire is indeed combustible, but not to God, so also the angel is indeed immortal, but not to God." And indeed he philosophizes most rightly thus: for "corruptible" and "incorruptible" are said relatively; and although fire could be said absolutely and without any distinction "combustible," because it suffices for this that it be combustible with respect to something, nevertheless, in order that the angel be said "immortal" or "incorruptible," that distinction seems necessary, if these names are taken for an impotence to non-being in any way whatsoever. For since they include a certain negation, they seem to deny a potency to not-being with respect to any agent whatsoever. On the other hand, they could be said absolutely "mortal," because it would suffice that they be

1292. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, cap. ...; De Genesi ad litteram, cap. ult., in fine; St. Anselm, on the place of Paul, 1 Tim. 6; St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on 1 Timothy 6:15 - 16.

such with respect to some agent, that they be affirmed such, unless perchance this name were used in some other signification, as we sometimes do. If, however, there were a name signifying only a passive potency to non-being, it would be stated absolutely of them.

Wherefore, for the greater explication of what we have said, it must be observed that these names - "mortal," "immortal," "corruptible," and "incorruptible" - are commonly used relatively only to created causes. For since they do not signify the cessation of a thing by annihilation, nor the cessation of the universe, but by a natural separation of form from matter, or the negation of that, therefore they are commonly said relatively to a created active power, which is able to separate matter from form, and thus to bring on death or to corrupt. And therefore it would not be lawful, by using these names, to assert that angels or rational souls by their nature are mortal, or by their nature not immortal: because, unless something else were explained, we would signify that these substances could be corrupted by some created agent. With the addition, however, we ought to say that they are not incorruptible with respect to God, but with respect to Him they are corruptible; and not immortal by their nature in such a way that their name would deny a potency to non-being with respect to any agent whatsoever - which is proper to God alone - and in this way absolutely it should be said that angels and souls by their nature are "annihilable," so to speak, because they are said relatively to the power of God, who alone can annihilate; and these spiritual substances by their nature are subjected to the power of God that they can be annihilated.[1293]

But it is easy to overturn the foundations of the former opinion. For the Lateran Council and the Fathers alleged speak of corruption, death, and destruction by a second cause; and by these words "immortal," "incorruptible," and "free from destruction" they use the common and popular signification by which we signify the negation of passive potency with respect to a created active power, as we showed in the preceding chapter; but with respect to God they are not willing to deny in angels and souls a native potency to be destroyed, and thus Leo X in that bull, in confirmation of his definition, adduces that passage of Matthew 10: "Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul." It is plainly concerning death inflicted by a second cause, which properly is called death, that the Council follows. And the same sense was followed by the Fathers all alleged in the first chapter. Therefore we said, in the preceding chapter, that absolutely souls and angels are to be called "immortal" and "incorruptible," because these names are said only relatively to a created cause.

To the reason brought for that opinion I reply that the case of the example alleged is different. For fire is therefore said by nature "heating," even if it need the concurrence of God, because it has by its nature a force and potency of producing heat, by which from within, as it were with a certain impetus, it is borne to such an effect, so that if the concurrence of God were denied to it, it would be something violent for it not to heat. But a spiritual nature is so constituted, produced, and preserved by God that it has in itself no force whatsoever by which, together with God's

1293. St. Cyril, cap. 2 (as cited).

concurrence, it might effect and preserve itself; rather it is so wholly from God and preserved by Him that of itself it does not resist to be or not to be, nor does it have any natural inclination in the mode of a potency toward existing, since it is really not distinguished from its existence.

Quaestio LI - On the comparison of angels to bodies

Thereupon there is inquiry about angels by comparison to corporeal things. And first, about the comparison of angels to bodies. Second, about the comparison of angels to corporeal places. Third, about the comparison of angels to local motion. Concerning the first, three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them

To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that angels have bodies naturally united to them.

- For Origen says in the book Periarchon: It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, to be understood to exist without material substance and without any fellowship of corporeal addition. Bernard also says in Homily 6 on the Song of Songs: Let us grant to God alone, namely, immortality and incorporeity, whose nature alone has no need of bodily companionship, neither for its own sake nor for the sake of another. But every created spirit needs bodily companionship. Likewise Augustine says, On Genesis according to the Letter: Demons are called "aerial animals," which need the nature of airy bodies. But the nature of the demon and of the angel is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.[1294]

The third is of immortality, that is, of immutability, which removes every change, whether for the better or for the worse. Thus St. Augustine first, in De Trinitate, book I, chapter 1, and in book VII of De Genesi ad litteram, the last chapter in fine; and St. Anselm on that place of Paul. The fourth is St. John Chrysostom on that place, that God is said to have immortality above other kings and lords, of whom Paul had made mention before, just as he had said earlier that God alone is powerful. The words of Paul are: "That you keep the commandment without stain, irreprehensible until the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." The Greek has epiphaneia, that is, "until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ"; he subjoins: "whom in his own times he shall show, the blessed and only Potentate, King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality," etc. From which it appears also in what way other things besides God are mortal and corruptible. There are, however, four expositions of that place taken from the Fathers. The first is St. Augustine's in De natura boni, chap. 39, and in Epistle 28, and St. Jerome's in his larger Commentaries on the Epistle to Titus at these words of the first chapter, "Quam promiserat," etc.: they interpret that place in this way, that no one is immortal just as God is, in the same sense as it is said in Mark 10: "No one is good but God alone." Wherefore they say that the rational soul is immortal in its own way - I mean, as we explained above, with respect to a created cause, not with respect to God; but that God is simply

1294. Origen, Periarchon; St. Bernard, Homily 6 on the Song of Songs; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram.

immortal with respect to any and every consideration.[1295] The second exposition is of the immortality of sin, of which Ambrose without doubt understands that text, De fide ad Gratianum, book 3, chapter 2; of which kind of immortality he said: "Neither is the angel immortal, whose immortality is the involuntary property of the Creator's nature." And that this was Ambrose's interpretation will be made clear below, question 63, article 5, at the end.[1296] The third is of immortality, or rather of immutability, which takes away every change, whether for the better or for the worse: thus St. Augustine in De Trinitate I, chapter 1, and in book VII of De Genesi ad litteram, last chapter in fine; and St. Anselm on that place of Paul. The fourth is of St. John Chrysostom on that place, that God is said to have immortality above other kings and lords, of whom Paul had made mention before, just as he had also said earlier that God alone is powerful.[1297]

On the comparison of angels to bodies

Then there is inquiry about the angels: first, about the comparison to bodies; second, about the comparison of angels to bodily places; third, about the comparison of angels to local motion. Concerning the first there is inquiry.

Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them

It is objected, that they do.

1) Origen says, Periarchon: To God alone, that is, to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, is proper this - that he be understood to exist without material substance and spirit, without any fellowship of corporeal addition. But every created spirit needs bodily companionship. Likewise St. Augustine says, On Genesis according to the Letter: Demons are called "aerial animals," which need the nature of airy bodies. But the nature of the demon and of the angel is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.[1298]

2) Moreover, St. Gregory in a homily on the Epiphany, calls the angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

3) Moreover, the life of angels is more perfect than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but also vivifies the body. Therefore angels vivify bodies naturally united to them.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, book 4, at the beginning, says that just as angels are understood to be incorporeal, so also immaterial.[1299]

I answer: Angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. For what befalls some nature is not found universally in that nature: thus to have wings, because it is not of the ratio of "animal," does not befit every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal

1295. St. Augustine, De natura boni, cap. 39; Epistola 28; St. Jerome, Commentaries on Titus, at chap. 1, "Quam promiserat," etc.

1296. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, lib. 3, cap. ...; cf. also below, q. 63, a. 5, in fine.

1297. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, cap. ...; De Genesi ad litteram, cap. ult., in fine; St. Anselm, on the place of Paul, 1 Tim. 6; St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on 1 Timothy 6:15 - 16.

1298. Origen, Periarchon; St. Bernard, Homily 6 on the Song of Songs; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram.

power, as will appear below, to have a body united is not of the ratio of an intellectual substance (substantia intellectualis) as such, but befalls some intellectual substance on account of something else - just as it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and existing in potency in the genus of intellectual substances, not having in its nature the fullness of knowledge, but acquiring it through corporeal senses from sensible things, as will be said below. Now wherever in a genus something imperfect is found, there must pre-exist something perfect in that genus. Therefore there are some perfect intellectual substances in the intellectual nature which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Not all intellectual substances, then, are united to bodies, but some are separate from bodies. And these we call angels.

Reply to the first: As was said above, there was an opinion of some that every being is a body; and from this estimation it seems to have been derived that some thought there are no incorporeal substances unless united to bodies - indeed to such an extent that certain men even posited that God is the soul of the world, as St. Augustine reports in book 7 of the City of God. But because this is repugnant to the Catholic faith, which sets God as exalted above all, according to that of Psalm 8: "Your magnificence is elevated above the heavens," Origen, refusing to say this of God, followed the opinion of others with respect to other things, as also in many other matters he was deceived, following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. The word of St. Bernard can be explained to mean that created spirits need a corporeal instrument, not naturally united, but assumed for some purpose, as will be said below. St. Augustine, moreover, speaks not by asserting, but employing the opinion of the Platonists, who posited certain aerial animals, which they called "demons."

Reply to the second: Gregory names the angel a "rational animal" metaphorically because of likeness with reason.

Reply to the third: To vivify effectively is simply of perfection. Hence it befits God also, according to that of 1 Kings 2: "The Lord kills and makes alive." But to vivify formally belongs to a substance which is a part of some nature, and which does not have in itself the whole of a species' nature. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than that which is united to a body.

Note on the text of the article.

The conclusion is a negation which to many seemed to be the same with the conclusion and doctrine of the first article of the preceding question, where St. Thomas taught that angels are incorporeal - although it is far different. For in that first article of the preceding question St. Thomas taught that angels are incorporeal, that is, essentially not a body, whether composite or simple, as Durandus thought, namely, that the heavens exist without any composition of matter and form - in which sense the rational soul is not corporeal, because its substance is not a body, but spirit. In this article, however, he asks whether angels are united to bodies, or have bodies united to them as souls have; and he answers that an angel is not naturally united to any body, as if he said that it is not the form of any body or matter - otherwise indeed than the rational soul, which, although spiritual according to itself, nevertheless is naturally united to a body. The arguments,

1299. St. Cyril, cap. 2 (as cited).

moreover, which the Holy Doctor adduced were also looking, not to prove that the angels are corporeal according to their substance, but that they are naturally united to a body. The conclusion of the article is rightly proved by the testimony of Dionysius, Divine Names, chap. 4 at the beginning, which St. Thomas brings in the argument But on the contrary, and by the reason which he asserts in the body of the article. However, about this matter no Scholastic, so far as I have read, disputes. Only some treat whether according to their substance angels are corporeal; and with St. Thomas they pronounce that they are by their nature incorporeal, about which in disputation 179 enough has been said.

Whether by matter, or by body, angels are naturally united. Disputation 183.

Caput I - The error of the philosophers and of Origen

The opinion of the ancient philosophers was that angels are forms naturally united to bodies. In this opinion seemed to have been those who asserted that the stars, or the heavenly bodies, are animated. Thus, concerning the animation of the heavens, Plato feels in the Epinomis, where he bids that the stars be venerated as gods - which he would not say, unless he thought they were animated. And most clearly Aristotle, in book 2 of De caelo, text 13, when he teaches that heaven is animated, and on that account has differences of position; for what some interpret of a soul assisting and governing it only, seems frivolous, since scarcely can the differences of animation be explained in this way: wherefore of a soul informing, not of one merely governing and assisting, St. Thomas himself interprets in Opusc. 15, chap. 2; and in Contra gentiles II, chap. 70; and in the Disputed Question On the Soul, article 8, to the third reply.[1300] Moreover, when in Metaphysics XII, texts 35 and 36, he teaches that the first mover moves the heaven after the mode of the appetible, he plainly seems to assert that the heaven is animated; otherwise it would not be moved by what is appetible. Philo consents in the book De opificio mundi, and in the book De somniis, and in the book De gigantibus; and Origen, in the first tome of the Commentaries on John, on those words "In principio erat Verbum," and in Periarchon, book I, chap. 7, who for the same reason asserted that the stars are capable of power and of life. He also deduces this from Job 25, where the stars are called unclean; he adds, moreover, that Christ died for the sins not only of men, but also of the stars and of the angels - unless, as he himself says in that tome on John, this be said hyperbolically of the stars. The same doctrine on the animation of the heavens was taught by St. Jerome, tome 6, in the Commentaries on the Epistle to the Ephesians, on that of chapter 1, "Qui fecit utraque unum," although many things which he teaches in that commentary he states not from his own mind, but from the opinion of others, as he himself testifies in the second tome of the Apology against Rufinus: from this opinion, however, he does not excuse himself. The same he taught in the Commentaries on Ecclesiastes on those words, "Gyrans gyrando vadit spiritus." And St. Augustine, in book II of De Genesi ad litteram, chap. 18, proposes the question and does not define it; and in the Enchiridion, chap. 58, he says that it is not sufficiently clear to him whether the lights of

1300. St. Thomas, Opusc. 15, cap. 2; Contra gentiles II, cap. 70; Quaestiones disputatae De anima, art. 8 ad 3; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, texts 35 - 36.

heaven have mind and sense and pertain to the society of the blessed; and in the book Contra Origenistas to Orosius, chap. 11: "Nor do these things," he says, "pertain to us." But when in book I of the Retractationes, chapters 5 and 11, he retracts what he had said in the book De immortalitate animae, chap. 15, and in book 6 of De musica, chap. 14 - namely, that the world is animated and is a kind of great animal - he does not retract it as manifestly false, but as uncertain, because nothing certain could be established about it.

And thus, according to the opinion of all these, who teach that the heavens are animated, it follows that angels, or intelligences, are the souls of the heavens. So St. Thomas, in the Question On Spiritual Creatures, article 6, thinks that in the opinion of those asserting the heavens to be animated, one should say that the intelligences are their souls and rulers; and he interprets the mind of Aristotle in that sense, of a soul assisting, not informing, the intelligence itself. Of these intelligences, or angels, St. Augustine also raised a question, De Genesi ad litteram II, chap. 18, whether they are the souls of the heavens, that by them they are not only ruled, but also vitalized; he remained, however, in doubt.[1301]

Caput II - The true opinion

The true opinion is that which St. Thomas handed down in this article: namely, that the angels are not only spiritual with respect to their substance, but also that no body is subsistentially under them united, that is, that no body is animated by them: from which opinion I see no Scholastic dissent, since all teach that the heavens are not animated. This, first, can be proved by this reason: If angels were the souls of some bodies, they would most of all be of the heavens, which are most noble bodies; but the heavens are not animated; therefore no body is animated by angels. Now that the heavens are not animated, I judge to be most certain. It is, in the first place, the common opinion of the Scholastics, as St. Thomas confesses in the places cited; and Bonaventure expressly teaches it in II, dist. 14, art. 3, q. 2; Richard, art. 3, q. 4; Scotus, q. 1 in fine; and the rest teach the same there; Bonaventure adds that the opposite is manifestly erroneous. Scotus indeed says it is to be believed, yet by physical reason cannot easily be proved.[1302]

Among the Greek Fathers, moreover, thus it is taught by St. Basil, Homily on Genesis and on Psalm 48; St. Cyril, book 2 Against Julian - indeed he affirms that the Platonic opinion is opposed not only to Christian doctrine, but also to philosophical reason. St. John Damascene agrees, De fide orthodoxa, book 2, chap. 6, where he judges that to be a dogma of faith. Of the Latins, Lactantius, Divine Institutes II, chap. 5; St. Ambrose, Homily 3 on Genesis; St. Jerome, Epistle 69, which is to Avitus, where he enumerates the opposing opinion among the errors of Origen; the same teaches on Isaiah, chap. 45, "My hands stretched out the heavens"; but what he himself said in the Epistle

1301. Philo, De opificio mundi; De somniis; De gigantibus; Origen, Commentaries on John, at "In principio erat Verbum," and Periarchon I, cap. 7; Job 25; St. Jerome, Commentaries on Ephesians and on Ecclesiastes "Gyrans gyrando vadit spiritus," and Apologia contra Rufinum II; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram II, cap. 18; Enchiridion, cap. 58; Contra Origenistas ad Orosium, cap. 11; Retractationes I, cc. 5, 11; De immortalitate animae, cap. 15; De musica VI, cap. 14.

1302. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 14, art. 3, q. 2; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate (as cited), art. 3, q. 4; Scotus, q. 1, in fine.

to the Ephesians, he seems not to have said from his own view, but to have transferred it from Greek books (as he himself testifies in the second tome of the Apology against Rufinus). This, however, he does not in that place specifically excuse himself of, which would not be objected by Rufinus as to others. But what he taught in Church, he holds his faith by profession. For he did not think that the sun is animated by a spirit, but that in that place, which elsewhere he explained, either an animation is signified, or that the sun by its own light bestows life upon other things. There is added Nicephorus, who, in book 14 of the Ecclesiastical History, chap. 27, among the Canons of a general Council in which the errors of Origen are condemned, reports the sixth, in which it is said thus: "If anyone says that the heaven, the sun and the moon, and the stars, and the waters which are above the heavens, are animated as if they were deities, and are material powers: let him be anathema."[1303]

But it was most customary: wherefore the Lord would not have forbidden the heavens to be adored, if they were endowed with a rational soul. Then too, when Scripture says that they were created by God for the service of the nations, it manifestly indicates that they are of an inferior nature than men, and as it were their slaves. Since therefore it is established that the heavens are not animated, it is also manifest that angels are not the forms (*formae*) of any bodies.

Passing over the argument of St. Thomas and the many things which Cajetan brings forward in its defense, this also could be proved in the following way: If an angel were united to a body, either he would bestow upon it life and also sense, or not. If he bestowed sense, we could scarcely assign a difference between him and a man; and consequently the angel would be the soul of a man. But if he did not bestow sense, but only the angel would understand according to himself, as if he were altogether abstracted from matter, he would be united to a body without sense to no purpose, merely in order to give it life. It remains therefore that angels in themselves are not corporeal substantially, nor can they be united as substantial forms to bodies. And this I judge to be so true, that not even God by His absolute power can unite them. For the kind of formal cause (*causa formalis*), which from within produces the effect, God cannot communicate to any and every nature; but only that form can be befitting to which by its native power it belongs. Since therefore the angel by his nature is not the form of a body, he cannot in any way have this from God.

Articulus II - Whether angels assume bodies

In the second place one proceeds thus.

Objicitur 1. It seems that angels do not assume bodies. For in the work of an angel nothing is superfluous, just as neither in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for angels to assume bodies. For an angel does not need a body, since his power surpasses in every way the power of a body. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.

1303. St. Basil, Homilies on Genesis and on Psalm 48; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum II; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 6; Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones II, c. 5; St. Ambrose, Homily 3 on Genesis; St. Jerome, Ep. 69 (to Avitus) and Commentaries on Isaiah 45; Nicephorus Callistus, Ecclesiastical History XIV, c. 27 (on the canons condemning Origenist errors).

Objicitur 2. Further, every assumption is terminated at some union; because to assume (assumere) is as it were to take to oneself (ad se sumere). But a body is not united to an angel as to a form (*forma*), as has been said. And from that which is united to him as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed; otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by angels were assumed by them. Therefore angels do not assume bodies.

Objicitur 3. Further, angels do not assume bodies from earth or water: because those would not suddenly disappear. Nor again from fire: because they would burn the things which they touched. Nor again from air: because air is unshapable and without color. Therefore angels do not assume bodies.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says, that angels appeared to Abraham in assumed bodies (De Civitate Dei XVI, c. 29).[1304]

I answer that, some have said that angels never assume bodies: but that all which is read in the divine Scriptures about angelic apparitions happened in a vision of prophecy, that is according to the imagination. But this is repugnant to the intention of Scripture. For that which is seen in an imaginary vision is in the imagination alone of the seer; whence it is not seen indifferently by all. But divine Scripture sometimes introduces angels appearing in such a way that they were commonly seen by all. Thus the angels appearing to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole household, and by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom. Likewise the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all. From which it is manifest that such things happened according to a bodily vision, in which that is seen which is posited outside the seer; whence it can be seen by all. But such a vision is not had unless there is a body. Since therefore angels are neither bodies nor have bodies naturally united to them, as is clear from what has been said, it remains that sometimes they assume bodies.

Reply to the first: An angel does not need an assumed body on account of himself, but on account of us, that by familiar intercourse with men he may demonstrate that intelligible fellowship which men expect to have with them in the future life. Moreover, that angels in the Old Testament assumed bodies is a certain figurative indication that the Word of God would assume a human body. For all the apparitions of the Old Testament were ordered to that apparition in which the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

Reply to the second: The body assumed is united to the angel neither indeed as to a form, nor only as to a mover, but as to a mover represented through an assumed movable body. For as Sacred Scripture describes the properties of intelligible things under likenesses of sensible things, so sensible bodies are by divine power so formed by angels that they fit for the representation of the intelligible properties of the angel. And this is for an angel to assume a body.

Reply to the third: Although air, remaining in its subtlety, does not retain a shape nor a color; nevertheless sometimes it is condensed, and can be shaped and colored, as is clear in clouds. And so angels assume bodies from air, by condensing it through divine power, as much as is necessary for the forming of a body to be assumed.

1304. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XVI, c. 29.

Conclusion: Angels, although they are not bodies, nor naturally conjoined to bodies; nevertheless sometimes by their will can assume bodies.

Disputatio CLXXXIV - Whether in assumed bodies angels appear truly, or only according to imagination

Caput I - Not only according to imagination, but also in very reality angels appear in bodies

It was the opinion of Vidaricus in his Summa, book 4, as Dionysius the Carthusian reports in the Second Book of Sentences, distinction 8, question: that angels do not in very reality appear to us in assumed bodies, but only according to the imagination of the sense; and one can think that William of Paris followed him, in On the Universe, book 6, part 1, chapter 6, when he proves that angels do not assume true bodies. Yet if he be carefully read, he only strives to show that the bodies assumed by angels are not human, although they seem to be human. However, it seems to be gathered from St. John Damascene, book 2, On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 4, where, according to Fabri's translation, he says thus: "By God's permission, being made and having strength, they are transferred, they are transformed into whatever figure they wish according to imagination"; and that "according to imagination" in the Greek is kata phantasiama, that is, according to phantasy.[1305]

Secondly, it can be proved thus: by their sleights, angels can as it were set before the eyes various figures, so that a man seems to himself to see them; why then shall we not say that they always appear thus?

Thirdly, the lamiae, who report that they have seen many things and traversed various parts of the earth, see all those things only according to imagination and phantasy, as is defined in the Council of Ancyra, or of Ancyra as some write, and is reported in the Canon Episcopi, 26, quaest. 5; why then shall we not say the same concerning the apparitions of angels, since those things which seem to appear to lamiae are the works of demons?[1306]

Nevertheless, the true opinion, and conformable to the doctrine of the Church, is that angels in bodies truly assumed have in very reality appeared externally to sight and to the outward sense. And this is the common opinion of the Scholastics in the Second Book of Sentences, distinction 8: of St. Bonaventure, in the First Part of that distinction, article with questions 1 and 2; of Richard, article 1, question 2 and 3; of Scotus, question 1; of Durandus, question 1; of Gabriel, question 1, article 2; of Dionysius in the place cited; of Marsilius in the Second Book, question 6, article 1, in the reply to the second and third objection against the first conclusion; of Alexander, First Part, question 34, member 2, Part 1 of that, in the body and to the first; and of Albert, Second Part,

1305. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 4; the phrase "kata phantasiama" ("according to phantasy") is noted as such in Fabri's translation.

1306. The "Canon Episcopi" (Decretum Gratiani, 26, q. 5) cites the Council of Ancyra concerning women (lamiae/strigae) who think they ride by night; their experiences are judged phantastical and demonic illusions. [Cf. the reporting tradition under 26, quaest. 5.]

treatise 9, question 33, member 2; Part 1 of that, On the Body and on the First; and On the Four Causes, Part 1, question 9, articles 10 and 11. Wherefore, as Dionysius most fittingly noted, Vidaricus seems to be mistaken when he asserts that he has drawn Albert over to his view. Moreover, this opinion is gathered from Scripture, in which the apparitions are narrated as having taken place in such a way that they happened not only according to imagination, but in very reality. For men and angels...

It is related that men and angels have oftentimes conversed together; such was that apparition of Raphael made to Tobias, as is written in his book. For since the Angel spoke not only with Tobias but also with others and answered them, this is an indication that the event befell not only according to imagination, but in very reality: for, as St. Thomas well observed, things which occur according to imagination do not appear commonly to all.

And from the Fathers St. Augustine teaches this expressly, City of God 15, c. 23. Although he doubts whether angels are by their nature corporeal or incorporeal, as we reported in Disputation 179, nevertheless he affirms it to be indubitable that they have appeared in a corporeal figure, so as to be seen and touched; and to deny this is impudence. The same is taught by St. Bernard, Sermon 5 on the Canticle, and Isidore, book 1 De summo bono, c. 12, n. 19; St. Gregory also agrees, Homily 34 on the Gospels, when he asserts that angels are sometimes sent to us visibly, sometimes invisibly. And Athanasius, Sermon 4 against the Arians, far along in the middle expounding that place of Mark 13, says that demons sometimes assume the figures of good angels; nay rather, St. John Damascene, alleged for the opposite opinion, expressly hands down ours, book 2 De fide orthodoxa, c. 3, where, speaking of good angels, he says: I call them without termini ("limits") for this reason, that, to good and virtuous men, to whomsoever God will that they be made visible, they do not appear as they are, but they assume one or another form, such as can be seen by men. Now what we noted above that he said of evil angels - if it be rightly translated from the Greek, as Billius turns it - lends no support to the former opinion, but rather confirms ours. Thus does he render it: "By a power granted by God they are strong, and are changed, and migrate, as it were, into any form, as indeed it appears." For what Faber turned "according to imagination," Billius translates "as it appears." And in Greek it is said kata phantasian, in Latin literally, "according to phantasy." For although phantasia in Latin signifies the interior sight of the imagination, nevertheless it also denotes the exterior: it is derived from the verb phaino, which in Latin is "to appear": therefore Billius rightly rendered, "as it appears." Hence, because in the interior sense there are, as it were, certain seeings and apparitions, it is rightly called phantasia, and the images or species thereof phantasmata; yet phantasma also signifies that which outwardly appears to the eyes, but is in truth not such as it appears - as in Matthew 14, when Jesus, having come walking upon the sea in the fourth watch, the disciples said, "It is a phantasm"; and Mark 6, "They thought it was a phantasm," not because it appeared only to the imagination, but because outwardly they saw something appear such as they judged was in reality not so. Thus therefore did Damascene say that, by God's permission, they are transformed "according to phantasy" into various figures of things - of swine, to wit, and of serpents and of men - although in truth they themselves are not such, but only appear so. And in the same sense the Manichees, asserting that the Word of God assumed not a true body

but only a phantasm, did not on that account say this because the Word appeared in flesh only to the imagination, but because, although it was presented to the eyes and external senses of all, as to a man, nevertheless it was not in reality such.

But for a fuller explication of this matter, first it must be noted that apparitions can take place in three ways. First, according to imagination; then, according to external vision - but in this way twofold: either according to a certain change in the very eye, with nothing existing outwardly, as is wont to be done by prestidigitations and it befalls the phrenetic - and let this be the second mode; or third, with some external figure really existing, which appears to be of such a quality and nature as in truth it is not, as colors appear in the rainbow which in reality are not such, because light in that body, disposed by its nature, so appears. We say therefore that angels are seen not only in the first mode (although sometimes they are also seen thus), nor only in the second (since that mode does not occur in a good disposition of the senses, but only when by tricks the senses are disturbed; whereas angels are also seen without any perturbation of the senses, as has been noted), but also they are seen in very reality by the change of such an object as, at such a distance and disposition, is of a nature to appear so, as we said of the color of the rainbow, and this will be explained more in the following chapter. And hence a solution is evident to the former argument of the contrary opinion: we grant indeed that the demon can change the eye by sleights, so that it seems to itself to see something outwardly when in reality it is not; and in this way angels can appear to men, just as also in imagination and in dreams. We confess nonetheless that they can also be seen outwardly in another way with the senses well disposed, namely with such a body assumed that, in that position and distance, it is of a nature for such a figure and color to appear.[1307]

Caput II - That to the external senses angels are wont to appear in assumed bodies

To two external senses angels are wont to appear in assumed bodies, to sight and to touch. For although they utter voices which are perceived by hearing, these are not qualities of their own bodies, but are formed in the object, the air, about which there is no difficulty. To sight however there appear figure and colors; I pass over also motion and rest and other common sensibles, which in them are seen in the same way as in others. About figure therefore and color we must now speak.

Figure can appear in two ways: in one way, because the body is in very reality determined in itself to such a figure by a condensation of air or of the substance which they assume. In another way, even if in itself it is not of such a figure as appears, nevertheless in that position and distance it is of a nature thus to appear; as in clouds many figures are presented to us afar off which in reality are not such, and if they were seen nearer, they would not so appear, yet in that convenient position they always appear. About colors in general it must be said that there is no color in an assumed body, but only a mixture of light, as in the rainbow, because the matter of those bodies, as we shall say in the next chapter, is so subtle and simple that it is not capable of color and of the

1307. St. Bernard, Sermon 5 on the Canticle; Isidore, De summo bono I, c. 12, n. 19; St. Gregory, Hom. 34 in Evangelia; St. Athanasius, Serm. 4 contra Arianos; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3. On the Greek kata phantasian and phaino, see Billius and Faber as cited.

secondary qualities. Wherefore in the body there can be only apparent colors, which, in Damascene's sense, can be said to be according to phantasy. But although neither the figure be true nor the colors true, nevertheless the eye in that position is so changed by them that, however much a man attend, he cannot discern whether it is a true human body or only an apparent one.

But about the qualities which in those bodies of angels men seem to themselves to perceive by the sense of touch, there is a greater difficulty. Augustine in the Enchiridion, c. 59, does not dare to define whether the bodies of angels, by which they appear, are tractable or not. Whence it is hard for him what is read in Genesis 18, that Abraham washed the feet of the angels; and that Lot also did this is written in Genesis 19. It is also hard for him to explain what is related of the wrestling of Jacob with the angel with so solid a grappling, Genesis 32. He answers however in these words: When such things are asked, and each conjectures about them as he can, understandings are not without profit exercised, if moderate discussion be applied and the error be absent of those who think they know what they do not know. For what use is it that these, and things of this sort, be affirmed, or denied, or defined with discrimination, when without crime they are unknown? And although Augustine says this about bodies naturally or connately belonging to angels, the same judgment, by stronger reason, ought to be made about those which are assumed by the angel's will alone. Augustine's judgment is indeed most prudent; I consider it more useful to us in many other matters, and to be observed most diligently in this matter of angels especially, lest, while we are over-ready in defining things, we easily fall into absurdities worthy of ridicule; and in matters of such moment one ought not to brandish even the least absurdity, and, without foundation and reason, to champion something coined from one's own brain.

Nonetheless, to indicate something probable by conjecture drawn from philosophical principles in the present question is not to be imputed to rashness. First then about hardness, which is a certain quality of bodies and is naturally in their objects alone, it must be said that it is not found in bodies assumed by angels, even if they present themselves as tractable to men, because those bodies are of a subtler substance than that they could have hardness intrinsically, as stone, bone, and the like have. For an angel neither can educe such a quality from the power of such a matter, nor change the primary qualities of those bodies so that from them that secondary quality - which is found only in mixed bodies - should arise. Nevertheless it can happen that a man, when he touches them, seems to perceive hardness, because the angel can so dispose the organ of touch and the surrounding medium that resistance is felt to the touch, and that body appears to the eye as flesh; although in that body there is not such a quality as there is in true flesh, which we call softness or smooth pliancy. In these matters therefore the sense of touch is easily deceived about doubtful qualities, or therefore also the judgment of the intellect formed from sense, while a man seems to himself to handle bones and flesh which in truth are not there.

From this doctrine I infer three things. First: if a man were to consider attentively, in bodies assumed by angels, he could easily say that it is not true hardness, nor true softness such as is found in bones and flesh; for, if he attended, he would easily perceive that our touch is not affected by those bodies in the way it is by those things which live and truly have flesh and bones. But if a man has persuaded himself that the one he sees is a true man, because the eye thus judges, and he

in simple mind lays hold of that body, it will seem to him that he touches flesh and bones, nor will he discern whether it is a true body or only an apparent one. And something similar befell Abraham and Lot when in Genesis 18 and 19 they washed the angels' feet: for they did not then know that they were angels, and it is to be believed that they appeared in assumed bodies as true men.

Second, there follows the greatest of all arguments - that Christ showed himself not to be a spirit when he presented himself to the disciples to be handled (Luke 24; John 20). For that he ate in their presence was not an inefficacious argument for sight; since in an assumed body an angel can in this way eat, as it happened in Tobias 12, when he ate with the angel Raphael. And for this reason St. Thomas teaches that each of those arguments was efficacious, not sufficient by itself alone, yet sufficient when joined together with the testimonies of the prophets.[1308]

Let such things be affirmed, or denied, or defined with discrimination, when without sin they are unknown; and although Augustine says these things about bodies which he thought angels naturally to be constituted of, the same judgment, by stronger reason, is to be made about those things which are assumed by the will alone of an angel. Augustine's judgment is most prudent, and is to be most diligently observed by us in many other matters more hidden, especially in this subject about angels, lest, while we desire to be readier in defining matters, we easily slip into absurdities; and in matters of such moment we ought not meanwhile to pronounce something from our own head without foundation and reason. Nevertheless, to indicate something in the present question by some probable conjecture drawn from the principles of philosophy, as it were by certain traces, is not to be imputed to rashness.

First, then, concerning hardness (durities), which is a certain quality (qualitas) of bodies and is numbered among the objects of touch, it must be said that it is not found in bodies assumed (corpora assumpta) by angels, even if they present themselves as tangible to men, because those bodies are of a more subtle substance than that they could have intrinsic hardness, as a stone, a bone, and other things of that sort have. For neither can an angel so arrange them and change their primary qualities that from them that secondary quality which is found only in mixed bodies could arise. Nevertheless an angel can bring it about that a man, handling them, seems to himself to be touching some hard body; and this is for the angel to exhibit his body as tractable to a man. This, however, does not befall touch with respect to the body assumed by the angel in the way that it befalls sight with respect to the colors of the same body: for although that body has neither hardness nor color, nevertheless it has a light which, being in this way set before the sight, is apt to appear under the species of such a color without any prestiges of the eyes. But it has in itself no quality which, by some peculiar reason as an object, is apt to appear as hardness; rather, by the angel's power such resistance is made to touch, lest the body which appears be compressed, so that one seems to himself to touch something hard and resisting. In the same way figure can be perceived by touch when the resistance is convenient to touch and in such a position that one seems to himself to handle something either round or square. The same must be said of the

1308. St. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 59; Gen. 18 - 19, 32; Luke 24; John 20; Tob. 12; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 3a, q. 5, a. 6 (as cited).

softness of flesh (mollities carnis), namely that it is perceived by touch only insofar as the resistance is less; whence a man easily judges that it is flesh which also appears to the eye as flesh; although such a quality is not in that body as it is in true flesh, which we call smoothness or softness (mellitudo seu mollicies). In these two qualities, therefore, the sense of touch is easily deluded, or the judgment of the intellect on account of touch, while a man seems to himself to handle bones and flesh which in truth are not.

From this doctrine I infer three things.

- First, if a man should carefully consider that which he touches in bodies assumed by angels, he could easily judge that it is not true hardness nor true softness such as is found in bones and flesh: because, if he should attend, he would easily perceive that touch is not so affected by those bodies as by others which live and have true flesh and bones. On the other hand, if a man has persuaded himself that he whom he sees is a true man - because the eye so judges - and with simple mind he handles that one's body, it will seem to him that he touches flesh and bones, nor will he discern whether it is a true body or only an apparent one. Thus I think it happened to Abraham and Lot when in Genesis 18 and 19 they washed the angels' feet: for they did not then know that they were angels and that they had appeared in assumed bodies. By contrast, as Cajetan relates, when a certain man had habitual intercourse with a demon succubus, and did not feel from that one's flesh the delight he desired, he said to the demon that he did not feel that delight which he was wont to feel with a woman; but the wretched demon answered that he could not make better flesh: for since that man knew that he was lying with a demon and also wished to experience the delight which he had experienced with women, he could easily by touch itself discern that he did not feel those qualities of flesh which at times he had felt in women.[1309]
- Second, there follows the greatest of all arguments - that Christ presented his resurrection to the senses when he offered himself to the disciples to be handled (Luke 24; John 20). For that he ate in their presence was not so efficacious an argument for sight; for in an assumed body an angel can in this way eat, as happens in Tobit 12, when he ate with the angel Raphael. And perhaps for this reason St. Thomas teaches that each of those arguments was not sufficient by itself alone for the resurrection, yet sufficiently conjoined with the testimonies of the prophets. To this Scotus and Gabriel agree in the place to be alleged below; I, however, with Cajetan in the place cited above, think that that argument from touch was the most efficacious for proving the truth of the human body in Christ. Therefore he said to his Apostles that by touch they could discern flesh and bones: "Handle, and see: for a spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see me to have." By "spirit" he understood an airy body assumed, which is wont to appear and is called a phantasm. But if by touch they had not been able to discern true flesh and bones, the softness and the hardness of them, he would not have said, "Handle and see," as if he were saying, "Touch and perceive true flesh and true

1309. Cajetan, In 2a 2ae, q. 95, a. 3.

bones." But when they saw him eating, he did not say, "See how I eat," because a spirit does not eat. For he knew that even angels in assumed bodies truly in this way appear as eating, so that it cannot be discerned by the eye whether in reality they truly eat.[1310]

- Third, it is gathered that hardness and softness are sensible qualities (qualitates sensibiles) counted among the objects of touch; and therefore false is the opinion of certain philosophers who think that these qualities are not sensed by touch, but that only a greater or lesser resistance is sensed, as if someone were to touch the heaven, in which there is no sensible quality, and yet because it cannot be penetrated, as if resisting to touch, it would in a certain way be sensed. Their opinion does not please me: first, because Aristotle in De anima II, in the chapter on touch, numbered these among the proper objects of touch; second, because a common sensible, like figure, cannot be sensed without a proper sensible: but it would be sensed in a body without any other quality only along with hardness or softness; therefore these are properly sensible qualities. Third, Christ would say in vain, "Handle and see," unless bones and flesh could be perceived according to their proper qualities of hardness and softness, and not by greater or lesser resistance; for so in the same way they could appear in a spirit, that is, in an airy body, through an altogether equal resistance. But it is established, moreover, that bones are able to be sensed only by reason of hardness, especially when they are joined to flesh.

Caput III - The arguments for the prior opinion are dissolved

Of those things that were brought forward for the prior opinion there remains only the third argument, about witches (lamiae). For to the first, by the testimony of St. John Damascene in the chapter above we have said enough; the second, about prestiges, was solved in chapter 2. To the third, therefore, about witches I reply: the Council of Ancyra openly teaches that the things which witches by their incantations and spells relate to have happened to them, happened to them only in dreams: as that they are carried upon beasts to certain fields, and the rest of this kind. St. Augustine agrees, in City of God XVIII, c. 18, speaking of the transformation of a man into the figure of some brute animal: for he affirms that this transformation cannot be done otherwise than in dreams. For although it can also happen through the assumption of some body under the figure of some brute, which the demon could so join to the man that a beast would appear, nevertheless, if the man had his senses free and not oppressed by heavy sleep, he would easily judge that he had not really been converted into a brute, nor truly borne heavy burdens and felt fatigue. Wherefore, when a man believes that he has been converted into a beast and labored much under burdens, we ought to think that all that happened to him in dreams; and in this case Augustine also speaks of men who seem to themselves to see other men converted into brutes: he affirms that even outside

1310. Luke 24; John 20; Tobit 12; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 3a, q. 55, a. 6; Scotus; Gabriel, Disputatio 186, cap. 2; Cajetan, loc. cit.

of sleep this is done by the power of imagination alone, which thus makes the thing appear outwardly as if it really were; it can also happen with some body joined to the man by the work of a demon, in which such a formation is made to seem.[1311]

But although these things very frequently happen to witches in dreams, as the Council of Ancyra affirms, nevertheless it is not to be denied that sometimes, with the senses free in wakefulness, witches are carried, not upon true beasts, but by demons in bodies assumed under the form of beasts, and other external works of demons of this sort truly appear to them, as Victoria teaches in the report on the art of magic, nos. 4 and 5, and Cajetan in 2a 2ae, q. 95, a. 3, and Alphonsus de Castro, book 1 On the just punishment of heretics, c. 16, which Alphonsus himself confirms with many examples. He answers, however, to that chapter of the Council of Ancyra, first, that the sect of those women of whom mention is made there is not the sect of witches, and that of those alone it was said that all the things which are told about them happen only in dreams, not, however, in reality: but I do not see on what foundation this rests. He answers next that in the canon it is defined only that those women are deceived, thinking that those things which frequently happen in dreams happen in reality; but from this it is not defined that they never happen in reality, but always in spirit. Augustine also only said that to men who think they have been converted into beasts and have labored much under a heavy burden, that never happened except in heavy sleep, for the reason said above; but not therefore does he deny that sometimes, others being spectators, someone can appear as converted into a beast, by reason of a body assumed by a demon under such a figure, as Alexander and Gabriel plainly teach; and this also can be done by prestiges, as is manifest.[1312]

Caput IV - Of what matter, and by what power, bodies are assumed by angels

It remains, in the last place, that we say of what matter the aforesaid bodies are assumed by angels, and by what power they are formed and fitted, so that they may appear of such a figure and color.

As to the first, the opinion which Bonaventure reports - that that body is of celestial matter - being omitted, because it has no appearance of probability, among the scholastics some think that such bodies are assumed from the matter of thickened and condensed air, which can be formed and appear under a color, as do clouds. Thus taught Durandus in the Sentences, II, dist. 8, q. 1, n. 7; and St. Thomas seems to assert the same in this article, ad 3. Alexander of Hales, however, and Albert the Great taught that bodies are assumed from the very body of air as it now is in its natural disposition: and in the solutions of arguments, that the good take bodies to themselves from the higher air, which is called ether; but the evil from the lower: which seems to have been the doctrine of Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, c. 12, n. 19, and of Bede in the eighth tome, book of questions, q. 9. He proves it, first, because air is at hand in order that such apparitions may occur

1311. Council of Ancyra; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, 18, c. 18.

1312. Victoria, Relatio de arte magica, nos. 4 - 5; Cajetan, In 2a 2ae, q. 95, a. 3; Alphonsus de Castro, De iusta haereticorum punitione, l. 1, c. 16; Alexander of Hales, q. 43, memb. 3, art. 1; Gabriel, art. 3, notatio 1.

suddenly; next, because when the body is left by the angel it is not dissolved into a thicker matter, but vanishes, so that immediately it does not appear: a sign, therefore, that that body had been taken from the very matter of air.[1313]

But, on the other hand, Bonaventure in II, dist. 8, third part of the distinction, art. 2, q. 2, Richard, art. 1, q. 3, ad 3, Scotus, q. 1.9 In ista quaestione, versiculo: "nam tunc assumit," and Gabriel, quaest. r, art. c, notatio 1, agree that bodies are not assumed by angels from the pure element of air without any mixture - because it is of too subtle a substance to be condensed and to be given a figure - nor from a perfectly mixed body, but from a certain aerial body with some admixture of a denser substance, which could also easily vanish; which indeed seems more likely to me, and in no way would St. Thomas and Durandus deny it, since the example of a cloud is used, in which there is not the substance of air alone, but also something mixed, whereby it is made thicker; indeed, concerning Isidore, Bede, and others it is not sufficiently clear that they are speaking of pure air. This, however, must be understood, as Scotus noted, of those bodies which immediately, once they are left, vanish. For it sometimes happens that spirits assume other natural bodies, as the body of the serpent in paradise, or of some other animal. Therefore Tertullian in the book On the Flesh of Christ, c. 3, said that angels assume bodies from nothing and reduce them to nothing, because they assume them from a certain subtle substance; the same is to be said about the body of the dove in which the Holy Spirit was seen.[1314]

But about the formation of the bodies, Bonaventure, Richard, Scotus, Durandus, and Gabriel teach that they are made by condensation alone, which can be done by compression alone and by local motion of the parts within themselves. Still, it is hidden to me how these bodies are given a figure: for since the compression and condensation of air is the cause of cold in air - as we see in air compressed by the lips, or by some other reason - straightway cold would naturally be felt; nevertheless to the touch it appears as if it were the temperament of some living and sentient thing. It is therefore a sign that this is done by another reason, indeed hidden from us, inquiry into which it is superfluous to dwell on too long.

But about the power by which these bodies are assumed and prepared, the Doctors also think variously. St. Thomas in the solutions, and Peter of Bergamo in the Concordance of doubtful passages, no. 117, think that it is done by the power of God. Alexander, however, 1 p., q. 34, memb. 5, asserts that the body to be assumed is prepared by the angel, but ultimately formed by God. Yet of what sort this preparation is and how it is done, he does not explain. It seems more probable, as Albert in the places cited and Bonaventure in the question alleged teach, that ultimately it is done by the angel's proper power. Thus also it is to be held.[1315]

1313. Durandus, In Sent., II, dist. 8, q. 1, n. 7; St. Thomas, ad 3; Alexander of Hales, Summa (1 p.), q. 34, memb. 4; Albert the Great, 2 p., locus cited, and De quatuor coaevis (1 p.), q. 9, art. 11 (sol.); Isidore, De summo bono, l. 1, c. 12, n. 19; Bede, tom. 8, lib. quaestionum, q. 9.

1314. Scotus; Gabriel; Tertullian, De carne Christi, c. 3.

1315. St. Thomas (in the solutions); Peter Bergomensis, Concordantiae locorum dubiorum, no. 117; Alexander of Hales, 1 p., q. 34, memb. 5; Albert; Bonaventure, II, dist. 8.

Disputatio CLXXXV - Whether all the apparitions of God that are narrated to have been made were made by the ministry of angels

Scotus and Gabriel seem to suppose this, when they assert that by mere condensation the body is figured: for since condensation is made by the sole motion of compression, which an angel can effect by his own power, it follows that a body can be assumed by an angel by his own power. And although it is not always done by mere condensation, nevertheless at times the angel can, by the application of other natural causes, bring such bodies to completion, so that they may be assumed. And this I hold to be more probable: for since evil angels also assume bodies for most wicked ends, it is not likely that God by His own power should form those bodies, and use only the demon himself as an instrument.

This opinion is supported by Leo I in Epistle 13, which is to Pulcheria Augusta, where he says that the Son of God appeared to the Patriarchs and received from them the offices of hospitality. The same is said by Clement of Rome, book 8 of the Constitutions, the last chapter.[1316] Moreover, besides Eusebius, St. John Chrysostom, and Theophylact, no one else expressly denies that in that place it was an angel, and that those apparitions were made by his ministry. And the sentence of Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Theophylact can be proved, because he who appeared to Moses openly said that he was God, and he declared other things about himself which can belong to God alone; why therefore ought we to say that he was an angel - especially since Scripture, where in truth an angel appeared, openly says that not the Lord, but an angel appeared? Among more recent theologians I have read only Clichtoveus in chapter 17, book 4 on St. John Damascene, On the Faith, who affirms that at least in the New Testament God sometimes appeared through Himself without any ministry of angels.[1317]

Caput I - Some Fathers judged that not all apparitions were made by the ministry of angels

Since in the Old and New Testament God often appeared to men, among the Fathers of the Church it is not altogether undoubted whether God Himself immediately, or in His place an angel, appeared in that body. Some think that not all apparitions of this sort, even in the Old Testament, were made through the ministry of angels: thus affirm Eusebius, first book of the Demonstration of the Gospel, chapter 5, and in another place; and St. John Chrysostom, homily 16 on the Acts of the Apostles, on those words of chapter 7, "Forty years being fulfilled"; and Theophylact on the same place, when they assert that God through Himself, without any ministry of angels, appeared to Moses and spoke with him. Tertullian also in the book Against the Jews, chapter 9, after the middle, and St. Ambrose on that passage to the Colossians 1, "Who is the image of the invisible

1316. Leo I, Ep. 13 ad Pulcheriam Augustam; Clement of Rome, Constitutiones, lib. 8, cap. ult.
1317. Josse Clichtoveus, in Damasc., De fide orthodoxa, lib. 4, cap. 17.

God," seem to think rightly when they teach that not the Father, but the Son of God, appeared to Moses and spoke with him; and the same about the Son was said by Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Theophylact.[1318]

In favor of this opinion are also Leo I, Epistle 13, which is to Pulcheria Augusta, where he says that the Son of God appeared to the Patriarchs and received from them the offices of hospitality; and Clement of Rome, book 8 of the Constitutions, the last chapter. But, besides Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Theophylact, no other expressly states that there it was an angel, and that those apparitions were made by his ministry. And the sentence of Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Theophylact can be proved, because he who appeared to Moses openly said that he was God, and he pronounced other things about himself which can belong to God alone: why then ought we to believe that he was an angel - especially since Scripture, where in truth an angel appeared, openly says that not the Lord, but an angel appeared? Among more recent theologians I have only read Clichtoveus, book 4, chapter 17, on St. John Damascene, On the Faith, who affirms that at least in the New Testament God sometimes appeared through Himself without any ministry of angels.[1317]

Caput II - The common and truer opinion is that God always appeared in both Testaments by the ministry of angels

The common and truer opinion is that God always appeared in both Testaments by the ministry of angels. About the apparitions made in the Old Testament St. Augustine thinks thus, book 2 On the Trinity, chapter 11, where he expressly disputes this question. Nor did he teach anything opposed in Epistle 111, when he says that God sometimes in a visible form appeared to the Fathers; for he does not deny that this was done by the ministry of angels. Dionysius, St. Jerome, and St. Gregory are also cited for this opinion; but these Fathers do not say that God always in the Old Testament appeared by the ministry of angels in all cases; rather, they teach this about certain cases in which it is said that God appeared: whence nevertheless our sentence is confirmed. For if, when Scripture says that God appeared and spoke, these Fathers affirm that it was done by the ministry of angels, it follows that everywhere likewise He appeared in the same way. It is also reported by Dionysius, book 4, chapter On the Divine Names, a little after the beginning; but there he only says that angels are the interpreters of the divine silence. He speaks more clearly for this opinion, chapter 4 of the Celestial Hierarchy, not far from the beginning, where he writes thus about spiritual substances: "The principal name of angels is so called, because the divine illumination is first in them, and through them signs of the operations which surpass our nature are made manifest to us." He adds then that the ancient fathers, taught by the angels, before the Law attained to the knowledge of the truth; that they received the Law itself through angels; and that God was never seen by any of the saints as He is, but through certain visions accommodated to

1318. Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, and elsewhere; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 16 in Acta Apostolorum (on Acts 7); Theophylact, in eundem locum; Tertullian, Contra Iudaeos, c. 9; St. Ambrose, In Coloss. 1: "Qui est imago Dei invisibilis."

1317. Josse Clichtoveus, in Damasc., De fide orthodoxa, lib. 4, cap. 17.

their senses: about which he subjoins these words, "And our most illustrious fathers learned these divine visions to be the works of the heavenly powers." He also teaches that the Law was promulgated to Moses through angels.[1319]

Next, St. Jerome on that passage to the Galatians 3, "It was ordained by angels," admits that the Law was also delivered to Moses through angels. St. Cyril agrees, book 8 of the Thesaurus, chapter 2, after the middle. Finally, St. Gregory, book 28 of the Moralia, chapter 2, teaches that sometimes God speaks in earthly substances through angels, as when He reproved Balaam by the mouth of the ass; sometimes in heavenly substances through angels, as when in the cloud He said in Matthew 3 and 17, "This is my beloved Son," etc.; sometimes at once in earthly and heavenly substances through angels He speaks: as when to Moses in the fire and the bush He spoke through an angel. There St. Gregory teaches that the apparitions under both Testaments were made by the ministry of angels. To these we can also add the Rabbi Moses Maimonides in the book More Nebuchim, that is, "The Guide of the Perplexed," part 2, where, as it regards the apparitions made in the Old Testament, he agrees with the aforesaid fathers.[1320]

This sentence is easily proved by a single inductive reason as follows. If at some time God had appeared through Himself without any angelic ministry - especially since Scripture relates that God spoke, and it introduces words not as of an angel, but as of God Himself speaking - yet then too God appeared and spoke by the ministry of angels: therefore we ought to judge that it was always done in the same way.

First, the Law indeed was dictated to Moses by the ministry of angels: although with Moses God then seemed to speak as it were through Himself, and Moses with him who appeared had converse as if with God; indeed Moses, and the whole people, adored Him as God, as, besides Dionysius, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Cyril, mentioned above, who clearly attest this, can not obscurely be gathered from the very text of Paul. For he says to the Galatians 3: "It (namely, the Law) was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator," that is, of Moses, who was mediator between God and the people: from which St. Augustine proves his opinion. And to the Hebrews 2: "For if the word spoken by angels was made firm, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward," etc. However, although Chrysostom, homily 3 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and Theophylact on that passage to the Galatians 3, understand the aforesaid testimonies about the Law, nevertheless they assert that it is therefore said to have been ordained through angels, because they were present at the promulgation of the Law, as witnesses, trumpets sounding, while thunderings and other signs were done by their ministry. Then the same Chrysostom on that passage to the Galatians and Oecumenius say that by "angels" there priests are understood, who promulgated the Law to the people. But Theodoret on both places admits that the Law was enacted with angels ministering: yet what their ministry was, he does not explain. Their reason also seems to favor this, because it does not appear how many could together concur in dictating, or writing, and promulgating the Law. Finally, Chrysostom and Theophylact understand

1319. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, cap. 4; cf. De divinis nominibus, lib. 4, c. init.

1320. St. Jerome, In Gal. 3: "Ordinata per angelos"; St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 8, cap. 2 (post med.); St. Gregory, Moralia, lib. 28, cap. 2; Moses Maimonides, More Nebuchim, pars 2.

that passage to the Hebrews also about other announcements made by angels in the Old Testament, the transgressors of which obtained due punishments: as it happened when the angels announced to Lot and his wife the overthrow of Sodom, and forbade them to look back; which command was so firm that Lot's wife, having transgressed, was turned into a statue of salt. From this Paul argues that those are worthy of greater punishment who have neglected the abundant salvation of the Gospel.

Nevertheless, the plainer sense of Paul's places seems to be, if we say that the Law itself was dictated by the ministry of angels: by which testimony the Fathers above named were brought to this opinion. And although one angel would have sufficed to speak or to write the Law, nevertheless many are said to have ministered, because by their work many other things were done in the promulgation of the Law.

Second, St. Augustine proves that the Lord appeared to Abraham by the ministry of angels, Genesis 17, when He made the covenant of circumcision with him, and he himself received the promise of the blessing of many nations in himself. For then that the Lord appeared to him, Stephen bears witness, Acts 7; because in Genesis 18 it is said that the Lord appeared to Abraham at the oak of Mamre; and when he had lifted up his eyes, he saw three men in the heat of the day, and he said, "Lord God." But from the following chapter it is manifest that those three were angels: for it is said that, Abraham being left, the angels entered Sodom. From this place, however, we cannot much press our adversaries: for when it is written in Genesis 18 that three men appeared, Scripture does not relate that all three spoke in the name and person of God, but only one of them; about whom adversaries could contend that he was God Himself, and appeared as the lord of the others; since also Abraham seems to have spoken only with the prince and lord, when he said, "Lord, if I have found favor," etc. And in the following chapter, according to the translation of the Seventy, we do not read that three angels came to Sodom, but only two. They came therefore (says Scripture) two angels to Sodom. One could therefore say that those two angels were sent by the Lord, who appeared among them as their prince.[1321]

Third, St. Augustine proves this from that place, Genesis 21, where Scripture says that to Hagar in the desert the angel of the Lord appeared, who plainly spoke in the person of God with these words: "Hold up the boy with thy hand, because I will make him a great nation." For these things cannot befit an angel, unless in so far as he bears the person of God.

Fourth, from that Genesis 22, where it is said that the Lord appeared to Abraham and commanded him the immolation of his son; for the Lord says after these things had been done: "Now I know that thou fearest the Lord, and hast not spared thy only-begotten son for my sake"; and yet he who said this was an angel: for it is said, "When Abraham was about to immolate, there appeared to him an angel from heaven and cried out."

Fifth, it is more clearly proved from Exodus 3. For where it is said that the Lord appeared to Moses in the bush and in fire, and Exodus 19 that He spoke with Moses on Mount Sinai; truly in Acts 7 Stephen, recounting the history, says: "After forty years were fulfilled, there appeared to him

1321. St. John Chrysostom, In Gal. ad loc.; Oecumenius, In Gal.; Theodoret, In Gal. 3 et Heb. 2.

in the desert of Mount Sinai an angel in the flame of fire of the bush, and there was made to him a voice of the Lord, 'I am the God of thy fathers'"; the same said he who appeared in the bush. And below the same Stephen says that Moses spoke with the angel on Mount Sinai: whereas Scripture never reports the converse of Moses with an angel, but with the Lord: the sign therefore is that an angel spoke in the person of God.

Lastly, Genesis 31: Jacob narrated to his wives his dream with these words: "And the angel of God said to me in my sleep, Jacob"; and after he began to speak with him, he said, "I am the God of Bethel": he who was called an angel spoke as the Lord: therefore in those places, where Scripture says that the Lord appeared, it is clear that it was an angel speaking in the person of God.

Some reply that therefore he who appeared to Jacob and to Moses is said to have been an angel, when in truth he was God: because he was the Word of God. He was called, however, Angel, because the Word of the Father is His angel, according to Isaiah, who called Him "the Angel of the great counsel." Thus responds Eusebius, book 5 of the Demonstration of the Gospel, chapter 10, and book 1, chapter 5; whose interpretation St. John Chrysostom follows, homily on the Acts of the Apostles, and Theophylact there; Theodoret also, question 5 on Exodus; Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, number 23; and Bede, tome 8, in the book of Questions, question 9, after the middle: indeed Isidore also adds that as often as Scripture introduces an angel speaking as God, one must always understand the Son of God. In the same way St. Cyprian, book 2 Against the Jews, explains that testimony Genesis 31, and that Genesis 22, when an angel is said to have appeared to Abraham and spoke in the person of God. And St. Hilary, On the Trinity, book 4 after the middle, and book 12 two leaves before the end, so understood the apparition made to Hagar: and for this reason in the Council of Sirmium, whose canons Hilary reports in the book On the Synods, chapter 15, it is said: "If anyone says that with Jacob he did not wrestle as in a dream, but says that the ineffable God or His Father wrestled, let him be anathema." The same opinion is also consonant to Theodoret, question 91 on Genesis, explaining the apparition in which Jacob in that wrestling is said to have seen the Son of God.[1322]

Yet this interpretation does not persuade me. For since every effect outside God is common to the whole Trinity, then alone is one person without another said to appear, when truly one is signified without another: as under the appearance of the dove, and in tongues of fire, the person of the Holy Spirit; but in these apparitions one person was no more signified than another: therefore one no more than another appeared. Then too we nowhere in Scripture read that the Son of God according to the divine nature is called an angel: for in that place of Isaiah, Scripture speaks of Him according to His humanity, and He is called Angel, because He was the messenger of the Father. But that Council of Sirmium has no force, as was noted in Disputation 109, chapter 5.

About the apparitions indeed made in the New Testament I see no special reason to be given...

1322. Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, lib. 5, cap. 10; lib. 1, cap. 5; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. in Acta Apostolorum; Theophylact, ad loc.; Theodoret, Quaest. 5 in Exodum; Isidore, De summo bono, lib. 1, cap. 12, n. 23; Bede, Tom. 8, Liber quaestionum, quaest. 9; St. Cyprian, Adv. Iudaeos, lib. 2; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 4 (post med.), et lib. 12 (paulo ante finem); Concilium Sirmiense, apud Hilarium, De synodis, cap. 15; Theodoret, Quaest. 91 in Genesim.

Third, St. Augustine proves it from that passage of Genesis where Scripture says that an angel of the Lord appeared to Hagar as she was in the wilderness, who clearly spoke in the person of God in these words: "Hold the boy in your hand; I will make of him a great nation." For these things cannot befit an angel unless he bears the person of God.

Fourth, from that passage Genesis 22 where it is said that the Lord appeared to Abraham and commanded him to immolate his son: "Now I know that you fear the Lord, and have not spared your only-begotten son because of me"; and yet that was an angel, for it is said, "When Abraham was about to immolate [Isaac], an angel appeared to him from heaven and cried out."

Fifth and more clearly it is proved from Exodus 3, where it is said that the Lord appeared to Moses in the bush and in fire, and Exodus 19 that the Lord spoke with Moses on Mount Sinai; but in Acts 7 Stephen, recounting the history, says: "When forty years were fulfilled, an angel appeared to him in the desert of Mount Sinai in a flame of fire in a bush, and there was made to him a voice of the Lord: 'I am the God of your fathers'"; which words were said by the very same who appeared in the bush. And the same Stephen says that an angel spoke with Moses on Mount Sinai, whereas Scripture never recounts Moses' speaking with an angel, but with the Lord: it is therefore clear that an angel spoke in the person of God.

Finally, in Genesis 31 Jacob recounts to his wives a dream in these words: "The angel of God said to me in a dream, 'Jacob'; and I answered, 'Here I am.' And after he began to speak with me, he said, 'I am the God of Bethel.'" He who was called an angel spoke as the Lord: if therefore in those places where Scripture says that the Lord appeared, it is clear that an angel spoke in the person of God, it is a sign that all the Lord's apparitions were made by the ministry of angels.

Some answer that he who appeared to Jacob and to Moses was called an angel, although he was truly God, because he was the Word of God; he was called "angel" because the Word of the Father is his angel, according to Isaiah, chapter 9, according to the translation of the Seventy, who called the Son of God "the angel of great counsel." Thus answers Eusebius in book 5 of the Demonstratio Evangelica, chapter 10, and book 1, chapter 5; whose interpretation are followed by St. John Chrysostom in the homily on the Acts of the Apostles, and Theophylact there, and Theodoret, Question 5 on Exodus, and Isidore, book 1 On the Summum Bonum, chapter 12, number 23, and Bede, tome 8, in the Book of Questions, question 9, in the middle; nay more, Isidore adds that whenever in Scripture an angel is introduced speaking as God, the Son of God is always to be understood. In the same way St. Cyprian explains, book 2 Against the Jews, that testimony Genesis 31; and likewise Genesis 22 when an angel is said to have appeared to Abraham and to have spoken in the person of God; and St. Hilary, On the Trinity, book 4 in the latter part, and book 12 shortly before the end, so understood the apparition made to Hagar; and for this reason in the Council of Sirmium, whose canons St. Hilary reports in the book De synodis, chapter 15, it is said: "If anyone should say that it was not the Son with whom Jacob wrestled as in a dream, but the ineffable God or his Father, let him be anathema." With this also agrees Theodoret, Question 91 on Genesis, explaining the apparition in which Jacob is said in that wrestling to have seen the Son of God.[1323]

Nevertheless, this interpretation does not persuade me. For since every effect outside God is common to the whole Trinity, then only is one person rather than another said to appear when one is signified without the other, as under the appearance of a dove and in tongues of fire the person of the Holy Spirit was signified; but in these apparitions one person was not signified more than another: therefore neither did one appear more than another. Furthermore, nowhere in Scripture do we read that the Son of God, according to the divine nature, is called an angel: for in that place of Isaiah Scripture speaks of him according to the humanity, and he is called an angel because he was the messenger of the Father. But that Council of Sirmium is of no weight, as was noted in Disputation 109, chapter 5. As to apparitions made in the New Testament, I do not see that there is any special reason: for since all in the Old were so made on account of the majesty of God, by assumed bodies, the same ought to be done in the New. Only the evangelical law has this prerogative over the ancient, that in it the Word deigned to appear in his own flesh.

Articulus III - Whether angels in assumed bodies exercise operations of life

Objicitur: It seems that angels in assumed bodies exercise operations of life.

1. For angels of truth do not befit any fiction. But it would be a fiction, if a body assumed by them, which seems to live and to have the operations of life, did not have such things. Therefore angels in the assumed body exercise operations of life.
2. Further, there is nothing futile in the works of an angel. But eyes and nostrils and the other instruments of sense would be formed in an assumed body by an angel to no purpose unless the angel sensed through them. Therefore the angel senses through the assumed body. Which is the most proper operation of life.
3. Further, to be moved with progressive motion is one of the works of life, as is clear in On the Soul, book 2; yet manifestly angels appear in assumed bodies to be moved. For it is said in Genesis 18 that Abraham walked together with them, leading the angels who had appeared to him. And the angel, to Tobias asking, "Do you know the way that leads to the city of the Medes?," answered, "I know, and I have frequently walked all its routes." Therefore angels in assumed bodies frequently exercise operations of life.
4. Further, speaking is a work of a living being. For it is brought about by a voice, which is a sound emitted from the mouth of an animal, as is said in On the Soul, book 2. But it is manifest from many places of Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in assumed bodies they exercise operations of life.

1323. Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, lib. 5, cap. 10; lib. 1, cap. 5; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. in Acta Apostolorum; Theophylact, ad loc.; Theodoret, Quaest. 5 in Exodum; Isidore, De summo bono, lib. 1, cap. 12, n. 23; Bede, Tom. 8, Liber quaestionum, quaest. 9; St. Cyprian, Adv. Iudaeos, lib. 2; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. 4 (post med.), et lib. 12 (paulo ante finem); Concilium Sirmiense, apud Hilarium, De synodis, cap. 15; Theodoret, Quaest. 91 in Genesim.

5. Further, eating is a proper work of an animal. Whence the Lord, after the resurrection, in argument of true life, ate with the disciples, as is had in the end of Luke. But angels appearing in assumed bodies ate, and Abraham offered them food, whom nevertheless he had previously adored, as is had in Genesis 18. Therefore angels in assumed bodies exercise the operations of animal life.
6. Further, to beget a man is an act of life. But this befits angels in assumed bodies. For it is said in Genesis 6: "After the sons of God had entered to the daughters of men, and they bore children to them, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown." Therefore angels exercise operations of life in assumed bodies.

Sed contra: The bodies assumed by angels do not live, as was said above. Therefore neither can the works of life be exercised through them.

Respondetur: I answer that certain operations of living beings have something common with other operations. Thus speaking, which is an operation of a living being, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, inasmuch as it is a sound; and walking with other motions, inasmuch as it is a motion. Therefore, as to that which is common to both kinds of operations, operations of life can be produced by angels through assumed bodies; not, however, as to that which is proper to living beings: for, according to the Philosopher in the book On Sleep and Waking, whose is the potency, his is the action. Whence nothing can have the operation of life which does not have life, which is the potential principle of such an action.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that just as it is not against truth that in Scripture intelligible things are described under sensible figures - for this is not said in order to establish that intelligible things are sensible, but that through the figures of sensible things the properties of intelligibles, according to a certain likeness, are given to be understood - so it is not repugnant to the truthfulness of holy angels that through bodies assumed by them they appear to men as living, although they are not. For they are not assumed except that through the properties and works of a man the spiritual properties of the angels and their spiritual works may be designated. Which would not be done so fittingly if they assumed true men; for then the properties of those men would be attributed to the men themselves, not to the angels

Ad secundum dicendum, that sensing is entirely a work of life. Hence in no way is it to be said that angels sense through the organs of assumed bodies; nor, however, are they formed to no purpose. For they are not formed for this, that through them there be sensation, but for this, that through such organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be designated; as through the eye is designated the cognitive power of the angel, and through the other members other powers, as Pseudo - Dionysius teaches in the seventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, between the beginning and the middle

Ad tertium dicendum, that the motion which is from a conjoined mover is a proper work of life. But in this way the bodies assumed by them are not moved, because angels are not the forms of those bodies. Angels, however, are moved per accidens when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in movables, and they are thus here that they are not elsewhere - something

that cannot be said of God. Whence although God is not moved when those things in which he is are moved, because he is everywhere, nevertheless angels are moved per accidens with the motion of the assumed bodies. Not, however, with the motion of the celestial bodies, even if they are in them as movers in movables; because celestial bodies do not recede from place according to the whole. Nor is the place of the spirit moving the orb determined according to some determinate part of the substance of the orb, which is now in the East, now in the West, but according to a determinate situation; because the moving force is always in the East, as is said in Physics 8, text 84

Ad quartum dicendum, that angels do not properly speak through assumed bodies; but there is something like speech, inasmuch as they form sounds in the air similar to human voices

Ad quintum dicendum, that to eat, properly speaking, does not befit angels, because eating imports the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater. And although in the body of Christ after the resurrection the food would not be converted, but would be resolved into pre - existing matter, nevertheless Christ had a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it. Whence that was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither converted into the assumed body, nor was that body of such a nature that nourishment could be converted into it. Whence it was not a true eating, but a figurative one of spiritual eating. And this is what the angel said to Tobias 12: "When I was with you, you indeed were seeing [me] eat and drink; but I use an invisible drink and food." Abraham, however, offered them food, thinking them to be men, in whom nevertheless he was venerating God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says, City of God 16

Ad sextum dicendum, that, as Augustine says, City of God 15, many have either experienced or, having heard from those who experienced, confirm that Sylvans and Fauns (whom the common people call incubi) have often been morally depraved toward women and have desired and accomplished intercourse with them. Whence to deny this seems to be impudence. But the holy angels of God could in no way fall thus, before the deluge. Whence by the sons of God are understood the sons of Seth, who were good. By the daughters of men Scripture names those who were born of the stock of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants could be born of them; for not all were giants, but there were many more before the deluge than after. If, however, from the intercourse of demons some are at times born, this is not through seed cut off from them, or from bodies assumed, but through the seed of some man received for this purpose; namely, that the same demon who is a succubus to a man may become an incubus to a woman: as they also take the seeds of other things for the generation of certain things (as Augustine says, On the Trinity, book 3, chapters 8 and 9), so that the one who is born is not the son of the demon, but of that man whose seed was taken

Explicatio Articuli.

The conclusion is that, as regards that which is proper to living beings, angels cannot exercise the operations of life; but as regards that which is common to the works of living and non-living things, they can exercise them. The holy Doctor wishes to teach that an action can be produced by an angel in a living body which outwardly is similar to a vital action, although in reality it is not, such as speaking and walking. For there is a twofold kind of vital actions. One kind is of those which, according to their substance, cannot be except from life - such are the operations of the senses - and such actions in an assumed body cannot be done by angels; and in this the Doctors agree plainly in the second book, distinction 8. As to generation, about which there could be some difficulty because of incubus demons, who, approaching women, can generate, they teach that it cannot be done in an assumed body, except by bringing from elsewhere the seed of a man; just as they can burn by applying fire to matter; which in reality would not be to generate: for to generate is to let seed fall from one's own substance, by whose power offspring is produced in the womb of a woman; but this has been sufficiently confirmed above in Disputation 178, chapter 5.

The other kind of vital operations is of those which, according to their substance, can be done by a non-living principle, although not as to the mode; such as speaking and walking. By the mode of these actions we mean that peculiar respect which they have to such a principle; by the substance of the actions we mean the motion itself. Of these, therefore, St. Thomas says that they can exist as to the substance from an angel in an assumed body, because according to that they are assimilated to the actions of non-living things and agree with them; not, however, according to the peculiar mode by which they are done by living beings.

Disputatio CLXXXVI - Whether operations of life of the latter genus can be done by angels in assumed bodies

Caput I - Various scholastic positions

As to the operations of the former genus, no one has hitherto doubted, but all candidly acknowledge that they cannot be done by an angel in an assumed body, neither as to the mode nor as to the substance: for although nutrition, according to its substance, which is the conversion of food into the substance of the living thing, could be done by God, nevertheless that it cannot be done by an angel, no one doubts. The difficulty is only about the operations of the latter genus, whether both as to substance and mode, or as to substance only, they can proceed from an angel in an assumed body. In which difficulty the first opinion is that of Durandus in the First Book, distinction 8, question 2, number 5, where he teaches that neither walking, which the philosophers call progressive motion, nor speaking, properly so called, can befit an angel in an assumed body; but something which is like voice and walking. It thus seems that we should attribute these operations to angels neither as to the mode nor as to the substance.

The foundation of this opinion he set down in that question, number 4: because an action of a living thing is said in two ways - one way, because it is only from a living thing as from a principle; and this does not suffice that it be called simply and properly an action of a living thing. Otherwise the projection of a stone, which is done by a living thing, could properly be called an action of a living thing; yet in that way all the things which are done by an angel in a body can be called operations of a living thing, indeed improperly and in a broader signification. In the other way an operation is said strictly and properly to be of a living thing, because it is not only from a living thing, but is also received in it; wherefore, since such operations require a living organ in which they are received, they cannot properly be exercised through assumed bodies.

...so that he is not the son of the demon, but of that man whose seed was taken, as is cited in cap. 8 and 9.

Explicatio Articuli.

The conclusion is that, as regards that which is proper to living things, angels cannot exercise the operations of life; but as regards that which is common to the works of living and non-living things, they can exercise them. The holy Doctor wishes to teach that some action can be produced by an angel in a living body, which outwardly is like a vital action, though in reality it is not - such as speaking and walking. For there are two kinds of vital actions. One kind consists of those which, according to their very substance (*substantia*), cannot exist unless from a living thing, such as the operations of the senses; and these actions cannot be done in an assumed body by angels. And in this the Doctors fully agree in II, dist. 8, on generation; yet, that there could be some difficulty because of incubus demons, who, approaching women, can generate, they teach that this is not done in an assumed body, unless by bringing from elsewhere the seed of a man, just as they can burn by applying fire to matter; which truly would not be to generate. For to generate is that from one's own substance seed fall, by whose power offspring is made in the womb of the woman. But this remains sufficiently confirmed above in Disputation 178, cap. 5.

The other kind of vital actions consists of those which, according to their substance, can be done by a non-living principle, though not as to the mode; for example, speaking and walking. By the mode of these actions we mean that peculiar respect which they have to their principle; by the substance of the action we mean the very motion. Concerning these, therefore, St. Thomas says that, as to their substance, they can be from an angel in an assumed body, because according to that they are likened to the actions of non-living things and agree with them; not, however, according to the peculiar mode whereby they are from living beings... Therefore the operations of life of the latter kind can be done by angels in assumed bodies.

Concerning the operations of the former kind no one has hitherto doubted, but all frankly admit that they cannot be done by an angel in an assumed body, neither according to the mode, nor according to the substance. As to the substance - namely, that the conversion of food into the substance (*substantia*) of the living subject could be done by an angel - no one doubts this is fictive

only. The sole difficulty is about the operations of the latter kind, whether they can proceed from an angel in an assumed body according to both substance and mode, or only according to the substance.

In this difficulty, the first opinion is that of Durandus in II, dist. 8, q. 2, n. 5, where he posits that neither walking - which he calls the motion of the body - nor speaking can properly belong to an angel in an assumed body, but only something that is similar to a voice and to walking. It seems, therefore, that he refuses to attribute these operations to angels either according to the mode or according to the substance.

The foundation of this opinion he delivered in that question, n. 4: because an action of a living thing is said in a twofold way. In one way, because it is only from a living thing as from a principle; and this does not suffice that it be called simply and properly an action of a living thing. Otherwise heating and the projection of a stone, which are done by a living thing, could properly be called an action of a living thing. In this way all the things that are done by an angel in a body could be called operations of a living thing, properly indeed only in a broader signification. In the other way, an action is said properly and strictly to be of a living thing, because it is not only from a living thing as from a principle, but is also received in it. Wherefore, since the operations of an angel in an assumed body are not received in a living subject, it follows that they are not properly operations of life.

But before we set forth our opinion, meanwhile it should be noted against Durandus that from his own reasoning it follows that speech is not properly an operation of a living thing, and hence can proceed from an angel according to its entire notion and mode. For although speech is from a living and knowing subject, yet it is not received in the living subject: it is, rather, a certain sound; but the proper subject of this is air, by the beating of which it is made, as the Philosopher testifies in De anima, II, c. 8. Therefore, as Alexander most fittingly observed, part. quaest., mem. 4, in corpore and ad argumenta, speech is not for that reason called an operation of a living thing because it is effected in a living thing, but because it is effected by a living thing in a certain peculiar manner, as will be explained below.[1326]

The second opinion is that of St. Bonaventure in II, dist. 3, pars 1, art. 3, quaest. 2, who teaches that there are three modes of the soul's operations. For some are from the soul solely as motor; and such is walking, and these can be from an angel in an assumed body, for it can have the notion of a mover. Others indeed are from the soul, not only as mover, but also as perfecting the body; such is the operation of sense. Lastly, some are partly from the soul as mover, and partly as perfecting the body, or are a perfection of the body, as laughter, in which there is both a local motion of dilation of the cheeks and an interior exhilaration: and these also can be done by an angel in an assumed body, in so far as they are from the soul as mover, but not in so far as they are from the soul as perfecting. Thus St. Bonaventure concedes the motion which they call progressive in an angel, in the very same way in which it is in an animal.[1327]

1326. Aristotle, De anima, lib. 2, cap. 8; Alexander, part. quaest., mem. 4, in corpore et ad argumenta.
1327. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 3, pars 1, art. 3, quaest. 2.

The third opinion is that of Scotus in II, dist. 8, quaestione unica, § In ista quaestione, in the middle of that question, where on the one hand he teaches that an angel in an assumed body cannot truly effect that progressive motion, nor speech, nor expiration and inspiration, nor the motion of the eyelids, but only according to a certain external likeness. On the other hand, he affirms that angels in assumed bodies can truly eat. For he thinks that the action of eating consists solely in this, that by local motion one divide the food and transfer it from one part to another; in which Scotus agrees with Alexander, part. quaest., q. 5, memb. 2; and Gabriel, in that same distinction, q. 1, art. 3, dub., judges this to be probable.[1328][1329]

Caput II - The true opinion

Now, before we complete our own opinion - and in this article, in the solution of the arguments also - something seems to need to be supplied; namely, that the actions of the latter kind, out of those which Scotus a little before enumerated, indeed can proceed from an angel according to their substance, but do not receive their denomination, nor take the name, from the substance alone, but also from that mode. Hence, in an angel such actions cannot be received in the said mode of a living thing; but only according to a likeness are they rightly said to be such. Of this kind are speech, breathing out and in, coughing, motion of the eyelids, laughter.

In these actions of living things it is chiefly the mode that is to be noted, rather than the substance of the motion. The substance of the motion proceeds from an efficient cause which moves the eyelids, or the nose, or any other part in which the subject moved is contained; and in this respect it can be effected by an angel in an assumed body. The mode, however, by which it proceeds, from which also it receives its denomination, so requires a living thing as principle that it is not supplied by an angel in an assumed body; and thus it does not have a true appellation from him, but only according to a likeness.

Accordingly, in individual motions one must connect that peculiar notion of a principle which they require. First, the motion which they call progressive is effected through a power that resides in the tendons, and also through imagination and appetite, by reason of which the motion is called local by Aristotle, De anima, II, c. 3, according to a certain difference and a special grade of the soul. Therefore, since that power is not in an assumed body, nor the imagination, nor the appetite, that walking will not be said to be such, as if some man were moving a corpse so that it should seem to walk; and the same must be said about the motion of the eyelids. Secondly, expiration and inspiration and coughing, although they are not necessarily effected through imagination, nevertheless are powers of the animal nature residing in the lungs; and this mode is denoted by the very names. Thirdly, laughter is through imagination and delight of the appetite at something playful and new, whence proceeds the transverse motion of the septum and thence the cheeks are dilated and are moved, and all this is signified by the very name of laughter. Wherefore, if some

1328. Scotus, II Sent., dist. 8, quaest. unica, § In ista quaestione (in medio).
1329. Alexander, part. quaest., q. 5, memb. 2; Gabriel, dist. 8, quaest. 1, art. 3, dub.

statue were so polished that it had such a motion of the cheeks, it would not be said to laugh truly, because there would be lacking to it the mode signified by the name; and the same judgment is to be made about weeping.

De locutione

Fourthly, about speech and voice it must be said that the substance of these and of sound do not differ essentially; speech, however, or voice, is called sound from such a cause: for as Aristotle, De anima, II, c. 8, defines voice to be a sound produced with imagination by an animal, so too speech is called a sound which indeed is produced in the air by a man with imagination, to signify. Therefore brute animals are said indeed to utter voices, but not to speak. For the same reason, therefore, an angel can neither speak nor utter voices. Hence, finally, about the act of eating it must be said, in the same way, that there can be a motion which, according to its substance, but not according to the peculiar mode by which it is from a cause by reason of which someone is properly said to eat, exists. For it belongs to the notion of that operation that the motion which crushes the food and transfers it into the stomach be done by an animal; wherefore angels who in assumed bodies only crush food are not properly said to eat, as St. Thomas in this article to the fifth, St. Bonaventure in II, dist. 8, pars 1, art. 3, quaest. 1, and Richard in art. 1, quaest. 5, in corpore, to the first and to the second, have clearly taught, and this is manifestly gathered from Scripture.[1330][1327]

For in Tobit 12 Raphael said: "When I was with you, I both seemed indeed to eat and drink; but I use an invisible drink and food." What is "I seemed," unless that I thus appeared outwardly as if I were eating, when yet in truth I was not eating, because I am sustained by another kind of food? But concerning Christ after the Resurrection, the holy Doctor in the solution to the fifth teaches that He truly ate, because that motion truly was from a living body crushing the food and transferring it into the stomach, with an order to nutrition; although, because it was a glorious body, nutrition did not follow, but that food vanished. This indeed I judge truer than what Scotus and Gabriel assert - namely, that nutrition perhaps did follow.

Some argue thus against Scotus: If the act of eating in an angel were true as it is effected in a man, it would have been as true as the act of eating in Christ after the Resurrection; wherefore that could not have been an efficacious argument to prove the Resurrection, since in the same way it could truly have been done by an angel in an assumed body. Scotus and Gabriel reply that all those arguments for the Resurrection, taken according to sense, were each in detail sufficient; yet that all together did much more, as St. Thomas sensed in III, q. 55, a. 6, ad 1, especially with the testimony of the Scriptures and of the angels who said that Christ had risen.[1330] And indeed, if we speak of proof as to sense, I judge that the argument from eating by itself alone was not efficacious, just as truly it was when He offered Himself to be handled by the disciples, as I noted in Disputation 184. For although the act of eating in Christ was a true act of a living thing, with the other things necessary for the true notion of such an action, still that which outwardly appeared was only the

1330. St. Thomas, III, q. 55, a. 6, ad 1.
1327. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 3, pars 1, art. 3, quaest. 2.
1330. St. Thomas, III, q. 55, a. 6, ad 1.

substance of that motion which could in just the same way appear in an assumed body. For that peculiar mode which we said belongs to the notion of that action cannot be seen and judged by sense; wherefore the aforesaid argument against Scotus does not prove much. Then he replies that there was something in Christ's act of eating that is not in an angel, namely an order to nutrition, which perhaps he thinks is signified by that name; and thus at least in understanding and in faith the Resurrection of Christ could be proved. For since sight could not discern this order, it could not be an argument patent to sense. In whatever way, therefore, this argument be framed against Scotus's opinion, it is of no moment.

Hence it is that when Abraham invited the three angels (Gen. 18) and offered them foods, he had not yet known that they were angels; so teach Alexander, part. quaest., q. 34, memb. 6, and St. Thomas in this article to the fifth, Gabriel in II, dist. 8, quaest. 1, art. 3, dub. 3. But what St. Augustine says, Ep. 49, quaest. 4, that the angels took foods and that Christ also did the same, not by a feigned and empty phantasm, but with most manifest truth, not by necessity but by power, is to be understood thus: not that the angels truly ate as Christ did, but that to the eyes of men both Christ and the angels seemed to eat, not by prestiges and some illusion of sense, but by true appearance. Unless perhaps Augustine, following the opinion of those who think angels are corporeal - which he himself does not much abhor - understood that angels in a natural body truly ate, as other animals do.[1331][1332]

Quaestio LII - On the comparison of angels to place

Articulus I - Whether an angel is in a place

...Dimensive quantity is not in angels, but there is in them a virtual quantity. By the application, therefore, of an angelic power to some place, in such manner as it is said that an angel is in a corporeal place. And according to this it is clear that one ought not to say that an angel is measured by a place, or that he has a place as a container; but that he contains the place in a certain way, as a body contains its own powers and does not itself contain them as a subject. Likewise it is clear that an angel is not in place because he is continuous with the place: for a body is in a body by contact of continuity; but an angel is in a place by contact of power.

It is objected: It seems that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius in the book On the Hebdomads says that the common conception of the mind among the wise is that incorporeal things are not in a place; and Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physics says that not everything that is, is in a place, but a mobile body. But an angel is not a body (as was shown above). Therefore an angel is not in a place.[1333]

1331. Tobit 12.
1332. St. Augustine, Ep. 49, quaest. 4.
1333. Boethius, De hebdomadibus; Aristotle, Physics IV.

Besides, place is a quantity having position. But whatever is in a place has some position; yet to have position cannot befit an angel, since by his substance he is exempt from quantity, whose proper differentia is to have position. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Besides, to be in a place is to be measured by a place and to be contained by a place, as is evident from the Philosopher in the fourth Physics. But an angel cannot be measured nor contained by a place: because the container is more formal than the contained, as air than water, as is said in the fourth Physics. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

But on the contrary: in the Collect it is said, "Thy holy angels dwelling in the heavens, may they guard us in peace."[1334]

I answer: It is fitting for an angel to be in a place; yet the term "to be in a place" is used equivocally of an angel and of a body. For a body is in a place by being applied to a place according to the contact of dimensional quantity. But in angels there is no such quantity, but there is in them a virtual quantity. Therefore, by the application of angelic power to some place in whatever way, an angel is said to be in a bodily place. And according to this it is clear that one ought not to say that an angel is commensurated by a place, or that he has position in a continuum; for this befits a located body precisely as it has quantity of dimension. Likewise one ought not on this account to say that he is contained by a place. For an incorporeal substance, by its own power touching a corporeal thing, contains it and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as a container, and not as contained. And in like manner an angel is said to be in a bodily place, not as contained, but in a certain way as containing. And by this the reply to the objections is clear.

The first conclusion is: An angel is in a place. The second conclusion is: An angel is in a place by the application of his power to a place. Both conclusions must be unfolded more fully in the following disputations.

Disputatio CLXXXVII - Whether angels are truly in a bodily place

Caput I - Catholic and certain doctrine

There have not been lacking those who asserted that angels are never truly and properly present according to their substance in a bodily place, but only abusively; and that some in his time held this view is reported by Mirandola in the first Apology on the descent of the soul of Christ into hell. Durandus also reports the opinion of those asserting that an angel is only in a place in the way in which a cause is said to be in its effect; and Hervaeus followed this opinion in the treatise On the motion of the angel, question 1, where he places the angel's being in a place according to the order by which a cause is said to be in its effect.[1335] There are also certain Thomists, whom we shall mention in the next disputation, who affirm that an angel is not in the empyrean heaven in a place

1334. From the Roman liturgy; cf. Tobit 12.

1335. Mirandola, Apologia prima de descensu animae Christi ad inferos; Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 37, quaest. 1; Hervaeus, De motu angeli, q. 1.

according to the propinquity of his substance, but, I know not, according to some other reason; yet these do not deny in a universal way that angels are in a place. Some also ascribe this opinion to Durandus, although in truth he himself rejects it: he only teaches that angels are in a place in a certain broader signification, whereas to be in a place properly befits bodies; nevertheless he did not deny their presence according to their substance, but only a determined place and position, as will be evident in the next disputation.

But the Catholic doctrine is that angels can truly be in a place, present according to their substance; and to affirm the opposite is heretical, as St. Thomas says on the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 17, question 1, article 1; and this opinion is followed by all the scholastics whom we shall recount in the next disputation.[1336] It is proved first from the Fathers. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 34, at the end, which is the second of the Theological Orations, speaks thus about the angels: "Everywhere they promptly are present, both on account of the readiness of their ministry and on account of the lightness of their nature"; which words cannot be understood except of the presence of their substance.[1337] Athanasius, in the letter to Serapion On the Holy Spirit, far from the end, when he distinguishes between the Holy Spirit and a created spirit, says that the Holy Spirit is everywhere, but that the created spirit is in certain places; he also affirms that angels are circumscribed by a place. Damascene uses the same mode of speaking, as we shall explain below. Gregory of Nyssa, in the oration on infants who are taken away before their time, about the middle, teaches that the dwelling of the angels is heaven, because that seat befits their nature. Damascene too, in book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, toward the middle, says that angels are circumscribed by a place, because they are not conversant on earth when they are in heaven, nor do they remain in heaven when they are sent by God to earth. St. Gregory, in book 1 of the Morals, chapter 2, and homily 34 on the Gospels, teaches that angels are circumscribed by a place and are frequently sent to us, although in intellect they always remain in divine contemplation.[1338]

Certain men try to collect this same doctrine from Scripture: first from the Apocalypse, chapter 12, where the battle of Michael with the Dragon and his angels in heaven is described, and it is added, "And their place was not found any more in heaven"; then from Luke 10: "I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven." Yet from these places nothing is proved, as will be manifest in disputation 194; it can be better confirmed by those places of Scripture by which we shall show in disputation 194 that an angel is moved with respect to place; for if he is moved with respect to place, it is necessary that he be in a place.[1339]

1336. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 17, q. 1, a. 1.

1337. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34 (the second Theological Oration), in fine.

1338. St. Athanasius, Epistola ad Serapionem de Spiritu Sancto; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, cap. 3; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio de infantibus praemature abreptis; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia I, cap. 2; Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 34.

1339. Apocalypse 12; Luke 10:18; see below, disputation 194.

Caput II - Arguments against the aforesaid doctrine

Against what we have said, there seem to be some testimonies of the Fathers. First, Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 17, at the beginning, says of an angel: "He is said, however, to be in a place, because in an intellectual manner he is present, and as is consonant to his own nature he operates; nor is he circumscribed elsewhere, but where he operates; for he cannot operate in many and diverse places at the same time." Here he seems to say that an angel is not in a place according to the true presence of his substance, but according to effect, or on account of a likeness only of his nature with some place. I answer: the intellectual mode of existing in a place, in Damascene, is not without real presence of substance, but without the bulk of quantity, as is the case with bodies by reason of bodily form and figure. For he had said just before that an angel, although he is like a body in appearance, is nevertheless not so contained in a place as to receive bodily form and figure; and immediately he subjoins the words just quoted, "He is said, however, to be in a place, etc., because in an intellectual manner he is present, etc." He said "in an intellectual manner," because in an indivisible way he is in a place, whole in the whole, and whole in every part. Augustine signified the same thing when he said that a corporeal creature is moved through places and through times, but a spiritual one only through times; God, however, neither through places nor through times. He means that a spirit is not moved through places after the manner of a body circumscribing for itself a place by figure and form, since it is present to a place in an intellectual mode; but he said this according to the opinion of those who assert that angels are incorporeal; for those who say they are corporeal (whose view Augustine too seems in some places to have followed, as we reported in disputation 179, chapter 2) must confess likewise that angels are moved through places after the manner of bodies

Next, against the aforesaid there seems to be that of Augustine, book 83 Questions, question 20, where he says that the place of God is abusively called the temple of God. Therefore if God is said abusively to be in a place, much more an angel. I answer: there he called the temple "the place of God" abusively, in which He is worshiped, not because His substance is there abusively; but because the temple is said abusively to contain God, whereas in truth God is both within and without. For he immediately subjoins: "Not that He is contained in it, but that He is present to it." He had also said above that what is contained by a place is a body. He speaks, therefore, of the containing place, not of real presence according to place.

Now there is a twofold mode of existing in a place: one according to figure, which we commonly call "circumscriptive," and it befits bodies alone; the other, however, according to simple presence, and it is commonly called in angels "definitive," because the created spiritual substance is thus definitely present to one place that it is not present to another; yet at times angelic substances are said to be circumscribed by a place. Thus speak Damascene in book 2 On the Faith, chapters 2 and 3, Athanasius, and St. Gregory the Great in the places cited in the first chapter, and Theodoret in question 3 on Genesis; but, as Gregory of Rimini rightly explains in 2 Sentences, dist. 2, question 2, article 2, and Marsilius in 2, question 2, article 2, at the end, this is the sense found among the Fathers: that an angel is described by a place in that he is determined and limited by a peculiar

place; for it befits God alone to be "in things" and in the whole universe not defined; because He is in the whole in such a way that His immensity is not ended and terminated by that place; but the substance of an angel is peculiarly limited to a place, because it cannot be at the same time in another.[1341]

Disputatio CLXXXVIII - By what account an angel exists in a place

Caput I - Enumeration of opinions and statement of the question

- "That an angel is in a place by a quality divinely communicated," Alexander asserts.[1342]
- "That an angel is in a place by an operation abiding," was the opinion of Aegidius and of the Ferrarian.[1343]
- "That an angel is in a place by something after the manner of an operation," Capreolus held.[1344]
- "That an angel is in a place by a certain application of power to act," Cajetan defends.[1345]
- "That an angel by his bare substance is in an undetermined place," Durandus pronounces.[1346]
- "That an angel by his substance alone is in a determined place," many scholastics have asserted.[1347]
- The true opinion.[1348]

Since we are instituting a question about the account on account of which an angel is in a place, we are not asking what the form is by which an angel existing in a place is denominated as present according to place, namely whether it be the presence according to place itself - be it a relation, or some other intrinsic or extrinsic form (for this matters little) - from which the angel is denominated present to a place; but we are asking what the foundation is because of which an angel is said to be in a place: whether it be the angel's substance alone, or something added to it; just as in bodies it is quantity by reason of which they are constituted in a place. In this matter the scholastics have been set in such great dissension that to report the opinions of each would be wearisome. Yet, that the difficulty may be more elucidated, so far as I can...

- To be in a place through a quality divinely communicated, Alexander asserts, cap. 1.[1349]
- To be in a place through a transitive operation, Aegidius and the Ferrariense held, cap. 2.[1350]

1341. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, cap. 2 - 3; Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 3; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., q. 2, a. 2.
1342. Alexander of Hales; see below, cap. 1 of this disputation.
1343. Aegidius Romanus; Franciscus de Ferrara; see below, cap. 2.
1344. Peter of Aquila (Capreolus); see below, cap. 3.
1345. Cajetan; see below, cap. 4.
1346. Durandus of St.-Pourçain; see below, cap. 5.
1347. Various scholastics; see below, cap. 6.
1348. See below, cap. 7.
1349. Alexander of Hales, Summa 2, q. 32, memb. 1.
1350. Aegidius Romanus, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 3, art. 1, q. 1; Franciscus de Ferrara, In III Contra Gentiles, cap. 63, § Considerandum tertio.

- To be in a place through something after the manner of an operation, Capreolus thought, cap. 3.[1351]
- To be in a place through a certain application of power for operating, Cajetan defends, cap. 4.[1352]
- To be in a determinate place by its naked substance, Durandus pronounced, cap. 5.[1353]
- That it is only its substance that is in a determinate place, many scholastics [hold], cap. 6.
- Whether there be in a place through a quality produced by the angel, or through some mode added to his substance, below, cap. 7.

Against Alexander: that an angel is in a place by a divinely communicated quality

When we undertake the question concerning the ground on account of which an angel is in a place, we are not asking what form it is by which an angel existing in a place is denominated - whether it be presence according to some relation, or some other intrinsic or extrinsic form (for it is clear that by this an angel is denominated as present) - but we are asking what is the ground on account of which an angel is constituted in a place; whether it be only the angel's substance, by reason of which he is said to be in a place; or whether something is added to it, as in corporeal supposits, by reason of which they are in a place. In this matter the scholastics are set in such variety that it would be troublesome to recount the opinions of individuals. But, that the matter may be more elucidated, so far as we can, we shall pursue not only what is proved by us, but also what is said by others.

The first opinion, then, is Alexander's, 2 part., q. 32, memb. 1, who asserts that the reason and the foundation by which an angel is constituted in a place is a certain quality or property divinely communicated.[1349] This opinion indeed seems to be without foundation. For that quality cannot be natural, nor supernatural produced by God alone; for thus the angel could neither be in a place nor be moved locally by his own power - a thing absurd and contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers, who, as we shall see in disputation 194, cap. 2, attribute motion to the lightness and promptitude of the angelic nature; whereas in this way motion would have to be ascribed to the divine power alone. It remains, therefore, that it is a natural power produced by the angel himself, which he can change at will, and thus be moved locally; and accordingly it is not a quality bestowed by God alone. Whether, however, it be a quality produced by the angel, or some mode added to his substance, we shall speak in cap. 7.

Caput II - Against the opinion that an angel is in a place by a transitive operation

The second opinion is not a little common among those who say that a transitive operation is for an angel the ground whereby he is constituted in a place. Thus teaches Aegidius, In I Sent., dist. 37, the third part of the distinction, art. 1, q. 1; and the Ferrariense, In III Contra Gentiles, cap. 63, §

1351. Peter of Aquila (Capreolus), below, cap. 3.
1352. Cajetan, below, cap. 4.
1353. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, below, cap. 5.

Considerandum tertio;[1350] he also judges that this is St. Thomas's opinion in this article, when he says that angels are in a place by an application of their power to a place, as the Ferrariense at length draws out in the cited place; and the Holy Doctor seems to agree, In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 3, and above in Summa I, q. 8, a. 1, when he said that God is in all things by reason of his operation. [1354] The first point is also proved from Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 17, where he says thus: "Nevertheless he is said to be in a place, namely the angel, who is present in an intellectual mode, and, as it were, works there; nor is he elsewhere, but he is, in an intellectual mode, circumscribed there where he works."[1355] It seems, therefore, that he assigns operation as the reason for existing in a place; for that particle "atque" conjoins the preceding with the following, as if he repeated the causal particle "quia", and the sense were: for this reason he is in a place, because he is present intellectually, and because he works there. But the clause "because he is present intellectually" explains the mode of existing in a place; whereas "because he works there" declares the foundation of existence in a place. Then it is confirmed by reason, first, because we do not seem able, without absurdity, to say that an angel is in a place, save by some contact of power, just as bodies by some contact of quantity; but contact of power is nothing other than operation: therefore by that the angel is constituted in a place. Then also, since God is constituted in all things by operation, a created spiritual substance also will be constituted [in a place] by operation.

This opinion is refuted by Scotus in II Sent., dist. 2, q. 6, § Contra hoc est.[1356] He also reports that it was condemned at Paris by the Bishop of Paris together with the theological faculty; the same is reported by Richard, In I Sent., dist. 37, art., q. 1; and Gabriel, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 4, in which places the aforesaid opinion is not approved.[1357] As to that condemnation made at Paris, there would be little need to care, since many other propositions have been unjustly condemned by the Doctors of Paris, even if in truth the aforesaid opinion had been condemned. But, as is gathered from Henry, Quodlib. 2, q. 9, who follows the opposite opinion and was among the Doctors who pronounced that condemnation, it was not defined there by the Doctors whether the foundation of existing in a place is substance, or operation, or something else. For Henry himself thinks that it is not bare substance, as we shall see in cap. 6; but they condemned the theologians asserting that an angel is in a place only by operation, not by substance - that is, that their substance is not truly present in a place, but that they are only in the place wherein they operate, just as a cause is said to be in its effect even if it be absent according to place. But this is not what the aforesaid opinion asserts. Be that as it may with that Parisian decree, this opinion must be refuted in another way.

1349. Alexander of Hales, Summa 2, q. 32, memb. 1.

1350. Aegidius Romanus, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 3, art. 1, q. 1; Franciscus de Ferrara, In III Contra Gentiles, cap. 63, § Considerandum tertio.

1354. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 3; Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1.

1355. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 17.

1356. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 6, § Contra hoc est.

1357. Richard of Middleton, In I Sent., dist. 37, art., q. 1; Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 4.

First, indeed, by the authority of Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 17, whose words we shall set forth below, where he asserts that an angel therefore works here and elsewhere, because he passes through diverse places; therefore it is prior to be in a place and to pass through places than to work in them.[1355] Then by four reasons.

First reason. Although God works before he is in things - both because things must first be produced before God is in them, and also because God has no need of propinquity of places in order to work, as we showed in disputation 8, cap. 3 - yet created causes ought first to be near to the place before they work. For their power is finite; wherefore they need propinquity of place as a necessary condition for working; therefore they are first in a place before they work.

Second reason. If an angel were in a place by a transitive operation, he could never, while himself resting, move some body, but would necessarily be moved together with it. For the mover cannot be present to a body which he moves except by some transitive operation other than local motion; but in the body which is moved the mover cannot himself rest, as is plain; therefore he could never move a body without being moved.

Third reason. If an angel were in a place by operation, it would follow that he who moves the heaven would be in the whole orb (which seems absurd), because he moves the whole. How, moreover, would he not move other parts by one part? We shall speak of this in disputation 192, cap. 2. It would also follow that any angel could by his power be simultaneously in heaven and on earth. For if an angel can move a body of such-and-such a size - for example, of forty palms - he can at the same time, together with others, move a body extended as far as heaven (for we shall show below, disputation 193, cap. 4, that one angel can be helped by another); then he would be in the whole body, not in some determinate part of it, as is gathered from those things which we shall say in disputation 192, cap. 2; therefore he would be simultaneously in heaven and on earth, which is absurd, as we shall show below.

Fourth reason, most efficacious of all and pressing more upon the adversaries, is that it would follow that the angels were not created in the Empyrean heaven, nor are they now blessed there, nor the damned in hell. The same is wholly gathered concerning the blessed and the damned souls, and concerning the soul of Christ - namely, that it did not descend according to substance to the lower regions, because neither angels nor the souls of men have there any transitive operation, nor did the soul of Christ have [such] in hell. The angels in the Empyrean certainly did not have it, because that heaven is not moved; moreover, an angel cannot imprint on a body any operation other than motion according to place. And although he were moved according to place, it should not be said that all the angels who were created in heaven were moved; why, indeed, should so many thousands of angels have been occupied in moving one single body? In hell, too, what operation could demons and souls have? We must not say that the fire in hell is agitated perpetually by them.

First reply. Aegidius replies that the angels are not in the Empyrean by any transitive operation, but by an application of power. But this solution is easily rejected. For either by "application of power" he understands an operation other than transitive motion according to place; and this

seems wholly invented, since an angel can effect nothing in a body other than local motion; or else let him assign that kind of operation which the angels imprint upon the Empyrean heaven; or he understands an immanent action of the will, which is the principle of transitive operations; and thus the sentence of Cajetan can be impugned in the same way. Add that, since the Empyrean heaven is not moved by an angel according to place, nor does it receive anything from him, we would say in vain that the angel applied his power and that by that he is in a place; for the application of power with respect to a body is nothing other than to some operation around it.

Second reply. The Ferrariense replies that spiritual substances are in those places by some transitive operation which they have not by their own power, but by a divine one. For, as St. Thomas teaches, De malo, q. 16, a. 9, ad 3 and ad 12, demons can be assumed by God as instruments for effects to be produced beyond the powers of nature; therefore we can say that something is there operated by the power of God, although it be hidden from us.[1358] But, besides the fact that an assumed instrument cannot, physically, operate something for which it has no inchoate power - as we showed in disputation 177, cap. 3 and 4 - such an occult operation of an angel seems devised without basis solely in order to prop up the Ferrariense's opinion.

Third reply. He replies, concerning the souls and the damned demons, that they are indeed in hell not by reason of transitive operations, but by reason of passion. Yet he himself does not fully approve this solution, on account of the authority of St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3, where he teaches that an angel is first bound to fire before he is tormented by it. [1359] For my part, another reply does not please me. First, because demons or souls do not suffer from the fire by any physical action derived from it, as we shall prove in disputation 243, cap. 3. Then also because in this way the difficulty is not removed concerning the blessed angels, the souls of the Fathers in the bosom of Abraham, the infants in limbo, who, according to the truer opinion, do not suffer from the fire, and the soul of Christ when it descended to the lower regions. Moreover, if the sentence is true which teaches that any thing whatsoever can at God's pleasure be assumed as an instrument, we must grant that he can assume a thing at rest or in motion, proximate or absent; for these contribute nothing to the notion of a voluntary instrument, since its whole efficacy is from God, who needs neither motion nor propinquity in order to work. Therefore, whether you say that the angel operates by God's power upon some thing, or that the fire operates upon the angel, it does not follow that the angel is proximate by that alone because, as an instrument, he operates; whatever propinquity he has, he must have it from elsewhere than from the fact of being an instrument to him who, neither by motion nor by propinquity, needs [anything] to work.

Fourth reply of Cajetan. Furthermore, since the same argument no less strikes against Cajetan's opinion, he too strives in this article to reply. First, with the Ferrariense, he says that the angels are in the Empyrean heaven by an operation wholly occult, which has already been confuted by us. Then he pronounces that the angels are not properly in the Empyrean heaven, but abusively and

1355. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 17.
1358. St. Thomas, De malo, q. 16, a. 9, ad 3 et ad 12.
1359. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, a. 3, quaest. 3.

metaphorically, because they are in the glory for which that heaven is destined; and he thinks this is the opinion of Nazianzen; Nyssen is also reported for this opinion.[1360] But concerning the other spiritual substances and concerning the soul of Christ he says nothing. However, on III, q. 52, a. 2, ad 3, he teaches that separated souls can, by God's will, operate upon a body just as an angel operates; and thus he grants that the soul of Christ truly was according to substance in hell, because by the power of the Word he wrought miracles there.[1361] He concedes, therefore, that all souls are in those places by reason of some occult operation communicated by the power of God; and he ought to concede the same about the demons, or else assert that they are not in hell by any other reason than the blessed are in heaven. But, first, to concede an occult operation to all these is superfluous, indeed invented; and although it is probable that the soul of Christ could, as an instrument of God, operate physically by his power (for I judge the opposite more probable, as is gathered from disputation 177), nevertheless I do not see what transitive action it had continually in hell. Be it so, that we grant this of the soul of Christ; but concerning the other spiritual substances, what shall we say - whether they exercise there some occult operation by the power of God, or whether they are not there truly and properly? But this is absurd. For, just as the same Cajetan, on III, q. 53, a. 2, against Durandus, proves that it is absurd to deny that the soul of Christ was in hell according to substance (which, when Picus of Mirandola once seemed to have said at Rome, and for the same cause was very ill thought of, from this error he carefully purged himself), worthy of the same censure will it be to affirm that the souls of the Fathers were not in the bosom of Abraham according to their substance; for to them Christ is said to have descended. Add that Scripture in the same way says that angels are in heaven as the Church says that Christ descended to the lower regions; therefore we must confess that they are in heaven in the same way as the soul of Christ was in hell.

Secondly, it would be falsely said that all the angels were created in the Empyrean heaven, if by the Empyrean heaven beatitude were understood; for from the beginning they were not blessed, nor have all afterwards obtained beatitude.

Thirdly, Christ begins to be in the Eucharist truly and in reality, and not by some operation nor by passion, as is plain; therefore an angel too can be there without action and passion. If he should say that Christ is there by the change of the bread into him, this helps nothing - both because, once the change of bread into the body of Christ has taken place, the body itself remains, and because he could be there without that, as Cajetan himself admits on III, q. 75, a. 2. For ...[1362]

1. For even if God were to restore the substance of bread, the body of Christ could remain; indeed, as we said in Disputation 177, chapter 5, the removal of the bread has by the nature of the thing no necessary connexion with the physical presence of Christ's body, but only by the force of the words. Therefore it is clear that, without any transitive action, some spiritual substance, or something having a spiritual mode, can be present to a place. In St. Gregory of

1360. St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Gregory of Nyssa are sometimes cited for metaphorical locutions about heaven; see below, cap. 4.

1361. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 52, a. 2, ad 3.

1362. Cajetan, In IIIam, q. 75, a. 2.

Nyssa I, for my part, have found nothing that would favor the view of those who assert that angels are not in heaven according to substance. St. Gregory Nazianzen, however, plainly teaches that they are in a place and traverse places, as we saw in the preceding disputation.

It remains to refute the arguments of the opposing opinion. As to the testimony of St. John Damascene, I answer: he only said that an angel is where he operates, which we readily grant, because he needs the proximity of a place in order to act; but he did not say that therefore he is in a place because he operates in it. And when he says, "And since it is in accord with its very nature, it operates," the conjunction "and" does not conjoin the clause "because" which preceded, so as to assign a cause why it is in a place; rather Damascene only signifies that an angel is in a place in an intellectual mode, that is, not according to the form of quantity, and that in the same mode he operates, that is, not by a quantitative contact, but by the presence of his substance. Nay more, in On the Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 17, he plainly admits that for this reason angels operate in a place, because they are in a place. "For the angel," he says, "on account of the swiftness of his nature, and because he passes quickly and speedily, operates in diverse places." As to the first argument, I grant that an angel is not in a place without some contact of power; yet not by any transitive action into the place, nor by passion, but in another way, as we shall explain in chapter 7. As to the second argument, I say that God is not in a place by reason of operation, or at least that this is not evident to us, as we proved in Disputation 28. And even if God were in a place by reason of operation, it would not follow that therefore an angel is also by reason of operation. For the absurdities follow which we set out, if we say that an angel exists by operation - absurdities which do not follow from our asserting that God exists there, as I noted in that disputation. Add that, since God does not need the nearness of place, as some precondition, in order to operate, whereas an angel does need it, it follows that by nature God could operate in a place before being in it, and thus could have operation as a foundation for being in a place; but an angel must be in a place before he operates, and thus he cannot be constituted in a place by reason of operation.

Caput III - The third opinion: that an angel is in a place by operation, passion, or presidency

The third opinion is that angels are in a place either by a transitive operation, or by passion, or finally by this, that an angel presides over things, or comports himself after the manner of an agent. Thus taught St. Thomas in Quodlibet 1, art. 4; and afterwards Capreolus, on the Second Book, distinction c., question 1, art. 1, conclusion 1, where he also reports, in favor of the same opinion, St. Thomas on the First Book, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 1; there, however, he attributes only this, that the reason of existing in a place is a transitive operation. But on his own authority Capreolus adds these words: "I say, prior to operation taken commonly, according to which an angel bears himself toward the body contained in the place after the mode of one presiding, or ministering, or in some way acting or suffering." He drew these from that same Quodlibet where almost the same things are found.[1363][1363][1365] The same opinion is embraced, it seems, by Picus of Mirandola in the Apologia,

1363. St. Thomas, Quodlibet I, art. 4.

question 1, not far from the beginning, where he affirms that an angel is in a place by operation, taking "operation" for any habituation to a body or to a place that obtains after the mode of active or passive operation. He further adds that this belongs to an angel by his own proper power; but that by God's absolute power he can be set in a place in another way.[1366]

Ferrarensis judges that this opinion, in the passage cited, is not according to the mind of St. Thomas even in that Quodlibet; for when Thomas says there that an angel is in a place by operation, or by one of those modes, he understands (says Ferrarensis) only a transitive operation, which is either local motion, or illumination, or any other such thing that he can have by God's power. Whatever be the mind of the holy Doctor in that place - which is difficult - this opinion of Capreolus is easily refuted by reason.

If Capreolus and Mirandola say that something other than a transitive operation, signified by the mode of action, is the foundation of existence in a place, then either it is some immanent operation of will (*voluntas*) or intellect (*intellectus*) (for it cannot belong to any other faculty). And so either one must say with Cajetan that by some peculiar act of these faculties an angel is constituted in a place - which we shall impugn in chapter 4 - or else by any immanent action whatsoever; and this is manifestly false. For an angel existing in heaven guards us on earth by intellect's mere attention and the will's desire, as St. Thomas teaches on the Second Book, distinct. 11, q. 1, a. 4, ad 5; therefore that guardianship and as it were the act of presiding does not constitute him in the earth; otherwise, since he can fix his attention upon the whole universe, he could place himself in the whole of it; which is absurd. Or else the habitus signified by the mode of action is some relation, as Capreolus indicates on the Second Book, distinction c., question 1, art. 3, to Aureol's arguments against the first conclusion, which he calls "ennoblement" and a certain "ornament" of the place itself; but this cannot be the foundation of such existence. For since to exist in a place is a certain relation, it cannot arise from another relation, unless some prior change be wrought in something absolute. That prior relation cannot arise from the angel's mere will or from his substance: not from his will, because no relation ever springs up unless a prior change has been made; not from his substance, because it would always be the same and could not vary with place; and consequently an angel would never be moved.

As to what Mirandola adds about the absolute power of God, if it be rightly understood, it is most true; yet it must be understood thus: that without some absolute change, which is the foundation of existing in a place, God cannot confer upon an angel that presence which consists in a relation. This third opinion has no argument in its favor that needs to be dissolved.

Caput IV - The fourth opinion: that an angel is in a place by an application of power to act

The fourth opinion is Cajetan's in this article, who, following Thomas of Argentina on the First Book, dist. 37, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, against the first conclusion, and Godefred of Fontaines in Quodlibet 8, q. 13 (whom Scotus cites in the place noted below), thinks he has surmounted all these

1364. Capreolus (Peter of Aquila), In II Sent., dist. c., q. 1, art. 1, concl. 1.
1365. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 3, a. 1.

difficulties if he concedes that an angel is not in a place in any other way than by an application of power to a transitive operation. He holds moreover that this application is an immanent act of intellect and will, and also an expedition of the executive faculty, by which the angel is in readiness to operate - and that this is of such power as to constitute the angel in a place, not only as long as the transitive operation is being completed, but even before he operates, when he is already said to be on watch and actually considers how the tasks enjoined there may be rightly performed. He adds, however, that this mode of existing in a place is incomplete; but that completely the angel exists there by a transitive operation. What it is to exist incompletely and completely he does not explain. Yet he does not deny that in the former mode the angel's substance is truly present - if he were to deny it, he would fall outright into the second opinion impugned in chapter 2. Therefore what remains to be proved against Cajetan alone is, that an angel is not truly present by that immanent action whereby he is said to apply his power to a transitive operation. But this can be shown by the reasons set forth in chapter 2: for it would follow that neither angels in the Empyrean heaven, nor the souls of the Fathers in purgatory, nor the damned in hell truly exist there, nor that the soul of Christ truly descended to the lower regions. For since in those places there was to be no future transitive operation, there will be no application of power to act. What Cajetan answers about angels existing in the Empyrean we have reported and refuted in that chapter. As to the soul of Christ, he answers that it had some effect upon the souls of the Fathers and of the damned - terrifying these, enlightening those; and that it also had some operation in those places of hell by a power of the humanity: he seems to understand a transitive action. But this reply is no less easily refuted.

First, because that illumination and correction, as effects in souls, could not be the cause of constituting Christ's soul in a corporeal place. For neither do such operations require nearness of place, since they are spiritual, and their effects are received in the spirit; and if they had any force upon bodies, they would sooner have constituted Christ's soul within the substance of the souls of the Fathers and of the damned than in a corporeal place. Moreover, none of those operations was intrinsic in the souls, nor was there any influx of a physical quality into the souls; for illumination is not effected by passion, but is wholly on the part of the object proposed - as we shall explain more fully in Disputation 1, chapter 5; therefore it cannot be the cause of constituting an angel materially in a place. Besides, either the humanity of Christ was the cause of those actions as a physical instrument, or only in a general way: in neither way does it seem sufficient to constitute the substance of his soul in a place. The first is manifest if it be as a subordinate instrument. And as to a physical manner, it has already been sufficiently proved above, in chapter 2, that by reason of instrumental action the soul of Christ could not be located in a corporeal place; nor can the application of itself as an instrument to act be in that case a cause of existing in a place. This opinion of Cajetan seems to have been devised for no other reason than that he might first place an angel in a place before he should act by a transitive operation - since that seemed to him necessary; for he thought that by his bare substance an angel could not be constituted in a place; yet I add that the mode proposed by Cajetan is not possible, and that this difficulty can be solved in a much

1366. Picus of Mirandola, Apologia, quaest. 1.

easier way. For I freely admit that an angel must be in a place before he operates; I also maintain that by his bare substance he cannot be constituted in a place; but I add that Cajetan's way is not possible, and that in another, much easier way the present difficulty can be resolved.

The fifth opinion was that of Durandus, on the First Book, distinction 37, the second part of the distinction, question 1, num. 4. He holds that an angel by his bare substance is in a place, not indeed in a determinate place which he could abandon by motion, but in a common place, namely, with respect to all the bodies which by his power he can move; and that to all these the angel is truly present by his substance and by his power, whether he actually operates or only wills to exercise some operation about them; and since his substance and his power are always the same, he keeps the same mode, so that by no reason can he leave the place which he once in this way has. Durandus proves this by two reasons. The first is: every agent, in order that it may operate, must first be present to the patient upon which it operates; but an angel, before he operates, cannot be understood to be present otherwise than by his substance; therefore, before he operates, he is present by his substance; and therefore, before he operates, by that same reason he is not more present to this body than to that, but he ought to be equally present to all of them. The second reason: if it be present to one body and not to another, although it can operate upon both, this must come to pass by some motion in the very substance of the angel; but no such motion seems capable of being received in the angel's substance; therefore he ought to be equally present to all bodies.

Durandus then explains this presence of an angel by the example of the heavenly bodies. For these too are present to all bodies about which they can operate; yet with this difference, that a heavenly body, since it has quantity and is corporeal, is hindered with respect to the bodies to which it is present, so that it is not equally near and immediately present to all; but a spirit, since it lacks quantity, is detained by no impediment that would keep it from being adequately present to all the bodies which it can move. Hence, although he calls the presence of an angel "presence by order" in regard of all bodies whatsoever, nevertheless he does not deny presence according to substance; but he confesses a presence not merely by order of convenience, but a true presence and according to substance.[1367]

This opinion of Durandus is rightly judged improbable by all the Scholastics of our time. For either he speaks of presence only by reason of convenience, and thus he establishes the angel to be nowhere present according to substance, which is absurd, as is clear from what was said in the first and second chapter; or only of the presence of cognition, whereby one is said to be present to the things which he has in view, and in this way the same inconvenience follows, namely, that he is nowhere present according to substance; or, thirdly, he admits a true presence and nearness of place in the substance of the angel, although not by situation and quantity, as indeed he grants; and from this no less inconveniences follow.

The first is, that the angel would be everywhere, against the common doctrine of the Fathers, whom I recalled in the preceding disputation, chapter 11; for they teach that angels are circumscribed by place in a particular way, because God alone is everywhere, as St. Thomas hands

down above, question 8, article 4, with whom the Scholastics agree in I, dist. 37. But that this is gathered from his doctrine is proved: for he teaches in number 34 that an angel ought not to be said to be present in all things. Then too, there is no greater reason why he should be in this place rather than in that by his substance and power, if his power is equally disposed toward each thing: therefore, since there is no body that cannot be moved by an angel, he will be at once in all. For if an angel of a lower grade and order, as all admit, can move any celestial body whatsoever, he will also be able to move any other body whatsoever; or if, because the elements are fluid, he cannot move them all at once together, it is enough that there be no part in them which he cannot move, so that he be effected equally in all their parts. Wherefore it is frivolous what Durandus answers, that an angel is not in all bodies because he cannot move them all. Or at least it would follow that the damned angels would be in heaven, because although a damned angel cannot move all things, even according to parts, nevertheless any one of them could move a heavenly body: therefore all the damned angels would still have remained in heaven. Then Durandus answers that an angel is everywhere where God is, yet in a different way, because God is there as the conserver and cause of all the things in which he is, but an angel only by that reason that he can move. In this very way he finally concedes that an angel could be in many other worlds, if they were made by God; which is plainly deduced from his doctrine. He must also concede that the damned angels remained in heaven - things most absurd.

The second absurdity which follows from the opinion of Durandus is that angels are not moved - which he himself candidly confesses - against Scripture and the common doctrine of the Fathers; see disputation 194.

Finally, the third absurdity is that an angel is always in an equal place: for since he is always equally related to all places, in all of them he will always be in the same way. But that this is absurd will be shown in the following chapter. The reasons of Durandus are easily dissolved: first, because in chapter 7 we shall show how an angel, before he operates, is in a determinate place; then also whence it comes that he is present to this rather than to that; finally, in disputation 194, chapter 3, we shall show that an angel can be moved from one place to another; hence therefore all the reasons of Durandus will be dissolved.

That an angel is in a determinate place by his substance alone, many Scholastics assert.

This is the opinion of many Scholastics, who affirm that an angel is in a place by his substance alone (*substantia*), every other thing being excluded. Thus they handed down in I, dist. 37, article 1, question 1; St. Bonaventure, in II, dist. 2, part 2, article 2; Scotus, question 6, 9; to question 8 and 9; Gregory, in II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, conclusion 4; Gregory, q. 2, a. 2; Henry; Marsilius, in II, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 4.[1368] But Henry, disputing this question at length in Quodlibet 2, q. 9, dares to define nothing; yet he notes that at Paris the sentence of those asserting that an angel is in a place only by operation and not by substance had been condemned by the Doctors, but it had not been defined

1367. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, q. 1, n. 4.

1368. Richard, In I Sent., dist. 37, art. 1, q. 1; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, part 2, art. 2, q. 1; Scotus, q. 6, 9; Ad quaest. 8, 9; Gregory, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, art. 2, concl. 4; Gregory, q. 2, art. 2; Henry; Marsilius, In II, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 4.

that the foundation of existence in place is the very substance of the angel; and in this all the doctors agreed, of whom he himself was one. Indeed, although he says against St. Thomas that the foundation of existing in place is not for an angel his operation, nevertheless he affirms that it is not the naked substance; what, however, that addition to the substance is, he does not explain.

Caput VI - Against the preceding opinion

Accordingly, the aforesaid Doctors, against the preceding opinions, pronounce that an angel is not in a place by reason of a quality communicated by God, nor by reason of a transitive operation, or of something that has the standing of a transitive operation: the same also they would say against Cajetan, that it is not by reason of application; and lastly against Durandus, that it is not by reason of his substance in every place, but by reason of his substance, as a body by reason of quantity, to be in a place determined and finite; so that in angels, from their substance alone, without anything else, there arises existence (*esse*) in place, just as in bodies from quantity alone; although it can vary at will.

But in accordance with this sentence it is taught that an angel is never loosed from place, nor does he pass from place to place without a medium. Now this sentence can be confirmed by three reasons. First, by refuting the other opinions, apart from which no other seems to remain. Second, because it cannot be understood that an angel ceases to be here until by motion he changes place: but if otherwise, then, as was said above, either the foundation of existence in place would depend upon the will, and he could, as it pleased, cease to be here where he was before, without being moved therefrom; therefore it is better to say that existence in this or that place arises proximally from the substance of the angel, even if it can be changed by the will: for thus he would never cease to be here by the mere nod of his will without motion. Third, because from this alone, that the angel's substance, without anything else, is a certain part of the whole universe of things, it follows that it has, according to itself, an order of place in the universe, without anything else.

However, although together with the aforesaid doctors I do not at all approve the sentences which I have thus far related, nevertheless I judge no less false that which they affirm, namely, that the foundation of existence in place is the naked substance; and this I not obscurely show by the following reason. Either the existence of the angel in place is taken for the mere relation (*relatio*) of presence, whereby one is said to be present to some place, and this cannot arise from the naked substance: for it would follow that the angel would always remain present in the same mode until the bodies to which he is present are moved; because from the same foundation on the part of one relative there is always born the same relation, the term of that relation remaining in the same way, whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic: wherefore, with the substance of the angel unchanged according to its nature, which is said to be the foundation of presence, and with the term not changed, the angel would be present in the same way, and thus from a permanent place he could not be moved - which is absurd. You will say, he can be moved, and that relation of presence can be removed by local motion. But this answer is of no value: for local motion must be to some form prior to relation, because relation, as I said, cannot be changed in itself unless either the term or

the absolute foundation is changed; but if that existence in place is some absolute mode from which the relation of presence follows, it cannot be said that such a mode arises from the naked substance of the angel, as in bodies it proceeds from naked quantity: for hence the first thing would follow, that an angel cannot be loosed from every place, and thus cannot pass from one extreme to the other without a medium - which will be proved false below, disputation 196, chapter 2 - since the foundation of existence in place is always present, namely, the substance of the angel, just as in bodies quantity: therefore an angel will always be in a place, like a body, although it can be varied by motion. Moreover, it follows that an angel is always in an equal place, and can never place himself in a smaller one: because just as the same quantity is always followed by the same existence in a place equal in all respects, and a body cannot be constrained unless perhaps by compression and condensation - which cannot befall the substance of an angel - so too the angel would always be in an equal place. But this Scotus does not dare to concede, and it is plainly false, as we shall say below in disputation 191. Lastly, if existing in a place does not arise from the naked substance of an angel, but from the angel's will alone, it follows that an angel can be wholly loosed from place; for to be in a place arises from his free will - which the Doctors of this opinion are unwilling to concede.

Now in answer to the first reason of this opinion I reply that all the other opinions have not sufficiently assigned the foundation of existence in place; yet on that account it is not necessary, with Scotus, to assert that the foundation is the naked substance. To the second I say that it can rightly be explained and understood that an angel ceases to be in a place without being moved therefrom by the mere nod of his will, as we shall say in the following chapter. But the third reason proves only this, that a spiritual nature, because it is a part of this universe of things, has, according to itself, an order of place in the universe; from which it is not yet gathered that this order is existence in place, of which we shall treat hereafter.

But this does not explain it. Therefore the aforesaid Doctors, in opposition to the preceding opinions, pronounce that an angel is not in a place by reason of a quality communicated by God, nor by reason of a transitive operation, or one that has the manner of a transitive operation; the same men would also say against Cajetan that it is not by reason of application; and finally against Durandus, that it is not by reason of his substance in every place, but by reason of his substance, as a body by reason of quantity, to be in a determinate and finite place; thus in angels there arises from their substance without anything else existence in a place, as in bodies from quantity alone; although it can vary at will. And in agreement with this opinion they teach consistently that an angel is never loosed from a place, nor passes from place to place without a middle. This opinion can be confirmed by three reasons. First, by refuting the other opinions, besides which none other seems to remain; second, because it cannot be understood that an angel ceases to be here until by motion he changes place: but if in some other way it were as the aforesaid say, or if the foundation of existence in place depended on the will, he could, as he pleased, determine to be here where before he was, without thereby being moved: therefore it is better to say that existence in this or that place arises proximally from the substance of the angel, even if at will it can be changed; for thus he would never determine to be here by the mere nod of the will without motion: third,

because from this alone, that the substance of angels, without anything else, is made a certain part of the whole universe of things, it follows that it, according to itself, has an order of place in the universe, without anything else.

Yet I - for all that I do not at all approve, together with the aforesaid Doctors fighting against the preceding opinions which I have hitherto reported, what they themselves affirm - I esteem the preceding opinion no less false, namely, that the foundation of existence in place is the naked substance. I show this not obscurely by the following reason. Either the existence of an angel in a place is taken for the mere relation of presence, whereby he is said to be present to some place; and this cannot arise from naked substance: for it would follow that an angel would always remain present in the same way, until the bodies to which he is present are moved; because from the same foundation on the part of one relative there always arises the same relation, the term of that relation remaining in the same way, whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic. Wherefore, the substance of the angel, unchanged according to its nature, which is said to be present, would make him present in the same way to the place, and thus he would remain in the same place - which is absurd, and it would abolish that local relation. But this is excluded: for local motion cannot change a relation, as I said, in itself, unless either the absolute term is changed or some prior absolute is changed; but if in place there is some mode, such a mode can arise, and thus local presence would arise from that mode in the angel, as in bodies it proceeds from quantity. Hence it will afterwards be proved that an angel is not present in every place, and thus neither can he pass from extreme to extreme without a middle.

Moreover, since there would always be in the angel the same foundation of existence in place, the angel would always be in an equal place for as long as by motion he varied it; it follows that the angel would always be in an equal place through the whole, and could never be constituted otherwise; for as long as the same foundation remains, the same existence in a place always follows. He would never be able to be contained by a greater or a smaller surface, unless perhaps by compression or rarefaction, which cannot befall a body in an empty space, nor can it befall the substance of an angel. From the existence of the angel it would follow that an angel would always be in an equal place, which these men do not dare openly to concede; and this is plainly false. Therefore we shall say below in disputation 191 that the foundation of local presence cannot be the naked substance of the angel; nor is it to be said that existence in a place simply is an absolute mode arising from the substance as from a principle, from which presence could not be said to vary by the will alone; for that would imply that existence arises from the naked substance of the angel, just as in bodies it arises from naked quantity; whence it would follow, first, that an angel could never be loosed from all place; second, that he could pass from extreme to extreme without a middle, which is false, as will be shown below in disputation 196, chapter 2. Moreover, since there is never wanting a foundation of existence in place in the angel, as in a body, the angel would always be in a place, although by motion it might be varied; therefore it follows that the angel will always be equal in place throughout, and will never be able to be differently constituted: for the same existence in a place always follows from the same foundation, unless perhaps by compression, which cannot happen in an equal place; thus he would be in an equal place. Scotus

might concede this, and, as will be said below in disputation 196, if to be in a place did not arise from substance but from quantity alone, it would follow that an angel could never be loosed from place: for to be present arises from the will; which the Doctors of this opinion do not wish to grant.

Now as to the first reason I answer that the arguments do not suffice to show it necessary that the foundation of existence in place be the naked substance. Second, I say that it can rightly be explained and understood that an angel ceases to be in a place without being moved therefrom by the mere nod of his will, as we shall say in the following chapter. But the third reason proves only this, that a spiritual nature, because it is a part of this universe of things, has, according to itself, an order of place in the universe; from which it is not yet gathered that this order is existence in place, of which we shall treat hereafter.

Vera Sententia.

Caput VII - The true opinion

With the other opinions now set aside, there seems to remain one alone more probable than the rest, namely, that an angel is in a place not by his naked substance as by a foundation, nor by any other reason from those set forth; but by a certain absolute mode added to the substance of the angel, depending wholly on his will as on an efficient principle. Henry indicated this opinion not obscurely when, after refuting other views, he said that an angel cannot be in a place by his naked substance: for he saw the inconveniences which followed therefrom; therefore he thinks that something must be added to that substance; and since nothing of those things which have been said can be proved to him, what else remains than some absolute mode, which can be the foundation of the relation of presence according to place, and of union with a body, depending wholly on the will of the angel; so that thus we may defend that he can be placed in a greater and a lesser place, pass from extreme to extreme without a middle, and at some time be wholly loosed from every place.[1369]

However, in the explanation of this opinion two things must especially be noted. One is that a body, by reason of its quantity, is in a place circumscribed, not because it is only defined by the place, but because the surface of the place embraces, surrounds, and measures it. These things, therefore, first befit a body insofar as it is a quantum and capable of measure; from the fact that it can receive the measure of another quantity there arises in it a certain mode, which we may call its own, not of the predicament of situation (situs), like lying, sitting, etc.; for that seems to be merely an extrinsic denomination with respect to another, but of the predicament of where (ubi), by which name it is commonly designated. Toward this mode, as toward an intrinsic term, local motion tends; then from this mode it follows that a body is distant from another or is near to it and can be contained by something; thus, even outside the heaven and in a vacuum - which is the same thing - it can be distant from another and approach it, and therefore be moved, as we noted in disputation 29, chapter 3.

1369. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 9.

The second thing to be noted is that this mode which we call "where" (ubi) befits bodies thus by reason of quantity, which can receive measure, so that of necessity this or that mode befits them; nor does it depend on the will of the body to free itself from every such mode, but only by the will of the angel can it be brought about that a body be moved from one body into another. It also befits a body by quantity itself that it have neither a greater nor a lesser mode, and hence that it cannot be contained by a greater or a lesser surface.

Therefore concerning the existence of an angel in a place we must by no means philosophize in entirely the same way. First it must be said that the existence of an angel in a place is not the mere relation of presence or of distance, whether this be called intrinsic and real, or extrinsic and of reason alone: for this, like any relation whatsoever, cannot be changed at will unless some prior absolute change has been made, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Moreover, it must be said that the foundation of this presence in a body, or in a place, is some absolute mode added to the substance of the angel by his will, as by an efficient principle, by reason of which he is united to a body and is present to it; wherefore, since this mode does not arise proximately from the substance, it can be greater and lesser; indeed it so befits an angel that he can wholly lack it. Whether by reason of that mode there also befits an angel the ratio of distance and motion according to place, we shall say in disputation 195, chapter 4, where also we shall assign some difference between this mode of the angel and that of a body.

Objicitur: Someone will object against this opinion, By what reason can it be that a mode produced in the substance of an angel constitutes him in a divisible place, since the substance of the angel itself, and therefore that mode received in it, are indivisible?

Respondetur: This can easily be understood. For just as the mode which a rational soul has in a body, when it is united to it, is in itself indivisible, as the soul itself is, yet makes it to be united to a divisible body; so also a mode of an angel can unite him to a divisible body, even if it is in itself indivisible. From the fact, however, that in itself it cannot be divided, there follows only this, that the angel is whole in the whole body and whole in any part of it, as the rational soul is. I say, moreover, that this mode is indivisible, as also is the mode of the soul with the body, with respect to quantitative division, because it is received in a spiritual substance; nonetheless I assert that it is divisible in the way in which a habit is said to have division, when it is extended to several conclusions, which they call virtual extension. For the mode of an angel also makes him to be in a divisible and extended place. Whether indeed that mode can be varied successively, we shall see below in disputation 191, chapter 3. Wherefore I cannot but marvel at the theologians and philosophers of our time, who, while conceding to an angel a presence which they call local by reason of the angel's own substance, affirm it to be some mode of the substance of the angel, indivisible indeed in comparison with the angel, yet divided and extended with respect to the place in which it constitutes the angel; so that that mode have in itself parts formally distant from one another, and one part correspond to one part of the place and another to another part. These Doctors, then, I strongly wonder at, that, when discoursing about spiritual angels, they do not yet lay aside these corporeal and material things, and in a spiritual and utterly indivisible subject they

constitute some accident formally extended to a place and, as the phrase goes, commensurate with a place, whose parts are distant among themselves and distant in place. For this seems proper to a body and to a bodily accident, for which a spiritual substance is not a capable subject.

Therefore philosophical reason teaches that, if there is any mode which an angel has by reason of which he is constituted in an extended body or in a place, that mode is in itself formally indivisible and lacks all extension commensurate with a place; and accordingly by reason of that mode the angel is constituted whole in the whole body or place, and whole in any part; and he has only that extension which above we called virtual. But if he had that extension which the aforesaid Doctors invent, it would in truth be brought about that the angel would be whole in the whole body or place and a part of him in a part; for he would have to be extended, just as the mode itself is extended.

And by this reason we can interpret the holy Doctor, since in the present article he asserts that an angel is in a place by application of power, if by application we understand that mode by which he is conjoined to a body: for this conjunction ought to precede, that his power operate in a body and in a place, as we shall see in the following disputation. Nor should it seem marvelous to anyone if we interpret the mind of St. Thomas in this way, when Thomists explain that application of power in so many different ways, as we reported above. If indeed there are any arguments against this opinion, they will be answered in the following disputation, where we shall treat of place and of the motion of an angel.

Nevertheless, some, not sufficiently understanding this mode of the union of an angel with a body, attack it in this way: Either that mode is the union of form with matter, or of nature with supposit, or of a continuous part with a part, or finally it is a conjunction of propinquity according to place. But an angel is not united as a form, nor as a nature, nor as a part, as is manifest: it remains, therefore, that the mode of his union with a body be only a conjunction of propinquity according to place; and by this same argument they contend that the body of Christ is united to the species of bread by the propinquity of place alone. From this they infer that an angel is proximately in a place by his substance; because from his substance there arises proximately this mode of union.

I answer that an angel is united or conjoined to a body, and the body of Christ to the species, by none of these modes. Not indeed by the first three, as is manifest; nor by the fourth: for the mode of conjunction according to propinquity of place has of itself a respect of distance from fixed points, by an order to which the place is constituted; because place cannot be without immobility. But an angel, and the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist, do not of themselves have a respect of distance from fixed points, but they have this distance by reason of quantity to which they are conjoined: for no spiritual thing, or one having a spiritual mode, as the body of Christ in the Eucharist, has according to itself a respect to fixed points, as I showed in that disputation 29, chapter 3. It remains, therefore, that there is some mode of conjunction of the angelic substance with a body as it is substance, not as it exists here or elsewhere; and of the body of Christ with the species, not as it is here or elsewhere, but according to itself: so that, the same body remaining, the angel retains the same mode of conjunction even if the distance varies; and, the same species

remaining in the body of Christ, the same mode remains even if the distance varies; and this conjunction, which is prior, is prior than the distance according to place from fixed points in each body, rather than that they be conjoined to one another by propinquity.

Disputatio CLXXXIX - Whether an angel is necessarily where he acts

Angel can act where he is not, as many theologians teach, chapter 1.

That an angel needs propinquity of place or conjunction in order to act is a more probable opinion, chapter 2.

The arguments of the former opinion are satisfactorily answered, chapter 3.

Caput I - That many theologians teach that an angel can act where he is not

There are various modes of existing in a place; but the operation of an angel is not in him as in a place, as was made clear in the preceding disputation; therefore he can act where he is not: for it can be that at least his operation be connected to this by the nature of the thing, even if operation is not the foundation of presence. Wherefore among the Scholastics another difficulty and disagreement on this matter remains; among whom not a few, and not unlearned, both ancients and moderns, hold that an angel can act where he is not present by his substance. This is the opinion of Gabriel on the First Book, dist. 37, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 8; and Ockham in the same distinction and question judges midway that a corporeal agent acts at a distance. Against this stands Hervaeus in the treatise De motu Angelorum, question 1, ad 3, when he objects against his own opinion; and not a few recent authors follow him, who for the same opinion allege Durandus on the First Book, dist. 37, a parte q. 1, num. 26, and Cajetan in the commentary on this article, because they teach that between an angel and a body there is necessary only the presence of order, not substantial presence, so that angels, when they operate, should not be wrongly thought to be present substantially. For as both of them, as we saw in the preceding disputation, plainly affirm, an angel is placed present according to his substance to a body before he operates: Cajetan to a particular body, Durandus indeed to all bodies: Durandus alone added that an angel is not present to this, that by the quantity of this he be estimated as proper habitat of a body; nevertheless he does not deny a real presence of substance, as those words clearly show.[1370] Many also think that Scotus, in the above-cited question, adheres to the first opinion; for since the agent seems to act proximately from within, the agent ought to be proximately conjoined to the patient, and act by touching it, as if to remove that which is in the middle; and sometimes he adds an action diverse from proximity, but not a distant one: thus, for example, the celestial body generates in the lower things forces of their matter, which it produces in other bodies as mediate; and fishes emit their spawn into the arms of fishermen, not into the net, cord, or hook. But here, says Scotus, one is

1370. The cluster summarizes Durandus on the First Book of the Sentences, dist. 37, a parte q. 1, num. 26; and Cajetan's commentary on this article. The report also notes Gabriel in I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 8; Ockham in the same distinction and question; and Hervaeus, De motu Angelorum, q. 1, ad 3.

deceived by two causes, as if there were a twofold power in acting conjoined, of which one at the same time acts in the proximate thing and at a distance, the other in the remote thing, although not at a distance: for the agent is imperfect, and suffers because the power of the agent departs from the perfection of its form; hence he grants first perfection: then he makes a generating form pass to the matter of the subject through various accidents, then to the substantial, and he corrupts the contrary. Hence some take Scotus in this way, as if in acting the two powers were not conjoined, and so that they do not together act, which acts in the remote thing, and not that the agent imperfectly exercises the power in the remote, without any good reason, as if it always acted in the remote. But truly it is not a consequence: for in fact no one of sound intellect denies that the agent is necessarily conjoined to the created efficient cause by two powers, and that by these two imperfect modes of acting it does not follow: hence from this I also strive to prove that to God it is not repugnant to act through such powers at a distance, as though as a principal or as a dependent cause he were to act because of such a mode of acting imperfectly, which is not necessary, as in disputation 28, chapter 1 and chapter 3 we have already said. Wherefore I do not see that Scotus' opinion in this matter must be referred to the present question, because in the second distinction of that same question, he teaches the contrary conclusion; for he plainly affirms that an angel is placed present according to his substance to a body ...

Caput II - The contrary opinion seems to be embraced

The sentence plainly pronounces that an agent of limited power must necessarily be present in order to operate; and hence that an angel is by nature first in a place before he operates in it. Nevertheless, Avicenna in the book On the Soul, section 4, chapter 4, and Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Metaphysics, commentary 18, have followed this earlier opinion.[1371]

Finally, more recent authors so embrace this sentence that, nonetheless, they assert that the power of an angel is limited, and that by its own nature it requires a certain sphere within which it can operate at a distance, but beyond which it is not able. They confirm this sentence by appeal to corporeal agents, among which they think there are some that within fixed bounds act at a distance without a medium; therefore much more ought this to be granted to an angel, who operates by intellect and will. In corporeal agents, moreover, this seems to be established. First, because some produce a better effect at a distance than in the proximate, as fire in tow or in some other well-disposed matter, rather than in the nearby air; for it does not kindle the latter, but it does burn the tow or other matter; and the sun generates minerals in the bowels of the earth, not in the air; and a fish sends numbness and torpor into the fisherman's arm, not into the hook, the line, and the rod: whence the fish has also received its name and is called the Torpedo; Pliny attributes this effect to this fish, book 32, chapter 1; Aristotle also reports, book 9 of the History of Animals, chapter 7, that this fish sends torpor and numbness into the fish which it aims at, so that it may seize them and feed on them, although it does not send it into the water that is interposed.[1372] Finally, if one were

1371. Avicenna, De anima, sect. 4, c. 4; Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaphysica, comm. 18.
1372. Pliny, Naturalis historia, 32.1; Aristotle, Historia animalium, 9.7.

to bring a bronze vessel full of water up to a fire, it always happens that the water shut up within, into which the fire acts at a remove, becomes very hot, while the bronze, upon which the fire acts immediately, remains cold: by such examples they do not hesitate to establish that twofold power in one agent which Scotus devised. And although in reality they are not separated, yet there is some force which operates at a distance, even if another, which acts only in the proximate, accompanies it: wherefore it will not be absurd to grant this alone in the angel, by which alone, at his will, he can operate. Then too, because a natural agent acts more perfectly upon the part in front of it, before which there is no impediment, even if it be more remote, than upon the nearer part, before which it has some impediment: therefore there is some force which acts at a distance without a medium, although not so perfectly - just as fire heats better the fore-part which it has before it without obstacle than that part before which there is some impediment.

But a special reason is proved for angels: for if in bodily agents nearness of place is required, that comes from matter and quantity, by which they seem determined so as to operate only by contact; but spiritual beings, since they lack matter and operate by the mere nod of the will, do not seem to require presence or nearness; or it will suffice that they be in some part of the body which they move, even if they are not in every part upon which they operate: and thus sometimes they will act where they will not be.

The more probable opinion, however, holds that an angel needs nearness of place and continuation for operating.

But the opposite sentence seems to be embraced, which all the Scholastics adduced in the preceding disputation, as is evident, seem to suppose; and Scotus, as we recounted in the previous chapter, namely, that an angel always operates upon what is remote by an effect continually derived and diffused through a medium. This sentence I will try to show by a threefold reason.

First reason: If an angel could operate at a distance without a medium, no terminus could be assigned within which he would necessarily have to operate at a distance; for if once the action of the angel must not be continued all the way to a terminus, then certainly that distance which is empty of the angel's effect contributes nothing and in no way harms that power for operating: for it is altogether per accidens that it is greater or less, since the power of the agent is not infused into it. For in the case of other agents, distance limits the operation for this reason, that through it the effect of the power is continuously diffused, and the greater the distance, the greater is the effect continued through it by the action of the operator. Wherefore, if an angel, for example, can move a weight of one hundred pounds, and he can move this when it is a thousand paces distant from him - not by a power diffused through a medium, but by the mere nod of his will - certainly the effect seems altogether the same if he moves the weight at twice the distance: since the distance itself neither augments the effect nor in any way hinders or contributes to the action, but has an entirely negative bearing. But to concede that an angel can move at any distance is absurd.

Second reason: If an angel could operate at a distance, he would not always be where he operates; therefore neither in an assumed body would he necessarily be according to substance, which seems to be against the common sentence, and openly against St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 17, where he says of an angel: "Nor is he elsewhere, but he is intellectually circumscribed there where he operates."[1373]

Third reason, taken from bodily agents, proves the point: for by experiment it has been found that no agent operates upon distant matter without some operation of this or that kind diffused through a medium: therefore it is a sign that an operation upon what is distant depends upon that which is carried out through a medium, whatever that may be. For if those two powers - the one which operates upon the distant, the other which operates upon the proximate - were conjoined per accidens in the same agent, it would be altogether accidental that one should operate before the other, and hence sometimes the one would operate without the other: for that which in no way depends upon another and is conjoined to it per accidens is sometimes found without it. But in fact no agent operates anything at a distance without operating upon what is near by some action: therefore it is a sign that the action at a distance depends upon the action upon the proximate. And if some body could act at a distance without a medium, then even if a vacuum intervened, it could operate: for the medium in no way helps toward operating upon the remote. But who would say that a fish would send its torpor into the arm, that fire would send heat into distant matter, that the sun, finally, would produce minerals in the earth, if the medium were a vacuum? Therefore there is some operation, even if minimal, diffused through the medium, which helps that action derived into the distant matter; otherwise, the fish would harm the arm without the line, hook, and rod, or even by means of the rod would harm the fisherman, even if he did not hold it with his hand; or surely the sun would illuminate the air in a closed room; for if he did not need a medium in order to operate, neither would an opaque body placed opposite hinder his operation: for it could hinder only for this reason, that since illumination must be continuous and an opaque body cannot receive it, it cannot proceed beyond. Since therefore it is impossible that these things happen, who will deny that an agent's operation is gradually diffused through the medium? But if we see that this is so in corporeal agents, no reason is available to us to assert the opposite about angels. Let us therefore speak of them in the same way as of bodies, namely, that they cannot operate at a distance without a medium; such that at least the angel must be in that part according to substance from which his power and effect are continually diffused into the remote parts - although it is not necessary that he be in every part of the body to which his power reaches: for if bodies existing in one part continually derive their power through the rest, in which they are not, much more should this be granted to angels.

Let the arguments of the prior sentence be enough.

1373. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, 17: "Nec alibi est, verum intellectualem inmodum illic circumscribitur, vbi operatur." (Nor is he elsewhere, but he is intellectually circumscribed there where he operates.)

Caput III - The foundations of the prior opinion are easily overturned

Now indeed to overthrow the foundations of the prior opinion is not laborious. To the first I answer that certain agents therefore produce a better or a different effect in remote matter than in proximate, not because their power and proper operation reaches into the remote without a medium, but because the matter is not in the same way capable or disposed. Wherefore the action continually derived from fire through the air does not produce fire in the air, but great heat; whereas in tow and in denser matter, which is more apt for combustion, it produces fire. And although the specific physical reason might be unknown to us, it would yet suffice in general to know that the matter is not disposed in the same way or capable of the effect. The same must altogether be said of the sun, which produces minerals in the bowels of the earth, not in the air, though with the same light diffused through the air into the earth. In the same way the fish sends numbness into the arm, not into the hook, the line, and the rod, by some quality derived through that medium all the way to the arm; and similarly it sends numbness into other fish, but not into the water that is interposed, by some quality derived through the water, as we have manifestly recounted above. Nor do I think it difficult to assign the particular reason for this diversity. First, as to numbness and the effect of poison, which occurs in an animal - the hook, the line, or the rod is not capable of it: for the effect is...

That effect is a kind of sickness; but this is an affection of animals: therefore it is not surprising if one and the same quality does not wound the reed, nor does a sensible effect appear in it, yet it wounds the hand holding it. But minerals, since they require a great and dense multitude of matter, cannot come to be either in air or in water, but in earth; and the same light which illuminates the air and the water, and also works other effects in these, by heating the earth through reflection, generates minerals therein.

Here, however, it must be observed in passing that the heaven, by a light diffused continually through the medium as far as the earth, generates animals and minerals in the earth, not because it is itself a proximate agent introducing a substantial form, but because it preserves light in the medium, and the preserved light brings about heat and other qualities which proximately dispose to the substantial form. For if light were preserved in the absence of the sun, the very same effect would naturally be produced as if the sun were present and the light were derived continuously from it: therefore its presence is not necessary for the introduction of a substantial form, just as a severed seed, in the absence of the animal that emitted it, generates an animal, and heat without fire generates fire in some suitable matter. For I think that either the seed, or the accidents that proximately dispose to a substantial form, do not need the aid or elevation of another agent in order to introduce the substantial form: and yet these are called instruments for this only reason, that they are powers derived from such a substance, by reason of which they have a native power of producing substance - about which the philosophers dispute more at length.

Next, concerning that effect of fire in tow (stupa), or in some other distant matter that is burned, no less a true account can be given, although it may seem difficult; and it is this, that in order for fire to kindle flame and burn, it needs a certain material of exhalation: for flame is

nothing other than kindled smoke; and thus we often see in furnaces the flame smothered by some denser matter, and then that matter resolved by the heat of the coals into a smoky exhalation and, lifted on high, set aflame. Therefore, since fire does not find in the air matter suitable for a smoky exhalation, but from tow or from some denser matter it easily resolves it, for that reason an excessive heat of fire does not inflame the contiguous air, yet it kindles tow or some denser matter. For all these, then, the same reason holds, why the same effect does not occur in the proximate and in the remote matter, namely because the proximate and the remote are not equally apt and disposed for the same effect.

As to the example about water enclosed in a bronze vessel and placed near the fire, I say that it is false that the vessel itself remains cold when the water itself is very hot; but experience only shows that that part of the full vessel, where it is touched by the water, is less hot than the boiling water enclosed within, so that a person can handle the vessel itself with his hand longer than the water. The reason for this difference does not come from the fact that a physical agent acts on a remote matter without a medium: otherwise in no way would it heat the bronze itself: but because, as some say, from the water by resolution a certain substantial vapor is formed, which is much hotter than the grosser parts of the water that remain; and this heat ascends to the upper part of the water, by whose ascent the water itself boils, but the parts below remain not so hot, and these cool the parts of the vessel which they touch, and somewhat retard the action of the fire upon the bronze itself.

But since not only the lower parts of the vessel, but even all around are less hot than the water itself, something else must be said.

I answer, therefore, that throughout every part the grosser parts of the water remain in contact with the vessel, and thus the vessel itself is somewhat cooled by them: but the subtler parts, namely vapors, do not adhere to the vessel, but immediately exhale through the water: and so by reason of them the water can be handled by us less than the vessel: hence, if some other denser heated matter were contained by the vessel itself, such as molten lead, we could not easily handle the vessel itself - just as neither molten lead, nor that denser matter. Moreover, that the vessel itself is somewhat cooled by the grosser parts of the water can be proved from the fact that, if that vessel have handles which the water does not touch directly, they are much hotter than the parts of the vessel itself that the water does touch closely, because the handles cannot be cooled by the water. Add also that because water penetrates more the organ of touch, it is much more easily perceived than the heated bronze itself: hence, even if I were to say that the water and the parts of the vessel are equally heated, it would not follow that they could be handled by us equally well with the hand, because an even heat is more felt in a liquid and flowing body than in a dense one.

Finally, as to fire, why it heats more quickly a remote part along a straight line that is not impeded than that which is impeded; and why it heats along a reflected line; this is manifest: for when there is an obstacle along the straight line, it cannot emit into it the hot exhalations by which it diffuses its heat; and therefore it is necessary that it first heat the remoter part by sending along a straight line those hot exhalations, which are diffused by reflection into those parts into which from the fire along a straight line they could not arrive; and thus, when the route along which the

exhalations tend is rightly considered, the parts which seemed nearer are farther away. And certainly no other reason can be assigned why fire does not act so quickly upon that part which has an opposite impediment, unless because heat must operate continuously along a straight line. But if it could operate without a medium, it would immediately and more quickly operate upon that impeded part, as we were deducing in the preceding chapter.

By the same reason said above, that is, on account of the diversity of matter, it happens that the magnet attracts iron and not another material, even a nearer one - not because its power and effect reach iron without a medium: for the power of the magnet is diffused through the air continuously as far as the iron, indeed even through wood; and an evident sign of this is that if between the iron and the magnet, at the same distance at which previously the iron was being drawn, some obstacle of denser matter be placed, which the power of the magnet could not penetrate, it would not draw the iron: but if the magnet did not need a medium, but only a certain distance, as the adversaries contrive, it would in the same way draw the iron with the obstacle interposed as it drew it before.

To the last reason, which tries to prove only about Angels, I answer that Angels do not need proximity of place and continuation of power to operate because of quantity and matter, but because of the power which they have as finite: for otherwise, if proximity and continuation were not necessary, they could operate at any distance to infinity, which implies an infinite power for operating. Moreover, it is not necessary that an Angel be present according to substance in every part of a body in which he operates; but it suffices if he be next to it, and from it the effect be derived and diffused continuously, as also happens in corporeal agents: yet, in the opinion of those who say that an Angel is in a place by operation, it must be granted of necessity that an Angel is in the whole body which he moves, and thus that the Angel, the mover of the heaven, is in the whole heaven - which seems false, as we shall say in Disputation 192, chapter 3.

Articulus II - Whether an angel can be in several places at the same time

It is argued procedurally as follows. It seems that an angel can be in several places at the same time. For an angel is not of less power than the soul; but the soul is at once in several places, because it is whole in each part of the body, as St. Augustine says.[1374] Therefore an angel can be in several places at the same time.

1. Further, an angel is in an assumed body; and when he assumes a continuous body, it seems that he is in any of its parts. But different places are considered according to its parts. Therefore an angel is at once in several places.
2. Further, St. John Damascene says that where an angel operates, there he is. But sometimes he operates at the same time in several places, as is clear of the angel overturning Sodom. Therefore an angel can be in several places at the same time.[1375]

1374. St. Augustine.
1375. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 30.

But on the contrary: St. John Damascene says that when angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.[1375]

I answer that an angel is of finite power and essence (*essentia*). But the divine power and essence are infinite, and God is the universal cause of all things, and therefore by his power he reaches all things, and is not only in several places, but everywhere; whereas the power of an angel, because it is finite, does not extend to all things, but to one determinate thing. For whatever is compared to one power must be compared to it as some one thing. Thus the whole universe of being is compared, as one thing, to the universal power of God; and likewise some particular being is compared, as some one thing, to the power of an angel. Hence, since an angel is in a place by the application of his power to a place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but only in one place.

Around this point, however, some have been deceived. For certain men, not being able to transcend their imagination, conceived the indivisibility of an angel after the mode of the indivisibility of a point. And therefore they believed that an angel could only be in a punctual place. But they are clearly deceived. For a point is something indivisible having position; but an angel is indivisible outside the genus of quantity, and existing apart from position. Hence it is not necessary that one indivisible place according to position be determined for him, but either a divisible or an indivisible one, greater or smaller, according as he voluntarily applies his power to a greater or a smaller body. And thus the whole body, to which by his power he is applied, corresponds to him as one place. Nor yet is it necessary that, if some angel moves the heaven, he be everywhere. First, because his power is not applied except to that which is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heaven in which motion is first, namely the part of the East. Whence also the Philosopher in Physics VIII attributes the power of the mover of the heaven to the part of the East.[1376] Second, because it is not held by the philosophers that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately; whence it is not necessary that it be everywhere. Thus, then, it is clear that to be in a place belongs in different modes to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place circumscriptively, because it is commensurated to a place; but an angel is not circumscriptively, since he is not commensurated to a place, but definitively, because he is thus in one place that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively, because he is everywhere.

Conclusion: An angel, since he is of finite power, can be neither everywhere, nor in several places, but only in one.

Concerning the text of the article there is nothing to note, except those things which are to be said in the disputations.

1375. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 30.
1376. Aristotle, Physics VIII.

Disputatio CXC - Whether an angel can be in diverse places at the same time

Caput I - Status of the controversy

The present controversy is not about the absolute power of God; as Scotus, Gabriel, Gregory, and Bassolis rightly noted, since, when it is said that an angel could, at least in a sacramental mode, be posited in diverse places - and faith does not teach the contrary - one ought not to deny that an angel could be placed by God in the same way. Therefore Goffredus is in error, as Bassolis reports from Quodlibet 12, when he asserted that an angel could not, by the absolute power of God, be in diverse places. Nor is the difficulty about "adequate" places; rather, the question is whether by his own proper power an angel can be at once in several places, whether adequate or not. Some, indeed - among whom Scotus and Gabriel reckon it at least as probable - hold that an angel can be in several non-adequate places by his own power. Then others, who deny that an angel can be in adequate places, are compelled to admit the same concerning non-adequate places, if by "adequate places" I mean those proportioned to an angel's power, namely the greatest among the places that by his proper power he can occupy; and so, if such a place is not adequately occupied, they hold he cannot at the same time, by his own power, be placed in another. They argue by reason thus: since an angel is in a place by the application of an efficient power - whether this be by operation or in some other manner - he requires for himself a place determined and adequate to his power, beyond which he could not have a greater; therefore he could not at the same time be in another place, since in the former his power would already be as it were consummated. And certainly, if he were in a place by his substance proximate to it, that remaining unchanged could not at the same time be in two places.

Just as the same quantity of a body, as body, cannot be in two places, so too does this reason proceed in the opinion of all, except Durandus, who says that an angel is in a determined place; for since Durandus affirms him to be everywhere, he will consequently also say that an angel cannot be in several different places, because he will claim for himself all bodies as if they were one place. Therefore the difficulty remains, whether an angel can be in several non-adequate places, that is, smaller than what by his own power he could occupy.

Caput II - That some taught an angel can be at once in several non - adequate places

Concerning non-adequate places the Scholastics do not feel the same way: some judge that an angel can at the same time be in several non-adequate places which, when taken together, do not exceed an adequate breadth. Thus Cajetan on this article, and the Ferrarian, book 3, cap. 68, § Ad evidentiam primi dubii.[1377] With them seem to agree Marsilius on II - II, quaest. 2, art. 2, after the second conclusion, and Bassolis on II, dist. 2, quaest. 4, a. 2, 3, in the body and at the end, although this latter author speaks of contiguous places, about which the reason is different, as we shall say in

1377. Cajetan, on this article; Ferrariensis, 3, cap. 68, § Ad evidentiam primi dubii.

the next chapter. Scotus, however, on II, dist. 2, q. 7, and Gabriel, quaest. 2, art. 3, dub. 3, teach that by no effective reason can anything be proved for either side; they explain their view thus, that the diverse places are not only contiguous but also separated, yet such that, if they were to become contiguous or continuous, they would not exceed one adequate place.[1378]

Cajetan adds that this can be done only within a certain breadth, the measure of which we do not know, lest we say that the angel's power - either for operation or for constituting himself in a place - can be diffused into any distance without limit. This opinion can be proved by no other reason than that it does not seem in any way to repugn the natural power of an angel. For although it is repugnant that an angel operate where he is not, yet to be and to operate in different places within a certain measure certainly seems to have nothing absurd. For that an angel who was in one body four palms in size should leave in it two palms of space, and, retaining two, begin to occupy two others in a different and distant body, does not seem to exceed the power that could occupy four palms; similarly, that an angel assume two smaller bodies, who could assume one larger, and appear in each - what would be repugnant in this?

Caput III - The truer opinion: an angel cannot be in several places, even non - adequate, in any way

Much more probable is the opinion of those who assert that an angel cannot be constituted in different places. By different places they understand different bodies not contiguous but separated, even if they teach that the places are not adequate and lie within a certain breadth which the angel could fill entirely by his presence. In my judgment, the holders of this view were Alexander on II, p., quaest. 32, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure on the Second Book, dist. 2, p. a., art. 2, quaest. 2, in the body and to the arguments; Aegidius on the Second Part, dist. a. 1, quaest. 2; Thomas of Argentina on the First Book, dist. 37, quaest. 1, art. 2, concl. 2; Richard, art., quaest. 3, when they absolutely pronounce that an angel cannot be at the same time in different places.[1379] St. Thomas clearly felt thus in this article, who never concedes in any way that an angel can be in several places at once - although he does not absolutely deny it when he replies to the arguments brought in the contrary. For he asserts that when an angel operates in several parts, he is not in all, but in that in which he first applies his power. In the same way he concedes that the angel who overthrew Sodom was not in several parts of the city, as the argument contended, but only in that by which he applied his power; which certainly would not have been necessary if he could be in several non-adequate places: he could, however, have been in several within the city, since that whole operation and subversion answered adequately to the angel's power; wherefore within that there could be designated several non-adequate places.

In the same opinion was Gregory of Rimini on the Second Book, dist. 2, q. 3, although elsewhere he taught the opposite, as we shall report in the next disputation. For he says there first that an angel can be constituted in several places, which he calls partial, not such as are at once

1378. Scotus, in II Sent., dist. 2, q. 7; Gabriel, quaest. 2, art. 3, dub. 3.

continuous, as in the same body, or contiguous, as in different contiguous bodies; for in either way they can compose one integral place. Then he asserts that he cannot be in several places which he calls total; and since he opposes total to partial, total places will be, if the bodies are mutually separate and joined neither by continuation nor by contact. And that with him total places are the same as places in no way conjoined is clear from the solution of a certain argument, where he is unwilling to concede that the demon was at the same time in the serpent tempting Eve and in Eve herself, whereas within that space two non-adequate places within a due breadth and figure could rightly be assigned to the demon.[1380]

This opinion is proved first from the doctrine of St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, cap. 3, about the middle, and of the other Fathers whom we have noted in disputation 187, cap. 1, who assert that an angel is in a place definite and circumscribed; for if he could be at the same time in several places, he would not be said to be defined by one. Hence Damascene infers that when he is sent to earth, he does not remain in heaven: he did not say this on account of excessive distance, but because he is always bound to, and defined by, one place. Moreover, in the first book On the Faith, cap. 17, he says: "Nor indeed can he operate at the same time in several and different places."[13811382] Didymus also, in the book On the Holy Spirit, far at the beginning, after he establishes the distinction between the Holy Spirit and a created spirit - that the former is everywhere, the latter, however, is defined by a determined place - says: "The angel, namely, who was present to the Apostle praying in Asia, could not at the same time be present to others constituted in the other parts of the world."[1383]

If someone should interpret all these things of adequate places, so that in small places within a certain sphere an angel could be, let him note, I beg, that "to be defined by one place" is the same as "to be in one place only," whether that be great or small: for never did the Fathers care to distinguish this.

But let us show by reason that an angel cannot be in several places set at whatever distance, and so could not remain in heaven when he is sent to earth, if once we grant that he can be placed in two places a little distant. First: if he could apply his power and himself to several places not continuous nor contiguous, so that a small distance would not hinder, by the same reason a great distance would not prevent, as above, in the preceding disputation's chapter, we proved of his action at an instant. By this reasoning Hervaeus, in the Treatise on the motion of an angel, quaest. 1, to the third, ...[1384]

1379. Alexander, II, p., quaest. 32, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, in II Sent., dist. 2, p. a., art. 2, quaest. 2, in corpore et ad argumenta; Aegidius, II part., dist. a. 1, quaest. 2; Thomas de Argentina, in I Sent., dist. 37, quaest. 1, art. 2, concl. 2; Richard, art., quaest. 3.

1380. Gregory of Rimini, in II Sent., dist. 2, q. 3.

1381. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, cap. 3.

1382. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, I, cap. 17.

1383. Didymus, De Spiritu Sancto.

1384. Hervaeus, Tractatus de motu Angeli, quaest. 1, ad tertiam.

Objicitur: As Christ, being in the same host, if it be divided, remains in each part of it, even if those parts are not contiguous, so also will an angel be able to remain, and thus he will persist in two non-adequate places.

Respondeo: The ratio is different. For the body of Christ is in the host by the power of God, not because it is bounded, or because it is one, but because the whole substance of the bread is by the power of the words converted into the body of Christ; wherefore, if the parts of the host be separated and placed at any distance whatever, the body of Christ always remains. But an angel, since he is present by his own power, can so be in one continuous body, or in two contiguous ones, that, if they be separated, he cannot be in them; otherwise, like the body of Christ, he could remain at whatever distance. And hence it is shown what repugnance there is on account of which an angel cannot be in two non-contiguous places; and the reasons of the former opinion remain solved.

Further it is to be observed that for this reason an angel can be in several bodies, if they are contiguous, in the same way as in one great continuous body; but not in several of the same quantity if they are not continuous, because, just as the contact of bodies contributes very much to the operation even of a corporeal agent's being diffused from one into another and thus its power works in both - which, if they were separate, could not act without a medium - so also contact, like continuity, contributes very much, that the angel's power establish his whole substance in two bodies or in two parts, which he could not place in several separated ones without a medium.

Since it has been established that an angel can be in only one place, it remains to see whether he can constitute himself in a greater and a lesser place without a limit. The question, however, is to be understood of a lesser place within a divisible latitude; for the following disputation will concern an indivisible place. In the present controversy the first opinion is that of Durandus in the First Book, distinction 37, second part of the distinction, question 1, no. 26, who, following the mode he adopted about the angel's existence in a place (as we saw in disputation 188, cap. 5), was driven to say that an angel is everywhere; a position which we showed there to be contrary to the sense of the Fathers. For this reason alone it is also to be rejected by us. For Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 34 near the end, and St. Jerome, in Epistle 53 against Vigilantius on that place of the Apocalypse 14, "And they follow the Lamb whithersoever he goes," affirm that angels and demons are everywhere upon the earth; they only mean to teach that they traverse all things, not simultaneously, but straightway by a swift motion. Jerome said they are everywhere with the utmost speed; Nazianzen, that they are present diligently to all, both because of the promptness of their ministry and because of the lightness of their nature; by which words they wished to signify the greatest celerity of motion. Tertullian likewise denoted the same in the Apology against the Gentiles, cap. 22, when he says: "Every spirit is winged: thus angels and demons; therefore in a moment they are everywhere." From these Fathers also the opinion of Durandus is refuted, since they clearly say that angels are moved - something Durandus in his opinion cannot concede; it is also refuted by the testimonies of others who teach that angels are moved, whom we listed in disputation 194, cap. 2.[1385]

1385. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34, near the end; St. Jerome, Ep. 53 contra Vigilantium, on Apoc. 14 ("Et sequuntur agnum quocumque ierit"); Tertullian, Apologeticus contra gentes, cap. 22.

The second opinion is that of the Irishman, in the First Book, distinction 8, question the second, in the solution of the fourth, as Gregory reports. He used to assert that an angel demands for himself such a determinate place that he can be neither in a greater nor in a lesser; nay more, that the angel's place is of circular figure. He adds, moreover, that if it should happen that an angel at some time assume a smaller body, some part of his substance must of necessity be outside it; and likewise if he assume a figure other than circular. This opinion seems to have been followed by Bassolis in the Second Book, dist. 2, q. 4, art. 1, and especially in the solutions to the arguments.[1386]

The third opinion is that of Scotus in the Second Book, dist. 2, q. 6, who, although in that article he said there is a place determined to the angel indeterminately - that is, a maximum, than which he cannot be in a greater, and a minimum, than which he is not in a lesser - yet subsequently admits that this opinion is doubtful, and that the opposite likewise - that the angel has a place determined determinately, that is, such that he is never either in a greater or in a lesser - is doubtful; for on neither side is there any reason that clearly convinces.[1387]

The fourth opinion is that of those who say that an angel demands for himself a maximum place determinately, in which he can be and not in a greater; yet not a minimum place, but that he can be placed in a lesser, and in a lesser ad infinitum. I speak of a divisible minimum, for of the indivisible there will be another question. This is the position of St. Bonaventure in II Sent., dist. 2, part 2, art. c., q. 3, ad tertium; of Gabriel, dist. ..., q. 2, art. 3, dub. 2; of Maior, q. 9; and of Marsilius in the Second Book, q. 2, art. 2, after the sixth conclusion; and of Ockham, Quodlib. 1, q. 4, which Gregory deems more probable in the same dist., q. 2, art. 2, in a certain doubt on this matter, although he says the opposite is not sufficiently impugned. The same is handed down by Aegidius in the First Book, dist. 37, second part of the distinction, art. 1, q. 2; by Richard, art. 2, q. 2; and by Cajetan in the commentary on this article. As to the maximum place, this will be sufficiently proved below; as to the minimum, it is shown thus: As one approaches a minimum there is no least divisible place; therefore an angel will be able to place himself in a lesser and lesser. For since he has no body, and is whole in any lesser and lesser part of a body just as he is in the whole, it follows that he can remain in a lesser and lesser.

The angel's place is maximally determined; but as to the minimum nothing is certain to us - this is more probable.

The angel's place is maximally determined; about the minimum nothing is certain, which is more probable.

I for my part think, first, with the Doctors just cited, that there is some maximum place of an angel, in which he can be such that he cannot be in a greater. Secondly, with the same I assert that an angel can be in some lesser place. Thirdly, that nothing is known to us whether there is a least place such that he cannot be in a lesser, or whether he can be placed in the lesser and lesser divisible place to infinity.

1386. Bassolis, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 4, art. 1.
1387. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 6.

The first part, against Durandus, is easily proved. For if there were not a maximum place in which he could be, it would follow that he could be placed in the whole universe - which we have already said is absurd. Now this argument not only proves that there is some term beyond which an angel cannot be, which term philosophers call extrinsic; but also that there is an intrinsic term, that is, that there is some place of determinate quantity, in which, according to all its parts, the angel can be, and in a greater he cannot. For since the angel's power is determined in itself, it demands an effect defined by an intrinsic term.

The second part, against the Irishman, is shown thus. First, it is certain that an angel can assume some small body, less indeed than a greater which he can assume. But it is ridiculous what that author used to say - namely, that then some of the angel's substance must necessarily be outside that body. For since an angel with his substance is whole in the whole and whole in any part, why cannot it be that he remain whole in one part of it and not in another? A substance that does not determine for itself a site according to the measure of quantity, as the substance of Christ does not, is not said to be straitened if it is placed in a lesser place; who then would say that an angel must be in a large body such that he cannot be in a lesser? Then it is proved more efficaciously: the same rational soul, which is more intrinsically present to a body than an angel is, can, wholly unchanged, be in a greater and a lesser body by animating it; therefore an angel also, who contributes to a body no power or life, will with much greater reason be able to be located in a greater and a lesser body. The rational soul indeed is not present according to its own will, but according to the diverse dispositions of the body, because it is not present to the body by its will; but an angel, at his pleasure, because he freely constitutes himself in any body whatever. About the souls of other animals the case is different: for if they are extended, they grow with the body itself; but if they lack any extension, in the same way as a rational [soul] they can be in a greater and a lesser. And what that author said about the circular figure of the place which an angel demands is plainly fictitious. For since an angel is indivisible, whole in the whole and whole in any part, and since together with the body he does not compose some animal which would require such a figure for its operations, it follows that he can be located in a body of any figure whatever.

The third part of our position about the angel's place as one tends toward a minimum is proved because no reason can make anything certain for us. For that an angel is indivisible does not seem sufficient for us to infer from it that he can be constituted in the lesser and lesser to infinity. For since his substance stands in need in some way of being applied to a body, nor is it present by itself alone, it is not sufficiently certain whether that mode requires a determinate quantity to which it makes the angel present, or not. And indeed, if it were certain that an angel can be in an indivisible place, that is, in a point, it would thence be confidently inferred that he can be in any lesser and lesser place to infinity - for the same reason would hold; but since this is not manifest, as the following disputation will show, nothing can be proved from it. On the other hand, I see nothing to prevent an angel from being able to be placed in the lesser and lesser divisible place to infinity. For although the rational soul cannot animate a lesser and lesser body to infinity - as St. Bonaventure most rightly noted - that comes from this, that its formal effect in matter requires some determinate quantity, or at least one bounded by some extrinsic term; but an angel, since he does

not inform the body in which he is, but only assists it, will not on this account be hindered from being present to a lesser and lesser body. Yet from this it is not lawful to infer, as St. Bonaventure contends, that an angel can be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity; for although no repugnance appears, it does not forthwith follow that we can affirm that this is possible for an angel, otherwise I could assert of any herb whatever that it can cure this or that sickness, if no contradiction appears to us - which no one will concede. This alone we concede to divine power: that if no contradiction appears, we say that it can be done by God.[1388]

How Scotus proves that an angel cannot be in a smaller, and still smaller, place to infinity.

Scotus, more cautious, does not dare to define anything about the angel's maximum or minimum place; yet he proposes certain arguments in that question 6 to our purpose, by which he strives to prove that an angel cannot be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity.

First argument. If an angel could be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity, he could be in a more and more acute place to infinity, that is, in a more narrow quadrangle; therefore an angel could be in a longer quadrangle to infinity, and thus at once in heaven and on earth; the reason is that he could also be in a greater length. For from proposition 35 of Euclid, book 1, by an evident demonstration it is established that the same body which is in one place can be in any other equal [place]; for example, if a body fills a square place, it will likewise fill an equal quadrangle, however much the sides are narrowed - this, however, is to be understood unless the figure hinders; for some liquid can be so thick by its nature that it cannot be placed in a quadrangle too narrow. Therefore, since an angel has no figure that would hinder this, he could rightly be in an ever narrower and more constricted quadrangle to infinity.

Cajetan replies to this in two ways. First, he understands Euclid's propositions only of bodies which by their own quantity fill a place, not of angels, because they are said to be in a place solely by the presence of their substance. And indeed the demonstrations proceed about quantity only as filling the sides of a square and quadrangle. Then he replies that, even if they be understood of spirits, it does not follow from this that an angel can be in an infinite place, and thus no absurdity follows; for even if the sides of the quadrangle are narrowed, it does not follow that one arrives at an infinite quadrangle. Moreover, although one grant that an infinite quadrangle cannot be given - as, whether true or shown by Euclid there - yet that quadrangle can be such as to exceed in length the heavens; whence it would follow that an angel could be at once in heaven and on earth, which the Fathers judge to be absurd, as was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore I will say that the case of bodies is one thing, that of spirits another, and that Euclid's demonstration has place only in bodies. Hence Maior is deceived in the place cited, who asserts that, by contracting that quadrangle, an angel can so remain in it as to be at once in heaven and on earth.[1389]

1388. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, part 2, art. c., q. 3, ad tertium.
1389. Cajetan, on this article; Maior, loc. cit.

Second argument. It is one thing, he says, to place oneself in some place and to remain there; another to place oneself in a lesser. If he could be in a lesser to infinity, he would have an infinite power to effect this. Cajetan answers that to be able to apply himself in a lesser place does not bespeak a greater power in an angel, but depends on his own will; whence it is clear that he can constitute himself now in one, now in another place.

Third argument. When an angel is in some place adequate to him, he is whole in the whole and whole in any part; therefore he can remain whole in any lesser part - otherwise he would abandon the rest. I answer: even though it be granted that he is whole in any part, I say it does not therefore follow that he can be in just any lesser place; if, however, an angel requires a certain lesser quantity to which he may be applied by reason of the mode which his substance ought to have, then, by a like reason as the rational soul, from the exigency of animation, cannot apply itself to any least part, even if it is whole in each when it is whole in all at once, so neither could an angel. I admit the reasons more strongly suggest that an angel can, by his own power, be in a lesser and a lesser place; yet this is not sufficiently clear to us. About the body of Christ in the Eucharist, the case is different: since he remains there not by his own power but by the power of God, he will remain in a lesser part and to an ever lesser extent, in which the whole substance is conserved. But that an angel likewise, if placed by the power of God in one body, could apply himself to a lesser and a lesser place, is not manifest.

Whether an angel can be in an indivisible place. Disputation 192.

Although Scotus does not dare to define anything about a greater or a lesser place of an angel, nevertheless he proposes certain arguments in that question 6.5 ad propositum, by which he tries to prove that an angel cannot be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity.

First argument. If an angel could be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity, he could be in an ever more straitened place to infinity, that is, in an ever narrower rectangle; therefore an angel could be in an ever longer rectangle to infinity, and thus at once in heaven and on earth; indeed he could be in a greater length as well: because from proposition 35 of book 1 of Euclid it is established by evident demonstration that the same body which is in one place can be in any other equal place - for instance, if a body fills a square place, it will also fill an equal rectangle, however much the sides be narrowed; and this is to be understood unless the figure should stand in the way: for some liquid can be so thick by its nature that it cannot be placed in a rectangle that is too narrow. Therefore, since an angel has no figure which would impede this, rightly will he be able to be in an ever more and more narrow rectangle to infinity.

Cajetan answers in this article in two ways. First, that Euclid's proposition is to be understood only of bodies which fill place by their quantity, not of angels, who are said to be in a place solely by the presence of their substance. And indeed the demonstrations proceed about quantity alone filling the sides of a square and of a rectangle. Then he answers that, even if it be understood of spirits, from that it does not follow that an angel can be in an infinite place, and thus no absurdity follows; because, even if the sides of the rectangle are narrowed, it does not follow that one arrives at an infinite rectangle. Moreover, although an infinite rectangle cannot actually be given,

nevertheless, as Euclid shows there, that rectangle can be increased so that the one which would be two feet long would exceed the heaven in length; whence it would follow that an angel could be at once in heaven and on earth, which the Fathers judge absurd, as was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore it must be said that the case of bodies is one thing, that of spirits another; and Euclid's demonstration has place only in bodies. Wherefore Major is deceived in the place cited, when he asserts that, with that rectangle narrowed, an angel can persist in the same, so that he would be at once in heaven and on earth.[1390]

Second argument. It belongs to some power to establish itself in some place, and, the greater, to place itself in a lesser: therefore, if he could be in a lesser and a lesser place to infinity, he would have an infinite power for bringing this about. Cajetan answers that to be able to apply himself to a lesser place is not a greater power in an angel, but depends upon his will, by which he can equally establish himself in one place as in another.

Third argument. When an angel is in some place commensurate to himself, he is whole in the whole, and whole in any part; therefore he can remain whole in any least part, the others being left aside. I answer: even if he is whole in any part, and so it is not repugnant that he be in some lesser place, nevertheless from elsewhere a certain lesser quantity is required, that he be applied to it, by reason of the mode which the substance of that [body] ought to have; just as the soul, by reason of animation, cannot be in any least part, even if it is whole in any [single part], when it is at the same time in all, as the rational soul. I admit the reasons more strongly suggest that an angel can, by his own power, be in a lesser and a lesser place; yet this is not sufficiently clear to us. About the body of Christ in the Eucharist, the case is different: since he remains there not by his own power but by the power of God, he will remain in a lesser part and to an ever lesser extent, in which the substance of bread can be conserved; and an angel likewise, if placed by the power of God. But that he by himself can apply himself to a lesser and a lesser place is not manifest.

Whether an angel can be in an indivisible place. Disputation 192.

Two opposed sentences of the scholastics. Chapter 1.

Scotus's sentence. Chapter 2.

Why the angel who moves the heaven is not in the whole, but in some part of it. Chapter 3.

Disputatio CXCII - Whether an angel can be in an indivisible place

Caput I - On the opinions of the theologians

About an indivisible place, that is, about the mathematical point, theologians also disagree. The first opinion is that of St. Thomas in this article, asserting that an angel can be in an indivisible place, that is, in a point. After whom follow Richard in the Second Book, distinction two, article two; Capreolus, question one, article one; conclusion two; Bassolis, question four, article two; the

1390. Cajetan on this article; John Major, loc. cit.

Ferraran Master, 3 Contra gentes, chapter 68, 9; to the principal argument Cajetan; and many recent theologians on this article; yet they do not agree in the foundation and in the reason of it.[1391] Richard, since he asserts that an angel is in a place by his own substance as by a foundation, as we saw in Disputation 188, chapter 6, for that reason teaches that an angel can be in an individual place, because he is in himself simple, that is, indivisible, and without extension; what wonder, then, if his substance answers only to an indivisible place and a point? But St. Thomas and others, who teach that [an angel] is in a place by operation, or by the application of his power, as we reported there in chapter 2 and 4, therefore assert that an angel can be in an indivisible place, because he is not in the whole body which he moves, but in that part to which first he applies his power, that it may be derived to the others. And because he can apply it by a point and by a divisible part, therefore he can rightly be located in a point, just as one body could move another through a point, if it should touch it only at a point.

The second opinion, more common among those who affirm that an angel cannot be in the point of a body. This was Alexander, part 2, question 32, member 3; St. Bonaventure on the Second Book, distinction 2, part 2, a. 1, question 3; Gabriel, question 2, article 3, doubt 2; Gregory, question 1, article 2, before the doubt which he proposes there; Major, question 9; Aegidius on the First Book, distinction 37, second part, article 1, question two; Ockham, Quodlibet I, question 4; Marsilius on the Second Book, question 2, article 2, after the fifth conclusion; yet neither do these Doctors rely on the same foundation.[1392] Alexander and St. Bonaventure so taught, because they thought the corporeal place must be divisible, and they consider "to be somewhere" and "to be in a corporeal place" the same: but to be in a point and to be nowhere, not to differ. The rest, whom I cited besides Aegidius, followed that sentence, because they judged that indivisible points do not exist really in a quantitative body, but only by assignation and imagination; and assignation can be made only by the contact of some body. Since therefore here we are disputing about the real existence of an angel, and this cannot be except in something real, it follows that he is not in a point, when neither can his substance touch a body so as to assign a point in it. Finally, Aegidius, since he teaches that an angel is in a place by operation, for that reason asserts that he is not in a point, because in a point he cannot operate. Then, even if he were not in a place by operation, he affirms that he cannot be in a point. For something is said to be in another in two ways: either because it is within the ambit of that; and in this way an angel cannot be placed in a point, because a point has no ambit; or because it is in the essence of that conserving it; and thus God alone is in things: wherefore in this manner an angel will not be able to be in a point.

1391. St. Thomas; Richard of St. Victor, In II Sent., dist. 2, art. 2; Capreolus, I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, concl. 2; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 2; the Ferraran Master, Contra gentiles 3, c. 68, 9; Cajetan ad rationem principalem.

1392. Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 32, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, pars 2, a. 1, q. 3; Gabriel Biel, II, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 2; Gregory of Rimini, q. 1, a. 2; John Major, q. 9; Aegidius of Rome, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, a. 1, q. 2; William of Ockham, Quodlibet I, q. 4; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., q. 2, a. 2 (after the fifth conclusion).

Caput II - The view of Scotus

Scotus, moreover, in Second Book, distinction 2, question 6.5, says to the point that nothing in this matter is ascertained. For the thing is very far removed from sense, and we have no knowledge from revelation; and as for physical reasons, which are asserted on either side, they are weak. First, indeed, the reasons by which the Doctors of the first opinion try to prove that an angel is at some time located in a point do not sufficiently persuade, especially if we stand by their principles. For either an angel is constituted in a place by a transitive operation, or by the application of his power to act, or by something which has the mode of a transitive operation, or by his mere substance, or by a mode added to it; for by one of these modes he could be located in a point. For if he were in a place in the manner in which Durandus thought, by no means could he be in a point, since from his opinion it openly follows that an angel is in the whole universe; but that in no way, from the things said, can he be in a point, is sufficiently proved; therefore we can have nothing certain for this opinion.[1393]

First, if an angel were in a place by operation, or by application to operate, that is, by a power derived for operating, it rather follows that he would necessarily have to be in a divisible part; for no operation, or power derived from an angel, can be received in a point; and if an operation cannot be derived in a point, neither can the angel's application to operate be referred to a point. By this reasoning Aegidius argues against those who think that angels are present in a place by operation.

Some reply that, even if an action cannot be received in a point, nevertheless by a subterfuge a point can move a body; and because an angel can apply his power to the whole body through a point, so that through it the body is said to be moved, therefore an angel can be in a point, whether he is in a place by a transitive operation, or by an application to operate. But although a mover of bodies can move another body through a point or through a surface - because, in order to move, it ought to touch the mobile, so that by a touch of quantity it imprint motion or an impetus (impetus), which is the cause of motion; and the touch of quantity either can be in an indivisible point, or of necessity ought to be in a surface, because a touch according to depth cannot be made - nevertheless an angel cannot move a body through a point. For if that could be done, it would be chiefly because he would touch through a point; but he cannot touch in a point: first, not by a touch of quantity, because an angel does not have quantity; further, not by a touch of power, or operation, because none of its effects can be received first in a point, so that through it they be derived into the rest of the body. Therefore neither can an angel move a body through a point; or else let them explain to us how a power or operation of an angel can be communicated to a whole body through a point.

By this reasoning it is proved not only that an angel cannot be in an individual point of a body, but also not even in some determinate part of the whole which is moved, unless we should say that a body is moved by an angel by some impressed quality which is called impetus (impetus). For if an angel moves a body to a place by his sole will - add, if you please, a mediating executive power,

1393. Durandus's opinion that an angel is in the whole universe excludes location in a point.

which some, without cause, distinguish from the will - the motion of the whole mobile, neither earlier in time nor earlier by nature nor by causality, is received in one part than in another. I speak of a solid and permanent body; for if it is fluid, one part can easily first be moved in time and then move another. And thus, even though the body be solid and permanent, it cannot first receive motion in one part than in another, but it is diffused equally into all; or else let them show us how one part moved is the cause of the motion of another. I grant indeed that, when the mover is corporeal, it moves the rest through one part, either because by the touch of one it impels the others, or because by that touch it impresses some quality in the others, if it first produces it in some determinate [part]; for if it creeps, like heat, of necessity the first part of the mobile is affected by that quality - just as the first part heated will not be said, also by reason of the quality, to move through some determinate part, but indeterminately. But motion according to place certainly is not diffused in this way: for it is not received first in some determinate part, nor does it creep little by little like heat, but equally in all the parts of the mobile it begins, as appears in an orb which is turned in a circle, and in any other body that is projected.

Moreover, that an angel, besides motion according to place, can impress some impetus (impetus) which can be the cause of motion, is to me most probable. For what else can he do in a heavy body which he holds suspended in the air? Since it is held back by no impediment, nor would that being held back cease by the mere negation of concurrence, as by God it could be hindered - since an angel cannot deny any concurrence necessary for the motion of a heavy thing - it follows that by some positive operation of the angel it is held back: but this is not motion according to place, because we suppose it to be held at rest. What then can it be, except an impetus (impetus), so moderated that it neither overcomes the heaviness and moves the body upward, nor is overcome by it so that the body be moved downward, but [the body], suspended, rests? Nevertheless I think it is not necessary that there be an impressed impetus distinct from the motion, in order that an angel may be able to move a body.

This supposed, it is difficult for me to see on what reasoning St. Thomas said that the angel, the mover of the heaven, is in that determinate part in which he impresses motion upon the whole body; for this cannot be done unless an angel be in a place by the impression of an impetus in a determinate part: and much less do I understand how what Aristotle says in De caelo II, in the chapter on this matter, can be true, namely, that that very part of the heaven is the one in which the mover is present and to which he gives the motion.

Moreover, that besides motion according to place an angel can impress some impulse which can be the cause of motion, seems to me hardly probable. For what else is it that he can do in a heavy body which is held suspended in the air? For since it is held back by no impediment, nor does that motion cease by the mere negation of concurrence - so that it could be impeded by God alone, because an angel can only deny the concurrence necessary to the motion of the heavy thing - it follows that it is held back by some positive operation of the angel: but this is not motion according to place, because we suppose it to be held at rest: what then can it be, except an impulse, so moderated that it neither overcomes the heaviness and moves the body upward, nor is overcome

by it so that the body is moved downward, but the body rests suspended? Nevertheless, it is not necessary that there be some impulse distinct from motion itself, in order that an angel be able to move a body.

On this supposition, however, it is difficult for me to see for what reason St. Thomas said that the angel, the mover of the heaven, is in that determinate part in which he impresses motion to the whole body: for this can be done only if the angel be in place by the impression of an impulse in that determinate part. And much less do I understand in what way that can be true which Aristotle says in On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 6, namely, that that part in the heaven would be the right, where the heaven had begun to be moved, if the motion had not been eternal: for in the motion of the sphere it does not appear which part could have been moved first, not only in time, but neither in causality and nature, unless we suppose intelligences animating the heavens, and impressing in some part a peculiar power for motion, which Aristotle himself seems to have thought, as we noted in disputation 183, chapter 1; or else let us affirm that an assisting angel first impresses an impulse in one part of the sphere, that it may move, rather than in another

Second, if an angel is in place by something that has a mode like a transient [operation], as if he presided or kept guard for some reason unknown, he could not be in a point: for to what end would custody, or the attention of one presiding, or anything of this sort, be directed only to a point, or be able to be directed? For although an angel can think about a point without thinking about the remaining parts, nevertheless he cannot keep guard, or preside, or effect anything similar, unless around the whole body: or else let them explain to us this mode of operation about a point, which is assimilated to a transient operation.

Third, if an angel is present by his bare substance, as others were saying, even if he be indivisible, it does not therefore follow that he can be located in a point placed in continuous quantity: for as St. Thomas most aptly noted in this article, the indivisibility of each is of a different kind, and in no way do they mutually correspond: therefore it need not be that the indivisibility of the angel can be constituted in a point of a line. And if the existence (*esse*) of the angel in place arose from bare substance, as some think, and because substance is indivisible he could be in a point, it would follow that he ought always to be located in a point, just as because existence in a foot-place follows the foot-measure, therefore he must always necessarily be in so much place. Either, then, the indivisibility of the angel's substance cannot demand a point as its place, or it must always demand it. For this reason Scotus, who said that an angel is in place through his bare substance, thought it not proved thence that he can be constituted in a point: because, says he, the indivisibility of the angel is not limited, as the point is in the continuum. Thus far we have shown that it is not sufficiently demonstrated that an angel can be in a point, even if we follow the opinions which we have above refuted concerning the foundation of the angel's existence in place. Nay more, although from some of those opinions the existence of the angel in a point might rightly follow, yet this should not be affirmed absolutely, because it would be gathered from a false foundation.[1396]

1396. Scotus holds that an angel is in place by his bare substance, yet from this it does not follow that he can be constituted in a point; see the discussion above on the foundations of the angel's existence in place.

But if we follow our own position, which we set out in disputation 188, chapter 7, namely, that an angel is constituted in place by reason of some mode added to his substance at his nod and will, it is still not clear to me that he can be located in a point. For who can know whether that mode ought to have a limited nature with respect to a part of a divisible body, and unite to it only the angel's substance, or even be able to unite it to a point? For neither side do I indeed see a contradiction; for that reason, however, I have no foundation to assert anything.

Thus far I have shown the foundations of the first opinion to be weak. Next it remains that we show the same about the foundations of the second, so that that third opinion of Scotus may remain approved, which affirms that the matter is doubtful and cannot be sufficiently defined. I show, then, that the reasons of the second opinion are of no moment as follows. First indeed, the foundation of Ockham, Gabriel, and Marsilius, denying points in the continuum, is false: and even if it were true, the question proceeds only on the supposition that points exist. But that they do exist I now briefly show. No one up to now has doubted about the extreme surface of any body: but some have denied the intermediate surfaces and the points of lines which are within the continuum (for every line is within a surface). Therefore at least it could be doubtful whether an angel could be on the whole surface, which is indivisible according to depth: and I judge the same about this for the same reason. But let us show that there are also points in the middle of a body: for if a perfectly plane surface be given, upon which there is a perfectly spherical [surface], it will touch without doubt really: it will touch the plane not according to the whole of itself, as is manifest: therefore [it will touch] by some part of itself, either by some indivisible or by some divisible part. Not indeed by any divisible part according to the width and length of the plane: for the mathematicians prove that otherwise not all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference would be equal; and the same likewise follows whether you say that the contact is in some determinate divisible according to the width and length, or in some indeterminate, and then the sphere would touch according to some of its divisible part in width and length along the periphery. Then that contact, with respect to the depth of each body, is not by any divisible part: we have therefore something indivisible with respect to every part; or it would demand for itself a place adequate to itself, which is a point. Now what some say, that that contact is made through some indeterminate part, is ridiculous: for since the contact is real and determinate, and is not made according to the whole body, it must be made by some determinate part thereof: therefore points are not by designation alone, but are real, so that by such contact they can also be designated: for the contact is real, nor is that by designation and contact effected by which bodies touch, but that which was there is designated.

Second, the argument of Alexander and St. Bonaventure proves nothing: for these Doctors suppose what they ought to have inferred, namely, that that which is in place ought to be in some divisible space: although this is manifest if we speak of existence in surrounding place; but about a simple presence somewhere, such as is the angel's, this is not so manifest, but is the very thing we now dispute.

Third, the argument of Aegidius likewise proves nothing, if once we say that an angel is in place not by reason of operation: for he did not rightly enumerate the modes of being in another when he said that something is in another either within its circumference, or as conserving it: for an angel is

in place by the simple presence of his substance, nor is it necessary to operate in order to be in it: hence by this reason it is not rightly shown that an angel cannot be located in an indivisible. Therefore each side remains uncertain: although I freely confess that no contradiction is inferred if we follow the affirmative side.

Caput III - Why the angel who moves the heaven is not in the whole, but in some part of it

It remains that we explain whether the angel who moves the sphere of heaven is in the whole, or in some part of it. The common opinion holds that he is in some determinate part of the sphere: so St. Thomas in this article, St. Bonaventure in the second book, distinction 2, second part, article 2, question to the second, and Scotus in question 3, s., and the others, and the philosophers commonly: for it seems incredible that an angel should be in the whole heaven: for if the whole heaven were the adequate place of the angel, since that angel who moves is of the lower order, the Archangels who are sent, and the other higher angels would demand a greater place for themselves, which is a point: whence it would follow that they could be in heaven and on earth at the same time, against the doctrine of St. John Damascene handed down above in disputation 190, chapter 3. For the greater length and breadth is that of the whole heaven than that which is between heaven and earth.[1397]

Yet it is difficult to explain how an angel, if he is in a determinate part of heaven, remains fixed, nor is moved with the heaven: but much more difficult according to the opinion of those who affirm that an angel is in place by operation: for besides the fact that, as we were saying above, he would rather be in the whole heaven equally first than in a determinate part, it would be difficult still to explain how the angel would be in some part in which he would continuously impress power and motion, and would not be moved with it. We say, therefore, that by reason of that mode added to his substance he is united to the body, so that we do not place him in the whole world: nevertheless he operates in the whole world, but not by impressing some influx through one part, nor is this to operate at a distance and remote, without a medium; for it is not repugnant that an angel, in the place in which he is, should operate continually through a long interval. But it seems necessary to say that the angel continually and successively changes in himself that mode by reason of which he is united to the body, so that he may remain fixed while nevertheless the parts of the heaven pass by successively, to which within the same quantity - four or five palms, for example - he continually and successively responds, either to the part of our east, or elsewhere: just as if an angel were in some part of a certain river, and the parts of the water were continually succeeding, so that they would continually and successively come to him while he remained at rest, he would have to change successively in himself the mode [of union]. Wherefore there is in the angel a mode, by which he is successively and continually present to the body, and by which he remains located in it: a matter which will be more elucidated in the disputation on the motion of angels.

1397. St. John Damascene, doctrine cited above in disputation 190, c. 3.

Articulus III - Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place

The third proceeds thus. It seems that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill a place. But angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place so that there is not a vacuum, as is evident from the Philosopher in Physics IV. Therefore several angels can be in one place.

1. Moreover, an angel and a body differ more than two angels. But an angel and a body are together in the same place: because there is no place which is not full of a sensible body, as is proved in Physics IV. Therefore much more can two angels be in the same place.
2. Moreover, the soul is in every part of the body, according to St. Augustine; but demons, although they do not enter into minds, nevertheless sometimes enter into bodies. And thus the soul and a demon are in the same place. Therefore for the same reason any other spiritual substances whatsoever.

But on the contrary, two souls are not in the same body. Therefore by equal reason, neither are two angels in the same place.

I answer that two angels are not at the same time in the same place. And the reason for this is that it is impossible that two complete causes be immediate to one and the same thing. This is clear in every genus of causes. For there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover: although there can be several remote movers. Nor does the instance hold of several men drawing a ship. For none of them is a perfect mover, since the power of each one is insufficient for moving. But all together are in the place of one mover, inasmuch as all their powers are aggregated to effect one motion. Whence, since an angel is said to be in place by this, that his power immediately touches the place after the manner of a perfect container, as was said, therefore only one angel can be in one place.[1398]

Reply to the first: That several angels be in one place is not hindered by the filling of the place, but by another cause, as has been said.

Reply to the second: That an angel and a body are not in place in the same way. Whence the argument does not follow.

Reply to the third: That neither are a demon and a soul compared to a body according to the same causal relation, since the soul is a form, but a demon is not. Whence the argument does not follow.

An plures Angeli simul in eodem loco esse possint? Disputatio 193.

- Several angels cannot be in the same place, even not an adequate one, St. Bonaventure and others said. Chapter 1.
- The preceding opinion is refuted. Chapter 2.
- That several angels cannot be in the same adequate place, the Thomists taught. Chapter 3.

1398. Physics IV, text 58.

• The truer opinion is that several angels can be in the same place. Chapter 4.

Plures Angelos non posse esse in eodem loco, etiam non adaequato, St. Bonaventure, and others said.

Caput I - There arise also Doctors on this question, indeed many who are brought forward to the same opinion by various arguments.

Thus think St. Bonaventure in the second book, distinction 2, part 2, article 2, question 4; Richard in the first book, distinction 37, article 2, question 4; Aegidius in the same distinction, part 2, article 1, question 3: in which opinion St. Thomas seems to have been in this article, and Capreolus in the second book, distinction 2, question 1, article 1, conclusion 3, and Bassolis in question 4, article 4: for this author only ...[1399]

1. Further, angels do not fill a place. But only a body fills a place, lest there be a void, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics IV. Therefore several angels can be in one place.
2. Further, an angel differs from a body more than two angels differ from each other. But an angel and a body are together in the same place: there is no place which is not full of a sensible body, as is proved in Physics IV, text 58.[1400] Therefore, much more can two angels be in the same place.
3. Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to St. Augustine in the Sermons; although they do not slip into minds, nevertheless they sometimes slip into bodies. And thus the soul and a demon are in the same place. Therefore, by the same reasoning, any other spiritual substances.

But on the contrary: Two souls are not in the same body. Therefore, by parity of reason, two angels are not in the same place.

I answer: Two angels are not together in the same place. The reason is that it is impossible for two complete causes to be immediate to the same thing. This is clear in every genus of causes. For there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover: although there can be several remote movers. Nor does the instance of several men dragging a ship avail; because none of them is a perfect mover, since the power of each one is insufficient for moving. But all together are in the place of one mover, inasmuch as their powers are aggregated for making the motion. Hence, since an angel is said to be in place by this, that his power immediately touches the place, after the manner of a perfect container, as was said above, there can be only one in one place.

Reply to the first: That several angels are in one place is said on account of the filling of place, but by another cause, as was said.

1399. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, pars 2, art. 2, q. 4; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., dist. 37, art. 2, q. 4; Aegidius of Rome, In eadem dist., p. 2, a. 1, q. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 3; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 4.

1400. Physics IV, text 58.

Reply to the second: An angel and a body are not in place in the same manner. Hence the argument does not follow.

Reply to the third: Nor, again, are a demon and a soul related to a body according to the same causal habitude, since the soul is a form, but a demon is not. Hence the argument does not follow.

The conclusion is: Only one angel can be in one and the same place. He himself deduces this conclusion from his own foundation, namely that an angel is in place because his power touches the place. Both points, however, must be examined in the following disputation.

Disputatio CXCIII - On whether several angels can be in the same place

Several angels cannot be in the same place, not even in a non-adequate place, as Bonaventure and others said. Caput 1.

The preceding view is refuted. Caput 2.

That several angels cannot be in the same adequate place, the Thomists taught. Caput 3.

The truer view is that several angels can be in the same place. Caput 4.

Caput I - That several angels cannot be in the same place, even if not adequately

There are also differing Doctors in this question; indeed, many are brought to the same opinion by various arguments. First, some assert that several angels cannot be in the same place by their own power. And, as their reasons indicate, they are speaking about a place even when it is not adequate. Thus think Bonaventure in the Second Book, distinction 2, part 2, article 2, question 4; Richard in the First Book, distinction 37, article 2, question 4; Aegidius in the same distinction, part 2, article 1, question 3. In this view St. Thomas too seems to have been in this article, and Capreolus in the Second Book, distinction 2, question 1, article 1, conclusion 3, and Bassolis in question 4, article 4: for this author only grants that it can be by the absolute omnipotence of God. [1401]

Bonaventure proves this first by the following reason. Since an angel is a certain part of the universe, and therefore in the whole he ought to have some order, it is necessary that naturally each angel be established in his own peculiar place: for if in the same place, however it be taken, there were several, the order of the universe would be perturbed. He admits, however, that on the part of the angel there is no repugnance, since one does not so occupy a place that his substance is an impediment to another, as one body is to another body; nor on the part of place: for since place does not need the presence of an angel, nothing on the part of place prevents it from receiving

1401. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, pars 2, art. 2, q. 4; Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., dist. 37, art. 2, q. 4; Aegidius of Rome, In eadem dist., p. 2, a. 1, q. 3; St. Thomas, in this article; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 3; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 4.

several angels into itself. He therefore thinks the whole repugnance to be on the part of the order which they ought to preserve in the whole universe, an order which he judges cannot be set aside by the power of the angel himself.

Second, Richard proves: things that are in the same place necessarily penetrate one another, as if there were two bodies; therefore if two angels were in the same place, they would mutually penetrate. Richard, moreover, supposes as known that two angels cannot penetrate one another.

Third, Aegidius argues: Whenever several things are compared to something one in the same way, they cannot be together in it, as two forms in the same matter; because they are related to it in the same way, they cannot be together. But an angel and a soul in the same body, and a body and an angel in the same place, can be together without repugnance, because they have regard to the matter or to the place in a different way; but two angels are compared to the place in the same way: therefore they cannot be together in the same place. All these reasons strive to prove this even about a place that is not adequate, as is sufficiently clear; and for that reason I said that these authors clearly think that several angels cannot be in the same place, even when it is not adequate.

Caput II - Refutation of the preceding opinion

And this view, in my judgment, can be refuted by Scripture and by reason, as I shall show clearly in caput 3; for now let it be enough to show that the reasons of these doctors are weak, whereby I shall also in some way indicate the falsity of their doctrine.

The first reason of Bonaventure proves only that an angel, together with the whole universe, has some order, not according to situation and place, but according to his substance and nature; this, however, would not be taken away even if several angels were placed in the same place. But order according to place is attended to only in bodies, which by their quantity necessarily must occupy different places.

The second reason of Richard has no force. Rather, the common doctrine of the Scholastics must be supposed, who assert that one created substance cannot be within another by illapsus (a substantial slipping-in), but only according to presence, as in a place. Thus teach the Master in II, dist. 8; Herveus in II, dist. 9, in the principal reply to the second reason; Bonaventure in II, dist. 8, part 1, art. 1, q. 2, In corpore, and on the second; Argentina in II, dist. 7, q. 1, art. 2; and the Ferraran in Contra gentiles, c. 18, at the end. For that a substance be said to be in another by illapsus, it is necessary, as the aforesaid Doctors noted, that it be in it in the mode of conserving that substance; but one created substance cannot conserve another: therefore neither can it be in it by illapsus, but only by the presence of place. And since one angel cannot be the place of another (for place is taken according to situs), nor can he slip into him, because he does not conserve his substance, it follows that in no way can one angel be in another. But God, who is of Himself omnipotence, since He conserves all things by the nod of His will, is in all things, even spiritual things, in such a way that He slips into their substances. And this is the doctrine of Augustine in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 83, where he writes thus: We do not believe that demons, by an energetic operation, slip substantially into the soul, but that they are joined by application and

oppression; but to slip into the mind is possible to Him alone who created. By these words he grants that an angel is united or conjoined to the soul, because he is together with it in the same body; yet he is not within the soul, because he cannot slip into it. The same was said most clearly by Bede on that passage of Acts 5, "Ananias, why hast thou tempted...," when he says that the mind and soul of man cannot be filled, as existing within his substance, by any creature, except by the whole Trinity. Fulgentius on the Faith to Peter, cap. 3, is also usually cited, where he says: There is, nevertheless, in each (namely, in angels) a natural boundary by which they are distinguished from one another; because none of them is in another. He said this, however, because he thought angels to be corporeal, although their bodies would not be from the elements: in which view St. Augustine also seems to have been; wherefore it is not surprising if, even in the place cited, he said that angels cannot slip into the substance of the soul. But since he concedes that they are within the human body, he denied that they are within souls by that peculiar reason already explained. I do indeed see that the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas is ascribed by many not to Augustine, but to Gennadius.

Now then, how little Richard's reason proves, I show thus. Although it is true that one angel cannot be within the substance of another angel, nevertheless the opposite does not follow, even if we say that several angels are in the same body together; for just as an angel can be together with a rational soul in the same body, yet not within it, so too he will be with another angel, yet not within him. For one substance cannot be in another save by a substantial illapsus, or as in a place: in the former way God alone can be, as we said; in the latter way, however, an angel can only be in a corporeal substance which has situs; but within another angel he cannot be, rather with him together in the same body. From the fact, moreover, that two angels are together in the same body, it does not follow that they must mutually penetrate and that one substantially slip into the other; otherwise an angel would also slip into the rational soul when he is in the body of the possessed, or conversely the soul of the possessed would slip into the angel possessing: which is absurd. Richard therefore infers badly.

The third reason also of Aegidius is no less weak. For although some things cannot be in the same place in the same mode - just as two forms in the same matter, or two quantified bodies within the same surface - yet on the contrary some can be in different modes, as an angel and a soul within the same body. From this, however, it does not follow that two things cannot be within the same body in the same mode: from particulars one ought not to draw a universal. And if Aegidius assumes in his reasoning a universal proposition - namely, that never can two or more be in the same place in the same mode - he assumes what ought to be proved. Besides, from those particulars it is not permitted to infer by parity the thing he contends; for two forms cannot therefore be in the same matter because they are present not only by the presence of place, but they bestow a formal effect upon the matter, and that effect by its nature clashes with the other. Next, two bodies cannot therefore be within the same surface, not because they are there in the same mode, but because each of them is such as to occupy the space of that surface by its quantity; but what has once been occupied and filled cannot be filled by a body. But an angel is in a body in such a way that he attributes no formal effect to it, but is present only by presence, nor does his

substance fill or occupy a space. Therefore nothing prevents his being with another angel within the bounds of the same body; unless something else were assigned that could be an impediment. And if it were sufficient for being in a different mode that some things could be together, it would follow that in the same matter there could be two quantities together, penetrated, one informing the matter, the other only present; because then they would be in different modes. But this is impossible. Therefore it matters little whether they be in the same or in a different mode for some things to be together, if something else prevents it; just as, on the contrary, in the same mode nothing hinders, if from elsewhere there is no impediment. This same point will be confirmed more in caput 4, where we shall also examine the reasoning of St. Thomas and Capreolus.

Caput III - That several angels cannot be in the same adequate place, as the Thomists teach

As for the force of St. Thomas's statement in this article - that several angels cannot be in the same place - the Thomists commonly understand his view to be about an adequate place; and they grant that nothing repugns several angels being in the same non-adequate place. Thus Cajetan in the commentary on this article, and the Ferraran in Contra gentiles, cap. 68, in the solution of the second doubt. They call a place non-adequate one that does not correspond to the whole operative power; for since these hold that an angel is in a place by operation, or by the application of his power to act, they rightly say that place is adequate in which an angel is established with the whole of his operative power; but that place is non-adequate in which he is situated by his operative power only in part. For if two angels move the same body, since each does not contribute adequately to the motion, he will be in that body as in a non-adequate place. They nonetheless grant that St. Thomas spoke also of a place that is not adequate, and denied that several angels could be in the same place even when it is non-adequate: for his reason clearly indicates this - not because it repugns the power and virtue of angels, but, as the Ferraran says, because it would seem superfluous.

Caput IV - The truer opinion: that several angels can be in the same place

I certainly judge that several angels can at the same time be in the same place. Thus absolutely teach Scotus in the second book, distinction 2, question 8; Gabriel, question 2, article 3, doubt 3; Gregory, question 3; Marsilius on the second book, the questions on the articles, conclusion 8; Major in question 10; and Ockham in Quodlibet 1, question 4.[1402] And when there is talk of a place that is not adequate, we agree with Cajetan and the Ferraran, inasmuch as he affirms that it does not repugn the power of an angel, but that either it is superfluous, or rare. Yet I say not only with them and with others now alleged that it does not repugn; but also that it is neither superfluous nor rare. And this opinion is commended to me not only because no contradiction seems to follow from it (for that would not suffice for me to assert it without doubt), but also because it is plainly

1402. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 8; Gabriel, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 3; Gregory, q. 3; Marsilius, In II, quaestiones super articulos, conclusio 8; Major, quaestio 10; Ockham, Quodlibet I, q. 4.

contained in Scripture: Luke 8. From which passage Richard of St. Victor, in book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 25, infers that angels are not bodies, because they can be at the same time in the same place.[1403] We also frequently see in the possessed that there are many demons: therefore it is sufficient that we grant that several can be in the same place.

The reasons adduced in the first chapter about the non-adequate place prove nothing, as we saw in the chapter. The reasoning also of St. Thomas, which seems to tend to the same conclusion, is not efficacious: for since he posits that an angel is in a place by a transitive operation, or by an application of power to act, he argues in this way, that one effect can have only one cause, as is clear in every kind of cause (he speaks of the proximate cause). Therefore, since the application of power constitutes an angel in a place, and this cannot be except from one agent, it follows that in one place only one angel can be. For if it sometimes happens that the same effect is from several causes, as appears in those who drag a ship, that happens only from the imperfection of the movers, whose power can be mutually aided: as if to say that such a thing in no way befits angels, because they are perfect movers. But this reasoning does not prevent that, even if an angel is in a place by a transitive operation, several can be located at the same time in the same place, at least in a place that is not adequate.

First, because it does not repugn the perfection of an angel to be helped by another angel for some effect: and for this reason we see that sometimes there are several demons in the same human body, that they may torment more. Then too, one angel can move a body with rectilinear motion, but others with circular motion: therefore it does not repugn that in the same body there be a reason for diverse operations. I say diverse operations, not because, as Cajetan thinks, one angel could move according to place and another illumine (for an angel can imprint no quality), but because by different motions according to place different angels can move the same body.

Moreover, it is proved much more easily that two angels can be in the same place from the mode in which we said an angel is constituted in a place: for since he is there by a certain mode added to his substance, by reason of which he is joined most nearly to a body according to the presence of his substance, nothing prevents that two be in the same body. For just as at the same time an angel is with the soul in the same body, and they do not impede each other, so too at the same time one angel can be with another. For what Ægidius said, that the soul and a demon can exist in the same body because they are in it in a different way, is trifling (as I have already shown in chapter 2): for the soul by its presence does not prevent the angel's presence, not because it informs the body but the angel does not; but because its substance, since it is spiritual, does not fill nor occupy a place like quantity does: and so it ends that spirits can be together. But this same thing holds for one angel with respect to another: therefore he can well be with him in the same body.

Up to this point I have proved absolutely only that two angels can exist in the same body and place, defining nothing about an adequate place. But about this I say that they can indeed be in the same place adequate to each, unless inequality of power on their part stands in the way: that is, from elsewhere it by no means repugns, whether we say that they are there by operation, or we say

1403. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, IV, c. 25.

that they are there by that mode of substance. But if all are unequal in power to operate and to constitute themselves in a place, for this reason two will not be able to be in the same place adequate to each, as is sufficiently manifest.

Refutation of that position

This position thus explained does not commend itself to me. First, it does not please me that he asserts it to be superfluous for many angels to be in the same place physically, and that for the most part this does not happen: since it is clear to us that frequently within the same man there are many demons, as in Luke 8 there was a legion; which ought to be judged neither superfluous nor rare and unusual. Nor indeed ought one to say that they are individual demons in the individual parts of the body, especially since the demons of that legion would have had to be in the smallest parts. We see also frequently in the possessed that there are many demons: therefore it is enough that we admit that many can be in the same place.

And then that which Cajetan and the Ferraran teach about material and formal place does not please me. For if once they grant that two angels can be in the same body adequately, even if it be not by reason of the same operation, nonetheless they must be said to be in the same formal place adequate. For to the formal account of place does not belong a foundation in that which exists there, which is operation. But the angel's material place is the very breadth and length of the body; but its formal account is the relation of distance to fixed points: just as the material place of bodies is the surface, and that relation is the formal account of that; wherefore, if the same body adequately corresponded to two angels, they would be said absolutely to be in the same adequate place.

Cajetan, however, in order to explain in what way by its very nature it repugns that several angels be in the same adequate place, notes first, that this is not to be understood of the absolute power of God; for in this way no one denies that it can be. Second, that it is to be understood according to the angel's natural power, because naturally the same effect cannot be from two causes which they call total, although it can be by the power of God and his absolute potency, so that two created total causes also concur totally to the same effect. If therefore God permits that an angel by his natural power be constituted by himself alone in a place, he will not be able at the same time to be with another in a place adequate to both, although he can indeed be in a place that is not adequate.

He adds, however, third, that two angels by their natural power, with God supplying nothing, can be in the same place materially, but not formally, to each a non-adequate place: he says materially, that is, in the same body of quantity and mass adequate to the virtue of each. He says moreover formally, in respect of the same operation and foundation: and thus, as he would say, two angels could be in the same bodily mass adequate to each by the mode of place, not by reason of the same, but of different operations, as if one, he says, moved according to place, but another illumined. The Ferraran agrees with Cajetan in this third point; for of the first he says nothing; but in the second he is of a contrary opinion. These two things, however, are nothing to the present subject: for now the difficulty is about existence in a place by the angel's own power, with God

alone concurring according to what his nature itself requires. Whether indeed the same effect can be from two total causes must be deferred to the third part, question 3, article 6, against this same Cajetan.

Quaestio LIII - On the local motion of angels

Consequently it must be considered concerning the local motion of angels.

And about this three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether an angel can be moved locally

Objicitur primo. It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves in Physics VI, no impartible thing is moved, because while something is in the term from which, it is not moved; nor even while it is in the term to which, but then it has been changed. Whence it follows that whatever is moved, while it is moved, is partly in the term from which, and partly in the term to which. But an angel is impartible. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.

Objicitur secundo. Moreover, motion is the act of the imperfect, as is said in Physics III; but a blessed angel is not imperfect. Therefore a blessed angel is not moved locally.

Objicitur tertio. Moreover, motion is only on account of indigence. But in the holy angels there is no indigence. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

Sed contra: It is of the same account for a blessed angel to be moved, and for a blessed soul to be moved. But one must say that a blessed soul is moved locally, since it is an article of faith that Christ according to his soul descended into hell. Therefore a blessed angel is moved locally.

Respondetur: I answer that a blessed angel can be moved locally. But just as to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so also to be moved according to place. For a body is in place insofar as it is contained under a place, or is commensurated to place. Whence it is necessary that even the motion of a body according to place be commensurated to place, and be according to its exigency. And from this it is that according to the continuity of magnitude there is continuity of motion; and according to the prior and posterior in magnitude there is the prior and posterior in local motion of a body, as is said in Physics IV. But an angel is not in place as commensurated and contained, but rather as containing. Whence the motion of an angel in place does not have to be commensurated to place, nor be according to its exigency, so as to have continuity from place; but it is a non-continuous motion. For since an angel is not in a place except according to contact of power, as was said above, it is necessary that the motion of an angel in place be nothing other than diverse contacts of diverse places successively, and not simultaneously, because an angel cannot be simultaneously in many places, as was said above. But it is not necessary that contacts of this sort be continuous. However, in contacts of this sort a certain continuity can be assigned: for an angel can be assigned a divisible place by the contact of his power, just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by the contiguity of its magnitude. Whence just

as a body successively and not simultaneously leaves the place in which it was before, and from this is caused continuity in its local motion, so too an angel can successively leave the divisible place in which it was before. And thus its motion will be continuous. And it can also leave a whole place at once, and apply itself at once to an entire other place. And thus its motion will not be continuous.

Reply to the first: To the first, therefore, it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways in the present case. First, because Aristotle's demonstration proceeds about what is indivisible according to quantity, to which by necessity there corresponds an indivisible place. Which cannot be said of an angel. Second, because Aristotle's demonstration proceeds about continuous motion. For if the motion were not continuous, it could be said that something is moved while it is in the term from which, and while it is in the intermediate to which: because the very succession of different "wheres" about the same thing would be called motion. Whence in whichever of those "wheres" the thing were, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of motion prevents this, because no continuum is in its term; as is clear, because a line is not in a point. And therefore it is necessary that that which is moved not be totally in the other term while it is moved, but partly in one, and partly in the other. Therefore, insofar as the motion of an angel is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not proceed in the present case; but insofar as the motion of an angel is posited to be continuous, thus it can be conceded that an angel, while it is moved, is partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which: yet so that the partiality be referred not to the substance of the angel, but to the place, because at the beginning of his continuous motion the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is in the very being-moved, he is in part of the first place which he is leaving, and in part of the following place which he occupies. And thus his motion will be continuous.

Disputatio CXCIV - Whether an angel can be moved from place to place

And indeed, that he can occupy the parts of two places, belongs to an angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by the application of his power (virtus), just as a body by the application of its magnitude (magnitudo). Whence it follows of a body movable according to place (locus), that it is divisible according to magnitude; but of an angel, that his power can be applied to something divisible.

Reply to the second: Motion (motus) of what exists in potency (potentia) is the act (actus) of the imperfect. But the motion which is according to the application of power is of what exists in act, because a thing's power is according to that by which it is actually.

Reply to the third: The motion of what exists in potency is on account of its own indigence; but the motion of what exists in act is not on account of its own indigence, but on account of another's indigence. And in this way an angel, on account of our indigence, is moved locally, according to that in Hebrews 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent for service, for the sake of those who are to receive the inheritance of salvation?"

The conclusion is affirmative, and in my judgment it is as certain as that an angel is in a place: yet for its elucidation certain things must be said in the following disputations.

Caput I - What Hervaeus and Durandus think

Among the Scholastics there is no one, besides Hervaeus and Durandus, who asserts that angels are not moved according to place: and this was taught by Hervaeus in the treatise On the Motion of an Angel, question 1, especially articles 1 and 2, which begins "Ad secundum principale"; and by Durandus in the First Book, distinction 37, in the second part of the distinction, question 1, number 26, and question 2; Aegidius also is reported for this view in the Second Book, distinction 37; and Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, plainly maintains that angels are moved, although he differs from others in the account by which motion is explained, as we shall see in the next disputation, cap. 2.[1404]

Now Hervaeus and Durandus are led to the aforesaid opinion about motion by different reasons. For they also held different opinions about the angel's being in a place. Durandus therefore teaches that an angel is not moved from place to place, because he thinks that an angel is always everywhere present, or at least simultaneously in all those places in which he can be and operate; and since for motion according to place it is necessary to leave one place and acquire another, it follows that an angel is not moved. Indeed, from this he even proved that an angel is simultaneously everywhere, or in every place in which he can be, because he says it cannot be understood how in the substance of an angel there could be some change according to place by relinquishing a prior place and acquiring another.

Hervaeus, however, asserted in the same way that an angel is not moved according to place, as he had said that he is not in a place: for, in order that something be moved in a place and to a place, it must be in a place. Since therefore Hervaeus asserts that an angel is not in a place, consistently with his principles he teaches that he is neither moved in place nor to a place; for that presence does not seem sufficient for motion according to place, which Hervaeus grants to an angel not according to substance, but as a cause is said to be in its effect. For this view, besides the foundations which the aforesaid authors employed in the opinions which they taught about the angel's place, there seems to be St. Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter, chapters 20 and 26, where he says that a corporeal creature is moved through places and times, but a spiritual creature only through times.[1405]

Caput II - The true opinion: that an angel is moved with respect to place

The common sentence of the Scholastics and established by the reckoning of the Fathers is, that an angel is no less truly moved locally than truly is in a place. Among the Scholastics, all the rest follow this view, whom we shall report in the following disputations, who also, against Hervaeus,

1404. Hervaeus, Tractatus de motu Angeli, q. 1, especially arts. 1 - 2 (incipit "Ad secundum principale"); Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, q. 1, n. 26, and q. 2; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In II Sent., dist. 37; Cajetan, Commentary on this article.

said that an angel is in a place, as we saw in Disputation 187. And I for my part hold it to be catholic, as can be manifestly deduced from Scripture, as we shall show shortly. Of the Fathers, those recalled in the aforesaid disputation, cap. 1, who affirmed that an angel is in a place so as to be defined by a determinate place, also transmitted this doctrine: for thus it is necessary that he be able to be moved from there. And thus Durandus and Hervaeus would plainly confess it, if they had supposed that angels are in a place in that way: for they denied the motion of angels either because they are not in a place, or because they are not defined by a determinate place.

There are also several other Fathers who clearly teach that angels are moved from place to place. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34, which is the second "On Theology", at the end, says this concerning angels: "They pass through all places, and are vigorously present everywhere, both on account of the promptness of their ministry and on account of the lightness of their nature." For if, as Durandus said, they were everywhere at once, they would neither be said to pass through places, nor to be everywhere vigorously present on account of the lightness and promptness of their nature; just as a body is not present to all the parts of the place which it simultaneously occupies because of the lightness and promptness of its nature, but because it is simultaneously in them. This Dionysius had already said earlier, in the last chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, before the middle, when he said that the feet of angels are painted winged, on account of the swiftness of their motion.[1406] St. John Chrysostom expressly, Homily 3 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, on those words "Are they not all ministering spirits?" says that among the angels who are sent, this is the difference, that they who are sent change places, but the Son of God does not. With him agrees St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, cap. 17, where he says: "The angel by nature's swiftness, and because he passes promptly and swiftly, works in diverse places"; and in book 2, cap. 3, he teaches that when angels are sent from heaven to earth, they do not remain in heaven.[1407] Among the Latins also of the ancients, Tertullian in the Apologeticum against the pagans, cap. 22, writes: "Every spirit is winged; such are angels and demons: therefore in a moment they are everywhere."[1408] St. Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, book 1, cap. 10, establishes a difference between created and uncreated spirit, that the created passes from place to place because it does not fill all things; and thus, he says, it has a descending motion; but the uncreated Spirit has no such motion, nor, when he is sent, does he depart from the Father. St. Jerome, Epistle 53 against Vigilantius, on that of Apocalypse 14, "They follow the Lamb wherever he goes," plainly teaches that angels are everywhere at hand on account of the swiftness of their nature. St. Gregory the Great, Homily 34 on the Gospels, when a little before he had said that angels who are sent from heaven always stand by God, gives the reason in these words: "Because although the angelic spirit is circumscribed, yet the supreme Spirit, who is God, is not circumscribed" - as if he were saying: although the angelic spirit is in a particular place and thus, when he is sent from heaven, he leaves the former place, yet because the uncreated Spirit is everywhere, wherever the angel goes, he is present to the supreme Spirit. If the angel remained in heaven, Gregory would adduce this reason in vain. The Master cites

1405. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 20 and c. 26.
1406. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, cap. ult., ante medium.
1407. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, I, c. 17; II, c. 3.
1408. Tertullian, Apologeticus contra gentes, c. 22.

this testimony in the First Book, distinction 34, cap. Sunt ergo, from Bede on Luke; but in truth it is from Gregory in that homily which is on the Gospel of Luke 15, about the ninety-nine sheep. The very same was taught by Gregory himself, Moralia, book 1, cap. 5. Finally, Bernard, Sermons on the Canticle, although he remains in doubt whether angels are corporeal, nevertheless proves them to be corporeal because they are moved; for it was indubitable to him that angels are moved locally, even if he doubted whether they are corporeal or incorporeal.

The same opinion is also openly handed down in Sacred Scripture, although certain testimonies are also commonly alleged for it which prove nothing at all. Omitting therefore those testimonies Luke 10, "I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven," and Apocalypse 12, "Nor was their place found any longer in heaven," about which we shall speak in the disputation, cap. 3 and 2, some people prove from these that angels are said in Scripture to ascend and descend (John 1 and elsewhere). Yet not everything that is said there can be proved to pertain to local descent and ascent. For it befits the divine persons to be said to descend without local motion; for the Spirit is said to have descended upon Christ because in that place he began to appear in a new manner. More effectively is the first point proved from Job 1, where it is said that Satan "went round about and walked through the earth": for although it is also said of God in Genesis 3 that he "walked at the breeze after midday," nevertheless that is said of God by reason of the assumed body in which he deigned to appear; but it is not credible that Satan walked and went around the earth in an assumed body: demons, or angels, assume bodies as often as they appear to men. Then from Matthew 8, where the demons asked of the Lord that he send them into the swine: for although from this alone, that they are said to be sent by God to us, it is not sufficiently proved that there is motion according to place, as we shall see presently, nevertheless from that passage alleged it is rightly proved, because there they are said not only to have been sent into the swine, but also to have been sent from that body which they possessed into the swine. But for someone to be sent from one place into another cannot be done without local motion. Therefore I said that from those places where angels are said simply to be sent by God, it is not proved that they are moved locally, because, as was said in Disputation 171, cap. 2, although to be sent ought to include some "going out" on the part of the one sent, nevertheless it ought not to be according to place, but it suffices if the person who is sent, from the sender, according to substance, begins to appear in some place. And since an angel is made by God to be present, even if he did not go out from that place nor depart, he would be said to be sent by him; but he will not be said to be sent from one place into another unless he is said to go out from one into another. Thus the divine person proceeding is also said to be sent by the producer, but is not said to be sent from one place to another. Here also pertain all those places in which the demons were said to go out from bodies, which we shall report in the following chapter.

Moreover, what we have said hitherto about angels is to be understood also of the rational soul (anima), namely, not only while it is in the body, but also when separated, that it is moved: by which account the soul of Christ is said truly to have descended to the lower regions, and in Luke 16 the soul of Lazarus is said to have been carried to the bosom of Abraham. But what some say, that that was only a parable, is absurd. For in parables proper names are not commonly

introduced. And it is of faith both that the soul of Christ according to substance descended to the lower regions, and that the souls of the damned are truly there, as will be said in its own places. Wherefore Durandus errs in the First Book, distinction 37, second part, question 1, to the sixth, and in the Third Book, distinction 22, question 3, number 5, when he says that a separated soul, according to itself, is nowhere, and that it is present in hell or in purgatory only by deputation.

Caput III - That an angel moves himself

If the testimonies of the Fathers alleged in the previous chapter are rightly considered, they prove not only that an angel is moved from place to place, but also that he is moved by himself; as Gregory of Rimini very well observed, in Second Book, distinction 6, question 1, article 4; that they also move themselves is taught by Scotus, in Second Book, distinction 2, question 10; and by Major, question 11 near the end; and the holy Fathers indicate this when they assert that, on account of the swiftness of their nature, they are present everywhere. For if they were not moved from an internal principle, the fact would be attributed not to the swiftness of their nature but to the efficacy of another mover.[1409]

From Scripture too it is plainly gathered, wherever demons are said "to go out": Mark 1; Luke 4; Acts 8. For to "go out" is not said - just as neither to "go" - unless of one who is moved by his own power. For who would say that a stone which is carried "goes" or "goes out of the house"? Wherefore I do not know why Gregory said in that same place that nothing certain is had in this matter; for he seems to understand it from Scripture.

It is also proved by reason: since living things which are much more imperfect move themselves, why shall we not grant this to a most perfect substance, such as a spiritual one is? For what some contend - that in anything moving itself it is necessary to distinguish the moving part from the part moved - can in no way be shown by reason.

Capreolus to no purpose, in the Second Book, dist. 6, question 1, conclusion 1, teaches that angels cannot move themselves by a motion per se, because in them one cannot distinguish a part that moves per se and a part that is moved per se; yet that they are moved well enough by an accidental motion, as he teaches in the second conclusion - a kind of accidental motion on account of the lack of the aforesaid distinction, which indeed I do not understand. However he may be moved, one ought not to deny that he is moved by his own proper power. But to dispute about a moving part and a moved part our plan does not require.

As to the separated soul, whether it moves itself, this is not so well established from the doctrine of the Fathers and of Scripture. Only on this ground does it seem to me probable that the soul moves itself: because, since it is a most noble substance, such a power as we grant to living things ought not to be denied it.

Two things, however, seem to stand against this position. One is that the separated soul cannot move any body, as St. Thomas teaches below, question 117, article 4; therefore neither can it move itself. I answer that, first, it is much more probable, as the holy Doctor taught, that no body can be

moved by a separated soul; because, as he proves, it would have to move it by the mere nod of its will; it could move no less in the body than outside it; for there would be nothing lacking in the body to the power of the soul's will that it would have outside the body; for a different mode of existing would derogate nothing from the aforesaid power. That the separated soul understands in a different way than when conjoined is not surprising: for when it is in the body, being conjoined with the senses, it receives from them the species by which it understands; by these too it is helped to the act of cognition, by which when separated it cannot be helped; but to be able, by the nod of its will, to operate, nothing in the way of conjunction with the body stands; for, in order that it move, it does not need any quantitative contact. From this, however, there seems to follow, against the opinion of those who say that a spiritual substance is in a place by way of operation, that the separated soul is not in a place, and therefore cannot be moved: for since it cannot operate upon any body, seeing that it cannot even move it in place, in no way will it be able to be in it by way of operation. But in our opinion, which we set forth in Disputation 188, that an angel is in a place without operation by reason of that mode by which it applies itself to a body, it can very well happen that a soul be in a place and be moved from a place. Next I answer that the soul can move itself even if it cannot move other bodies: for a greater power seems necessary to move other things than to move itself.

A second thing that stands in the way of the aforesaid position is this, that the soul, while it is in the body, cannot tear itself away from it; therefore neither can it, outside the body, move itself from one place to another. I answer that the account is different: for just as the substance of a demon can in such a way be joined to one body that it is bound to it, nor does it subject to its own will that mode so as to change it, and consequently cannot be moved from that place (for the motion from that place must be by carrying off the body, the mode by which it is united to the body being left intact); so also, much more, the soul, naturally united to the body, has such a mode of union with the body that it cannot be separated from it, because it cannot leave that mode which it has not by its own will, but by the nature itself of generation; but the mode which, outside the body, by its own will it communicates to itself - by which it is joined to some body, as in a place - it is in accord with reason that by its will it can also change.

Finally observe that it is frivolous what certain men invent, that some angels are of such power that by some, as it were, impressed impulse they either bind another angel to a place or move him from it by force: for this seems proper to bodies. Those who philosophize in this way seem to be led by imagination rather than by reason, when they philosophize about spirits in the same way as if they were bodies. Wherefore, if one angel, however excellent, drive another from a place, he does not do this except by the power of God and command, as also holy men effect it; otherwise, one good angel could not bind a demon of a higher species, since by natural power he would rather be overcome by it.

1409. Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 4; Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 10; Major, q. 11.

Disputatio CXCV - Whether the motion of an angel is something in the angel himself

- That the motion of an angel is something intrinsic to him, Lichetus taught. Caput 1.[1410]
- That an angel is moved only to an extrinsic form, the majority have taught. Caput 2.[1411]
- Notes for the explication of the truer view. Caput 3.
- The middle position is more probable. Caput 4.
- The arguments which are opposed to our position are answered. Caput 5.
- An angel can be moved with continuous motion. Caput 6.

Caput I - That the motion of an angel is something intrinsic to him, taught by Lichetus

Although all the Scholastics, with one voice against Horushus and Durandus, admit that an angel is moved, yet they differ among themselves and hold different opinions about the nature of the motion itself. Some judge that the motion of an angel is toward some intrinsic form, which they call "where" (ubi), just as also happens in bodies. This view is followed by certain more recent authors, and expressly by Lichetus in II, dist. 2, q. 5, art. 2, where he reports Gregory's position and replies to his arguments.[1410] They also allege Scotus in II, dist. 7, q. 9, in the response to the question toward the end, when he says that when angels are moved in an assumed body, their motion is something formally distinct from the motion of the body itself; with greater reason, therefore, he ought to assert the same when an angel is moved by himself without an assumed body.[1412] Among the other Scholastics I could find none who would give support to the aforesaid opinion. For Alexander, II, q. 33, memb. 1; St. Bonaventure on I, dist. 37, art. 1, q. 1; Richard, art. 3, q. 1; Gabriel on II, dist. 2, q. ...; Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1, teach only that an angel is moved from place to place; what, however, he acquires by such motion - whether something intrinsic, or something extrinsic - they do not explain.[1413] The others, however, embrace the opposite view, as we shall see in the following chapter.

The reasons for this opinion are chiefly three. First: motion must be in the mobile; therefore real motion must really be in the mobile. But the motion of an angel is real, as was proved in the preceding disputation; therefore it must be real, and consequently intrinsic, in the mobile itself; otherwise, if it were only an extrinsic denomination, which is something of reason, it would be said by reason alone and not in reality itself that an angel is moved.

Second: an angel is not only moved per accidens by the motion of another, as in an assumed body, but also per se, so that it is by him per se primarily that it is true to say "is moved"; therefore in him there must be some real variation, in order that he be said to be moved per se. But this

1410. Lichetus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 5, art. 2, reporting Gregory and replying to his arguments.
1411. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, art. 2, q. 1; Ferrariensis, In III Contra gentiles, cap. 102, § "Respondetur"; Caietan, on this article, no. 9; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 5.
1410. Lichetus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 5, art. 2, reporting Gregory and replying to his arguments.
1412. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 7, q. 9, ad quaestionem dico, toward the end.
1413. Alexander of Hales, II, q. 33, memb. 1; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 37, art. 1, q. 1; Richard of Middleton, art. 3, q. 1; Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. ...; Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1.

cannot come about unless there be in him some intrinsic change: for by an extrinsic respect to other things a real change cannot come about. For an extrinsic change does not arise unless by some real change made in one of the extremes; and since an angel is moved with no other thing changed or varied, it is necessary that some intrinsic change take place in him; if by the variation only of other things an angel were said to be moved locally, it would be not so much he as other things that would be said to be moved.

Third: an angel is in a place by some real and intrinsic mode added to his substance; but to be moved is to change place; therefore there must necessarily be a change of that intrinsic mode by which an angel is constituted in a place. For motion is nothing other than the coming-to-be of the very form that is acquired; just as whitening is nothing other than the coming-to-be of whiteness.

Caput II - That an angel is moved only to an extrinsic form, taught by many

Many other theologians affirm that an angel is moved only to some extrinsic form. In this position were Aegidius on I, dist. 37, part 2, art. 2, q. 1; Ferrariensis, III Contra gentiles, cap. 102, especially at the paragraph "Respondetur"; Caietan in this article, no. 9; on these points Gregory, in II, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 5, judges that the same is true in the motion of a body as in the motion of an angel.[1411][1414][1415][1416] For this cause some recent writers, not having well grasped Cajetan's view, supposed that he taught that an angel is not moved; although many grave authors think that a body is not moved according to place to an intrinsic form, yet for this do not assert, nor are they compelled to hold, that a body is not truly moved. This opinion has no slight foundation in St. Thomas and in Aristotle. First, St. Thomas below, question 100, article 3, teaches that angels can move bodies according to place, yet not by any other motion; for a body moved according to place is not in potency to anything intrinsic.[1417]

Next, Aristotle, Physics VIII, cap. 7, text 59, says that local change alone befits the more mobile; whence he gathers that local motion is nobler than the others, because by it nothing of those things that are intrinsic to the mobile itself is changed; and therefore it is more fitting to a nobler body, whose other changes are not ad intra. Wherefore, if nowadays bodies by motion according to place are moved by something extrinsic, much more should this be asserted of angels.[1418]

Moreover, as to bodies, reason itself confirms this very point: for in this kind of motion a body is said to be moved to a place; but place is an extrinsic form of the located thing; therefore to be moved to a place, that is, motion according to place, is only to an extrinsic form. I add that the last predicaments are commonly designated only by extrinsic denomination; thus "to be in a place," which is called the predicament "where" (ubi), and is said to be the terminus of motion according to place; whence it follows that if the terminus of this motion is an extrinsic form, the motion itself

1411. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, art. 2, q. 1; Ferrariensis, In III Contra gentiles, cap. 102, § "Respondetur"; Caietan, on this article, no. 9; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 5.

1414. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), as above.

1415. Silvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), III Contra gentiles, cap. 102.

1416. Cajetan, on this article, no. 9; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 5.

1417. St. Thomas, below, q. 100, a. 3.

1418. Aristotle, Physics, VIII, cap. 7, text 59.

also will be a denomination only extrinsic to the mobile. Some, to be sure, assert that motion according to place is something intrinsic, but the form toward which it tends is extrinsic; but philosophy rightly opposes this. For this reason Aristotle, Physics III, in the first and second chapters, defining motion, says that it is the act of a being in potency, as in potency; because motion is an act of the mobile; but by this very fact it leaves the mobile in potency to the term, whereas the act which is called perfect leaves it in potency to other forms; and so motion itself is called by Aristotle in Greek an imperfect act; thus heating is an imperfect act; such an effectible act, which by the very fact that it is the act of what is to be heated, makes the thing be in potency to the heat by the form which is the term of the motion. If therefore an imperfect act and motion is intrinsic to the mobile, it leaves the mobile in potency to the terminus and to an intrinsic form: for how could it be that being moved is intrinsic to the mobile, and yet the motion be extrinsic? And so rightly Aristotle, Physics III, cap. 3, said that motion is action and passion, and that the work, or term, of action is the fact done; but the work, or term, of passion, is the effect produced. If therefore the effect is extrinsic to the mobile, it follows that the action will also be extrinsic; and if the fact is extrinsic, the action likewise will be extrinsic. Gregory has heaped up many other reasons to prove that local motion is to an extrinsic form, and that the motion itself is also extrinsic. Of which I choose this one alone: If the terminus of motion according to place is an intrinsic form which is called "where" (ubi), then either it is acquired in an instant - then it would be acquired at the first instant and not be at the prior - or it is acquired successively. But succession cannot come about in an instant; and if the motion were successive in an instant, the form would already have parts, which seems absurd.

Some have held this opinion when an angel is only moved with a bodily motion, as when he is carried in an assumed body; since the angel moves some body whole and entire, and along with it the angel himself is moved; then they say that an angel is moved by an extrinsic respect by reason of the motion existing in the body itself. But when he is moved per se, because he himself of himself changes presence without the motion of any body with which he might be moved, then he is said to be moved by a motion intrinsic and inherent to himself.

Caput III - Notes for the explication of the truer view

In order that, between these extreme opinions, we may assign a kind of middle one which seems to us more probable, some notes must first be premised. The first is that whatever is moved is said to be moved either per accidens, which is by the motion of another; or per se, which is by ...

But by another motion; because a body set in motion according to place is not in potency to anything intrinsic. Next, Aristotle in Physics VIII, chapter 7, text 59, says: "By locomotion alone nothing of the things which are in the subject itself is changed, as when something is altered." From this he gathers that motion according to place is more noble than the others, because by it nothing of the things which are in the mobile itself is changed; and therefore it suits a more noble body, which is not capable of the other motions: and if bodies are set in motion according to place toward something extrinsic, much more does this seem to be asserted of the Angels.[1419] Moreover,

with regard to bodies he confirms this very point by reason, because in this kind of motion a body is said to be moved to a place, but place is an extrinsic form to the thing placed which is moved to a place: therefore motion according to place is only toward an extrinsic form. Add that the last predicaments are commonly assigned through extrinsic denomination only; among them indeed one is "to be in a place," which is called the predicament "where" (*ubi*), and it is said to be the terminus of motion according to place: whence it comes about that, if the terminus of this motion is an extrinsic form, the motion itself also will agree to the mobile by extrinsic denomination only. Hence what some assert - that motion according to place is indeed something intrinsic, but the form toward which it tends is extrinsic - openly clashes with good philosophy: for this reason Aristotle in Physics III, chapters 1 and 2, defining motion, says that it is the act (*actus*) of a being in potency (*potentia*), insofar as it is in potency; because motion is such an act of the mobile that by this very fact it leaves the mobile in potency to those other forms which are called perfect act: and so motion itself by Aristotle in Greek is called ἐντελέχεια, endelecheia, that is, imperfect act. Such is heating, as heating, which, by the very fact that it is the act of what is heatable, makes that subject to be in potency to being hot through the form which is the terminus of the motion. If, therefore, motion, as imperfect act, is intrinsic to the mobile, it will leave it in potency to an intrinsic terminus and form: for how can it be that to be moved is intrinsic to the mobile, and that motion should be extrinsic to it? And therefore Aristotle, Physics III, chapter 3, said that motion is action and passion, and that the finished product is the terminus of action, while the state of being affected is the terminus of passion. If, then, to be affected is extrinsic to the mobile, to suffer will also be extrinsic; and if the product is extrinsic, action too will be extrinsic.[1420] Gregory heaps up many other reasons to prove that the motion of bodies is toward an extrinsic form, and that the motion itself is extrinsic. Of these I have chosen this one alone: If the terminus of motion according to place is an intrinsic form, which is called "where" (*ubi*), either it is lost in an instant by a first not-being, and another is acquired in the same instant, or it is acquired successively. It cannot be acquired in an instant, otherwise motion would be made in an instant; nor can it be acquired successively, because then that form would have parts, which seems absurd.

Some defend this view when an Angel is moved only by the motion of a body, as in an assumed body; or when an Angel moves some body whole at once, and together with it the Angel himself is moved: for then they say that the Angel is moved by an extrinsic respect on account of the motion existing in the body itself; but when the Angel is moved per se, because he of himself changes his presence without the motion of any body with which he is moved, they say he is moved by a motion intrinsic and inhering to himself: and thus Ferrarensis taught in the chapter cited. Yet although in the ninth [place] he asserts that an Angel is moved in two ways, per se and per accidens, as has been said, nevertheless about an inhering motion he teaches nothing. However, their opinion can be recommended in this way: When an Angel is moved by the motion of another, he does not have

1419. Aristotle, Physics, VIII, chapter 7, text 59.
1420. Aristotle, Physics, III, chapters 1 - 3.

a motion proper to himself, therefore neither one inhering to himself; but by respect to the motion of another, in which he is, he is said to be moved. Conversely, when he is moved per se, he is moved by a motion proper to himself: therefore by a motion intrinsic and inhering to himself.

Notations for explaining the truer opinion

Between these extreme opinions we assign a certain middle one, which seems to us more probable; certain notations must be premitted. The first is that whatever is moved, is moved either per accidens or per se. Per accidens everything is said to be moved which is moved by the motion of another; per se, however, that which is moved by a motion proper to itself. But motion per accidens is assigned by Aristotle in Physics, chapter 1, in three modes. The first is of those things which are conjoined per accidens with that which is moved per se; in this way the "musical" is said to be moved, and motion can extrinsically befit that which is moved per accidens. The second is of the part with respect to the whole. The third is of the whole with respect to the part. And in these two modes that which is moved per accidens receives per se a motion formally inhering; it is nevertheless said to be moved per accidens, that is, not adequately; and thus it is moved by a motion that is adequate to another.

The second notation is that to be moved per accidens, that is, by the motion of another, happens in a twofold way. First, by the motion of another as efficient cause: and in this way Aristotle said in Physics VI, text 86, chapter 10, that a man in a ship is moved per accidens, because the motion of the ship causes motion in the man, not because by the motion of the ship, and not by a motion proper to himself, the man is moved. For since the ship and the man are two subjects of motion, it is necessary that each be moved by its own proper motion, and thus that each also be in a place peculiar to itself. Next, to be moved per accidens happens by the motion of another formally, when something is denominated as being moved by the motion of another, as the "musical" is said to be moved by the motion of the man in whom it is.[1421]

Third notation. About the presence of an Angel in a place, or in a body, one must philosophize in the same way as about the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, and of the rational soul in the body: for although the foundation is not the same for all these, so that they exist in a place or in a body, yet in this they agree, that by a certain absolute mode they are said to be conjoined to a body, and to have a relation of presence to it: just as Christ also is conjoined to the quantity and accidents of bread. And although any body, by force of the proper passion of quantity, always has some mode which we call "where" (*ubi*), which by the will can be changed into another of the same genus by motion, nevertheless there is a difference between this mode of a body and the mode of an Angel, of the rational soul, and of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. First, because the mode of a body is of such a nature that of itself it entails a relation of distance to fixed points, even if it be in a vacuum or outside the heaven, as was noted in disputation 29, chapter 3: and therefore a body can by itself alone be moved according to place even in a vacuum and outside the heaven, because to be moved with respect to place is nothing else than to change a mode of

1421. Aristotle, Physics, VI, text 86, chapter 10.

distance; but a body can change this mode anywhere. But the mode which we attribute to an Angel, and which the soul has so that it may be in a body, and which the body of Christ has so that it may be contained under the species of the Sacrament, does not of itself ordain the Angel, or the soul, or the body of Christ to any relation of distance, but to the thing and body to which they are conjoined and united: for spiritual things, or things having the mode of spirituals, cannot of themselves have situation, except by reason of the body or quantity to which they are conjoined: and thus they cannot be or be moved in a vacuum, as was there proved.

If, moreover, these three had of themselves situation with a relation of distance, as any body whatsoever has, it would follow that they could not be moved from an extreme to an extreme except through a middle; which we will show to be false in disputation 195. Whence it follows that an Angel, the soul, and the body of Christ, with that same mode intrinsically in no way varied, can be moved with a body: for since that mode only unites these substances with a body, or with a quantity and accidents, the same mode being retained, they can be moved with the body, and change distance along with it. For since of themselves these three do not have distance except by reason of the body or quantity to which they are conjoined, of themselves also they cannot change that distance, except by reason of the change which is made in the body or in the quantity to which they are conjoined: but, contrariwise, for the body of Christ to begin to be under other species, and the rational soul, if it could, and an Angel to be in another body under exactly the same distance in which another was, it must necessarily change mode, but not distance; for neither the Angel nor the soul, remaining in the same mode, can be conjoined to diverse bodies. It is therefore a sign that that mode by which it is united to a body does not of itself entail distance, but only an order with the body to which it is conjoined, whether it be in this place or in another.

I now suppose, moreover, that the rational soul is united to the body by reason of a spiritual mode which it has in itself. Nor do I approve the opinion of those who say that the soul is united to the body by some material mode existing in the matter itself, so that thus a man should be defended to attain the terminus of generation, which he thinks to be a certain mode of union: for if the mode of union were in the soul itself, it could indeed be spiritual, and therefore a man could not by his generation attain that terminus. Their opinion for this reason does not please me: both because it cannot be understood that a soul newly informing matter should not in itself be otherwise disposed, and therefore should not have some mode of union; for by the mode of matter alone it cannot be changed in itself so as to inform what according to itself it would not inform. Next also because the terminus of generation is neither a mode of union existing in the soul, nor existing in matter, but the whole composite according to the existence (*esse*) of the whole, as will be proved below in article 7.

Objection. Yet someone may say, if an Angel can have a mode by which he is present to some body, he could also have a mode by which he would be absent from it; for it seems to be the same subject of contraries.

Solution. I answer: the presence which an Angel has to the body to which he is conjoined is not a presence with respect to immobility and distance to fixed points, but only to the substance and quantity of that body, wherever it may be; and thus he can have not a mode opposed to distance from a body with respect to immobility and fixed points, but a negation of conjunction with it.

Someone will then ask further, if an Angel were in the same body, and a body were placed by the absolute presence of God in two places, could he by his own power remain in them; just as by his own power he can in diverse places move the same body, as the rational soul can move the same body in diverse places? - what indeed commonly is said of bodies existing in two places, namely, that while it suffers in one place from some agent, it suffers this in the other also, even if in the other place it has in effect that action and passion; for action and passion denote an order to a place, and those things which by an order to one place befit a body existing in two places, do not befit it, even though in another place. I reply that it can remain; and that the whole point is to be established of Angels not by their own power, but by the divine. For if by his own power an Angel were in that body, his conjunction being supposed, then by this very fact that by the power of God the body were placed in diverse places, the Angel also would be placed; nor would the Angel by this be compelled to leave the body to which he was conjoined; because his conjunction would only regard the body according to itself absolutely, not as in this place or that: for that miracle does not of necessity dissolve the natural bond of conjunction between spirit and body; otherwise by this very fact without a new miracle the bond of the soul with the body would be dissolved, and the bond of accidents with a subject, which is false. Just as, therefore, a fourth agent cannot act upon a body, except through its original situation; nevertheless, while it acts upon it in this place, its effect naturally impressed upon the body results in that other place in which by the prior power of God that body has been placed: so too, even if while an Angel by his proper power were in that body in this place, he would remain united to the body in the other place in which by the divine power that body existed; the unity of the body would persist in that place, because this union does not regard that or this distance and fixed points, but this body, wherever it be. Wherefore, although an Angel by his proper power cannot be in several non-contiguous bodies, because he cannot have diverse modes of union with diverse bodies, yet he can by his own power be in the same body existing in several contiguous places, because to have diverse modes with diverse bodies is one thing, but to persevere in one and the same mode in the same body is another; and so an Angel in that case would be in the same body by the same mode in both places.

The middle opinion is more probable.

Caput IV - The more probable middle sentence

I judge the middle sentence to be much more probable, which is partly the first, partly also contains the second, and consists in three points. The first is, when an Angel is moved in place, not by the motion of a body, but by himself, there must be in the Angel some power by which he has an intrinsic mode. The second is, that motion according to place does not formally consist in the variation of that mode, but in a certain extrinsic denomination of distance from fixed points; and

consequently the terminus of the motion is not that real mode, but that distance. The third is, that an Angel is moved per accidens by the motion of the body in which he is, and no intrinsic change is made in him. These points must be proved from their proper foundations. The first part is easily gathered from what has been said in disputation 188, chapter 7: for since an Angel is in a place by reason of some mode by which he is united to the substance of some body, it is necessary that the mode be changed, so that the Angel be placed in a different body, just as if the soul were to unite to a different body it would require a different mode; and ...

The second part is proved from the third note: for since the mode of the Angel by which he is united to a body does not of itself induce a respect of distance from fixed points, but only unites the substance of the Angel to this body or to that, wherever that be; therefore, whenever the body is moved and the Angel remains united to the same body, he will not vary the mode, just as, while the soul is in the body, wherever it accompanies it, it retains the same mode of union. Thus the formal notion of motion does not consist in the change of that mode which the Angel has in himself, but in the variation of an extrinsic respect of distance, which he receives by reason of the body. For motion according to place is formally ordered to a new distance from fixed points, or to such a mode as by itself necessarily entails that distance: but that mode of the Angel cannot of itself have distance from fixed points, except by reason of the body in which he is; therefore motion according to place does not consist in the variation of that mode which the Angel has. Therefore, when the Angel, the bodies not being moved, is himself moved because he is successively united to diverse bodies, he is not formally moved in that he changes in himself that mode of union with the body, but in that he changes a different distance which he has not primarily from himself nor from that mode, but from the bodies to which he is united; and hence in him there is only an extrinsic respect.

For the difference between the mode which a body has from its quantity and the mode which an Angel has by his will is manifest, as we noted in the places cited: because the mode of a body from itself necessarily induces a respect of distance from fixed points, but not the substance of the Angel of itself, except by reason of the body to which he is conjoined, as was shown in disputation 29, chapter 3. But the mode by which he is conjoined to a body is entirely the same at diverse distances, if he always adheres to the same body, as we were saying of the rational soul in that third note.

Objection. Yet someone will object in this way: Whenever in some mobile there is motion by an extrinsic respect, it is necessary that that motion be intrinsic in another; for nothing is denominated extrinsically except from a form formally existing in another subject. But in this case there is nothing that is moved by a motion inhaerent to itself; therefore neither will the Angel be said to be moved extrinsically.

It is answered: Many things are denominated extrinsically, not from a form of the same kind existing in another, just as a wall is denominated right from the right-handedness of an animal; but some things are extrinsically denominated from an opposite form, as a creator from a creature, and a visible from sight; and sometimes even an extrinsic denomination is taken from circumstances wholly absolute, as we said in disputation 115, chapter 2. It is always true, however, that every

extrinsic denomination is taken from something real. Thus, then, an extrinsic denomination of motion according to place befits the Angel from the various distances of the bodies to which he is successively conjoined, because from those distances he is also said to successively be distant: for since in himself he does not have the posture of distance, but by reason of the body to which he is conjoined, and since he is successively united to various bodies or to various parts of the same, it comes about that he is also said successively to be distant, and therefore to be moved.

The third part of our position can also easily be proved from what has been said; for an Angel, that he may be conjoined to some body and be said in some way to be in it, must have over his substance some mode, as has been said, so that as often as he remains conjoined to the body, wherever that be or wherever it be moved, he always retains the same mode, as the soul does while it is in the body, and as Christ does in the Eucharist. Therefore, if the body in which the Angel is should be moved, and he himself should always remain in it, he will indeed be moved with no intrinsic change made in him, not only not with that in which motion according to place formally consists, but not with any prior change either, as we said in the second part. For since the Angel does not have distance from himself, nor from any other mode intrinsically his, but only extrinsically from the body in which he is, as Christ in the Eucharist and the soul in the body; and since he changes this distance along with the body and by this very fact is moved according to place; it follows that motion according to place, by which he is said to be moved extrinsically, only denominates him. And since he always retains the same mode by which he is conjoined to the body, when he remains in the same, as it is moved along with it, there is made in him no intrinsic change either which is prior to local motion, as there is in the case of the second part.

Therefore, in this kind of motion the Angel, by the motion of the body, is moved per accidens, not only efficiently, but also formally; that is, he is denominated to be moved by the motion of the body itself, in the very way in which the soul, when it is moved with the body, is said to be moved. For who would say that the soul acquires in itself a peculiar mode of place and distance? For thus it would be moved not per accidens but per se, that is, by its own proper motion, and it would be moved neither by itself nor by the mover of the body, but by him who preserves it present to the body; as some wrongly think of Christ, when he is moved in the Eucharist, as we shall say presently.

Therefore the things which we have said can be confirmed and more fully unfolded by the example of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, which must necessarily be said to be moved per accidens only by the motion of the species and by the mover of the species. Thus taught St. Thomas, III, question 76, article 6, and Cajetan, and more recent Thomists there, Paludanus on the Fourth, distinction 10, question 3, article 3, Richard, article 4, question 1, Soto, question 6.[1422] The reason, however, is manifest: for the words of consecration, and God by their ministry, effect only this, that Christ be present to the species, not as present in this place only or in that, but as those species are such. Therefore the mode intrinsically by which Christ is united to the species does not of itself entail distance from fixed points, but by reason of the species themselves Christ is said to

1422. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 76, a. 6; Cajetan; more recent Thomists there; Paludanus, In IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 3, a. 3; Richard, a. 4, q. 1; Soto, q. 6.

be distant. When, therefore, someone moves the species themselves, by this very fact he necessarily confers efficiently on Christ the distance of the species; therefore he is said to be moved per accidens, not per se, but per accidens by the motion of the species in which he is.

Likewise, he who were to move a ring in which a demon or an Angel were would necessarily move the Angel by this very fact, because the Angel himself would preserve the mode of union with the ring. But if the motion of the species of the Sacrament, or of the ring, were not derived extrinsically into the body of Christ or into the Angel, but they were moved by a proper motion inhering in themselves, it would follow that Christ is not moved by the priest, nor the Angel by him who carries the ring; but that the body of Christ is moved by God alone, who preserves him in the species, and that the Angel is moved by himself, who continuously keeps himself in the body: which things Scotus in the Fourth, distinction 10, question 6, Maior, question 6, and Gabriel, question 1, article 2, conclusion 10, and on the Canon, lecture 47, letter H, willingly assert, because he thinks that Christ in the Eucharist has a proper distance in which he is proximately preserved by God. But that this follows is manifest: for motion is effected by that by which distance is also effected; but the distance in the body of Christ is effected by God alone, if he has some proper distance, as is manifest; therefore he is moved by him alone. But who does not see that this is absurd? For hence it would follow that a priest, when asked what he is carrying, could not answer, "the body of Christ," because he himself does not move, nor carry, the body of Christ; but Christ himself carries himself: the same, in the case of an Angel present in a ring which is moved along with someone, must be said. Since therefore he who moves the species or the body is said to move Christ or the Angel, it follows that Christ and the Angel are moved per accidens by the motion of the body or of the species, by an extrinsic denomination only derived therefrom.

Satisfaction is given to the arguments that are opposed to our position.

Caput V - Answers to the arguments opposed to our position

Moreover, since our position has proceeded by a certain middle way between opposing views, it must needs refute the arguments of each opinion which seem to be opposed to it.

To the first argument I answer that not every real motion must be intrinsic in the very mobile which is said to be moved really; but a mobile can undergo such a denomination by an extrinsic denomination only. For many other extrinsic denominations are attributed to things denominated along with this particle "really": we say, "God really creates," and yet he is said to create not by a creation intrinsically in himself but in the creature existing; for that particle "really" does not denote an intrinsic inherence of a form, but a real foundation from which the denomination is taken. Thus also in our case, the things which are said to be moved per accidens are said to be moved really and to change distance, as music is in the soul and the soul is in the body: although in themselves they receive neither motion nor distance intrinsically, but are said to receive them by an extrinsic denomination; which many learned men, whom I cited in chapter 2, judge to be true even of the motion of bodies which are moved per se; and Aristotle has not obscurely indicated this.

To the second argument I answer that indeed the Angel is moved per se and per accidens, as has been explained in the second and third part of our position; but in neither way is he moved by a motion intrinsically inhering in him, because the distance to which local motion is ordered is in no way intrinsically -

But on the contrary to the second argument I answer, the Angel indeed is moved per se and per accidens, as was explained in the second and third part of our position; but in neither way is he moved by a motion intrinsically inhering in him, because the distance to which local motion is ordered in no way intrinsically befits the Angel, neither by reason of himself, but by reason of the body in which he is, and extrinsically: yet there is always some intrinsic change, from which that extrinsic denomination of motion according to place proceeds. First, when the Angel is moved per se, he is always varied intrinsically in that mode by which he is united to bodies; then, when he is moved per accidens by the motion of the body in which he is, intrinsically the body is always changed, by whose motion secondarily, that is, per accidens, the Angel is said to be moved.

But you might say: If the Angel, when he changes different bodies into different distances, is said to be moved by an extrinsic denomination only, and is never moved by a motion intrinsically inhering, it follows that he is always moved per accidens: for that which is moved per se first ought to have in itself an intrinsic motion. I answer, to be moved per se first is not to be moved by an intrinsic denomination, nor is it to be moved per accidens to be moved by an extrinsic denomination: for sometimes something is moved by an intrinsic denomination which yet is moved per accidens, as an integral part in the whole; but to be moved per se first is to be moved, not by the motion of another, nor after something else is first moved, but by one's own motion, whether that be denominated intrinsically or extrinsically: and because, when the Angel is moved in the aforesaid manner, he is not moved by another's motion, but by his own proper motion, even if by an extrinsic denomination only, he is said to be moved first and per se; but when he is moved by the motion of a body, he is said to be moved per accidens, because the motion of the body secondarily denominates him.

Reply to the third argument is clear from what was said in chapter 4, in confirmation of the second part, namely that, while the Angel is moved per se, a certain real intrinsic mode is indeed changed, but the motion does not formally consist in its mutation, because that mode of itself is not the cause of the distance, in the variation of which is placed the formal notion of motion according to place; but the whole distance befalls the Angel secondarily from the body to which he is conjoined.

Second. The arguments adduced in the second chapter for the opinion of Giles and others can prove nothing against ours: for we grant that the Angel's motion according to place, whether per se or per accidens, befits the Angel as placed in an extrinsic denomination. However, because we do not think true what they assume and teach universally about bodies, satisfaction must be given to them also. First, therefore, we say that bodies are moved to a form which we call where (ubi): for this arises from the proper passion of quantity, which it has from comparison to another body, as we noted in chapter 3 in the third notation; I grant indeed that St. Thomas and Aristotle, in the passages alleged in the second chapter, strongly incline to the opinion which says that motion

according to place in bodies is not effected toward an intrinsic form, unless we are willing to interpret them of an inhering form which is a disposition to corruption; nevertheless, it seems more probable to posit in the very body that is moved an intrinsic form which is called where (ubi), and to locate in its variation the motion according to place. The reason brought there proves nothing, because motion according to place is not toward the containing place, which is the ultimate surface of the surrounding immobile body, but toward that intrinsic mode of the body which is called where (ubi): otherwise neither outside the heaven nor in a vacuum could a body be moved, nor the first moved according to Aristotle's own opinion, since he thinks there is no place there; but that a body can certainly be moved in a vacuum and outside the heaven, we showed above in disputation 29, chapter 3.[1423]

I add, however, that those who say that motion according to place is toward an extrinsic form, but the motion itself intrinsically inheres in the mobile, teach things mutually repugnant, as I proved above in chapter 5.

And to the argument of Gregory of Rimini brought in the same chapter I reply, that whenever a body rests at some point, it has that mode of where indivisible indeed, which, when it begins to be moved, it leaves by the last being in the place, which is the last not-being-in-motion; and in any instant - mutatis mutandis - that is, when the Angel is moved per se, it has in the same way an indivisible form, which in the same way it leaves, which can be called proportioned to the quantity of the body; but in the succession of motion it certainly acquires a form of where successive, which has latitude, and is said not to be proportioned to the mobile itself; nor is it absurd, as Gregory falsely supposes, to concede successive parts to this mode of the body which we call where.

Moreover Gregory argues this also thus: A body, when it rests, does not have any mode: therefore neither when it is moved will it have one: for if when it rests it had a mode, God could remove it from the body, nor would it be evident under what other mode then the mobile would remain: therefore it is a sign that such a mode is altogether fictitious. I answer, just as figure follows determined quantity, which Aristotle places in the predicament of quality, which is a positive mode of quantity, and God cannot remove all figure from a quantity, but it will always retain this or that figure, indeed with the quantity unchanged he cannot remove the very figure which it now has; so too that form of where, which is called a mode of commensurable quantity, cannot altogether be removed from the mobile, but of necessity it has one or another; lastly, that very one which it now has while resting at this point it will always have, unless it be moved from there. From what we have said here and in disputation 188 one may gather that existence in place, which befits Angels and bodies, is not under the same predicament nor does it agree under any one univocal concept. For the where of bodies is an intrinsic form, but that of Angels is only an extrinsic denomination, as has been said. Nor indeed ought the theologian or philosopher be anxious in assigning the various species and genera of the predicament; for there are other things among the last six in which they can scarcely or in no way be assigned, as happens in when and

1423. Aristotle, Physics VI, chs. 4 and 10; see above, Disputation 29, ch. 3.

having. For when Aristotle assigned these last six predicaments, he did not wish them to come under the laws of all the others; rather he assigned them, as it were, as principal heads along with the others, to which all the things about which men are wont to dispute might be reduced.

Furthermore, since everything that is moved by a continuous and successive motion must be partly at the terminus whence and partly at the terminus whither, as Aristotle teaches in Physics VI, chapters 4 and 10, St. Thomas most fittingly explains this of Angels in this article in solution to the first: not that the Angel according to some part of himself is partly at the terminus whence and according to another part at the terminus whither - this would be repugnant to him, since he has no parts - but because he has a part of the terminus whence and a part of the terminus whither; to each he is likened and approaches.[1424]

On the occasion of this doctrine Scotus more at length disputes in II, distinction 2, question 9, article 4. To the argument, in solution 3 of the principal, whether a point, if it could exist separately, could be moved continuously, and against Aristotle he proves that it could be moved continuously along a line, and he dissolves all his reasons, some of which do not militate against the Angel's motion, except this one: "Everything that is moved is partly in the terminus whence, partly in the terminus whither." For Aristotle clearly understands it of the part of the mobile, not of the part of the terminus whence and whither; yet it suffices, as St. Thomas expounded, that the mobile have on its part something of each terminus, even if it have no parts in itself, as an Angel. Let the question about the motion of a point be left to philosophers for debate: to me it does not seem impossible that it be moved, if it were separate, just as it is moved when conjoined; and by the same reason, if an Angel could be in an indivisible place, he could be moved continuously along a line in the same way. Here men are wont to dispute about the measure of the Angel's motion, about which enough was said in disputation 36, chapter 1; whether indeed the Angel is said to be moved discretely, when he is at the terminus whence, or when he is at the terminus whither, we shall see below in disputation 197, chapter 4

Caput VI - An Angel can be moved by a continuous motion

St. Thomas in I, distinction 37, question 4, article 1, seems to have taught that the Angel's motion is not continuous; this opinion was followed by the Hibernian, whom Gregory reports: yet all the Doctors alleged suppose that the Angel can be moved with this kind of continuous motion, which the same holy Doctor expressly taught in this article, together with Cajetan and all more recent Thomists there; likewise the Ferrarienis in Contra gentiles, book 3, chapter 102.[1425] For the clearer understanding of the first doubt: Scotus in II, dist. c., question 9; Maior, question 12, conclusion 2; Marsilius in II, question 7, conclusions 3 and 4; and Gregory at length in II,

1424. Aristotle, Physics VI, chs. 4 and 10; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 53, a. 1, ad 1.
1425. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 53, a. 1; Cajetan there; "Ferrarienfis" (Contra gentiles, III, c. 102).

distinction 6, question 2.[1426] Nor do I see by what reason this can be denied, if we shall have said that the Angel is in a place by a transitive operation, or by some other reason, in whatever way we shall have said that he is in a divisible place.

Articulus II - Whether the Angel passes through the middle

Objicitur: On the contrary it seems that the Angel does not pass through media.

1. For everything which passes through a middle, first passes through a place equal to itself, greater than the middle. But the place equal to an Angel, which is indivisible, is a point-like place. If therefore the Angel in his motion passes through a middle, it must be that he numbers infinite points by his motion. Which is impossible.
2. Moreover, an Angel is of a simpler substance than our soul. But our soul by its thinking can pass from one extreme to another without passing through a middle. For I can think of Gaul, and afterwards Syria, thinking nothing of Italy, which is in the middle. Therefore much more can an Angel pass from one extreme to another without a middle.

But on the contrary: If an Angel is moved from one place to another, when he is at the terminus whither, he is not being moved, but is changed. But before every being-changed there precedes a being-changed-in-process. Therefore while existing somewhere he was being moved. But he was not being moved when he was at the terminus whence. Therefore he was being moved while he was in the middle. And thus it is necessary that he pass through the middle.

Respondetur: I answer that, as was said above, the local motion of an Angel can be continuous, and not continuous. If therefore it be continuous, an Angel cannot be moved from one extreme to the other without passing through the middle: because, as is said in Physics VI, the middle is that into which that which is continuously changed first comes, rather than into that which is changed last. For the order of prior and posterior in continuous motion is according to the order of prior and posterior in a magnitude, as is said in Physics IV.[1427] But if the motion of an Angel be not continuous, it is possible that he pass from one extreme to another without passing through a middle. This is clear thus. Between any two extreme places there are infinite middle places, whether divisible places be taken, or indivisible. And of indivisibles it is manifest, because between any two points there are infinite points in the middle, since no two points follow upon one another without a middle, as in Physics VI is proved. But about divisible places it is necessary to say this. And this is demonstrated from the continuous motion of some body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time measuring a body's motion it is not possible to take two "nows" in which the body that is moved is not in a different place. For if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would follow that it also rested there: since to rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and before. Since, therefore, between the first now and the last of

1426. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 9; Maior, q. 12, concl. 2; Marsilius, In II, q. 7, concl. 3 - 4; Gregory (of Rimini), In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 2.

1427. Aristotle, Physics VI, ch. 6; IV, ch. 11.

the time measuring the motion there are infinite "nows," it is necessary that between the first place whence it begins to be moved and the last place at which the motion is terminated there be infinite places. And this also appears to sense. Let there be one body of one palm, and let the road along which it passes be two palms: it is manifest that the first place whence the motion begins is of one palm, and the place at which the motion is terminated is of the other palm. But it is also manifest that when it begins to be moved, it gradually leaves the first palm, and enters the second. Therefore, insofar as the magnitude of the palm is divided, according to this the middle places are multiplied: because every point marked in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of one place; and a point marked in the magnitude of the second palm is the terminus of the same. Whence, since a magnitude is divisible to infinity, and points are also infinite in potency in any magnitude, it follows that between any two places there are infinite middle places. But the mobile does not consume the infinity of middle places except through the continuity of the motion: because, just as the middle places are infinite in potency, so also in a continuous motion there are certain things to be taken as infinite in potency. If therefore the motion is not continuous, it is not necessary to traverse all those infinite middles, but it can pass from one extreme to the other without going through every intermediate.

If the motion is not continuous, all the parts of the motion will be numbered in act. If therefore any mobile whatever is moved by a non-continuous motion, it follows that either it does not traverse all the middles, or else that it actually numbers infinite middles. Which is impossible. Therefore, according as the angel's motion is not continuous, he does not traverse all the middles. But this - namely, to be moved from an extreme to an extreme and not through the middle - can befit an angel, but not a body: because a body is measured by, and contained under, place. Hence it must follow the laws of place in its motion. But the substance of an angel is not subject to place as contained, but is superior to it as containing. Hence it is in his power to apply himself to a place, as he wills, either through the middle or without the middle.

Reply to the first: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to the contact of power. And thus the place of an angel can be divisible, and not always a pure point. Yet, as has been said, the middle places also, even divisible ones, are infinite. But they are consumed through the continuity of the motion, as is evident from what has been said.

Reply to the second: When an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to diverse places; but the essence of the soul is not applied to the things it thinks of - rather the things thought are in it. And therefore it is not similar.

Reply to the third: In continuous motion, "to have-been-changed" is not a part of the motion, but its terminus. Hence "to be moved" must be prior to "to have-been-changed." And therefore such motion must be through the middle. But in non-continuous motion, "to have-been-changed" is a part, just as unity is a part of number. Hence the succession of diverse places, even without a middle, constitutes such a motion.

Explication of the Article.

The conclusion is: When an angel is moved by a discrete motion, he does not pass through the middle. Concerning the doctrine of this conclusion, we must dispute in the following disputation: for it is entirely the same controversy, whether an angel can be moved from extreme to extreme without the middle, and whether he can be moved by a discrete motion. Therefore St. Thomas supposes that an angel can be moved discretely (which below we have to examine), and he teaches that when he is moved discretely, he does not pass through all the places, and he proves this by the following reason: between any two assigned places there are infinite others - whether the discussion is about indivisible points (which is most well known), or about divisible places mutually communicating, whose multitude is taken according to the multitude of respects of immobility to fixed points; which are plainly infinite. Therefore, if an angel, while he were moved by a discrete motion, were to traverse the whole space and the middle, he would number all those places, which are infinite - an absurdity. This reason, which to some seems to prove nothing, in my judgment is efficacious and evidently demonstrates what it contends. Therefore, to confirm it, certain points must be noted.

They object, then, in this way: Even if a mobile, while it is moved by continuous motion, traverses all those indivisible places which we said are infinite, nevertheless on that account it is not said to number them: so also an angel, even if he were to traverse them by discrete motion, would not number them. For it is not impossible for an infinite to be traversed; but that an infinite multitude be numbered is repugnant. For, as Aristotle says in Physics VI, chapter 2, texts 18 and 19, something is said to be infinite in two ways: one, by division, because it can be divided, although it is finite in extremes; and an infinite of this sort can be traversed: another is infinite in extremes, which lacks end and beginning; and an infinite of this sort cannot be traversed. But the space, even if it contains infinite places by division, is not infinite in extremes but by division; therefore it can be traversed in infinite instants of time, which also make an infinite, not in extremes but by division.[1428]

But those who attempt in this way to impair St. Thomas's argument do not advert that the ratio of continuous and of discrete motion is altogether diverse; and hence that in continuous motion infinite places, which constitute an infinite only by division, can be traversed - in infinite instants of time also - but not in discrete motion, as St. Thomas's reason contends. For in continuous motion, even if the mobile traverses infinite places, it does not number them, because number consists in discreteness, and nothing can be numbered except discretely. Wherefore, if an angel were to traverse those infinite places that communicate, not by continuous motion but by discrete, he would not only traverse them, but also number them: for that motion would be as it were by leaps; and thus it would be necessary that there be a first leap and a last, and consequently that, traversing discretely, he number all.

Then it must be observed that the continuous motion of an angel ought to be made through all the places that communicate and are in the space. For if an angel were moved in such a way that he left, at once, the ten-foot place, for example, which he first occupied, and occupied another ten-foot

1428. Aristotle, Physics VI, ch. 2, texts 18 - 19.

place which follows next and does not communicate with the first, he would not be moved continuously, but his motion would be discrete - in which some have been deceived, thinking that then too the angel's motion would be continuous if he were moved in continuous time. For the continuation of time does not suffice for the continuation of motion; the continuation of the space in which he is moved is also required. For since in bodies the continuation of motion is taken from the continuation of the form which it acquires, according to the opinion of those who say that bodies, when they are moved according to place, acquire some intrinsic form, as the Ferrariensis noted,[1429] and, on the opinion of others - which he himself follows - who teach that by motion according to place a body does not acquire an intrinsic form, the continuation is taken from the continuity of the extrinsic space which the body is said to traverse; in the same way one must philosophize in the case of angels. And since they are moved according to place and only an extrinsic form, as we proved above, it follows that the continuation of motion in angels is taken from the continuation of the extrinsic space which he traverses; and the continuation of this space consists in this, that he leaves, little by little, the places that communicate. The same must be said even if, by motion according to place, the angel were formally to acquire something intrinsic. Add also that if the angel were to leave, in the manner we described, places that do not communicate, he could not be moved in continuous time. For he would have to leave the first place by a first "not-being," and acquire the following by a first "being"; and then the third by a first "being" of itself, and leave the second by a first "not-being." Therefore it would be necessary for him to rest in the second place for a time, because he could not have that by a first being, and leave it by a first not-being, unless time intervened between these two instants. For in the same instant he could not be by a first being, and not be by a first not-being, as is quite clear. Therefore the reason of St. Thomas rightly proves what he contends.

Disputatio CXCVI - Whether an angel can be moved from extreme to extreme without the middle

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

Since the Doctors of the Schools have held various views about the manner in which an angel exists in a place, it was necessary that they opine variously also in this present controversy. Let us therefore set out the opinions of individuals in their order, so that we may at length subjoin our own. The first is that of those who absolutely teach that an angel cannot be moved from extreme to extreme without the middle. Thus teach Alexander in the second question 33, second member; Albert in II, distinction 37, article 23; St. Bonaventure in the second part, distinction 2, article 2, question 2; Richard in article 3, question 2; Giles in the second part of distinction 2, article 2; Henry in Quodlibet 13, question 7; of whom only Albert follows this opinion in such a way as to

1429. The "Ferrariensis," Contra gentiles, III, c. 102.

assert that an angel must indeed traverse the middle, and never be moved without it, yet that he traverses it in an instant. The others hold that the middle must necessarily be traversed in time; about which we must dispute below.[1430]

The first foundation of this opinion is that there seems to be no reason why a body could not be moved from extreme to extreme except through the middle, whereas an angel can be moved; for the mind cannot conceive that something is now in this place which before was at a distance, and has not come through all the intermediate places.

A later foundation is that of Giles in this way: although an angel is in a place by operation, as he himself teaches, and by voluntary activity, and thus it may seem that it belongs to his freedom to exist in the extremes and not in the middle, nevertheless since an angel is a certain part of the universe, he can never be without order in it. Therefore he ought to have some status; otherwise he would not pertain to this universality of things. This reason also seems to prove in the opinion of those who say that an angel is in a place voluntarily by mode or by application to operation: because in no way can an angel be absolutely away from every place, and thus of necessity he must pass through the middle. For according to the opinion of those who say that an angel is by his substance proximately in a place, if this is proved for a body by its quantity, by a much better reason is the earlier point proved.

The second opinion is that of Scotus in II, distinction 2, question 12, who plainly concedes that an angel can be moved from extreme to extreme without a middle participating in the extremes, yet not without a middle not participating. For, says Scotus, a double middle is posited: one, which participates in the extremes, that is, which of itself has the magnitudes of either extremity, and this is commonly called a communicating middle. As if there be posited a place of four feet, in which the angel is first and whence he begins to move, and next after this place there be posited another also of four feet: between these two one can assign infinite places of the same magnitude that communicate. All these are called a participating middle; and without this, says Scotus, it is possible for the discrete motion of an angel to occur - by leaving the first place, not little by little, but wholly at once, and by acquiring the second in the same way at once. The other middle, not participating, is that which is between distant extremes and has nothing in common with the extremes: for example, if there be a place of four feet, then another, and another of the same magnitude, which do not communicate among themselves; continuous, however, until one comes to another extreme place. Scotus says, then, that an angel cannot be moved from the first place to the last, unless he first be in all the others that do not participate; and this is not to be moved without a non-participating middle.[1431]

This opinion he proves thus. That order which is previously established by the author of nature among inferior agents does not seem necessary for a superior agent; just as the order of forms succeeding one another, which has been established by the author of nature, ought to be observed

1430. Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 33, memb. 2; Albert the Great, In II Sent., dist. 37, a. 23; St. Bonaventure, II, dist. 2, a. 2, q. 2; Richard of St. Victor (as cited), a. 3, q. 2; Giles of Rome, II, dist. 2, a. 2; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XIII, q. 7.

1431. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 12.

by any agent whatever; and thus a man cannot first induce a rational form unless he first induce the form of an embryo, so as to preserve the mode of forms which the author of nature has constituted. Since therefore by God there has been defined an order for things which are to come among themselves according to their status, whenever an angel is moved, he ought to observe the same.

But if you say (adds Scotus) that this argument also proves about the participating middle that without it there cannot be motion from extreme to extreme - which is against his own doctrine - he replies that the argument proves nothing about that middle: because, while an angel passes from one extreme to the other through a non-participating middle, in the instant he has all those participating places in a certain order of nature, although he does not have them in an order of duration; that is, he does not have the beatitude of motion by successive passing through them. But if an angel were to pass from extreme to extreme without a participating and without a non-participating middle, he would have neither in an order of duration nor in an order of nature all those intermediate places. This same opinion is explained in the same way by Licheto in II, distinction 2, question 12, after the fifth conclusion.[1432]

The third opinion is that of Gabriel in II, distinction 2, question 2, article 3, in the first doubt, who asserts two things. The first is that motion according to place is not properly said of that which is only a change without continuous succession; that an angel can be moved to a place without a middle in this manner: if an angel is in a place not adequate to him - as if in the one of a stadium - and he wishes to be in a place adequate to himself - say, of one cubit - he can in an instant set himself there without a middle; not, however, abandoning the prior place, but as it were by occupying a larger extension. He proves this because no resistance seems to be present, which is the cause of succession, so that the angel would little by little extend himself into a smaller place than he had. The other thing he asserts is that from an adequate place to an adequate place he cannot be moved in an instant without a middle; and he judges the same if the motion is from a place not adequate to an adequate place, when it is necessary to leave the prior place. He proves this because, if without a middle he could leave the prior place and acquire the other, it would follow that there are two instants without a middle: for he would leave the prior place in the same instant and likewise arrive at the other (for what is wholly together is in an instant), and he would acquire the other also in an instant; and so either they would be the same instant as the prior, or different - which cannot be: because in the same instant an angel cannot be in both...

...in each extreme; therefore it would be different. Then moreover, either there would be some middle between them, or none: if none, it follows that those two instants would be without a middle, which is absurd. Therefore it is necessary that a middle time intervene, and thus that the motion through the middle be effected in that time.

1432. Licheto, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 12, after the fifth conclusion.

Caput II - The more probable opinion

A fourth opinion has seemed to me more probable, namely, that an angel can be moved from place to place without a middle, whether participating or not participating; I mean, from place to place, leaving the prior. In this sentence were St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent Thomists on this article; Capreolus in II, dist. 6, q. 1, art. ..., concl. 3; Ferrariensis, cap. 102; Hervaeus in the treatise On the Motion of an Angel, q. 1, a. 1, 3, and 4, and on the First Book, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2; although this author, since he says that an angel is in a place not according to substance but according to effect, as we saw in Disputation 187, chapter one, must not think about motion without a middle in the same way as the others. Marsilius also agrees in the Second, q. 7, a. 3, after the first conclusion; and St. Gregory in the Second, dist. 6, q. 3, a. 1, concl. 2.[1433]

This opinion, taken from the doctrine set forth above, can easily be established by reason; in the following chapter, by refuting the others, it will also be confirmed. The reason is of this sort. If an angel by his own substance (substance: substantia) were in a place, as a body is said to be by its quantity (quantity: quantitas) when it is capable of measure, then without doubt by himself he would always be in a place in such a way that he could never be released from it. But as a body cannot be moved by a created power unless it move successively and pass continuously through the middle, so neither could an angel; for his substance by itself would continuously present existence (*esse*) in a place. But since an angel by his substance is not in a place, except by the mode (mode: modus) whereby he is conjoined to a body, by reason of which he is said secondarily to be in a place, as was concluded in Disputation 188, chapter 7, and since an angel by his will can conjoin himself to this body and not to another as he wills, he can certainly conjoin himself to an extreme body even if he is not united to the middle, and thus be moved from extreme to extreme without any middle. The same follows if we say that an angel is in a place by operation, or by an application to act externally, and thus this sentence of St. Thomas accords with the principles of many opinions.

Whence it follows that, although God can place the same body at once in diverse places, or in one, leaving the prior without any transition through a middle - and thus on this account it is certain that the body of Christ could have been placed in the Eucharist while remaining at the same time in heaven - yet, according to the mode which it has in the sacrament, without a new miracle it could be moved from extreme to extreme without a middle. For there it exists in an indivisible mode, and not according to commensuration to a place; and of itself it does not necessarily entail a mode of existing in place, but is in a place by reason of the species, and thus only by reason of the body to which it is conjoined. Therefore, without a new miracle, just as an angel could be moved from extreme to extreme without any middle, so too could it be.

Let this suffice for the arguments of the other opinions.

1433. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. ..., concl. 3; Ferrariensis, cap. 102; Hervaeus, De motu Angeli, q. 1, a. 1, 3, 4; Id., In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2; Marsilius, In II, q. 7, a. 3, post primam concl.; Greg., In II, dist. 6, q. 3, a. 1, concl. 2.

Caput III - Rebuttal of the arguments

It remains to dissolve the arguments of the other opinions, and at the same time to refute what they teach.

Reply to the first argument for the sentence of Aegidius: according to the opinion of those who say that an angel is in a place by reason of his bare substance, as a body is by reason of quantity, I grant that it cannot be understood that an angel is by his own power disengaged from a place, just as neither can a body by some created power; and therefore we admit that in this way he cannot be moved from extreme to extreme without a transition through a middle, unless by divine power. But if an angel is in a place either by reason of the mode whereby he is conjoined to a body, or by operation, as Aegidius himself posits, or by application to act, as others teach, this is certainly easy to understand and to explain, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Wherefore, Aegidius does not use this rationale, but other more recent men, who philosophize about spiritual things almost in all respects after the fashion of corporeal things - men to whom it was necessary to leave sensibles and to investigate a higher mode of contemplating spiritual things.

Reply to the latter argument, which Aegidius employs: with Hervaeus in the treatise On the Motion of an Angel, q. 1, a. 1, to the second difficulty, as I also responded in Disputation 193, chapter 3, at the beginning, I answer that the order which an angel has in the universe with the other parts is not one of position and place, but of nature, perfection, and ministry. Who does not see this? Wherefore an angel can rightly retain his order in the universe without being in any place. [1434]

Rightly, then, does Hervaeus mock those who think it dangerous to affirm that an angel can be disengaged from every place; for thus it is best understood that he stands in his proper liberty, to pass from extreme to extreme without a middle.

What we have said of an angel must, in the same way and for the same reason, be held of any material substance (*substantia*) stripped of its quantity, or at least with the mode of quantity removed, which they call commensuration in order to place, which the body of Christ lacks, although it has quantity and extension in itself. For, first, a substance stripped of its quantity remains without any extension, and therefore has no extremes from which distance can be taken, as we noted in Disputation 29, chapter 3; therefore it cannot be in a place, for this cannot be understood without distance. Next, a substance with quantity but without that mode of quantity in order to place, although it be extended in itself, nevertheless, because it cannot be commensurated to a place, no measure of distance can be taken from it to fixed points, which yet would be necessary in order for it to be said to be distant, according to the doctrine set forth in the aforesaid disputation. Therefore, in neither way can a material substance, whether with its quantity but without that mode in order to place, or without the quantity itself, be in a place by reason of itself.

But that some in the substance itself of matter contrive a certain extension and figure and surface, such that it occupy a place, that they may thus defend its remaining in a place, either clearly includes a contradiction or removes the true manner of philosophizing. For what else, I ask,

is the extension of parts than quantity itself, or an effect of quantity? What they answer who, over and above the extension of quantity in material substance, defend another extension which they call substantial, adding something common to the definition of quantity which the philosophers have handed down - this must on no account be admitted; nor, if we defend new opinions, is it permitted us to fabricate new definitions of things: for thus nothing would remain fixed whence our disputation might begin. Definitions too must be drawn from the common mode of conceiving: now it is the common definition of the ancient philosophers, which they hand down to us of quantity, that by reason of it something is extended and divisible; why then shall we exchange this ancient definition for another new one?

Add that the proper property of quantity, as Aristotle attests in the chapter On Quantity in the Predicaments, is that according to it things are said to be equal or unequal. But according to that extension which the aforementioned Doctors ascribe to substance, one thing is equal or unequal to another; therefore that is truly quantity. But on this matter we shall speak more fully in the topic on the Eucharist.

Now with this truth premised, in the manner of philosophizing that we have hitherto followed, it must be said that neither an angel nor a material substance without quantity, or without that peculiar mode of quantity which we have said, can be in place and at a distance, for exactly the same reason. Wherefore it must not be said that, quantity or that mode having been removed from a substance, the result would be that the substance would of itself flow to a point because it would remain indivisible; for there would be no greater reason on account of which it should of itself be placed at this point rather than at that: wherefore neither would it remain at a point, because then it would be somewhere; but it would remain nowhere, nor would it have in the universe an order of position, but only an order of its substantial rank, as we said of the angel.

That a substance without quantity is indivisible matters little to placing it of itself at a point, as we shall say; for the indivisible that a substance has is of another genus than the indivisible of a point. The latter has a position in a continuum; the former does not, nor is it in quantity, but in substance. For this reason we showed above in Disputation 192, chapter two, that even if an angel is indivisible, it does not follow that he must or can be in an indivisible place; for the indivisibility of the angel and of place are of diverse genera, and consequently of themselves the one does not answer to the other, nor is it commensurated to it.

But the adversaries say: if God were to take away quantity from a corporeal substance, and then were to will that it produce its quantity again, by that quantity it would be placed somewhere; yet there would be no greater reason on account of which it should be constituted in this place rather than in another, if that quantity had remained nowhere. Therefore, that we may say that it must be placed by its quantity in that place in which it previously was, it is necessary to assert that the substance remained in that place. I reply that quantity in a substance is conserved and produced by God alone and not by the substance's own nature; and thus, when taken away by God alone, it can be restored only by him...[1435]

1434. Hervaeus, De motu Angeli, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; cf. Disputatio 193, cap. 3, in principio.

To the argument of Scotus's opinion I answer, first, that he assumes what he ought to have inferred; next I say that, if his reasoning has any force, it can be retorted upon himself as well. First, then, when he assumes this proposition, that an order preestablished by a higher agent must be observed by a lower, if he speaks of the order which is constituted by nature itself for acting, it is true. But when he adds that there is determined by God an order of the parts of the universe among themselves, such that one part of the medium be prior to another, he either understands this of the situation of those parts among themselves only, or of the manner of passing through them. If he understands it of their situation, it is true; and thus an angel cannot pervert them, unless by changing the bodies themselves according to place, so that he make to be in the one what was in the other; he can never, however, make that there not be the same distance, if so many bodies of the same quantity are interposed between the extremes. But if he understands it of the manner in which the mobile must pass through those parts of the medium, so as, leaving the extreme, first to hold the middle rather than the other extreme, he is adding what he ought to have inferred; and that is false. For God has not necessarily established this order in an angel, as was proved in the preceding chapter.

Moreover, I retort the argument against Scotus himself in this way: if the order of the parts in the medium must be observed, why must there not be observed that order of the medium which participates in the extremes, if indeed that is prior to the medium which does not participate in the same? But what he himself answers can scarcely be understood; for he says that he who passes from extreme to extreme without a participating medium does indeed have all those places in an instant, not in an order of duration, but in an order of nature, which, however, he would not have if he were to pass from extreme to extreme without a non-participating medium. How this is true, or can be understood, he does not explain, nor can any difference be assigned. For what else can it be to have had all those middle places in an order of nature and not in an order of duration, than thus to have passed from extreme to extreme as if he had really been in them and passed through them? But the same can be said even if the passage were made through a non-participating medium. Therefore Scotus's argument can rightly be turned back upon himself.

To the argument finally of Gabriel I answer that an angel indeed left the former place all at once, not by parts, as happens in continuous motion; nevertheless he left it by a first not-being in it, not by a last being, and in the same instant he had the latter place in the opposite extreme. Therefore the first not-being in the former was the first being in the latter, which by no means repugns; rather, in substantial generations it so happens that the first not-being of the one is the first being of the other. Nor indeed is to cease to be altogether at once the same as to have the last of one's being; but not-being of that which formally is to cease to be is altogether at once, and thus in an instant. I grant indeed that sometimes even the last being of a thing is called its cessation, because in it its being comes to an end; yet this is only in those things whose not-being is the being of something successive by motion, as indivisible places, which cease when a successive motion begins immediately after them. But since in the present case the former place of the angel ceases not by a successive motion but by the acquisition of the extreme place, which happens in an

1435. The continuation of the reply follows in the subsequent text.

instant, it ought to cease by a first not-being. Whence it is that that place which ceases by a first not-being of itself ceases altogether at once and not little by little by parts; whereas, on the contrary, a place which ceases by a succeeding motion through the last of its being ceases little by little, not altogether at once, that is, it begins little by little not to be the place itself, not altogether at once - the opposite of which Gabriel supposes. His opinion, therefore, in that wherein he asserts that an angel cannot leave a place and acquire another without a medium, is not proved by us; yet in that wherein he teaches that he can acquire a new place with the former retained without a medium, in part he agrees with us.

Articulus III - Whether the motion of an angel is in an instant

Objection 1. It seems that the motion of an angel is in an instant. For the stronger the power of the mover is, and the less the mobile resists the mover, the swifter is the motion. But the power by which an angel moves himself incomparably surpasses the power that moves any body. Now the proportion of velocities is according to the diminution of time. But every time is proportionable to every time. If therefore some body is moved in time, an angel will be moved in an instant.

Objection 2. Further, the motion of an angel is simpler than some bodily change. But some bodily change is in an instant, as illumination: both because a thing is not illuminated successively as it is heated successively, and because a ray does not first reach the nearer before the more remote. Therefore much more is the motion of an angel in an instant.

Objection 3. Further, if an angel is moved in time from place to place, it is manifest that in the last instant of that time he is in the term to which; but in the whole preceding time either he is in the immediately preceding place, which is taken as the term from which, or partly in one and partly in another. But if partly in one and partly in another, it follows that he is partible, which is impossible. Therefore in the whole preceding time he is in the term from which. Therefore he rests there, since to rest is to be the same now and previously, as has been said. And thus it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.

But on the contrary: In every change there is a before and an after. But the before and after of motion is measured according to time. Therefore every motion is in time, even the motion of an angel, since there is a before and after in it.

I answer that it must be said that some have said that the local motion of an angel is in an instant. For they said that when an angel is moved from one place to another, in the whole preceding time the angel is in the term from which; but in the last instant of that time he is in the term to which. Nor need there be any medium between two terms, just as there is no medium between time and the term of time. But between two "now"s of time there is a middle time. Hence they say that there is not to be given a last "now" in which he was in the term from which; as in illumination and in the substantial generation of fire there is not to be given a last instant in which the air was dark, or in which matter was under the privation of the form of fire. But there is to be given a last time, such that in the last of that time there is either light in the air, or the form of fire in matter. And thus illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous motions.

But this does not hold in the present case, and this is shown thus. Of the notion of rest it is that one at rest is not otherwise disposed now and before; and therefore at every "now" of the time measuring rest, the one at rest is in the same - both in the first and in the middle and in the last. But of the notion of motion it is that what is moved is otherwise disposed now and before; and therefore at every "now" of the time measuring motion the mobile is in another and another disposition. Whence it must be that in the last "now" it has a form which previously it did not have. And thus it is clear that to rest during a whole time in something, for instance in whiteness, is to be in that at every instant of that time. Whence it is not possible that something rest during the whole preceding time in one term and afterwards in the last instant of that time be in another term. But this is possible in motion, because to be moved during some whole time is not to be in the same disposition at every instant of that time. Therefore all changes of this sort which are instantaneous are terms of a continuous motion: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination the term of the local motion of the illuminating body. But the local motion of an angel is not the term of some other continuous motion, but exists of itself, depending on no other motion. Hence it is impossible to say that during the whole time he is in some place, and in the last "now" he is in another place. But one must assign a "now" in which last he was in the preceding place. But where there are many "now"s succeeding one another, there of necessity there is time, since time is nothing other than the numbering off of the prior and the posterior in motion. Whence it remains that the motion of an angel is in time: indeed in continuous time, if his motion be continuous; but in non-continuous time, if the motion be non-continuous. For in either way it happens that there be the motion of an angel, as has been said. For the continuity of time is from the continuity of motion, as is said in the Physics. But that time, whether it be continuous time or discrete, is not the same as the time which measures the motion of the heaven, and by which all corporeal things are measured which have mutability from the motion of the heaven. For the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of the heaven.

Reply to the first: If the time of the motion of an angel be not continuous, but a certain succession of "now"s, it does not have proportion to the time which measures bodily motion, which is continuous, since it is not of the same notion. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable - not indeed by proportion of the number of mover and mobile, but on account of a proportion in the magnitudes in which the motion is; and besides, the swiftness of an angel's motion is not according to the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Reply to the second: Illumination is the term of a motion, namely of alteration, not of local motion - so that one understand the illuminating body to move first to the nearer and then to the more remote. But the motion of an angel is local and is not the term of a motion. Hence it is not similar.

Reply to the third: That objection proceeds on continuous time. But the transitions of an angel's motions can be such that, if an angel in one instant can be in one place and in another instant in another place, with no intermediate time existing. But if the times of an angel's motion be continuous, then in the whole preceding time the last "now" is varied through infinitely many

places, as was explained above. He is, however, partly in one place and partly in another - not because his substance is partible, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was also said above.

Conclusion: The motion of an angel is in time: if it be continuous, in continuous time; if it be discrete, in non-continuous but discrete time. The explication of this true doctrine will be the subject of the following disputation.

Disputatio CXCVII

Caput I - Whether the motion of an angel through the medium can be in an instant

That an angel can be moved through the medium in an instant, not a few have thought. cap. 1.

That an angel cannot be moved through the medium in an instant, the truer opinion concludes. cap. 2.

Further treatment of the difficulties of the present question, and of the next, will be given in what follows.

Caput II - That an angel cannot be moved through the medium in an instant; the truer opinion concludes

With the position set forth, that sentence seems to be embraced which affirms that an angel cannot be moved from one extreme to the other through the medium without succession and a continuation of motion. Thus teach St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent authors commonly in this article. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 37, second part, article 2, question 3; Richard in the same place, article 3, question 3; Aegidius in the same distinction, part, question 3; Scotus in the Second Book, distinction 2; Gabriel [Biel], shortly before the solution of the arguments, question 3, article 3, if he be read attentively; Capreolus in the Second Book, distinction 6, question 1, article 1, conclusion 4; the Ferrarian in Contra gentiles, book 3, chapter 10.[1436]

But in truth St. Thomas, whom Cajetan follows, wished to confirm this sentence by a certain peculiar reasoning; yet if the opinion of the Ferrarian were true, which teaches that an angel cannot be in a place except by a transitive operation, since an angel can have no power over bodies by his own proper virtue except motion according to place - and here he begins by an ultimate non-being - it would follow that by his proper virtue an angel could not be moved in place nor alter a place in any way except through time. But since it has been said that an angel is in a place by the mode of a substance, and thus can in an instant begin to be in a place, and, according to the many ways of opining in this matter, the angel may begin to be in a new place, the former way, by a first

1436. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 37, pars 2, art. 2, q. 3; Richard, ibid., art. 3, q. 3; Aegidius, ibid., part., q. 3; Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2; Gabriel (Biel), q. 3, art. 3; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 4; Ferrarien. (Ferrariensis), Contra gentiles, III, cap. 10.

non-being which is the first being of the subsequent, ought to be set aside; and yet very many nevertheless assert that he cannot from extreme to extreme pass through the medium in an instant, but that necessarily the passage must be made in time. Another reason therefore is to be sought: for at present we are not inquiring whether he can abandon one place and acquire another in an instant, but whether from extreme to extreme he can in an instant pass through the medium.

Reason of this sentence. The reason, indeed, which Bonaventure, Richard, and Scotus have intimated - no matter what opinion be held concerning the mode by which an angel exists in a place - does, in my judgment, manifestly demonstrate that neither by the angel's own proper power nor by the power of God can it be brought about that an angel, or a body, be moved from extreme to extreme through the medium in an instant. The reason is of this sort. Either in the same instant the angel is at once in the middle and at the end, that is, at the extreme of the space; or there is some succession. For no other mode of being at once among these two modes can be devised. If you say that he is in an instant in such a way that by a first non-being he ceases to exist in the one extreme, and by a first being he is constituted in the other extreme simultaneously and in the middle - this indeed can happen without repugnance, if the middle and the posterior extreme are a place adequate to the angel's power, according to those things which we said in Disputation 191, chapter 2. Yet this certainly is not to be moved from extreme to extreme through the medium, but from one place into another without a transit through the medium: for since in the same duration the mobile is constituted in the other extreme and in the middle, it cannot be said to be moved through the medium, since the particle "through" denotes some genus of priority; but in the present case it could signify none.

Truly this reason not only proves that an angel cannot be moved from extreme to extreme through the medium without succession by his proper virtue - of which alone Scotus speaks - but even not by the absolute power of God: for it shows the clear implication of a contradiction. By the same argument it is proved that the motion of bodies through a vacuum cannot be without succession; for, since a body cannot at once fill the whole emptiness, but only a certain part corresponding to its own quantity, it follows that only successively can it fill up that emptiness by motion. For example: if at the top of a two-foot empty tube there be placed one foot of water, that water will not be able at once to fill the whole tube; for thus it would correspond to a larger quantity than its own weight and measure, which is absurd: therefore it must by successive motion little by little fill up the entire emptiness, and hence it would not move in an instant.

But Gregory responds to this reasoning by saying that in the same instant an angel is in heaven and on earth and in places however distant, not permanently (so he says) but transiently; and thus that an angel can through a plenum, and a body through a vacuum, be moved from extreme to extreme through the medium in an instant. Yet in this reply he seems rather to play with words than to explain the thing: for if the angel is at the same instant in the beginning, the middle, and the end - even if there be only a slight duration in those places, and he persists only for an instant - no reason can be given why it could not be said that he passes through the middle transiently. Add

that when the Fathers cited in Disputation 190, chapter 3, affirm that, while the angel is in heaven, he is not on earth, they also understand "according to the instant"; for if in the instant he were in both, then it would follow that, while he is in heaven, he could also be on earth.

Moreover, one might reply to the foregoing reason in this way: that the particle "through," when we say "through the medium," denotes not succession of duration but some order of causality; and thus, even if the angel is not first in duration in the middle than in the end and extreme of the space, nevertheless he is said to be moved "through the medium," because existence in the middle has the account of a cause with respect to existence in the extreme. Thus, for example, the sun is said to illuminate the water through the air, not because the air is first illuminated in duration than the water, but because in this order the sun's light illuminates diaphanous bodies, so that as by way of a cause it first illuminates the medium than the extreme.

This reply, however subtle it may seem, nevertheless has not a firm foundation: for the example adduced is not similar. A natural agent, such as light, even if in an instant it produces in the subject submitted to it the whole effect, still acts in that order that it stands in need of a continuation of the subject in which its effect is received, so that, by spreading itself from the prior part, it may act upon the remaining parts; and therefore it is rightly said that the sun illumines the extreme through the medium. But the light produced is not said to be moved according to place from the extreme of the diaphanous body through the medium, if it is at once everywhere. But a body that is moved through a vacuum, or an angel through a plenum, is not said to operate within a receiving subject in a spatial continuation, but to receive in itself motion according to place; wherefore, unless first in duration they are in one distance than in another, they are not said to be moved from one to another. For if they are at once in the middle and at the extreme, an indivisible distance arises in them: how then will it be said that they are moved from one to another through the medium?

Furthermore, the very thing can be done, and the virtue of some agent can operate in continuous space; and yet, on account of the account of the parts in what follows - namely that the same effect cannot at once be diffused equally with the prior part - this indeed is impossible: but to an adequate extent through the whole middle, so that one part cannot be produced in some mode unless another part depend on it; as experience shows, that one foot of water at once in a vacuum cannot be diffused to a greater quantity, it being impossible that it at once be in the whole, unless by God's absolute power, if God were to constitute the same thing replicated in different places and distances at the same time through a vacuum - something which nature cannot do, since by its distance in an instant it would be carried across great distances without transition and without permanent standing. This resistance, therefore, we must grant also in the angel; for since by the foregoing reasoning he is determined to a certain place, so that he cannot be in a greater one, it follows that by succession he must be in the middle and in the extreme; and if by God's absolute power he were placed at once in the middle and in the extreme, he would not be said to be moved through the medium to the extreme, but to remain in both.

I add, moreover, that the resistance of the medium is not the reason of the succession of motion, nor does it of necessity have to be equaled by time; but the succession from extreme to extreme through the medium - which some call "continuous on account of the space," even if in itself it have no parts - those affirm can be in an instant. From the Doctors cited, the Irishman alone said that not only can it in no way be done in an instant, but also that it must necessarily be so done; the rest, however, assert only that it is free for the angel to traverse infinite places in succession, yet not to do so in an instant. But the speed of the angel's motion is not according to the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Caput III - The arguments of the former sentence are dissolved

The argument, however, that is taken from the vacuum on behalf of the former sentence can easily be dissolved: for it does not prove that any body can be moved through a vacuum from extreme to extreme without succession, or that it can at once be in the middle and the extreme, but only in that part of the vacuum which, according to its quantity, it could adequately fill. Wherefore, either we do not approve the sentence of Aristotle when he says that a body would necessarily be moved in an instant through a vacuum, or it must be asserted that he spoke not from his own position, but against those who were asserting that the whole cause of the succession of motion comes from the resistance of a plenum, and yet that in a vacuum a body can be moved. We say, therefore, according to true philosophy, that the succession of such motion does not come from the resistance of the plenum, but from the nature of the quantity of the mobile; which is of such a sort that it must first be in a place prior and adequate to itself than in a posterior, nor can it fill up just any emptiness. And this is what the philosophers commonly call the internal reason of the mobile, from which it is said that the succession of motion is necessary. For it is not according to the proportion of mover and mobile, but according to the proportion of the magnitudes in which the motion is; and, moreover, the speed of an angel's motion is not according to the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.[1437]

But the argument drawn from a vacuum on behalf of the prior opinion can easily be dissolved: for it has been proved that no body can be moved through a vacuum from one extreme to the other through the middle without succession, indeed neither can it be simultaneously in the middle and at the extreme, but only in that portion of the vacuum which by its own quantity can be adequately filled. Wherefore either we do not approve the sentence of Aristotle, when he said that a body is necessarily moved in an instant through a vacuum; or it must be asserted that he did not teach that from his own settled opinion, but contrariwise, since he affirmed that the whole cause of the succession of motion proceeds from the resistance of the plenum, and nonetheless he held that a body can be moved in a vacuum. We therefore say that according to true philosophy the succession of motion does not proceed from the resistance of the plenum, but from the nature of the quantity of the mobile, because such is its nature that it must first be in the prior place proportioned to it,

1437. Compare the common argument from Aristotle, Physics IV, text 61, concerning motion in a vacuum; and see Disputation 190, cap. 3, on the Fathers' statement that while an angel is in heaven he is not on earth.

before being in the posterior, nor can it fill up just any vacuum whatsoever. And this resistance the philosophers commonly call the internal resistance of the mobile, from which they say the succession of motion necessarily arises. And although God by His absolute power could place the same body, as it were, replicated in diverse places and distances within a vacuum, nevertheless He cannot make it so that a body thus posited is said to pass from one distance into another in an instant, since in reality it does not pass over, but remains simultaneously. We must concede this resistance also in an angel: for since by his very nature he is determined to a certain place, so that he cannot be in a greater, it follows that there must be succession in the middle and at the extreme; but if by the absolute power of God he were placed simultaneously in the middle and at the extreme, he would not be said to be moved through the middle to the extreme, but to remain simultaneously in both. I for my part would add, that the resistance of the medium is not the cause of the succession of motion, nor should it in any way be referred to that, but only to its speed. For since the succession of motion consists in this, that it has a before and an after, and with every other extrinsic thing removed, these are sufficiently provided for either by the quantity of the body, or by the nature of the angel determined to a certain quantity of place and space, and with these removed, every other thing being posited, succession does not follow, it follows that this is the whole cause of succession; but speed proceeds from the virtue of the mover per se, and from a lesser resistance of the space per accidens: and since the angel has no resistance in the middle, so as to be moved, speed must be taken solely from his virtue; but speed is proved to differ from succession, because with the same succession there can be a greater and a lesser speed.

If, however, someone were to inquire concerning the speed of the angel's motion, whether it be determined and require a determined time, or whether the angel can be moved in the same space in a lesser and lesser time: some answer that he can always be moved within the same space in a shorter and shorter time; thus Alexander seems to have taught in the second part, question 35, member 1, to the first,[1438] and those are forced to say this who teach that he can be moved through the medium in an instant. Capreolus also agrees, In II, distinction 6, question 1, article 3, to the third, against the second conclusion.[1439] And it seems to be the doctrine of the Fathers whom we alleged in Disputation 194, chapter 2,[1440] who assert that an angel is promptly present where he will, and of St. Augustine, whom Gregory of Rimini reports for his own opinion in the questions on the resurrection, where he affirms that a glorious body passes through both intervals with the same speed with which a ray of the sun passes.[1441] I, however, think that the speed of an angel is great, and such as cannot easily be discerned by corporeal sight, and similarly that of the glorious body; but it is not so great as to be in an instant without motion, even if the ray of the sun were to pass through intervals without succession. For the speed of a glorious body, or of an angel, is compared by St. Augustine, so that by some visible example it might set forth the matter to us, not as though it were in an instant; for the other motions which are seen by sight are slower than that they could

1438. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars 2, q. 35, memb. 1, ad 1.

1439. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3, contra secundam conclusionem.

1440. See above, Disputation 194, cap. 2.

1441. Gregory of Rimini, Quaestiones de resurrectione, reporting St. Augustine on the glorious body passing intervals with the speed of a solar ray.

enable us to explain the speed of the motion of an angel and of a glorious body. In this same sense the Fathers said that angels are promptly everywhere present and without delay: for what happens so suddenly, even if it be placed in some succession, seems to us momentary; and St. Augustine, in the last book of the City of God, last chapter, for this same reason said that the motion of the glorious body is at the beck of its soul.[1442]

I add moreover that this great speed of an angel, if it be compared to his proper power, is determined: for it is impossible that a power be finite and determined, and not have an effect of determined speed. By this very reason we proved in Disputation 113, chapter 2, that the power of God is infinite, because He can move more and more swiftly ad infinitum.[1443] Wherefore an angel cannot be moved in ever briefer and briefer time ad infinitum as he pleases, but there will be a maximal time proportioned to that power of his, even if that very great speed depends on his motion. The same must be said, for the same reason, of a glorious body, if it is moved from within by some created power communicated to it: for if it is moved by God according to His will, the speed will not be determined: for God can move any body more and more swiftly ad infinitum.

Furthermore, some philosophers, combined with the reason which we adduced in the preceding chapter, concede that a body cannot be moved in a vacuum in an instant, nor be at once in the middle and at the end of the vacuum, if the body in some way touch the surface of the vacuum, as in that example of the empty bucket which we brought forward in the preceding chapter; but if a body be within a vacuum not touching the extreme surface of the vacuum, it must be said with Aristotle that the motion in a vacuum would be in an instant. But this evasion is useless: first, because motion could not be in an instant, therefore it would rather have to be said that the mobile remains in some indivisible distance, than that it is moved from one to another. Next, there is no doubt that within a vacuum, or above the heavens, where properly speaking there is no vacuum, as we noted in Disputation 29, chapter 3, from Aristotle,[1444] a body cannot be broader, deeper, and longer in itself than in the plenum, and thus by its own quantity cannot prevent other bodies from being placed in some order, so that they fill up more than it alone by itself could fill; therefore, as for other bodies, the mobile itself, that it may fill and be extended, must necessarily do this with succession: for it cannot at once answer to the quantity of the others which together with it were filling, nor does anything stand in the way to prevent its doing this by succession. From which it follows that a body can rightly be moved either within a vacuum, or beyond the heavens, as was proved in that disputation, chapter cited, and that it must necessarily be moved successively.

Caput IV - On the discrete motion of an angel

In the preceding disputation, chapter 2, it was shown that an angel can be moved from place to place without a medium. This opinion being supposed, St. Thomas, Cajetan, and some more recent authors in this article teach that then indeed an angel is moved by a discrete motion.[1445] They call

1442. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. 22 (last book), cap. 30 (last chapter).
1443. See Disputation 113, cap. 2.
1444. See Disputation 29, cap. 3, from Aristotle.
1445. St. Thomas Aquinas; Cajetan, in the present article.

discrete motion as it were a number consisting of the units of the angel's existences in each of the places with that succession; for example, if an angel is first in A, then in B, and finally in C, which are diverse non-communicating places, he is said to be moved discretely in the whole time in which he is in all of them. Wherefore, in their opinion, the first place is not an extrinsic terminus a quo for the discrete motion, but is a part of the motion itself, just as the second and third place are. In the same opinion, and for the same reason, it must be said that the mobile is not moved when it is precisely in one of those places, but when it is in all of them, or in each one of them with respect to the others: just as a number is not in the individual units by itself, but in all together, or in any one with respect to the others: thus Cajetan noted in his commentary around the solution to the first.

Although this opinion is true, nevertheless it could be said that there are many changes according to place, when after one place many are acquired without continuation, each of which would be instantaneous, since the terminus ad quem is produced in an instant. Nor does the succession which is there between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem hinder anything; for this in all changes which are made in an instant must necessarily be, since change is nothing other than the acquisition of the terminus ad quem, which is done in an instant, even if it looks to the terminus a quo. But that there could be said to be many changes is proved from this, that in any place from which an angel passes discretely to another there must be rest for a time; therefore the rest in that place does not pertain to the motion, otherwise, when someone is moved from one quality to another, and in each of those he rests, he would be said to be moved by one discrete motion; and similarly in motion according to place, when it were interrupted by rest for a time. Moreover, that an angel rests for a time in any place from which he passes discretely to another is shown thus: before an angel acquires the second place, he must be in the first in such a way that to be in the one is not to be in the other; but in the second, and in the third, and so on with the others, he begins to be in an instant of our time, and by the first being, therefore that first being of the second is the first not-being of the first, and the first being of the third is the first not-being of the second, and so with the rest: therefore in any place in which the angel has ceased to be by the first not-being, necessarily he was for a time, as is manifest, and consequently for a time he rested. But existence in a place by rest cannot pertain to motion as a part, but as a terminus also; therefore there will be many changes, not one motion.

Some reply that the discrete motion of an angel is distributed into different states of discrete time, which they suppose to be of a different kind from ours, which is continuous, and thus that he is in the several places for the instant of that time, and consequently that existence in any place pertains per se to the motion; and that nothing hinders the instants of that time from being immediate then: for this is peculiar to discrete time, that it is composed only of instants. Granted, however, the intrinsic duration of that existence to be in those different places, and that the so-called discrete time be different from our time, which obtains in motion or consists of the body: nonetheless we must not concede that duration of that angelic existence to measure itself by the places, as was shown exactly in Disputation 36, chapter 1,[1446] where we proved that our time measures even these operations of an angel, or at least, although it is not their measure, it cannot

1446. See Disputation 36, cap. 1.

be denied that they coexist with our time, and thus that an angel necessarily remains in any place for the duration of our time as has been proved, which is sufficient for the existence in any place to be called rest, and by no reason to pertain to motion. Besides, in this matter it matters little to speak in this or that way.

Quaestio LIV - On the knowledge of the angels

After considering those things that pertain to the substance of an angel, we must proceed to his knowledge. But this consideration will be fourfold. For first it must be considered about those things that pertain to the angel's cognitive power (*virtus cognoscitiva*). Second, about those things that pertain to his medium of knowing. Third, about those things that are known by him. Fourth, about the mode of their knowledge.

Concerning the first, five things are asked...

Existence in place by rest cannot pertain to motion as a part, but only as a terminus from which; therefore there will be many changes, not one motion.

Some reply that the angel's discrete motion consists in distinct states of a discrete time, which they suppose to be of a different kind from our time, which is continuous; and thus that in individual places the angel exists only for the instant of that time, and so his existence in any place per se pertains to the motion; nor, they think, does anything hinder those instants of that time from being immediate, for this is proper to discrete time, that it is composed solely of instants. Yet, even granting to them an intrinsic duration of existence in those diverse places, and calling it a discrete time different from our time (which consists in the motion of the heavens or of a body), nonetheless we ought not to say that that duration of the angel's existence in diverse places measures itself, as is clear from what was said in Disputation 36, chapter 1, where we proved that our time measures even these changes of angels, or at least that, even if their duration be denied to cohere with our time, it cannot be denied that they are nevertheless connected with our time; and thus it is necessary that the angel in any place should continue for a span of our time, as remains proved. Therefore existence in any place is rest, and in no way pertains to motion. Besides, in this matter it makes little difference one way or the other.[1447]

Having considered those things which pertain to the substance of angels, we must proceed to the consideration of their knowledge. And this consideration is fourfold. First, about those things that pertain to the angel's cognitive power (*virtus cognoscitiva*). Second, about those things that pertain to his medium of knowing. Third, about those things that are known by him. Fourth, about the mode of their knowledge. Concerning the first, five things are asked.

1447. See Disputation 36, cap. 1.

Articulus I - Whether the angel's understanding is his substance

Objicitur. It is objected first as follows. It seems that to understand (the act of understanding) in an angel is his substance. For an angel is more sublime and simpler than the agent intellect of the soul. But the substance of the agent intellect is its action, as is evident in the third book of On the Soul through Aristotle and his Commentator.[1448] Therefore, much more is the substance of an angel his action, which is to understand.

1. Further, the Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics that the act of the intellect is life.[1449] But for living things to live is to be, as is proved in the second book of On the Soul. Therefore life is essence. Hence the act of the intellect is the essence of the understanding angel.
2. Further, if the extremes are one, the mean does not differ from them, because an extreme is more distant from the other extreme than is the mean. But in an angel the intellect and the thing understood are the same, at least insofar as he understands his own essence. Therefore to understand, which falls as a mean between the intellect and the thing understood, is the same as the substance of the angel who understands.

Sed contra. But on the contrary: The action of a thing differs more from its substance than does its very existence: but in no creature is its existence (*esse*) its substance. For this is proper to God alone, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore neither in an angel nor in any other creature is its action its substance.

Respondeo. I answer: It is impossible that the action of an angel, or of any other creature whatsoever, be its substance. For action is properly the actuality of a power (*actus virtutis*), just as existence is the actuality of substance or essence (*essentia*). But it is impossible that something which is not pure act be its own actuality: because actuality is repugnant to potentiality. Now God alone is pure act. Hence in God alone is His substance His existence and His acting. Further, if an angel's understanding were his substance, it would follow that the angel's understanding is subsistent. But a subsistent "to understand" cannot be more than one, just as no abstract subsistent can be multiplied. Hence the substance of one angel would not be distinguished either from the substance of God, which is subsistent understanding itself, or from the substance of another angel. Likewise, if an angel himself were his own understanding, there could not be degrees of understanding more and less perfect, whereas this difference arises from the diverse participation of understanding itself.

Ad primum. Reply to the first: When it is said that the agent intellect is its action, this is a predication not per essence, but by concomitance: because when its substance is in act, straightway, so far as it is in act, its action concomitantly accompanies it. This is not the case with the possible intellect, which has no actions unless and until it has been made actual

1448. Aristotle, De Anima, III; the Commentator (Averroes) ad loc.
1449. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI.

Ad secundum. Reply to the second: Life does not relate to living as essence to existence, but as course to running; of which pair one signifies the act in the abstract, the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if to live is to be, that life is essence. Although sometimes life is put for essence: according to which St. Augustine also says in the book On the Trinity that memory, understanding, and will are one essence, one life; but in this way the Philosopher is not speaking when he says that the act of the intellect is life

Ad tertium. Reply to the third: An action that passes into something extrinsic is a mean between the agent and the subject receiving the action. But an action that remains in the agent is not really a mean between the agent and the object; it is so only according to the mode of signifying. Really, rather, it follows upon the union of the object with the agent. For from the fact that the understood becomes one with the understanding, there follows understanding as a certain effect different from both

Conclusio. The conclusion is that an angel's understanding is not his substance. Concerning this, a brief controversy will be had with Aristotle and Durandus.

Disputatio CXCVIII - On whether intellection in an angel is his substance

Caput I - The opinion of Aristotle and Durandus

This controversy with Aristotle and Durandus is indeed easy, and we shall also dispatch it briefly. Therefore, Aristotle, in book 12 of the Metaphysics, chapter 7, after he had taught that God is one immortal and perpetual substance, always understanding, whose essence is to understand, seems to affirm the same also of the other separate substances in chapter 9.[1451] He shows first that the intellection of these substances is not changed, because otherwise they would grow weary in understanding; then he proves that their substance is their understanding: because, if it were some accident, they would not be the most noble substances, as he supposes.

This opinion in that very place is embraced by the Commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Philoponus.[1452] Of our own Scholastics, however, only Durandus, on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 5, to the first, asserts that the cognition by which an angel knows himself is his substance: for he says in these words, Although to understand is the act of the angel's intellectual power, really different from it when he understands a thing other than himself; nevertheless his being is not an act of the essence really different from it. Where, since he grants that intellection is really distinguished from the intelligent power when the angel understands other things besides himself, he does not seem to grant this concerning that intellection by which he knows himself; and since he says that the intelligent power is the same as the essence, he clearly seems to think that understanding is not distinguished from the essence and substance of the angel when he understands himself.

1451. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, chs. 7 and 9.
1452. Averroes (the Commentator), Alexander of Aphrodisias, and John Philoponus, ad loc.

Caput II - The truer opinion: that intellection in an angel is not his essence

The common opinion of the Scholastics is to be embraced, on the Second Book, distinction 3 (whom we will cite singly below), who assert with St. Thomas in this article that intellection in an angel, whether by which he understands himself or other things, is not his essence and substance, but is a certain accident added to him.[1453] This is gathered also from Leo, epistle 91, chapter 5, where he speaks thus: As it is proper to God alone to be uncreated, so also no man is Truth, no man is wisdom, no man is justice; but many are partakers of truth, and of wisdom, and of justice; God alone, however, needs no participation.[1454] But what Leo defines of men he understands of any creature whatsoever, even a spiritual one, since he says that it is proper to God alone to be uncreated being, to be wisdom, etc. Pseudo-Dionysius likewise, chapter 11 of the Celestial Hierarchy, says that all the heavenly minds are divided into essence, power, and operation; which three Anselm also distinguishes, chapter 3 of On the Fall of the Devil.[1455] Besides this, it is clear from Scripture that many things were revealed to the angels in the course of time after their creation: the knowledge of these therefore was not their substance, for then it would have been with them always.

All these things rightly prove that Aristotle's opinion is not only false, but also worthy of the note of error; and since there is no greater reason regarding the intellection of other things than of the angel's own self, and since the Fathers, being intent, speak universally of intellection without any distinction, the opinion also of Durandus will be absurd; against which St. Gregory disputes on the Second Book, distinction 7, question 2, and on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 2, article 2, first conclusion; and Marsilius on the Second [Book], 9.7, article 1, second part, second conclusion.[1456]

The reasons of Aristotle are frivolous and empty. For the first does not rightly prove that an angel would need to be wearied if he always understood: for if men grow weary in contemplation, this is not because the intellect and the soul work greatly, but because they are helped in contemplation by the ministry of a bodily instrument; but the body is wearied by an excessive dissipation of vital spirits. The second reason likewise proves nothing: for although an angel's substance is perfected by the knowledge of himself, it does not follow that that cognition is the perfection of the substance itself, but rather that the substance of the angel, together with that operation, is disposed in a more perfect way - just as every substance is more perfect with its accidents than by itself alone. I pass over the many things which Cajetan wastes here in explaining St. Thomas's arguments, in which it is not necessary to linger.

1453. St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, art. on this question.
1454. Pope Leo (the Great), Epist. 91, c. 5.
1455. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, c. 11; Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 3.
1456. St. Gregory, In II Sent., dist. 7, q. 2; and In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 1; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., 9.7, a. 1, second part, second conclusion.

Articulus II - Whether the angel's understanding is his existence

Objicitur. It is objected to the second as follows. It seems that the angel's understanding is his existence (*esse*). For to live for living things is to be, as is said in the second book of On the Soul. But to understand is a certain living, as is said in the same place. Therefore the angel's understanding is his existence.

1. Further, as the cause stands to the caused, so the effect to the effected. But the form by which an angel is, is the same as the form by which he understands, at least himself. Therefore his understanding is the same as his existence.

Sed contra. But on the contrary: The angel's understanding is his motion, as is clear from Pseudo-Dionysius, book 4 On the Divine Names; but existence is not motion. Therefore the angel's existence is not his understanding.[1457]

Respondeo. I answer: The action of an angel is not his existence, nor is the action of any creature. For a twofold action is posited, as is said in book 9 of the Metaphysics. One, namely, which passes into something external, inducing a passion in it, as to burn and to cut. The other action, however, is that which does not pass over into an external thing, but rather remains in the very agent itself: as to sense, to understand, and to will. For by an action of this sort nothing extrinsic is changed, but the whole thing is done in the agent itself. Regarding the first action, therefore, it is manifest that it cannot be the very existence of the agent. For the existence of the agent is signified as within the agent; but such an action is an efflux into a patient from the agent. The second action by its very notion has infinitude either simply or in a qualified way. Simply indeed, as in understanding, whose object is the true; and in willing, whose object is the good; and each of these is convertible with being. And thus understanding and willing, so far as of themselves, are disposed to all things, and each receives its species from its object. In a qualified way, however, sensing is infinite, in that it is ordained to all sensibles, as sight to all visible things. But the existence of any creature is determined to one thing according to genus and species. Only the divine existence is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names.[1458] Hence it is only the divine existence that is its own understanding and its own willing.

Ad primum. Reply to the first: Living is sometimes taken for the very existence of a living thing, and sometimes for the operation of life, that is, by which it is shown that something is living. And in this way the Philosopher says that to understand is a certain living. For there he distinguishes different grades of living things according to different operations of life

Ad secundum. Reply to the second: The essence of the angel is the ratio of his whole existence; but it is not the ratio of his whole understanding; for the soul cannot understand through its essence. And therefore, according to its proper notion, inasmuch as it is such an essence, it is compared to the very existence of the angel. But the act of understanding is compared according to

1457. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV.
1458. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV.

the notion of a universal object, namely, of the true or of being. And thus it is clear that although it is the same form, nevertheless it is not according to the same notion the principle of existing and of understanding. And on this account it does not follow that in an angel there is the same thing to exist and to understand

Conclusio. The conclusion denies [the identity]. Cajetan spends much here in order to explain the mind and reason of the holy Doctor; but I have judged it worthwhile to forgo them. For from the doctrine of the preceding article it easily stands out that the angel's understanding and his existence differ, especially because the angel's existence is not distinguished from his substance and essence by the nature of the thing, as we shall say in the third part of St. Thomas, question 17, article 2; since it has already been proved that the angel's understanding is not his substance, it follows also that it differs from his existence.

Articulus III - Whether the angel's intellectual power is his essence

Ad tertium sic proceditur. It is argued to the third as follows. It seems that the virtue, or intellectual power, of the angel is not other than his essence

It is objected:

- For mind and intellect name an intellective power. But Pseudo-Dionysius in many places of his books calls the very Angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore an angel is his intellective power.[1459]
- Further, if the intellective power in an angel is something besides his essence, it must be an accident. For we call that an accident of something which is besides its essence. But a simple form cannot be a subject, as Boethius says in the book On the Trinity. Therefore an angel would not be a simple form: which is against the premises.[1460]
- Further, St. Augustine says in Confessions XII, near the end, that God made the angelic nature near to himself, but prime matter near to nothing. From which it seems that an angel is more simple than prime matter, as being nearer to God. But prime matter is its own potency. Therefore much more is an angel his own intellective potency.[1461]

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says in De coelesti hierarchia, c. 2, about the middle of it, that angels are divided into substance, virtue, and operation. Therefore in them substance is one thing, virtue another, and operation another.[1462]

I answer: Neither in an angel, nor in any creature, is the operative virtue or power the same as its essence. This is clear as follows. Since power is said with respect to act, there must be, according to the diversity of acts, a diversity of powers. Whence it is said that a proper act answers to a proper

1459. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, chs. 7 - 9; De coelesti hierarchia, c. 2.
1460. Boethius, De Trinitate.
1461. St. Augustine, Confessions, XII.
1462. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, c. 2.

power. Now in every created thing essence differs from its existence (*esse*), and is compared to it as potency to act, as is clear from the above. But the act to which an operative power is compared is operation. In an angel, however, to understand is not the same as to be, nor is any other operation either in him or in any other created thing the same as its being. Hence the essence of the angel is not his intellective power, nor is the essence of any created thing its operative power.

Reply to the first: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind" because the whole of his cognition is intellectual, whereas the cognition of the soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.[1459]

Reply to the second: A simple form which is pure act can be the subject of no accident, because the subject is compared to the accident as potency to act. And such a form is God alone; and of such a form Boethius is speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potency to act, can be the subject of an accident, especially of that which follows the species. Such an accident pertains to form; but an accident which belongs to the individual not following upon the whole species follows upon matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.[1460]

Reply to the third: The potency of matter is to substantial being itself, and not an operative potency, but to accidental being. Hence the case is not similar.

Note on the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is: In an angel, and in every created thing, power is not the same as its essence. St. Thomas understands this not to be the same by nature of the thing, but universally that it is an accidental form added to the substance. With St. Thomas agree his disciples, and Alexander,[1463] and this opinion harmonizes with the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius who, as we cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 1, assigns three things to the angel: essence, virtue, and operation - which, since they are enumerated in the same way by him, must in the same way be distinguished. Anselm too adds his support, in De casu diaboli, cap. 8, where he teaches that conversion and the will toward the good or toward the evil is a certain essence, yet not a substance; therefore he holds it to be an accident distinct from substance. By the name "will" moreover he does not understand the act, but the very faculty; for he distinguishes will from its conversion, while conversion is an operation. And in the book De conceptu virginali, cap. 4, he distinguishes these three just as Pseudo-Dionysius does: essence, virtue, and operation.[1464]

Articulus IV - Whether in an angel there are an agent intellect and a possible intellect

It is objected:

- It seems that in an angel there is an agent and a possible intellect. For the Philosopher says in De Anima III that, just as in every nature there is something by which all things become and something by which all things are made, so also in the soul. But an angel is a certain nature. Therefore in him there is an agent and a possible intellect.[1465]

1459. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, chs. 7 - 9; De coelesti hierarchia, c. 2.
1460. Boethius, De Trinitate.
1463. Alexander of Hales, In I, q. 21, memb. 1.
1464. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 8; De conceptu virginali, c. 4.

- Further, to receive is proper to the possible intellect; but to illuminate is proper to the agent intellect, as is clear in De Anima III. But an angel receives illumination from a superior, and illuminates an inferior. Therefore in him there is an agent and a possible intellect.[1465]

But on the contrary: In us the agent and possible intellect are posited with respect to phantasms, which are compared to the possible intellect as colors to sight, and to the agent intellect as colors to light, as is clear from De Anima III. But this does not hold in an angel. Therefore in an angel there is not an agent and a possible intellect.[1465]

I answer: The necessity of positing a possible intellect in us was because we are found sometimes understanding in potency and not in act. Hence there must be a certain power which is in potency to intelligibles before the very act of understanding, but is reduced to the act of them when one becomes a knower, and further when one becomes a considerer. And this power is called the possible intellect. But the necessity of positing an agent intellect was that the natures of material things which we understand do not subsist outside the soul as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only potentially intelligible while existing outside the soul. And therefore there had to be another power which would make those natures actually intelligible. And this power is called in us the agent intellect. But both of these necessities are lacking in angels: for neither are they at some times understanding only in potency with respect to the things which they naturally understand; nor are their intelligibles intelligible in potency, but in act. For they understand first and principally immaterial things, as will appear in the following question. And therefore in them there cannot be an agent and a possible intellect, except equivocally.

Reply to the first: The Philosopher understands those two to be in every nature in which it happens that there is being generated or made, as his very words show. But in an angel science is not generated, but is naturally present. Hence there is no need to posit in them an agent and a possible intellect.

Reply to the second: It belongs to the agent intellect to illuminate, not indeed another intelligent subject, but intelligibles in potency, inasmuch as by abstraction it makes them actually intelligible. But it belongs to the possible intellect to be in potency with respect to naturally knowable things, and sometimes to be made in act. Hence that an angel illumines an angel does not pertain to the notion of agent intellect. Nor does it pertain to the notion of possible intellect that he is illumined about supernatural mysteries, to the knowing of which he is sometimes in potency. But if anyone wishes to call these an agent and a possible intellect, he will be speaking equivocally, nor ought one to stand upon the usage of names.

Conclusion: In angels there is neither an agent intellect nor a possible intellect - a point which in the following disputation will be briefly examined.

1465. Aristotle, De Anima, III.
1465. Aristotle, De Anima, III.
1465. Aristotle, De Anima, III.

Disputatio CXCIX - On whether there is in angels an agent and a possible intellect

Caput I - Various opinions

Although certain Scholastics concede an agent intellect to the angel, yet they vary in assigning the reason on account of which they say it to befit him. They agree in this opinion: Albertus in the fourth book De causis, part 1; Scotus in the Second Book, dist. 3, the last question; Bassolis in question 4, article 3; Richard in question 2, to the first; indeed Alexander in the second part, question 22, member 3.[1466]

Scotus first proves simply that this faculty must be granted to the angel by these arguments. First, this faculty has nothing of imperfection; therefore it is not to be denied to the angel. Second, in the angel there is a possible intellect; therefore also an agent intellect, for these refer to each other mutually. Third, even if the angel had been created from the beginning with all the species of things, nonetheless he ought to have an agent intellect: for Christ too had knowledge of all things from the beginning of his conception, and yet he did not lack an agent intellect; it is enough, namely, that the angel by his nature be able to receive species from things, so that this power by its very nature befit him.

For this same reason Richard also grants it to the angel; and all who assert that the angel receives species from things are compelled to grant it.

Others indeed, for many reasons frivolous and of no weight, say that the agent intellect is in the angel, which I deliberately pass over; it suffices to add only the opinions of Alexander and Albertus: Alexander holds that the agent intellect is in angels, not so as to abstract species from phantasms, but so as to elicit intellection; Albertus, not so as to elicit cognition, nor so as to produce species, but so as to illuminate them and render them suitable for the possible intellect to be able to understand, indeed so as even to illuminate the possible intellect itself.

About the possible intellect Scotus says that it is indeed in the angel in the same way as it is in men: for since he thinks that no species is inborn in the angel, but that he receives all from things, he consequently affirms that the angelic intellect is possible to become all things, as Aristotle said of ours in De Anima III, c. 4; for it becomes all things by the species which it receives; and since of itself it is without them, it is called "possible" because it can receive them. Richard agrees with Scotus that "to become all things" befits it; and he also teaches that the angel begs species from the things themselves. Scotus further adds that even if we were to concede that species had been infused to the angel at the beginning of his creation, nonetheless his intellect would be possible or passive - which he confirms by this argument: whatever thing that receives a form in itself is the subject of that form...

1466. Albertus Magnus, De causis, IV; Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. ultima; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, q. 2, ad 1; Alexander of Hales, II, q. 22, memb. 3.

Conclusion: In angels there is neither an agent intellect nor a possible intellect; which conclusion is to be briefly examined in the following disputation.

The true opinion

The opinion of St. Thomas in this article is the one we embrace, which Cajetan and more recent Thomists follow: namely, that in an angel there is not an agent intellect nor a possible intellect; although concerning the possible intellect the question may be merely about the word.

Here, however, we must suppose what, in the following question and article, St. Thomas teaches, and we shall there prove, namely, that an angel does not receive species from things, but either has them ingenerate in himself from the beginning, or at least understands without them.

First, then, as to the agent intellect, I show the aforesaid position thus. Either the agent intellect is posited for the sake of illuminating the species, as Albert said; and since such an illumination is superfluous and cannot be explained, the agent intellect ought not to be granted for this effect. That that illumination is superfluous is clear, because the species alone, conjoined of itself with the possible intellect, is a sufficient principle of cognition; or let them explain to us, if they please, what that illumination is, and what it does in the species and in the intellect; for we can scarcely understand it, much less explain it. Or the agent intellect is posited so as to be a principle of eliciting intellection together with the species, as Alexander said; and in this mode it ought not to be a distinct power, even according to formal account, from the possible intellect: for the possible intellect has, together with the species, the power of producing intellection. If it pleases to name that very possible intellect, as it is such a principle, by the title of "agent," then the question will be about the word, and no other power besides the single intellect will have to be constituted, which is what we now contend.

Nor does the agent intellect seem necessary for anything else, if that is true which we suppose, namely, that an angel does not receive species from things. For if in any way it seemed necessary, it would be chiefly for this, that it produce those species and abstract them from things, as in us it abstracts them from phantasms; therefore it remains that it is useless to concede an agent intellect to the angel.

Wherefore the reasons of Scotus, which we adduced in the preceding chapter, are easily dissolved from what has been said. To the first I answer that this power of the agent intellect supposes some imperfection in that in which it is, namely, an indigence of species which by its nature it must receive from without; for to this alone can the agent intellect serve, to abstract species from things or from phantasms. Since, therefore, the angel cannot receive species from things, in no way does he need an agent intellect, and hence he is not endowed with such a faculty, because in nature there ought to be nothing superfluous.

To the second I say that in the angel there is not a possible intellect for receiving species, as we shall immediately say, but only for receiving intellection.

To the third we grant that in a man there would be an agent intellect, even if from the beginning he received all the species of things; because by his nature he would not have them infused, but otherwise by his nature he ought to receive them from things and senses. Wherefore the faculty of the agent intellect in man would not be useless, even if de facto it did nothing, especially since from things he could always acquire new species.

Concerning the possible intellect, moreover, the dissension among the doctors is rather about the word than about the thing itself. For although it cannot be denied, as Scotus contends, that in the angel there would be a possible intellect for receiving a species even if he had it infused in himself by nature, nevertheless this is not what Aristotle calls a "possible intellect" in De Anima III, chapter 4, but because first it is a bare potency in the genus of intelligibles, and then it becomes all intelligibles by the reception of species. In this sense St. Thomas in this article rightly denies a possible intellect in angels. Thus Cajetan answers Scotus on this article, for which reason I see that the question is rather about the word than about the thing, and therefore there is no need to dwell longer on it.[1467]

Articulus V - Whether in angels there is only intellective cognition

Objicitur: It seems that in angels there is not only intellective cognition.

1) For St. Augustine says, in the City of God, that in angels there is a life by which they understand and feel. Therefore in them there is a sensitive power.[1468]

2) Further, Isidore says that angels know many things by experience, which arises from many memories, as is said in the first book of the Metaphysics. Therefore in them there is also a memorative power.[1469]

3) Further, Pseudo-Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that in demons there is a perverse phantasy. But phantasy pertains to the imaginative power. Therefore in demons there is an imaginative power; and by the same reason in angels, because they are of the same nature.[1470]

But on the contrary: St. Gregory says, in the Homily on the Ascension in the Gospels, that man feels with the beasts and understands with the angels.[1471]

I answer that in our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised through bodily organs, and such powers are acts of certain parts of the body, as sight is in the eye, and hearing in the ear. But there are certain powers of our soul whose operations are not exercised through bodily organs, as the intellect and will; and such are not acts of any parts of the body. Now angels do not have bodies naturally united to themselves, as is clear from what was said above. Hence, of the powers of the soul, none can belong to them save intellect and will. And the

1467. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 4; Cajetan, In Iam partem, q. 79, a. 2.
1468. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII (cf. also VI, c. 10 - 12).
1469. Isidore of Seville, De summo bono, II; Aristotle, Metaphysics I (on experience arising from many memories).
1470. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4.
1471. St. Gregory the Great, Homilia de Ascensione in Evangelia.

Commentator also says, in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, that separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And this agrees with the order of the universe, that the supreme intellectual creature be totally intellective, and not according to a part, as our soul. For this reason also angels are called intellects and minds, as was said above.[1472]

To what, however, is objected on the other side, one can answer in two ways. In one way, that those authorities speak according to the opinion of those who posited that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Which opinion St. Augustine frequently employs in his books, although he does not intend to assert it. Whence he says, in the City of God, that over this sort of investigation one ought not to labor much.[1473]

In another way it can be said that those authorities, and the like, are to be understood by a certain likeness: because, since sense has a determinate apprehension of the proper sensible, it is in common speech that even according to a certain apprehension of the intellect something is said to be "felt." Whence also opinion is named "feeling." Experience, moreover, can be attributed to angels by a likeness of the things known, and not by a likeness of the cognoscitive power. For there is in us experience when we know singulars through sense. But angels know singulars, as will appear below, yet not through sense. Still, memory can be posited in angels, according as it is posited by Augustine in the mind, although it cannot belong to them according as it is posited a part of the sensitive soul. Likewise one must say that "perverse phantasy" is attributed to demons from the fact that they have a false estimation concerning the true good. Deception, however, is in us properly according to phantasy, by which sometimes we adhere to likenesses of things as though to the things themselves, as is clear in sleepers and madmen.[1474]

Conclusion is affirmative and without any controversy.

Quaestio LV - On the medium of angelic cognition

Consequently, the question is asked concerning the medium of angelic cognition. And about this three things are inquired.

1472. Averroes, In XII Metaphysicorum.
1473. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei (cf. the remark that one should not labor much over such an inquiry).
1474. St. Augustine, De Trinitate X, c. 1 - 3 (on memory in the mind).

Articulus I - Whether the angels know all things through their own substance

Objicitur: It seems that the angels know all things through their own substance. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names that the angels know the things that are on earth according to the proper nature of the mind.[1475] But the nature of an angel is its essence. Therefore the angel knows things through his own essence.

1. Further, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics II and in De Anima III, in those things which are without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same.[1476] But that which is understood is the same as the knower by reason of that by which it is understood. Therefore in those things which are without matter, as angels are, that by which something is understood is the very substance of the knower.
2. Further, whatever is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is in him in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: for the lower beings are essentially in the higher, and the higher are in the lower by participation. And hence Pseudo-Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that God gathers the whole into the wholes, that is, all things into all things.[1477] Therefore the angel knows all things in his own substance.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says in the same chapter that angels are illuminated by the reasons of things; therefore they know by the reasons of things, and not by their own proper substance.[1475]

Respondeo: I answer that that by which the intellect understands is compared to the understanding intellect as form, because the form is that by which an agent acts. But in order that a potency be perfectly completed by a form, it is necessary that all the things to which the potency extends be contained under the form. And hence it is that in corruptible things the form does not perfectly complete the potency of matter, because the potency of matter extends to more than is contained under the form of this or that thing. But the intellectual potency of an angel extends to the understanding of all things, because the object of the intellect is being, or common truth. Now the angel's very essence does not comprehend all things within itself, since it is an essence determined to a genus and to a species. But this is proper to the divine essence, which is infinite, to comprehend all things in itself simply and perfectly. And therefore God alone knows all things through his essence; but an angel cannot know all things through his essence, and so his intellect must be perfected by certain species for the knowing of things.

1475. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 7 (and cf. c. 4).
1476. Aristotle, Metaphysics II; De Anima III.
1477. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4.
1475. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 7 (and cf. c. 4).

Ad primum: To the first it must be said that when it is said that the angel knows things according to his nature, the word "according to" does not determine the medium of cognition, which is the likeness of the thing known, but the cognitive power, which belongs to the angel according to his nature

Ad secundum: To the second it must be said that, as the sense in act is the sensible in act, as is said in De Anima II, not as though the sensitive power itself were the very likeness of the sensible which is in the sense, but because from both there is made one thing as from act and potency; so too the intellect in act is said to be the understood in act, not because the substance of the intellect is the very likeness by which it understands, but because that likeness is its form. And it is the same thing to say that in those things which are without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same, as to say that the intellect in act is the understood in act. For from this it is that something is understood in act, namely that it is immaterial

Ad tertium: To the third it must be said that those things which are below the angel and those which are above him are in a certain manner in his substance: not indeed perfectly, nor according to their proper notion, since the angel's essence is finite and, according to its proper notion, is distinguished from others, but according to a certain common notion. But in the essence of God all things are perfectly and according to their proper notion, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is in any thing whatsoever either proper or common. And therefore God has through his essence a proper cognition of all things; not, however, the angel, but only a common one

Explicatio Articuli: The conclusion is: An angel does not know all things through his essence as through a proximate principle and intelligible form. For in the preceding question, Article 1, we proved that the very act of understanding in the angel is not his essence, and in the second that his existing is not his understanding; now indeed he shows that his essence is not the proximate principle of understanding, as is the form or intelligible species by which the intellect is informed. Moreover, in this article he speaks of the intellection of other things besides God and the angel himself: for concerning the cognition by which he understands himself he treats in Article 1 of the following question; but of the cognition which he has of God, in Article 2. When, moreover, he says in this article that not all things are known by the angel through his essence, he does not mean that the angel does not know some things through his essence, but that he does not know all things through it; by what, indeed, he understands those things, the following article declares. Wherefore the doctrine of the present article will be better examined together with the following.

Articulus II - Whether the angels understand by species received from things

Objicitur: To the second, this is how one proceeds. It seems that angels understand by species received from things. For whatever is understood by some likeness of itself in the knower is understood in the knower. But the likeness of something existing in another is either there by the mode of exemplar, so that that likeness is the cause of the thing; or it is there by the mode of image, so that it is caused by the thing. Therefore it is necessary that every science of an intelligent being

either be the cause of the thing understood, or be caused by the thing. But the science of an angel is not the cause of things existing in nature, but the divine science alone. Therefore it is necessary that all the species by which the angelic intellect understands be received from things.

1. Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the agent intellect in the soul. But the light of the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic intellect can abstract species even from the very sensible things. And thus nothing forbids saying that an angel understands by species received from things.
2. Further, species which are in the intellect are indifferent to what is present and what is distant, except insofar as they are received from sensible things. If therefore an angel does not understand by species received from things, his cognition would be indifferent with respect to what is near and what is distant. And thus it would be pointless for him to move according to place.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names that the angels do not gather divine cognition from things divisible or from sensibles.[1475]

Respondeo: I answer that the species by which angels understand are not received from things, but are connatural to them.

For thus one must understand the distinction and order of spiritual substances, as there is a distinction and order of corporeal things. Now the highest bodies have a potency in their nature totally perfected by form. But in lower bodies the potency of matter is not totally perfected by form, but receives now one, now another form from some agent. Likewise also the lower intellectual substances, namely human souls, have an intellectual potency not naturally complete; but it is completed in them successively by the fact that they receive intelligible species from things. But the intellectual potency in higher spiritual substances, that is, in angels, is naturally complete through connatural intelligible species, insofar as they have connatural intelligible species for understanding all the things which they can naturally know. And this also appears from the very mode of being of substances of this sort. For lower spiritual substances, namely the soul, have something akin to body, inasmuch as they are the forms of bodies; and therefore from their very mode of being it befits them that they should obtain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies; otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. But higher substances, that is, the angels, are altogether separated from bodies immaterially, and subsist in intelligible being; and therefore they obtain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible efflux, whereby from God they received the species of the things known together with their intellectual nature. Whence St. Augustine says in the second book On the Literal Meaning of Genesis that the creatures which are below the angels are thus caused that first they come to be in the cognition of the rational creature, and afterwards the very constitution of the creature exists.[1478]

1475. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 7 (and cf. c. 4).
1478. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, II.

Ad primum: To the first it must be said that in the mind of the angel there are likenesses of creatures, not indeed received from the creatures themselves, but from God, who is the cause of creatures and in whom first the likenesses of things exist. Whence Augustine says in the same book that, just as the ratio by which a creature is made exists first in the Word of God than the creature itself which is made, so the cognition of that same ratio exists first in the intellectual creature, and afterwards there is the very constitution of the creature

Ad secundum: To the second it must be said that from extreme to extreme one does not arrive except through a middle. Now the being of a form in the imagination, which indeed is without matter, yet not without material conditions, is the middle between the being of a form which is in matter and the being of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Hence, however powerful the angelic intellect may be, it could not reduce material forms to intelligible being unless it first reduced them to the being of imagined forms - which is impossible, since it lacks imagination, as was said above in the preceding article. Granted also that it could abstract intelligible species from material things, nonetheless it would not abstract them, because it would not need them, since it has connatural intelligible species

Ad tertium: To the third it must be said that the cognition of an angel is indifferent with respect to what is distant and what is near according to place. Yet on that account his local motion is not pointless. For he is not moved locally in order to receive cognition, but to operate something in a place

Conclusio: The angels do not understand by species received from things, but by species innate and connatural to them; the truth of which will be more fully explained in the following disputation.

Disputatio CC - Whether the angels understand by species

Caput I - That Durandus and the Nominalists held that angels, by their essence alone and their intellect, understand all things

The controversy stands on the principle by which an angel understands, namely, whether it is his very essence and intellect alone, or whether he needs some species added to the intellect; and, further, by what rationale such species befit an angel. On this question theologians vary in their positions, and since the matter is most remote from sense, scarcely any firmly certain conclusion can be obtained. Nevertheless, for our part we shall examine the dispute among all the opinions, so that at least it may appear to us which of them is less in accord with philosophy and reason.

The first opinion is that of those who say that an angel, without any species - either innate or acquired - by his essence alone and by his intellect, suffices for understanding whatever he understands with proper and even judicative cognition. Thus taught Durandus and the Nominalists.[1479]

1479. Durandus; and the Nominalists (as cited in the scholastic literature ad loc.).

Communis sententia: The common opinion will be treated in the second chapter.

Iudicium: A judgment concerning both opinions will be treated in the third chapter.

non final, not material, not formal: therefore efficient.

Third, they teach that the knowledge which they call abstracted (abstract knowledge) is produced in angels from the very intuitive knowledge, or from a habit effected by it: thus teach Ockham, Gabriel, and Gregory. For, as Gabriel says in the first question of the Prologue, article 2, notation 2, there is a twofold abstract knowledge: either it is of a universal predicate abstracted from singulars, and this arises from the intuitive knowledge of singulars, from which it is abstracted; or it is of a thing abstracted from existence, that is, of a non-existent; and this does not arise from intuitive knowledge, but from a habit which abstract knowledge effects in us.[1480] Now that this abstract knowledge exists in angels, no one will doubt. But that it is produced not through species implanted in the angel, but through a habit which the intuitive knowledge effects in them, they prove in this way. If now an angel were created, even with species of all things, whence could he understand that this or that thing was past, unless he had first seen it as present, and from that knowledge something had been effected in the intellect, which would be a principle of understanding that thing as past?

Caput II - The common opinion

The common opinion among the Scholastics is that an angel understands all things through species, likenesses, or qualities added to the intellect (intelligible species). Thus hold St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent authors in these two articles; Albert, Alexander, St. Bonaventure, Richard, Scotus, Aegidius, Hervaeus, Maior, Capreolus, Thomas of Argentina, Marsilius, the Ferrarian, Henry.[1481] And although Henry does not grant many species, he nevertheless asserts that a certain one habit of science is necessary with respect to all the things that the angel knows. He also teaches that this habit can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it is a quality of the first species of quality; in another way, as by its power it is the very knowables, and it makes them present to the intellect. In the latter way, he says, it can be called a species; and thus the angel understands all things by a single species. He grants only one for this reason, because if there were many, the angel would always actually understand any given thing by its species; which does not follow if one posits one habit or only one species for all things, as he himself at some length, and rather obscurely, shows. Therefore the common opinion is that an angel understands all things through species added to his intellect, whether these be more or fewer; about which it is not now to be disputed.

This, moreover, was the opinion of Proclus in the book of Causes, which is circulated among the works of Aristotle; where, in proposition 10, he says that intelligences are full of the forms of things, that is, of the intelligible species of things.[1482] It can truly be proved from Aristotle, De

1480. Gabriel, In I Sent., Prologue, q. 1, a. 2, not. 2. The position is attributed here also to Ockham and Gregory.

Anima III, chapter 1, or, according to another division, chapter 4, where he praises Plato for saying that the intellect is the place of forms.[1483] And although he is speaking of the human intellect, nevertheless the same reason seems to hold also of the angelic. St. Thomas also asserts it in the argument But on the contrary to Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, chapter 4, a little from the beginning; yet if that place be attentively read, nothing favors this opinion.[1484] By what reason this opinion can be proved, we shall see in the following chapter.

Caput III - A judgment concerning both opinions

I, for my part, think there are efficacious reasons at hand to prove that the human intellect is furnished with species for understanding (intelligible species); but that scarcely any exists which openly convinces the same thing of the angelic intellect in like manner. First, indeed, concerning the human intellect it is proved from the senses, in which it is ascertained by experience that there are species. Passing over the external senses - whose species not a few reasons drawn from experience confirm - concerning the internal senses, which are more similar to the intellect, it is shown thus. For in our internal imagination we often retain likenesses of things; when things absent and past we make present to ourselves, as if we were beholding them; which could not be recognized unless some species and likenesses of them were preserved in our imagination. For why is it that things which we have never seen we cannot remember; whereas of those things, however...

But those things we have seen we easily remember, unless it be because these left in us some image of themselves impressed, whereas those left none. Therefore, since in these faculties we say that there are species in addition to the very potency and power of the faculty: we must grant the same also to the human intellect, which is so bound to the senses in this state that it understands nothing without them. But of an intellect altogether separated from the body this reason does not prove.

Yet someone could, concerning every cognoscitive faculty, and concerning the angelic intellect likewise, persuade the same thing by this argument. For a cognoscitive faculty according to itself is a certain universal principle of this and that cognition; nor is it determined of itself to know this rather than that: therefore it needs some peculiar form by which it may be determined to understand this or that; and no form seems more fitting than the species of the object. For every quality which together with the faculty itself is a principle of knowing something is rightly called a species of that thing, that is, a species in first act representing, because it has the power of producing the actual and express likeness which is the very cognition itself, as was shown above, disputation 43, chapter 7.

1481. St. Thomas; Cajetan; Albert, tract. 4, q. 19, a. 11; Alexander, p. q. 24, memb. 2 - 3; St. Bonaventure, in II, dist. 3, par. c., art. 2, q. 1; Richard, art. 6, q. 1; Scotus, q. 10, 9; Aegidius, ead. dist., par. 2, art. 1; Hervaeus, q. 4, art. 2; Maior, q. 6 - 7; Capreolus, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 4; Thomas of Argentina, q. 2, ar. 4, I p., art.; Marsilius, in II, q. 7, art. 1, II p., concl. 5 - 6; Ferrar., II Contra Gent., cap. 96; Henry, Quodl. 5, q. 14, lit. S.

1483. Aristotle, De Anima III, cap. 1 (or, according to another division, cap. 4).

1484. St. Thomas, in the argument But on the contrary to Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4, a little from the beginning.

But someone will object, that even if the intellect, or the cognoscitive faculty, receives the species of singular objects, nevertheless it remains indifferent of itself to understanding this or that; and it must be determined by some extrinsic principle: therefore by this reasoning it is not sufficiently proved that species must be conceded to an Angel. But this objection does not stand against the foregoing reason. For although an intellect furnished with a species needs some principle by which it is determined to the exercise about this object - something which in us proceeds from the senses and from the will - yet on the part of the universal agent principle there seems necessary some form which should physically modify the very faculty to act this rather than that. For the intellect and the faculty of knowing of themselves seem only to be the physical principle of knowing in general, and with this or that species it is completed in the notion of an integral principle, so as to understand this or that.

I answer: Nevertheless, although this reasoning proves something of man's intellect, it does not likewise of the angelic intellect. For one could say that the universal efficacy of the angelic intellect, for understanding this or that, is not necessarily determined by an intrinsic form. For it seems proper to cognoscitive and appetitive faculties to be determined by objects, not as efficient causes, but as concurring in a peculiar way to the operation and having, in some manner, the ratio of cause; yet so that the appetitive faculty is determined by the object as existing in cognition, but the intellect by the very object existing externally as present, past, or future, according as it is accommodated to the intellect. For by the very fact that it lies within the latitude of its proper object, already the intellect can be determined by it. And this, in Angels, can be defended without any inconvenience; whereas to concede species to an Angel certainly is not without some difficulty.

First, because if the angelic intellect of itself were not sufficient, without some species added to it, to elicit cognition, then either it ought to receive it from things, or to have it produced together with it from the beginning. If we say the former, many absurdities follow, which we shall see in the next disputation. Then too, if it be said that an Angel receives species from things, we could say that the very things concur with the intellect of the Angel to the cognition of themselves without any species; therefore it must not be said that the Angel receives species from things. But the latter has no less difficulty. For either those species produced from the beginning and infused with the Angel are from God alone, not as due perfections of angelic nature, or as forms due and flowing from the Angel by way of passion. The former is difficult: for it would follow that God could deny species to an Angel without inflicting any force on angelic nature; wherefore it would not be violent for an Angel to have the cognition of nothing, just as it is not violent for him not to see God, although he can see Him by a light not due to him being communicated. For even those who say that an Angel now understands by species added to the intellect must plainly admit that the species of some possible natures have not been conceded to him, nor are these known by the Angel, without the Angel suffering some force. For no one suffers force unless some form be denied to him against his internal impulse, or a contrary form be infused.

Further, if in this manner species were infused into an Angel, they would be supernatural forms, just as is the light of glory. For all such forms would be infused immediately by God, as is the light of glory; and on the part of the Angel there would be only passive potency, as there is for receiving

the light of glory; nor would such forms be infused by God through any required disposition or created cause, as the rational soul is infused. Therefore nothing would be lacking for them to be called supernatural forms no less than the light of glory, according to the definition of what is supernatural which we shall hand down in disputation 214. But if you say that for this reason these species are natural forms, because they are from God acting naturally, whereas the light of glory is a supernatural form because it is infused in a supernatural way, that is, beyond the common course: this difference is not sufficient. For a natural form must be distinguished from a supernatural form not only on the part of the efficient cause, but by itself, as we noted above, disputation 44, chapter 1, against Scotus, and we shall also show below in disputation 214, chapter 2. For God is not said to do something supernaturally except in one of two ways: either because He alone produces that which otherwise is wont to be produced by a created agent, although, because of some impediment, it now could not be produced by a natural agent; or because He produces some form which is by its own nature supernatural. But in no other way can a distinction be made on the part of the very mode of operating, naturally and supernaturally.

Wherefore it would be easier, as I think, to defend that evident cognition, which they call intuitive and proper, proceeds from the sole power of the angelic intellect in such wise that, in proportion as the power of the Angel's intellect is a universal cause, and needs some determination that it may operate in this or that mode, it is determined by such and such an object, proper to it and equal to its native power - not because the object concurs with the intellect as an efficient cause, but because, in the mode of object and terminus, it itself modifies and determines it to such an operation, so that, concerning such an object, it cannot have any but such an operation; yet not because it is excited by the object to consider this rather than that - for this comes from another cause, as we shall say below, disputation 236, chapter 4 - nor because the object can concur with the intellect as efficient cause for intellection, as will be evident from what we shall say in the next disputation. And hence can be solved the argument of Scotus and the Nominalists, whereby they contended that the object is the efficient cause of intellection. For the fact that, the object being posited, intellection is posited, and, it being removed, intellection is removed, is not sufficient for us to say that it is an efficient cause; but it is enough to allege that it is a cause in another way, as has been explained. What objects are proper to it and wholly accommodated to its native power we shall note in disputations 208 - 209 and 225 - 226.

This, however, does not hinder that the Angel may need some form added to him for understanding objects not accommodated to his native power: for seeing God, and the mysteries of grace, and future contingents; because for these he does not have a complete power of understanding, but an inchoate one. For he has the power of understanding, as understanding is, which under its latitude includes understanding this and that; but he does not have the fully complete power so as to understand or see certain objects which are above his power, such as God, and the like. Yet his power is completed for seeing these, when some supernatural form is added, as we have philosophized about the light of glory above, disputation 43, chapter 6 and the following.

Someone will say that from what has been said it follows that the infused species which were communicated to the soul of Christ for knowing natural things are also of a supernatural order. For we were also inferring that against the species of Angels. I answer: this does not follow in any way. For since we suppose that created natural things can already be understood and known as they are by Angels with intuitive (as they say) cognition, it is not surprising if in another intellect, which by itself is not able to know them, species can be given, infused, of a natural order for knowing those same things. I said, for knowing those same things: because for supernatural objects, such as grace and the beatific vision, species infused of a natural order are not given, but of a supernatural order according to their substance, just as the things themselves are which are known. For if the Angel's intellect could behold created things without species, then to no intellect would those species and that intuitive cognition be connatural, but they would be supernatural to all. It remains proved, therefore, that these species are not infused into the Angel from God's mere will.

Next, it cannot be said that these species arise from the very nature of the Angel as its passions, as some think - of whom we shall speak in disputation 201, chapter 3. For since the nature of the Angel and of his intellect are determined according to themselves, they demand determinate passions and perfections connatural to them. But the species of intelligible things are not determinate; therefore they cannot be according to the Angel's natural inclination. That these are not determinate is clear. For either the Angel's intellect requires only the species of the things which God has created or is going to create, or also the species of possibles which He is not going to create. As to the species only of things which He has in fact created or is going to create, the Angel cannot have a natural inclination; because these are not determined naturally, but only by the will of God. But a natural inclination, especially to passions, must be determined naturally. Nor can he have it to the possibles; for there would be no greater reason why to these rather than to those, and hence he would naturally incline to all. Therefore either the Angel would have all those species, which would be infinite; or he would lack some, indeed infinitely many, against his natural propensity. Both are absurd. Therefore it would be easier to defend that an Angel, without species, understands all created and natural things.

But against this opinion someone will object in this way: If the bare power of the Angel together with the object sufficed, the Angel could indeed understand possibles and future things; for the possible and the future, as such, are intelligible objects. I answer: concerning future things there is nearly the same difficulty in the opinion of those who assert that the Angel understands through species. For the Angel neither has the species of future things, nor does he receive them from future things when they are present, as we shall prove below, in the next disputation, chapter 3. However, in either opinion an easy reply can be made. Therefore I say: whether the intellect have the species of possible and future things, or have none but by its bare power understand all things, it does not therefore understand the possibles which are contained in the power of God alone, and the future contingents which depend on free choice (for these alone do we deny to angelic cognition), because these are not objects which correspond to the power itself according to its natural virtue and are equal to it. Wherefore about those it will not be able to operate by its own proper power.

But, to defend the common opinion, certain difficulties must be examined, that we may somewhere be able to rest and to philosophize consistently. Furthermore, someone can defend that the species infused into Angels are from God, and nevertheless that they are of a natural order: because, although they could have been produced by God alone, no other efficient cause or disposition requiring it, which seems to be required by the ratio of a supernatural entity which we handed down in disputation 154; yet, because such species are about objects of a natural order, and - as it were - are infused by God at the demand of the very objects, that they may be understood, therefore the species themselves too are of a natural order. This reasoning, however, is not without difficulty. For although the objects of the intellect are of a natural order in the genus of being and of thing, nevertheless in the genus of object they can be of a supernatural order. For many future things from the freedom of the will are natural entities in the genus of thing; and yet, in the genus of object, they are supernatural, so that, as future, they are not known naturally by Angels; nor can their species of a natural order be infused into Angels; otherwise there would be no cause why such species were not conceded to them from the beginning of creation.

Further development on the determination of the intellect by the object

It is asked whether the Angel receives species from things.

Disputatio CCI - Whether the Angel receives species from things

Opinio Scoti, et aliorum, cap. 1. - That the Angel receives no species from things; and so on. The opposite opinion of the adversaries. How the Angel had these species in the beginning in his mind, cap. 3.

Caput I - The opinion of Scotus and others

Nor do those who concede species to the angelic intellect, that by them it may be furnished so as to understand, agree among themselves about the mode in which such species befit an Angel. The first opinion is of those who teach that an Angel receives species from things in the same way in which our intellect abstracts them from the senses. Thus affirms Scotus in II, dist. 3, question 11; Richard, article 6, question 1; Major, question 6 - 7; Bassolis, question 4, article 8; Marsilius in II, question 7, article 1, part, conclusions 5 - 6; and Alexander in the Preface to the second question, article 2; and others, as is gathered from them: all, with no distinction made, seem to assert that all the Angel's species are received from things, and that none were infused from the beginning of creation; and he speaks in one place about the species of spiritual things, in another about the species of material things in general; but other authors say the species of incorruptible and universal things...[1485]

1485. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 11; Richard, art. 6, q. 1; Major, q. 6 - 7; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 8; Marsilius, In II, q. 7, a. 1, pars, concl. 5 - 6; Alexander, in praef. ad secundam quaestionem, art. 2; and others as cited in these loci.

They say that the species were connatural to the Angel from the beginning of his creation, but that the species of singular and corruptible things were later derived from the things themselves. Yet, in my judgment, they understand only the species of incorruptible things to have been created together with the Angels themselves, and to have been connatural to them from the beginning of their creation; whereas the species of incorruptible things that were to exist after the Angels, such as souls, were, in the lapse of time, received from the things themselves in the same way as from other corruptible things. For, in their opinion, the very same absurdity would follow if the Angel had had from the beginning the species of future incorruptible things, namely, that he would rightly know other future things by them.

Therefore they prove that the species of singular things not yet present to the Angels are drawn from the things themselves; otherwise it would follow that all future things, even contingent ones, are known by the Angel before they exist, if from the beginning of his being he had had the species of all those things. By this line of reasoning the aforesaid Doctors proceed - except Scotus, who asserts that indeed Angels could have had the species of all singular things and of future contingents, and nevertheless would not know future contingents, because by those species Angels would not know the connection of actual existence with such a thing. He therefore employs another reason, namely, that there would be infinite species in the Angel, if he had from the beginning the species of all future things, because future contingents are infinite. For he thinks, as we shall see below, that there cannot be one species which represents many things, but that to singular things and operations singular species also are to be assigned.

How Scotus defends his opinion.

Scotus, however, adds two points. One is that, if the Angel did not have some connatural species from the beginning, he could receive singular ones from things; in which point the other authors would not dissent from Scotus, for if he could receive some, why could he not also receive all? He nevertheless says that in fact God infused certain species into the Angels, so that He might create him adorned and perfect; which Bassolis and Major expressly noted with Scotus in the places cited. The second is that, even if the Angel had the species of singular future things, nevertheless for intuitive knowledge he would receive something from things. Major taught the same in the place cited, for they think that intuitive knowledge is not had by the species alone and the proper concept of the thing, but is the knowledge of the thing as actually existing and present, and therefore for it the proper species of the thing previously infused does not suffice, unless then the Angel receives something from things. Gabriel agrees, in 2, Question on the Prologue, article 2, notation 2, from the doctrine of Ockham.[1486]

But in this Scotus does not altogether agree with the others. For others teach that the Angel receives intelligible species from things, by which he afterward elicits intellection; Scotus, however, asserts that Angels receive intuitive knowledge itself from things in such a way that the intellect together with the very singular present thing produces the intuitive cognition of it, although from this knowledge (as Scotus says) a species is left behind for abstract knowledge, that is, for the

1486. Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., Prol., q. 2, a. 2, not. 2, drawing on Ockham.

knowledge of a thing not existing, or considered without existence. Thus he taught in Question 10, to the Question, near the end of it. How Scotus differs from Gabriel, Ockham, and Gregory, we said in the preceding disputation, chapter 1. For those grant that there is no species in the Angel; Scotus, however, says there are many, and that only intuitive knowledge is received from things; wherefore Cajetan does not seem to have accurately reported Scotus's opinion below, question 57, article 2.

For this opinion Augustine is usually brought forward, 12 On the Trinity, chapter 7: for he says that God does not see temporally, nor does anything new occur in His vision when something is newly done in time, just as (he says) the senses are affected thereby, whether the carnal senses of animals and men, or the heavenly senses of Angels. To this testimony we first reply that it is not surprising if Augustine held this opinion, who, as we saw in disputation 179, chapter 2, did not hesitate to assert that Angels are corporeal. But those who teach that they are spiritual, as Scotus affirms, ought to deny that they can suffer anything from a body. Then I say that this can be understood, not because the Angel is changed by the present thing as by an efficient cause, but because he does not understand future things until they are present, as we showed in disputations 106 and 107.

Caput II - That the Angel receives no species from things: the common and truer opinion is established

We must embrace the common opinion, which teaches that the Angel does not take any species from the things themselves; which St. Thomas, together with Cajetan and others, hands down in this article; likewise St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, chapter 96; and Ferrariense likewise; Albert the Great in various places; Thomas of Argentina in II, distinction 3; St. Bonaventure; Capreolus; Aegidius; Hervaeus; to whom Henry agrees in the place cited in the preceding disputation; for although he says that the Angel understands all things not by various species but by one habit, nevertheless he teaches that that habit is not acquired from things, but was created together with the Angel.[1487]

Setting aside many others, this opinion is proved by a single, efficacious reason, and the opposite is refuted.

If the Angel were to receive species from present things, it would have to be done in one of three ways: either the present things alone would have to be the entire and perfect cause of the species in the angelic intellect; or the things themselves together with the intellect would have to concur to produce the species, so that the things would be causes which they call partial; or, finally, the angelic intellect alone would have to be the cause of the species. But in none of these ways can it be done: therefore it must not be asserted that the Angel receives species from things.

1487. St. Thomas, this article; Cajetan ad loc.; St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 96; Ferrariense idem; Albert the Great in several places; Thomas of Argentina on II, dist. 3; St. Bonaventure; Capreolus; Aegidius; Hervaeus; and Henry in the place cited in the preceding disputation.

First, the things themselves existing outside the intellect cannot be the whole and entire cause of the species. For if the things are material, because the material and corporeal cannot act upon what is spiritual, which is more noble; for nothing corporeal can by its own power produce a spiritual form, of which only the Angel and a spiritual substance is capable. Then also, because even if the things themselves and the objects are spiritual, species cannot proceed in this way: for, as we will show in disputation 217, the Angel by his own power can only imprint motion according to place in bodies; but to produce some quality he certainly is not able: therefore neither can he produce a species of himself in another Angel.

Second, the things themselves and the objects cannot produce species as a partial cause. For either they would in this way be the cause of the species by their own power, or as instruments elevated by the power of the Angel's intellect, not by their own power, for the reason given above. Not as instruments: for although we say that the phantasm, which is material and corporeal, is in us an instrument for producing species in our intellect, we ought not to assert the same of things which are outside the angelic intellect, when compared with it. For the phantasm, because it is conjoined to us, can be naturally elevated by our agent intellect by a certain natural ordination, whereby it is placed under it by the very fact that it is conjoined; but a thing is separated - how could they be elevated as instruments by the angelic intellect, since even with respect to God such an elevation of things to produce higher effects is rather difficult? Add that, by whatever reason instruments could be assumed for producing intelligible species, they could be assumed for producing intellection itself, as Scotus wished. Therefore it would be pointless that they should first be assumed for producing species rather than intellections themselves.

Third, a species cannot be produced by the efficacy and power of the intellect alone without any cooperation of things and objects; for by the same reasoning someone could say that, with things and objects present, cognition is effected and there is no need of an impressed species by which the intellect is rendered potent in first act. Then also, in order that the agent intellect, which is of itself a common and indifferent power, be determined to the production of this or that species, it would need another particular cause or an instrument by which it would be determined: therefore of itself it would no more abstract this species than that one. But a particular cause or an instrument it would not have, as we suppose: therefore intelligible species cannot be abstracted by its power alone. You will say: it would be determined by the things themselves as by an object, or matter. This is surely impossible. For although an efficient cause may be determined by the subject, or matter, about which it operates, by reason of which it produces various effects, and a knowing faculty may also be determined by the object which it knows, nevertheless the agent intellect cannot be determined by things as by matter, because it does not operate upon them; nor as by an object, because they are not its object: therefore neither in this way can it be determined by them. By this reasoning it is proved that the Angel cannot receive species from things, and hence that there is not in the Angel an agent intellect. For if for any reason it ought to exist, it would be chiefly for the production of species; for to no other effect is it necessary, as we showed in disputation 198.

From what has been said it also follows that the opinion of Gabriel and Gregory, Ockham, and Bassolis is false, who assert that the things themselves existing outside the Angel's intellect are the efficient cause of the species in the angelic intellect.

Caput III - In what way the species which the Angel has were from the beginning inborn in his intellect

Likewise it is gathered that the claim of Scotus is false, namely that the intuitive cognition of singular things is proximate from the object, if he understands it to be from the object as from an efficient cause. But if he understands it to be from the object after the manner of a formal cause, bestowing the species and terminating the cognition, he ought to have said this of every cognition: therefore this would not be something peculiar to intuitive cognition.

Finally, I also judge false what Scotus asserts, that even if an Angel were to know future things, and through proper species and a concept according to the existence which they will have at the time when they are future, nonetheless, when those things are already present, his knowledge of them must be changed, so that what was abstractive would become intuitive, and that it must be derived from the things themselves. For he holds that abstractive and intuitive cognition differ according to substance. He defines intuitive cognition in Quodlibet 3, article 2, around the second question, and in the second book, distinction 3, question 9, in the section that begins "Secundo quaero...." To the question, he wishes intuitive cognition to be the knowledge of a thing as actually existing and present. Gabriel says the same in the first question of the Prologue, article 2, note 12. Therefore I judge this false. For if the Angel had proper knowledge of future things for that time, nothing of the presence of those very things would ever be changed in the cognition. That, when things are present, the cognition is changed, is for this reason, that previously he did not have any proper knowledge of them as they were to be future. But if such knowledge be had, certainly the presence of the thing would change nothing, as we said above in disputation 64, chapter 4, about an eye which would see in the absence of the object, as if it could be done: wherefore Maior rightly noted, in second distinction 3, question 10, that an intuitive knowledge of future things can be granted by God before they are present. But when in the same distinction, question 7, in the third proof of the conclusion, he says that something is changed in the cognition which the Angel previously had, when now he beholds the thing, he asserts this because he thinks that the Angel now does not have proper knowledge of future things before they exist.

In what way the Angel has these species inborn from the beginning in his intellect, among later Doctors there is a dissension of opinion. Some say that the species are, as it were, passions naturally proceeding from the essence: thus Cajetan, I - II, question 50, article 6, where he says that the Angel receives habits "from without" in a twofold way, in one way as an adventitious quality (such as supernatural habits), in another way as a quality congenite by the Author of nature, just as heaviness and lightness have their motions from the generator; and in this manner Angels have the intelligible species of things. But by "congenite quality" he does not understand "generated together with the Angel," for thus he would also think that grace and supernatural

habits were communicated to the Angels in this latter way; rather he understands a quality which they call connatural, and, as it were, a passion of the Angel himself, which he compares to the motion of heavy and light bodies, which also flows from the heavy and the light themselves. Capreolus asserts the same in the second distinction, question 2, article 3, in replying to Aureolus's argument against the third conclusion. And it seems to have been the view of the author of the Book of Causes, as proposed among Aristotle's works, proposition 10.[148814891490]

And this indeed can be confirmed by the reasoning set down in the preceding disputation: because, since the Angel's intellect has a natural power for understanding, it ought also to have either a species naturally conjoined from within, or some force by which it might be able to acquire it for itself; otherwise the faculty of understanding would be in vain, since from its natural principles it would not have whereby it could operate, unless from God alone it were freely to receive a species. Others, however, think that intelligible species do not arise from the nature of the Angel himself as from a natural efficient principle, but are infused by God alone and freely given; for if they flowed naturally from the intellect, or from the Angel's nature, there would be no greater reason on account of which he would have the species of those things which are future and not of possibles; but if of possibles, there would be no greater reason on account of which he would have these rather than other things, as we were inferring in the preceding disputation, chapter three; and that the Angel does not have the species of all possible things, indeed that he has only those of future things, is the common teaching, which St. Thomas sets forth below in question 56, article 2, reply to the fourth.[1491] Ferrariensis, however, who is cited for this latter opinion in Contra Gentiles, book II, chapter 96, seems rather to have followed the former. I for my part confess that, on either side, the matter is difficult, nor can the arguments of either side be fully satisfied. Yet it has seemed to me easier for understanding, that the Angel does not need species in order to understand, but by his own power alone is able to understand something by the very fact that it is contained within the bounds of his object. But what is placed within the breadth of that object will become clear from what follows.

Articulus III - Whether the higher Angels understand by more universal species than the lower

To the third, it proceeds thus. It seems that the higher Angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower. For to be universal seems to be what is abstracted from particulars. But Angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.

1488. Cajetan, In I - II, q. 50, a. 6, on two ways of receiving habits "from without."
1489. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 3, ad argumentum Aureoli contra tertiam conclusionem.
1490. Liber de causis, prop. 10, ascribed among Aristotle's works.
1491. St. Thomas, I, q. 56, a. 2, ad 4.

Further, what is known in the specific is known more perfectly than what is known in the universal: because to know something in common is, as it were, a mean between potency and act. If therefore the higher Angels know by more universal forms than the lower, it follows that the higher Angels have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower. Which is incongruous.

Further, the same cannot be the proper ratio of many. But if a higher Angel were to know different things by one universal form, which a lower Angel knows by many specific forms, it follows that the higher Angel would use one and the same form for different things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper cognition of each. Which seems inconvenient.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says, in the twelfth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, that the higher Angels participate in knowledge more universally than the lower. And in the Book of Causes it is said that the higher Angels have forms more universal.[1492][1493]

I answer that, from this it is that there are some things higher in reality, that they are nearer and more like to the One First, which is God. Now in God the whole fullness of intellectual cognition is contained in the One, namely in the divine essence, by which God knows all things. But that fullness of intelligibility is found in created intelligibles in an inferior mode and less simply. Hence it must be that the things which God knows through the One, lower intellects know through many, and the more through many the more the inferior intellect shall be. Thus therefore, the higher the Angel, the more through fewer species he will be able to apprehend the universality of intelligibles; and therefore it is necessary that his forms be more universal, as it were each one of them extending itself to more things. And of this an example can in some manner be seen clearly in us: for there are some who cannot grasp intelligible truth unless it be expounded to them in particular detail one by one, and this happens from the weakness of their intellect; others, however, who are of stronger intellect, are able to grasp many things from a few.

Reply to the first: It befalls the universal to be abstracted from singulars insofar as that intellect which knows receives its cognition from things. But if there be some intellect not receiving cognition from things, the universal known by one universal form will not be abstracted from things, but will in a certain manner pre-exist things: either according to the order of cause, as the universal reasons of things are in the Word of God; or at least according to the order of nature, as the universal reasons of things are in the angelic intellect.

Reply to the second: To know something universally is said in a twofold manner. In one way, on the part of the thing known, so that there is known only the universal nature of the thing. And thus to know something universally is imperfect. For he would know man imperfectly who would know of him only that he is an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of knowing. And thus it is more perfect to know something universally. For that intellect is more perfect which, through one universal medium, can know singulars properly, than that which cannot.

Reply to the third: The same cannot be the proper and adequate ratio of many. But if it be excellent, the same can be taken as the proper ratio and likeness of diverse things. Thus in man there is universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues, and it can be taken as the

1492. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, c. 12.

proper ratio and likeness of particular prudence which is in the lion for acts of magnanimity, and that which is in the fox for acts of caution, and so of the others. Similarly in the divine essence there is received, on account of its excellence, the proper ratio of singular things which are effects. Whence singular things are assimilated to it according to their proper ratios. And in the same way it must be said concerning the universal ratio which is in the Angel's mind, that by it, on account of its excellence, many things can be known by a proper cognition.

Conclusion: the higher Angels know the same things through fewer species.

Disputatio CCII

Caput I - Whether there can be one species, or quality, in Angels representing many things

That there is one species, or quality, in Angels representing many things, many authors have said; see chapter 2. That there are singular species of singular things was said by Scotus and others.

Since, with the common opinion, we suppose that the Angel understands through species, to see whether the higher understands through fewer, it is necessary first to examine whether one individual species of many things can be; in which difficulty the prior opinion is that of those asserting that one and the same species cannot be of many things. Thus taught Scotus on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 10, in the sections "Ista propositio" and "Ad quaestionem"; Bassolis, question 3; another opinion is in Richard, article 6, question e, in the second argument "Sed contra"; Maior, question 6, conclusion 2.[1494] And since the aforesaid authors think that the species of all natures were from the beginning inborn in the Angel, but that, in the course of time, the species of individuals and singulars are taken from the things themselves, they teach that the singular species of singular natures and of singular individuals are in the Angel.

They prove, first, because from the opposite sentence it would follow that infinite things could be represented by a single species: for now, in the highest Angel, either there is one species representing all the possible natures different in species, or at least many of them; therefore that species could represent all the natures of the lower species; but these are infinite, because under any species infinitely many others can be made: therefore one species could represent infinite things. Likewise about individuals one can argue thus: if there is some intelligible species representing the nature itself, and some individuals of it, it will be able to represent infinite individuals. Moreover, that infinite individuals, whether of the same nature, or of natures of the same genus, cannot be represented by the same species, Scotus proves, because where a plurality according to number requires greater perfection, an infinity according to number will require

1493. Liber de causis, on higher Angels having more universal forms.

1494. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 10, §§ "Ista propositio" and "Ad quaestionem"; Bassolis, q. 3; Richard, art. 6, quaest. e, in 2, argumento "Sed contra"; Maior, quaest. 6, conclusio 2.

infinite perfection: for if, that someone carry so many pounds, it is necessary he have strength so great that he can carry infinite, it is necessary he have infinite strength; add that if there were one species representing infinite individuals, the Angel could by his own power understand all at once.

Therefore the conclusion is that the higher Angels know the same things through fewer species.

Whether there can be one species of many things.

Singular species of singular things were said by Scotus and others, in chapter 1.

Secondly Scotus proves that one quality cannot represent many, by this argument: a single ratio of knowing has one adequate object under which the rest are included; but one species, or quality, cannot have one adequate object containing the rest under itself, if through it all creatures are represented, as some affirm: therefore neither can there be one species of all creatures, nor one habit for understanding all created things, as Henry asserted, can there be.

Thirdly, nothing is a principle of knowing another unless it be the ratio of that thing, or contain its ratio; but one species cannot be of this sort, because it cannot contain in itself the ratios of so many natures; therefore it cannot be a principle of knowing many.

Fourthly, the same cannot be assimilated to many different things among themselves; therefore one quality cannot be the likeness and species of so various natures.

One species, or quality, in Angels representing many things, many authors have said.

Caput II - The more common and truer opinion: that one and the same numerically species can represent many diverse things, and that such species were granted to Angels

A still more common and truer opinion is that which teaches that one and the same numerically species can represent many diverse things, and that species of this sort were granted to Angels. The authors of this opinion were Albert in the book On the Four Co-causes, part 1, quaest. 5, art. 12, after the middle; Aegidius in the Second Book, dist. 3, second part of the distinction; Capreolus in II Sent., quaest. 2, art. 2, dub. 3 and 4, and quaest. 2, art. 1, concl. 7, and art. 3, to the arguments of Scotus against that conclusion; Thomas of Argentina, quaest. 2, art. 4, in the second part of the article, in the conclusion; the Ferrariense, II Contra gentes, cap. 98, § Tertia conclusio; Henry also in Quodlibet V, quaest. 14; St. Bonaventure likewise in the same distinction, in the third part of the distinction, article 2, question 1, to the third, where he admits that by one species the specific nature and all the individuals are known. The principal foundation of this opinion is of this sort: if there is no manifest contradiction, there is no reason why we should say it cannot be done, namely, that by one quality and species many things are represented; and if it can be done, we ought not deny it to an Angel, that which is of greater perfection, as Henry asserted, so that, the more perfect the Angels are, the fewer species they may understand by. For although this reasoning does not prove that it is necessary, nevertheless it shows it to be most congruous and fitting to the most perfect spiritual nature.

Moreover, that what we have said does not imply a contradiction will clearly appear if we dissolve the arguments of Scotus. By doing so, we shall also remove the foundations of that opinion. The first argument was that it would follow that by one species infinite natures could be represented. I answer, however, first, that although we concede that by one quality many natures can be represented, it does not therefore follow that infinite natures can be represented; because although it represents three or four, it does not follow that it can represent all the possible inferior natures, which Scotus says are infinite; for a species can be adequate to three or four natures, so as to represent them only: but it would follow that it can represent infinite inferiors, if from the very fact that it represents a superior, it represented an inferior; which does not happen.

Secondly, I say, it is not established whether there are infinite possible species toward the lowest, as we noted above in Disputatio 106, cap. 4; nor would anything absurd follow if we were to say that toward that side there are infinite possibles. Thirdly, for now I declare that it is not impossible that by one created quality and finite according to essence there be represented infinite natures of things specifically diverse, or individuals of the same nature. For just as by one species, or created quality, God is represented, who is infinite according to essence - namely, either by the light of glory, or by an impressed species, which can come to be, or by the very vision, which is an expressed representation, all of which are deduced from what was said above in the whole of question 12 - so too it does not imply a contradiction that by one simple quality there be represented an infinite multitude either of individuals in the same nature, or of diverse natures.

And if you press this by reasoning that, in order that a quality represent one nature, some perfection is required; in order that it represent two, a greater is required; therefore, in order that it represent infinities, an infinite is required, which cannot occur: I answer that by this form of arguing one only gathers an infinite increase whenever the increase is univocal in the same form according to the intensity or extension of quantity. But if the increase occurs in a different nature, certainly it does not follow; rather this alone is finally gathered, that for representing an infinite multitude a species of a different nature, or property, is required - which we do not deny, as I also showed above, Disput. 50, cap. 5. I said, of a different nature or property; because even if we did not say that they are of a different nature according to species, it would suffice to say that it is numerically different from that which represents finite things, but has a different mode; although this would have to be understood of a species which would represent infinite individuals of the same nature.

Also what I added to the first argument proves little: because although some intelligible species represented infinite things, it would not be possible to conclude that it is of infinite perfection, as is clear from what has been said. And indeed it does not repugn that things actually infinite be known at once, as we showed above, Disput. 49. Moreover, even if one granted a species actually infinite, representing in first act, it would not therefore have to be conceded that all those things could at once be known in act. For the representation of that species would not be of such a nature that, as if in a mirror, all things would be seen in it. For neither does the intellect, as it were, turn directly to the intelligible species and behold in it the things that are said to be represented in it; rather that species would be said to represent things in first act, or, as others speak, by the mode of a habit

(*habitus*), because it would be a principle with the intellect for eliciting the cognition of singulars, and thus would be distinguished from the very word or cognition, for a word or cognition is, as it were, an actual representation; but a species would be, as it were, habitual: and since the cooperation of the intellect with the species is limited, hence it happens that an impressed species represents more things by the mode of a habit than the intellect actually knows by it. Cajetan nevertheless concedes in this article that an Angel can by one species (*species intelligibilis*) understand many things at once, but not all. Whether truly he can understand all or not, we cannot so easily define. This, however, is certain, that only so great a number of things can be understood together as the power of the intellect to use the species permits.

The second argument for Scotus's opinion was that one species ought to have one adequate object, etc. I answer that it is not necessary that one species have one adequate object according to some univocal ratio; but as an adequate object there can be that whole multitude of things which are represented by the species, just as sight has as its object color and light, which do not agree in one adequate and univocal ratio, as we noted above, Disputatio 7, cap. 5. The same holds for being (ens), which according to the whole latitude of its analogy is the object of the intellect. Wherefore I do not see why Cajetan should concede in this article that, with respect to any intelligible species, there is one formal ratio of the adequate object in which all the things that are represented by that species agree. He does, however, very well teach that there is one object which is chief among the rest and containing them - something Capreolus had also said in article 3 cited in the solution to Scotus's first argument, against the seventh conclusion. Wherefore the Ferrariense, II Contra gentes, cap. 98, § Ad evidentiam eorum, plainly asserts that there can be one species representing many things which do not agree in one adequate ratio; and then, Ad huius, he merely affirms that it can also happen that many objects represented by one species agree in one common ratio - which we do not deny. Furthermore, although we were to concede that the many things which are represented by one species ought to agree in one common ratio, the argument of Scotus would prove only against Henry that there cannot be one species, or quality, with respect to all intelligible things; because all cannot agree in one common ratio. But the foregoing reasoning certainly does not prove that many things cannot be represented by the same species, because many could agree in one common ratio.

The third argument of Scotus also proves nothing: for one and the same can be a ratio of knowing another in a twofold manner. First, insofar as it is known before; and in this way Scotus rightly teaches that that, by which another is known, ought to be either by the ratio of that thing, or formally contain that thing; but in this way the species is not the ratio of knowing the object which it represents, because it contains neither the object, nor anything else, formally in itself. Then, one thing is the ratio of knowing another not previously known, to wit, as the species of that thing, insofar as it is a principle for eliciting the cognition of that thing, or insofar as it is the very actual representation of the cognition; and in this way it ought not formally to have in itself that which makes the thing be known, nor ought it to be the ratio of that thing, but it is enough if it represent it. Wherefore, even if one species, expressed or impressed, be of many things, it does not follow

that it formally contain in itself the ratios of diverse things, or be the same formal ratio of them; and this, moreover, is manifest in every opinion. For who would say that the species of man is a man, or of the same ratio with man? - and so of the rest.

Hence also the reason adduced in the fourth place for the confirmation of the prior opinion is solved. For in two ways can one thing be the likeness (*similitudo*) of another: in one way by a quality or a form of the same ratio, which is said to be the likeness of the second genus of relation, such as exists between two whites; in another way one and the same can be the likeness of another, although they be altogether of diverse natures, for this sole reason, that the one represents the other, by cognition, to be sure, or by a principle of cognition. In the first way it repugns that one quality, or form, be assimilated to many; and thus it repugns that one likeness bear the similarity of many things, since the same cannot have the same quality, or form, as the form and quality of many. In the latter way it does not repugn that the same quality be a likeness of many: because the same quality can represent many things either actually, as an expressed species, or habitually, as an impressed one, since this representation is not according to an identity in form.

Disputatio CCIII - Whether, the higher an Angel is, the more he understands by fewer species

Scotus and Bassolis thought that higher Angels do not understand by fewer species.

- Thomists said that the higher Angels, not only by hierarchy and order, but also by nature, understand by fewer species.
- Two other Scholastic opinions.
- What ought to be judged in this matter.

Caput I - Scotus and Bassolis deny that higher Angels understand by fewer and more universal species

There are certain Scholastic positions in the present controversy, although none of them rests upon any certain foundation. I will therefore set them forth one by one, and finally will show that nothing certain can be defined in this matter. The first opinion is that of Scotus and Bassolis in the places cited in the preceding doubt, who affirm that higher Angels do not understand by fewer and more universal species; and the same must be asserted by Richard, who holds that by one species many cannot be represented. They are also brought forward for this opinion, all who said that Angels receive species from things - although, from their very position, it does not follow; for they only said that the species of singular things and of future things are received from things, and that of those which Angels do not know from the beginning; yet they conceded that there were connate to Angels the species of those natures which they know from the start, among which they could have thought that some are universal, namely in respect of thought, or of a principle of cognition. The foundation of this opinion can be nothing else except that by one and the same quality many

cannot be represented. For if they can, I do not see by what certain reason it can be denied that higher Angels understand by fewer species. Moreover, since in the preceding disputation it was shown that by the same quality many individuals can be represented at once, I do not see anything to stand in the way whereby superiors should not understand by fewer species. Whether, however, some reason also demonstrates that this is so, we will say below.

Angels superior not only in hierarchy and order, but also by nature, understand by fewer species, the Thomists said.

Caput II - Thomists affirm that higher Angels understand by fewer species

The opinion common among the Thomists is that which St. Thomas indicated in this article in the reasoning of his conclusion, and which Cajetan and more recent theologians plainly follow. [1495]

Many theologians in this article, and Capreolus in the second book, distinction 3, question 2, article 1, the eighth conclusion, hold that Angels not only by higher hierarchy and order, but also by a more excellent nature within the same hierarchy and order understand by fewer species; and they confirm this opinion from Pseudo-Dionysius, chapter 12 On the Celestial Hierarchy, where he says that the higher Angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower; and from the Book of Causes, cited under Aristotle, where in the tenth proposition this opinion is expressed. And finally by reason: for either one must say that all Angels have equally universal species, which seems false, since the more perfect Angel ought to understand more perfectly than the inferior, and therefore by more universal species; or, if some ought to have more universal species than others, they ought to be superior not only in order and hierarchy, but also in nature. And this is likewise confirmed by the reasoning of St. Thomas: for, the more perfect any intellectual nature is, the more it is like God in the mode of knowing and in the perfection of intellection; but the perfection of intellection chiefly consists in this, that by one simple essence diverse things be known; therefore the perfection of an Angel will also consist in this, that by fewer species he understand more things.[1496]

Cajetan furthermore adds that this is so true that the highest Angel, who now exists, by one single species understands all the things that by his natural power he can know.

Judgment on the preceding opinion. So far as concerns the earlier part of this opinion, it contains nothing absurd; yet it does not rest on any firm reasoning. First, because it is not sufficiently certain whether all Angels differ in species, as I discussed in Disputation 181 and proved. But if Angels do not differ in species, it cannot be certain that Angels more perfect according to the degree of individual nature should understand by fewer or by more perfect species. If, however, we concede that individual Angels differ in species, it still does not follow that more perfect Angels understand by more perfect and fewer species: for either such species are

1495. Albert the Great, De quatuor coaequaevis, part 1, quaest. 5, art. 12; Aegidius of Rome, In II Sent., dist. 3, second part of the distinction; Capreolus, In II Sent., quaest. 2, art. 2, dub. 3 - 4; quaest. 2, art. 1, concl. 7; art. 3, ad argumenta Scoti; Thomas of Argentina, quaest. 2, art. 4, in the second part of the article, in the conclusion; Ferrariense, II Contra gentes, cap. 98, § Tertia conclusio; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, quaest. 14; St. Bonaventure, in the same distinction, second part of the distinction, article 2, quaest. 1, ad tertium.

1496. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, quaest. 2, art. 1, concl. 8.

communicated to Angels solely by the will of God, and then who could know whether different species, or species of the same kind, have been granted to individual Angels? For that Angels of a more perfect nature understand more perfectly does not of necessity proceed from more perfect intelligible species; for a more perfect intellect with an equal species understands more perfectly than an inferior.

But the later part, which Cajetan added, is very well refuted on this sole ground, that he asserted it without any foundation or reason. First, because there is no one who could rightly measure the proportion which one Angel bears to another with respect to all intelligible things, so as from that to infer that the supreme Angel in that proportion so exceeds the rest as to embrace all intelligibles by only one species, which others understand by many species. Next, because by that reasoning we ought to assert that the supreme Angel by his own power could, whenever he wished, contemplate all things by a single intuition; which seems so difficult that it is not to be affirmed without great foundation and reason. Furthermore, if another Angel superior to the one who is now supreme were created, then, according to Cajetan's opinion, he would have to be of another species; therefore he ought to understand by fewer species than he who is now supreme; and yet he could not understand by fewer than by one; therefore it is not to be said that the supreme Angel who now is understands all things by only one species. Cajetan replies that in that case a certain new species would have to be added to each of the inferior Angels by which they would know; but that in the absolutely highest there would be one species only, by which he would know all things; whereas in him who before was supreme, there would remain one species with respect to all the things inferior to him, both spiritual and corporeal, and another would have to be added to him by which he might know the Angel then created superior to himself. But this is no less a fiction and fabricated at Cajetan's pleasure. By what reasoning could anyone commend such a division of species? Moreover, if the Angel who is now supreme knows all things inferior to himself, both spiritual and corporeal, by a single species, and only a new species would be added to him, that he might understand him who is superior, by the same reasoning we ought to say the same of the rest who now exist, namely, that by one single species they understand both all corporeal things and spiritual things inferior to themselves, and that species are multiplied in them only that they may know superiors. Wherefore, the more someone is superior, the less will he understand material and spiritual things below himself by fewer species, as this opinion seems to assert, so that in this respect the superior Angel is more like God. But if with respect to these things it is not fitting to assign to the superior Angel fewer species, neither will it be fitting with respect to other things. Read Aegidius in the place to be cited in the next chapter, who at length pursues how it is not necessary that the supreme Angel understand by one species only, even if Angels who are higher understand by fewer species than those who are inferior.[1497]

From what we have said it is evident that it is not necessary that the greater perfection of an Angel resemble God in this, that he understand all things by fewer intelligible species than an inferior; but it is enough if he understand them more perfectly. As for the testimony of Pseudo-Dionysius, if it be rightly inspected, it proves nothing: for he only maintains that the knowledge of

1497. Aegidius of Rome, In II Sent., dist. 3, part 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

more things inheres in the higher Angels themselves, and this is what he said, that their knowledge is more universal. The words of Pseudo-Dionysius according to the translation of Perionius are: "The order of the holy Cherubim is a partaker of higher wisdom and knowledge; but the orders of those essences which are subjected to them are also themselves partakers of wisdom and knowledge; yet they are a part which is with respect to those who hold the higher place." Therefore Dionysius wishes to teach that the lower Angels know fewer things, and for this reason called their knowledge a "part" of the knowledge of the higher Angels, which the ancients called particular knowledge.

But concerning the species which the Scholastics attribute to Angels as the principle of knowledge, Pseudo-Dionysius indeed has not a word. I confess, however, that that Book of Causes had the mind to assert that higher Angels understand by fewer species; yet that book is of lesser authority for confirming and establishing the opinion of the Thomists, for it is not Aristotle's, but either Proclus's, or Avempace's, or Alfarabi's.[1498] Of another testimony of Pseudo-Dionysius, which is thought to favor this opinion, we shall speak in the last chapter.

Caput III - Two other Scholastic opinions

The third opinion is of those who say that Angels of a higher order understand by fewer species than Angels of a lower order; yet Angels of the same order, even if they differ in species, have altogether the same species of things, and differ only among themselves in that Angels of a superior nature within the same order understand more perfectly the same things by the same species, because they are of a more perfect intellect. Aegidius defends this opinion as probable in the second book, distinction 3, part 2, question 2, article 2, to the fourth doubt; but Ferrariense expressly embraces it in Contra gentiles, book 2, chapter 98, near the conclusion. Herveus likewise favors it in that distinction 3, question 4, article 4, where he asserts that all Angels who agree in the same proximate genus have equal intelligible species; and thus, the higher they are in genus, they have fewer intelligible species, yet not, however, the higher they are in nature according to species. Whether indeed all who agree in the same proximate genus are of the same order he does not explain. Moreover, in any Angel of a more perfect nature even according to species he grants clearer intelligible species than in another of an inferior nature.[1497][1499][1500]

Ferrariense confirms this opinion, first from Pseudo-Dionysius, chapter 12 On the Celestial Hierarchy. Then, because we see many brute animals diverse according to species; among which those that are more perfect do not have fewer sense-faculties: therefore, by the same reasoning, it is not necessary among Angels that, the more perfect they are in nature, the fewer be the intelligible species; which reason he seems to have drawn from Aegidius.

1498. Liber de causis, attributed in the schools under Aristotle's name; in the tenth proposition this opinion is expressed; the work is commonly ascribed to Proclus, Avempace, or Alfarabi.

1497. Aegidius of Rome, In II Sent., dist. 3, part 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

1499. Ferrariense (Franciscus de Ferrara), II Contra gentiles, cap. 98, circa conclusionem.

1500. Herveus Natalis, that same distinction 3, q. 4, art. 4.

But by the same reasoning it could be proved, that neither in Angels of a higher order ought there to be fewer species; and the testimony of Pseudo-Dionysius scarcely proves anything, as we showed above; wherefore this opinion too of Ferrariense has no firm foundation.

The fourth opinion is that of Henry, Quodlibet 5, question 14, who says that Angels understand all things by one quality or habit. He supposes, indeed, as Scotus affirms, that if intelligible species are posited in an Angel, they would be as many as are the objects; but he denies multiple species in an Angel, and concedes only one habit: because, if there were many intelligible species, they would simultaneously move the Angel's intellection to understand all objects; for if in us the many species which we have were to move the intellect all at once, we would at the same time be understanding all the diverse things to which they are ordered; but since intellection is determined to one here and now, there must be in an Angel not a multitude of distinct species, but a single cognitive habit, from which, as from a primary form, the Angel directs himself, according to the order of objects, now to one intellection, now to another.[1501]

Caput IV - The fourth opinion (Henry of Ghent)

But by the same line of reasoning it could also be proved that neither in Angels of a higher order ought there to be fewer species; nor does the testimony of Dionysius, which proves little, avail here, as was shown above: therefore this opinion of Ferrariense likewise has no firm foundation.

The fourth opinion is that of Henry in Quodlibet 5, question 14, who teaches that any Angel whatsoever understands all things through one quality or habit, not through many species; although he affirms that that habit can in a certain manner be called a species. He presupposes what Scotus asserted, that, if intelligible species were given in an Angel, there would be as many as there are objects to be known; but he denies that there are many species in an Angel and concedes only one habit: because, if there were many intelligible species, they would simultaneously move the Angel's intellect to understand all objects. For if in us the many species which we have do not do this, but now we are moved to one object, later to another, the reason is manifest: since we also need sense for understanding, and sense is not moved all at once to all things, but now to one, then to another object, neither, therefore, is the intellect moved all at once to all things; but this has no place in Angels. If, however, one habit be posited in individual Angels, which Henry calls the habit of knowledge, the aforesaid inconvenience does not follow, because that habit inclines first to one primary object, and then to the rest; nevertheless, this author does not show what that primary object is, nor how afterwards the Angel is moved successively, and not at once, to the rest.

Refutation. Yet I for my part do not see why Henry does not concede many species to Angels, and attribute to them only one habit. For granted that an Angel have many species of many things, nevertheless he is not thereby determined to a first cognition: not to a first, I say, only that which he had at the beginning of creation; but to that from which he begins to set some kind of business in motion in such wise that that cognition did not arise from another, as happens in us; but to this he is determined by God, as we shall say below in Disputation 212, question 9, article 10, last, and

1501. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 14.

as Aristotle teaches in the seventh book to Eudemus near the end, where he said that our first cognition is from fortune, yet supported, instructed, and directed by divine aid.[1502] It is also difficult to show how from one habit an Angel is determined to this object rather than to another, or to another object than to this, unless he be determined by some other cause than by that habit alone; in Angels of a higher order, as we were often saying against the same Henry, there would have to be fewer species; yet in truth we were saying that on this reasoning one ought not to deny more species to an Angel.

What is to be held in this matter

But what is to be thought in this matter.

I for my part judge that this matter is so far removed from human sense and reason that we can establish nothing certain about it, not only by some sure and manifest reasoning, but not even by a probable conjecture. For although in one or another way of philosophizing we cannot detect a manifest contradiction, nevertheless on that account we ought not to assert that species exist in Angels in this or that manner, unless we are induced to it by some other reason. But I consider that this reason is not sufficient to procure that we should philosophize in this way rather than in that. Wherefore, in a matter so removed from sense and human philosophy, it is more fitting to affirm nothing than to assert something without a sure reason. Therefore I pass over many other things which recent Theologians, each in defense of his own opinion, have invented from their own sense; for they divide species in Angels as they please.

But someone will object to us again with Dionysius, in the last chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy before the middle, where he seems to assert that higher Angels understand by fewer species: for as he sets forth how the individual members of our body are in some likeness and metaphor attributed to Angels, about the teeth he says that they divide nourishment for digestion: "For each nature that has mind receives one intelligible understanding handed down by a more divine nature, and with a certain power, whereby it exercises care over others by nature, it divides and amplifies it according to the capacity and guidance of the inferior. If, therefore, the higher Angel distributes into many concepts to the inferior that which he himself had understood by one most simple concept, so that he may adapt what he knows to the capacity of the inferior, it is a sign that the higher understands through fewer species than the lower."

I answer that Dionysius is not speaking about the knowledge of things which a higher and a lower angel knew naturally - as if he thought that the lower Angel understands through more species - but he is speaking about those things which higher Angels know solely by divine revelation, and he says that these are known by the higher by one most perfect concept, and are distributed to the lower into many, that each according to his capacity may understand them better. Of these mysteries there are no proper species in an Angel. But if the discourse be about natural things, since any Angel whatsoever naturally knows them as they are, it cannot be that the

1502. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, book 7, near the end. See also Vázquez's own Disputation 212, question 9, article 10, last.

higher ought to divide them into more concepts so as to hand them on to the lower to be better understood. Wherefore below, Disputation 217, chapter 1, by the same reasoning we shall show that lower Angels cannot be illuminated by higher in those things which each of them naturally knows, but only in those which they receive by divine revelation.[1503]

Quaestio LVI - On the knowledge of Angels on the part of immaterial things

Hence there is inquiry about the knowledge of Angels on the part of the things which they know. And first, about the knowledge of immaterial things. Secondly, about the knowledge of material things.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether an Angel knows himself

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that an Angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says, in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 6, that Angels are ignorant of their proper powers. But once the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an Angel does not know his own essence.[1504]

1. Further, an Angel is a certain singular substance; otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to singular subsistents. But no singular is intelligible. Therefore it cannot be understood. And thus, since there is in an Angel only intellectual cognition, no Angel will be able to know himself.
2. Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible; for to understand is a kind of being-passive, as is said in On the Soul III. But nothing is moved or suffers from itself, as is clear in corporeal things. Therefore an Angel cannot understand himself.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 2, that the Angel, in his very confirmation - that is, in the illumination of truth - knew himself.[1505]

I answer that, as is evident from what has been said above, the object stands differently in an action which remains in the agent and in an action which passes into something external. For in an action which passes into something external, the object, insofar as the act passes to it, is separated from the agent, as the heated from the heater, and the edified from the builder. But in an action which remains in the agent, it must be the case, for the action to proceed, that the object be united to the agent; just as it is necessary that the sensible be united to the sense in order that it sense actually; and thus the object, as united to the power for such an action, stands as a form which is the principle of action in other agents. For just as heat is the formal principle of heating in fire, so the species of the thing seen is the formal principle of vision in the eye. But it must be considered that the species of the object of this sort is sometimes only in potency in the cognitive power, and

1503. Below, Disputation 217, chapter 1.
1504. Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 6.
1505. St. Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 2.

then it is only a knower in potency; and for it to know actually, it is required that the cognitive power be reduced to act by the species. But if it have it always in act, nevertheless through it it can know without any preceding change or reception. Whence it is clear that to be moved by the object is not of the notion of the knower insofar as it is a knower, but insofar as it is a cognitive potency. Nor does it make any difference for this, that the form be the principle of action, whether the form itself be at some time inherent, or be of itself subsistent. For heat would not heat less if it were subsistent of itself than it heats when it is inherent. So too, therefore, if something in the genus of intelligibles stand as a subsistent intelligible form, it understands itself. But an Angel, since he is immaterial, is a certain subsistent form, and by this he is actually intelligible. Whence it follows that by his own form, which is his own substance, he understands himself.

Reply to the first: That text is from the ancient translation, which is corrected by the new, in which it is said: "Moreover even they, namely the Angels, knew their proper powers," in place of which in the other translation there had stood: "and even these are ignorant of their proper powers." Yet the letter of the ancient translation can be saved as to this, that Angels do not perfectly know their power insofar as it proceeds according to the order of the divine wisdom, which is incomprehensible to Angels.

Reply to the second: It is not because of singularity that there is no intellection of singulars among us in things corporeal, but because of matter, which is in them the principle of individuation. Whence, if some singulars subsist without matter, as Angels do, nothing prevents their being actually intelligible.

Reply to the third: To be moved and to suffer belong to the intellect insofar as it is in potency. Whence this has no place in the angelic intellect, especially as regards that by which he understands himself. For the act of the intellect is not of the same notion as the action which in corporeal things is found to pass over into external matter.

Conclusion: An Angel knows himself by his own substance.

- Opinion of Scotus and others, cap. 1: That an Angel understands himself by his essence is the truer opinion, but not understood in the same way by all. cap. 2.
- Opinion of Scotus and others.

In the present controversy there is no difficulty whether an Angel understands himself. For who is ignorant of himself? nor is there any doubt whether the cognition by which an Angel knows himself is an operation distinct from the substance of the Angel; for about this we have already treated above in Disputation 198. The present question, therefore, is set in expounding the mode by which an Angel has cognition of himself - namely, whether a species or quality added to the intellect is the principle of the cognition of himself, or whether his very substance moves the intellect without any species of himself.

In this difficulty the first opinion is that of Scotus,[1506] Distinction 3, question 10, at the end, because he asserts that an Angel knows himself in two ways: first, by the knowledge which he calls intuitive of the thing as it is; and in this way he understands himself through his very essence without another intelligible species of himself; then by the knowledge which they call abstractive, which is a certain inferior cognition; and in this manner he knows himself through a certain intelligible species added to his intellect. The same is taught by Maior in the same Distinction, question 4, the single conclusion, and in the solution of the third argument; by Bassolis in question 3, to the second argument; and Gabriel seems to agree in the same Distinction, question 2, article 3, conclusion 10; for with Scotus, question 8 of that Distinction, he says that when he says that an Angel understands himself through his essence, he understands it of the knowledge which they call intuitive.[1507] Scotus leaves the former part of this opinion - namely, that an Angel can know himself through his essence by that intuitive knowledge - as known and manifest. But the latter - namely, that an Angel can also understand himself by that abstractive knowledge and through a species, which is more difficult - he proves by this reasoning: Every cognition which, in its kind, is imperfect and befits a superior Angel, can also befit an inferior; for it cannot be that to the superior, who is more perfect, an imperfect cognition befit, but not to the inferior; but the superior Angel...

Caput II - The common sentence: that an angel understands himself through his essence without any added species as a principle of understanding

But if you ask for what a species of himself is required in an Angel, since he is present to himself: Bassolis answers that a species is given on account of that abstractive and imperfect knowledge.

Impugned. But, leaving aside this opinion, as to its former part, of which we must speak below: as to the latter part, it is not approved by me. For either abstractive cognition is called by Scotus the knowledge of a thing through alien species, such as we have when we know a thing in the likeness of another and not as it is; or abstractive is called the knowledge of a thing not existing, even if it be through a proper species and concept, such as is the knowledge of a rose in winter: but in neither way can an Angel understand himself by abstractive knowledge. Not in the first way, because an Angel does not know himself through species and concepts of other things, that is, he does not know himself after the manner of other things, as we conceive spiritual things after the manner of corporeal things; for he has a proper and quidditative concept of himself; nor does he shape himself after the manner of any other thing: for if he did not know himself by a proper and quidditative concept, he could not know anything else in that way. Not in the latter way, for when he understands himself, he understands not only himself according to essence, but also himself according to existence; nor can he so consider himself as to understand himself without his existence. The Doctors of this opinion seem indeed to concede in the Angel this abstractive

1506. Scotus, In II Sent., Dist. 3, q. 10, ad quaestionem in fine.

1507. John Maior, In II Sent., Dist. 3, q. 4, conclusio unica, and in the solution of the third argument; Bassolis, q. 3, ad secundum argumentum; Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., Dist. 3, q. 2, art. 3, conclusio 10; and cf. Scotus, the same Distinction, q. 8.

knowledge of himself, yet through a proper species. For who would say that an Angel understands himself through the species and concepts of other things? But by the foregoing reason it has been proved that it cannot be that an Angel have this abstractive knowledge of himself in this way: because existence is so manifest to him that no knowledge of himself can be had by the Angel without considering his existence.

Objection. Yet someone will say that nothing hinders the Angel from having abstractive knowledge of himself together with intuitive knowledge, just as the blessed know all created things by a proper and quidditative knowledge, that is, through the proper species and concepts of things, and at the same time by an abstractive knowledge, that is, through alien species and concepts of other things.

Answer: In the case of man the ratio is different: because he, by the ministry of the senses, receives the species by which he understands all things; and these he retains as his own proper work; in beatitude he understands by them, even if a quidditative cognition of things be communicated to him by God through the proper species of things. But the Angel, since by his nature he has a proper knowledge of himself, it does not seem by what reason the same nature should communicate to him that imperfect intellection through alien species with respect to those things which he naturally knows by a proper concept. And although we should concede that one Angel can know other things - even spiritual ones - through alien concepts, nevertheless it could not be said that he knows himself after the manner of some other thing: since by his nature he understands himself perfectly and by a quidditative concept. Wherefore also the authors of this opinion do not strive to attribute to the Angel this imperfect knowledge of himself, which they do not call abstractive but quidditative and proper; yet in such wise that he understand only himself as to essence, with no consideration at all of his existence: which we have already noted above cannot be done. In neither way, therefore, can we say that the Angel knows himself by abstractive knowledge; and so for this effect it is not necessary to grant him an intelligible species of himself.

That an Angel understands himself through his essence (*essentia*) is the truer sentence, but it is not understood in the same way by all.

Common is the sentence among the Scholastics that an Angel understands himself through his essence without any other species added as a principle of understanding. Thus they teach with St. Thomas in this article, Cajetan and more recent Thomists, and the Ferrariensis; and the same holy Doctor in the same book, Against the Gentiles, chapter 98; and the Ferrariensis there as well, "Quantum ad secundum," and in what follows; Richard in the Second, distinction 3, article 6, question 1; Thomas of Argentina in the same distinction, question 2, article 4, in the first part of the article, the first conclusion; Capreolus in question 2, article 1, the fifth conclusion; and Henry too in Quodlibet I, question 12, when he asserts that the separated soul understands by its essence without any other species; concerning angels, and concerning creatures separated from matter universally, he taught the same in Quodlibet IV, question 7. But what in Quodlibet V, question 14 he said - that angels know by a certain habit added to the power of understanding with respect to other objects which are outside the angel - hence falsely did Scotus in the place alleged think Henry to have been in the same sentence as to assert that an angel cannot understand himself without a

certain habit added to the intelligent faculty: whereas in truth Henry only said that a habit is necessary for understanding other objects, not, however, for understanding himself, as is manifest from the places cited above. Lastly, this sentence which we have hitherto reported seems to be presupposed as probable by St. Bonaventure in II, distinction 3, second part, article of the distinction 2, question 1. Yet they do not all explain it in the same way.[1508]

Some understand it thus, that the angel's substance and essence is per se intelligible by the angelic intellect without any other species of itself, not because it moves efficiently to elicit its vision, as an intelligible species does with the intellect, but because the intellect of the angel by its apt nature is sufficiently in first act to elicit the intellection of the substance and essence of itself; and the substance of the angel of itself is sufficiently intelligible and present, so as to terminate the act of intellection. This mode of explaining the aforesaid opinion is commonly attributed to Cajetan; but in my judgment he did not so teach; I will report his mode below. From this, however, which we have set down as common, it follows that intelligible species are not necessary for understanding other material objects, or even spiritual ones; but that the intellect is of itself powerful and in first act for understanding all intelligibles: for since all things are of themselves intelligible to the angelic intellect, that is, they have of themselves the ratio of object, just as the angel's essence has with respect to the intellect of that same angel, nothing seems to hinder that, without a species of them, they be understood by the angel, if the essence of the angel himself is rightly understood by him. For the essence of the angel, which is an intelligible object, according to this opinion does not in any way concur with the power by way of a principle. That the remaining objects are not conjoined with the intellect of the angel matters little; for conjunction according to place, or any other conjunction whatsoever of the object with the power, seems necessary only for this, that the object concur with the power by way of a principle to intellection. Wherefore, in this opinion, it does not approve itself to me, what he says, namely, that therefore the essence of the angel, which is of itself intelligible, is known by the angel himself because it is present and conjoined to the intellect, as if that presence contributed anything, once it is conceded that the object does not concur with the intellect to intellection by way of a principle. Yet that which seems to follow from it - namely, that species of other things are not necessary in order that they be understood by the angel - I do not think absurd in an angel, as above in Disputation 200, chapter 3, I noted. And if our intellect in this life understands the essence of our soul through species, this is not a wonder: because the mode of understanding which befits us in this life is with the aid and ministry of the senses; and therefore we need species received from the senses out of corporeal things, by which we understand all spiritual things and our soul after the manner of corporeal things. But if our intellect did not depend upon the senses in its mode of understanding, it would understand the substance of our soul and other things without species, like the angels.

1508. St. Thomas, in this article of I, q. 56; Cajetan (on I, q. 56); Ferrariensis; St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, c. 98; Richard of Middleton, In II Sent., dist. 3, art. 6, q. 1; Thomas de Argentina, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, art. 4, pars prior, conclusio prima; Capreolus, In II Sent., q. 2, art. 1, conclusio quinta; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. 12; Quodlibet IV, q. 7; Quodlibet V, q. 14.

Others, however, explain and defend the aforesaid sentence in another way. They say, therefore, that the very substance of the angel stands in the place and stead of a species for eliciting intellection by way of the proximate principle, and is not only a common cause in the manner in which it concurs to other operations of the angel himself. This mode of philosophizing I judge to have been Cajetan's in this article; the Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles, chapter 98, to the evidence which Aegidius had taught earlier in II, distinction 3, part 2, question 2, article 1, in the body, and in the little work On the Knowledge of Angels, question 3; and Capreolus in the same distinction, question 2, article 3, in the solution to the arguments against the fifth conclusion; and commonly the Thomists follow it.[1509]

Their single reason is of this sort: Species are therefore posited in the place of objects in a knowing power, in order that, conjoined with the faculty itself, they may constitute one integral principle for eliciting intellection: for object and power beget knowledge: and since the object, as such, cannot by nature's order be conjoined to the faculty, it has been provided that a species be substituted in the place of the object. But on the contrary, when the object is by nature conjoined with the intellect, a species would be superfluous; but the object itself, by itself, together with the faculty itself, can be the principle of cognition. Therefore, since the essence of the angel, which is of itself intelligible, is by nature conjoined to its intellect, without any other species it will by nature move to the cognition of itself as a proximate and proper principle.

This mode of philosophizing is difficult. For since the essence of the Angel is not some form added to the intellect, but the substantial form from which the intellect is born, by what reason can it come about that it be itself the form determining the intellect by way of a proximate and proper principle? For a principle that determines to this action must be in the intellect itself. Rather, therefore, it seems one should say that the intellect is of itself determined in such wise and is moved by the essence as the first root, that it have in itself a complete power of understanding the essence itself and the angel's substance. By a like reason Scotus argues against this opinion in II, distinction 3, the eighth and ninth questions, the Objections; supposing in this sentence that St. Thomas posited that the whole principle by which an angel understands himself is his essence. He argues thus: for something to be the principle of an immanent operation, it must be the act of the faculty eliciting that operation. But the essence of the angel is not the act of the intellect, but only assists it: therefore it is not the principle of such intellection, which is an immanent action. He adduces the example of heat, which, unless it were in wood as its form, but only assisted it from without, could not be the reason and principle of acting for the wood.

Some reply that the essence of the Angel can be considered in the genus of thing and in the genus of intelligible; in the genus of thing, however, it is the object of the intellect, and thus rather the intellect is in that as in its form than that in the intellect; but in the ratio of intelligible the essence is in the intellect as the intelligible is in the intelligent; and in this way it is the proximate principle of intellection, at least in part, if it cannot be the whole principle: and hence nothing

1509. Cajetan, on this article; Ferrariensis, on Contra Gentiles, c. 98; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In II Sent., dist. 3, pars 2, q. 2, art. 1, in corpore; Opusculum De cognitione angelorum, q. 3; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, art. 3, ad argumenta contra quintam conclusionem; and the common Thomists.

hinders that one say that the intellect is in the essence, and again the essence in the intellect, in diverse ways; and that the intellect, which is of itself an indifferent principle to all intelligibles, is determined to the intellection of the Angel's essence by it as by the species and proximate principle of such intellection. Thus Capreolus answers in the article there cited in the solution to the first argument against the fifth conclusion; and the Ferrariensis in the chapters there and the ninth that are alleged.[1510] He seems, moreover, to have drawn forth that solution from the doctrine of St. Thomas, On Truth, question 8, article 6, to the second objection. The Thomists moreover establish a distinction between a natural form ordered to operation, like heat, and an intelligible form ordered to intellection, in order to satisfy Scotus's argument, namely, that a natural form does not determine an agent and a faculty as a proximate principle unless it inhere in reality; but an intelligible form determines by this alone, that it assist: wherefore thus also it can constitute the intellect in first act for understanding in that way in which some assert that the divine essence, by mere assistance, supplies the place of a species and of a proximate principle in the blessed for their vision. In the same way, therefore, the essence of the Angel will be able to be a principle. And (as Cajetan noted in replying to this argument) for this reason especially the essence of the angel, even if it does not inhere in the intellect, can be to the Angel a proximate principle of understanding himself, because, although it does not inhere in the angel's intellect as forms and intelligible species inhere, nevertheless it is substantially conjoined to it. Nor does Scotus abhor this sentence, when he teaches that an Angel understands himself by a perfect and intuitive knowledge through his very essence as through a principle. Thus he taught in that question, 8 and 9, to the Question.[1511] But when there he strives to prove that the essence of the Angel is not the principle whereby he understands himself, he does not wish to exclude the essence altogether from the ratio of principle, but only to show that it is not the whole principle of understanding, but, as he himself calls it, a partial one, so that together with the intellect it constitute an integral principle in the Angel of understanding himself: the opposite of which he unjustly attributes to St. Thomas, whereas in truth he never thought that the essence of the Angel is the whole and integral principle of understanding himself - a view which neither the doctors cited for this opinion, nor, so far as I know, any other, has taught.

To me, however, this sentence is difficult. First, because it seems to me to lack the foundation which Cajetan contends for, namely, that it is enough, in order that something be the principle of understanding, if it assist the intellect and not inhere in it. For that which does not inhere cannot be a determining principle by way of an efficient cause: I speak of a created principle; for the divine essence could do so, although in fact it does not inhere.[1512]

... nor is it so, as I have already disputed above, Disputation 43, chapters 3 and 4, where I have expressly shown it. Then, even if the essence of the Angel is conjoined with his intellect, indeed is the subject of the intellect, that nevertheless does not suffice for it to be the proper and proximate principle of intellection. For in that way it will only be a principle and a common principle, as it is

1510. Capreolus, loc. cit.; Ferrariensis, locis citatis.
1511. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 3, qq. 8 - 9, Ad quaestionem.
1512. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 8, a. 6, ad 2.

of other operations. Wherefore I rather judge that the intellect, as also any other faculty, is the proper and proximate principle determining the essence and substance of the Angel, rather than the converse. Wherefore I would philosophize in this way: that the essence of the Angel is the common and remote principle of his own intellection, but the proximate principle is the intellect; and that the conjunction of essence with intellect contributes nothing at all toward the essence being a particular principle in his intellection whereby the common efficacy of the intellect would be determined. And this I would the more readily concede, since I do not see it sufficiently proved either that intelligible species (species intelligibiles) are necessary in Angels for understanding other objects, or that the faculty of the intellect on the part of an efficient and eliciting principle, together with a thing intelligible on the part of the object which the intellect may regard, suffices. But in a matter so obscure to us and remote from sense, let it suffice to have said these things.

Articulus II - Whether one Angel knows another

It is proceeded thus to the second. It seems that one Angel does not know another. For the Philosopher says in De anima III that if the human intellect had in itself some nature of the number of the natures of sensible things, that nature existing within would prevent alien things from appearing. Likewise, if the pupil were colored with some color, it could not see every color. But as the human intellect stands with respect to knowing corporeal things, so the angelic intellect stands with respect to knowing immaterial things. Since, therefore, the angelic intellect has in itself some nature determined from among the number of those natures, it seems that it cannot know others.[1513]

1. Moreover, in the Book of Causes it is said that every intelligence knows that which is above itself insofar as it is its cause. But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.[1514]
2. Moreover, one angel cannot know another through the essence of the angel who knows, since every cognition is according to the ratio of likeness. But the essence of the angel who knows is not similar to the essence of the angel who is known, except in general, as is clear from what was said above. Whence it would follow that one angel would not have proper knowledge of another, but only general; likewise, it also cannot be said that one angel knows another through the essence of the angel known, because that whereby an angel understands is something intrinsic to the intellect; but the Trinity alone slips into the mind. Likewise it also cannot be said that one knows another through a species, because that species does not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel can understand another.

1513. Aristotle, De anima III.
1514. Liber de causis.

3. Moreover, if one angel understands another, either this would be through an innate species; and thus it would follow that, if God now created some new angel, he could not be known by those who now exist. Or through a species acquired from things; and thus it would follow that superior angels could not know inferiors, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another.

But on the contrary: it is said in the Book of Causes that every intelligence knows things that are not corrupted.[1515]

I answer that, as St. Augustine says in the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 2, the things that pre-existed in the Word of God from eternity flowed forth in a twofold way. In one way into the angelic intellect, by the fact that God impressed upon the mind of the angel the likenesses of things which He produced in natural existence. In another way, so that they subsist in their proper natures. Now they pre-existed in the Word of God from eternity not only as the rationes of corporeal things, but also as the rationes of all spiritual creatures. Thus, therefore, to each of the spiritual creatures from the Word of God were impressed all the rationes of all things, as much corporeal as spiritual: yet in such a way that to each angel there was impressed the ratio of his species according to natural and at the same time intellectual existence; namely, so that he might subsist in the nature of his species, and by it understand himself. But the rationes of other natures, as much spiritual as corporeal, are impressed upon him according to intellectual existence only, so that by means of such impressed species he might know both corporeal and spiritual creatures.[1516]

Reply to the first: The spiritual natures of angels are distinguished among themselves by a certain order, as was said above. And thus the nature of one angel does not prohibit his intellect from knowing other natures of angels, since both superiors and inferiors have an affinity with his nature, the difference existing only according to diverse degrees of perfection.[1517]

Reply to the second: The ratio of cause and caused does not conduce to this, that one angel know another, except by reason of likeness, insofar as cause and caused are similar; and therefore, if among angels a likeness be posited without causality, there will remain in one a cognition of the other.

Reply to the third: One angel knows another through a species of the latter existing in his own intellect, which species differs from the angel known, of whom it is the likeness, not according to material and immaterial existence, but according to natural and intentional existence. For the angel himself is a form subsisting in natural existence; but his species which is in the intellect of the other angel has there only intelligible existence; just as also the form of color has natural existence in the wall, but in the conveying medium it has only intentional existence.

1515. Liber de causis.
1516. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, book 2, chapter 8 (throughout).
1517. See above, q. 50, art. 4.

Reply to the fourth: God made each creature proportioned to the universe which He was disposed to make. And therefore, if God had resolved to make more angels, or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in angelic minds; just as if a builder wanted to make a greater house, he would have made a larger foundation. Whence it is of the same ratio that God would add some creature to the universe, and some intelligible species to an angel.

The conclusion is, Each Angel knows all the others through the species of all spiritual things which he has had inborn from the beginning.

By what mode one Angel knows another. Disputation 205.

- That each Angel, through his own essence (essentia), knows any other whatsoever, some have held. Cap. 1.
- That one Angel knows another through that other's essence, others have said. Cap. 2.
- That, by the intellect's power alone or through a species, one Angel is known by another, the more probable opinion asserts. Cap. 3.

Caput I - How one Angel knows another

We suppose in this disputation that which ought to be without controversy, namely, that one angel is rightly known by another. For no reason seems why one angel could be hidden from another angel. For among men there are many manifest causes why one is not manifest to another. For man receives knowledge of those things which he knows from the senses; but the senses require the presence of the object according to place, which can be taken away by many causes; whereas the angelic intellect does not require the presence of place in order to understand; wherefore it can understand absence and presence and even past things.

I am amazed, however, by what reason Justin, in the book of Questions proposed by the Gentiles to Christians, question 76, said that angels and demons do not mutually know and understand one another; which also St. John Chrysostom teaches in a homily on Matthew, on those words, "Then he left him," when he asserts that by his will an angel becomes invisible to a demon. If this is true in any way, it is not from the nature of the thing, but has its origin from the will of God. For God can rightly prevent that demons know good angels. The controversy, therefore, is only about the mode by which one angel knows another. In which matter there is some variety among the Schoolmen.[1518]

Some said that one Angel, through his own essence, understands any other whatsoever. Whose opinion could be understood in a twofold way: first, that the essence of one angel is the eliciting principle of the cognition which he has of another Angel, as in the preceding disputation some said that the essence of each Angel holds the place of a species for eliciting the cognition of himself. For although we would say that there are not given species of other things in an angelic intellect, nevertheless it would be asserted that the essence of the angel holds the place of species, as a proximate principle for eliciting the cognition of another; or else for the reason which we set forth

1518. Justin, Quaestiones (question 76); St. John Chrysostom, Homily on Matthew, on "Tunc reliquit eum".

in the preceding disputation, that neither for the cognition of himself is there need of a species, nor does the cognition of himself hold the proximate place of a species. Then the aforesaid opinion can also be explained in this way, that one angel, through his own essence previously known, and after the likeness thereof, knows other angels; in which sense the author of the Book of Causes seems to have handed down this opinion, in Aristotle's school, proposition 8, when he asserts, "An intelligence understands what is under itself and what is above itself, after the mode of its own substance"; mention of which sentence St. Thomas makes in De veritate, question 8, article 7, and refutes it. Yet he refutes not this notion of a general and quidditative knowledge in the very way which St. Thomas himself explains it.[1519]

For I for my part would not deny that, in this mode, one angel is known by another: for as one angel knows God in the likeness of himself, and retains this knowledge even when he contemplates Him clearly with a proper and quidditative concept, so also when it is obscure, one angel can know another in this mode; not because through his own essence, as through a cause, or as through a superior effect, he understands another angel, but because in the likeness of himself he conceives another angel by intellect. For just as through corporeal things we understand spiritual things without any order of cause and effect, much more through one spirit and angel can another be known. Yet this cognition is not quidditative and proper, but through alien species or concepts, such as that whereby we have, through these corporeal things, knowledge about spiritual things and about God. For no one is able to conceive some thing by its own proper and quidditative concept, as it is, if he only understands it in the likeness of another. For this is to conceive only through analogy and a certain likeness.

Moreover, St. Thomas in the place alleged does not impugn this opinion for the reason that he thinks one angel cannot in this mode be known by another, but because the author of that Book of Causes seems to assert that one angel, through his own essence, is known to others either because he is the cause of the latter, or its effect. For Avicenna too thought that the superior intelligences are causes of the inferior; which opinion we have said to be heretical in Disputation 171, chapter 1. It could also, and ought rightly, to be refuted if it were to assert that one angel is known by another solely through his own essence, and in the likeness thereof: for thus he would deny in one angel a quidditative knowledge of another. We, however, approve this opinion only in that part by which it asserts that also in this mode one Angel can be known by another, and not by quidditative and proper knowledge alone.

Caput II - That one Angel knows another through that other's essence, as some said

Others indeed judged that one angel is thus known by another, that the essence of the angel known be present to the intellect of the other as that whereby he understands.

...that he might understand it. Mention of this opinion was made by St. Thomas in Contra gentiles II, chapter 98,[1520] and some more recent writers think it was Scotus's in II Sentences, dist. 3, q. 10; they affirm it to be probable and not as yet sufficiently impugned.[1521] But what is

commonly brought from the Fathers, namely that one Angel cannot enter into another Angel, as we said above in Disputation 194, chapter 2, is no obstacle to our saying that one Angel is of himself intelligible to another, and consequently can be united to the other's intellect after the manner of an intelligible form. For he is said not to be able to enter into another, because he has not the power of conserving that other in its own existence (*esse*), which is denoted by the name of entry (illapsus). Wherefore this is rightly attributed to God alone, by whom all things, both spiritual and bodily, are conserved. Yet one Angel can be alongside another and, as an intelligible form, assist him and with that other's intellect produce an intellection of himself. For there is a difference between spiritual and material things, that spiritual things are of themselves intelligible and suitable to the intellect, whereas material things are not so. But that one Angel can produce an intellection of himself in the intellect of another they prove by these reasons. First, because one Angel can move and impel another with local motion; therefore he can concur with him as an efficient principle to intellection. Next, one Angel can illuminate another; therefore he can concur with him to an intellection of himself.

Now Scotus taught this view in such wise that he not only said one Angel is a principle of knowledge of himself together with the intellect of the other Angel at once, but even extended it to all the things that are known by an Angel, granting this in the case of intuitive knowledge; for about this kind of knowledge he philosophizes that intuitive knowledge arises not only from the intellect of the Angel who knows those things, but also from the very things known as from a peculiar, that is, partial, agent, as he calls it. For he thinks abstractive knowledge to be effected through species imparted to the angels at the beginning of their creation, as we showed above in Disputation 207, chapter 1. Accordingly, this opinion, in the peculiar way in which those recent authors took it, is not to be attributed to Scotus. And since in that disputation, chapter 2, it has already been proved against Scotus that material things cannot concur with the intellect of an angel as an efficient principle for his knowledge, it remains that here, against the same Scotus and the aforesaid recent writers, we show that one angel cannot, for the knowledge of himself, concur with the intellect of another in that manner.

First, because it is said without foundation that one angel can effect in the intellect of another something for illumination, as we shall also show below in a disputation; otherwise, physical bodies too could move not only locally but to some quality, which is against the common view, as we shall see there. Next, what they assert - that one angel can be impelled by another and by an impulse be moved locally - is a fiction; and they who philosophize in this mode seem to feel the same way about angels as about bodies. Moreover, it is clear that one angel does not operate his own knowledge in another's mind as its instrument: for by what account would he be elevated so as to operate in it physically and in very reality? or on what foundation is that assertion made? Since a far easier way is at hand to show the mode in which one angel is known by another, we ought not to flee to these difficult and absurd devices. Add that if one angel had to move the intellect of another

1520. St. Thomas, Contra gentiles II, c. 98.

1519. Liber de causis, prop. 8; St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 8, a. 7; see also the censure of Avicenna's causality of intelligences in Disputation 171, cap. 1.

to the knowledge of himself, and could in no other way be known, it would follow that he would never be known by that other unless he were joined to him in place; for an angel cannot operate physically at a distance, as we proved in Disputation 190, chapter 2.

Caput III - That, by the intellect's power alone or through species, one Angel is known by another, as the more probable opinion holds

I for my part judge it more probable that each angel has in his own intellect a sufficient native principle whereby he may know any other angel without any other species of that one, and without the essence of the angel known supplying the place of a species. I would understand this according to the opinion of those who say that an angel does not need species of things in order to know them; for thus neither will he need a species of another angel to understand him - a view which above in Disputation 200 I called probable. But if, with other Doctors, we assert that an Angel understands things other than himself by species either innate or infused by God, we ought to say the same of the knowledge by which one Angel knows another, namely, that he is understood by a species of himself native to the knower or infused by another Angel. This opinion was handed down by St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article, by Ferrariensis in Contra gentiles II, chapter 98, and by all who assert that an Angel understands other things beyond himself by means of their species, whom I listed in that disputation; the other modes which we have so far reported seem to contain something absurd. Wherefore this last view ought to be confirmed by a refutation of the others.[1520][1522]

Here, however, it should be noted whether one Angel, especially a superior, is comprehended by another. Certain more recent theologians assert first that inferior Angels are comprehended by their superiors; they prove it by this reasoning. For if an inferior comprehends himself, much more will he be comprehended by a superior; since a superior has greater efficacy and power in understanding. Then they say that a superior Angel is indeed understood by an inferior with a quidditative and proper concept, yet not comprehended by him, so far as regards quidditative and proper knowledge. This view is, without controversy, as I think, true. But as to comprehension, they prove it thus: for an object to be comprehended by some intellect, it must be known by a knowledge as perfect as the thing itself is by its nature knowable. But the knowledge which an inferior Angel has of a superior is not so perfect in the genus of knowledge as a superior Angel is in the ratio of intelligible; and by this line also they defend the common doctrine of the theologians who say that God is comprehended by no blessed intellect save by Himself, because no knowledge can be so perfect in the genus of knowledge as God Himself is in the ratio of intelligible.

I, however, think that not only is a superior Angel not comprehended by an inferior, but that neither is any free creature at all, however perfect, comprehended by another, if by the ratio of comprehension it is required that the knowledge be, in its own genus, as perfect as the thing comprehended is in the genus of intelligible. That this is not necessary for comprehension I have

1520. St. Thomas, Contra gentiles II, c. 98.
1522. Cajetan, In Iam, q. 56, a. 2; and Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles II, c. 98.

more than sufficiently shown in Disputation 53, chapter 2; but, as I showed there in chapter 4, for a thing to be said to be comprehended it is necessary, not only that all the things which formally are in it and belong to it be known, but also those which can be deduced from it as from a cause; for all these in some way pertain to it. Wherefore it is also necessary to know the decree of the will of an Angel or a man, for another to be said to comprehend him. Since, therefore, no Angel, even a superior, knows the free effects of another Angel, even an inferior, he will not be said in any way to comprehend him. Were this not an obstacle, we should have to say that a superior Angel is rightly comprehended by an inferior; since to the ratio of comprehension it is by no means required that the knowledge, in its own genus, be as perfect as the thing itself comprehended is in the genus of intelligible.

But against what we have said, there could be the difficulty which St. Thomas touched in the first argument: how the spiritual nature of one Angel existing within himself does not hinder him from knowing another Angel. For true is the doctrine of Aristotle, De anima III, chapter 4, text 4, that what exists within the sense, namely in the soul, prohibits and obstructs, that is, prevents something external from being known.[1523] In solving this, Ferrariensis in II Contra gentiles, chapter 98, and Cajetan on this article at solution 3, labor not a little; yet the conclusion and the solution are easy. For Aristotle did not mean that any and every quality and thing existing within the cognitive faculty impedes the cognition of what is similar; this is not even true in the external senses themselves. For one pupil that is bright and diaphanous does not prevent another bright and diaphanous pupil, or another luminous body, from being seen; indeed, if with a right temperament of the organ there should be some color in the pupil, it would not thereby follow at once that all visibles would appear of that color, or that vision would be impeded. Nor, again, in flies - whose eyes are full of blood - do they not for that reason see rightly and discern among visibles. For a quality existing within does not by its nature prohibit the reception of the visible species, which they call intentional, but it impedes some alteration and change according to an accidental form of the same nature; and thus in the senses, in which some alteration is necessary...

...some antecedent alteration to sensation is necessary, as in touch and smell a quality existing within prohibits the sensation of a like quality: therefore that the Angel's substance is spiritual and of the same nature with the substance of another Angel does not impede his understanding the latter; because the Angel's substance in itself is capable of spiritual cognition, and is in no way contrary to it. But when Aristotle in that book, chapter 4, says, "What is within obstructs," he means this of the human intellect, and signifies that the intellect must be spiritual and unmixed: for unless it were unmixed, it could not know all things, since it would be material - not that any and every substance existing within prohibits cognition of another substance of the same kind; but for the reason stated. Wherefore that an Angel is spiritual and of the same nature and substance with another does not hinder him from being able to understand that other in one of the aforesaid ways.[1524]

1523. Aristotle, De anima III, c. 4.
1524. Aristotle, De anima III, c. 4.

Articulus III - Whether an Angel can know God by his natural powers.

Proceeding to the third: It seems that Angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

1. For Dionysius says, in the ninth chapter of On the Divine Names, that God is set above all the heavenly minds by an incomprehensible power; and afterwards he adds that, because He is above every substance, He is separated from all cognition.[1525]
2. Further, God is at an infinite distance from the intellect of an Angel. But infinite distances cannot be reached. Therefore it seems that an Angel cannot by his natural powers know God.
3. Further, it is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face." Whence it seems that there is a twofold cognition of God: one by which He is seen through His essence, according to which it is said that He is seen face to face; another according to which He is seen in the mirror of creatures. But the first cognition of God an Angel could not have by his natural powers, as has been shown above. And a specular vision does not befit Angels, because they do not receive divine cognition from sensible things, as Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names.[1526] Therefore Angels cannot by their natural powers know God.

But on the contrary: Angels are more powerful in knowing than men. But men by their natural powers can know God, according to Romans 1: "What is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more Angels.

I answer: Angels can have some cognition of God by their natural powers. For the evidence of this, one must consider that a thing is known in three ways. In one way, by the presence of its essence in the knower: as when light is seen in the eye. And thus it was said that an Angel understands himself. In another way, by the presence of its likeness in the cognitive power: as a stone is seen by the eye insofar as its likeness results in the eye. In a third way, insofar as the likeness of the thing known is not received immediately from the thing itself that is known, but from some thing in which it is reflected: as we see a man in a mirror. The first cognition is assimilated to the divine cognition whereby God is seen through His own essence. And this cognition of God cannot belong to any creature by its natural powers, as was said above.[1527] But the third cognition is assimilated to the cognition by which we, on the way, know God through His likeness shining forth in creatures, according to Romans 1: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Hence we are also said to see God in a mirror. Now the cognition by which an Angel by his natural powers knows God is midway between these two, and is assimilated to that cognition by which a thing is seen through the species received from it. For since the image of God is imprinted upon the Angelic nature by its very essence, the Angel knows God insofar as he is a likeness of God. Yet he does not see the divine essence itself, because

1525. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IX.
1526. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus VII.
1527. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 4.

no created likeness is sufficient to represent the divine essence. Wherefore this cognition is more akin to a specular one, since the very Angelic nature is a kind of mirror representing the divine likeness.

Reply to the first: Dionysius is speaking of the cognition of comprehension, as his words expressly show. And thus God is not known by any created intellect.

Reply to the second: From the fact that the Angel's intellect and essence are at an infinite distance from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him, nor see His essence by his own nature. Yet it does not follow that for this reason they have no cognition of Him: because just as God is at an infinite distance from the Angel, so the cognition which God has of Himself is at an infinite distance from the cognition which an Angel has of Him.

Reply to the third: The cognition which an Angel naturally has of God is midway between the two cognitions; and yet it is more akin to one of them, as was said above.

Notes concerning the Article. - The conclusion is that Angels by their natural power can have some cognition of God. The doctrine of this article, as regards the explication of this conclusion, is easy. Only two points are worthy of remark.

First, it must be noted how St. Thomas says that an Angel cannot through his own essence know God as He is, because there can be no likeness of God which makes Him be known as He is. Yet we said above in Disputation 39, chapter 1, on the mind of St. Thomas, that there cannot be given a species which, once seen beforehand, is the ratio of knowing God as He is; nevertheless, an intelligible species can be produced which, not being previously seen, but as an eliciting principle, is the cause of knowing God. In this article, however, St. Thomas is speaking of a species which, once previously seen, would make God be known; and this he says is not given in an Angel. For although the essence of the Angel himself is a certain likeness of God, and in it the Angel knows God, yet it is not so exact that God could be perfectly seen in it, and as He is. For this reason he does not here deny that an intelligible species can be given as an eliciting principle; and in this sense we have explained this passage, and others of the same St. Thomas, above in that disputation, chapters 1 and 2.

Next, the doctrine which the Holy Doctor has in this article is to be noted, namely, that the light existing in the eye is seen through itself, not through some species of itself. I, however, judge this to be rather difficult. For the light which is in the eye can be seen neither through itself nor through any species: otherwise the bodily organ of the pupil would be seen as luminous, and therefore its figure and quantity - which are as it were a common sensible that, by reason of the proper sensible, namely light or color, are always perceived. But no one sees the quantity, figure, and position of his own pupil; therefore neither the light. But on this matter the philosophers treat more fully in De anima II, chapter 7.[1528]

1528. Aristotle, De anima II, c. 7.

Disputatio CCVI - In what way an Angel naturally knows God

Caput I - Two Scholastic opinions

At this point one could dispute whether an Angel understands God through a natural species proper to Him - a certain proper and quidditative knowledge, which is not intuitive as is that of the blessed - but of this we have already said enough and more than enough above, in Disputation 40, concerning the vision of God in general, in which the beatitude of the rational creature consists, and we treated this in Disputation 36 and the following. Now, therefore, there will only be controversy about the mode by which an Angel on the way knows God with the knowledge of a wayfarer, not indeed with a proper and quidditative knowledge - for this can in no way be communicated to him, as we said in that disputation - but with an inferior knowledge, such as we too have of God. In this difficulty the Scholastics also vary.

Setting aside the opinion of Scotus, which we adduced in that disputation, asserting that on the way God is known by an Angel through a proper and quidditative species, the first opinion is that of those who say that God is so known by an Angel on the way that the essence of the Angel is the eliciting principle of cognition. This opinion is followed by more recent authors, and seems to be embraced by Cajetan in this article, in replying to the second objection; also by Ferrariensis in book II against the Gentiles, chapter 98, at the section "Ad huius evidentiam," and by Capreolus in II, distinction 3, question 2, article 1, conclusion 5, at the end of the proof.[1529] For they assert that the essence of the Angel is a principle, after the manner of a representing species, for eliciting together with the intellect the cognition of God: yet in such wise that it is itself also known; in which respect it differs from other species which the intellect uses as a principle of intellection, because the others are in such a way a principle that they are not known, whereas the essence of the Angel has both: not indeed because the essence itself, as known, is the ratio of knowing God, but because at once it is the principle of knowing God, as a species, and is known. In favor of this opinion Henry is also reported, in Quodlibet IV, question 7; yet I think he did not teach it. St. Thomas, too, is alleged in this article, who plainly asserts the opposite, as we shall see below.[1530]

Now the first can be proved as follows. Unless the Angel, through his own essence as an eliciting principle of cognition, knew God, he could not otherwise know Him than through that [essence], or through other effects known beforehand. Wherefore the Angel would know God in the same way as we too understand Him on the way. But we must assign to the Angel a more perfect mode of knowing God than to us; and no other appears than the one just stated. Therefore one must say that God is known by the Angel in that way.

A second reason. Further, if the Angel knew God in the same way as we know Him, it would follow that the Angel acquires the cognition of God by discourse, namely, by deducing knowledge of God from knowledge of himself or of other things. But an Angel does not discourse, as St.

1529. Cajetan, on this article; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles II, c. 98, at "Ad huius evidentiam"; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 5 (in fine).

1530. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. 7; and see St. Thomas in this article, below.

Thomas testifies below in question 58, article 3. Therefore one must say that God is understood by the Angel in another way than by us. Wherefore Scotus, to the question - supposing on the mind of St. Thomas that God is not known by the Angel through a species, but through the essence of the Angel himself as through an object known prior - infers against that same St. Thomas that the Angel in his cognition discourses.[1531][1532]

A second opinion is that of Marsilius, on the First Book, question 7, article 1, part two, conclusion 8, where he affirms that God is known by an Angel through an inborn species, not indeed a proper and quidditative one of God Himself, as Scotus asserts, but in some other way: and this opinion does not seem to be proved otherwise than because the same reason seems to hold for God and for other things, that they be known by an Angel.

Caput II - The more probable opinion

The opinion of those seems to me more probable who assert that an Angel, through his own essence as a reason priorly known, compares to himself a knowledge of God. Thus teach St. Bonaventure on Book II, distinction 3, part 2, article 2, question 2, in the solutions to the arguments; Bassolis, question 3, article 2. Against this, Richard in II, distinction 4, article 1, questions 1 and 2 (although Bassolis also concedes with Scotus that a quidditative knowledge of God through a proper species can be given to the Angel). St. Thomas also agrees in this article; for he says that a thing can be known in three ways: first, through its own essence, as the divine essence is seen by the blessed; second, through the likeness of the thing which is in the cognitive faculty, as color is seen by the eye through its species; third, through a species reflected in a mirror. For the Holy Doctor thinks that in a mirror one sees the species of a color reflected in it; and in this way, he says, God is known by an Angel through a likeness of Himself reflected in the very essence of the Angel as in a mirror - as if to say, God is seen by the Angel through the likeness of Himself refracted in the Angel's essence as in a mirror.

...by an Angel, when the Angel beholds his own essence as it were a species and likeness of God. We have, therefore, from the mind of St. Thomas, that God is known by an Angel while the Angel understands his own essence, which is a certain likeness of God, as a species in a mirror; which opinion indeed commends itself to us, even if the example does not please - about which we have already spoken above, disputation 38, the last chapter.

For the explanation, however, of this opinion, note that the present difficulty can be understood in a twofold way: first, from which things, or by what reason, the Angel knows that God is in the nature of things the author and governor of all; then, since the Angel does not have on the way a proper and quidditative concept of God, but understands Him in the likeness of other things, just as we understand spiritual things in the likeness of bodily things - by whose likeness the Angel knows God - whether by the concept of his own essence, or of other things. Concerning the former way, I judge that God is sufficiently known by the Angel from his own essence, or from the essence

1531. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 3.
1532. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9.

of any other thing whatsoever; so that from any thing whatsoever he rightly understands that there is one supreme being, the author and governor of all - this, moreover, without discourse: for in seeing the essence of any created thing he sees that it depends not on itself but on another. For, as Capreolus rightly notes in the second, distinction 3, question 2, article 3, to the first argument against the sixth conclusion, and as St. Thomas indicates below, question 58, article 3, there is discourse when from one known item another, previously unknown, is inferred, or at least whenever from one piece of knowledge another is simply gathered. Therefore, since the Angel by one intuition knows his own essence and that of any other created thing, not depending on itself but on another, by that very fact he knows that there is a certain supreme being on whom all created things depend; nor does he need any new item of knowledge drawn from a prior one in order to know God; wherefore neither does he need any discourse.[1533]

Concerning the latter sense of the question: since the Angel does not see God as He is, nor by a proper species, it follows that he must have knowledge of Him by the species of other things, whether spiritual or corporeal, just as we know God and spiritual things by alien species. Whence it follows that the opinion of those is false who say that the essence of the Angel serves the Angel himself as an intelligible species (species intelligibilis), and not as a known thing, for eliciting the knowledge of God; for since the Angel does not know God by His own proper species and concept, but by the species and concept of another, it follows that he must first elicit the knowledge of that other thing, in the likeness of which he knows God; and therefore his own essence ought not to serve as a species for eliciting the knowledge of God, but as a known object, when, in its likeness, he understands God; he can also use other things for this knowledge.

Moreover, not a few theologians labor in the question whether the Angel knows God better by his own essence or by the natures of other things. Yet it can be easily answered with a distinction. For either the discourse is about the knowledge of God with respect to the question whether He is (an est), and in this way God seems equally well to be known by the Angel through the knowledge of other things and through his own essence first known; for since God is known with respect to the question whether He is by this, that it is known that any treated thing depends not on itself but on another, this is made known equally well to the Angel concerning other created things as concerning his own essence; in this respect the Angel does not know God better through his own nature than through the essences of other things, with respect to the question whether He is. Or he is speaking of the mode in which the Angel knows God in the likeness of created things; and in this way by far the Angel will know God better from many other creatures than from himself alone, for from many creatures he will conceive more perfections about God. And let this suffice concerning this whole question of St. Thomas.

1533. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1 contra sextam conclusionem; and see St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 3.

Quaestio LVII - On the knowledge of Angels with respect to material things

Then inquiry is made about those material things which are known by Angels. And concerning this five things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether Angels know material things

Objicitur primo: It seems that Angels do not know material things. For the intellect is the perfection of the intelligent. But material things cannot be perfections of Angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore Angels do not know material things.

Praeterea: An intellectual vision is of those things which are in the soul by their essences, as is said in the Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12.[1534] But material things cannot be in the soul of man, or in the mind of an Angel, by their own essences. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by the imagination, by which likenesses of bodies are apprehended, and by the senses, which are of the bodies themselves. But in Angels there is no imaginative and sensible vision, but only intellectual. Therefore Angels cannot know material things.

Praeterea: Material things are not intelligible in act, but are known by apprehension of sense and imagination, which are not in Angels. Therefore Angels do not know material things.

Sed contra: Whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do. But the intellect of man, which is by the order of nature beneath the intellect of an Angel, can know material things. Therefore much more can the intellect of an Angel.

Respondetur: I answer that such is the order in things, that the higher in beings are more perfect than the lower, and that what in lower things is contained deficiently, partially, and multiply, in higher things is contained eminently and by a certain totality and simplicity. And therefore in God, as in the summit and vertex of things, all things pre-exist super-substantially according to His own simple existence (*esse*), as Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names.[1535] But Angels among other creatures are nearer and more like to God. Whence they participate more in the divine goodness, and more perfectly, as Dionysius says in Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 4.[1536] Thus, then, all material things pre-exist in the Angels themselves, indeed more simply and more immaterially than in the things themselves, though more multiply and imperfectly than in God. Now whatever is in anything is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. But Angels according to their nature are intellectual; and therefore, just as God by His own essence knows material things, so the Angels know them by the fact that they are in them by their intelligible species.

1534. Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12.
1535. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus.
1536. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, c. 4.

Ad primum ergo dicendum: The intellect is the perfection of the intelligent according to the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) which he has in the intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of the Angel are perfections and acts (*actus*) of the angelic intellect

Ad secundum dicendum: Sense does not apprehend the essences (*essentia*) of things, but only external accidents; nor does the imagination. Rather, it apprehends only likenesses of bodies. But intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Whence it is said in De Anima III that the proper object of the intellect is the what - it - is (quod quid est); about which it does not err, just as neither does sense err concerning its proper sensible. Thus, then, the essences of material things are in the intellect of man, or of an Angel, as the intelligible is in the intelligent, and not according to its own real existence. But there are certain things which are in the intellect or in the soul according to each kind of existence. And each of these is an intellectual vision

Ad tertium dicendum: If the Angel were to receive the knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, it would be necessary that he make them actually intelligible by abstracting them; but he does not receive the knowledge of them from material things; rather, through species of things actually intelligible, connatural to him, he has the knowledge of material things - just as our intellect has it according to the species which it makes intelligible by abstracting

Conclusio est affirmans.

Articulus II - Whether Angels know singulars

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli singularia non cognoscant

Objicitur primo: The Philosopher says in I Posterior Analytics that sense is of singulars, but reason or intellect of universals. But in Angels there is no sensitive cognitive power, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore they do not know singulars.[1538]

Objicitur secundo: Every cognition is through some assimilation of the knower to the known. But it does not seem that there can be any assimilation of an Angel to a singular as singular, since the Angel is immaterial, as was said above, whereas singularity is the principle of matter. Therefore an Angel cannot know singulars.

Objicitur tertio: If an Angel knows singulars, he knows them either by singular species or by universal species. Not by singular species, for then it would be necessary that he have infinite species. Nor by universal species; because the universal is not a sufficient principle of knowing the singular as singular, since in the universal singulars are known only in potency. Therefore an Angel does not know singulars.

Sed contra: No one can guard what he does not know; but Angels guard individual men, according to that of Psalm 90: "He has given his Angels charge over you," etc. Therefore Angels know singulars.

1538. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.

Respondetur: I answer that certain men have entirely denied to Angels singular cognition. But this, first, derogates from the Catholic faith, which holds that the things here below are administered by Angels, according to Hebrews 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits?" If, however, they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts are of singulars. And therefore others say that indeed an Angel has knowledge of singulars, but that he uses it in universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; just as an astrologer indicates some future eclipse by the dispositions of the celestial motions. But this aforesaid position does not avoid the inconvenience: for thus to know singulars in universal causes is not to know the very true singular itself - that is, as here and now. For the astrologer, knowing a future eclipse by computation of the celestial motions, knows it in the universal, and not as it is here and now, unless he apprehend it by sense. But administration and providence and motion concern singulars precisely as they are here and now. And therefore it must be said otherwise, that just as man, by two genera of powers of cognition, knows all kinds of things - by intellect, indeed, universals and also immaterial things; by sense, however, singulars and corporeal things - so the Angel, by one intellectual power, knows both. For the order of things has this, that the higher a thing is, the more unified a power it has, and the more it extends to many; as is clear even in man himself, that the common sense, which is higher than the proper sense, although it is one power, knows all the things which are known by the five exterior senses, and also certain other things which no exterior sense knows, namely, the difference between white and sweet.

I answer that, a like consideration is had also in other cases. Wherefore, since by order of nature the Angel is above man, it is incongruous to say that man by any power of his knows something which the Angel does not know by his one cognitive power, namely the intellect. Hence Aristotle takes it as absurd that God should be ignorant of what we know, as is clear in De anima I and in Metaphysics III.[1539]

But the mode by which the Angel's intellect knows singulars can be gathered from this, that just as things flow forth from God so as to subsist in their proper natures, so also that they may be in angelic cognition. Now it is manifest that from God there flows into things not only that which pertains to the universal nature, but also those things which are the principles of individuation. For He is the cause of the whole substance of the thing, both as to matter and as to form. And according as He causes, so also He knows, because His knowledge is the cause of the thing, as was shown above.[1540] Therefore, just as God, by His essence by which He causes all things, is the likeness of all things, and by it knows all things not only as to universal natures but also as to singularity, so the Angels, by the species imparted by God, know things not only as to their universal nature, but also according to their singularity, inasmuch as these species are certain multiplied representations of that one and simple essence.

1539. Aristotle, De anima I; Metaphysics III.
1540. See above, on God's knowledge, q. 14, a. 8.

Reply to the first: The Philosopher speaks of our intellect, which does not understand things except by abstracting; and by that very abstraction from material conditions, that which is abstracted becomes universal. But this mode of understanding does not befit Angels, as was said above. And therefore the same reason does not apply.

Reply to the second: According to their nature the Angels are not assimilated to material things as something is assimilated to another according to a likeness in genus or in species or in accident, but as the superior has a likeness to the inferior, as the sun to fire. And in this mode too there is in God a likeness of all things, both as to form and as to matter, inasmuch as in Him, as in a cause, there pre-existed whatever is found in things. And for the same reason the species of the angelic intellect, which are certain derived likenesses from the divine essence, are likenesses of things not only as to form, but also as to matter.

Reply to the third: The Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are likenesses of things both as to universal principles and as to the principles of individuation. How, moreover, by the same species many things can be known, was said above.[1541]

Notes regarding the Article. The conclusion is affirmative. In these two articles few things remain to be noted, besides those which we have noted in the preceding questions, namely, whether Angels understand by species; and whether these species are received from things, or are inborn in Angels and created together with them. Two points therefore are to be noted now.

One is this: although in the school of St. Thomas it is held that singulars are not directly known by us through the intellect, but only through sense, yet as to Angels there is no controversy, but among all it is certain that singulars, even material ones, are known by Angels directly and by a proper concept. What is to be said in this matter about our intellect is not to be examined in this place.

The other is this: an Angel can rightly, by one and the same species according to the thing, understand both universals and singulars, if nothing else stands in the way. For above, in Disputation 202, it was shown that by one and the same species according to the thing many things can be known by an Angel and presented to him.[1542] I said, if nothing else stood in the way: for, as we showed in Disputation 117, chapter 3, neither the Angel nor the intellect that sees singular things forms, by a proper and quidditative concept, the common notion either of genus or of species; since, as it penetrates the thing as it is, it cannot have a common and confused concept of it.[1543]

Articulus III - Whether the Angels know future things

It seems that Angels know future things. For Angels are more powerful than men in knowing. But some men know many future things. Therefore much more do Angels.

1541. See above, the discussion in Disputation 202.
1542. Disputation 202.
1543. Disputation 117, c. 3.

Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the intellect of the Angel is above time; for Intelligence is compared to eternity, as is said in the Book of Causes. Therefore, as regards the Angel's intellect, past and future do not differ, but he indifferently knows each.[1544]

Further, an Angel does not know through species received from things, but through innate universal species. But universal species are equally related to the past and to the future. Therefore it seems that Angels indifferently know the past and the present and the future.

Further, just as something is said to be distant according to time, so also according to place. But Angels know distances according to place. Therefore they also know distances according to future time.

But on the contrary: That which is a proper sign of divinity does not befit Angels. But to know future things is a proper sign of divinity, according to that saying: "Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods." Therefore Angels do not know future things.[1545]

I answer that, the future can be known in a twofold way. In one way, in its cause. And thus future things which from their causes proceed by necessity are known by certain knowledge, as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But those which proceed from their causes as in most cases are known not by certitude, but by conjecture, as a physician foreknows the health of the sick man. And this mode of knowing future things belongs to the Angels, and so much the more than to us, by how much they know the causes of things more universally and more perfectly; as physicians who see causes more acutely are better able to prognosticate concerning the future state of a sickness. But those which proceed from their causes as in fewer cases are wholly unknown, as things casual and fortuitous.

In another way future things are known in themselves: and thus it belongs to God alone to know future things, not only those which proceed by necessity or as in most cases, but also those that are casual and fortuitous. For God sees all things in His eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and encompasses it. And therefore one intuition of God is borne to all things that are done through the whole of time as to things present, and He sees all things as they are in themselves, as was said above when we treated of God's knowledge.[1546] But the angelic intellect, and any created intellect whatsoever, falls short of the divine eternity. Hence by no created intellect can the future be known as it is in its own being.

Reply to the first: Men do not know future things except in their causes, or when God reveals them. And thus Angels know future things far more subtly.

1544. Liber de causis.
1545. "Annuntiate quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quia dii estis vos" (Isa 41:23).
1546. See above, on God's knowledge, q. 14, a. 7.

Reply to the second: Although the Angel's intellect is above time by which bodily motions are measured, yet in the Angel's intellect there is a time according to the succession of intelligible conceptions; according to which St. Augustine says, in the work On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that God moves the spiritual creature through time. And thus, since there is succession in the Angel's intellect, not all the things that are done through the whole of time are present to him.[1547]

Reply to the third: Although the species which are in the Angel's intellect, in themselves, are equally related to the present, the past, and the future, nevertheless the present, the past, and the future are not equally related to reasons. For those things which are present have a nature by which they are assimilated to the species which are in the Angel's mind. And thus through them they can be known. But those which are future do not yet have a nature by which they may be assimilated to those species. Hence through them they cannot be known.

Reply to the fourth: Distances according to place are in the nature of things, and they share in a certain species whose likeness is in the Angel. This is not true of future things, as has been said. And therefore the case is not similar.

Explanation of the Article. The first conclusion is: Future things which come about by necessity can with certitude be known by Angels in their causes. The second conclusion: Future things which happen frequently can be known by an Angel by way of conjecture, in the manner in which a physician knows from the evidence of some cause either health or death - yet more perfectly, by how much he more perfectly than a physician knows the causes. The third conclusion: Future things which happen rarely are altogether unknown to an Angel even in their causes, and in themselves can be known by no other intellect than by God alone: for He has all things present in His eternity.

Concerning the second and the third conclusion it must be observed that they are to be understood not only of contingent effects proceeding from free choice alone, but also of contingent effects proceeding from natural causes concurring per accidens. For in either way contingent events are wont to occur now frequently, now rarely. For from the mere concurrence of natural causes something can come about frequently; and otherwise, rarely. Likewise from free choice at one time something may occur rarely, at another time frequently. For men too by their will sometimes do certain things rarely, and certain other things frequently; a man, being disposed in one way or another in this or a like occasion, often acts in a like way from a like disposition. But regarding both conclusions, understood in either way, difficulties must be examined.

Disputatio CCVII - Whether future contingents proceeding solely from natural causes can be known by an Angel

These contingents cannot, with certitude, be known by Angels, as not a few have taught.

1547. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, c. 20.

Caput I - Statement of the question and preliminaries

That we may examine the proposed question in due order, certain points must first be premised about future contingents that arise from natural causes. To this end we must recall what we said above,[1548] namely, that an effect can come about contingently without any intervention of the application or cooperation of free choice, from the mere concurrence of natural causes; for about those effects to which free choice concurs, either as a cause or as applying causes, we shall have to treat in the following disputation, since in both cases the same line of reasoning seems to apply. Now an effect is said to occur contingently from merely natural causes whenever it does not proceed from their necessary influx, but from an accidental concurrence; and from such a concurrence there sometimes arises an effect - for example, one is laboring under some bodily disposition which of itself is not yet a sufficient cause, and a change of air or of constellation supervening, the sickness gains strength and death ensues; in such a case the event is called merely contingent, because it did not follow from the per se concurrence of all the natural causes. Effects contingent in this way sometimes happen frequently, sometimes seldom, and sometimes indifferently either way; for as the concurrence and application of natural causes is variable, so now one mode of concurrence will be frequent, and another rare. Concerning all such effects, in which there is no cooperation of free choice, the present controversy is understood - namely, whether such can be known by an Angel with certitude.

That these contingents cannot be known with certitude by Angels, not a few have taught. Future events before they exist cannot be known with certitude by an Angel, just as the contingent effects of free choice; if, however, they come about frequently, they can indeed be known beforehand by some conjecture, as happens with works of free choice that are wont to occur frequently. Richard reports this opinion and defends it as probable in 2 Sentences, distinction 7, article c., question 2; indeed, St. Thomas seems to have embraced it in this article: for he speaks of all contingent effects, among which he numbers sickness - unless someone should interpret him in a more favorable fashion, as if that example had been adduced in order to show that future contingents from free choice are in the same way known by Angels as a physician knows the outcome of an illness.[1549] The same opinion the holy Doctor seems also to have handed down in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 154; and Ferrarienis in the same place, s. One could also say that, where he only teaches that these futures can be known by Angels much better than by men, he does not define whether they are known by Angels with certitude.[1550] From this, however, it is not sufficiently concluded that these Doctors were of the opinion we have reported; yet Bonaventure in 2, distinction 7, part 2, article 1, and Aegidius in the same distinction, question 2, and Hervaeus in that distinction 7, article 2, who interprets St. Thomas in this sense, and finally Dionysius Carthusian in the same distinction 4, 9, do openly teach that opinion. Moreover, Richard to that extent judges it to be true that he brands the opposite not so much an error.

1548. See above, Disputation 64.

1549. Richard of Mediavilla, In II Sent., d. 7, a. c., q. 2. St. Thomas is taken so to speak in this article.

1550. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 154; Ferrarienis in the same place, s., where he teaches only that Angels can know these futures much better than men, without defining certitude.

In the opinion, then, of these Doctors, natural events proceeding from the heavenly bodies, which in no way can be impeded, are known with certitude by Angels; but others proceeding from lower causes, which can be impeded by others per accidens, are known only by conjecture.

This opinion is proved, first, because even if effects of this kind are from natural causes determined of themselves to one side in operation, yet by accident and for the most part they come about as contingent, so that things which of themselves are in the class of certain and contingent cannot be known with certitude by a created intellect; therefore neither can such events be known with certitude by Angels. Then, because the opposed opinion seems to have been condemned by the Parisian School; for in a certain article, which Richard and Dionysius report as condemned, it is stated that whoever should say that nothing is by chance, nothing by fortune, but that all things come about by necessity, is to be condemned: for if things by chance and fortune sometimes occur, how could it be that they are known with certitude by an Angel?[1551]

Caput II - The more probable opinion: that contingent events not depending in any way on free choice are known with certitude by Angels

But here a much more probable opinion always commends itself, which asserts that not only the motions of the heavenly spheres and the encounters of the stars, but indeed all natural events which take place in lower matter - whether from the heavens or from other lower natural causes - where free choice in no way intervenes, are known with such certitude by Angels as eclipses of the sun and moon are known by mathematicians. What I have said about effects must in the same way be asserted about their impediments. Therefore an Angel knows with certitude future events - sickness, plague, or something of that kind - from natural causes, and indeed also whether such an effect will be impeded by some other stronger natural cause. I said, however: provided free choice does not intervene; for if some cause is to be applied by free choice - such as a drink, or some other medicine - the event of the illness cannot be known with certitude.

This opinion was handed down by Alexander, 2. part, question 26, member 4; by Durandus in 2, second, distinction 7, question 3, number 4; by Albert in distinction 3, question 8, number 9; Albert in that distinction 7, article 5; and Richard thinks it probable in the place cited. Moreover, Thomas of Argentina, in 1, distinction 7, question 1, article 3, when he says that futures which do not have an immutable and necessary cause cannot be known with certitude by an Angel, does not sufficiently explain himself, because he does not state plainly whether he is speaking of a cause immutable from the intrinsic side, or also from the extrinsic, such as are many natural causes which, although they operate necessarily, can be impeded from without. In the same way, Marsilius in 2, question 7, article 1, in the second part of the article, after the seventh conclusion, only teaches in general that future contingents cannot be known by an Angel.[1552]

1551. Richard and Dionysius report as condemned at Paris the statement: that nothing is by chance, nothing by fortune, but that all things happen by necessity.

1552. Alexander of Hales, II pars, q. 26, memb. 4; Durandus, In II, dist. 7, q. 3, n. 4; Albertus, dist. 3, q. 8, n. 9, and in that dist. 7, a. 5; Richard loc. cit. Thomas de Argentina, In I, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 3; Marsilius, In II, q. 7, a. 1, pars 2, post septimam conclusionem.

By one sole reason, in my judgment an effective one, this our opinion can be confirmed, namely this. An Angel knows with certitude future motions and encounters of the stars and of the celestial spheres, unless they are impeded by God; that is, the Angel knows evidently how the celestial spheres and the stars of themselves and by their natural course will be moved in the future and will meet one another, unless by the free will of God they should be impeded; therefore the other natural effects from lower natural causes, being future, are in the same way known with certitude and evidently by an Angel: because lower causes are no less naturally and necessarily inclined and determined to their effects than the celestial spheres and stars are to their own motions and various aspects and conjunctions; the only difference is that the celestial spheres, since they do not have any created cause more powerful than they except God alone, cannot be impeded by others, whereas other lower causes can be impeded by many causes, also lower. We have, therefore, that - considered at least according to the nature and inclination of the second cause, if there be no impediment from elsewhere - natural events can be known not less certainly and evidently by an Angel than the future motions and aspects of the stars. Such future events are plague, sickness, sterility, and other things of that kind, which are future from causes wholly natural. The rest, indeed, of the effects of lower causes can be impeded by other natural causes; nonetheless what, on account of such impediment, will be future or will not be future must be said to be known no less certainly by an Angel.

For lower causes - such as the cause of sickness, of sterility, and the like - can be impeded in two ways. First, by created free choice applying contrary natural causes, when it can; and in this way we do not assert that it is known by an Angel with certitude what will be future or not future from such an impediment: for this event is then reduced to free choice, and about it a judgment must be formed in the same manner as about other effects of free choice, of which we shall speak in the following disputation - unless after the remedy and impediment have already been applied by free choice, and it no longer depends upon it; then indeed the same judgment ought to be had about it as about an impediment applied wholly naturally. Then secondly, the effect of a natural cause can be impeded or varied by the intervention and opposition of a solely natural cause, no free choice intervening, but causes occurring to each other according to their natural course; and in this way a natural effect is called contingent, because such a concurrence is per accidens, and therefore is called contingent. Thus we also say that it is known with certitude by an Angel what from the impediment of a natural cause will be future or will not be future, and that in the Angel there is a no less certain judgment about what will arise from the concurrence of a contrary cause than if it would arise from the sole natural cause without impediment; so that just as the Angel knows with certitude that fire will burn, and that from such a constellation there will be a plague or barrenness in the future, and that from such a composition of humors an illness will be born; so also he knows whether, by the intervention of a contrary constellation, or of a material or efficient cause, such an effect will be impeded or not impeded: for, just as natural causes of themselves necessarily incline to one side, as fire to heating, so also, in this matter, unless something else hinders, they produce this effect and not another; so too the impeding causes naturally and necessarily so impede, that they cannot fail to impede. Since, therefore, an Angel knows evidently the forces of any natural

cause whatsoever, and - having exactly compared them with one another - will certainly and evidently know which cause will overcome another and in what way: therefore he will know with certitude what from such a concurrence will be future or will not be future. We, however, therefore neither evidently nor with certitude know these events, because we do not sufficiently weigh or understand the power and potency of causes; on that account natural contingent events are wont to be no less uncertain to us than contingents from free choice, so that we attain to them only by conjecture.

And what we have said about future effects from natural causes not knowing, must in the same way be asserted about future effects from brute animals, which - although they act by cognition and appetite - are nonetheless borne toward their objects no less naturally and necessarily, unless they are impeded, than natural causes which do not know; and therefore, since an Angel knows with certitude all future impediments from natural causes, as has been said: he will also know with certitude what brute animals will do or will not do. Now we understand this to be true whether knowing natural causes are determined and impelled to their actions by the stars, or from themselves: not indeed freely, but naturally. I have said this because some concede that future events from brute animals can be known with certitude, if the brutes are determined to them by the stars; although in either way the same reason holds. But whether these futures are known with certitude by proper knowledge, which they call intuitive, we shall see in the following disputation.

The arguments for the former opinion are refuted. Cap.

He evidently knows how the heavenly spheres and the stars by themselves and by their natural course will in the future move and meet one another, unless they be freely hindered by the will of God: therefore the other natural effects which are going to result from inferior natural causes are in the same way certainly and evidently known by an Angel. For inferior causes are no less naturally and necessarily inclined and determined to their effects than the celestial spheres and the stars to their motions and various aspects and conjunctions; only that the spheres, since they have no created cause more powerful than they, are impeded by God alone, whereas other inferior causes can be impeded by many other, even inferior, causes.

We have therefore, taking into account at least the nature and inclination of the second cause, that, if no impediment come from elsewhere, natural effects are no less certainly and evidently known by an Angel than the future motions and aspects of the stars. Such events are pestilence, sickness, sterility, and other things of this kind, which are going to be from causes wholly natural. And although other effects of inferior causes can be impeded by other natural causes, nevertheless one must also say that even what, in the presence of such impediment, will be or will not be, is known no less certainly by an Angel. For inferior causes, as the cause of sickness, of sterility, and the like, can be impeded in a twofold manner.

First, by created free will, when it can, applying contrary natural causes; and in this manner we do not assert that it is known for certain by an Angel what will or will not be out of such impediment. For this event must be reduced to free will, and about it the judgment is to be made in the same way as about the other effects of free will, of which we shall speak in the following

disputation, unless after the remedy and impediment has now been applied by free will and no longer depends upon it; then indeed there ought to be the same judgment of it as of an impediment applied wholly naturally.

Then, the effect of a natural cause can be impeded, or varied, by the intervention and opposition of a natural cause alone, with no free will intervening, but by causes meeting each other naturally; and in this way a natural effect is called contingent, because such a concurrence is per accidens, and therefore is called contingent. In this way we say that it is also known with certainty by an Angel what from an impediment of a natural cause will or will not be; and no less certain a judgment exists in the Angel concerning the effects of a natural cause set against a contrary natural cause. For just as natural causes are inclined to one side - for instance, to heating, as fire is to heating matter - unless something else stand in the way; so also, if something else obstruct, they work to another effect; and thus they are naturally and necessarily so as not to be able not to hinder. Hence, since the Angel plainly knows the power of each natural cause and, by exact comparison of them with each other, what cause will overcome another and by what proportion, therefore he will certainly know what, from such a course of contrary causes in the future, will or will not be.

We, however, neither certainly nor evidently know, because we do not sufficiently weigh or understand the strength and potency of the causes; and therefore natural events that are contingent are wont to be uncertain for us, so that we attain to them by conjecture alone.

And what we have said about the effects of natural causes must be asserted likewise about the effects that are going to arise from brute animals, which, by constitution and appetite, work naturally and necessarily - that is, unless they be impeded. Therefore the Angel will certainly know all those operations that from natural causes are going to proceed; and he will also know what brutes will do or will not do. I say this, whether the causes be determined to their actions by their own nature, or by the celestial dispositions; for in either case they act not freely but naturally.

On dissolving the arguments of the contrary opinion

Caput III - Dissolution of contrary arguments

By this same doctrine whereby we confirmed our opinion, we can dissolve the contrary arguments. To the first line of reasoning adduced we say that effects arising from a natural cause, with no intervention of free will, even applying it, are altogether necessary; and also when they are impeded by a second natural cause that occurs, they are impeded necessarily. Nevertheless both such events and such impediments are said to be contingent - not because they do not happen necessarily and with the determination of the natural cause to one side, but because it is per accidens that one cause is impeded by another. Wherefore the contingency of these effects - that is, their being able to be and being able not to be - must be taken on the side of the thing made, not on the side of the mode of efficiency in the cause itself, as I explained in Disputation 61, cap. 1, in accordance with Henry's mind. Wherefore Gabriel, in the First Book, distinction 38, question

unica, article, in the second part of the article, and Corduba, Book 1, question 55, doubt 4, do not call these effects contingent, but necessary; and they call only those contingent which are in some way from free will. Therefore, since this kind of contingency does not remove the necessary and determined mode of operation to one side of the efficient causes or even of the impedients, it follows that such events are known by an Angel with certainty and without any deception, because he attentively weighs the nature and power of all causes.

But some object thus: If an Angel certainly knows such effects, it follows that they are not contingent; which seems absurd. But this objection has no force. For such effects are not called contingent with respect to the Angel, but from themselves, that is, of such a nature as to be able to be and not to be; nor are they said to be contingent for the Angel because they are of uncertain truth and unknown to the Angel. And if this is assumed in the argument, it ought to be denied; for it assumes what had to be proved, and about which our controversy is.

To the definition of the Parisian article which was alleged afterwards, I answer that nothing is defined in that article against our opinion: for only those are condemned who assert that all things happen necessarily, as Wyclif said, even those which proceed from free will. Concerning natural causes, however, nothing is determined; nay rather, I do not see how, according to right faith and true philosophy, it can be said that the events of natural causes come to either side from liberty and the indifference of the cause.

Nevertheless, although we affirm that these events of natural causes, and of brutes, happen necessarily, or are necessarily impeded by other brutes or natural causes, yet chance cannot on that account be denied, although in these things fortune has no place. For chance is called an event which follows per accidens with respect to some other cause than a rational one, although it come about necessarily by the intervention of some other natural cause and of a necessary agent; but fortune is spoken of only with respect to man: for that alone is called an effect which happens to a man contrary to his intention, even if it come about by the intervention of some natural cause and of a necessary agent. Although, therefore, other causes which can occur act naturally and necessarily, nevertheless chance and fortune can still be spoken of.

Further, one could object first Tertullian in the Apologeticus, cap. 22, near the end, where speaking of the divination of demons, he says that they always answer ambiguously. He subjoins these words: "They have in the hollow of the air and from the nearness of the stars, and from commerce with the clouds, a celestial knowledge of things, so that they also promise rains which they already feel to be coming." I answer: it is no wonder if Tertullian attributed to demons no other kind of cognition of future natural events; for since he thought that they are corporeal and endowed with sense, it is not marvelous if he said that they only in this way foreknow future rain and other natural events; although the opinion which affirms that all Angels and demons are by their nature spirits and are wholly void of body is truer, as was proved in Disputation 178, cap. 3 and 4; consequently we ought to deny that future rain and other such events are foreknown by demons from some presence on account of the nearness of place, as is manifest; for the cognition of the intellect does not depend on the nearness of place, as sensible presence depends on the senses of the body.

I admit, nevertheless, that Tertullian probably felt the same as Athanasius in the book of Questions, question 27, where he says that rain and the inundation of the Nile cannot be foreknown by a demon; although he said, as we reported in Disputation 179, cap. 3, that all Angels are incorporeal. We have, however, against Tertullian and Athanasius, Augustine, who, although he thinks that Angels and demons are not spiritual and incorporeal, nevertheless judged otherwise concerning the mode by which they foreknow rains and other natural events. For in the book On the Divination of Demons, cap. 5, he teaches that they divine sicknesses or future tempests which they themselves are going to produce, because they receive the power of injecting diseases and of vitiating the air; which surely must be understood to be done by demons not by their proper power - because by this they can only move bodies according to place, as we shall say in Disputation 208, cap. 3 - but by the application of natural causes, which they can apply. He adds further below: "Certain things they do not themselves make, but by natural signs they foreknow future things (which signs cannot come within human senses), and they foretell them beforehand." And below, "What wonder if the demon, by an affection of the air and by an arrangement known to himself, should foresee tempests for us who are ignorant?" And in cap. 6 he shows by this sole reason that demons can be deceived in this divination - that these things are by Angels who serve God, that is, by the good [Angels], from another disposition unknown to the demons, suddenly and in a moment changed; and a little below he adduces the example when, Matthew 8, when the Lord was seen, there was made a calm: for what demon would not have thought that that tempest would last longer, if he had attended only to natural causes? We, however, have said that these futures are known certainly by Angels, if in no way free will intervene.

Another mode also of announcing future things to us is assigned by the same Augustine, On the Trinity, book 4, cap. 17, and in book 12 On Genesis according to the Letter, cap. 13: namely, on account of the highest swiftness and acuteness of seeing, because they perceive things which are far off, and announce them to us, they seem to predict things future, which are to them present.

Then, against what has been said, they adduce also the same Augustine, City of God, book 9, cap. 22, where he teaches that temporal futures are better known by the good Angels, who in their cognition cannot be deceived, because they see them in the Word, than by demons, who can be deceived for this reason, that they see only in causes. I answer: Augustine is not speaking about futures from causes merely natural, but also about those which depend on free will: and these are known to demons in causes only by conjecture, but by the good Angels in the Word, that is, with God revealing; and for that reason they are more certainly known by them.

Lastly, some argue from Wisdom 8, where, as if proper to God, it is said to be "to know portents before they happen": but these are effects natural from causes altogether natural. I answer first that this indeed is not assigned as proper to God in such a way that it does not also befit a creature: for there concerning the same Wisdom of which a little earlier it had been said, it is said, "He knows the past, about the future he conjectures"; but past things are rightly known by Angels: therefore the same must be believed concerning portents. Besides, I say that there there is a

sermon about created wisdom, which he says has always loved herself; and of this he says that it knows portents, knows past things, and about future things conjectures, in that mode alone in which to man in this life it is permitted.

Disputatio CCVIII - An future contingentia ex libero arbitrio propria virtute ab Angelis certo cognoscantur

- These futures cannot be known certainly by Angels: this is indubitable to Catholics. Caput 1.
- By what reason some try to prove that these futures cannot be known certainly by Angels. Caput 2.
- A difficult argument against the foregoing doctrine, to which various Doctors respond. Caput 3.
- The true solution of the foregoing argument. Caput 4.

Has futura ab Angelis certo cognosci non posse, Catholicis indubitatum esse.

Thus Justin, in the first book of Questions propounded by the Gentiles, questions 2 and 146; Eusebius, book 5 of the Preparation for the Gospel, cap. 10, where at length he discourses about the oracles of demons; Damasus, book 2 On the Faith, cap. 4; Anselm, book On the Fall of the Devil, cap. 1 - all of whom, although they speak only of demons (except Damasus, who also understands that doctrine about the good [Angels]), yet from thence the same must be proved about the good [Angels], if we attend only to their natural power. For on what foundation could we say that demons therefore do not understand futures from free will because they are impeded by God, when nevertheless by their natural power they could understand? For indeed from the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4, part 4, not far from the middle, in demons all natural endowments remained intact: and if demons by their natural power cannot foreknow such futures, in the same way good Angels will not be able to do so, since they are of the same nature.[1553]

The same truth also is confirmed by Scripture. For in Isaiah 46 it is said: "I am God, and there is no God besides me, nor is there any like me, announcing from the beginning the last things, from the start the things that have not yet been done." When he says "nor any like me announcing future things, pointed out beforehand," he indicates that no one at all can be made like to him in this; where Jerome writes thus: "From the beginning you must consider that besides me there is no God, nor could another know the things to come, except I, who announce through the Prophets." And upon that in Daniel 2 about the dream, he adds: "Let the Magi confess, let the soothsayers confess, that all secular knowledge of literature does not have prescience of future things; but God has it; from which it is proved that the Prophets spoke by the Spirit of God." When he says that it is not of men but of God, he also excludes Angels; otherwise he would not rightly have said "but of God"; nor would he from that rightly have inferred that the Prophets, foretelling future things, spoke by the Spirit of God, if by the art of demons the future could be foreknown.

1553. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, part 4.

From the same prediction of futures Isaiah gathers the true divinity: "Declare to us the things that are going to come, and we shall know that you are gods" (Is 41:23); where Jerome at length shows that the idols were not able to predict future things. He proves it, because they did not even foresee the ruin of their own temples. Wherefore Origen rightly says, Contra Celsum, book 6, at the beginning, that the character of divine discourse is the prediction of future things, which does not fall under human nature; and they judge by the events when it is evident that there has been a prediction by the divine Spirit. Therefore Damascene, in the place alleged above, denied not only of demons, but also of good Angels, according to the consideration of their nature, a prescience of future things from free will; but he taught that good Angels have a foreknowledge of these futures by the revelation of God, and evil ones only by conjecture.[1554] Moreover, since among the Schoolmen this is held as most certain, yet it is very difficult to assign the reason why these futures cannot be foreknown by Angels.

Caput II - Some Schoolmen attempt a priori to demonstrate that future contingents from free will cannot be known by Angels, by this reasoning.

These futures are either known by Angels in their causes, or in themselves: not in their causes, because free will is of itself indifferent to one side and to the other, and equally regards the one and the other; therefore from it no more is the future event understood than the non-future. Not in themselves, because this seems the proper [power] of God alone, who, as he is eternal, by his eternity has all things, as well future as past, as present: therefore in no way can future things be known certainly by Angels.

But this reasoning is weak. For that free will is indifferent to either side does not hinder that one part of a contradiction be determinately true and the other false, as we have shown at length in Disputation 66, cap. 2 and 3; for indeed the indifference and liberty of free will can be understood in that way which Aristotle thought, namely, that neither part be true nor the other false, but that both be true or both false, as we there more fully proved. Since, therefore, in future things one part is true and the other false, it follows that each in its own mode is knowable, that is, the true as true, and the false as false. Why, then, just as it is known by God, could it not be foreknown by an Angel? For what was said - that it is known by God on account of a real presence in his eternity - we have shown to be false in Disputation 66, cap. 2 and 3 and 4. Therefore by this reasoning it is not sufficiently shown that future things cannot be known by an Angel with certainty: in their cause, if, compared with it, they have truth. And even if it were proved that they cannot be known by an Angel properly and quidditatively (which we by no means grant), it would not yet be shown that it is not permitted also to gather, at least by another's concept, that they cannot be known with certainty by Angels; just as a future eclipse is evidently foreknown by astrologers.

1554. Tertullian, Apologeticus 22; St. Augustine, De divinatione daemonum 5 - 6; On the Trinity IV, 17; De Genesi ad litteram XII, 13; City of God IX, 22; St. Jerome, on Isaiah 46 and Daniel 2; Origen, Contra Celsum VI; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, 4; Justin, Quaestiones et responsiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 2, 146; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica V, 10; St. Anselm, De casu diaboli I.

But against this the philosophical argument adduced above would have no force, as is clear. Therefore I would judge that the aforesaid truth cannot be proved by an a priori philosophical reason; yet it is rightly proved by Scripture and by the testimonies of the holy Fathers, which ought to suffice for a theologian. There is also a convincing and manifest a posteriori philosophical reason: for the oracles of demons, as even the pagans and Gentiles attest, are full of lies; therefore it is a sign that future contingents cannot be known by them with certainty; for if they could foreknow them, God would not deny them this knowledge, nor would He perpetually hinder them from a natural operation. Add also that among the pagans and Gentiles it was held so divine a thing to predict the future, that those who predicted such things were reckoned by them among the number of the gods; and therefore to foreknow the future is called "divination," as though it were the gift of a god to foreknow the future. Although, therefore, by an a priori natural reason this truth cannot be made so clear, yet it is so known to philosophers - even pagans and Gentiles - that it seems, as it were, to be naturally instilled in their minds.

Another a posteriori reason is also commonly brought to prove the same: because if an angel could by his own power foreknow some future contingent, he could also foreknow all; which is absurd, for all things are infinite: but infinite things cannot be known by a finite intellect, since the future thoughts and motions of a created will are infinite. Yet someone could reply that an angel cannot foreknow all at once, yet he can foreknow them singly. Wherefore from the fact that he can know one, nothing absurd follows.

Nevertheless it must be observed what St. Thomas teaches in two propositions of the article, namely in the second and third, to be most true. In the second he teaches that future contingents which frequently come to pass can be known by an angel by some conjecture; he understands also those which depend on free choice, since men for the most part act according to the impetus of passions, there is some reason why such future things are known by some conjecture. In the third conclusion he teaches that those futures which happen rarely cannot be foreknown by any conjecture; which is manifest: for in those which rarely occur there is not some reason by which the future can be known; rather, from some conjecture a contrary opinion is more easily estimated as future.

Caput III - The difficult argument, to which the Doctors reply in various ways

Moreover, in the opinion of those who teach that angels know all things by species innate to them from the beginning of their creation, there is a difficult argument, by which it seems to be proved either that future things are foreknown by an angel by a proper and quidditative concept, or at least that at present they can be known by no reason; or finally that angels receive species from things, through which they understand. For either angels have from the beginning of their creation proper species of all things which afterwards will be future, or they do not have them. If they do not have them, we must say that an angel does not understand through species, but through his bare intellect, or at least that he receives species from the things themselves. But if from the beginning they have proper species of future things, it follows that futures, before they are, can be known by

an angel by his own power; for an intellect furnished with the species of some object can understand that object not only by another's concept, and after the manner of other things, but even quidditatively and properly. For this reason I said that this argument is difficult only in the opinion of those who think that species of all things, even of future things, were indited in angels from the beginning of their creation. Yet those who embrace the aforesaid opinion strive in various ways to satisfy it.

First, Cajetan answers in the preceding article, with respect to the second, that innate intelligible species in angels are related to future things in the same way as if there were in the eye an innate species of visible color. For just as through it the future color would not be seen, but only the present, so also through the intelligible species of future things an angel does not know them until they are present. And the reason is that between the representing and the represented there is required a real relation of likeness; but such a relation is only between actually existing things: therefore the existence of the object is necessary as a necessary condition in order that the species infused in the angel may be said to represent it; and when the thing exists, without any change in the species itself the representation begins, and therefore it can now be a principle of knowing that thing, because it now begins to represent it.

Since Cajetan plainly holds the same as Ferrara in Contra gentiles, book 2, chapter 96, to the second, and the solution seems to be taken from Giles in the Second Book, distinction 7, question 1, article 1, to the second, where he says that through species infused in the angel from the beginning of his creation future things cannot be known, but present things; because present things, without any change of species, begin to be represented, which before, when they were future, were not represented. St. Thomas also seems to indicate the same in this article in reply to the third, when he says that future things are not known by an angel through innate species, because they do not yet have the nature by which they are made like to the species. But we shall interpret the words of St. Thomas in the right sense.

However, this solution of Cajetan can be impugned in many ways. First, in sense-vision, in which, if there were a visible species of color before the color existed, there would be no less vision than if the color existed and were placed opposite: for as from departing sensibles sensation remains in the sight, as we proved above in disputation 38, chapter 2, from the doctrine of Aristotle, St. Augustine, and from experience, in the same way, before the color were produced, there could be vision, if its proper species in the eye were preserved by God: for what greater reason could there be why, when the color goes away, either by motion or by corruption ceasing, the sensation of it can remain in the eye as if it were present, and yet there cannot be sensation of a future color? Moreover, the same color's receding from sight by motion, or ceasing by its own corruption, can certainly occur; therefore if, when the sensible object departs by motion, the species can remain and, by reason of it, sensation be produced, a species can also remain when the object is corrupted, and likewise sensation be produced. Wherefore the example adduced by Cajetan is of no force. From which it also further appears that the real existence of the object is not necessary in order that it be actually represented. Next, this point is proved thus: the representation of the object is not a relation of likeness which is found between things that differ

generically according to themselves; for the species, which is an accident, represents the substance, and a spiritual species represents a body: what, therefore, hinders that this relation be able to be to a future object, or especially that it be able to be to a past object? otherwise no species could be a principle of knowing a past thing, if there could not be a relation to a past thing; and by the same reasoning there could not be one between past and present. But who will say that past things are not known by an angel? Why then will future things not be known, if angels have their species?

Second, others reply that some change indeed takes place in the species infused in the angel, from the fact that things begin to be present; so that in the species which belonged to a future thing there begins to be some new real mode from the presence of the object, for lack of which formerly it was not a species, so that by it that thing might be known when it was future. Yet this solution is opposed by a manifest reason. For the species of future things, which are said to have been infused in the angel from the beginning of creation, are either truly species of those future things, or they are not. If they are species of future things, it follows that futures are represented by them; but if they are not species of those things until they receive that new mode in time, we say in vain that from the beginning those formless qualities, which are not species, were infused in the angel. And it is much better to assert that the species of things are infused in time, when the things begin to be, than that from the beginning they be granted to him in such a way that it is necessary afterwards at some time for them to be changed by a real mode, in order that they have the true nature of species and be able with the intellect to be a principle of intellection. For what can that quality infused from the beginning serve, if it must, in time, be changed by some real mutation?

Third, others reply that by those species future things are not known as future; but those things which are really future are apprehended by a simple cognition, their existence not being considered; and, as if they were to say, that future thing is apprehended only as possible and according to its essence. This solution they seem to gather for themselves from St. Thomas in this article in the reply to the third, which nevertheless, as I think, he in no wise intended. But the reasoning can be impugned no less efficaciously. First, because those species granted to angels from the beginning of creation are species of future things according to every circumstance of time, place, and cause, so that by the same species they know "to be" at this time and in this place and from this cause, when they are present: if, therefore, they are a principle of knowing present things with all circumstances, no real change having been made in the species themselves, as this solution supposes, why could they not be a principle of knowing these same things with the same circumstances before they were present? For indeed these very things are properly species.

Again, it will be impugned thus. If species of things were indited to an angel, then, in the opinion of all, only species of future things were indited, not of possibles - at least not of those which can be effected by God alone; the angel indeed has from the beginning species infused of those things which will be future, or at least through the species of substances and of causes he can know their operations and their natural possible effects. But of things which can be effected by God alone and are not going to be future he has no species, as all admit; he has only those of things that will actually be future. Therefore they will not rightly say that by those species things are represented only as possible and not as future.

Fourth, others reply in the end, that angels indeed have innate species of things; yet in them things are represented not as future, but as possible. I say, even if this were true with respect to their own operations and the possibles of second causes, nevertheless it is not true of those things which God alone effects - such as the creation of souls - and likewise of men. For although man is generated by a second cause, yet it is plain that the rational soul, which depends upon God alone, is from Him; therefore an angel cannot know men as merely possible to be made by God, so as to know that that thing will be future: rather, as to such things he either knows them as present, or as past, or not at all as future by such species.

Caput IV - The true solution of the foregoing argument

But, that the foregoing argument may be satisfactorily resolved, two points must be noted. One is that the intelligible species is a likeness and representation of the object, not because it makes the thing actually known (for this is proper to the expressed species, which is the word and expressed species), but because the object is said to be represented in an intelligible species for this reason, that the species is the principle for eliciting an intellection or cognition, which is the expressed species of the future cognition, and a likeness to the act of the object. For this reason the intelligible species is said to represent the object habitually, that is, in first act.

The second point to be noted is that, just as in natural agents it does not suffice to have a sufficient principle for acting unless one also have the matter and an object duly disposed, wherein the operation be received and with which the efficient cause cooperate; so also in cognitive powers, besides the indited faculty and the species, which constitute the power complete in first act for operating, there is required a proper and natural object about which it may be able to operate. For sight does not operate around sound by an impressed species, nor hearing around color; hence there is of necessity required some real presence of the proper object, in order that cognition may be elicited about it: for the intellect cannot, in first act for operating, elicit its act without the presence of the object - indeed, it could not even, regarding itself, if the impressed species were preserved without that presence, as we observed a little above about sense. But I say that, besides the species, a certain and determinate object is necessary, about which the operation of the knowing faculty is terminated, in order that the act of cognition be elicited.

Since therefore future contingents do not fall within the range of the natural object of the angelic intellect, as we proved above, it follows that, so long as a thing is future, it cannot be known by an angel, even if he had the intelligible species of it; for that species is not an actual and expressed representation of the future thing, but only a habitual one, and, as it were, in first act for eliciting the expression; and since the future, as future, is not an object.

But the natural object of this species is not the future as future, but the same thing only insofar as it is past or present; it follows that, at the time when the thing is still future, by that species it is not represented except habitually: that is, that species is not a principle for eliciting cognition of that thing as future, but only as present or past. And this happens without any variation in the species itself, solely from this, that when compared with this thing it has that thing as its proper

object; whereas, compared with another thing, it does not regard that other as its proper object, and therefore it can be the principle for eliciting cognition of one thing and not of another; for the principle of cognition operates about a certain and determinate thing, which it has as its proper object. The difficulty of the proposed argument would have force, if the impressed intelligible species (species intelligibilis) represented the object in such a way that in it the intellect, as in a mirror, understood the thing, as some are pleased to say; but this I judge to be false. For the intellect is not converted to the species as to a mirror, in order that in it it may gaze upon the object - since such a conversion can scarcely be explained - but the intellect, instructed by the impressed species and, as it were, in first act, elicits the cognition of that object of which that is said to be the species. In the same way, even if we were to say that the angel understands created things without any species of them, by the native power of the intellect alone, one would still have to philosophize concerning the cognition of future things: for since knowing faculties do not operate except about their proper object, and future contingents are not the object of the intellect considered according to its proper power, it follows that they can never be known by it except by a special revelation. And hence is solved the difficulty proposed in Disputation 199, cap. 3 - namely, why the angel does not know future things if he does not need species for understanding, but understands them by the native power of the intellect alone. It is answered that the intellect alone can operate about its proper object; but future things, of themselves, are not the proper and natural object of the intellect, as has been proved.

In this sense we could interpret certain dicta of the Scholastics. First, that of Capreolus in the Second Book, distinction 3, question 2, article 3, ad primum Gregorii, against the third conclusion, near the end of the reply, where he says that future things are therefore not known by angels, not because angels receive cognition from things (he understands: after the mode of an efficient cause), but because the future things themselves are not capable of cognition, nor are they subjected to it; and so it would be clear that they are therefore not known, because they are not objects accommodated to the angelic intellect.[1555] In the same way St. Thomas seems to have spoken in this article in the third reply, when he said that the angel's species are indeed equally disposed toward present, past, and future things; yet the future and the past are not compared to the species in the same mode, because future things, since they are not yet, do not have a nature by which they may be assimilated to the species - as if he were saying: they are not yet suitable objects such that by those species they can be understood, although the species of themselves are of those things which are so future as the past and present can be. This is what the Holy Doctor seems to signify when he says that the species are equally related to present, past, and future. And if Hervaeus, when in a certain opinion which he judges more probable he says that future things are not understood by the species infused into the angel from the beginning, because the future things themselves do not determine the species, wished to teach only this, his doctrine is true. But if he wished to teach what the Doctors alleged in the preceding chapter said in the second mode of replying, his opinion must be impugned in the same way as their reply.

1555. Capreolus, in II, distinctione 3, quaestione 2, articulo 3, ad primum Gregorii, contra tertiam conclusionem, circa finem solutionis.

Objicitur: Someone will object: If God were to infuse into the eye the species of a future color, there would result a vision of it as if it were present, just as we said a little before, that when sensibles withdraw, sensations sometimes remain in the organs of the senses; therefore, in the same way, if the intellect of an angel had the species of a thing which is future, he would not only know it as present and as past when it is truly present and past, but also as future.

Respondeo: I answer that the notion of species in the eye and in the intellect is different. For a species in the eye affords only the vision of color or light according to itself, as if it were present, without any judgment of present, past, or future; but an intelligible species ought to be the principle of knowing a thing with the judgment of future, present, or past. Now the angel cannot have the judgment of the future; and therefore a species in the intellect of a thing which is truly future cannot serve for the intellection of the future, nor is it, with respect to that, a principle of understanding.

I grant that it would be much easier to answer all difficulties if we were to say that the angel does not understand by species given, but by the bare potency of the intellect; and therefore he does not understand future things, because they are not objects naturally accommodated to the intellect. Nevertheless, even if we defend that the angel is endowed with species from the beginning, to dissolve the difficulties, as above, will not be difficult.

Moreover, with respect to the cognition of past things, recent theologians spend much effort, especially in explaining the cognition of past things which is called memory. For memory or recollection is the consideration of a past thing previously known. Some indeed say that memory and recollection occur both in angels and in us by means of a certain species remaining from the past cognition, so that by it we know the thing and the past cognition of it, and this is to recall or to remember it. And in the same way they defend the rationale of memory and recollection in sense: for memory belongs not only to the intelligent part, but also to the sentient, according to the opinion of Aristotle in the book On Memory and Recollection.[1556] But since no sense can sense its own sensation, because a sensation is not itself something sensibly perceptible - otherwise I would sense in what part the sensation occurs, and even of what magnitude it is, which is absurd - it follows that it is not necessary that recollection and memory occur by means of the species of the past cognition; but just as in sense we can defend the rationale of memory and recollection without a species of past cognition, so also we could explain in the intellect recollection and memory without a species of the past cognition, even though memory is a cognition of a past thing and as previously known. To say this in passing - which we leave to be examined more fully by the philosophers - memory in sense occurs in this alone, that we apprehend a past thing with the same circumstances of time and place under which it was previously known to us; for thus we are said to know that thing as past and as previously sensed or known.

But whether an angel can know a past thing as past, which really was past, but which he did not previously know, presents a difficulty - namely, whether an angel, if now created, could by natural power know whatever has been done from the beginning of the world, which, if it were present,

1556. Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia.

would rightly be known by him, or not. And, to tell the truth, I find no reason to say that past things of this sort cannot naturally be known by an angel; for the Scholastics and the Fathers commonly deny to the angel, according to his own proper power, only the cognition of future things; therefore they hold that all other natural things are subject to his cognition. What then can prevent such past things from being known by an angel? First indeed, if we say that he does not need species infused or given by God; for thus by the natural power of the intellect alone, without species, he will know them. Then also, if he needs species for understanding natural objects, and naturally asks to have these infused by God, thus he will have the species of past things, and hence will naturally know them.

Finally, it must be explained how possibles are known by angels. I say, therefore, that the possibles which are in the natural potency of a creature are certainly known by an angel. For since the angel rightly understands and penetrates the force and nature of any creature whatsoever, he will also rightly know all the things that can be done by it. I do not say all individual possibles - for these are infinite - but all possibles diverse according to species. About individuals one must say that each can be known by an angel, not all at once, because they are infinite, but little by little, because there is nothing that he cannot know, if he wills to attend.

Second, I assert that an angel rightly knows all the things that do not imply a contradiction in a creature, as being able to be done by God in the creature itself; for example, whether he could cause cognition without any concurrence of the creature, whether he could again create a thing produced and annihilated, and other things of that kind. The reason is that an angel so perfectly understands the nature and properties of any creature whatsoever, that he also rightly knows what repugns to it or implies a contradiction with respect to it. Supposing also that he rightly knows already the nature of sin and of grace, he rightly knows whether by the absolute power of God they can be together, whether sin can be blotted out without grace or without any other intrinsic change.

Third and finally, I pronounce that the possible futures of substances which can be produced by God alone are not known by an angel - not only not all of them, but not even any one of them. And so an angel does not know whether God can produce this kind of beasts and brute animals, this rational creature, or another. I said in particular this kind or this species; for in general he rightly knows that it is possible...

Articulus IV - Whether angels know the thoughts of hearts

It seems that angels know the thoughts of hearts.

1. For St. Gregory says in the Moralia, on that word of Job 28: "Gold or glass shall not be equal to it," that then, namely in the beatitude of the risen, one will be transparent to another as he is to himself, and when the intellect of each one cleaves to another, at the same time his conscience is penetrated. But the risen will be like the angels, as is had in Matthew 22. Therefore one angel can see that which is in the conscience of another.

2. Further, as figures stand to bodies, so intelligible species stand to the intellect. But by seeing a body, its figure is seen. Therefore, by seeing an intellectual substance, the intelligible species which is in it is seen. Therefore, since an angel sees another angel and also a soul, it seems that he can see the thought of each.
3. Further, the things which are in our intellect are more like an angel than the things which are in the phantasy, since the former are understood in act, but the latter are in potency. But the things which are in the phantasy can be known by an angel, just as bodily things can, since the phantasy is a power of the body. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect.

But on the contrary: What is proper to God does not befit angels. But to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God, according to Jeremiah 17: "The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable, and who shall know it? I the Lord search," etc. Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

I answer: It must be said that the thought of the heart can be known in two ways.

- In one way in its effect, and thus it can be known not only by an angel, but also by a man, and so much the more subtly, the more occult the effect of this kind has been. For a thought is sometimes known not only through an outward act, but also through a change of the countenance. And even physicians can know certain affections of the mind by the pulse, and much more angels or even demons, insofar as they more subtly weigh these hidden bodily alterations. Whence St. Augustine says in the book On the Divination of Demons, that sometimes the dispositions of men, not only uttered by the voice, but even conceived in thought, when certain signs are expressed in the body from the mind, they learn with entire facility; although in the book of the Retractions he says that it ought not to be asserted how this happens.
- In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the intellect, and affections as they are in the will. And thus God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and the affections of wills. The reason of this is: because the will of a rational creature is subject to God alone, and He alone can operate in it, who is its principal object as ultimate end; and this will be made clearer below. And therefore the things which depend on the will alone, or which are in the will alone, are known to God alone. Now it is manifest that it depends on the will alone that someone actually consider something; for when someone has the habit of science, or intelligible species existing in him, he uses them when he wills. And therefore the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2 that "the things that are of man, no one knows but the spirit of man, which is in him."

Reply to the first: The thought of one man is not known by another on account of a twofold impediment, namely on account of the grossness of the body, and on account of the will shutting up its secrets. The first obstacle will be taken away in the resurrection, and it is not in angels. But

the second impediment will remain after the resurrection, and is now in angels. And yet by the quality of the mind, according as, together with the measure of grace and glory, the clarity of the body will represent it, thus one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply to the second: Granted that one angel see the intelligible species of another by this, that the mode of intelligible species according to greater and lesser universality is proportioned to the nobility of substances; it does not follow that one knows in what manner the other uses those intelligible species, by actually considering.

Reply to the third: The brute appetite is not master of its act, but follows the impression of another cause, bodily or spiritual. Therefore, since angels know bodily things and their dispositions, they can through these know what is in the appetite and in the phantastic apprehension of brute animals, and even of men, insofar as in them the sensitive appetite sometimes proceeds into act by following some bodily impression, as it is always in brutes. Yet it does not follow that angels know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the phantastic apprehension of man insofar as they are moved by the will and reason; because the lower part of the soul also in some manner participates in reason, as an obedient subject to one commanding, as is said in Ethics I. Nor yet does it follow that if an angel knows what is in the sensitive appetite or in the phantasy of a man, he therefore knows that which is in the thought or will: because intellect and will do not lie subject to the sensitive appetite and to the phantasy, but can use them in diverse modes.

Conclusion: The thoughts and affections of hearts, as they are in the intellect and will, cannot be known by an angel by his natural power, but by God alone. Concerning this article not only the things which pertain to it itself seem to be to be examined, but also all those which concern question 107 about the speaking of angels, which are connected to this article. In the first place, however, we shall treat the things which the Holy Doctor teaches in this article.

- Whether the thoughts and affections of our heart are certainly known by an angel by his own power. Disputation 209.
- The thoughts of the heart, the volitions, to be known by angels, not only what they are, but also about what they are, was the opinion of Hervaeus and Durandus. Cap. I.
- That the secrets of hearts are not known by angels, the divine will hindering alone, was said by Scotus and others. Cap. 2.
- The common opinion, which asserts that the secrets of hearts cannot by their nature be known by angels, is explained by the Man of Strasbourg and by Aegidius. Cap. 3.
- The second and third mode by which the aforesaid common opinion is explained by Henry. Cap. 4.
- The fourth mode of explaining the same common opinion, from St. Thomas, Alexander, and others, is confirmed by the reasoning of Richard. Cap. 5.
- The same mode of defending the common opinion is otherwise proved by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and Ferrariensis; whom Scotus and Durandus impugn. Cap. 6.

- To Durandus's argument Ferrariensis replies. Cap. 7.
- To the same argument of Durandus Cajetan replies. Cap. 8.
- The common opinion is confirmed by another reason by St. Gregory. Cap. 9.
- The author's judgment in the present controversy.

Cogitationes cordis, and volitions to be known by angels, not only what they are, but also about what they are, was the opinion of Hervaeus and Durandus.

Disputatio CCIX - On whether angels know the thoughts of hearts

Caput I - Hervaeus and Durandus: that angels know thoughts and volitions, not only what they are but also what they are about

The present controversy is to be understood not only about the affections of the will (*voluntas*), but also about the thoughts of the intellect (*intellectus*); for by the name "knowledge of the heart" we now wish to understand both. We speak also not only of the cognitions of an angelic heart, but also of a human one; and we inquire whether one angel can know the secret thoughts of the heart of another angel, or of a man, before they are manifested by the will of that angel or of that man. In which question the opinions of theologians are so various that scarcely can we review each without prolixity. However, that we may elucidate this matter, it will be necessary to pursue not only what is proved for us, but also what is said by others.

The first opinion, then, is that of Hervaeus in the second book, distinction 8, question 3, asserting that the thoughts of our heart, or of one angel, can be so known by another angel that it is manifest to him not only what those thoughts are, but also about what they are, that is, about which object they are engaged; whether also they be after the mode of flight or of pursuit, of affirmation or of negation: only one thing indeed being hidden from one angel, namely to discern about which object the affection and thought of another angel or of a man is borne more intensely. The sole foundation of this opinion and of the following one is this, namely, that the thoughts and affections of the heart are certain natural entities, not otherwise than the substance of the very angel himself, indeed of far inferior account; what, then, can hinder that they should be most certainly known and understood by any angel who perfectly beholds the substance of another, even if they are not manifested?

Durandus makes mention of this opinion in the same distinction, question 5, number 10, and he not only judges it probable, but also adds that the thoughts and affections of one angel, or of a man, are altogether known by another angel: first, what they are; then, about what they are engaged, after the mode of flight or of pursuit, of affirmation or of negation; finally, about which object the man or the angel operates more intently. For he holds that no reason can be assigned why, when an angel knows the thoughts and affections of the heart, what they are and about which object, whether they be engaged after the mode of affirmation and negation, he should not also be able to

know about what they operate more intently; and since he deems sufficient the reason adduced above, that an angel be said to know affections and thoughts in the manner that Hervaeus said, he was induced to assert that affections and thoughts are altogether known by an angel.

This opinion, understood in either way, is opposed to the manifest testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers. First indeed, Scripture plainly indicates that it belongs to God alone to know the thoughts of the heart: Psalm 7, "God, who searches hearts and reins"; Wisdom 1, "Because God is witness of his (namely of man's) affairs, and the searcher of his heart"; Jeremiah 11, "Who tries the reins and the heart." For if the hearts of men were manifest to all angels, or to the angels mutually among themselves, the Scriptures would not adduce this encomium as something great and proper to God Himself. But someone may say that this encomium is so attributed to God that it also befits angels, as that of Psalm 146: "Who numbereth the multitude of the stars, and calleth all of them by their names"; by which words the prophet seems to prefer the Lord to men. Yet in that Psalm something also peculiar is attributed to God. For when it is said, "and He calleth all of them by their names," Scripture denotes not only God's perspicuous intelligence, which comprehends all the stars by a certain number and so penetrates their nature that He can give them names expressing their properties and natures, but also that each single star is so called by God that it obeys His nod and will. Then too there are other places of Scripture in which it is openly said that it is of God alone to know the thoughts of the heart: Jeremiah 17, "The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable: who shall know it?" But if an angel could in the same way know it, it would be asked in vain, who shall know it; nor would Scripture reply, "I the Lord," and in 2 Paralipomenon 6, when Solomon besought God to hear those coming to the holy temple which he had built, he said: "Do Thou hear from heaven, etc., be propitious and render to each according to his ways, which Thou knowest him to have in his heart: for Thou only knowest the hearts of the sons of men."

But Durandus replies, in the aforesaid question, number 16, that it is proper to God to know all the thoughts of hearts present and future, which befits no creature. Yet the reply is frivolous. For Scripture speaks plainly also of present thoughts: for when Solomon said in 2 Paralipomenon 6, "For Thou only knowest," he was speaking of the thoughts of those who were to pray in the temple. Moreover, he asks that the Lord render...

The Lord renders to those praying in that place according to their ways, because He alone knows the hearts of the sons of men, that is, the things which they have in their heart when they pray: therefore He is not speaking of future thoughts, but of present ones, for which God is about to grant the petitions.

Moreover, Herveus in that question, in the solution to the first, replies that in these places of Scripture it is signified that it is proper to God to know fully, perfectly, and in every way the secrets of the heart; but to see and to know also certainly and evidently, yet not in all ways, is not the proper prerogative of God alone, but also befits the angels. But how frivolous this solution is is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and will be gathered from what we shall say below.

Then the same position is refuted by the Fathers. Among the Greeks, St. John Chrysostom, homily 30 on Matthew, on those words, "Why do you think evil in your hearts?" and homily 23 on Matthew on this, "And when He was at Jerusalem," says: The knowledge of human hearts belongs to God alone, who formed them. St. Cyril teaches plainly the same in book 9 on John, chapter 19, and book 3, chapter 3, and Athanasius in the book of Questions to Antiochus, question 27.[1557] Add also St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, a little before the middle, who says that angels, without speech, mutually communicate to one another the counsels of their own heart.[1558] Among the Latins, St. Jerome, Epistle 40, which is about the two sons, speaks thus: For God alone stands in the sight of all sinners, from whom even sins meditated in the heart cannot be concealed. And on that passage Matthew 9, "Behold some of the scribes," etc., he says: But the Lord, seeing their thoughts, showed that He is God, who can know the secrets of the heart. But if angels could penetrate the secrets of hearts, neither would God alone be present to the hearts of men, nor would it be a sufficient argument of divinity to know the secrets of hearts. St. Ambrose agrees on that 1 Corinthians 2, "The Spirit searches all things." The author also of the work On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, among the works of St. Augustine, chapter 81, thus writes: We are certain that the devil does not see the inner thoughts of the soul.[1559] And St. Augustine, tractate 32 on John, a little before the middle, from that testimony 1 Corinthians 2, teaches that the secrets of the human heart are certainly known by no other than by the man himself and by God.

The reason also by which Herveus proves that it can indeed be known by an angel what the secrets of hearts are, and about what they are, and whether they are on the mode of affirmation or of negation about the object, yet not about which object the man, or the angel, operates more intensely, is rightly repelled by Durandus and is judged trifling by others, which reason is this. The more a species is distant from the thing represented, because it represents it remotely, the less it expresses it; but the species existing in the mind of one angel represents remotely the secrets of the heart of another angel or of a man; therefore it represents and expresses them less; hence it follows, says Herveus, that although an angel knows the secrets of another's heart, what they are and what they are about, nevertheless he cannot discern about what the man, or the angel, operates more intensely. Yet this reason, as Durandus correctly noted, only proves that a thing thought by one angel is not so well known by another angel as it is known by him who thinks it: because the cognition of a thought either represents remotely or is borne toward the thing thought; it does not, however, prove that it cannot be known by one angel about what another operates more intensely: for to this it is not necessary to know the thing thought by another angel as well as he himself knows it.

That the secrets of hearts are not known by angels, solely because the divine will prevents it, was said by Scotus and others.[1560]

1557. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 30 in Matth.; Hom. 23 in Matth.; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, lib. 9, cap. 19; lib. 3, cap. 3; Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum, quaest. 27.

1558. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, cap. 3.

1559. Ps.-Augustine, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, cap. 81.

1560. Cf. Scotus, II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2; IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 4; and others cited below.

Thus thought Scotus in II, distinction 9, question 2; to the arguments of the second question, in the solution

to the first; and in IV, distinction 10, question 4, article to the arguments, in the solution to the third; Ockham in II, question 20, Quodlibet 4, question 13; Gabriel in II, distinction 9, question 2, article 2, and on the Canon of the Mass, lecture 31; Bassolis on the same distinction, question 2, 5, To the first principal, in the second and ninth solution; but against this mode Lichetus, question 1, which he puts in the third place in question 3; Holcot in II, question 4, to the second principal question.[1561] Furthermore, all the Doctors cited agree with Scotus in the first part of this opinion in the same way; in the latter part, however, not in the same way: for the others, besides Scotus, affirm that de facto the secrets of the human heart and of another angel are ignored both by good angels and by bad. But Scotus, although in the second book of the Sentences, in the place cited, he had taught that the secrets of one can be known with certainty by another angel by their own nature, nor can they be hidden by the will of the angel or of the man to whom they belong, later, in the fourth, in the question cited, asserts that evil angels are prevented by God, lest they can know the secrets of hearts: but as to the good, he seems to think that in no way are they impeded by God. By what manner, indeed, angels can speak with one another, below in disputation 211 we shall see.

They prove this opinion as to the former part, first, because cognition and affection, whether of this sort be natural or free, is a certain created natural being, true, and therefore intelligible: what then can hinder, that it not be known by an angel, who also quidditatively knows any created spiritual substance? Then he confirms the same part, because no sufficient reason can be assigned, for which we should say that the secrets of his own heart can be hidden by each man or angel, lest they be seen by another angel, and by the same thing be made manifest by will alone: thus, therefore, it must be said that the manifestation or hiding of counsels and affections of his will to another angel does not depend upon the will of a man or of an angel; and hence by their own nature, unless they be prevented by God, individual angels can know the secrets of others.

The latter part of this opinion these Doctors added chiefly for this reason, in order somehow to satisfy the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers. For, as we saw in the preceding chapter, they plainly pronounce that it is of God alone to know another's secrets. Besides these two points which we have said, Maior adds that it is necessary for an angel to be placed at a certain distance according to place, that he may be able to understand the secrets of the heart: just as also, that a man may see colors with the bodily eye, he needs such and such proximity according to place. But Maior understands that, with the impediment of the will of God removed, which impediment not being present, the angel by his own nature would know the secrets of a man or of another angel at a certain distance, but not at any distance whatsoever.

This opinion, although it teaches truly in this respect, that it asserts that the secrets of a man, or of one angel, are in fact not known by another: for this the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers manifestly demonstrate, as we said above: yet in this respect, that they assert that by their

1561. Scotus, II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2; IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 4; William of Ockham, II, q. 20; Quodlibet IV, q. 13; Gabriel, II, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2; in Canonem missae, lect. 31; Bassolis, ad eandem dist., q. 2, 5, ad primum principale, solut. 2 et 9; Lichetus, q. 1 (posited third) in q. 3; Holcot, II, q. 4, ad secundum principale quaesitum.

own nature such secrets can be known by any angel, and that solely by the will of God they are prevented from being known by them, it is with very good right not approved by all other Theologians. But before I show its falsity, I am pleased to impugn, with this reason, that which Maior asserted about distance according to place. Although any creature, even a spiritual one, needs nearness of place to act upon some external matter, as we said in disputation 189, chapter 2, nevertheless to understand those things it does not seem to need it: both because an angel does not receive species or cognition from corporeal things, as we showed in disputation 200; and also because even if it were said that an angel receives cognition from things, we ought not to understand this as happening by the multiplied action of corporeal things through a medium as far as the angel. For the same reason, which below against some is to be proved, in the speech of angels nearness of place is not necessary. This, therefore, set aside, the opinion of Scotus and of the others is impugned as to its two parts.

First indeed from the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, adduced in the preceding chapter, since thus Scripture and the Fathers attribute to God the knowing of the secrets of human hearts, or even of angels, in such a way that it belongs to Him alone: therefore either they signify that these secrets de facto are known by God alone: and this would be false, because others besides God de facto know the secrets of the human heart, for guardian angels and saints know our prayers which we offer them, and good desires; therefore not God alone knows them: or Scripture and the Fathers signify that they are known by God alone by His own proper power, and in this way it is proper to God: and thus, against this opinion, it is gathered that the secrets of hearts cannot be known by angels by their own power.

Then by reason the same is proved, because it is not credible that by God perpetually both evil and even good angels are impeded lest they know the secrets of hearts, and that against their natural power He continually inflict this constraint on them. For that God hinders the power of demons, lest they do many things which they could accomplish by their own power, is not to be wondered at: for the order of this universe requires it, lest many things perish in a single moment; indeed to this end good angels are believed to be appointed as guardians, that they may resist demons and defend our affairs from their power: but that demons and angels are impeded from the knowledge of the secrets of the heart, I do not see by what reason it ought to be done. But if someone should say that they are impeded as a punishment of their sin, that is not sufficient: for by this same reason they ought to be impeded from natural cognition of other things: and since not all angels, even the good, know the secrets of the human heart, it must not be said that they are perpetually impeded by God, since neither as a punishment nor for another just cause ought that to be done.

This opinion of Scotus also is accustomed to be opposed by legitimate arguments; those by which it is wont to be confirmed by some reasons have been set forth; but the arguments against it are those which we have adduced hitherto.

Communis sententia, quae asserit secreta cordium non posse ab Angelis suapte natura cognosci; a Thoma de Argentina, et Aegidio explicatur.

Caput III - The common and much more probable opinion is that the secrets of the heart of one man, or of an angel, cannot be known by another angel.

Thus teaches St. Thomas in this article and in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 53; and the Ferrariensis there; Alexander, part 2, question 26, member 3; St. Bonaventure in the second book, distinction 8, part 2, article 1, question 6; Richard, the same distinction, article 2, question 4; Capreolus, question 1, article 1; Durandus, question 5; Thomas of Argentina, distinction 7, question 1, article 2; Aegidius, question 2, article 2, and in the treatise On Angelic Cognition, question 1; Gregory in the second book, question 1; Marsilius in question 6, article 4; Henry in Quodlibet 3, question 13.[1562] The common and principal foundation of all of these is that which has hitherto been adduced from Scripture and the Fathers; yet in explaining this same opinion they do not a little differ: for although all say that something of the secret of the human and of the angelic heart lies hidden, what, however, that secret is, not all understand in the same way. I shall therefore relate various ways of defending and explaining this opinion, so that in the end I may leave to the judgment of some what in it is more probable. Nor indeed in a matter so difficult do I dare to pass judgment on anything.

It is not enough: for by this same reasoning the natural cognition of other things ought to be impeded; and since not all angels, even the good, know the secrets of the human heart, it must not be said that they are perpetually impeded by God, since neither as a punishment, nor for any other just cause, ought that to be done. This opinion of Scotus also is wont to be impugned by certain reasons by which the opposite is usually confirmed; yet the most powerful arguments against it are those which we have hitherto adduced.

The common opinion explained by Thomas of Argentina and Aegidius

The common and much more probable opinion is that the secrets of the heart of one man, or of one angel, cannot be known by another angel. Thus teach St. Thomas in this article and in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 154; and Ferrariensis in the same place, § Circa id, quod de occultis cordium; Alexander of Hales, Summa II, q. 26, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 8, pars 2, a. 1, q. 6; Richard of St. Victor, to the same distinction, a. 2, q. 4; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1; Durandus, q. 5; Thomas of Argentina, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 2; Aegidius Romanus, q. 2, a. 2; the Treatise on the Knowledge of Angels, q. 11; Gregory, II, q. 1; Marsilius, q. 6, a. 4; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 13.[1563]

The common and principal foundation of them all is what has been brought forward up to now from Scripture and the Fathers. Yet in explaining that opinion they do not a little vary: for although they all say that something of the secret of the human and angelic heart lies hidden, still what that

1562. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 57, a. 4; Contra Gentiles III, c. 53; Francesco de' Ferrarisi (Ferrariensis), ad loc.; Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 26, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 8, pars 2, a. 1, q. 6; Richard of St. Victor, ad eandem dist., a. 2, q. 4; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1; Durandus, q. 5; Thomas of Argentina, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 2; Aegidius Romanus, q. 2, a. 2; Tractatus de cognitione Angelorum, q. 1; Gregory, II, q. 1; Marsilius, q. 6, a. 4; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 13.

secret is, not all understand in the same way. I will therefore set forth various modes of defending and explaining this opinion, so that at length what in it is more probable I may leave for the judgment of others to decide. Nor indeed would I dare to prejudge anything in a matter so difficult.

Let the first mode be that of Thomas of Argentina in the place cited, who asserts that the act of intellection and the cogitation of the intellect of one man or angel are indeed known by another angel as to the signification of the terms, but not as to the composition and division; as if he should say that any angel by his native power knows what another apprehends and about what he is thinking; but he does not discern consent and dissent, that is, a composition affirming or denying. In the same way he philosophizes about acts of the will (*voluntas*): because the will pursues nothing by an act of complacency, nor flees by an act of displeasure, except what has been judged to be fitting or unfitting. Wherefore he concedes that the act of the will of another is known by one angel, as to the thing about which it is occupied; but whether it be of complacency or of displeasure, it is not known.

Of this opinion Aegidius seems to have been in the place cited, where he said that the cogitations of one angel can rightly be known by another in such wise that he knows what intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) he uses for understanding, whether the species of white or of black, but he does not, however, discern what in particular he thinks. For since (he says) the same species of the same thing in the intellect of an angel or of a man can serve to know habit and privation, to composition affirming and denying about the same thing, it is not wonderful if one angel is ignorant what another angel or man is thinking, even if he knows what species he uses for understanding. Of acts of the will Aegidius said nothing, but perhaps he is in the same opinion.

Durandus mentions this opinion in the place cited, and also the opinion of Herveus, which differs little from this, and he judges both to be probable, and more conformable to the sense of the common Doctors and of Scripture. Herveus, however, refutes it at greatest length in the question cited, especially by this reasoning: it is impossible by the same concept or by the same expressed species (*species expressa*), altogether invariable, to understand various things successively, or about the same thing to know now affirmatively, now negatively; therefore, if an angel knows the concept and the expressed species in the mind of one, and knows about what thing it is, he must necessarily understand what about that thing the angel or man thinks, whether he affirms or denies. And since there is not given one and the same species which is of itself indifferent to knowing contraries or diverse things as one pleases, it must necessarily be said either that it is not known by one angel about what thing another is thinking, or else that it is altogether known what and how he thinks about that thing. Moreover, that it is not possible by the same expressed species, remaining invariable, to know different things successively, or to know in a different mode, is

1563. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 57, a. 4; Contra Gentiles III, c. 154; Francesco de' Ferrarisi (Ferrariensis), ad loc.; Alexander of Hales, Summa II, q. 26, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 8, pars 2, a. 1, q. 6; Richard of St. Victor, ad eandem dist., a. 2, q. 4; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1; Durandus, q. 5; Thomas of Argentina, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 2; Aegidius Romanus, q. 2, a. 2; Tractatus de cognitione Angelorum, q. 11; Gregory, II, q. 1; Marsilius, q. 6, a. 4; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 13.

admitted especially by Thomas of Argentina and by Aegidius, since they say that there is not the same numerically quality and species which is of itself indifferent to things opposite or diverse or to be thought in a different way.

By an excellent reason Henry also proves it: because it cannot be that someone be reduced from potency (*potentia*) to the act (*actus*) of understanding with no change made in him. Therefore, if someone now thinks one thing in one way, he will not then be able by the very same quality altogether to think a different thing or the same in a different way. Nay rather, if we follow a more probable opinion, as often as we know diversely about some thing, we cannot but have a knowledge and cogitation expressed altogether diverse from the prior: nor can the same act, which is the complacency of one thing, be varied so as to be the flight and displeasure of the same thing or of another. Wherefore it is rightly inferred that there is not the same expressed species of itself indifferent to understanding various things; and therefore either in no way are the cogitations of another known by one angel by his own power, or else they are altogether known.

Someone will say that the change of a new relation supervening suffices, so that by the same species various things or in a various mode are known. This, however, is frivolous, as Herveus says: for no relation can begin unless a prior change has been made in the related, or in the very terminus. Since, therefore, the things thought by the angel are not changed when he himself begins to think what before he did not think, it follows that the change must be made in the cogitation itself. And if someone says that this can be done by a merely rational relation varied, this is the more ridiculous: both because a relation of reason or an extrinsic denomination cannot begin without a prior real change made in the related, or in the terminus, or in some other thing; and here no change seems possible unless it be made in the cogitation itself: and also because for a new real cogitation in us, an extrinsic denomination or relation alone does not seem sufficient; but some physical change in the species itself is necessary.

In exactly the same way it ought to be proved that the affect of the will about some thing cannot be known without its also being known in what way it is conversant about that thing: because there is no affect of itself indifferent so as to be complacency or displeasure, pursuit or flight. But if in the same act of the intellect we should concede affirmation and negation together, and in the same act of the will flight and pursuit, it cannot be that that act be certainly known, insofar as it is intellection, but not insofar as it is at once affirmation and negation; and that an act of the will be known as it is an affect about this thing, but not as it is pursuit or flight.

Durandus, overcome by the force of this argument in the question cited, yet so that he might defend as probable the aforesaid opinion of Aegidius and of Argentina, says at number 14 of the question cited, that it can be answered that all acts of the intellect and of the will are of the same species; to wit, whether they be affirmations or negations, pursuits or flights: yet that there is another difference besides the difference of intension and remission. And by this reasoning he thinks that in some way the opinion of Herveus can be defended, as we shall say, namely, that the cogitations and affects of another can be known by an angel as to what they are about, but not as to how they are.

But although we should concede to Durandus that cogitations and affects are not distinguished according to species, indeed nor even according to intension, nevertheless the argument made above would retain its force: for it is necessary to grant another distinction and change for this, that by the same quality the same thing be in a different way the object of cogitation and of affect successively, as has been shown: because the same quality, remaining in the same way, will always be conversant in the same way about the object, whether that quality be a cogitation or an affect.

Finally, someone could say on behalf of the opinion of Argentina and Aegidius that it is indeed known by one angel, certainly and evidently, what impressed intelligible species (*species intelligibilis impressa*) another angel or man uses; yet not what expressed species (*species expressa*) and cogitation he expresses: for the same impressed species is of itself indifferent to eliciting this or that cogitation about the same thing: wherefore it does not follow from this, that because one knows what species another uses, he also knows what he thinks. But this doctrine is altogether different from the aforesaid opinion. For Aegidius and Argentina plainly concede that the cogitation of another is known by one angel, and therefore the expressed likeness and species, which is the very cogitation. Wherefore according to their opinion, not only does one angel know what impressed species another uses to elicit a cogitation, but also what expressed species and cogitation he has. Moreover, it cannot be that one angel certainly knows what impressed species another uses to elicit a cogitation, unless he also knows the cogitation itself: for since no change is made in the impressed species from this, that an angel or a man uses it to elicit an intellection, it cannot be that one angel should know what species rather another angel uses, unless he sees the effect of it, namely the cogitation itself, for the eliciting of which the other uses the impressed species.

Furthermore, if this opinion of Argentina and Aegidius were true, all the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers could be explained. For if from one angel the affirmation or negation of a cogitation, the displeasure and complacency, the flight or pursuit of an affect, were hidden, even though the cogitation and affect were manifest, only in that respect in which they are conversant about such an object: then indeed it could rightly be said that the secrets of hearts, even affects and cogitations, are known and discerned by no one other than by God and by the very man or angel to whom they belong. For since he does not know the affirmation nor the negation, nor the flight, nor the pursuit, he is not said to know the affects and cogitations: because he does not understand of what sort the cogitation or affect is.

Caput IV - The second and third mode, by which Henry explains the aforesaid common opinion

The second mode of explaining the aforesaid common opinion, partly different from the preceding, is that of Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 13, who teaches two things. One is that the cogitations of a man, or of one angel, according to their own natures, can be excellently known by another angel and by a demon by their proper power, not only as to what object they are about, but

also whether they are affirmations or negations. The other is that it is not known by one angel to what end those cogitations are directed by another angel or by a man: and this he calls the secret of the heart, which can be known by God alone.

But, in order to explain how it is that from one angel it is hidden to what end the cogitations of another are directed, and therefore that even his affect is unknown, he notes that two things are of themselves considered in the will (*voluntas*), namely the very act of affection and of will which is elicited: and this he says is known to any angel not only in its exterior effect, but also in itself; and the relation (*relatio*) of the will to the object, which adds nothing of entity above the will - this relation Henry himself calls the intention of the will about the object, and the internal virtue - and he says that this is the secret of the heart, which is known to God alone and to the one having it.

Wherefore this author concedes that it is rightly known by one angel what another angel or man is thinking, indeed even about what he has an affect and an intent of mind: because he knows the substance (*substantia*) of the affect of the will: but to what end he directs the affect is altogether hidden. Accordingly, according to Henry, one angel knows whether a man thinks about a woman, and whether he has an affect about her; but whether to concubinage, or to another end, he is ignorant.

Moreover, he proves that the cogitations and affects even freely elicited by the will of one are rightly known by another: because they are certain qualities and entities of the natural order existing in the nature of things. What therefore can hinder, so that they cannot be evidently and certainly known by another angel? By which reasoning Scotus proved that every cogitation and affect of one angel or of a man is by its own nature known to another angel, unless he be impeded by God. Furthermore, that relation of the affect, which Henry called intention and internal virtue, to be unknown to another angel, he confirms by no reason; but seems to have contrived it solely so that he might reserve some hidden thing of the heart to God, which by its nature to any created intellect, other than to the one having it, would be unknown: and by this means on the one hand he would satisfy the places of Scripture and of the Fathers, in which it is said that the secrets of the heart are known to God alone; on the other hand he would concede, on account of the reasoning made, that the intellections and affections of one angel or man are known to another angel.

Yet this opinion seems no less without foundation than the preceding. First, because the intention of the will appears to be nothing other than the affect of complacency and of love or of hate: for intention is essentially an act (*actus*) of the will elicited by it. Therefore he who knows the affect elicited also knows the intention of the will about this or that object. For what can be more secret in the human heart than the love and affect of it? Wherefore, if an angel rightly knows that a certain man thinks about the beauty of a woman, and knows the affect of love or of hate about her: in the same way...

In the same way he will know whether he is thinking of embracing her, or of some other shameful act with her, and whether he loves or hates her; and accordingly he will know whether he is thinking of her with an intention of enjoying her embraces, or of fleeing her.

It is frivolous to assert that the intention of the will is that relation which Henry fabricates: for intention is an affect and an act elicited by the will (actus elicitus voluntatis), that is, an appetite (*appetitio*). Secondly, by what rationale, in the acts of the will (*voluntas*), is the act itself and the affect distinguished from that relation, and only in that relation is there said to be a hidden secret? By the same token in the intellect (*intellectus*) intellection (*intellectio*) ought to be distinguished from that relation, and in that relation a secret even of the intellect ought to be constituted, which would be known only to God and to the angel; and just as, in that relation of the will according to Henry, intention (*intentio*) is to be constituted: so too in the relation of the intellect would be constituted the ground of assent, of composition and division, of affirmation and negation. Wherefore, with Thomas of Argentina, we shall say that the intellections and thoughts of another can indeed be known by an angel, what they are and about what they are, not only of what sort they are - a point which Henry, as I judge, would not deny. Accordingly I said that his opinion differs little from the opinion of Argentina; but the latter has already been sufficiently refuted above.

Thirdly, that relation which is in the will besides affect and love, and is called intention, is either real (*realis*) or of reason (*rationis*), proceeding only from an extrinsic denomination of the very act of love and of the affect. If it is real, then either it is inborn to the faculty of the will, or it comes to it from without. If it is inborn, it follows that it is always entirely the same - which is absurd; for thus there would always be in us the same intention of mind. But if it comes to the power of the will, and can be absent from it (since a man does not always remain in the same intention), it follows that it is really distinct from the power, at least as a mode is distinguished from the thing of which it is the mode, according to what we noted above in disputation 217, chapter 5, and 219, chapter 3: because that, without which another can be, is distinguished from it by nature of the thing, and in some way really, or more than by reason. However it be said, for my part I do not see first by what account the very affect of love and of hate of one angel or man could be known by another, and yet that relation, since it is of the same order, could not be. Then, if this relation comes to the power and is not inborn to it, as is manifest, there must be some foundation of it: and no other seems to be than the act itself and the affect of love. But a relation founded on an affect is received rather in the affect itself, as in its proximate subject, than proximately in the very power of the will. He, therefore, who knows the affect clearly and as it is, as Henry admits is known by an angel, will also be able to know that relation, and accordingly the intention. Moreover, if that relation which is called intention were of reason, it would be known by an angel in the same way: for this denomination in the power would proceed from the very act elicited regarding such an object. Therefore, since one angel certainly knows the affect of another, he will also know such a denomination or relation, which Henry calls intention. From what other foundation such a relation could arise Henry cannot show.

Furthermore, if this mode of philosophizing and of explaining the common opinion were true, one could not ineptly defend what that common view maintains and what the testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture signify, namely, that there is something hidden and secret of the heart of a man or of an angel which cannot be known by another angel.

Thirdly, the same Henry, in another way, explains and defends that common opinion in Quodlibet 5, question 15, where he treats of angelic speech and illumination, so that in the same concept and thought of one angel there is something which is hidden from another angel. For he thinks that by one and the same concept there is known by an angel the universal and the singular of the object: and that the concept is manifest to the other angel insofar as it concerns the universal; but hidden and unknown insofar as it is engaged with the singular. Yet this mode of philosophizing could be assailed in the same way as the preceding ones; and we shall discuss it more at length below in disputation 211, where there must be treatment of the speech of the angels.

A fourth mode of explaining the same common opinion, from St. Thomas, Alexander, and others, is confirmed by the reasoning of Richard.

On the same, as defended by later authors

Lastly, from writers the aforesaid points seem to be interpreted and defended in another way.

That the affections of the will and the thoughts are the "secrets of hearts" and are not certainly known by another angel

This common opinion of St. Thomas is defended by Cajetan and more recent theologians on this article; Alexander, St. Bonaventure, Marsilius, Gregory, Capreolus, and Ferrariensis in the places cited. They say, therefore, that the affections of the will of one angel or of a man cannot be known with certainty by another angel; and they call these affections the secrets of hearts. The same seems to be taught about thoughts by St. Thomas, Cajetan, Marsilius, Gregory, Capreolus, and Ferrariensis - except that, as is gathered from the reasons of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Richard, and Capreolus, they speak only about cognitions which depend upon man's free power, as will be clear in the next disputation, and on that account only inasmuch as they depend on the free will.

They vary, however, in confirming the common opinion, in which Alexander, St. Bonaventure, Marsilius, and Gregory agree: for they prove it only from Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers, about which enough and more than enough was said in chapter one of this disputation.

Richard, however, proves it in this way. One angel is not intimately present to our soul, or to another angel: therefore he needs species (*species intelligibiles*) in order to know those singulars which begin to exist in the soul or in the angel, by species derived from them into his intellect - as we reported above in disputation 201, chapter 1. Therefore one angel cannot know the singular affections and thoughts of another angel or of a man unless he receives species from them. But those things which are voluntary in an angel or in our soul, such as affections and free thoughts, do

not of themselves produce species, unless by the motion of the will of him in whom they are. Therefore, unless the man or angel wills, they cannot send species into the intellect of another angel; and consequently they cannot be known for certain.

But this reason has no force.

It is refuted first. First, because distance according to place can in no way hinder something from being known by an angel, as was already noted above in disputation 204, chapter 2, and will be said in disputation 212, chapter 2; just as nearness according to place can in no way help. If this sufficed, that one angel could certainly know and behold the thoughts and affections of another angel or man, they could easily be known by an angel in this way: because one can be at the same time in place with another, as we showed in disputation 193, chapter 4. It would therefore be in the power of anyone to draw near to another and to gaze upon his heart.

Then, although an angel might understand through species of present things, yet he would not receive them from things, even spiritual things, but would have them from the beginning infused in him or inborn: why then would he not have species of thoughts and affections so as to understand them, if otherwise they were a natural and suitable object for the intellect?

Finally, if we were to say that in angels there are no species of singular things, but that they receive them from things present, there would be no reason why we should assert that an angel does not receive from present thoughts and affections, without the command and will of him in whom they are. For although these operations are free, and so are subject to the liberty of the will, so that one can elicit them and not elicit them, nevertheless, once elicited they do not obey the command of the will in what they produce of themselves. Wherefore, so as to produce a habit in the will itself, or in the intellect, they do not obey its command; but, whether the will wills or wills not, an affect and a thought once freely elicited cannot, against the will, fail to produce a habit. Therefore, since they of themselves produce a species in the intellect of another, if they produce it, it will not depend on the command of reason whether they produce it or not.

Add also that by this reasoning men who are rude and ignorant could never, nor even those who are learned and who would not follow this opinion, speak with angels and explain their mind to them. For if that were to be understood by the angel through a species derived from the affect and thought, and it were to be subject to the free will of the one having the cognition and the affect that some species be derived from them into the intellect of the angel, it would never be derived until the man wished such a species to be produced. But no ignorant person, nor even any learned one who would not follow this opinion of Richard, would ever will that such a species be produced, because either he would not attend to this, or in no way would he believe that this could be done; therefore he would never manifest his mind to an angel.

You may say perhaps that it is enough that a species of the thought and affect be produced at once in the other, if the man or the angel wills that the other know his mind, although he does not expressly will that a species of his thought or affect be produced in the intellect of the other. But this is frivolous. For who does not see that, for a thought to produce a species from itself, it matters

nothing at all whether the will of the one having such a thought wills to manifest it; as though the thought itself had intellect, and as soon as that will was posited it understood that it could not otherwise be manifested than by producing from itself a species in the intellect of the other?

Caput VI - Another way of proving the common opinion; and the attack of Scotus and Durandus

The same way of defending the common opinion is otherwise proved by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and Ferrariensis, whom Scotus and Durandus attack.

The common opinion, in the way we said it is interpreted, is proved by another argument by St. Thomas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Capreolus in the places cited, which is as follows. A created rational will is subject to God alone, and he alone can act upon it; therefore those things which depend on the created will can be known by God alone, to whom the will itself is subject. Such are affections and thoughts; therefore they can be known by God alone. By this argument St. Thomas wishes to prove that the affections of the will and the thoughts of the heart are hidden by the very will so as not to be seen by angels; rather, he maintains that by their very nature, insofar as they proceed from free will, they are known to God alone. For if by their very nature they were known to another angel, they could not be hidden by the will of the one having them - which Scotus shows very well in the second place cited, by this argument: it cannot be that what is otherwise of itself intelligible to some intellect, without any other impediment, should by the will alone of the one having it be rendered not intelligible. Therefore, if thoughts and affections are by their very nature intelligible, they cannot be hidden from another angel by the will alone of the one having them. In this, however, Scotus is mistaken: he thinks the opinion of St. Thomas was the one he himself attacks; whereas the latter rather says that the secrets of the human and angelic heart are by their very nature unknown to another angel. Accordingly that which St. John Chrysostom asserts, homily 5 on Matthew, on those words, "Then the devil left him," is to be explained in a good sense. For thus he writes: "But according to the dispensation of God the good Angel withdraws; or rather, he does not withdraw, but hides himself, making himself invisible to the devil: for unless he wills, the good Angel will not be seen by the devil." This, however, is difficult if what we have said is true; especially because St. Chrysostom elsewhere teaches that angels are spiritual and incorporeal, as we reported in disputation 179, chapter 4. It must therefore be understood thus: that not by his own power does the good angel make himself invisible to another angel, but only by God's dispensation. For if by natural power this could be done, in the same way some demon of a higher nature could hide himself from a good angel of a lower nature; since in demons all natural endowments have remained intact, as Pseudo-Dionysius teaches, chapter four On the Divine Names.

Moreover, Durandus attacks the same argument as follows. If the affections and thoughts of one angel could not be known by another angel because they depend on the free will of the angel, upon which God alone acts, then by the same reasoning the substance (*substantia*) of the rational soul, and of the angel himself, could not be known by any other than by God; and likewise all other

things which depend freely on God alone. For if those things which depend on human free choice are unknown to angels, much more will those be unknown which depend on the free choice of God - which, however, is absurd. Therefore the argument of St. Thomas only proves that the acts of the human will, or free intellections, are rightly known by God because they depend on him; but that they cannot be known by anyone else than by God, or by the man himself or the angel who has them, does not seem to be sufficiently proved.

To the argument of Durandus Ferrariensis replies.

Caput VII - Ferrariensis' reply to Durandus

The argument of Durandus presses the Thomists not a little, and therefore they try in various ways to dissolve it. First, Ferrariensis replies in the place cited. About the middle of that place he says that the argument of St. Thomas does not rest on this proposition, "Everything that proceeds from God alone is known to God alone," but on another, namely: "Every operation and every affect of a creature which proceeds from no naturally acting cause, but only from a free one, from God, is known only to God and to the very agent, and to whom he shall have willed to manifest it." But not every effect which proceeds freely from God is of this sort. However, this reasoning of Ferrariensis does not satisfy me. First, for if St. Thomas were to assume that latter proposition, he would not argue rightly: he would assume in his argument what rather he ought to prove. Then the reason on account of which St. Thomas...

St. Thomas said that a free affect of the will, and an act of the intellect, are known by God alone; the reason is that this power of the will can be moved by him alone: therefore, by the same reasoning, whatever depends on God alone, will be known with certitude by him alone.

But come now, let us admit Ferrariensis's solution, and argue against it in another way: let us show that some inconveniences follow from it. First, it would follow that the motion of the heavens, which proceeds from an angel voluntarily, is not naturally known to another angel: so Durandus infers, and the same reasoning seems to have place here. But Ferrar. replies that the motion of the heaven does not depend on the angel's will alone, but also on the heaven's natural form; and on that account it can rightly be known by an angel. However, two reasons stand against this solution. One is that the motion of the heaven cannot at once depend upon an angel and upon the heaven's natural and intrinsic form; rather, if the sphere itself is moved by an angel, the form would concur only passively; otherwise, if its form is a natural efficient principle of the motion, the will of the angel is superfluous, just as it would be if fire burned. The other reason is that if the motion of the heaven were from an angel and from its own natural efficient form, and hence could be known by an angel, then by the same reasoning free cogitations too would be known to any angel; for although they depend on a free will, nevertheless they are elicited by a natural cause, namely by the intellect. But perhaps this reason proves what neither St. Thomas nor Ferrar. and the others of this opinion deny, namely that the cogitations of hearts, insofar as they are cogitations, are known to angels according to their substance; but that the end and intention from which they proceed, and according to which they are directed, is not known.

Second, it would follow that the motion of a stone upward, produced freely by one angel, cannot be known by another, because it depends on the angel's free will. Thus Ferrar. objects to himself, and replies that that violent motion of the stone is natural to another body; and on that account it is rightly known by an angel, because for this it seems sufficient if it have a natural connection with some natural body. Yet this solution has little weight: for now we are not treating of abstractive knowledge, whereby a thing is known according to itself abstracted from existence; but of the knowledge which they call intuitive, whereby an angel knows not only a motion or operation according to itself, but as existing in this or that subject. Therefore, although an angel rightly knows that upward motion is natural to air and to fire, this is not enough for him to know when such a motion inheres in some mobile contrary to its nature, unless he know the impelling cause. If therefore he cannot in this way know an affect of the will and the motion of the intellect, because they proceed from a free cause, namely from the will, by the same reasoning he will not know that the motion upward is then in the stone, if it depends solely upon the free will of an angel.

Third, it is inferred that an angel does not know a man's progressive motion, nor the motion of imagination; because these motions no less depend on the will than the intellect's very cogitation. For if it be said that these operations do not depend upon will alone, but also on some other natural faculty, either of imagination or of a mover according to place, we will say the same of the operations of the intellect. However, as I noted above, this reason proves what even the Doctors of this common opinion do not deny, namely that intellections, insofar as they are intellections, according to their substance are rightly known by an angel, and only their end and intention, for which they are done, is unknown; which we will propose below as probable. But if someone does not grant this, assuredly he can be pressed not slightly by the argument made above.

But someone might say: therefore not only free affections, but also the intellections and cogitations of one angel cannot be known by another, except by God and by the very angel who has them; because God alone works in the intellect, just as also in the will of a man or an angel. But against this there is another effective reason: for from this doctrine it would follow that not only could the cogitations existing in another's mind not be known by another angel, but neither could habits, nor intelligible species; because God alone produces these by infusing them, or at least God alone together with the intellect of the angel effects them; which however seems false, and contrary to St. Thomas himself, who in the reply to the second plainly confesses that intelligible species existing in another angel are known by one angel; but that the use of them alone is hidden, that is, the operation of the intellect to which the angel uses the species. And he says that the use of them, or the cognition by them, is hidden from another angel only for this reason, because each uses his species and thinks as he pleases, at the command or motion of the will. From this doctrine too we shall infer below that the act of intellect of one angel, from which he cannot cease at will, is naturally known to all the others.

Wherefore the opinion of Marsilius is not to be approved, in the place cited, corollary 2 after the second supposition, when he asserts that any habit existing in one angel can be hidden by him, lest it be seen by another.[1564] For this opinion has no solid foundation. Since the production of a habit

does not depend proximately but only remotely on our liberty, and its conservation in no way depends on liberty, there is no reason why we should say that a habit by its nature cannot be known by any angel. From which it follows that it cannot be hidden by the angel in whom it is, so as not to be seen by another.

To the same reasoning of Durandus Cajetan also replies.

Cajetan and Capreolus on St. Thomas's reasoning

Caput VIII - How Cajetan interprets St. Thomas's reasoning

In like manner Cajetan and Capreolus, in article 2 cited, against the first conclusion of Durandus, endeavor to dissolve the argument of Durandus which above was brought against St. Thomas's reasoning. They say, therefore, that the principle on which St. Thomas's reasoning rests is not that which Durandus supposed, namely, that the will is subject to God alone as efficient cause, so that from this he might infer that therefore the affect of the will is known to God alone; but that the principle is another, to wit: a motion of the will is not some nature having fixed being, as substance has, nor does it have a necessary and determined connection, nor does it necessarily and determinately depend on some natural cause, but on God alone; nor can it of itself move the intellect of another angel to the cognition of itself, either proximately or remotely, by impressing some species of itself; nor does another angel have species connatural to him by which the secrets of hearts would be represented. From this he rightly infers that the secrets of hearts cannot be known by another than by him whose they are, and by God, by whom alone the will is moved. Thus Capreolus reports the proposition on which the whole reasoning of St. Thomas seems to rest.[1565] Cajetan in truth says nearly the same principle is assumed by St. Thomas, namely, that free acts of our will, or of an angel, do not have a connection with any natural and necessary cause; and therefore they are not represented in connatural species in an angel, as other natural effects are; whence it is rightly inferred that they cannot be known by another angel, but by God alone and by the one to whom they belong. But Cajetan proves that the free acts of our will or of an angel are not represented in the species of another angel, because they are of a higher order than natural things are; therefore by species of natural things they cannot be represented. He calls "natural things" those which have a natural cause, that is, which acts in the mode of nature determined to one. Finally, to make this evident, Cajetan shows in his last words why free acts of the will are not known by another angel through species indited to him from the beginning, namely, because angels have species only of natural things; but since they do not have also species of free volitions and affections, he does not prove...

However, who does not see that both Cajetan and Capreolus supply many things to St. Thomas's reasoning which the holy Doctor himself did not think? Nowhere will you find in him any one of those propositions; but he only assumed what we recounted above, namely, that God alone works

1564. Marsilius, in the cited place, corollary 2 after the second supposition.

1565. Cajetan and Capreolus, on I, q. 57, a. 4, ad 1; Capreolus reports the proposition as the principle on which St. Thomas's reasoning rests.

in the will of a man or of an angel, so as to gather from this that the free affections and motions of that will are able to be known by God alone, who alone works in it. Then, from the proposition which Capreolus assumes, it is indeed rightly inferred that the secrets of the heart are not known by another angel, if angels understand things by the species of the things themselves; nevertheless that principle seems to have been assumed for the mere will of the author, without any other foundation: for it seems gratuitously said, and rather it ought to have been gathered in the reasoning than posited as a pronouncement, that the secrets of the human or angelic heart neither move of themselves the intellect of another angel so as to be known, nor do they produce a species of themselves in an angel, nor does another angel have from the beginning connatural species of them, by which he might know them. For those who say that the secrets of the human heart, or of an angel, can be known of themselves, teach this in one of these three modes: namely, either because they can be known of themselves without another species by the power of the intellect, as all other things; or because they of themselves produce a species in the intellect of the angel; or because the nature of the angel requires him to have species of these secrets, just as of certain other things, which, if he does not have them, he lacks them by God's will alone, though otherwise they would be connatural to the angel in the same way as the species of other things are.

In this the sum of the present controversy seems to be constituted.

In like manner it matters little what they assert, namely Cajetan and the others, that the secrets of hearts are not represented by the species of natural things, and that the intellect of an angel has only species of natural things. First, because it does not seem impossible that by the same species there might be represented to an angel many things of a diverse kind, as the substance and the accidents of a thing; why then will it be repugnant that the secrets of the heart and the affection of the will be represented, as well as the substance of an angel, if indeed by the same cognition and expressed likeness many things and all diverse things can be represented? Next, we also wonder that affects and free operations of the will are said to be known by species wholly distinct from the species of natural things; yet it needed to be proved that in the intellect of whatever angel there are no species of the secrets of hearts, or of other things if they are true; and if they are not true, this ought to have been proved, that an angel, by the power of his nature in creation, had his species of other things infused into him or generated as connatural to him, but not, however, of the secrets of hearts, so that all cognition of an angel would be through species, - or at least, if an angel can, without species, more clearly know other things, it ought to have been proved that by his natural power his intellect cannot know the secrets of hearts, as it can other things.

But if someone should say that cognitions come about through impressed species by which an angel's intellect elicits cognitions, and that by no species can the secrets of hearts be represented, because secrets are free, whereas species, whatever they be, are of the natural order: against this, there follows not even according to absolute divine power that impressed species of the secrets of the heart, or a proper knowledge of them, can be given - if indeed that species and that knowledge is of the natural order, and things of the natural order, that is, not free, cannot represent free

secrets. But if we grant that there can be species naturally representing the secrets of the hearts both in first act and in second, it needed to be proved why they are not infused naturally into an angel, as are the rest of the species of other things.

Finally, it is to be observed, according to the opinion of these Doctors, and joined with the reasoning to be urged against them, that the cogitations of the human heart, or of some angel, could be known by another angel insofar as they are cogitations, and according to their substance - which way they would be turned in the mind, and what he would affirm or deny about them - because they are elicited by a natural principle, and according to their nature they are of the order of things; yet they would deny that they are elicited by a natural principle, and according to their nature are of an order extrinsic, depending in that way upon a free will; for what connection could there be without some intrinsic change made in the very act of cogitation, from this alone, that by some reason, and with indifference, the will moves the intellect to think? Indeed liberty is formally not an affection of the intellect, but of the will. Therefore it seems only to be said, according to the opinion of these Doctors, that the free affections and intentions of the will are hidden from another, and principally also the very intention by which cogitations are directed; but the cogitations themselves, according to their substance insofar as they are operations of the intellect, are not hidden from another angel.

Caput IX - Gregory confirms the common opinion by another reason

Gregory confirms the common opinion by another reason.

He in the cited question, so as to defend the common opinion with St. Thomas and others, and at the same time to confirm it, notes that, for some sensible to be sensed, it is not enough that it be, in itself, sensible, and that a sensing power be present in something, but moreover it is necessary that the sensible be placed at a fitting distance according to place, in keeping with the nature of whatever sensing faculty. In the same way, he says, for some thing to be known by an intellect, even an angelic one, by a proper knowing, which they call intuitive, it is not enough that it be in itself intelligible, and that the power of the intellect be of itself potent to understand; but it is necessary that it be related in a certain manner to the intellect, so that it be known by its proper and intuitive concept. If it is impossible for it to be thus related, it will be impossible for the secret of another's heart to be known by a proper and intuitive concept. Wherefore, in order that the cogitation or effect of another be known by an angel as it is, and by a proper concept, it is not enough that it be, of itself, of the genus of intelligibles, and that the faculty of the intellect be potent for the genus of intelligibles; but it must have a certain special mode required, that it may be known by a sure and intuitive knowing: and this mode, says Gregory, is to exist as in a subject in that one by whom it ought to be understood and intuitively known. And because the secret of the heart of one angel does not inhere in the intellect of another, therefore it cannot be intuitively known by any other than by him in whom it is. Lest this reasoning seem assigned without foundation, he confirms it by this example: for if an angel were together with a rational soul, and they were to penetrate one another in the same body of a man, or soul with soul, as two men also would mutually penetrate

one another; nonetheless the soul would not understand the secret of the angel's heart, nor would one soul [understand] the secret of another, however near they might be according to place, for no other reason than that the secret of the one is not in the other: therefore it is a necessary condition for this, that the secret of the heart be understood, that it exist as in a subject in him by whom it ought to be understood. From which it is clear that thus Gregory embraces the common opinion, though by a reason other than that by which St. Thomas confirms it.

But Gregory's reasoning has no firm foundation. For although, in order that a sensing faculty operate, the natural power of the faculty itself and the nature of its proper object do not suffice, but some mode is necessary, namely propinquity; nevertheless from this it is not rightly inferred that the mode necessary for the secret of the heart to be known is that which Gregory assigned. First, in vision, and in other faculties and external senses, propinquity of place is required, yet for this reason, that the sensible may send its species into the potency; but once that [species] has been received in the faculty, propinquity of place is not necessary, as we proved above in disputation 207, cap. 3. But even if it were necessary, it would be required only that in some manner the operation of the sense be terminated. Next, when Gregory adds that the mode necessary for the secret of the heart to be known is to exist in him by whom it ought to be known, either he assumes this in his reasoning, or he infers it from that prior doctrine. If he assumes it, his reasoning is trifling, because in it he assumes what he ought to have inferred: for the whole controversy is about this, whether one angel knows the secret of a heart not his own, but what is in another angel or in a man. Therefore, when Gregory assumes in this way, that in order for the secret of the heart to be known it must be in him by whom it ought to be known, he assumes what is contradictory to the opposed opinion. Lastly, what he adduces in confirmation concerning a soul which would be together with another soul or an angel, is of no moment. For the reason why our soul, when it is in the body, would not understand another soul or the angel with whom it would be together, is that, when it is in the body, it needs species acquired through the senses. And because the secret of the heart of another soul or of an angel does not send its own species into the senses, even if another soul were near in place, as is clear, therefore the secret of that one would not be known. The same must be said for the secret of an angel existing together with the soul in the same body, and for the same reason. Distance or propinquity of place contributes absolutely nothing to whether the secret of the heart, or any other thing, be understood or lie hidden: nay rather, that it be in the intellect itself as in a subject makes no difference; for our intellect, though possessing habits (*habitus*) and the species themselves, does not understand by a proper concept, but by discourse from sensibles: therefore, even if the secret of an angel were set in the intellect of our soul, nonetheless it would not be understood by a sure and proper concept. Therefore Gregory's example has no force.

But if someone follow the opinion of Durandus, who thinks that neither our intellect nor the angelic knows anything through species, but proximately through itself: at least he cannot deny that our soul needs the operation of the senses for it to understand anything; since the secret of an angelic or a human heart cannot be perceived by our senses, even if it be near in place, it will not be able to be known by the intellect. Therefore we concede to Gregory that, for a thing that is

intelligible to be known, it is necessary that it exist in him by whom it ought to be known, because the secret of the heart can be known by no other than by him whose it is: for Scripture and the Fathers teach this. But Gregory's reasoning to prove this is of no moment.

Judgment of the author in the present controversy.

Caput X - The author's judgment

On this matter indeed my judgment is that nothing can be effectively proved by philosophical reason; this has been in some part shown above: for none of the arguments adduced sufficiently show that the secret of the heart of one angel or of a man cannot be known by another. Nor indeed could it be: since the nature of the angelic intellect is not sufficiently clear to us, we can scarcely understand what it is able by its power to know, unless we derive it from the Fathers and from Scripture; wherefore, led by natural reason alone, we are not fully able to understand of which things it naturally receives species and of which it does not have them. Nonetheless, since it is clear to us from the Fathers and from Scripture that the secrets of our hearts are not known by angels, it must not be said with Scotus that these secrets are by their nature known to any angel and are prevented by God alone from being known, as was proved above. Therefore, from Scripture alone and the doctrine of the Fathers it is clear to us that the secret of the human heart is not within the latitude of the natural object intelligible by an angel. Whence an easy answer is given to the reasoning of Scotus and of others who contend that by its own nature such a secret can be known by an angel. For we say that, even if they be of a natural and created order, not of a supernatural one, nevertheless they are not therefore perceived by an angel, because not every created thing is a natural object of the angelic intellect, as we also said above about future things. Although this does not stand by natural reason, from the doctrine of the Fathers and of Scripture, joined to the very strong reason which we established in chapter 2, we are compelled to admit it. It remains, however, that in the following disputation we explain what we understand by the name of secret or of knowings of the heart

On the secrets of hearts and angelic knowledge

For the nature of the angelic intellect not being sufficiently clear to us, we can scarcely understand what it is able to know by its power, unless we derive it from the Fathers and from Scripture; wherefore, led by natural reason alone, we are not fully able to understand of which things it naturally receives species and of which it does not have them. Nonetheless, since it is clear to us from the Fathers and from Scripture that the secrets of our hearts are not known by angels, it must not be said with Scotus that these secrets are by their nature known to any angel and are prevented by God alone from being known, as was proved above. Therefore, from Scripture alone and the doctrine of the Fathers it is clear to us that the secret of the human heart is not within the latitude of the natural object intelligible by an angel. Whence an easy answer is given to the reasoning of Scotus and of others who contend that by its own nature such a secret can be known by an angel. For we say that, even if they be of a natural and created order, not of a supernatural

one, nevertheless they are not therefore perceived by an angel, because not every created thing is a natural object of the angelic intellect, as we also said above about future things. Although this does not stand by natural reason, from the doctrine of the Fathers and of Scripture, joined to the very strong reason which we established in chapter 2, we are compelled to admit it. It remains, however, that in the following disputation we explain what we understand by the name of secret or of knowings of the heart.

What a cogitation (*cogitatio*), or the secrets of the heart, are - things which an angel by his own nature cannot know. Disput. 210.

Not in the same way about affections (*affectus*) and about cogitations is one to judge, some think probable. Cap. 2.

Objections against the aforesaid opinion. Cap. 3.

Disputatio CCX - What a cogitation or the secrets of the heart are, which an angel by his nature cannot know

Caput I - Preliminaries and the sense of "secrets of the heart"

On this controversy depends both a full understanding of the foregoing, and also a perfect knowledge of that locution by which angels open to one another the secrets of their heart. Concerning this the Scholastics did not differ much. The present controversy, therefore, is, what ought to be understood by the secret of the heart of a man or of an angel. The Doctors cited in the preceding disputation, for the common opinion, seem to understand by the secret of the heart the cogitations (*cogitationes*) of the intellect and the affections of the will. About the cogitations, however, of the interior sense they do not speak. Whether, however, by secret there is also understood the very cogitation of the intellect, insofar as it is a cogitation, or only by that reason which depends upon the affection of the will, they do not explain. Gregory of Rimini, however, in the place cited, from the same passages of Scripture alleged above, tries to prove that the secret of the heart is not only the affection of the will, but also the cogitations of the intellect, not only insofar as they depend upon the free will toward this or that end, but also insofar as they are cogitations. For in Matthew 9 it is said: "Cum vidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum," etc. From which place, says St. Jerome, the divinity of Christ is sufficiently proved: because it is proper to God to behold the cogitations of the heart. In that place, however, the discourse is not about affections or intention, but about cogitation. Then in 1 Paralipomenon 28 it is said, "Omnia enim corda scrutatur Dominus, et universas mentium cogitationes." There it is attributed to God not only, as to what is proper and peculiar to him, to understand and behold the affections of our will, but also the cogitations of our mind

Not in the same way about affections and about cogitations is one to judge, some think probable.

Caput II - Not to be judged the same way about affections and about cogitations; a probable opinion

To some, indeed, not without reason it seems that one ought to philosophize in another way about cogitations as to their very substance, insofar as they are cogitations of such an object, than about the affections of the will. Durandus reports that this opinion was held by certain Theologians. And although St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the Thomists in this article seem to speak in the same way about the cogitations of the intellect and about the affections of the will; yet their reasoning does not prove that the cogitations of the human heart are hidden from an angel as to their substance, but only insofar as they depend on free will, over which God alone has efficacy. By this reasoning they gather that the things which are free, insofar as they are free, are unknown to an angel. For cogitations of the intellect, as to their substance, are from a natural cause for us, just as the motion of walking is; and in the same way they depend on the will. From the opinion of these Doctors it follows that cogitations of the intellect are, in the same way, objects of the angelic intellect as also are the effects of walking, namely, that as to their substance they are the natural object of the angelic intellect. In the same way, too, it seems one must speak about the cogitations of the senses and of the imagination. For although, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and from reason, they cannot be known by an angel; yet in themselves they are beings in such a nature, that is, of a natural and not a free faculty; but precisely in that mode in which they are cogitations of the senses. That intellectual knowings are spiritual in no way hinders that they be known by an angelic intellect as they are: for the intellect beholds spiritual things no less than bodies.

In favor of this opinion these Doctors also add the Argentinensis, who, as we showed in cap. 3 of the preceding disputation, grants that the cogitations of one angel are known by another - what they are, and about what object they are - although under the ratio of composition and division they are not known; so that by this reasoning there be saved something secret which by its nature alone is known to God; which can be much better saved too, as we shall see below. Next there is Hervaeus, whom we saw in cap. 1 of the preceding disputation, who admits that the cogitations of one angel are known by another - what they are, and about what they are, and whether he affirms or denies; but not what he is intent upon in acting. Then this is plainly the opinion of Henry, when he concedes that the cogitations of the heart of one angel are known to another, not only what they are and about what they are, but also whether they be affirmations or negations; nay even, as regards the affections of the will, he asserts this too: that the intentions of the will alone are hidden. Although in this, what he asserts about affections, his opinion is not to be approved; because he himself badly distinguishes intention from affection of the will, as we showed in cap. 4 of the preceding disputation. Lastly, this opinion was publicly taught by our Alfonso de Vega, my master and the most eminent professor of Theology in our College of Complutum, in the year 1571; which indeed I myself judge no less probable, although I would more gladly hear the judgment of others about it: and these things commend its probability.

First, because no difference seems to exist between (a) cogitations of the heart which are exercised solely by liberty from the command of the will toward an end, and (b) the cogitations of sense or local motion, which we call progressive in man: but who will deny that the cogitations of the imagination in man and local motions are known to any angel whatsoever, yet the intentions from which they proceed are hidden? Next, the reasoning of St. Thomas and of others, as I said a little before, proves only that the affections of the will, taken in themselves, are unknown to angels; but cogitations only by that very reason which depends on affection, that is, insofar as they are moved toward one end or toward another. Lastly, since on this matter scarcely anything can be proved by philosophy, as we said in the last chapter of the preceding disputation, but we must only maintain that the secret of the heart is hidden from angels, so as to satisfy the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers; if by this way all things could be saved, the mode of speech among angels would be transmitted to us more suitably and more congruently, which by many other ways is scarcely explained or defended without inconvenience: therefore this opinion ought not to be judged improbable.

Objections, therefore, that the same manner of philosophizing which we have set forth does not square with the testimonies of Scripture, entirely fall away: we shall say that the cogitations of the heart, as to their substance, insofar as they are natural such as they are, are known to angels; but that the intention of the heart, that is, the cogitations themselves insofar as they fall under intention, or insofar as they are its cause, lie hidden from an angel's intellect.

Although taken absolutely the cogitations of the heart are nothing other than operations of the intellect (*intellectus*), nevertheless, when they are called cogitations of the heart, according to the phrasing of Scripture they are signified as cogitations together with affection (*affectus*) and such an intention (*intentio*); especially in that passage of Matthew 9, where Christ said to the Pharisees: "Why do you think evil in your hearts?" and "He saw their cogitations," etc. From which place, as we saw above, St. Jerome affirms that His divinity is proved. For it is the same thing in that place, to see their cogitations, and to see their perverse intentions arising from their cogitations. And it is the same to think evil in the heart, and to have a perverse intention. Similar is that of Matthew 15 and Mark 7: "Out of the heart proceed evil cogitations," that is, evil deeds, which are called evil cogitations as it were evil things thought, which proceed from a perverse affection. For the heart is said not only of cogitation, but as conjoined with the affection of the will (*voluntas*). And Luke 2: "That the cogitations of many hearts may be revealed." And Ecclesiasticus 8: "If perchance this cogitation of your heart be remitted to you." In which and in many other places by cogitations of the heart Scripture understands not only the operation of the intellect, but as it is conjoined to affection and intention. Therefore, when Scripture attributes to God alone the searching of the reins and hearts, or the cogitations of the heart, it does not understand only the consideration of the intellect according to its substance (*substantia*), but the affection from which that [consideration] proceeds, or of which it is the cause. For there are innumerable testimonies of Scripture, by which under the name of heart the will itself is signified. Wherefore the secret of the heart will be that affection of the will. Proverbs 4: "With all watchfulness guard your heart." Ecclesiasticus 8: "Do not entrust your heart to every man." And chapter 12: "In the mouth of fools

is their heart; in the heart of the wise is their mouth." But the heart which the wise man bids to be guarded, and not to be opened to every man, etc., is plainly the interior affection of the will. If, therefore, we were to say that the secret of the heart is reserved to God, that is, the free affection of the will, even if cogitations were known, insofar as they are certain intellections and knowledges, it would seem that satisfaction is given to the Scripture asserting that to God alone the cogitations and secrets of hearts lie open: for it understands the cogitations themselves according to the end to which they are directed, or from which they proceed.

For greater clarity in this matter, it must be noted that there is a twofold kind of operation in the will: one is about an object which does not move the will necessarily as to the exercise, but only freely; yet it is sometimes elicited necessarily and naturally from inattention or defect of cogitation on either side. But there is another kind with respect to an object toward which the will is borne necessarily as to the exercise, such as in us is the affection of love toward God clearly seen; and in angels also in the state of wayfarers (as some think) the love of their own self and of God as an ultimate natural end: whether this is true, we shall say in its place. If we speak of the former kind of affection, according to this opinion it would have to be said that every affection of this sort is unknown and hidden to an angel: because of itself it belongs to the genus of free [acts], although by accident, through a defect of full consideration, it may be elicited naturally and necessarily on either side. For, as we shall show more at length in chapter, question 71, article 6, one and the same affection of the will, altogether unchanged in itself, can be successively free and necessary, solely by an extrinsic denomination arising from attention or from the inattention of reason. But this extrinsic variation is not sufficient for the same substance of the affection, remaining unchanged in itself, now to be able to be known, now not to be able to be known: wherefore the same entity, unchanged in itself, ought always to be compared with the intellect in the same way. Therefore, since it must be maintained in accordance with those things which we have deduced from Scripture and the Fathers, that free affections of the will of one angel, or of a man, cannot be known by another angel; the same must be said of those [affections] that are natural and necessary by reason of mere inattention, which we have called in the first place: but on the other hand, it must be said that affections which by their nature are natural and necessary as to the exercise with respect to such an object, are always known by any angel whatsoever; because, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas and of others who follow the common opinion, as we reported in the preceding disputation, only the free affections of the will are hidden from angels.

By the same reasoning it would have to be said of acts of the intellect, insofar as they are cogitations according to their substance, whether they are elicited freely from full consideration, or naturally and necessarily from inattention, that they are known to angels: because they are always of the same nature. If, therefore, they are once known, they will always be able to be known, whether they are elicited naturally or freely.

But someone will object. The first movement of the will naturally follows from the impression and motion of the appetitive power in us, even if its nature is not necessary but can be elicited freely: therefore, since the demon and the angel know the motion of the appetitive power, they will also know the affection of the will with respect to the same object.

It is answered: An angel rightly infers from the sudden motion of the appetitive power even the motion of our will, since he knows that in sudden motions without liberty the heart of man and the will are touched: yet from this it does not follow that he intuits the very affection of the will as it is, but that he deduces it from manifest conjecture, and so he will not be able to know whether such an affection is from the will. But if he were to know it properly and by an intuitive knowledge, he would always be known evidently by an angel. The things which we have set down thus far do not lack probability: which, if they were admitted, we could easily assign below the mode of speech among angels according to this doctrine. If, however, someone contends that even the cogitations themselves, insofar as they are cogitations, are not known by angels, as to the speech of angels one would have to philosophize in another way, as we shall say below. Moreover, in a matter very difficult and far removed from our sense it has been enough to have proposed the various opinions of others; but in the meantime to prejudice nothing, and to leave entire to the judgment of other more learned men what is truer in this controversy, I have prudently determined.

Objections against the foregoing opinion

Against the things which we have said about cogitations of the intellect, someone could argue first in this way. If one angel knows what another angel or a man is thinking, and whether by his cogitation he affirms something or denies it, finally if he intuits the very cogitation, he will without doubt know first what he is thinking more intensely and more efficaciously: and since the affection of the will always follows intensity and the more perfect cogitation, the whole secret of the heart of one angel, or of any man whatsoever, will be known to another angel. Then, since the sin of infidelity consists in an error of the intellect against the faith, it will also be known by any angel whether a man falls into the sin of heresy

I answer: Neither [conclusion] is gathered from the foregoing doctrine. Not the first: because although a man, and an angel also, always follow with their affection the more efficacious and more express cogitation, this is to be understood thus, that whenever the affection is moved, it follows the more express and more efficacious cogitation; not, however, that the affection cannot fail to be moved by it: for it can resist any cognition whatsoever; therefore the angel does not know whether our will consents to the more intense cogitation or does not consent. Add also, that not every more intense cogitation moves the will, but that which with a certain peculiar expressness proposes the object in a certain proportion with the will; which proportion and expressness the angel cannot know and penetrate. Nor does the further inference follow which was added: because although the sin of infidelity is consummated in an error of the intellect, and the angel would know this insofar as it is a certain false enunciation in the intellect; nevertheless, since it also requires the consent of the will for it to be a sin, and this is not known to the angel, it clearly follows that an angel cannot know for certain the sin of infidelity in a man. However, from an excessive delay in thinking against matters of faith, and from other conjectures taken from sense and imagination, he can discern that a man has fallen into heresy: for all that, he never intuits the affection of the heart as it is, but only gathers by conjecture more or less certain.

Then someone could object St. Augustine, who, since in the book On the Divination of Demons he had said that the demons sometimes know the dispositions of men not only uttered in voice, but even conceived in cogitation, when certain signs are expressed in the body, retracts that in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 30, as if he had said that with a rather bold assertion.[1566]

I answer: Augustine did not retract this, as though he judged false that cogitations and dispositions of men are known by demons from some effect; but [he retracted it] because he judged it uncertain whether in the body itself certain signs are expressed by which the internal dispositions of men are known. Augustine's words are: "That these things come to the knowledge of demons has been learned also through some experiments; but whether there are certain signs from the body of those thinking, sensible to them but hidden from us, or whether by another way and by that spiritual [way] they know these things, either it will be found only with great difficulty by men, or not at all." Therefore Augustine only thinks it difficult whether...[1567]

Objections against the preceding opinion

It is objected. First objection. Against what we have said concerning the cogitations of the intellect, someone could argue first in this way: If one Angel knows what another Angel or a man is thinking, and whether by his cogitation he affirms something or denies it, finally if he beholds the cogitation itself, he will undoubtedly know first what the other inwardly thinks and more efficaciously; and since the affect of the will always follows the intension and the more perfect cogitation, from that he will certainly know the affect: and thus the whole secret of the heart of one Angel, or of any man, will be known to another Angel. Then, since the sin of infidelity is in an error of the intellect against the faith, any Angel whatsoever will also know whether a man lapses into the sin of heresy.

I answer: Neither of these is gathered from the doctrine set forth above. Not the first: because although a man's more intense cogitation is more expressed, it does not follow that our will's affect is always moved in proportion to the expression of the cogitation, nor that the affect of the will consents to the more intense cogitation, or does not consent. Add also that not every more intense cogitation moves the will, but those that propose the object with a peculiar determination and proportion in respect of the will - a proportion and expression which the Angel cannot know and penetrate from the cogitation alone as it is in us; and therefore that which was being inferred does not follow.

Nor does the second follow: for although the sin of infidelity is formally in the error of the intellect as enunciating something false, nevertheless since it requires the consent of the will, if this consent of the will be not known to the Angel, it is plain that the Angel cannot certainly know the sin of infidelity in a man; but only by conjecture the more, from overlong dwelling in the cogitation concerning matters of faith, and from other conjectures taken from the disposition, he can discern that he has fallen into heresy: yet by conjecture only, rather than by certain knowledge.

1566. St. Augustine, De divinatione daemonum; Retractationes II, c. 30.
1567. The quotation is from St. Augustine, Retractationes II, c. 30.

Second objection from the words of St. Augustine in the Retractations. Then someone could object St. Augustine, who, whereas in the book On the Divination of Demons he had said that demons know not only men's dispositions, but also the cogitations conceived in their heart, when certain signs are expressed in the body, retracts that in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 30, as though he had said it with a bolder asseveration.

It is answered: Augustine did not retract this because he judged false that cogitations and men's dispositions are known from some effect; but because he judged it uncertain whether in the body itself certain signs are expressed by which the internal dispositions of men are known. Augustine's words are: "That these things come to the knowledge of demons has been learned also through some experiments; but whether there are certain signs from the body of those thinking, sensible to them but hidden from us, or whether by another way and by that spiritual way they know these things, either it will be found only with great difficulty by men, or not at all." Therefore Augustine thinks that sensible signs in the body are given, by which Angels discern cogitations and the secrets of hearts; and this alone he says he had affirmed with a bolder asseveration.[1568]

In what way the Angels speak among themselves

Disputatio CCXI - One Angel's speaking to another is undoubted. cap. 1.

One Angel's speaking to another by impressing into his mind the cognition of the object known by himself, is maintained by Scotus. cap. 2.

Scotus's opinion is refuted. cap. 3.

Some have judged that one Angel speaks to another by impressing upon him the species of his own cognition. cap. 4.

The preceding opinion is confuted. cap. 5.

The reasons for the foregoing opinion are dissolved. cap. 6.

Ockham and Gabriel held that Angels speak among themselves in such wise, that one impresses the cogitation of his concept into the mind of another Angel. cap. 7.

Cajetan and Capreolus said that one Angel speaks to another by this alone, that he wills his secret to become manifest to him, without any other change in himself. cap. 8.

What Durandus held. cap. 9.

Aegidius and others held that angelic locution is effected by certain spiritual signs, which are not concepts and intellections. cap. 10.

Others judge the locution of Angels to be the word of the mind, or some intellection. cap. 11.

The arguments against the preceding opinion are resolved. cap. 12.

1568. St. Augustine, De divinatione daemonum 6; Retractationes II, c. 30.

Caput I - That Angels speak among themselves

Although St. Thomas below, in question 107, disputes about the locution of the Angels, nevertheless it is not amiss for me to examine that whole question in this article, and to gather into one whatever is worthy of note concerning the locution of Angels. Now among all the theologians it is without controversy that Angels speak, mutually expressing to one another their concepts and the secrets of hearts; although, as to the mode whereby they effect this, there is no small dissension among them.

It is proved first from Scripture that Angels speak mutually among themselves. Thus in Zachariah 2 it is said: "And the Angel who was speaking in me went forth, and another Angel went forth to meet him, and he said to him."[1569] In Apocalypse 7: "One Angel cried out to the four others, saying: Do not harm the earth, or the sea," etc.[1570] Moreover, Daniel and Micaiah saw Angels speaking among themselves, as is frequently recounted in their prophecies. However, since in these places the Angels appeared to the prophets and to John in the form and figure of a man, someone could say that that speaking was not spiritual, but with voices formed in the air, as though they had spoken. But since these bodily locutions in assumed bodies signify to men the spiritual locutions by which Angels speak among themselves, from these same places it is not obscurely gathered that Angels are able to speak among themselves; for if they did not spiritually speak among themselves, in vain also would they discourse in assumed bodies, or appear as discoursing.

Furthermore, this is plainly gathered from 1 Corinthians 13: "If I speak with the tongues of men and of Angels," etc. On this passage St. John Chrysostom, homily 32 on that Epistle, thus writes: "He says the tongue of Angels, not because he assigns a body to spirits; but, if I speak those things which they use among themselves."[1571] Theodoret, Ecumenius, and Anselm follow this sense of Paul, where they acknowledge that Angels speak among themselves and mutually manifest the secrets of their heart. St. Basil also in the homily on the beginning of the Gospel of John, about the middle, says: "For the Apostle indicates to us that even Angels have their proper language, when he says: If I speak with the tongues of men and of Angels." St. Ambrose too interprets Paul's places in the same way in his commentaries on that Epistle: for he says, "To speak with the tongues of Angels is to have known spiritually an angelic motion; that is, the secret of the heart."[1572]

But Theophylact, in the commentaries on that place, although he concedes that Angels speak among themselves, and that their language is the intellect, whereby they communicate divine meanings to one another, nevertheless explains Paul's sense with these words: "Nor did he say that Angels have tongues; but, wishing to express something better and more excellent, that would surpass human tongues." We could therefore interpret Paul in that place so, that his sense would be: If I speak with the tongues of all nations, nay also of Angels, if such there be, that is, if I speak with some more sublime language than human, but have not charity, etc. This sense seem to have

1569. Zechariah 2:3 - 4.
1570. Apocalypse (Revelation) 7:2 - 3.
1571. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 32 on 1 Corinthians 13.
1572. Theodoret, Ecumenius, and Anselm on 1 Corinthians 13; St. Basil, Homily on the beginning of the Gospel of John; St. Ambrose, Commentary on 1 Corinthians 13.

been followed by St. Jerome, Primasius, and Sedulius in that place. We could also explain that place concerning the language of Angels with Gagneius, as the most eloquent tongue named by the Apostle, in the same way that a fair face is commonly called an angelic face; and in Acts 12, when Herod, clothed in royal apparel, delivered a harangue to the people, all cried out, saying, "The voice of a god and not of a man"; in which sense Prosper, adducing this place of Paul, says in the Epistle to Demetrias: "For indeed it is possible that a manifold skill in speaking should reach not only to all the art of human eloquence, but even to that of the angelic tongue," etc.[1573]

But however you interpret this place, from Scripture it is manifest that Angels, by mutual speech, disclose to one another the secrets of the heart, as clearly appears from the testimonies adduced above.

Besides the testimonies of the Fathers brought forward, Augustine first plainly teaches this in the book On the Divination of Demons, chapter 6; for of the demons he thus speaks: "If they announce anything concerning that disposition of God, they hear in order to announce," etc.; therefore, since he says that they hear, he clearly holds that others also speak to them; for only the Supreme Angels are illuminated immediately by God, and they hear according to the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius, which we shall adduce in disputation 216, chapter 1.[1574] Next, St. John Damascene in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 3, toward the middle, says of the Angels that they communicate their thoughts and counsels among themselves without having need of ears, but making use of the aid of speech: when he says that Angels do not need a tongue nor ears, he understands bodily ones. For since he says that they mutually communicate their counsels, he must concede to them of necessity spiritual tongues and ears. Finally, if that is true which Pseudo-Dionysius teaches (whom in those disputations 216, chapter 1, and 217 we shall cite), namely, that inferior Angels are illuminated by the superior, from whom new mysteries are known, and that which Isidore teaches, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 10, namely that inferiors obey the superiors, it necessarily follows that they speak among themselves; for neither illumination, nor command and authority, can be without some locution being employed.

Finally, the same truth is confirmed by reason. For if Angels did not speak among themselves, there would be no society among them, nor could it exist; for this is prepared by communication, and without it cannot stand. But to say that Angels are not capable of society is absurd: for the natural aptitude for society seems to be the property of rational creatures; or else we must fall into another, greater absurdity, to say that Angels have no need of communication and speech, because all the secrets of one are manifest to any other - which in the preceding disputations we have shown to be false. The whole difficulty, therefore, of the proposed controversy consists in explaining the mode by which Angels speak among themselves. In which matter to be elucidated, the scholastic doctors are established in such variety that to rehearse the opinions of individuals and to examine them singly, as is fitting, cannot be done without prolixity. Yet, that the minds of

1573. St. Jerome, Primasius, and Sedulius on 1 Corinthians 13; Joannes Gagneius, ad loc.; Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistola ad Demetriadem.

1574. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3; Isidore of Seville, De summo bono I, c. 10.

students, to whom it is pleasant to dispute about hidden things, may be exercised, and that the truth itself may be better elucidated, we have thought it worth the effort to pursue not only what is proved by us, but also what is said by others.

Caput II - That one Angel speaks to another by impressing into his mind the cognition of the object known by himself, as Scotus maintains

It did not seem out of place to me to set down in the first place the opinion of Scotus on this matter, and to expound it according to his manner of speaking; for other opinions, as rivulets from a fountain, are derived in part from it. He therefore asserts that one Angel speaks to another by this very fact, that he impresses into his intellect the intellection of the same object which he himself knows; and he calls the intellection impressed by one Angel into the intellect of another locution, insofar as it is the effect of the Angel impressing it; and he calls audition, compared with the Angel who receives it. Thus he teaches in the Second Book, distinction 9, question 2, in the disputation "To this question", and in "As to the manner of life." But, that we may understand this opinion according to the mind of Scotus, certain things from his doctrine must be noted.

First, that the intellection of some object in an Angel can occur in four ways: first, when the thing is intuitively known in itself. Second, when it is intuitively known by one Angel, then by the intellect of another knowing it. Third, it is abstracted through a species imparted to the Angel, or acquired: but none of these intellections in an Angel is audition or locution, because any one of them is from the object or from the species, or even proceeds from the intellect of the Angel understanding by it, as from an efficient principle. Fourth and finally, one Angel can so know some object, that he receives the intellection of it from another Angel as from an entire efficient cause; and he who receives it understands by it, doing nothing toward it; and this he calls audition with respect to the Angel receiving it and understanding by it; but it is locution with respect to the Angel efficiently causing and impressing it.

Second, according to the same Scotus, it must be noted that the efficient principle of this cognition in the mind of one Angel - which is locution and audition - is not the intellection existing in the intellect of the speaking Angel, but the intelligible species impressed, and the memory of the speaking Angel constituted in first actuality for understanding, that is, a potency by reason of the impressed species for eliciting intellection. And, in Scotus's view, this memory is one and the same subsisting intellectual principle, remaining alive indeed in the speaker himself, but passing over to the intellect of the Angel who hears; and with respect to him who receives, it is merely a passion. Moreover, the cognition actually existing in the mind of the speaking Angel is not the cause and principle of the cognition existing in the mind of the hearer; Scotus proves this, because actual intellection does not have the ratio of parent, as memory has; therefore rather memory and the species of the speaking Angel produce intellection in the mind of the hearer than the speaker's actual intellection does. According to the doctrine, therefore, of Scotus, the intellection in the mind of the Angel who hears is of the same object of which is the intellection in the mind of the speaker;

and it depends on the will of the Angel speaking, just as the intellection remaining in his own intellect depends on it. For as he has power to use that species to elicit a cognition which remains in himself, so also to bring about cognition in the intellect of the hearer.

Third, it is to be noted how an Angel who speaks to another can operate in three ways in the intellect of the hearer: first, by producing the act of intellection without imprinting a species. Second, by producing the species and the intellection together. Third, by producing only the species.

He speaks in the first way (says Scotus) when one Angel speaks to another Angel about a thing already known according to a habit of understanding: when the intellect already had the species, the Angel who speaks then produces only the intellection in the intellect of the hearer; for since he who hears already has the species, a new, other species cannot be impressed in that intellect concerning the same object, because several species concerning the same object cannot be in the intellect of the same Angel.

In the second way a superior speaks to an inferior, when he manifests something to him about which the inferior has no species and of which he had no previous knowledge: because then, as far as the inferior who hears is concerned, both causes must concur, namely, of the species and of the cognition; and the Angel superior who speaks to him can imprint both, and, consequently, thus speak to the inferior as to communicate to the intellect of the hearer both the species and the cognition together. This, however, in such order, that the intelligible species be first produced in the intellect of the hearer, and, after he has it, the Angel who speaks produce the intellection; for intellection is derived from the species as from its basis: the intellection, indeed, impressed in the intellect of the hearer by the Angel, is effected from the species together with the intellection of the Angel speaking, as from an intelligible light which shines, as is the intellection which the Angel who speaks has.

In the third way one Angel speaks to another, by imprinting in him only the intelligible species; because he does not wish to imprint the cognition, but only the species of the same object which he himself considers. In this way the inferior speaks to the superior when the superior did not have the species of that object which the inferior considered and wished to manifest (for if otherwise he had the species, Scotus would not concede that in the intellect of the superior a species of the same object could be produced); and this when the superior Angel is intent and actually considering something else: for then the inferior can imprint the species of the object which he himself knows in the intellect of the superior, but cannot produce the actual cognition of it, lest he distract the intellect of the superior from the consideration which he has and to which he is attending; yet if the superior were to speak more intently, even if the inferior were distracted in the consideration of another thing, he could not hinder the effect.

... and further, the superior is able not only to imprint a species, but also an actual consideration of the object which he himself considers and is able to express; because, by reason of the more perfect nature which he has, the superior has the power to hinder the inferior from the thought and consideration in which he is engaged, and therefore can imprint a wholly different one. But the

inferior angel, who speaks to the superior and cannot imprint an intellection but only a species, Scotus compares to a man speaking with his voice to another who pays no heed to the things that are being said, because his mind is distracted with the consideration of another thing. This is the whole doctrine of Scotus - though dispersed rather than set in order - which can be gathered from the question alleged Ad v. ... ad vlt. ... of the later ones. From these it is clear that, in his view, for one angel to speak to another is nothing else than to imprint an intellection of the same object in the intellect of the hearer.

Scotus proves this opinion, thus explained, in 9. Ad quaestionem: because he who speaks to another, if he could, by the very fact that he speaks, would proximately produce in the intellect of the hearer the concept and intellection of that matter about which he speaks; but men, on account of their imperfection and defect of power, while they speak with their voice, are only remotely - namely, by the uttered voice - the cause of the concept and thought in the hearer. Now an angel can proximately produce the cognition of the same object in the intellect of the hearer, because every agent constituted in first act can operate, and produce its effect, in any subject capable and suitable; but the angel who speaks is constituted in first act for producing intellection, and the angel who ought to hear is capable of such an intellection: therefore the angel who speaks can produce an intellection in the intellect of the hearer, and accordingly speak with another in this way.

Caput III - The opinion of Scotus is refuted

Greg. more at length refutes this opinion of Scotus, cited below; and first he proves false that which Scotus taught in the first place, namely, that one angel can see in the mind of another some thing (as he says) intuitively, after first seeing the cognition in that other's mind: for, as we have at length shown above,[1575] it is impossible through a medium first seen to see something else, unless in that medium there is the whole ratio of the other thing; and thus, through a previously seen cognition of another object, the object of that cognition cannot be clearly seen. But since Scotus himself has also handed down this doctrine in Quodlibet 14, as we there said,[1576] I think that in the place above alleged he did not teach what Greg. imputes to him; indeed, in the question cited Ad VI lectoris, toward the end he plainly teaches that, from the fact that an angel sees the vision of some object in the mind of another angel, he also in a certain manner sees the object of that vision; when he said, "In a certain manner," he clearly indicated that he does not behold clearly the object of that vision as it is.

Passing this over, Scotus's position, as to the remaining points which he teaches about the locution of angels, must be impugned.

1575. See above, Disputatio 38, cap. ..., where it is shown that it is impossible, through a medium previously seen, to see something else unless the whole ratio of the other is in that medium.

1576. Scotus, Quodlibet 14, as cited there; he says one sees "in a certain manner" the object of the other's vision.

First, because it is false that an intellection, which is a vital action and essentially depends upon that in which it exists - he who is said to understand through it - can be produced by one angel in the intellect of another, as we showed elsewhere;[1577] therefore one cannot speak to another by producing, in the intellect of the other, the cognition of that object which he himself knows.

Second, even if it were possible that an angel as well as a man should understand by an intellection which they did not produce in themselves but received from another, nevertheless it is still false that an intellection can be produced by one angel in the mind of another: for the common sentence of the Scholastics, in I, dist. 8, is that the soul of a man cannot be changed by an angel except only through the mediation of the imagination; and that not even the imagination itself can be changed by the impress of a quality, but only by the application of some agent, or at least by some motion according to place, whereby the humors of the human body can be stirred.[1578] On what foundation, then, could Scotus affirm that one angel is able to produce in the intellect of another an intellection and cognition?

Third, even if an angel could effect this, nevertheless on that account he would not be said to speak to him whose intellection he imprinted: for to produce an intellection in someone is rather to bring it about that he understand, than to speak with him. For to speak to another is not properly to bring it about that he understand the same thing which I also understand, but to explain to him my concept about that thing, that is, to make him understand that I have it in my mind. If, then, one angel were to speak to another by imprinting in him an intellection, as Scotus said, he would have to imprint the intellection of his own proper intellection, and not only of the thing which he himself understands. For if he imprinted only the intellection of the object which he himself also understands, not imprinting the knowledge of his intellection, another could not discern who was speaking to him: for he would only know the thing known by another, but would not know the intellection of the speaker. But if Scotus were to say that one angel imprints not only in the intellect of another the intellection of the same object which he knows, but also the knowledge of his own intellection; he would consequently have to assert that the principle imprinting in another angel that knowledge is not the intellect of the speaking angel together with the species, but the intellection existing in the mind of the speaking angel. For an intellect together with the species of the object can only be a principle for effecting the cognition of that object, either in the angel himself, or in another, if one could produce knowledge in another. If, indeed, the intellect together with the species of the object is not the principle of reflex cognition in the selfsame angel, and of the knowledge by which he knows that he understands, then, a fortiori, it cannot be the principle for producing in the mind of another the knowledge of his own intellection. Whether, however, the cognition existing in the mind of the speaker can be the principle of knowledge in the mind of the hearer, so as to produce it, we shall say in cap. 5.[1579]

1577. Cf. 1.2, quaest. 3, art. 1, where it is shown that intellection is a vital action essentially dependent on its subject.

1578. See the common Scholastic sentence on I Sentences, dist. 8, that a human soul cannot be changed by an angel except through the imagination, and that even the imagination is not changed by an impressed quality, but only by the application of some agent, or at least by some local motion stirring bodily humors.

1579. Below, cap. 5.

Fourth, this reason militates against Scotus's position. If one angel can by the power of his intellect and of the species which he has of the object imprint in another's mind the cognition of the same object, and in this way speak to him: he could effect the same also in our soul joined to the body, just as also in the separated soul. For the conjunction with the body and the body itself seem to offer no obstacle by which a spiritual intellection should not be produced in the soul. But who would dare to say that angels or demons speak to us thus? Therefore it is a sign that angels do not speak to one another in the way Scotus thought. And that the same reason holds for the separated and the conjoined soul we shall show more fully below in cap. 5. Moreover, either our separated soul could not speak with an angel; or, if it could speak, it could imprint in him the knowledge of the same object which it knows. But if, when separated, it could, then it could also when conjoined; because the same reason obtains for it in each state, as we shall say.

Fifth, Greg. argues thus: Since the angel who hears sees in the intellects of many angels the species of the same object of which he himself receives the impressed knowledge, whence can he discern that it comes from this rather than from that one? And if he cannot discern this, he will not be able to know which of them is speaking to him.

Sixth, that which Scotus teaches in that question alleged, 9. Ad argumenta secundae quaestionis, ad primum, does not please me, namely, that one angel can speak to another in the manner explained above, although his thought be to him [the hearer] known through itself, and the object of it likewise. This does not please me: for although one could properly speak to another, to whom his thought is known, by explaining to him his mind (as we daily speak to God, to whom our whole heart is open), nevertheless, if speaking takes place in the manner Scotus imagines, one angel seems to speak fruitlessly to another to whom the same object is known. For what does it matter if an angel imprint the knowledge of the object which he himself knows upon another angel to whom that object was already known through itself, and he understand the same thing by two cognitions, one elicited by himself, the other impressed by the speaking angel? Nay rather, if Scotus were to be consistent with his statements, he would have to aver that this is in no way possible. For on that ground he himself said that an inferior angel cannot speak to a superior who is understanding another thing, because he could not imprint on him the knowledge, since two knowledges cannot at the same time be in the same intellect. But I do not see why two different knowledges of different objects could be together, but of the same object they could be: since the one must be elicited by the intellect, the other only received in it, as is clear from what has been said.

Lastly, if what Scotus teaches were true, namely, that an inferior angel cannot speak to a superior when the latter is distracted and is not thinking of the same thing as the inferior, it would follow that the inferior could rarely speak to the superior - which is absurd: for it rarely happens that both think of the same thing at the same time.

As for the argument by which Scotus confirms his position, it is easy. One must answer, therefore, that the intellect of one angel, furnished with an intelligible species, is a sufficient principle of producing cognition or knowledge in itself, not in another: because it is only a principle of immanent and vital actions. By the same reason the intellect of the angel who hears is the cause ...[1580]

Caput IV - Statement and confirmation of the opinion

Some hold that one angel speaks to another by impressing in him the species of his own cognition (species intelligibilis).

A view akin to Scotus's is the opinion of certain more recent authors, who think that the speech of angels takes place in such a way that the angel who speaks, at his own will, impresses upon the intellect of the hearer not the cognition and knowledge of the object which he himself knows, as Scotus said, but the species of the knowledge which he has about some thing, so that he manifests to the other not only the object, but also the concept (conceptus) which he has about the object. And they say the same regarding the affection of the will, namely, that one angel, at his own will, produces in the mind of another the concept of his own will. Accordingly, on this view hearing is not the same operation as speaking, only considered under a different aspect, as Scotus had said; but speech is the impression of an intelligible species in the mind of the angel to whom the speech is directed, whereas hearing is the knowledge produced by the intellect of the recipient from that species and by the power of the species received in him.

The more recent writers who follow this opinion think they have as its patron Richard in II Sentences, distinction 9, article 2, question; yet he does not entirely agree with them. For he teaches that the species which the speaking angel produces of his concept is not received as in a subject in the intellect of the hearer; but that the angel who desires to speak draws forth, from a certain spiritual ray connatural to himself, a certain species of his concept, and transmits it by means of that spiritual ray to the intellect of the other angel to whom he has decided to speak. He says that this species always remains in that transmitted ray as in its subject, and in it is made present to the intellect of the hearer, so that the angel who is to hear uses it as an instrument, in order that from it he himself may elicit another [species], and infuse it into his own intellect, by which, now constituted in first act, he may elicit the knowledge of the concept existing in the mind of the speaking angel. And because it is in the power of the speaking angel to extend this spiritual ray with the species as far as the intellect of the hearer, therefore one angel can speak to one angel in such a way as not to speak to another, because he can, as he pleases, extend that spiritual ray to one angel and not to another; whence it will come about that one hears, but the other does not hear.

This opinion can be confirmed, first, because speech with all that is necessary for it cannot take place unless some change is made in the intellect of the hearer. Now for speech the first thing necessary is that the speaker make the hearer attend. Add that one angel can speak to another such

1580. segment.

that others do not hear; and all these things require some special change in the mind of the hearer. No more fitting kind of change can be assigned than the manner explained, as will be clear by induction; therefore let us philosophize about angelic speech on that basis. Next, one angel hears another speaking, and knows his concept, in a nobler way than one man understands the mind and the secret of heart of another man who is speaking - who would doubt this? Therefore, since a man, when he hears another man speaking, knows the secret of the other only with abstract knowledge and through alien species, an angel ought to know the mind and concept of another angel who is speaking with proper knowledge, as they say, quidditative and intuitive; and so he ought to have a proper species of it. But he does not have this from the beginning of his creation, otherwise he would know the concept of the other and the secret of heart without the other speaking to him and revealing it, which is absurd. Nor should one say that God would be at hand so that, as soon as one angel should speak and wish to manifest his concept to another, He would infuse into him the species; for this would be said gratuitously and without any probable foundation. What remains, therefore, is that the angel who speaks produce in the mind of the hearer a certain species of the knowledge which he has in his own mind, by which he may unfold his concept to him. For no other fitting way seems to remain for us to say that one angel speaks to another.

Præcedens opinio confutatur:

Caput V - Refutation of the foregoing opinion

The aforesaid recent authors seem to have been led to this opinion for this only reason, that they judged every other way of philosophizing about this matter to be full of difficulties; while this one would appear plausible and at first glance easy; whereas in truth it is no less entangled with difficulties, as we shall show in this chapter, where at the end we shall also briefly refute Richard's way of philosophizing.

First, therefore, against the aforesaid opinion common reason contends. For from the common sentence of the theologians with St. Thomas, below, question 110, article 3, an angel cannot change a corporeal creature as to the least genus of quality, but he can imprint upon it only local motion, as we shall say in Disputation 218, chapters 1 and 3; therefore much less will he be able to communicate an intelligible species to a spiritual creature.[1581] Next, St. Thomas also teaches below, question 110, articles 1 and 2, that one angel cannot act upon the intellect or the will of another; and this is the common sentence of the theologians, as we shall see in that disputation: therefore, in the same manner, one angel cannot speak to another.[1582] The adversaries, however, reply that indeed one angel cannot, by the mere command and nod of his will, imprint anything other than local motion, nor can he move the intellect and will of another; but that he can imprint a likeness and intelligible species in the mode of an object. Yet, besides the fact that this solution seems devised only to make an escape, it will be clear from the second reason that it has no weight.

1581. St. Thomas, below, q. 110, a. 3; and see Vazquez, Disputatio 218, cap. 1 and 3.
1582. St. Thomas, below, q. 110, a. 1 - 2.

The second reason against the same opinion is as follows. If one angel could imprint upon another the species of his concept and of his will in the other's intellect, either he would do this by the mere nod and command of his will, assuming nothing else as a principle for producing it; or he would do it by a command of his will, with the cognition and affection which he has being assumed as the principle from which to produce it. He cannot do it in the first way, as the adversaries plainly admit; otherwise it would follow that one angel could, at will, change the intellect of another angel in this or that way. Nor can he accomplish it in the latter way, namely, by his own intellection and affection as by an object producing the species of itself. For cognition existing in the mind of one angel and the affection existing in the will, if they produce anything of themselves, produce it naturally and necessarily, and in such a way that it is no longer in the power of the will to restrain the intellection or the affection, once produced, from producing anything of itself. For these qualities do not lie subject to the command of free reflexive will so as to produce this or that, in this or that manner. By this reasoning, since habits (habitus) are produced by acts as by their proximate efficient principle, the will cannot, just as it pleases, forbid or bring it about that its act, or an act of the intellect, once produced, should not produce a habit. Indeed, the will could refrain from eliciting an act within itself, and impede the intellect from eliciting one; but once such agents are produced, as they produce something of themselves, assuredly they produce it naturally and necessarily, nor do they stand in need of a new mandate of liberty and will. Hence, according to the opinion of these authors, it would follow that the secrets of hearts, by that very fact that they are, would naturally and necessarily be manifest to all the angels; nor would their manifestation depend upon a new choice of the will of him whose they are, but straightway of itself would produce a species in the mind of all the others; because there would be no greater reason why they should produce their species in the intellect of one angel rather than in the intellect of another.

The adversaries reply that the concept existing in the mind and the affection in the will of one angel do not, of themselves and naturally, produce the species of themselves in the intellect of another angel; but do so insofar as it pleases the angel to whom they belong, because he uses them, when he wills, for the production of the species. For we do not make use only of our powers when we will, but also of the habits and qualities existing in us; indeed, we employ species and habits at the discretion of our will. But this reply can easily be refuted, because we do not use everything that is in our power whenever we will, but only those things which our natural faculties, which are by their nature subject to the liberty of the will, use for acting - such as species and habits. For these do not operate of themselves, nor can they produce any effect, but only together with the faculties with which they are conjoined and to which they are assigned as assisting principles. A species does not operate except with the intellect; likewise a habit does not operate except with the intellect, or with another faculty which it renders apt for acting. And since the faculties themselves are naturally so constituted and connected with the will that they are moved by it, it follows that we also use species and habits at the discretion and liberty of the will.

But all the other effects which we know to be produced by our acts alone, whether of the intellect or of the will, do not proceed from some native faculty of ours; rather, they are produced in us by nature in such a way that it does not depend on the liberty of our will whether they be

produced or not from such a principle, although it is within the power of the will that there be such a principle from which they spring. Thus habits, which are generated and effected in our faculties by acts, proceed so naturally from the acts that the will cannot hinder an act from producing a habit or a disposition - though it can freely elicit or command an act which will generate the habit or disposition - for this sole reason, that the act is the complete cause of producing the habit, and does not produce it together with some native faculty of ours that lies under the free power of man. Likewise, effects which are naturally imprinted upon our body by acts of passions and affections do not lie under the election of the will, nor can the will prevent their being produced.

In the same way, if it is true (as the adversaries, unless I am mistaken, assert) that from an act of understanding in us there remains some species with respect to memory, that does not lie under our power; rather, once the act of intellect is posited, it arises naturally and necessarily. So too the multiplication of species from the external senses to the internal, and up to the intellect, takes place so naturally that it is not within our power, once a species is posited from which others are multiplied. For species do not produce other species together with natural faculties which are subject to the command of the will. For this reason, although it is commonly said that we use habits when we will, it is not said that we use acts when we will, because we do not use them at will for producing something. Therefore, if the concept existing in the mind and the affection in the will of one angel produce the species of themselves in the intellect of another, and do not produce it in cooperation with the intellect or with the will, as the adversaries admit, but are themselves the complete cause of such a species, it will not be wholly by a free choice of the will that he produces it or does not produce it; rather, the concept in the mind and the affection in the will of the angel, once produced, will thereafter of themselves naturally effect in the intellect of another the species of themselves. From this follow the absurdities which we were inferring above.

Moreover, that they may evade the force of this argument in any way, the adversaries reply that indeed habits are produced naturally by acts, and that from cognition there naturally remains an impressed species in the same object, and that the production of such a species or habit does not depend on the will of the angel or man in whom the habit or species is; because acts are naturally inclined to produce both. But, they say, an act existing in the intellect of one angel and an affection in the will are not naturally inclined to produce the species of themselves in the intellect of another; and therefore they require the command of the will of him in whom they are, so that freely they may produce such a species. Yet this solution seems no less a makeshift. For either acts of the intellect and of the will have from themselves the power to produce the species of themselves in the intellect of another, or they do not have it. If they have it, then they cannot fail to be naturally inclined to produce it; because acts of intellect and will do not have from themselves liberty for producing, but they themselves are only freely elicited; liberty with respect to acting is in the will itself. Next, the acts of the intellect and of the will are not faculties which by their nature are subject to the will for acting according to its free command. Finally, why shall we say that these acts obey the will so as to produce the species of themselves in another angel, and not so as to produce it in the very angel in whom they are? Since the power of an act of will as well as of intellect does not have liberty from itself, but is naturally inclined to produce its own species and likeness, no

reason seems to exist why we should attribute to the act of will and to the intellect what we grant to the other faculties of the soul, namely, to be subject to the will so that, by its command, it may operate that to which it has of itself a natural power; for this is proper...

It seems rather proper to the inferior faculties, which have their root in the same essence (*essentia*) of the soul or of the angel. But if we say that the act of the intellect and of the will of one angel does not of itself have the power of producing a species (*species*) of itself in the intellect of another, much less will it be able to produce it by the command of the will, as is manifest. Therefore in no way must it be said that by the command of the will a species is derived into the mind of another angel.

A third reason against the preceding opinion is no less effective, because from it there would follow that our soul could speak to an angel in this way, by impressing upon him the concept of its thought and of its will, not only when it is separated from the body, but also when it exists in the body. For since a separated soul speaks to another separated soul, as is clear about the soul of the rich man who spoke to the soul of Abraham (Luke 16), by the same reasoning it will be able to speak to another angel: nor, indeed, ought we to deny to souls this kind of life and society with the angels. Therefore, since spiritual speech, according to the opinion of these men, is brought about in no other way than by a species impressed upon the mind of the angel who hears, it follows that in the same way our soul, both when conjoined and when separated, can speak with angels. But they reply that so long as our soul is conjoined, it cannot thus speak with an angel, though truly it can when separated, because our soul, conjoined to the body, is itself impeded, so that it does not speak in that mode. Yet they must tell us what impediment that conjunction with the body can be, such that the soul cannot imprint the species of its concept or affection mentally upon another soul or angel. For it ought not to operate by means of the body, but by the power of the spiritual concept and affection alone, which do not need propinquity of place, or at least do not require contact with the body. What, I ask, can stand in the way, such that a concept existing in the human intellect, and an affection in the will, does not imprint a species of itself upon another soul or an angel, even at any distance whatsoever, if it does not require propinquity, or, if it does require it, at least at a fitting distance without any other contact such as is required among corporeal agents? For since the concept in the mind and the affection in the will are an entire and perfect cause for imprinting such a species, and each is the same in the soul when conjoined and when separated, it follows that such a species is produced either in both modes or in neither. For whenever the principle and the patient are the same, and there is no impediment either of place or of distance, the same effect follows, as is evident by induction. Led also by this reasoning St. Thomas, below, in Question 117, Article 4, said that if the soul by its own motion and command could move the body according to place when it is separated, it could also do so when conjoined, nor could its state in the body in any way impede this power of operating spiritually.[1583]

A fourth reason, from nearly the same principle, deduces another absurdity, namely this. If speech were brought about in this way, then even if the conjoined soul could not speak to an angel, nevertheless an angel and a demon could thus speak to our soul even when conjoined to the body.

And if they could, assuredly it would sometime have happened. For it would be frivolous to assert that God by his infinite power has up to now prevented demons or angels from speaking thus to men, since that would be affirmed without any foundation. Moreover, no one up to now has experienced in himself that an angel spoke to him in this way; therefore it is a sign that he cannot speak thus either.

Furthermore, from the aforesaid opinion what we said above can be inferred, and thus it is shown. For if an angel can imprint a spiritual species of his concept and affection upon another angel and upon a separated soul, by no lesser reason will he be able to imprint it upon a soul conjoined to a body: since the soul is just as spiritual when conjoined as when separated from the body, and by its own substance in the same way capable of a spiritual species when it is conjoined as when it is separated; and by that species once impressed, without any miracle, it could understand in the body without any ministry of phantasms, just as the soul of Christ, according to the opinion of all, operated by infused species.

Someone will perhaps reply (for to this point I have not read what the adversaries say) that our soul is not capable of such a spiritual impression for this present state, because as long as it is conjoined, it uses only the ministry of phantasms for understanding and for acquiring intelligible species. Yet this can in no way stand in the way, such that the soul in the body might not receive species in no way dependent upon phantasms, if there be a cause sufficient of itself to imprint them. For that our soul is tied to the senses as long as it is conjoined to the body can only impede that by its own power it acquire species in some other way than by the ministry of phantasms. Finally, the falsity of this opinion will be evident from the solution of the arguments by which it is confirmed. But before we go on to refute those, let us impugn the opinion of Richard, as we promised above.

Omitting, then, the reasons brought against the preceding opinion, which also fight against Richard, that which he imagined about that spiritual ray emitted by each angel who speaks all the way to the other who hears, can be much more easily overthrown. For either it is emitted outside the angel, like vapor or smoke from a body: and this is a fiction - first, if it be said to be a spiritual substance. For who would believe that a spiritual substance is derived from any angel whatsoever as often as he speaks, or especially that it would be created from nothing, since it would be produced according to itself as a whole, which is to be created? Or again, if it is said to be an accident: already there would be some accident outside a substance and without a subject, which is absurd. Or else that spiritual ray is an accident remaining in the intellect of the angel who speaks, so that it is only said to be transmitted to the angel who ought to hear, because it is present to him as an object - and thus to posit such a spiritual ray distinct from the concept and affection of the speaking angel, from whose power and virtue the species is drawn, is superfluous and fictitious; since it is better to say that the species is produced proxime by the affection and concept of the speaking angel, than by any other ray. Besides, what Richard adds is superfluous and imaginary, namely, that some species is produced from that intellectual ray by the speaking angel, and that it

1583. St. Thomas, below, q. 117, a. 4.

is offered to the angel who is to hear, in order that he draw from it another species. For, first, so great a multiplication of species does not seem necessary; and, next, because unless one species is received into another as into a subject, one cannot say that one is drawn from another by the angel's power. For that is said to be drawn forth from another which is received in another as in a subject. Certainly, nearly all the things that Richard has said seem to be so made up by him, that they appear more like dreams than to have any show of probability.

Caput VI - The arguments for the foregoing opinion are refuted

Now indeed it is not difficult to tear up the foundations of this opinion. To the first argument we answer that one angel cannot be compelled by another angel who speaks so as to hear, as we shall show below; whereas, however, one man, whether he wills it or not, is forced to hear another who speaks. For a man hears by the senses, which cannot but be moved by a present object; or at least, if the angel who hears is necessarily excited by the one speaking, we do not know in what manner. But I, for my part, hold as certain that by the bare impression of a species one angel can by no means be so excited by another, as the preceding opinion asserts, that he cannot but hear, that is, that he cannot but, by means of that species, actually understand. For even in the first instant of their creation the angels had impressed species of all things, according to a sufficiently common opinion; and yet no one asserts that an angel actually considered all the objects of those species: because the angel uses the infused species when he wills; and the first thought about some thing can be determined by no other agent than by God, as we shall also say below in Disputation 236, chapter 3.[1584] Therefore an angel could receive a species sent in by another angel from his concept and the affection of his will, and yet not operate by it; and hence he would not understand: and if he did not actually consider by that species, he would not hear.

To the latter argument I say that indeed one angel more perfectly understands the affection of another angel speaking to him than one man understands the concept and affection of another man; nonetheless that cognition of the angel never goes beyond the limits of abstractive cognition, which is through others' concepts: nor does any angel thus know the affection of another so as to behold his heart as it is, but only, as it were, from the report of the angel speaking. I said, the affection of the heart: for the thought and concept of the speaking angel, according to its substance, he would be able to know intimately, not by a species emitted by that one, but by the species which he has, or by the power of his intellect, and, even without species, to understand; and that sentence is true, which somewhere asserts that only the affection of the heart of one angel is hidden from another, not, however, the thought, according to substance. And therefore, until these things are made manifest to us and we are taught, we are not able to understand them.

Dixi the affection of the heart: for he would be able intuitively to know, according to its substance, the thought and concept of the speaking angel, not by a species emitted by that one, but by the species (species) which he has, or by the power of his intellect, if, even without species, he

1584. Vazquez, Disputatio 236, cap. 3.

understood other things; and that sentence is true which somewhere asserts that only the affection of the heart of one angel is hidden from another, not, however, the thought, according to substance.

But someone will ask, whether, just as we say that there are indeed species (species) of future contingent things, yet that by them future things cannot be known until they are present, in the same way we may say that there are indeed proper species of the affections and secrets of the hearts of one angel, yet that by them they are not known until they are made known by that angel to whom they belong. I answer, there is a different account. For even if we concede species of future contingents, nevertheless it does not follow that immediately the future, under the state of futurity, can be known: because, until they are present, they are not the natural objects of a created intellect, as was shown above in Disputation 208, chapter 4: but when the object is changed, even if on the part of the faculty the other requisites for understanding remain, there cannot be knowledge, as we showed there. But if an angel had the species of the secrets of another angel, although he would not understand them as future, nevertheless he could understand them as present; nor would there be need to wait for that angel, in whom they are, to reveal them: because revelation does not change the being of the thing; wherefore, if after revelation the object is accommodated, and the angel has the proper species of it, he will also know it before revelation. But not so of future things: for to be present and to be future are diverse, and they have a diverse account of the intelligible and of truth; wherefore this variation alone suffices, that under one state a thing can be known which under another cannot. We, however, therefore say that locution is necessary for the manifestation of secrets and affections of the heart, because the angel who ought to hear does not have the species of that thing, nor does he have it as his proper object, which he would be able to understand by a proper and quidditative concept, but only insofar as it is expressed by some speech and revelation; just as we too, who by revelation alone know many things among secrets which we cannot behold by a proper concept.

Caput VII - Angels speak among themselves by one angel's impressing the cognition of his concept into another's mind (Ockham, Gabriel)

That angels speak to one another by this, that one impresses the knowledge of his concept upon the mind of another angel, was the view of Ockham and Gabriel.

The third opinion is not altogether different from the two preceding, which Ockham teaches in the Second Book, question 20, and Gabriel in Quodlibet I, question 7, and again in Book II, distinction 9, question 2, article 4. In their explanation they suppose that to speak by the intellect is nothing other than to express within oneself an interior word or intellection, and to have it in the mind; but to hear by the intellect is the same as to see or to understand such a word in the mind of another: which they seem to gather for themselves from St. Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, chapter 10. This foundation laid, they assert that one angel speaks to another in this way: first indeed that one angel forms within himself the word of that which he thinks and desires, or has resolved upon; then that this thought, after the manner of an object, effects in the intellect of the other not a

species of itself, but a knowing and cognition; and when the other angel receives this, he is said to hear the word of the intellect uttered by another. This opinion agrees with the two preceding, inasmuch as it posits something derived from the intellect of the speaking angel into the intellect of the hearer: with the opinion of Scotus indeed, because he says that what is derived into the intellect of the hearer is not a species but an intellection; with the opinion of more recent authors, because it says that the impression in the mind of the hearer is made not by the intellect, but by the word produced in the mind of the speaker. But this opinion differs first from the opinion of Scotus, both because, whereas Scotus asserts that the intellection is derived into the intellect of the hearer from the intellect of the speaker constituted in first act by an intelligible species (species intelligibilis), this opinion says that the intellection in the mind of the hearer is produced by the word and intellection produced in the intellect and mind of the speaker; and also because Scotus says that the knowledge in the mind of the hearer is produced by the intellect alone and the species of the speaking angel as by a complete cause, and that the angel who hears is only passively disposed; but Gabriel and Ockham say that the knowledge in the mind of the hearer is produced by the word existing in the mind of the speaker, and by the intellect at the same time of the hearing angel, so that from these two there is one cause. Then this opinion differs from the other, the second opinion, both because that one teaches that from the intellect of the speaking angel there is not derived into the mind of the hearer an intellection but a species, which is for it the principle of intellection; whereas this opinion asserts that there is derived an intellection and cognition; and also because the second opinion affirms that the species in the mind of the hearer is produced by the intellect of the speaker freely at the arbitrement of the will; but Ockham and Gabriel teach that it is produced naturally and necessarily. And this opinion can be confirmed by almost the same reasons as the two preceding.

Nevertheless to me, in the same way as those, it is by no means proved. First indeed, because, as I showed above in Disputation 201, chapter 2, knowledge in the mind of an angel cannot be produced by an object existing outside the angel, whether it be corporeal or spiritual. Then, because on this supposition the true ratio of locution among angels cannot be defended: for locution, which is to another, ought to be free, that one may freely express and signify his concept to another; not natural and necessary: otherwise any angel would speak to any other, since, according to the opinion of Gabriel and Ockham, the concept of his mind is naturally known to another; nay, even a man would speak to any angel; it would follow also that man always speaks to God, because his concept and the secret of his heart are always known and manifest to God. Moreover, that the soul of a man, while it is in the body, can speak to an angel by naturally impressing upon him the knowledge of its concept; and conversely that an angel can speak to the soul in the same way (which is absurd), is made manifest from the things said against the preceding opinion in the foregoing chapter, nor is it necessary to tarry longer on that point.

To the argument just made Gabriel and Ockham reply that one angel cannot speak to another unless he wills, and therefore two things are required for locution, both an act of the intellect and of the will, so that locution signifies the formation of a concept in the mind and connotes the will of manifesting. However, this will is not necessary for this, that by its command and motion the act of

the intellect and the word which is in the speaker's intellect imprint its knowledge upon the hearer (for this it does naturally), but that the angel may voluntarily form a concept in himself with this intention, that it operate upon another angel. But this reply can easily be refuted. For since the word existing in the mind of one angel operates in the mind of another naturally, and not by the command or motion of the will, that intention of the angel will contribute nothing at all to locution and the expression of the concept in the mind of the other; and therefore it will in no way pertain to the notion of locution. For that will can only bring it about that the concept be expressed in the mind of the speaker; but that the same concept, once expressed, be locution, will in no wise depend on that will. It would pertain, however, to the ratio of locution, if the concept existing in the mind of the speaking angel were to produce freely and at his will knowledge of itself in the mind of the hearer; but that this depends not on the will of the angel, remains sufficiently proved in the preceding chapter.

Caput VIII - That an angel speaks merely by willing his secret to be manifested (Cajetan, Capreolus)

All the other Scholastics who differ concerning the locution of angels, by common consent conspire in this one thing against the preceding opinions, that they say one angel speaks to another with no effect produced in him. What, however, is necessary on the part of the speaker, they do not explain in the same way. Wherefore they too have divided into various opinions, which we shall forthwith recount one by one. The first of these opinions, which stands as the fourth in order, is that of Cajetan below, question 107, article 1, and of Capreolus in Book II, distinction 11, question 2, and of others whom we shall mention below; they teach that merely because one angel wills that the secret of his heart be manifest to another, it is rightly understood by him; and therefore that the ordination of this secret to another angel (as Cajetan speaks) is locution; and that the knowledge which thence is born in the mind of the other angel is not produced by the speaking angel, or by anything which exists in his mind, but that hearing is from the hearing angel alone. In support of this opinion the Holy Doctor is alleged below in that question 107, article 1; what, however, he himself says in that place, we shall see below.

This opinion is confirmed first, because it is proved that the secret of the heart of one angel is of itself hidden from another angel, as was proved in Disputation 209, chapter 10. Moreover, that this secret of the heart can, by the will of the angel to whom it belongs, be opened to another angel, no one will deny. Since therefore, as is clear from the foregoing, we ought not to say that anything is produced in the intellect of the hearer by the angel who speaks, no other way seems to remain. Cajetan confirms this next, because this very fact, that by the will of him to whom it belongs the secret of the heart is ordered to another angel, by that sole ordination of the will is among the things which pertain to another angel; but any angel can understand all things that pertain to himself; therefore also the secret of another's heart so ordered by that one's will.

Those who seem to have followed this opinion are Alexander in Part II, question 27, member 6; St. Bonaventure in Book II, distinction 10, article 3, question 1; and Albert in Part II, treatise 9, question 35, member 2; for although they assert that angels speak to one another by certain nods, nevertheless they understand those nods to be the very concept of the intellect of the speaking angel, and the secret of the will ordered by the will itself to another angel, that it might be manifest to him. Finally, according to the opinion of these men, in this way the secret of the heart is known after the will of manifesting, that it is seen not only with certitude, but also, as they say, by a quidditative and intuitive knowledge.

To me, however, to confess the slowness of my own understanding, as also to the Master Cano, a distinguished man from the Thomist school, the aforesaid opinion has always seemed difficult. First, indeed, it is difficult that by the will alone of the speaking angel the secret of the will or of the intellect, which before was altogether unknown, should be made manifest to another angel, with no change wrought in him, nor anything produced in the speaking angel himself, or in the hearer; for a thing wholly unchanged in itself stands in the same relation to the intellect now as before: for it would be marvelous if, on account of some extrinsic respect which it would receive from the will, it would become intelligible.

But someone will object that a thing is sometimes better understood on account of various media which are employed for its explication, with no change at all made in the thing itself: therefore it is not marvelous, if by reason of the will ordering the secret of the heart to another angel there is now known what before was unknown.

I answer: when a thing is not understood, or

I answer: when a thing is not understood, or is not known primarily, but by reason of something previously known, it can rightly happen that that which remains in itself unchanged is now understood and known, whereas before it could not be known or understood. Then, however, there is some change on the side of the object, at least of that which is primarily known. For this reason, from one principle known there is known that which before was altogether unknown. And the same happens if a change be made in some sign expressing the thing: for this change too is understood to have been made on the side of the known object. But in the present case, it is not so: for the will, by which an angel wills his secret to be known to another, is not a medium which, previously known either as a sign or as a medium, leads us to a cognition of the secret of the heart; nor does it change anything in the secret itself: therefore it contributes nothing to the secret of the heart being able to be known, upon the accession of that will so ordering it, when previously it was unknown.

But what Cajetan asserts, namely that for this reason the secret of the heart is known without any other change, solely because it is directed by the angel's will - since now it is among those things which pertain to the other angel to whom they are directed - matters little. Another reply to Cajetan is refuted. First, because if that will which is said to direct the secret of the heart cannot vary anything in the secret itself, it is idle to say that a secret which did not previously pertain, now thereafter pertains to another angel by reason of that will. Then also because from that doctrine it would follow that an act of hatred or of love by which one angel pursues another, is no less among

the number of those things which pertain to that other than the secret of the heart is after the aforesaid act of will: and consequently now a free act of one angel would of itself be as well known to another angel as to himself; which Cajetan and the authors of this opinion, as I think, do not grant. And if one free act, on the ground that it has another angel for its object, is known to him, by the same reasoning any other act will be known: for what does it matter that one angel's act is conversant about another angel as about its object, so that we should say that that act rather than another is known? What also does it matter that one angel's act now pertains to another angel by the mere will of the one ordering, so that what previously could not be known is now known?

From what has been said it is also clearly inferred that what Marsilius teaches is manifestly false, in the second question six, article two under the second supposition, corollary 2, namely that an angel can by his will hide a habit which he has, so that it cannot be known by another.[1585] He proves it in this way: if an angel can hide the act of his intellect and will, which are of themselves more intelligible because they have more act and less potency, then with much greater reason it must be said that he can also hide a habit which he has in himself. But since from what has been said it is established that by the mere choice of will, without any other change in the thing itself, or in the sign, or in the primary object, nothing is made intelligible which before was not, as we have proved, by the same reasoning it must be said that by the mere nod of the will it cannot be hidden. And if an act could be hidden, a habit also could be, as Marsilius infers.

Then the aforesaid opinion is refuted by this reason besides. Even if it were true what its authors contend, namely that the secret of the heart becomes manifest to an angel after the will and the ordering of the will, nevertheless in this way of opening the secret the true ratio of locution would not be preserved: for locution is not an act of will, but of intellect expressing something. Wherefore Theophylact and Theodoret, as we shall report below, rightly said that the tongue of the angels is their intellect; whereas according to the aforesaid opinion the tongue of the angels would be the will. Someone will perhaps reply that the locution of angels is the very concept which they had hidden in their mind, insofar as it is now manifest by the ordering of the will. Yet even on this account the true ratio of locution cannot be defended: for that concept, insofar as it is made manifest by the affection of the ordering will, is not the expression itself and signification which belong to the ratio of locution, but rather is the thing expressed and signified by the locution itself. Therefore by no force of a true ratio of locution can it be defended.

The reasons for this opinion can easily be dissolved. To the first we say that the secret of the heart of one angel is of itself hidden from another angel, nor can it be explained to him, or be made manifest to him by impressed knowledge, or by a species in that one's mind, as was proved above sufficiently; nevertheless, there is no need to recur to the aforesaid way of philosophizing which the preceding opinion follows: but it can be defended and explained by another, perhaps easier, way; or certainly, if no rationale of philosophizing should be available to us, in this difficulty we ought rather to confess our ignorance than to assert something without firm foundation. For the matter is most remote from sense; and therefore it is no wonder if it altogether escapes us.

1585. Marsilius, secunda quaestio sexta, articulus secundus, suppositio secunda, corollarium 2.

As to the second reason I say that both what Cajetan says is rather uncertain and without foundation: both that the secret of the heart of one angel after the ordering of the will pertains to another angel, and that all the things which in some manner pertain or are referred to any angel are known to him. For, as we said above, the hatred and love by which one angel pursues another are conversant about him and pertain to him no less than that ordering of the secret: and yet that affection of hatred and love is hidden from him about whom it is conversant.

Furthermore, as regards the mind of St. Thomas, almost all Thomists, not lightly nor without foundation, think that he is for this opinion. This is gathered especially from those things which we shall report below from the Doctor Saint in disputation 212; nevertheless, we could benignly interpret him. For he nowhere said that the secret of the heart of one angel becomes manifest to another, and is explained by speech, by the mere will of the one having it, without any other sign expressive; but in that first article, question I, q.107, in the body, he only said that the intellect is moved by the will from potency to act in two ways: first, that it may actually consider the things which it has in memory, and thus that an angel speaks to himself by command of the will, namely by an act of the intellect which is called a word; then he said that the intellect is moved by the will by the ordering of the concept of his mind to another: and thus one angel speaks to another. In which place St. Thomas does not suppose that locution is the very ordering of the will; for by this the angel does not speak to himself; but that it is the concept itself of the intellect; for this the angel speaks to himself. And by the same reason he said that the concept itself is locution to another when it is ordered to another: not because, when previously the concept had been produced in the angel and was unknown to the other angel, after the mere ordering of the will it becomes known to him, and is locution with respect to him; for not everything which is known to another, even if it be a word, is locution with respect to him, but that which is directed to him, as will be explained in chapter twelve. Therefore, from the ordering of the will St. Thomas said that the intellect is moved to speak to another, because it depends on its command that the intellect of one angel express a concept directed to another angel, which concept is locution with respect to him; just as it also depends on it that the intellect actually consider and speak to itself; and in the first reply he only assigns the difference between an angel and a man, namely that a man, because of bodily impediments, not immediately upon ordering his secret does he manifest it to another, but has need of the manifestation of an exterior tongue; an angel, however, has not this impediment, and immediately upon willing to manifest a secret, manifests it.

Whence St. Thomas does not teach that an angel, by the mere nod of his will, without any other sign, speaks to another angel. Nor did St. Thomas teach this anywhere. Rather, in II distinction 11, question 2, article 3, near the end, he clearly asserts that locution is effected by some sign which one angel can naturally know in another, namely by intellectual signs; and they seem to constitute no other intellectual sign than the very concept of the mind produced from that direction of the will which we have mentioned, as he expressly affirms in De veritate, question 9, article 4, reply to the fourth: "And if one angel shall speak to another by a sign, namely by a species, in whose act his

intellect is in order to another."[1586] In the body of the same article he taught what we have reported from other places. Wherefore St. Thomas rather seems to have handed down the opinion which we shall explain in chapter twelve.[1587]

Quid senserit Durandus.

Caput IX - What Durandus held

The fifth opinion is that of Durandus, who, while he asserts that one angel does not speak by impressing something on the other's intellect, nevertheless explains the locution of angels in this way.

First, he affirms that angels can speak to one another by some expressed voice in the air, as men speak with one another; which can only be true in assumed bodies, about which there has been hitherto no difficulty. As to spiritual locution, about which the whole controversy is, he then says: if that opinion is true which asserts that thoughts and the secrets of hearts are of themselves manifest to any angel, locution is effected by the mere ordering of the will of one to another, not because by that ordering he makes secret thoughts - or what before was unknown, since he supposes that the secrets of the heart are of themselves manifest to all - to be known; but the point will be that a concept and a secret, known to all, be directed to one angel and not to another; just as when someone in a loud voice speaks to one person in the presence of many, so that he is heard and understood by all, he is not said to speak to all, but to speak in the presence of all, to him to whom he directs the secret of his will and his words. But if the secrets of hearts are of themselves hidden from angels, says Durandus, I do not understand the way by which the mutual locution of angels can be rightly explained.

Against this opinion, however, Damascene is first opposed, De fide orthodoxa II, chapter 3 near the end; for concerning angels he says: "They are one with us, nor do they have need of ears; nevertheless they have, as it were, conferences of discourse among themselves; their communications among themselves are everywhere." By which he plainly pronounces that angels, in a spiritual manner, carry on communications with each other; and communication is the same as to explain and to make manifest. For what is of itself known to another cannot be brought out or communicated to another. And since Damascene says that this communication takes place, he clearly indicates that angels speak to each other in a spiritual mode and make secrets manifest to each other

He explains the locution of angels in this way. First, he affirms that angels are able to speak to one another with some voice expressed in the air, just as men speak among themselves: which can only be true in assumed bodies, about which up to now there has been no difficulty. But as to spiritual locution, about which the whole controversy stands, he then teaches that, if the opinion is true which asserts that the thoughts and secrets of the heart are of themselves manifest to any

1586. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4: "Et si unus Angelus per signum alii loquetur, scilicet per speciem, in cuius actu intellectus eius sit in ordine ad alium."

1587. St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 (circa finem); Summa Theologiae I, q. 107, a. 1 (in corpore).

angel, locution takes place by a mere ordination of the will of one toward another, not because by it he makes the secret to be known which before was unknown - for he supposes the secret of the heart to be of itself manifest to all - but because the concept and the secret, although known to all, are directed to one angel and not to another; just as when someone speaks aloud to one person in the presence of many, so that he is heard and understood by all, he is not said to speak to all, but to speak to one before all, to whom he directs the secret of his will and his words. But if the secrets of hearts are of themselves hidden from angels, Durandus says that he does not find a way by which the mutual locution of angels can be rightly explained.

To this position, first, St. John Damascene is opposed, in book II, chapter 3, a little before the middle: for he says of angels, "Not having need of tongue or of ears, they communicate their thoughts and counsels among themselves without the aid of speech." Where he plainly pronounces that angels in a spiritual manner communicate their counsels among themselves; but to communicate is the same as to explain and to make manifest: for what is of itself known to another cannot be brought forth or communicated to another. And since Damascene says that this communication takes place without speech, he clearly indicates that angels speak to each other in a spiritual mode and make their secrets manifest to one another.

Then an effective argument fights against Durandus. For if the sentence were true - as he himself supposes - which asserts that the secret of the heart of one angel is of itself manifest and known to another, there could be no locution among angels. For, as we said above, locution is an act of the intellect, or of a rational faculty, expressing and signifying that which it speaks; therefore, if an angel speaks about the secret of his heart, he ought to express and to signify it. And although it may sometimes happen that, without speaking by imprinting something on another's intellect, that of which one is speaking is nevertheless known to the other, still locution explains in this way. Durandus, however, meets this, and says that in exterior locution two things are necessarily found: both the thing which is expressed and made known through locution, and the sign itself, by which it is expressed and signified; for of a thing which is not expressed by a sign, but is only known of itself, no one is said to speak. But in spiritual and interior locution, certainly it is not necessary that those two exist, namely, the sign and the thing signified: rather, the very interior concept is called the locution by which a man speaks to himself while he understands; and apart from it there is not some other thing about which a man speaks to himself. In the same way, says Durandus, that concept existing in the mind of the angel who speaks can be a locution directed to another, even if it is of itself known to him, and in it we do not find those two, both the sign expressing and the thing itself expressed.

Yet if we attend to the true notion of locution, we shall easily discover that, both in interior locution by which an angel speaks to himself, and in that by which he speaks to another, those two which we have said ought to be present. For in our concept, by which we are said inwardly to speak to ourselves, those two are found. For there is an expression and signification of some thing - namely, the very word and expressed likeness; there is also the thing itself understood, as it were impressed and signified to the one understanding by the same intellection and by the expressed species of it. Wherefore, in this locution our concept is not the thing about which we speak, but

rather is the locution itself; but truly the concept existing in the mind of one angel, according to the sentence of Durandus, is not the expression itself, but rather the thing understood and expressed, which is known and is expressed to another: therefore that the will of the angel directs the concept to one angel rather than to another, although before it was equally known to all, is not a sufficient reason for it to be called locution.

I dismiss two other modes of locution, which Heruæus reports in the place to be cited below. One is of those who assert that the locution of angels is brought about by certain impressions in the imagination of some living thing, by arranging its species; another is of those who assert that locution takes place through certain figures imprinted in the Empyrean heaven: for these things are futile and empty, as is evident.

That the locution of angels takes place through certain spiritual signs which are not concepts and intellections, Aegidius and others held.

Melchior Canus also felt the same, who never could understand that one angel speaks to another in the way which the Thomists have taught. Moreover, the aforesaid Doctors thus assert that by these signs one angel speaks to another, in such a way that by no means do the signs pass over into the very angel who hears, but they remain in the one speaking. The contrary of which some more recent writers falsely impute to these authors. To these there are also wont to be numbered Nicolaus de Lyra on that passage of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 13, "If I speak with the tongues of men, &c.", where he says that in angels there is something naturally known to others, and when in one angel that is ordered to declaring to another that which is secret and hidden to him, then one angel speaks to another; and he calls the power of explaining in such a way a tongue. And the Ordinary Gloss on that place seems to think the same. Yet because they do not explain what that is by which the secret of one angel is expressed and explained to another, we cannot plainly judge what opinion they held. I think the foundation of this opinion to be nothing else than this: since it is agreed that one angel does not speak to another by imprinting in him a species, or some knowledge, or sign, no other mode of speaking seems to remain than this one, especially since it has a great likeness to the mode of exterior and bodily speaking by which men mutually use among themselves.

Caput X - On angelic locution by spiritual signs

All the other authors who remain agree in this one thing: that one angel speaks to another by the expression of some sign, not bodily but spiritual, after the manner of exterior and bodily locution. Yet they vary in assigning this kind of spiritual sign. Aegidius, in II Sentences, dist. 10, q. 3, a. 1, in the resolution of the article; Thomas of Argentina in the same distinction, q. 1, a. 2; Gregory, in II Sentences, dist. 9, q. 2; Marsilius, on the Second Book, q. 7, a. 2; and Clichtoveus, in book 2, chapter 3, of St. John Damascene's De fide, a little before the middle, teach that these spiritual signs, or gestures, by which angels speak among themselves, are not acts of cognition, but certain spiritual signs of such a nature that they manifestly signify to one angel the thoughts and secrets of the heart of another angel.[1589] Of this opinion see also St. Anselm on that passage of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 13, "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels"; or Heruæus, who is thought to be the author of those commentaries, where he says thus: "By 'tongues' by which thus some speak to others are understood certain gestures or interior motions, by which they mutually intimate to themselves what they have wished to communicate"; although this author does not explain sufficiently whether these signs are certain concepts existing in the mind of the one speaking, or are signs which are not concepts. With these also Melchior Canus agreed, who never could understand that one angel spoke to another in the way the Thomists have taught. But the aforesaid Doctors thus assert that by these signs one angel speaks to another, in such a way that by no means do the signs pass over into the very angel who hears, but they remain in the one speaking. The contrary of which some more recent writers falsely impute to these authors. To these there are also wont to be numbered Nicolaus de Lyra on that passage of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 13, "If I speak with the tongues of men, &c.", where he says that in angels there is something naturally known to others, and when in one angel that is ordered to declaring to another that which is secret and hidden to him, then one angel speaks to another; and he calls the faculty of explaining in such a way a tongue. And the Ordinary Gloss on that place seems to think the same.[1590] Yet because they do not explain what that is by which the secret of one angel is expressed and explained to another, we cannot plainly judge what opinion they held.

I think the foundation of this opinion to be nothing else than this: since it is agreed that one angel does not speak to another by imprinting in him a species, or some knowledge, or sign, no other mode of speaking seems to remain than this one, especially since it has a great likeness to the mode of exterior and bodily speaking by which men mutually use among themselves.

Durandus, however, in that distinction 11, question 2, number 4, attacks this opinion by this reasoning. Either these signs signify naturally, or by institution: not naturally - for if such signs are of some thing, especially of affections and of the secrets of the heart: of these they cannot be; for affections and the things which are within the angel's intellect are naturally known to anyone to whom they are referred; but for those things which are naturally known, nature ought not to have

1589. Aegidius, II Sent., dist. 10, q. 3, a. 1 (in resolutione articuli); Thomas de Argentina, eadem dist., q. 1, a. 2; Gregory, II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2; Marsilius, in II, q. 7, a. 2; Clichtoveus, in cap. 3, lib. 2 Damasceni De fide (ante medium).

1590. Nicolaus de Lyra, on 1 Cor. 13, "Si linguis hominum"; cf. the Ordinary Gloss on the same place.

instituted some sign. In addition, by natural signs one is not said to speak; otherwise, he who would bring it about that a cause be known through effects, and he also who would lay open the secrets of his heart to another by some affection - such as shame, or another exterior passion - would be said to speak, which seems absurd. Nor can such a sign be from institution, because the things that are natural in an angel cannot be varied. But Durandus, from the sentence of those whom we just now reported, supposes that these signs are always in an angel by nature. Nay rather, from this it would follow that angels always speak, since they always have in themselves such signs; just as also he who would continuously utter voices would be said to speak continuously.

Nevertheless, Durandus's argument against the aforesaid opinion is weak. First, because although the authors cited say that these signs and motions naturally signify, still they do not assert that they are always in the angel, but that they are voluntarily produced by them when they speak. Moreover, Maior, to be cited in the following chapter, judges that there are certain spiritual signs from a free institution signifying the secrets of the heart; and these signs, he says, are certain concepts of reflexive knowledge, about which angels make agreement among themselves, that by them this or that be signified. This I do not see to be sufficiently impugned by Durandus's reasoning: for although by free institution concepts would not be varied in themselves - just as neither are voices changed by institution - nonetheless a free institution could bring it about that by those concepts the secret of the heart be mutually signified, just as by voices not varied things diverse, as it pleases, are signified.

For my part, however, I should rather think that such signs, if any could exist, would be natural, not instituted by free choice. For it seems frivolous that angels should first have come together among themselves in order that such signs be instituted for this or that signifying. Nay, such a convention and gathering into one seems among angels impossible unless there were some signs which naturally signified the affections and secrets of hearts. For, that they might come together, and treat about instituting some sign, they would have to understand one another and first in some way explain themselves and speak among themselves; just as if some men had dealt among themselves about the institution of a certain language, it would have been necessary that they had come together by naturally significant gestures, or by some prior language. But thus there would already be something prior by which angels could speak among themselves; and therefore they would not have needed gestures instituted by themselves in some way: for if among men a language is necessary, it is in order that they may the more easily understand one another, because by gestures they could with difficulty explain themselves; among angels, however, if any natural signs could exist, these would suffice in order that they might explain themselves no less rightly than by instituted signs, because of their supreme perspicacity.

Next, it is false what Durandus subjoins in his reasoning, namely, that therefore there are not some signs among angels which naturally signify the secrets of the heart, because the secrets of hearts are of themselves manifest to others. First, because it is absurd, as we showed in the preceding disputation, that the secrets of hearts are of themselves manifest to all angels. Next also because, even if they were so, nothing would hinder their having certain signs by which they would

be naturally signified; just as an effect always naturally signifies the cause from which it proceeds; although these signs would not be necessary to the angels, if otherwise the secrets of hearts were known of themselves.

Finally, Durandus objects against the aforesaid opinion that, if we could speak by any signs whatsoever, it would follow that by groans we also could speak, which is absurd. But the objection is frivolous. For if someone, with the intention of expressing his concept, were to emit groans, without doubt he would be speaking; just as also a mute is said to speak by gestures.

Wherefore this opinion is more probable than the others. For from it none of those inconveniences follow which follow from the others that I have thus far reported. Yet someone might argue against it by this reasoning: since locution is an operation of a rational faculty, and in an angel is an act of the intellect, it follows that, while an angel speaks, he produces in himself those signs by which he wishes to express the secret of his heart; for if they always existed in the angel, they could not have the nature of locution, unless one were to say that the angel always speaks by them. But the possible intellect seems to have no other operation than intellection, and through intellection the production of habits: why, therefore, ought we just now to fashion a new kind of operation in angels? One can answer, however, that this kind of sign was devised for no other reason than to explain the nature of locution, which one must assert in angels. But if we could explain it by an easier way, it would not be necessary to have recourse to this kind of sign. And if the mode which we shall immediately submit in the next chapter does not please, this one seems to me to be preferable to all the others.

Some, moreover, hold that an angel's locution is a word of the mind, or some intellection.

Caput XI - The final opinion in the present controversy: that one angel speaks to another by the expression of an interior word

The last opinion in the present controversy seems to be that of those who assert that one angel speaks to another, and lays open to him the secret of his heart by the expression of an interior word, that is, by a certain intellection, in which the other angel sees the secret of the one speaking, and by that very fact is said to hear. This opinion is handed down by Henry in his Quodlibeta, question 15, article 2; by Hervaeus in II, distinction 11, question 1; by Maior, distinction 9, the last question; and it does not seem to me improbable.[1591] Therefore these authors agree with the rest mentioned in the preceding chapter in this, that angelic speech is done by some spiritual sign; yet they differ from them, because those others assert that these signs are not acts of cognition and intellection, whereas these say that it is a certain cognition expressed in the mind of the one speaking, by which the secret of the heart is made manifest to the other. Nevertheless, they vary in some way in explaining this opinion. Maior teaches that this happens by an institution of the angels themselves, to whom it seemed good that by certain concepts they should mutually communicate their secrets; which institution we rejected in the preceding chapter.

1591. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta, q. 15, a. 2; Hervaeus, II Sent., dist. 11, q. 1; Maior, dist. 9, q. ultima.

Hervaeus, however, philosophizes in this way. First, he teaches that singulars are not known by an angel through a proper concept and species, but through a species of the universal; so that, the concept of the universal quiddity not being changed, the angel, as he wills, now understands this singular, now that one, according as he should wish to apply that concept. And Hervaeus understands this his opinion about those singulars which a higher angel knows only by revelation: for he was thinking of speech only about these things, not about other things known whether universal or singular; because he judges that all those things, and the concepts of them, are naturally known mutually to the angels themselves; about what is already known, speech would be vain.

Next he teaches that speech about singulars among angels takes place thus, that an angel who has known a singular by revelation explains to another the concept which he has about that singular, forming a certain other concept of a vague individual, which the other angel can understand; just as we, too, use words signifying a vague individual, expressing a determinate one.

I pass over other things which he himself brings forward in the explanation of this opinion, and the reasons by which he confirms it, which have little weight.

Scotus impugned this manner of thinking of Henry in II, distinction 9, question 2, in the section Circa istas quaestiones. First, in that he says that proper speech in angels is done through an intellectual word; in which, however, he does not seem to me improbable, as will be explained below. Second, because he teaches that one angel speaks to another only about singulars which he knows by revelation; in which this opinion is not at all approved. First, because from it it would follow that only a superior angel speaks to an inferior, since only the superior can reveal hidden things to the inferior. Next also, because that about which one angel can speak to another is not only the cognition of some singular which he communicates to an inferior by revelation, but also the secret of his will; and about this, in like manner, an inferior angel can speak to a superior just as a superior to an inferior; because even the secret of the will of an inferior is unknown to a superior; which Henry himself also concedes, as we saw in disputation 209, chapter 4.

Third, Scotus impugns Henry's opinion because it is false that through the same concept of a universal nature, remaining in the same mode and not changed, a singular can be known; and in this part we too judge this opinion false: because, as we showed above in disputation 209, chapter 3, against Thomas of Argentina, it cannot be that through the same cognition, or an unchanged concept, something begins to be known which before was not known.

Finally, Hervaeus, in the place alleged, says that speech is effected among angels by the word of the mind produced in the intellect of the one speaking, just as exterior speech in us is done by the word of the voice uttered; so that by that concept and word of the mind there is explained something which in another cogitation was hidden. For this author had said, as we reported in disputation 209, chapter 1, that the cogitations of one angel are known to another - what they are and about what they are; nay even whether they are engaged about the object by way of affirmation or negation; yet it is not known about what they are engaged more intensely. Therefore Hervaeus thinks that what was hidden in the cogitation itself and in the very intention of the will is expressed

and signified by another concept and word of the mind; from which opinion St. Thomas does not dissent in the places alleged by us in chapter 8; indeed he seems to have expressed it when he says that speech is effected by intellectual signs, and that these are an intelligible species, insofar as by its act it orders the intellect to another.

However, although Hervaeus's opinion is not approved by us in this, that he asserts the cogitations of one angel to be so manifest to another - namely, what they are and about what - so that nonetheless it is hidden about what they are engaged more intensely, for the reasons set forth in the place cited; I will nevertheless propose his foundations, insofar as he has asserted that one angel speaks to another by a word of the mind; in which he agrees with Henry and with Maior. But I leave the definition of this controversy to the judgment of others.

For the sake of this matter, it must first be premised the doctrine of those same doctors which we reported in disputation 209: namely, that the cogitations of the intellect of one angel are known to another according to their substance, insofar as they are cogitations, not however as to that from which the intention arises. And since cogitation about some object is a certain expression of it, and is called the word of the intellect or of the mind, it rightly follows that in this there is angelic speech: for if some angel by the concept of your mind were to say to another that you have such an intention in the secret of your heart, he would speak no less to him than if by an exterior word he signified it; for, as will be explained below, a concept of something is not only the cognition of that thing to the one who has it, but also to another who sees and contemplates it, and it can be compared as a sign.

Now this opinion is confirmed in general by the authority of the Fathers, and by reason. Theophylact, on that text of 1 Corinthians 13, "If I speak with the tongues of men," says: "For there is a certain power of understanding by which the angels mutually communicate divine perceptions; the tongue of angels is this." If, according to Theophylact's opinion, the tongue of angels is the faculty of their intellect, it follows that the word also by which they mutually speak is the concept itself of the intellect uttered; by which they speak not only with themselves, but also with others, and by this they signify their perceptions to others.[1592] Theodoret, on the same place, writes thus: "He calls the tongues of angels not those which are perceived by sound, but those which are perceived by intelligence, by which they praise the God of the universe and differ among themselves." But what, I ask, can there be in an angel by which he praises God and differs from another, if not the intellect? For praise and speech are acts (*actus*) of the intellect (*intellectus*), not of the will (*voluntas*), as is known. Moreover, to praise and to dispute about some matter is a work of intellection: therefore it follows that the word of angels is an interiorly uttered concept, which we call the word of the mind or of the intellect. Furthermore, if one angel can speak to another, he will also be able to supplicate and to praise: but supplication and praise are acts of the intellect, which really are intellection; therefore angelic speech likewise will be an act of intellection. What Gregory thinks, when he says that the speech of angels with God is the desire itself of the will, will be explained below. Bede, moreover, book 2 on Job, on those words at chapter 27, "If suddenly the

1592. Theophylact, on 1 Cor. 13: "Si linguis hominum loquar."

dawn shall appear," says that the speech of angels is consent, and he understands this not without the enunciation and utterance of the intellect: for below he says, "And what they will, they immediately enunciate; but enunciation is a certain intellection." He then adds, "Whence can it be that they have perceived similar motions through the subtlety of their nature; and this is called conversation: for the spirit cannot have any of its affections lie hidden from another; for simple creatures, having no bodily obstacle, are clear to themselves." He must, however, be cautiously explained, lest we say that every affection of the angel's will is known to another, but only that they are impeded by no bodily mass, lest it be seen what another speaks interiorly; for we, because we are corporeal, are impeded by the senses and the mass of the body, lest we see the hidden speech of an angel.[1593]

But indeed, in order that we may clearly understand this manner of philosophizing which, from Hervaeus and others, we have reported, two things must be observed. One is, that every concept and act of intellection is a certain speech; and in all of it a word and a spiritual discourse are found. And although every cogitation, insofar as it is a cogitation, is in itself known to God and to the angels, as this opinion maintains; nevertheless, not every cogitation has the nature of speech with God and with the angels, but only that which is, as it were, a certain reflex of the act, by which someone explains that he has such a concept about such a thing: because to speak to another is not to make that concept manifest to him; otherwise, when someone by divination or by some other way knows what we have in our heart, we would be said to speak to him, which is absurd. To speak to another is to express by some sign what we have in our heart: and since the word and concept of our cogitation is a sign of the thing cogitated, it follows that the act of the intellect by which one angel explains to another the secrets of his heart is speech with respect to that other. And for this reason I said that the speech of angels is, as it were, a reflex act of the intellect, because it is either an act of the intellect about a cogitation, or about an act of the will and the secret of the heart. I also said that every act of the intellect by which it understands itself is in a certain way called to speak; and on account of that which it expresses within, it is called the word of the mind itself.

Another thing to be noted is that the nature of speech does not consist only in the concept for explaining and expressing the secrets of the heart; but besides, it is necessary that such a concept be directed to someone, by whom we wish it to be heard or understood; just as happens in an exterior word: for although someone speaks in a loud voice, and is heard by many, nevertheless he is not said to speak to all, but only to those to whom he directs his words by a certain peculiar intention. Now speech to another can be made in many modes: namely, by way of command, of petition, of simple narration, or of teaching. And just as command is an act of the intellect manifesting to an inferior the affection and will of a superior, or matters of fact; whereas petition is an act of the intellect manifesting the desire of an inferior to obtain something from a superior and one who is able, as Prima Secundae, question 17, explains; so also simple narration and discourse is the manifestation of a secret in matters just as they are, merely for the sake of manifesting it.[1594]

1593. Bede, on Job, book 2, on the words at chap. 27: "Si subito apparuerit aurora."
1594. St. Thomas, Prima Secundae, q. 17.

Moreover, the way in which the act of the intellect that explains the secrets of the heart is always directed by some peculiar intention to him to whom it is said, will be explained below in a later place. From what has been said we gather, according to this opinion, that spiritual speech of the angels is a certain concept of the intellect, which they have about the secret of the heart, ordered by a peculiar intention toward another, by which there is signified to another what someone has in his heart; and this doctrine will be further elucidated in the following chapter.

Otherwise, if someone by divination or by some other way knows what we have in our heart, we should have to say that we are speaking to him, which is absurd. Rather, to speak to another is to express by some sign what we have in our heart. And since the word and concept of our thought is a sign of the thing thought, it follows that the act of the intellect by which one angel explains to another the secrets of his heart is, with respect to them, speech. I also said that I called the speech of the angels an act of the intellect as it were reflecting, because it is either an act of the intellect about a thought, or about an act of the will and the secret of the heart. I also said that every act of the intellect is speech, because the intellect that understands is said in a certain way to speak with itself; and therefore, because it expresses within itself, it is called the word of the mind itself.

Note moreover: the notion of speech does not consist only in the concept that explains and expresses the secret of the heart; but besides this it is necessary that such a concept be directed to someone by whom we wish it to be heard or understood, as happens in the external word. For if someone speaks in so loud a voice that he is heard by many, nevertheless he is not said to speak to all of them, but only to those to whom he directs his words by a certain peculiar rationale. Now speech to another can take place in many modes: it is by way of command, of prayer, of simple narration, or of teaching. And just as command is an act of the intellect manifesting to an inferior the affection and will of a superior, that something be done; while prayer is an act of the intellect manifesting the desire of an inferior to obtain something from a superior and one who is powerful, as will be explained in the Prima Secundae, question 17; so too simple narration and speech is a manifestation of an internal secret solely for the sake of manifesting it. Moreover, the mode by which the act of the intellect, explaining the secret of the heart, is always directed by some peculiar rationale to him to whom it is said, will be explained below. From what has been said, therefore, we gather, according to this opinion, that spiritual speech among the angels is a certain concept of the intellect which they have about the secret of the heart, ordered by a peculiar rationale toward another, by which there is signified to another what someone has in his heart; and this doctrine will be further elucidated in the following chapter.

Dissolution of the arguments against the preceding opinion.

Caput XII - The arguments against the preceding doctrine are dissolved

It remains that we set down certain arguments which can be brought against the foregoing doctrine, and by their solution we may explain the aforesaid position more and more.

The first argument: If every concept of one angel, insofar as it is a concept and a certain thought of the mind, is known to another, it follows that by such a concept one angel can indeed speak about the secret intention of his will, but not explain or speak about any thought other than the very one which he has in his mind; because speech ought not to be about things known and manifest, but about things unknown and hidden.

I answer first with Scotus in the second Distinction 9, question 2. To the arguments of the second question, in the solution of the first, he says that speech can also be about those things which are known to another: for we truly speak to God by prayer and by thanksgiving, explaining to him our affection and desire when we petition; although that very desire of the poor is manifest to him without any prayer and accepted, according to that of Psalm 19: "The desire of the poor the Lord has heard," etc. Perhaps for this reason St. Gregory the Great, book 2 of the Moralia, chapter 4, said that the angels speak to God by the fact that they are rapt into the movement of admiration; and he says that the voice of the angels is the very movement of admiration, whereas the voices of the saints who cry out to God are their desire: not because locution properly consists in affection alone, but because these things are known to God in themselves, no otherwise than if they were expressed by voice. Otherwise, just as the desire of the will alone is not properly prayer, so neither is it properly speech. But that the angels are able to speak with God by prayer, not because God needs their speech in order to understand something, but because they themselves can make petition, is manifest; and St. Thomas expressly hands this down below in question 117, article 2, reply to the first.[1595]

Then I say, according to this opinion, that the thought which one angel has is known to another only when it is present; but a past or a future one is not known, because unless he has memory of the past by the fact that he had known the present, it seems difficult that it can be known by an angel. Therefore, about this a given angel could speak to another as about a thing unknown; and so he would speak not only about the desire of his own will, but also about his hidden thought.

The second argument is of this sort: In the very way we said one angel would speak to another, the same angel could, at the same time and with the same discourse, speak to many without a certain bound and limit; for the same concept in the mind of the speaker, expressing the secret of the heart, is related in the same way to all; therefore all can hear, and so he would be said to be speaking to all of them.

Some say that one angel speaks to another from this, that he impresses upon him an intellection or the species of his concept; they grant nonetheless that one can speak to many without any limit. To me indeed - if their opinion concerning the mode of angelic speech were proved - about the number to whom an angel could speak one should philosophize otherwise. For just as an angel by his own power cannot move many bodies at once without a determinate number, even if he moves them by the mere nod of his will, because he has a power that is finite and limited; in the same way he could not, by a spiritual action, imprint upon many angels without a certain number and bound the species or cognition of his secret. For both in regard to spiritual action and in regard to

1595. St. Thomas, Prima Secundae, q. 17; and explicitly in the Prima Pars, q. 117, a. 2, ad 1.

corporeal, he has a finite power; but a finite power demands an effect determined not only in species but also in number, as was explained above in Disputation 103, chapter 2, so that he cannot at once, without a bound, produce many things. For that the very power, if it should persevere according to duration into infinity, can produce many things into infinity, does not sufficiently argue for a power infinite according to intensity, but only according to duration. For which reason, when Scotus had said that one angel speaks to another when he impresses upon him the thought of his secret, he consequently asserted in the second Distinction 9, question 2.

The third argument: From the foregoing opinion it follows that the angel who speaks has no power of arousing the hearer, if he produces nothing in that one's mind, but only proposes a word to him when he expresses it by his own intellect.

I answer first, if this argument has any force, it has force not only against the last opinion, but also against many others previously mentioned among those who say that angels so speak among themselves that one impresses nothing upon the intellect of another. The only one is Alexander, in the second part, question 27, member 7, who, while asserting that one angel speaks to another without impressing anything upon him, nevertheless affirms, in that same case when one speaks to another about the mysteries of grace, that he has the power of arousing him; although he does not have it when he speaks about other natural things. Yet he assigns no reason for the difference, nor can he assign one. Next, I say also that, even on the opinion of those who teach that one angel speaks to another by impressing upon him a species, it does not follow that one angel is necessarily aroused by another, as was shown above sufficiently against that opinion. Only in the opinion of Scotus, and of others who teach that one angel speaks to another by impressing upon him a cognition, must it be said that the angel who hears is necessarily aroused by the one speaking; yet we have impugned this opinion above. We confess therefore that one angel does not have the power of arousing another so that he necessarily hears, whether he speaks about natural things or about the mysteries of grace; for I find no difference between these two. Or else, if there is some necessary power of arousing from the angel that he may hear, we are ignorant of it.

Lastly, to all these things which we have said, two items are to be added. One is that not only can a superior angel speak to an inferior, but also an inferior angel to his superior, as St. Thomas expressly taught in question 107, article 2, and all the Doctors alleged above. And although, in the opinion of those who maintain that one angel thus speaks to another by impressing something upon him, the matter is not without difficulty - because it would seem difficult how an inferior angel could impress upon a superior - yet in the later opinion which we set down, and in the others, there is no difficulty at all. What we have said about angels is to be understood also of separated souls, insofar as they understand without conversion to phantasms, as the angels do: for if a soul is with another soul, or with an angel, the soul speaks to the angel, and the angel to the soul.

The other is that a soul and an angel can speak with God, as St. Thomas teaches, question 107, article 3; for although the secrets of the heart are known to God, nevertheless an angel, or a soul, can express that by the word of his mind, and propose it to God, as he does by prayer and by thanksgiving.[1596]

Disputatio CCXII - Whether an angel can speak with another at any distance

- Some have held that a determinate distance is necessary for one angel to speak to another. Caput I.
- Others have taught, more truly, that distance contributes nothing to one angel's speaking to another. Caput II.

Caput I - That a determinate distance is necessary for one angel to speak to another

In article 4 of question 107 St. Thomas disputes whether distance according to place contributes anything, that one angel speak to another: as among men, a certain and determinate distance is required. In this difficulty not a few Schoolmen affirm that distance contributes much, that one angel be able to speak to another; and hence that by reason of distance some locution is impeded. This opinion is handed down by Gregory in the second Distinction 9, question; by Scotus in the Reportata, in the same Distinction, question 8, and again in the same Distinction, question 2; by Richard, article ..., question ...; by Major, article ..., dub. ...; by ...; and indeed this author asserted that the opposite opinion favors the article condemned by the Parisian School, namely, that an angel is not in a place. The same is taught by Bonaventure in the second Distinction 10, article 3, question 2; by Basso in Distinction 9, question 2, article 2. The foundation of this opinion is of this sort: since the speech of an angel is a spiritual operation and yet limited and finite, it therefore demands a determinate distance; for bodily speech also presupposes this, not because it is bodily, but because it is of a finite and determinate power. Yet this reason, if it has any force, has it only in the opinion of those who assert that in the speech of angels there is impressed some form upon the mind of the one addressed - which opinion was held by Richard, Gabriel, Scotus, and Basso, although they otherwise followed it in different ways. But in the opinion of Gregory, Major, and Bonaventure, who maintain that one angel speaks to another without impressing anything upon him, whether by signs or in some other way, I for my part do not see what force it can have.[1597]

Accordingly the position of those who affirm that nearness contributes nothing at all to hearing, nor distance impede it, so as to prevent one angel from speaking to another in such wise that he can be heard, stands firm; as St. Thomas taught below at q. 107, a. 4, and as Caietan and recent Thomists there - Alexander, Second Part, q. 27, memb. 7, and Marsilius on the Second, q. 7, a. 2, to the fifth reason - likewise taught.[1598] And I, for my part, judge this view to be true not only if we follow those who say that locution takes place without any impression inhering in the hearer, but even if, with Scotus and others, we say that one angel speaks to another by some impression made in that one's mind. For bodily causes therefore require a determinate distance, because their effect

1596. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, II, c. 4; Psalm 19; St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 107, a. 2; a. 3.

1597. Scotus, II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2; the Reportata on the same distinction; Richard; Major; Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 10, a. 3, q. 2; Basso, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2.

1598. St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 107, a. 4; Cajetan ad loc.; Alexander of Hales, Summa, II pars, q. 27, memb. 7; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., q. 7, a. 2, ad 5; cf. Disputatio 189, cap. 2.

must be continuously diffused, nor can they act on the extreme part without acting through the whole space by a continuous action; but if they did not require a determinate distance, their effect would be infinite with respect to extension, which is impossible. Now although this reasoning, in the same way, proves concerning operations of angels that pass into external matter - since such an operation must of necessity be diffused continuously through the whole space, as was proved above in Disputation 189, ch. 2 - yet as regards a spiritual operation, such as locution is, it proves nothing. For when the operation is spiritual, if there is any from one angel into another, it does not pass through a medium; therefore it will not be greater or lesser for bearing upon an angel more or less distant. Rather, of itself it must be carried out and defined solely according as it is received in the angel. On this ground we said in that disputation that an angel could operate upon matter existing at any distance, if his operation were not continuously diffused through space; and I said the same concerning physical agents, if they could operate immediately upon the extreme without a medium.

Therefore this view, as I think, is true, by whatever line of philosophizing we wish to reason about the mode whereby one angel speaks to another - especially according to the common opinion, which says that nothing is imprinted in the hearer by the angel who speaks in order that he may hear. For just as an angel can, at any distance whatever, understand a thing existing outside himself, so in like manner will he be able to hear; for his hearing is a kind of understanding, and locution must be outside the one speaking.

Moreover, it should be observed that angels can indeed be distant from one another by a greater and a lesser bodily distance, if such were greater and lesser; yet never, even if the expanse were infinite, could they be situated at an infinite distance. The reason of the former is that, since by their own will they can change place without any fatigue, one could withdraw farther and farther from another without end; nor will we be able to mark out a place beyond which an angel could not be moved still further. The reason of the latter is that, since an angel must always be in a determinate and finite place, and it is impossible that between two determinate and finite places there should be an infinite interval, it follows that angels cannot be distant to infinity; for that interval will be bounded by termini and extremes.

Disputatio CCXIII - Whether one angel can speak to another in such a way that others do not hear, even if they wish

- That one angel can speak to another so that others cannot hear, some have taught. Caput I.
- That one angel cannot speak to another secretly in such a way that he is not heard by others, others not improbably maintain. Caput II.

Caput I - That it is possible for one angel to speak so to one that others cannot hear

That it is undoubted among the Scholastics that one angel can speak to many together is clear: for whether another hears or does not hear what is said, someone speaks only to him to whom he directs his discourse; just as if Peter were disputing with John before a crowd, he would be speaking only with him, and yet all the rest would hear.

The controversy is whether, as one man can so speak secretly to another that no one else hears, so too one angel can thus open the secret of his heart to another that he alone hears. In this difficulty the former view is that of not a few Scholastics, who think that one angel can indeed so speak secretly to another that others cannot hear. This is the view of St. Thomas below at q. 107, a. 5, and of Cajetan there; whom many recent Thomists follow; likewise Richard, in II, dist. 9, a. 2, q. 1 and 2; Ægidius, dist. 10, q. 3, a. 1; Bassolis, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, § Est igitur quartus modus; and Marsilius, on the Second, q. 7, a. 2, in reply to the third reason urged on the contrary.[1599]

However, since these authors differ about the mode of angelic locution, they do not confirm this conclusion in the same way. First, Cajetan and other Thomists use this reason: since one angel opens the secret of his heart to another angel solely by a nod of his will, once that is posited, the secret of the heart already has an ordination to the angel to whom by that very will it is directed; it follows that it can be opened to one in such a way that it remains hidden from the rest, and hence that one can thus speak to another that the others cannot hear, because to speak is nothing other than to unfold the secret of the heart, while to hear is to perceive and understand it.

St. Thomas hints at this reasoning not obscurely; and therefore they incline strongly to that opinion which we reported in Disputation 210, ch. 8, from Cajetan and other Thomists. Yet someone could interpret St. Thomas as not speaking of every kind of locution whatsoever, but only of that which is illumination, of which we shall speak in the following chapter - namely, that it can be perceived by an angel who is illuminated, in such a way that it is not perceived by others who are inferior; otherwise we are compelled to draw St. Thomas into that opinion, that by a mere nod of the will there is locution - a position we showed in that ch. 8 to be rather difficult.

Richard, and those who think that one angel speaks to another by imprinting in him the species of his secret, will easily be able to assign the rationale here: namely, either that the angel can direct the intellectual light to one and not to another, or that he can imprint upon one the species of his secret and not upon another. In the same way, those who, with Scotus, assert that one angel speaks to another by imprinting in him a cognition of his secret through the intellect - namely a species by which he himself also understands, as Scotus said - will also say that one angel can thus speak to another that he is not heard by others: for they affirm that this cognition is generated in the hearer's mind according to the will of the one speaking. Bassolis clearly held this view in the place cited, although he and Scotus say that the innermost things of hearts would of themselves, unless God prevented it, be manifest to all.

1599. St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 107, a. 5; Cajetan ad loc.; Richard of St. Victor, In II Sent., dist. 9, a. 2, qq. 1 - 2; Ægidius Romanus, In II Sent., dist. 10, q. 3, a. 1; Bassolis, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, § Est igitur quartus modus; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., q. 7, a. 2, ad 3.

Third, although Marsilius says that locution is effected by signs distinct from thoughts and naturally signifying the affection and secret of the heart (whence it seemed to follow that one angel could not speak to another without being also understood and heard by others, if they wished), nevertheless he teaches that either occurrence is possible: both that an angel expresses his secret by such signs so as to be heard by all, and so as to be heard by one alone if the speaker so wills. For he thinks there are certain signs such that, if an angel uses them in speaking, he will be heard by all because they signify to all; and others so peculiar that they are understood by one alone, by the use of which the angel will be able to speak secretly to one alone and be heard by him only. But I do not see by what reasoning he proves this difference of signs, indeed I do not see that it can be proved.

Fourth and finally, although Ægidius teaches that one angel speaks to another by signs, nevertheless he asserts that one can so speak to another that the rest do not understand, but only in that locution which is at the same time illumination, whereby a superior illuminates an inferior. For since illumination concerns only things otherwise unknown, and angelic perspicacity is not the same in all, not all equally understand the things handed down by illumination: just as disciples, even if they perceive the sound of the master's words, do not in the same way grasp the sense. For this reason not all are indiscriminately illuminated by all; rather, each order is illuminated by the one closer to it. Wherefore, according to Ægidius's view, whenever an inferior speaks to a superior - since such a locution is not illumination but simple locution - it is heard by all the others. On which account, in part, Ægidius favors the later opinion, which we shall set forth in the next chapter.

Caput II - That one angel cannot so speak to another secretly that, if the others will, he is not heard - others not improbably maintain

But indeed some of the Scholastics, not without probability, affirm that one angel cannot so speak to another that, if the others will, he is not heard. Thus teach Gregory in II Sentences, distinction 9, in that second question; Gabriel in the same distinction, question 2, article 5; Major in that same question 2; Herveus in II Sentences, that distinction 11, question 1, to the first, from those which in the body of the question are brought forward; and Ockham, Quodlibet I, question 7. The foundations of these Doctors vary according to the various opinions about locution.[1600]

First, Gregory and Major say that angels speak through certain signs, whether these are natural - as Gregory says - or by free imposition, as Major thinks; and that these signs, however they signify, are equally known to all (for all know what those signs denote, either naturally or also by the free imposition of the angels). Consequently, they assert that one angel cannot speak secretly to another.

Next, Gabriel and Ockham follow the aforesaid opinion in another way: for they say that one angel speaking with another ought to be heard by all, unless God were to impede it. For, according to their opinion, one angel speaks to another by a cognition derived from the cognition which he

1600. Gregor., in II, dist. 9, q. 2; Gab., eadem dist., q. 2, a. 5; Maior, q. 2; Herueus, in II, dist. 11, q. 1, ad 1, from what is brought forward in the body of the question; Ocam, Quodlib. I, q. 7.

himself has; and that is derived naturally into the mind of the hearer. Hence it would be derived equally into all, unless it were impeded by God; but because in fact God impedes, lest the cognition existing in the mind of the speaker be derived into all, but only into those to whom the angel wishes to open his secret, now rightly one angel can speak to another without the rest hearing.

All these authors, and the others alleged for that opinion, speak consistently with their principles; and therefore they are to be refuted only in that way in which their principles, which we do not approve, are disproved - about which enough and more than enough has been said above. I except one Marsilius who, in my judgment, does not philosophize consistently. For when he has said that angels mutually speak among themselves through certain signs naturally significative, he could not deny that the angel who is speaking is heard by all. For that which he asserts - that there are some signs peculiar to one alone as signifying, and others to another - is frivolous and can by no reason be proved, once it is granted that those are natural signs; indeed, if they are natural, it follows that they are equally manifest to all. And since it seemed probable to us that angels mutually speak by certain signs that are not concepts, consequently the foundation of his for that later opinion is proved for us.

And if that opinion were true which we reported in Disputation 210, chapter 12, about angelic locution, from Herveus and others: by the same reasoning it would be probable that angels speak among themselves and express the secrets of their hearts in such a way that one could not speak secretly to another, but would be understood by all, if they themselves will. For since that opinion says that the secret of the heart and will is expressed by the intelligible word, which is a certain cognition, and that this is not naturally the angel's own, it will be known to one no more than to another. Yet I would judge that opinion concerning locution to be probable with Ægidius's limitation: who asserts that it is to be understood of common locution, in which one angel does not illuminate another. For about that in which there is a revelation of mysteries, one angel can be heard by some in such a way that he is not heard by some others - I do not say by all the others, but by some others. For all who are of equal perfection will be able to hear; since, as we shall say below, illumination is made by the superior angels by a certain division of universal concepts into singulars, so that each, according to his capacity, may perceive those mysteries; and thus it happens that those supernal mysteries, unfolded in a higher and more common concept, are not understood by all the angels; and consequently, in such locution the angel who illuminates cannot be heard by all.

Finally, even if the angel speaking can be heard by all, with Scotus it must be said that one angel can converse with one and not with others. For, that someone be said to speak with another, it is not enough that he be heard by him - as I said at the beginning - but he must also direct his speech to him.

Articulus V - Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace

It seems that the angels know the mysteries of grace.

1. For among all mysteries the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ is the most excellent. But the angels knew this from the beginning. For St. Augustine says, On Genesis, Book 5, to the effect that this mystery was hidden from ages in God, yet that it might be made known to the heavenly principalities and powers. And the Apostle says, 1 Tim. 3: that "great is the sacrament of piety, which appeared unto angels." Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
2. Moreover, the reasons of all the mysteries of grace are contained in the divine wisdom. But the angels see God's very wisdom, which is his essence (*essentia*). Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
3. Moreover, the prophets are instructed by angels, as the Father teaches through Pseudo-Dionysius in the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy. But the prophets knew the mysteries of grace. For it is said in Amos 3:7: "The Lord God does nothing without revealing his secret to his servants the prophets." Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.

But on the contrary: no one learns that which he already knows. But the highest angels also inquire about, and learn, the divine mysteries of grace. For in chapter 7 of the Celestial Hierarchy it is said that Sacred Scripture introduces certain heavenly essences asking a question of Jesus himself, and learning the knowledge of his divine operation for us, and Jesus teaching them without a medium; as is clear in Isaiah 63, where, when the angels asked, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" Jesus answered, "I who speak justice." Therefore the angels do not know the mysteries of grace.

I answer that in the angels there is a twofold cognition. One indeed is natural, according to which they know things both through their own essence and also through innate species (*species intelligibiles*). And by this cognition the angels cannot know the mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will (*voluntas*) of God. For if one angel cannot know the thoughts of another insofar as they depend upon the latter's will, much less can he know those things which depend solely upon God's will. And in this way the Apostle argues, 1 Corinthians 2: "What things are of man, no one knows but the spirit of the man that is in him; so too what things are of God, no one knows but the Spirit of God."

But there is also another cognition of the angels which makes them blessed, by which they see the Word and things in the Word. And by this vision they know the mysteries of grace, yet not all of them, nor do all equally; but according to what God has willed to reveal to them, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 2: "But to us God has revealed them through his Spirit." And yet the superior angels, contemplating the divine wisdom more perspicaciously, know more mysteries and higher ones in the very vision of God, which they manifest to the inferiors by

illuminating them. And some of those mysteries they knew from the beginning of their creation; others, however, they learned afterwards, according as it was congruent to their offices, being taught by the superiors.

Reply to the first: Concerning the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ it is possible to speak in a twofold way. In one way, in general. And thus it was revealed to all from the beginning of their beatitude. The reason is that this is a certain general principle, to which all their offices are ordered. For all are ministering spirits, as it is said Hebrews 1:14, "sent for ministry, for the sake of those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" - which indeed was accomplished through the mystery of the Incarnation. Wherefore it was necessary that about this mystery all should be commonly instructed from the beginning.

In another way we can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation as to certain special conditions. And thus not all the angels were instructed from the beginning about all of them; indeed, some even of the superior angels learned afterwards; as is clear from the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius adduced.

Reply to the second: Although the blessed angels contemplate the divine wisdom, nevertheless they do not comprehend it; and therefore it is not necessary that they know whatever lies hidden in it.

Reply to the third: Whatever the prophets knew about the mystery of grace through divine revelation was revealed far more excellently to the angels. And although to the prophets God revealed in general those things which he was going to do concerning the salvation of the human race, nevertheless the Apostles learned certain special things about this which the prophets did not know, according to Ephesians 3: "As you reading may understand my prudence in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known as it has now been revealed to his holy apostles." Among the prophets themselves also, those later in time knew what those earlier did not know, according to Psalm 118[119]: "I have understood more than the ancients." St. Gregory also says that by the successions of times there grew an increase of knowledge.[1601]

Disputatio CCXIV - Whether an angel can, by his natural powers, know the mysteries of grace

Caput I - Three diverse opinions of the Scholastics

The first opinion is that of Scotus in IV, dist. 10, q. 8, § Respondaco, and in the following places, who, disputing about the mode of existence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist and about the mode of existence of the accidents, says that these can be known by an angel by his own proper power; this opinion is embraced by Bassolis on IV, dist. 10, q. 8; by Maior on the same, q. 5; and earlier it had been taught by Ægidius in Theorem 16; by Gabriel in the Canon, lecture 43, letter X; and by Ockham in IV, q. (on the Eucharist), art. 3.[1602] Moreover, because this opinion, as far as this

1601. St. Gregory, Hom. 6 in Ezech., among other places.

part goes, is true, I shall set out below the reasons by which it is confirmed; for the present, however, I adduce only one, by which Scotus and others prove that all the mysteries of grace already effected, whatever they may be, are excellently known by the angels. The reason is of this sort: every created being is an object proportioned to the angelic intellect and to any separated intellect, so that it be known by it with cogitation (as they say) abstractive; therefore it also will be able naturally to be known with intuitive cognition: for the intuitive differs from the abstractive only in this, that the intuitive is of a present thing, while the abstractive is of a past and absent thing; but he who is able to know something absent and past will by far better know it when present. Furthermore, that the mysteries of grace are an object accommodated to a separated intellect so as to be known by abstractive knowledge, Scotus does not expressly affirm; but it can be proved from his doctrine in a twofold way. First, because if anything stood in the way so that they were not accommodated objects to be known naturally - especially because they are of a supernatural order (for they seem therefore to be called supernaturals because they are of another, higher entity) - yet this is false: for the natural and the supernatural do not differ in themselves, but only on the side of the efficient cause; because they are produced either by a natural efficient or by a supernatural efficient; whereas otherwise, in themselves, they have a nature of the same order. Thus Scotus himself taught in the place cited; and earlier he had said in Prologue I, the first question, Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, and the following, where he asserted that there is no form which by its own nature belongs to any supernatural and higher order, but that according to their substance all things are natural, and that the ratio of the natural and of the supernatural befits things only on the part of the efficient cause. By which reason, too, he asserts elsewhere that there is in us a natural appetite for beatitude, as for a form natural to us, about which in I - II, q. 5, a. 8, there is to be a discussion. Then there can be added another confirmation of Scotus's, because it can happen that a natural being is much more perfect than a supernatural: for substance, which is a natural being, is much more perfect than any accident whatever; therefore an accident which is called supernatural can be no less rightly understood than a substance which is called natural. This opinion is favored by Henry in the Summa, article 33, question 2, to the third, where he asserts that the species of the divine essence cannot be produced, because if it were in the blessed intellect, the angel would see it by his own proper power; but the species of the divine essence, whether impressed or expressed, is something supernatural.[1603]

The second opinion is that no supernatural mysteries of grace can be known by an angel by his own proper power; and from this they further infer that the mode whereby Christ exists in the Eucharist cannot be seen by an angel by his own proper power. About the mysteries in general, St. Thomas teaches thus in this article, and Cajetan and the recent Thomists with him. But about the mode whereby Christ exists in the Eucharist, the same holy Doctor treats it in III, q. 76, a. 7; and there Cajetan; Soto on IV, dist. 10, q. 1, art. 7; Richard on the same distinction, art. 5, q. 1; Paludanus, q. 4, art.; and Henry, Quodlibet XI, q. 12. Bonaventure is also reported for this opinion

1602. Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 8, § Respondaco; Bassolis, In IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 8; Maior, ead. dist., q. 5; Ægidius, Theorem 16; Gabriel, In Canonem, lect. 43, lit. X; Ockham, In IV, q. (de Eucharistia), art. 3.

1603. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 33, q. 2, ad 3.

on the same distinction, part 2, art. 2, q. 1; and Alexander, part 4, q. 10, in the treatise on the Sacrifice of the Mass, memb. 7, art. 3.[1604] However, these two Doctors speak about the human intellect while it is conjoined to the body; and as to the intellect conjoined to the body, I do not see that there can be any controversy: for it is manifest that the body of Christ in the Eucharist cannot be perceived by the human intellect in the present state. Ockham, moreover, without any foundation, philosophizes in this matter by a certain peculiar reason; for he says that the body of Christ in the Eucharist would emit species into the eye so as to be seen, unless by a special providence of God it were hindered by God. But, this opinion being set aside, about which we must treat expressly in the place cited in the Third Part, the aforesaid opinion about the mysteries of grace in general is proved thus by St. Thomas: an angel cannot know things which depend on the free will of a man or of another angel, namely the secrets of the will; therefore neither can he know those which depend on the free will of God; of this sort are the mysteries of grace; therefore those cannot be known by an angel by his own proper power. Moreover, the holy Doctor speaks not only about future but also about present mysteries of grace: so that just as the secret of the heart, which is present, cannot be known, so neither can present mysteries of grace. But about the mode whereby Christ is in the Eucharist, they confirm their opinion thus: that mode is of the supernatural order, depending on the sole will of God; therefore it is not an accommodated object so as to be known by an angel by his own proper power. The aforesaid Doctors, who speak about the mode whereby Christ exists in the Eucharist, say nothing about the mode whereby the accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament - namely, whether an angel would be able to know the absence of the bread and of the subject of the accidents, and consequently the mode whereby they exist per se. Henry, indeed, speaks about the passing-away of the bread, namely whether an angel knows that there is annihilation or conversion, and by what mode Christ succeeds to the bread.[1605]

The third opinion is that of Durandus on IV, dist. 10, q. 4, n. 6, who teaches partly with the first, partly with the second opinion; for he says two things. One is that the existence of accidents without a subject could perhaps be known by an angel by natural power, because by his own nature an angel knows all natural beings, and accordingly he could know the absence and the corruption of any created substance; for it ought not to be of greater difficulty that the existence of a thing be known than that the non-existence of it be known, since they are of the same order. The other is that the existence of the body of Christ under the species of bread cannot be known by angels by their own proper power. He confirms this because this existence is not of a natural order but of a supernatural; indeed it is by no means subject to the course of natural things; and those things which are of a supernatural order cannot be known by angels by their own proper power. In this,

1604. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 76, a. 7; Cajetan ad loc.; Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 1, a. 7; Richard of Mediavilla, ead. dist., a. 5, q. 1; Peter of Palude, q. 4, art.; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. XI, q. 12; St. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., dist. 10, pars 2, art. 2, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars IV, q. 10, in tract. de Sacrificio Missae, memb. 7, art. 3.

1605. Ockham's view is reported and set aside; on the mode of Christ's existence in the Eucharist, see the places cited in the previous note.

Durandus agrees with St. Thomas and with the other Doctors of the second opinion, namely in this point: that they teach that angels by their own proper power cannot know any mysteries which are of a supernatural order.[1606]

Caput II - Certain notes for the explanation of the truer opinion

Furthermore, in order from these three opinions to elicit distinctly that which to us seems more probable, two things must first be premised.

One is that a supernatural being is said relatively with respect to the natural, or the nature over which it is said to be, as is manifest. For this reason, in Disputation 44, chapter 1, I showed that it is not possible to create any substance of a supernatural order, as I there deduced at length from this principle.

Another thing to be noted is that this respect or relation (*relatio*) of the supernatural can be considered in a twofold way: first, by a comparison made with the subject; then with the cause. In the first way there are supernatural beings according to substance (*substantia*), such as forms and perfections which accrue to some nature, as the grace of the hypostatic union, beatitude, and virtues infused per se by their own nature. They are said to be supernatural in relation to the subject because they so come from without that neither the subject by its own nature nor anything else demands such perfections, but they are produced by God alone above the natural inclination of any subject.

Yet Scotus objects, in that first question of the Prologue, what Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, namely, that to be able to have faith is of man's nature, but to have it is of the grace of God; whence Scotus himself proves that grace is a natural perfection of man, if indeed it is of man's nature to be able to have it. But Cajetan replies in I, q. 1, a. 1, § Unde ad primum, that Augustine did not say that it is natural to man to be able to have faith, but that it is of the nature of man to be able to have faith; and these two are different: for in the former way it would be signified that there is in man a natural inclination to grace; in the latter, however, there is only denoted that there is in man a capacity for grace, arising from the very substance and nature of man. I, for my part, would add that nothing is proved from Augustine's testimony, even if he were to say that it is natural to man to be able to have faith: for in that mode of signifying there would be denoted that that capacity for grace is natural to man, indeed relative to the principle from which it arises, not however to the form which it regards; and from a capacity of nature we do not gather that the form is of a natural order: for even to the hypostatic union...[1607]

Moreover, that from these three opinions we may elicit distinctly what seems to us more probable, two things must be premised.

1606. Durandus of St. Pourçain, In IV Sent., dist. 10, q. 4, n. 6.
1607. Cajetan, In I, q. 1, a. 1, § Unde ad primum; Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 2.

One is that a supernatural being is said relatively to the natural, or to the nature above which it is said to be, as is manifest. For this reason I showed in the first chapter of the foregoing disputation that no substance can be created under the sole relation to God. From this principle I there drew out at length that it is called supernatural relatively to the subject over which it is placed.

Another thing to be noted is that this respect or relation of the supernatural can be considered in two ways: first, by comparison made with the subject; then, with the cause. In the first way there are supernatural beings according to substance (*substantia*), such as forms and perfections which accrue to some nature - grace, the hypostatic union, beatitude, and the virtues infused by their very nature. They are called supernatural relatively to the subject because they come from without in such a way that neither the subject by its own nature, nor anything else, produces such perfections by its own natural inclination, but they are produced by God alone above the natural inclination of any subject.

It is objected, however, by Scotus in that first question of the Prologue, from what St. Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2 - namely, that to be able to have faith is of the nature of man, but to have it is of the grace of God - that hence Scotus proves grace to be a natural perfection of man, since it belongs to man's nature to be able to have it. Cajetan replies, in the First Part, question 1, article 1, § "Unde ad primum," that Augustine did not say it is natural to man to be able to have faith, but that it belongs to the nature of man that one can have faith - two different things. For in the former way it would be signified that there is in man a natural inclination toward grace; but in the latter is denoted only a capacity in man for grace, arising from his very substance and nature.[1608] I would add that nothing is proved from Augustine's testimony, even if he were to say it is natural to man to be able to have faith. For in this way would be signified and denoted that that capacity for grace is natural to man in relation indeed to the principle from which it arises, namely to the very substance and nature of man; yet from capacity we do not gather that the form is of the natural order: for even for the hypostatic union there is a capacity of nature, and yet the union itself is not natural.

Then an effect is said to be supernatural according to the mode, that is, on the part of the mode of the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), because it is brought about beyond nature by God alone, no natural cause asking for it, even if the thing itself is of a natural order and otherwise could have a created cause and in another way could have it. Such is the restoration of a lost eye: for the eye itself is indeed a natural thing, which otherwise in generation itself is from a created cause operating naturally, and joined to the whole man it is according to his nature, just like the other parts; yet because it is restored by God alone, no created cause asking for this, we say it is done in an order above nature. By the same reason the healing of a sickness is a supernatural work on the part of the mode, when it is done either suddenly or little by little in such a way that no created cause could be its cause. Yet although the creation of the soul in the body is by God alone, nevertheless it is not called supernatural, even on the part of the mode of efficient causality:

1608. Cajetan, In I, q. 1, a. 1, § Unde ad primum; St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 2.

because a natural cause, which disposes the matter for the generation of man, asks that the soul be created so as to be infused into the body, which, if it were not created, would be beyond the natural order of things.

As to the corruption of the accidents of the sacrament of the Eucharist by burning or in some other way, it must be said, namely, that it is supernatural on the part of the mode of efficient causality: because no natural cause requires such a corruption or annihilation. For although the heat of fire by its natural activity disposes toward corruption, nonetheless this happens only when there is a subject apt to receive some opposite form. But in the sacrament of the altar matter is lacking, and that must be produced by God alone, no natural operation of a created cause asking for it: therefore it ought to be called supernatural. On the other hand, it is not called miraculous, because it is not rare, but is common to the sight of men, and appears according to the common course of causes. Nay rather, if those species were not burned, and if fire did not generate, or a worm did not generate, according to diverse dispositions, it would be called a miraculous thing.

From the same principle it is gathered that, if the heavens were annihilated, the annihilation or cessation of them would be supernatural, not because it would be above the power of the cause destroying them - for God alone can reduce a substance into nothing, and it is not above his power to annihilate and destroy it - nor because it would be above the nature of the thing destroyed: for every creature intrinsically does not repel being reduced to nothing, but by its very nature has that it can be destroyed, as we said above in disputation 182; but it would be called annihilation supernatural, because it would be by God in such a way that no natural cause in any way requested or demanded it, as the disposition in the matter of a conceived embryo asks for the creation of the soul. And hence we say that all those things which are perpetually conserved by God, and are immortal because they cannot be corrupted by a created cause, can be conserved naturally and endure perpetually.

But you will object: by the same reason the creation of things made in the beginning ought to be called supernatural on the part of the mode of efficient causality, because creatures were made by God in such a way that no natural cause asked for their creation. I answer: the creation of things cannot be called supernatural: because since then there was no created cause, but all things in the beginning had to be made by no one other than God, it could not be said to be above the nature of other causes, which then were none; wherefore neither could it be called supernatural according to substance, nor according to the mode of efficient causality.

From all these things it is clearly evident that Scotus's doctrine is false when he teaches that the natural and the supernatural are not distinguished otherwise than by the order to the natural agent, and that the supernatural - namely, not otherwise than by the manner of operating, in accordance with which an agent is said to operate naturally or supernaturally, according to those things which were said in the latter notation. But this opinion of Scotus is false, because it has been sufficiently proved that certain forms are by their very nature of a supernatural order, because they are natural to no subject; others, however, are supernatural only on the part of the mode by which they are produced. Moreover, when we say that certain effects are supernatural on the part of the agent, it is not to be taken as if one agent were supernatural and another natural: for the same God

is both a natural and a supernatural agent. He is called "natural" indeed when he operates in accordance with what other natural and created causes ask; "supernatural," however, when beyond the order which all other causes require he effects something.

The true opinion is set forth in general.

Caput III - On what of the supernatural an angel can know naturally

Therefore the opinion is set down in two points. One is that all those things which are supernatural in the former way - namely, by their very nature - cannot be known by an angel by his proper power, either by that knowledge which they call abstractive, as possible before they exist, or by that knowledge which is called intuitive, when they exist - unless by some divine revelation. The other is that all those things which are supernatural in the latter way - namely, which by their nature are of the natural order and are only supernatural on the part of the mode of efficient causality - can be known by an angel by his proper power, and by abstractive knowledge when they are only possible, and by intuitive knowledge when they actually exist. These two must be confirmed singly.

The first part can easily be proved from the things said: for if certain beings by their very nature are of another order, they ought to be above the grasp and natural intelligence of a created nature; otherwise, by the same account by which one mystery would be understood, any other supernatural thing could be known, and hence all mysteries would naturally be known to angels; wherefore even the union of human nature with the divine person would be known by the demons - which all deny. And if anyone should say that this mystery is therefore not known because it is necessary to know the persons, the Trinity in God, still it follows that it can be known by an angel that there is a union of human nature with God, whether in this or in that person. The reason set forth above not only proves that supernatural mysteries cannot be known with certitude when they are present, but also not even as possible before they exist: for both are above the grasp and the natural intelligence of an angel, since by their nature they are of a supernatural order.

There are, however, certain recent authors who say that the mystery of the Incarnation, which they grant to be by its very nature supernatural, can indeed be known by an angel as possible, but not as to whether it is in reality. They prove this by the following reason: because angels know the extremes of this union, namely human nature and God; since therefore it does not imply a contradiction that those extremes be united, such a union can rightly be known by an angel as possible; but on the contrary he cannot know whether such sanctification is possible. But their argument is weak and can be retorted against them. First, that it has no moment is shown thus: for it can happen that an intellect knows two extremes, and yet cannot understand the whole, which does not imply a contradiction in bringing together those two; nor is it necessary that an angel should know all the principles from which all things can be deduced which do not imply a contradiction among those extremes - at least those which can be done by God's power alone and are by their very nature supernatural. Then I retort the argument back on them: for if an angel knew that a humanity can be united to the divine person, he would also know that by that union

itself it would be sanctified and constituted just by God; for this does not imply a contradiction, indeed it necessarily follows upon that very union. Why then could he not know that a soul or an angel can be sanctified by some other gift? Lastly, this same our opinion can be proved from that passage of the First to the Corinthians, chapter 2, where Paul says: "For what man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man who is in him? So also the things of God no one knows, except the Spirit of God." And below: "Now we have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we may know the things that are given to us by God." From which Paul intimates that the gifts of grace can be known only by the Spirit of God.

But indeed, although in this part we agree with St. Thomas, nevertheless his reason, which we reported in the previous chapter, does not prove it efficaciously. For from the fact that supernatural things, or grace, depend on the will of God alone as on a cause, it follows only that they cannot be known so long as they are future. But that when they are now present they cannot be known, he does not show: for many things, like the creation of the angel and of the universe, depend on the will of God alone; yet once produced, they are rightly known. And if this reason of St. Thomas had any moment, it would also prove that supernatural things on the part of the agent and the mode of operating could not be known by angels: because whether they are or are not, they depend on the will of God alone - such is the restoration of an eye.

The latter part of this opinion proposed above is also easily proved - namely, that beings supernatural on the part of the mode of efficient causality, such as a restored eye, can be known naturally by angels. For since these beings by their nature are of the natural order, and exist altogether just as if they were made in a natural way, by whatever reason they come to be, in the same way they can be known. Therefore not only by an angel, but even by a man, these beings are known with certitude: for who does not see and know that an eye has been restored by a supernatural work? And not only is it known with certitude by an angel that it has been done supernaturally, but also with certitude that it has been done by God, not by the forces and order of nature. For it is not hidden from angels that there is no created cause which could certainly restore an eye, while God, being omnipotent, can do it. Wherefore the angel rightly knows not only these supernatural beings on the part of the mode by which they are brought about when they are, but he also has abstractive knowledge before they are, that they can be done by God.

From this doctrine it will not be laborious to dissolve Scotus's reasons. To the first I reply that what is supernatural by its very nature, as being above the order of nature, is not an accommodated object of our intellect or of the angelic intellect, so that it should be understood by it without revelation. But that there are certain beings by their very nature supernatural, and not only on the part of the efficient cause, has now been proved more than enough. To the latter reason I say that every substance (*substantia*) in the genus of being is a perfection rather than any accident (*accidens*), if each of them be considered in itself; nevertheless there is some accident of a higher order which perfects the substance itself and raises it to a higher order. But it can happen that the intellect knows that which in the genus of being is greater, namely substance, and yet does not know that which in the genus of being is less, namely accident, because by a certain superior and more perfect reason it affects the substance. It is also evident that the substance of one angel is per

se manifest to another, not so an accident of his, which is much less perfect. But that common proposition, "What can be done or known in regard to the greater, can be done or known in regard to the lesser," must be understood of things which are of the same formal kind, as was set out at length above in disputation 118, the last chapter.

Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine.

Caput IV - What in the Eucharist angels can know naturally, and what remains hidden

Since from the foregoing it is clear that those kinds of beings which by their very nature are supernatural cannot be known by an angel, but those which are natural according to their nature and only supernatural on the part of the efficient cause can rightly be known by him, let us see which, in this sacrament of the Eucharist, are of the first sort, and which are hidden from him. This we shall explain more easily if we rightly distinguish those things which in this sacrament are by their nature supernatural from those which are supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause.

First, then, in this sacrament there is the union of the body and blood of Christ with the divinity.

Second, there is the power of the body and blood for sanctifying.

Of these, Scotus grants that the first can be known by an angel; about the second he does not teach, at least he will concede that the effect of this sacrament can be known by an angel when it occurs, even though in truth that effect is of a supernatural nature; but from that he does not concede that therefore the very virtue is known, because this depends on the will of God alone. But for us, in accordance with what has been set down above, it must be said that neither the union of the divinity with the flesh and with the blood, nor the power of this sacrament to sanctify us, nor its effect can be known except by the revelation of God: to be known by an angel's proper power - these three belong by their nature to the supernatural order; but supernatural beings cannot be known by an angel with certitude by his own power.

Third, in this sacrament there is the absence or cessation of the substance of bread. This, however, can rightly be known by an angel not only with certain knowledge by discourse and by alien species, but also by a proper and quidditative concept, just as all cognition about corporeal things judges privations and contraries. Herein the opinion of Scotus is proved, and Aristotle's testimony clearly confirms the reason for it: for, as Aristotle says, On the Soul II, chapter 7, text 103, sight is of light and of darkness, hearing of sound and of silence; that is, sight is conversant both with the visible and with the invisible, hearing with the audible and with the inaudible; which in On the Soul III, chapter 2, text 138, he explains in these words: "For since we do not see darkness, by the light of sight we discern" - that is, we judge between light and darkness - "not by any other sense than sight: not because sight actually perceives darkness and light; and between these two ..."

But that sight discerns the two not because it somehow acts upon darkness, but because, since sight is the proper subject for perceiving light, it is also the proper subject for the opposed privation, for which privation hearing or any other external sense is not capable: nevertheless,

from the privation of its proper object in sight, the intellect rightly judges the absence of that object. Therefore habit and the opposed privation are altogether of the same order and refer to the same potency; and consequently, habit and privation, or an opposed negation, when compared with the intellect, will be of the same account.

Yet light and darkness are referred to sight in a different way: for sight does nothing about darkness, whereas the intellect, by its own proper act, can so know the negation of substance (*substantia*), or of being, which it has for its object, just as it knows being itself - unless from elsewhere, on account of its conjunction with sense, the intellect be deceived about the non-being of a thing: for this cause we judge from what outwardly appears that something is, which in reality is not. Therefore, since the angel's intellect is impeded by no body or sense, but knows all things as they are in themselves; and since the being and the non-being of some thing fall under the same order and are referred in the same formal aspect to the intellect, it follows that, just as it understands and defines a thing, so also, even if in a supernatural manner it cease and be destroyed, it is plainly and clearly known by the angel, in the way in which negations can be known. Wherefore the angel will rightly know that under the species of the Eucharist there is not the substance of bread: because in very truth it is not there, even if by the supernatural power of God it has been destroyed.

We can illustrate this matter by manifest examples: if God, beyond the natural order of things, were to restore sight to a blind man, or were, in one having two eyes, to remove the other by His sole will; or if He were to produce light in the air without a luminous body, or, even with a luminous body present which would otherwise produce it, by His sole will were to hinder it and make the whole air dark; not only the angel, but even a man, would discern both the effect and its privation. If, then, an angel can with certitude know these two by his own power, he will also be able no less certainly to know the defect of the substance of bread in the Eucharist: for we, for our part, cannot know it because the things which we grasp by the intellect we must also know by sense, and we judge of the substance of the thing through the accidents that appear to sense; and, since we see the accidents of bread in the same way, we suppose the substance of bread to remain there. But when the angel gazes upon the natures and substances of things as they are in themselves, and not through accidents, by that same method he can know the absence of bread or its presence, just as we [know] the absence and the presence of light, even if each were brought about supernaturally: so too he can know the substance of another angel and its non-existence, even if, by a supernatural ordinance, it were reduced by God to nothing.

It may be said: It could happen that the substance of bread existing in the nature of things would not be known by an angel, because God would impede the cognition: therefore an angel could suspect that the substance of bread is there, yet that he is being impeded by God from knowing it; and thus it could not be evident to him that the substance of bread is not there.

But this objection is frivolous. First, because, if it had any weight, it could also be inferred that it is not evident to an angel that the air is deprived of light, and that a man has sight: for he could suspect that he is being impeded by God from knowing the light in the air and the sight in a man. Thus too we would not have evidence through the senses, because we could suspect that the things

we see are seen by us only through illusions of the eyes, as can happen. Therefore, just as no one prudently suspects this, and so nothing hinders one from having certitude of things through the senses, so too nothing can hinder an angel from rightly judging, in the sacrament, that the substance of bread is not there, from this very fact that he does not know it; even if it could be there, and he himself were impeded by God from knowing it.

Next, I say that the angel's intellect does not infer the cessation of an entire substance from the fact that he does not know that it is, that is, from a negation of a cognition of its being; rather, he knows the cessation of the substance by a positive act, as his proper object within the natural order, just as he knows being itself. Wherefore, just as by the very fact that some thing is, it is subject to the angel's cognition, so also the non-being of a thing is in the same way subject [to it], by the very fact that the thing itself is not.

Fourth, in this sacrament there are the accidents (*accidens*) of bread without a subject, and accordingly they exist per se. I judge, however, that this is something supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause, because it is beyond the order of created nature, but it is not supernatural by its own nature: wherefore, from the doctrine set out above it follows that they can certainly be known by an angel - not, I say, by a proper and quidditative concept, but at least certainly and evidently, yet by some discourse.

For the absence of the substance of bread and of wine is certainly known by angels, as has been proved thus far. Hence an angel cannot but evidently infer that those accidents are without a subject, and accordingly that quantity is altogether per se, while the other accidents are in quantity. Moreover, that the accidents remain there is certainly known by an angel; there can be no doubt: for if we truly perceive them by our sense and truly judge of them that they are there, much more certainly will an angel know that they remain there. This argument clearly proves that it is certainly known by an angel that the accidents remain there without substance, and accordingly that they exist per se in the manner explained - whether this certain cognition be through a proper species and a quidditative concept of that per se mode, or be only through alien species and concepts, yet by a necessary and evident discourse.

I add, nevertheless, that that positive mode of existing which the accidents have from the defect of a substance is known by an angel by a proper and quidditative concept; though this seems difficult to some. But the reason is manifest, because that mode is not supernatural by its own nature, but only on the part of the efficient cause: therefore it can be known by a proper and quidditative concept in exactly the same way in which something else is known by an angel which, by its nature, belongs to the natural order, though it is produced in a supernatural mode - such as a restored eye. Moreover, I am persuaded that the mode whereby the accidents exist per se is, by its nature, of the natural order, because it necessarily arises from the negation of some natural entity as from something prior: therefore it cannot be of the supernatural order; for if it were such, it could not have a necessary connexion with that negation. Yet from the removal of the substance of bread or of wine the per se being of the accidents that remain necessarily follows, and presupposes it as something prior: because, from the removal of the substance, it necessarily follows that the accidents which remain are per se.

It must be observed, however, that there are two negations which have a connexion with the per se being of the accidents: one of the substance, the other of the mode of inherence: yet these are compared to the per se mode of the accidents in a different way. For the negation of the substance is prior to the per se mode of the accidents: as we shall show below, it is not that the substance ceases because the accidents begin to be per se, but rather the contrary. But the negation of existing in a subject arises in the accidents from the positive mode of existing per se: just as the negation of a proper personality in the humanity of Christ arises from the fact that it exists in another person.

But some say that that mode of the accidents whereby they exist per se is supernatural not only on the part of the efficient cause, as is the restoration of an eye, but also by its own nature, as grace, the hypostatic union, and the like. And they gather the reason for the difference from this - that the restoration of an eye indeed is at the beginning brought about in a supernatural way, afterwards, however, it is wholly conserved naturally; but this mode of existing of the accidents is not only at the beginning produced supernaturally, but is also continuously conserved in the same way. Yet this difference has no weight: for from the continuous conservation of the accidents one can only gather that their mode of existing per se is supernatural not only on the part of the efficient cause in the beginning, but also in the continuous conservation. For instance, if God were to produce light in the air without a luminous body, He would continuously conserve it in a supernatural way; yet the light produced would be of an entirely natural order. Likewise, if, with a luminous body present, God were to hinder light from being produced in the air, the darkness made in the air would continuously be made in a supernatural way; yet they would be entirely of a natural order, and could be known by any created intellect. Therefore, that different mode of supernatural production - whether only in the beginning, or also in the continuous conservation - does not argue a difference of a thing's being natural or supernatural according to its own nature, but only a difference according to mode.

Someone will object next with this reason: that mode of existing per se does not naturally befit any other nature; therefore by its nature it is supernatural, according to the definition assigned by us in the second chapter. I answer: although a univocal mode of the same account does not befit other things besides the accidents of this sacrament existing without a subject, nevertheless, because the per se mode - by far of greater perfection - which befits substance is of the natural order, that mode also, when communicated to accidents, will by itself and by its own nature be of the natural order, and will be supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause. Thus, from the fact that an angel knows the accidents to be without a subject, and accordingly to be per se after the fashion of a substance, he will not from that know them to be supernatural by their own nature. Just as if the souls of brute animals were preserved by God separately from matter, they would subsist per se after the manner of substances, yet by their own nature they would still belong to the natural order.

Secondly, I add nevertheless that the positive mode of existing per se (modus per se existendi), which the accidents have from the absence of the substance, can be known by the angel by a proper and quidditative concept; although this seems difficult to some. The reason is clear, because that mode is not supernatural by its own nature, but only on the part of the efficient cause: therefore it

can be known by a proper and quidditative concept in exactly the same way as something else is known by an angel which, although by its nature pertains to the natural order, is nevertheless produced in a supernatural way, as a restored eye is. And I am persuaded that that mode whereby the accidents exist per se is by its own nature of the natural order, because it necessarily arises from the negation of some natural being, as from something prior: therefore it cannot be of the supernatural order; for if it were such, it could not have a necessary connection with that negation. But in fact it necessarily follows upon, and presupposes as prior, the negation of the substance of bread or of wine: for from the absence of the substance it necessarily follows that the accidents which remain exist per se.

But it must be observed that there are two negations which have a connection with the per se being of accidents: one is the negation of the substance, the other of the mode of inherence. These, however, stand in a different way to the per se mode of accidents. For the negation of the substance is prior to the per se mode of accidents: for, as we shall show below, substance does not cease to be because the accidents begin to exist per se, but rather the contrary; whereas the negation of existing in a subject arises from the positive mode of existing per se: just as the negation of a proper personality in the humanity of Christ arises from its being in an alien person.

Some say that the mode by which the accidents exist per se is supernatural not only on the part of the efficient cause, as is the restoration of an eye, but also by its own nature, as grace, the hypostatic union, and the like. They take the reason for the difference from this, that the restoration of an eye is at the beginning indeed produced in a supernatural way, but is thereafter conserved entirely naturally; whereas this mode of existing of the accidents is not only introduced in a supernatural way, but is also conserved in the same way. But this difference carries no weight: for from the continuous conservation of the accidents one can only gather that the mode of existing of those accidents is supernatural not only on the part of the efficient cause in the beginning, but also in their continual conservation; just as if God should produce light in air without a luminous body, and should continually conserve it in a supernatural way, still the thing produced would be entirely of the natural order; and likewise if, a luminous body being present, God should impede the production of light in the air, the darkness in the air would continually come about in a supernatural way; yet it would nevertheless be entirely of the natural order and could be known by any created intellect. Therefore that diversity - of a supernatural production in the beginning alone, or also in the continual conservation - does not argue a diversity between what is of the natural and what is of the supernatural order according to the nature of the thing, but only according to the mode.

It is objected then against this reasoning: that mode of existing per se of the accidents naturally belongs to another nature; for by our account given in the second chapter we assigned to it a nature of the supernatural order. I answer: although a univocal mode of the same account does not befit other things besides the accidents of this sacrament existing without a subject, nevertheless, because the per se mode - by far of greater perfection - which befits substance is of the natural order, that mode also, when communicated to accidents, will by itself and by its own nature be of the natural order, and will be supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause. Thus, from the

fact that an angel knows the accidents to be without a subject, and accordingly to be per se after the fashion of a substance, he will not from that know them to be supernatural by their own nature. Just as if the souls of brute animals were preserved by God separately from matter, they would subsist per se after the manner of substances, yet by their own nature they would still belong to the natural order.

From the fact that they are separated from matter, there would indeed be known by the angels clearly and by a proper concept that per se mode which they have when separated from a subject; and yet that per se mode does not belong univocally to another form: for the mode which befits a rational soul is of a different account from the mode which befits another. For this reason, therefore, these modes are known by the angel not only evidently, but also by a proper and intuitive concept, because, since the principal analogate - namely the per se mode which befits the whole substance and the separated rational soul - is by its nature of the natural order, by much greater reason will that mode which is communicated to accidents be so.

Secondly, a more difficult objection is raised. Finally, against the doctrine set forth above one can argue thus: if from the fact that an angel knows for certain that the substance of bread is not under the accidents he clearly infers that the accidents exist per se; by the same reasoning from the fact that he knows Christ's humanity not to have its own proper personality he will clearly infer it to have an alien personality. But since it is true that a created nature cannot be suppositum for any created person - as the more probable opinion holds - he will infer the humanity to be in the divine person. Moreover, that an angel knows for certain that the humanity in Christ lacks its own personality is proved in the same way in which we showed above that the absence of the substance of bread and wine in the Eucharist is known for certain by an angel: because it is of the very same order, and a natural form and the negation or privation of it can be known by an angel in the same way. Therefore, since the proper personality of human nature is of the natural order, and is known by the angel not only evidently, but by a proper and intuitive concept, by the same token the negation of it can be known.

I answer: the personality of human nature and of angelic nature is nothing other than a mode of existing per se (modus per se existendi), such that it is in none other in any way; and from this it is that human nature lacks its own personality, because it is in an alien person, such that the negation properly arises from the fact that it is sustained by another: just as the privation of one form in matter arises from the fact that there is another opposite form. But in the accidents of the Eucharist it is not so: for they therefore lack a proper mode of inherence in a subject, not because they have a mode of existing per se, but because they are deprived of and stripped of their subject; therefore they are despoiled of the proper mode of existing in another, and the mode of existing per se is necessarily communicated to them. Whence it happens that an angel, left to his own nature and faculty of knowing, is not deceived in knowing whether the accidents exist per se or in another; nevertheless he is deceived in the cognition of the mode and of the personality proper to the humanity, supposing that the humanity of Christ exists per se, whereas in truth it exists in another.

The reason for the difference is that, since the per se mode of existing of the accidents arises necessarily from the negation of a proper subject, and this is wholly of the natural order, and therefore is known by the angel by his own power; consequently that mode of existing per se of the accidents in this case can be known. But since the privation of proper personality befits human nature from the fact that it is sustained by another, and to be sustained by another - namely by the divine - is of the supernatural order, it follows that an angel does not know the privation of created personality; although he does know created personality, and the privation of it is of the same order as the personality itself. For what we said, namely that the privation of some form and the form itself are of the same order, and hence can be known in the same way by the same intellect, must be understood whenever the privation does not depend essentially on something positive of the supernatural order: as the privation of created personality does. Hence it comes about that an angel, left to his nature and power, is plainly deceived about created personality and the personality proper to human nature, and thinks it to be where in truth it is not: because he cannot grasp whether that nature is sustained by another person. Nor does it hinder that the angel has a proper and quidditative concept and species of proper personality: for in the judgment by which he affirms that it is or is not, he can nevertheless be deceived, because it depends on something supernatural about which he cannot give judgment. The angel, therefore, is deceived in the judgment of natural things, of which he has a proper species, because of their conjunction with something supernatural: and in this case we must speak in the same way, whether we say that created personality is merely the negation of existing in another, or a positive mode of existing per se; for in either way the absence of created personality depends on something supernatural.

Moreover, some more recent authors contend that the mode of existing per se of the accidents does not depend upon, nor follow from, the cessation of the whole substance, but rather the contrary: so that, just as from the union of the divine personality with the human nature, as from an opposite form, there arises the privation of created and proper personality; so also the per se mode of the accidents, as an opposite form, is the cause that the whole substance ceases, because by its own nature that substance requires to be conserved by such accidents; wherefore, since without them it would be praeter naturam, the very existence per se of the accidents demands that the whole substance cease; and since that per se mode of the accidents is supernatural, it follows, by what we have said, that the negation of the substance cannot be known, although taken in itself it be of the natural order, because it has a connection with something supernatural, namely with the per se mode of the accidents; just as the non-existence of created personality cannot be known because of the supernatural union of the divine personality. They also devised this manner of philosophizing in order to defend that the cessation of the whole substance is not an annihilation, because it comes from something positive as from an opposite form.

But, so that we may reserve for its own place the things that pertain to annihilation, as to our present purpose I answer first that that per se mode of the accidents is not of the supernatural order according to its own substance, but only on the part of the mode of being effected, as was shown above: and thus the argument proves nothing. Then I say that even if it were of the supernatural order, and were a contrary formal cause so that the whole substance of bread should

cease, nevertheless it would not prevent the negation of the whole substance from being able to be known, just as the union of the divine personality prevents the non-existence of created personality from being known, as we said above: because the privation of created personality in a created nature not only arises from the union of the divine personality with the created nature, but also so essentially depends upon it that it cannot occur in any other way, even according to the absolute power of God. Wherefore, since the union with the divine person, which is a necessary and essential cause of the privation of created personality, cannot be known, it is rightly inferred that that privation cannot be known. But if the negation of the whole substance should arise from the per se mode of the accidents as from an opposite form, it would not so necessarily arise that it could not happen otherwise: for the negation of the whole substance could take place without the per se mode of the accidents by God's absolute power, so that first the accidents would be corrupted and then the whole substance, or at the same time the substance together with the accidents. Therefore the very negation of the whole substance as a fact - that is, that there is not substance there - does not depend essentially on the per se mode of the accidents. And it matters little if one should say that the cessation of the whole substance takes place in a different way, either through the separation of the accidents or after the prior destruction of the accidents: for as regards the negation in fact of the whole substance, it is altogether the same whether done in this way or in that, and thus can be known in the same way.

Finally, I say that the per se mode of the accidents is not the formal cause of the opposition to the whole substance, so that from it there should arise the non-being of the whole substance, as the union of the divine personality is the cause of the negation of created personality: because the accidents are conserved per se outside a subject so much the more praeter naturam than the whole substance is without accidents; for an accident depends more on its subject than prime matter on an accident; or at least the reason of each dependence is equal. Therefore the per se mode of the one cannot be the cause of destroying the other: but only this, that the one be without the other - whatever be the case with the other, whether per se, or in another, or utterly destroyed - will be called praeter naturam. Moreover, there is no reason that should compel us to assert that, in order to destroy the substance of bread, God first willed to separate the accidents and then to destroy the whole substance of bread: since it is much more easily understood that first the destruction of the substance take place, then the accidents remain per se; if indeed the destruction of the substance is to be posited only so that the words of consecration be true and the body of Christ be present, from whose presence the destruction of the bread arises, as was said in Disputation 176, chapter 6.[1609] Since therefore the destruction corresponds to the positive effect of the words - namely the presence of the body of Christ - if the substance of bread remained, the words of consecration would not be true; another mode is devised in vain: which is also by no means necessary for defending that the cessation of the bread is not annihilation, which, as must be done, we will show in its own place.

Fifthly, in this sacrament there is the mode by which Christ exists under the species, namely, whole in all and whole in each part of them. This, however, I think can rightly be known by an angel by his own power. First indeed he can know that under the sacramental species there is the substance of the body and of the blood; although he may be ignorant that it is united to the Word of God: for the substance of the body and of the blood is of the natural order; therefore he can know where it is and when it is. Then he can know that the nature of Christ's body's quantity is such as to extend the substance in which it is in relation to place; whereas, on the contrary, since the substance of the body and blood remains there with its quantity, having in itself part outside part, but without the mode of extension in relation to place, it follows that by an angel can be known in no wise either effect of quantity - namely, that it extend the substance within itself - or the privation of the mode of quantity by which it would be extended together with place. For, as we were saying above, by the same power of intellect by which he can know the nature and substance of something, he can rightly know its privation; and since from the privation of that mode of quantity it follows that the substance is whole in the whole and whole in any part of the place, it also follows that there can be known by the angel that mode whereby the body of Christ exists in the Eucharist: whole in the whole quantity of the species, and whole in any part of them. The same would altogether follow, if we should say that the substance of the body in the same way remains whole under the whole quantity of the species and whole in any part of them, because it lacks its proper quantity: for once this is removed, those modes would seem naturally to follow, namely that the substance exist indivisibly under some quantity; but the privation of proper quantity is of the natural order, just like quantity itself.

But if someone should say that this mode which befits the substance - by which it exists whole in the whole and whole in any part of it - is of a different account from the modes which befit angels and spirits; I answer, even if it be of a different account, it does not on that account follow that it is of the supernatural order: for if there be found some mode of the natural order whereby some creature exists whole in the whole and whole in any part, a mode of this sort, according to its own nature, could not be of the supernatural order.

Lastly, it is to be observed that, although this mode which the body of Christ has in the Eucharist - for existing beyond its own nature - be of the supernatural order, nevertheless it will be possible that the body of Christ be known according to its substance without that mode. As Cajetan most aptly warned in the place already mentioned: for just as the humanity of Christ is now known by the demons, without the mode of the union being known, so too the body of Christ could be known, without that mode being known. For nothing is required that one thing not be known unless another be known, when the one neither belongs to the definition of the other nor is of the same order with it.

1609. Vazquez, Disputatio 176, caput 6.

Durandus answers that indeed the presence of the body of Christ under the species of bread can be known, and that individual mode whereby the whole body exists there in the whole quantity and whole in any part of it, as has been proved up to now; but whether this be by transubstantiation or by simple adduction, it is not known by an angel by its own natural power, but only by a revelation of God.

But for the explanation of this matter it must first be noted, as we said in Disputation 177, chapter 5, that the notion of transubstantiation is not this, that the substance - namely, that of which transubstantiation is said to be made - is produced or conserved by these things; indeed, those who in this manner defend the notion of transubstantiation in the sacrament of the Eucharist seem to reduce to a certain invented kind of philosophy, rather than to what is true and necessary, what has been defined de fide in the Council of Trent, session 13, chapter 4, as was said more fully in that place.[1610]

Then it is to be observed that, in the place mentioned, we said that the simple adduction of the body of Christ to the sacramental species differs from transubstantiation in this, that simple adduction must be done in one of these modes - either by leaving the prior place, or even by retaining it - yet in such a way that the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist either remains together with the substance of bread, or, if the substance of bread ceases, it does not cease by force of the presence of the body of Christ, but by the sole will of God, the presence not requiring it. Then, however, the presence of the body of Christ and the destruction of the bread stand concomitantly and without any connection, so that the one does not follow upon the other. But that there be that connection between the presence of the body of Christ and the destruction of the bread, it is necessary that the presence of the body of Christ have some opposition with the very substance of the bread, so that they cannot be together. Now this opposition is not between the substances themselves according to themselves, as is manifest, nor from some mode communicated to them, which some without foundation contrive, but from the mere truth of the words, which standing, it is impossible that the substance of the body of Christ be there and the substance of bread remain; for otherwise the pronoun "This" would not truly point out the body of Christ, as will be explained in its place. Nor indeed would it be enough for transubstantiation to be said, if the consecration were made by a copulative proposition, by saying in this manner, "Here be made my body," and "Here may the substance of bread not remain"; although in this case both would be done, and the species would truly remain consecrated together with the body and blood of Christ. But the reason why then there would not be transubstantiation is this, that then those two changes would be together or concomitant, and the one would not follow upon the other - namely, neither the change of the presence of the body of Christ nor the destruction of the substance of the bread. For for the truth of a copulative proposition it is not necessary that the truth of one part arise from the other part; and therefore, with Peter disputing in one part, and John running in the other, the proposition is true, "Peter disputes, and John runs," because these two things happen at the same time; but now transubstantiation is true, because by a single demonstrative enunciation, "This is my body," the body of Christ becomes present in such a way

1610. See Vazquez, Disputatio 177, cap. 5; Council of Trent, session 13, cap. 4.

that by this very fact the substance of the bread must necessarily be destroyed. Therefore, since the priest, by making the body of Christ present, destroys the bread, it is rightly said that the substance of the bread ceases into the body of Christ and passes into it, as will be declared more fully in its place.

Therefore, since an angel can by its own natural power know that, with these words uttered, all this comes about - namely, by reason of the truth of the words, that body is in the Eucharist, and consequently the substance of bread is destroyed - once the words have been uttered and the effect seen, which is wrought in the bread and in the presence of the body of Christ, it can rightly understand by its own power that that body is there by transubstantiation. Nor is this to know something natural by its nature and substance, but something supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause. Certainly, if in the body of Christ there were some mode, by reason of which the destruction of the substance of bread would follow, that would be supernatural according to its own nature, and hence could not be known by an angel by its own power; because, however, nothing else intervenes there than the efficacy of the words by the power of truth and signification, nothing hinders an angel from rightly knowing that Christ is there by transubstantiation. Moreover, the angel knows that those words were instituted by Christ even from the effect (for this is a matter of fact); it also sees that, whenever those words are pronounced, it thus comes about, nor can they be true otherwise: it therefore rightly knows the mode of transubstantiation.[1610]

Disputatio CCXV - On whether the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the angels in the state of wayfarers

Caput I - The common opinion is that the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the angels in the way

It is undoubted among all that the mystery of the Trinity was revealed to the angels in the way; and likewise the mystery of justification and of beatitude, as St. Thomas rightly warns in 2 Sent., dist. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad primum, and in this 1, q. 64, a. 1, ad quartum. But concerning the mystery of the Incarnation there is some difficulty, whether it was revealed to all the angels from the beginning. Not a few doctors affirm that it was revealed. Thus Rupert teaches on that passage of John 8, "He was a murderer from the beginning"; Catherine in the book On the Special Predestination of Christ, and in another On the Glory of the Angels; Viguerius in the Institutes of Theology, c. 3, § 2, v. 15, and c. 20, § 1, v. 4; Jacob of Valentia on that Psalm 81, "Arise, O God, judge the earth"; Nicholas of Lyra and Dionysius Carthusian on that Isaiah 63, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" The Dean of Louvain in 2, a. 2, § 8, a. 8, also favors this opinion. St. Thomas too, although in this article ad primum he says that this mystery was revealed to the blessed angels, yet lower down in q. 64, a. 1, ad quartum, seems to teach that the demons also knew the mystery of the Incarnation, if his words be carefully inspected; and most clearly in 2 Sent., dist. 11, q. 1, a. 4, he

1610. See Vazquez, Disputatio 177, cap. 5; Council of Trent, session 13, cap. 4.

so taught. Bernard also seems to have said the same in Sermon 17 on the Canticles, although he does not assert it consistently. Some likewise gather this view from St. Augustine, 3 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 19, whom in that argument St. Thomas cites four times to prove this; indeed in 2 ad illud, a. 4, he plainly affirms that Augustine was in this opinion. Of the many reasons which only congruently show that knowledge of this mystery was communicated to the angels, that one seems to me the weightiest, that Adam in the state of innocence knew this mystery, as St. Thomas teaches in 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad quintum, and more clearly in 2-2, q. 2, a. 7, in the body, and it is not obscurely indicated by that of Genesis 2, "This now is bone of my bones," which Paul interprets at Ephesians 5 by these words, "This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

There are, however, some more recent Thomists who assert that this mystery was not revealed to the angels in the way; to whom at first glance some testimonies of Scripture and of the holy Fathers seem to lend support, which must be interpreted in a good sense, so that we may defend the opinion set forth above. And it seems to have been the opinion of Alexander, 2 p., q. 25, memb. 1, and Gabriel, on 2 Sent., dist. 9, q. 2, a. 5, dub. 4, where they assert that this mystery was revealed only to certain angels, not indeed in the instant of creation, but of confirmation in grace; wherefore they understand of certain ones only that saying of Ephesians 3, "It appeared to the angels," etc.[1611]

Caput II - The testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers which seem to oppose the foregoing opinion are set forth and explained

That the mystery of the Incarnation was not revealed to the angels from the beginning, several and weighty Fathers of the Church seem to have handed down; whose testimonies must in this chapter be reviewed and explained. Among the Latins is St. Jerome, tome 6, in the Great Commentary, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, at those words, chapter 3, "The mystery hidden from ages," where he thus writes: "But the mystery hidden from ages can also be understood otherwise, namely that the ages themselves were ignorant of it, that is, all spiritual and rational creatures." He had said the very same in chapter 36 of Isaiah; and lower down, at those words of the same chapter 3 to the Ephesians, "That it might be made known to principalities," etc., he seems to teach that from the preaching of this mystery made in the Church the angels learned the manifold wisdom of God. And he attributes to the angels also that expression of Psalm 23, "Who is this King of glory?" and that of Isaiah 63, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" - angels who, wondering at the mystery of Christ, were asking about Christ himself, "Who is this King of glory?" etc. - thus does the same Jerome interpret in that of Isaiah 63 and in that Psalm.

Then St. Ambrose, in the book On the Instruction of Virgins, c. 5, and in the fourth book On the Faith, c. 1, and in the book On Those Who Are Initiated, c. 7, understands in like manner both those places of the Old Testament, both Psalm 23 and Isaiah 63, of the angels, in such a way that he

1611. Rupert of Deutz, In Ioan. 8; Catherine of Siena, De eximia praedestinatione Christi; De gloria Angelorum; Viguerius, Institutio Theologica, c. 3 § 2 v. 15; c. 20 § 1 v. 4; Jacobus de Valentia on Ps. 81; Nicholas of Lyra; Dionysius Carthusian on Is. 63; Decanus Louaniensis, 2 a. 2 § 8 a. 8; St. Thomas, In 2 Sent. d. 11 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1; 1 p. q. 64 a. 1 ad 4; 2 Sent. d. 11 q. 1 a. 4; Bernard, Serm. 17 in Cant.; Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3 c. 19; St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 1 a. 3 ad 5; 2-2 q. 2 a. 7; Gen. 2:23; Eph. 5:32; Alexander of Hales, 2 p. q. 25 memb. 1; Gabriel Biel, In 2 Sent. d. 9 q. 2 a. 5 dub. 4; Eph. 3.

understands them as asking about the mystery of the Incarnation. From which doctrine an effective argument is drawn in this way: if the angels were asking about this mystery, it is a sign that they were ignorant of it; for about those matters which we know, we never ask.

Among the Greek Fathers the same opinion seems to have been followed by Justin, in the Dialogue with Trypho against the Jews, p. 27, when he explains that of Psalm 23, "Who is this King of glory?" of the angels, in the manner in which Jerome also and others explain...

They too have explained it; and Pseudo-Dionysius, ch. 7 of On the Celestial Hierarchy, where that of Isaiah 63, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" he understands of the same angels in precisely the same way.[1612] But St. John Chrysostom, in the preface to the Gospel of John, introducing that of Ephesians 3, "the sacrament hidden for ages," says that John the Evangelist speaks of things which not even the angels, before he declared them, knew; therefore he judges that the angels learned the mysteries from John's preaching; and in Homily 7 on the Epistle to the Ephesians he seems to assert that not only were the riches of Christ hidden from the angels, but even the very substance of the mystery: "This alone," he says, "did the angels know, that the portion of the Lord is his people."[1613] The same plainly is affirmed by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, on that passage of Ephesians 3.[1614] St. Cyril also, book 2 on John, chapter 3, interprets the same passage of Paul about the mystery of the Incarnation. And although he does not say that it was unknown to the angels before the preaching made to the Church, yet that seems to be gathered from the text of Paul, when he says, "that it may be made known to the principalities," etc.; for if Paul speaks, as Cyril says, about the mystery of the Incarnation, it is rightly inferred that it became known to the angels from the preaching made in the Church.[1615] Most clearly, however, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 3 on the Canticles, after the middle, seems to have held the same; for there he speaks thus: For in the earlier times those powers set over the world above knew in this matter only that simple and uniform wisdom of God, fitting in a certain manner to the miraculous rule in nature of what was to be accomplished, etc. But about that diversified kind of Wisdom which consists in the interweaving of things that are opposed to one another, they now through the Church have been most clearly taught. He then explains what things they were taught, subjoining: "Who indeed is the Word made flesh, who would mingle life with death, in what way by his own stripe he would heal our wound." Afterward he expounds, one by one, those things which from Christ's Incarnation the angelic powers learned.[1616] They too have explained it; and Pseudo-Dionysius, ch. 7 of On the Celestial Hierarchy, where that of Isaiah 63, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" he understands of the same angels in precisely the same way.[1612] But St. John Chrysostom, in the preface to the Gospel of John, introducing that of Ephesians 3, "the sacrament hidden for ages," says that John the Evangelist speaks of things which not even the angels, before

1612. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 7, on Isaiah 63, "Quis est iste qui venit de Edom?"

1613. St. John Chrysostom, Praefatio in Evangelium Ioannis, on Ephesians 3, "Sacramentum absconditum a saeculis"; Hom. 7 in Epistolam ad Ephesios.

1614. Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, on Ephesians 3.

1615. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, lib. 2, c. 3.

1616. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. 3 in Canticum Canticorum.

1612. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 7, on Isaiah 63, "Quis est iste qui venit de Edom?"

he declared them, knew; therefore he judges that the angels learned the mysteries from John's preaching; and in Homily 7 on the Epistle to the Ephesians he seems to assert that not only were the riches of Christ hidden from the angels, but even the very substance of the mystery: "This alone," he says, "did the angels know, that the portion of the Lord is his people."[1613] The same plainly is affirmed by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, on that passage of Ephesians 3.[1614] St. Cyril also, book 2 on John, chapter 3, interprets the same passage of Paul about the mystery of the Incarnation. And although he does not say that it was unknown to the angels before the preaching made to the Church, yet that seems to be gathered from the text of Paul, when he says, "that it may be made known to the principalities," etc.; for if Paul speaks, as Cyril says, about the mystery of the Incarnation, it is rightly inferred that it became known to the angels from the preaching made in the Church.[1615] Most clearly, however, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 3 on the Canticles, after the middle, seems to have held the same; for there he speaks thus: For in the earlier times those powers set over the world above knew in this matter only that simple and uniform wisdom of God, fitting in a certain manner to the miraculous rule in nature of what was to be accomplished, etc. But about that diversified kind of Wisdom which consists in the interweaving of things that are opposed to one another, they now through the Church have been most clearly taught. He then explains what things they were taught, subjoining: "Who indeed is the Word made flesh, who would mingle life with death, in what way by his own stripe he would heal our wound." Afterward he expounds, one by one, those things which from Christ's Incarnation the angelic powers learned.[1616]

But to defend the earlier opinion, the passages of Scripture from which arguments were taken against it must first be interpreted; then what the Fathers thought must be shown. First, therefore, that of Psalm 23, "Who is this King of glory?" is interpreted variously by the Fathers, and therefore little can be proved from it. For although St. Augustine understands it of the angels, nevertheless he thinks it was said not out of ignorance, but out of admiration.[1617] That of Isaiah 63, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" the Fathers do not explain in the same way: for Athanasius, in the book On the Saving Advent against Apollinaris, accommodates those words to the demon questioning Christ when he approached to tempt him; to which interpretation does not fit the response which the Prophet subjoins, "I who speak justice," etc.[1618] But Tertullian, book 4 Against Marcion, chapter 40, says that those were the words of the prophet, by a prophetic spirit contemplating the Lord in his passion, and saying, "Who is this," etc.[1619] Finally, St. Cyril, in his commentaries on that passage, even if he refers it to the blessed angels asking at the time of the Ascension, nevertheless says that question proceeded from astonishment at an unusual spectacle. Therefore, even if we admit Justin's interpretation, it is not necessary to assert that the angels were ignorant of some

1613. St. John Chrysostom, Praefatio in Evangelium Ioannis, on Ephesians 3, "Sacramentum absconditum a saeculis"; Hom. 7 in Epistolam ad Ephesios.

1614. Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, on Ephesians 3.

1615. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, lib. 2, c. 3.

1616. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. 3 in Canticum Canticorum.

1617. St. Augustine, Serm. 178, on Psalm 23, "Quis est iste rex gloriae."

1618. Athanasius, De salutari adventu contra Apollinarem.

1619. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, lib. 4, c. 40.

part of the mystery and from this ignorance asked, "Who is this," etc.; which is clearly refuted by manifest reasoning: for the blessed angels, of whom that interrogation is said, before the Ascension did indeed know the mystery of the Incarnation and who was that King of glory, at whose Nativity they had said, "Glory in the highest to God" (Luke 2). Therefore they did not ask who he was out of ignorance. But if we say that they spoke that out of some ignorance, requesting that the knowledge of that mystery be made more illustrious and that they be taught, so it must be asserted, as will be explained below in the following disputation, chapter 6: that they were not altogether ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation, but of certain circumstances of it, which they wished to be taught.[1620]

And indeed, as regards the place of Paul to the Ephesians 3, "that it may be made known to the principalities," it is not sufficiently proved from that passage that this mystery was unknown to the principalities and powers of the angelic orders; for before Paul's preaching and conversion not only the substance of the mystery of the Incarnation, but also the other circumstances of our redemption and of the Gospel could have been known to the angels from the preaching even of the other Apostles after the day of Pentecost. Wherefore, with such an occasion given, Paul seems to have said, "that it may be made known to the principalities," not the mystery of the Incarnation, but "the multiform wisdom of God"; nor did he say that it had been given to him to preach this mystery alone, but "the unsearchable riches of Christ," and "what is the dispensation of the sacrament"; by which he wished to signify that day by day new and marvelous things were being done in the preaching of the Gospel, in which the multiform wisdom of God would shine; but these things are said to "be manifested to principalities and powers" because, when they were being done in their sight, they were said to be made known to them: just as in 1 Timothy 3 he calls this "the great mystery of piety," "which," he says, "appeared to angels," that is, that which was done in the sight of the angels themselves, they too preaching it and glorifying; not because, before it was done, they had not known it, but because, they themselves beholding it, it appeared to the world and to all.[1621]

St. Augustine indeed interprets the passage adduced from Ephesians 3 in another way in book 5 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 19, so as to defend that the mystery of the Incarnation was not then made known to the angels when it was preached, but before the preaching; whose interpretation is this, if we understand the words of Paul as he himself recites them more fully: "To me" (he says) "the least of all the saints has been given this grace to evangelize among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all what is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden from ages in God, who created all things, that it may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavens through the Church the multiform wisdom of God." St. Augustine therefore refers that clause, "that it may be made known," to that, "hidden in God," so that the sense is, it has been granted to me to preach the riches and dispensation of the sacrament hidden in God, which was thus hidden from the ages, that nevertheless it might be made known to the angelic principalities, and had been previously known to them through the Church, namely his,

1620. Luke 2:14; see below, the following disputation, cap. 6.
1621. Ephesians 3:10; 1 Timothy 3:16.

because first among them was the Church: yet this exposition, although it favors more the prior opinion, seems to me forced; for it is better that that part, "that it may be made known," be referred to that, "to evangelize," so that the sense be, it has been given to me to evangelize, that through my preaching the multiform wisdom of God may be made known.[1622]

Then indeed I confess that, in this way, the testimonies of Scripture above alleged, and the interpretations which the Fathers applied to them, are satisfied, so that we may defend that this mystery was not hidden from the beginning from the angels: nevertheless I cannot deny that some Fathers from those alleged have taught the opposite and therefore that the opinion is not improbable which asserts that this mystery was not revealed to the angels from the beginning. Now the Fathers are Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, Jerome, and Nyssen in the cited places, who seem not only to have spoken about circumstances, but also about the very substance of the mystery, when they say that it was hidden from the angels. The reason too which we adduced for the prior opinion from Adam does not press much: because there was a much greater reason why in the state of innocence this mystery should be revealed to Adam than to the angels: both because from Adam's flesh human nature was to be taken; and also because the matrimony of Adam with Eve signified the mystery of Christ with the Church, and their union according to the flesh; therefore it would not be marvelous if this mystery were revealed to Adam, which was altogether unknown to the angels. Moreover, that the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to Adam, common opinion asserts, nor do I see that anyone denies it.

Finally it must be added that, in whatever way we choose to philosophize in this matter, before the coming of Christ in the flesh the mystery of the Incarnation was known to the angels as to its substance at least, and its principal parts: for the prophets enlightened by the ministry of angels predicted it, and Gabriel the Archangel announced it to Mary: but from this it does not follow that it was revealed to them from the beginning.[1623]

Caput III - What mysteries the blessed angels have known in the Word

In this chapter we must not be disputing whether the angels see in the Word, by the same vision by which they see the essence (*essentia*) of God, any other created mysteries; for about this we have said more than enough above in Disputation 50: but here it is to be presupposed what we set forth there more fully, namely that all other created things, insofar as they are created, are seen by the blessed by another vision than that by which God himself is seen; and that they are not seen by force of the vision of the divine essence, but because God, revealing himself to the blessed, also reveals other things. By what account the blessed are said to behold those in the Word, there also it has been explained. Moreover, this doctrine is consonant with St. Thomas in the following question, article 7, where he concedes that the blessed angels, in the course of time, know many

1622. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. 5, c. 19.
1623. On prophets illuminated by angelic ministry and Gabriel's annunciation to Mary, see Luke 1.

things in the Word which at the beginning of their beatitude they did not see: and yet the vision of the divine essence does not vary: a sign therefore is that, in the mind of St. Thomas, they are seen by another vision.[1624]

Further, as regards those things which the blessed angels from the beginning knew by God revealing by another vision, or by the same, first, no one doubts that they saw the mystery of the Trinity: because he who sees God cannot not see the things which are formally in God: and of this sort is the mystery of the Trinity. Then about the mystery of the Incarnation it must be said in the same way, that it was known by the angels in beatitude, as we said it was known in the wayfarer's state: although Jerome, Chrysostom, Nyssen, and the other Fathers alleged in the preceding chapter seem to deny this, yet it is most congruent to their state that from the beginning they knew this mystery; since indeed all are ministering spirits, as the Apostle testifies in Hebrews 1, "for the sake of those who are to receive the inheritance of salvation": there is no doubting that this mystery of the Incarnation, at least according to its substance, was revealed to the angels from the beginning of beatitude, although they may have been ignorant of certain circumstances. And that it was known to them before it was accomplished in act, we have already shown enough in the preceding chapter.

Finally it is to be observed what St. Isidore, in the book On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, teaches, namely that all those things which by the will of God are to be in the future are known by the angels in the Word before they are done (which seems to have been the opinion of St. Augustine in Confessions book 13, chapter 13, and in City of God book 9, chapter 22): this, however, is not to be understood universally; because some things too are understood by the blessed in the course of time when they happen, as we taught above in that disputation 50, chapter 7: which St. Thomas plainly held, as he teaches in the following question, article 7. And what Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter 58, that nothing is certain about this matter, is not wondrous: for Augustine did not see Dionysius; and Gregory, in his works, commemorates the doctrine of Dionysius about the hierarchies, and St. Thomas in that question gathers into one: nor could he have learned it except by revelation, as he himself attests, chapter 6 of On the Celestial Hierarchy, where he says that he learned all things from his teacher, namely Paul, whom he calls his initiator: which also Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 58, says, that nothing is certain here, unless what the manifest conclusions of the Church's doctrine contain.[1625]

1624. St. Thomas, in the following question, art. 7 (Summa theologiae I).

1625. Isidore, De summo bono, c. 12; St. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. 13, c. 13; De civitate Dei, lib. 9, c. 22; Enchiridion, c. 58; Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 6; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 108.

Disputatio CCXVI - Whether the intellect of one angel is enlightened by another

Caput I - The opinion of Durandus

All these things, therefore, are revealed by God immediately. In this reasoning Durandus seems to suppose that illumination only occurs about those mysteries which in some manner look to the state of beatitude; and since all the things which pertain to the state of beatitude ought to flow most immediately from God, it follows that angels are enlightened immediately by God.

But the latter part of his position, which he himself added so as to satisfy certain places of Dionysius, he sets forth thus: since all the angels are mutually conjoined among themselves in the irradiation of the divine light, whether natural or supernatural, that which is revealed to one angel is represented to the others according to a certain order of consequence: wherefore, although they are enlightened at the same time, nevertheless one is said to be enlightened earlier by nature or by dignity than another. In this way, however, Durandus does not explain in what the ratio of the enlightenment of one angel by another consists: for he thinks that one is not enlightened by another as by a master, since he maintains that all are enlightened by God as by the efficient cause; he will readily grant that an angel is enlightened, with his faculty for understanding strengthened, by an internal illumination.

Yet this view does not approve itself to me.

This opinion is rejected: First, because there are plain testimonies of Dionysius by which, according to the common teaching of the Schoolmen, he teaches that one angel is enlightened not only by God but also by another angel, not because one after another is enlightened by some order from God, but because one is truly instructed by another in the matters to be understood. The first testimony is in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 5, under the title On Priestly Perfections, where he teaches that the lower things are at length reduced to God through the higher. The second testimony is in the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 8, where he affirms that the angels of the second hierarchy are purged by the angels of the first hierarchy. The third testimony is in the same book, chapter 4, where he asserts that a certain angelic substance communicates to an inferior the understanding received from a superior. St. Thomas reports these three testimonies below in question 106, articles 1 and 4, in the argument On the contrary.[1626] But Durandus explains the last testimony in such a way that certain angels are enlightened immediately by God, and others by others, not in the order of cause but in the order of consequence, as above was set forth according to the mind of the same author.

This interpretation, however, can by no reason be accommodated either to the aforesaid third testimony or to the others. First, it is most manifest about the other two; as to the third testimony, it is proved thus: for in that same chapter 4 of the Celestial Hierarchy, after the midpoint, after he

1626. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 5, c. 8, c. 4; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 106, a. 1; a. 4 (argument "Sed contra").

had said that the law was given through Moses by the ministry of angels, and that through their works it came to us, immediately he subjoins these words: "As though the order of the divine law were to ordain that the things which hold the secondary place be raised and stirred to the divinity by those which are first; for this law has been sanctioned by God not only in the highest and lowest minds, but also in those which are of the same order, that, in whatever hierarchy there are first, middle, and last orders, the superiors of the inferiors be their teachers, and, as it were, point the way with the finger and show the approach to divinity, illumination, and association."[1627] Where, when he says that the superior angels are teachers of the inferior, he plainly indicates that illumination is derived from one to another not only by an order of consequence but also by the order of cause; and in chapter 8 of the same book, at the beginning of the middle, he says that certain receive revelation from God immediately, but others through the work of others, and that these indeed have a less clear knowledge, but those a clearer: where he openly teaches that certain angels are enlightened by others, not only according to an order of consequence, but also according to a true cause.

Next, that interpretation which Durandus applies to the testimonies of Dionysius is fabricated and has no firm foundation of true doctrine, and therefore the latter part of his opinion is opposed to reason: for if illumination were derived from one angel to another in the order of consequence, there would necessarily be an order of cause between the illumination of one angel and another; for if there be no order of cause, there cannot be an order of prior and posterior, and therefore no one will be said to be enlightened by another. Perhaps someone will say that there can be the order of prior and posterior according to dignity, which is counted among the modes of the prior by Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter On the modes of the prior. However, although according to the reason of dignity and nobility it may rightly be said that one is enlightened earlier than another, yet by this reason alone it cannot be said that one is enlightened by another, or that illumination is derived from one to another; and consequently it could not be said that one is remotely, but another immediately, enlightened by God: moreover, this does not sufficiently agree with the others who, against Durandus, affirm that one angel is truly enlightened and taught by another, as to the manner in which this illumination takes place.

Caput II - The second opinion explained in five ways

The second opinion generally affirms that one angel is enlightened by another by some change impressed in him by the one by whom he is enlightened. In this opinion were Scotus on the Second Book, distinction 9, question 2; to another question, Bassolis, question 1, article 2; likewise a certain Doctor, Gabriel, question 2, article 4; Ockham on the Second Book, question 20, article 2; Hervaeus on the same distinction 9, question 1, article 2; indeed, in this also St. Thomas below seems to be included, in question 106, article 1; and Capreolus on the Second Book, distinction 17,

1627. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 4 (near the middle).

question 2, article 1, conclusion 2, which he explains in article 3, in the solution to the first argument of Durandus against the first part of the same conclusion. They vary, however, in the explanation of this opinion.

- The first mode of explaining and defending this opinion is that of Scotus and Bassolis, who, following the opinion which they took on the locution of angels, teach first that not every locution is illumination, but only that which perfects and teaches the intellect of the hearer. They add, moreover, that the intellect of the hearer is not perfected by any thought of the true, but by the true which is known by divine revelation. Then they assert that this illumination occurs in the same way as locution is wont to occur, as was expounded according to Scotus in Disputation 210, chapter 2, namely, that knowledge is produced in the mind of the hearing angel who is enlightened, which he himself in no way produces. This opinion, explained in this way, seems probable as to its former part, as will be explained below; as to the latter, however, I judge it false for the same reason by which I proved in chapter 3 of that disputation that the locution of angels cannot be effected in that manner.[1628]
- The second mode of explaining the aforesaid opinion is that of Gabriel and Ockham, who likewise teach two things: one is, that inferior angels are enlightened only by their superiors about those matters which the superiors have received by revelation; in which they agree with Scotus and Bassolis. The second is, that illumination takes place in the same way as locution, namely, in this way: that the concept of the thing which is revealed, existing in the mind of the superior angel who is said to enlighten, produces knowledge of itself in the mind of the inferior angel who is enlightened. This opinion I consider probable as to the former part, as also the preceding: as to the latter, however, it must be attacked in the same way as also the opinion of the same authors which we reported and impugned in that Disputation 210, chapter 7, on the locution of angels.
- The third mode is that of others, who say that illumination is effected by the infusion of some supernatural light, or of some species impressed on the mind of the angel who is enlightened, or finally by this, that the angel who enlightens somehow modifies the species existing in the mind of the other. This opinion for the same reason does not approve itself to me as also that on the locution of angels, which, as we saw in that Disputation 210, chapter 4, asserts that one angel speaks to another by this, that he impresses a species of his concept in the mind of the other: and by much greater reason this opinion does not please me, insofar as it affirms that one angel is enlightened by another by receiving in himself some supernatural light: for if an angel cannot change the intellect of another by impressing a species, much less can he impress some quality which has the nature of light, especially a supernatural one.
- The fourth mode is that of those who assert that angels are enlightened by another through the derivation of a certain spiritual ray from that one, by whom the inferior angel is stirred up and forms in himself a likeness by which he understands the object about which he

1628. See Disputation 210, chs. 2 - 4, 7, on angelic locution.

is instructed and enlightened by the superior. Which mode, as I think, seems to be that of Richard, because he teaches in the same way that angels speak with themselves, as we reported in Disputation 210, chapter 4; for although, when treating of illumination in the Second Book, distinction 9, question 2, article 1, he only says that to enlighten some angel is nothing other than to manifest to him some truth looking to the truth of the intellect, and to sharpen the edge of that intellect; nevertheless he seems to suppose that this whole thing is done by the sending of a spiritual ray as far as the angel who is to be enlightened. Moreover, in the Second Book, distinction 10, question 2, article 2, speaking of the illumination by which an angel enlightens a man, he affirms that a man is not enlightened by an angel by receiving from him a species of some kind: I do not know whether he thinks the same of the illumination of a man and of an angel. However that may be, we refuted that opinion on locution in the aforementioned chapter 4; and this philosophical mode of illumination must be refuted in the same manner.

Caput III - St. Thomas's view (the fifth mode)

To all these modes there can be added a fifth, which St. Thomas follows below in question 106, article 1, where he asserts that illumination consists in two things: both in this, that the intellect of the inferior angel is strengthened by the superior; and in this, that the superior angel portions out, into manifold and distinct reasons, the truth which he himself knows distinctly by a single simple and common concept, so that the inferior may be able to grasp it. He explains the former part by the example of two hot bodies: for as one heat by the proximity of another becomes more intense, so too the power of the intellect of the inferior angel is corroborated by the turning of the superior angel toward him, since among incorporeals there is an order of approach by spiritual conversion of one angel toward another. He declares the latter part by the example of a master, who by many words and concepts unfolds to his disciples that which he himself understands by one or by fewer; and he collected this doctrine from Dionysius; we in what follows will explain it at greater length. [1629]

But in what way the intellect of one angel can be corroborated by another needs to be more carefully elaborated: for an angel cannot infuse any light or quality into our intellect, as we showed in Disputation 210, chapter 3, and we shall also show below; therefore in no way will he be able to corroborate the intellect of another by the advent of some natural or infused light: by such a mode he could operate in our intellect and enlighten another, which no one grants.

Then, against this same position of St. Thomas, Aegidius argues in the following way: if one angel's intellect were to be strengthened by another, that strengthening would be either in the other as in the subject, or in another by operation; but that an angel should enter into another, no one concedes; therefore he cannot operate in him by producing that strengthening. This argument has weight also in the case of those who assert that angels are in a body or elsewhere by operation.

1629. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 106, a. 1; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia. Also cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. On the modes of the prior.

Moreover, one angel cannot be corroborated by another for the same effect and operation: for the same act of understanding cannot be from two intellects; for intellection is an immanent action, that is, which remains in the agent; and the same cannot be in two. From all which reasons - especially the last - he gathers force, which proves that the intellection of one angel cannot be corroborated by another through the impression of any quality or of any degree, since one angel cannot operate upon the intellect of another: otherwise he would operate also in our intellect.

Cajetan benignly interprets the opinion of St. Thomas.

...to the same work, that is, to the same cognition, not by the mode of nature, that is, not by physical action nor by a physical concurrence, but by the mode of art cooperating with nature: in which way a teacher by his art helps the disciple and corroborates that one's intellect. Moreover, to explain the mode of this teaching and discipline, Cajetan notes two further points, of which one I do not see as much to the purpose; the other is this: in the action of teaching, as such, the disciple is not first illumined before the truth is proposed, but first the truth, known and clarified, is proposed; then the intellect is illumined to see that truth, and consequently its own light is strengthened. To propose the truth, he says, is nothing else than to propose it as already known by the very Angel who proposes; but because sometimes the object as known by the superior Angel is not accommodated to the intellect of the inferior, therefore the superior's concept is sometimes divided into several concepts, that the inferior may perceive the thing better. From all which Cajetan gathers that in no other way is the inferior Angel illumined by the superior, nor in any other way is the intellect of the inferior corroborated by the superior, than the intellect of a disciple is illumined and strengthened by a teacher - not by physical action, but by the mode of art and discipline.

This opinion of Cajetan, although true as far as it goes (as I shall prove below), nevertheless seems little suited as an exposition of St. Thomas's mind. First, because St. Thomas says that in the illumination of Angels there are two things, namely, that the light of the intellect is corroborated and that the truth or object is proposed. If the corroboration of the light of the intellect had its origin from the proposition of the truth, as Cajetan explains, St. Thomas would not distinguish these two in this way. Second, when in q. 117, a. 1 he shows how one man can be taught by another, he says that this can happen in a twofold manner: first, by proposing to him some things by which he may be led little by little to the knowledge of an unknown truth; then, by strengthening his intellect. He explains this more at length in these words: Not indeed by any active power, as if of a higher nature, as was said above concerning the Angels who illumine; for all human intellects are of one grade in the order of nature; but insofar as the teacher proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, which perhaps the disciple would not have such power of gathering by himself, so as to be able to deduce the conclusions from the principles. These are the words of St. Thomas. From which it is evident, according to St. Thomas's own mind, that in the illumination of Angels there are two things - namely, the corroboration of the light of the intellect and the proposal of the truth or object - and that the one is not simply reduced to the other.[1630][1631]

1630. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 9, a. 1, in solut. 2.
1631. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 111, a. 1 (in corp.).

I freely admit that Cajetan's interpretation finds no small favor from St. Thomas in De veritate q. 9, a. 1, in solut. 2, and again in the body of the article in I, q. 111, a. 1: for there he plainly teaches that the intellect of the Angel who is illumined is corroborated solely from this, that he beholds something known in the superior Angel for the sake of knowing other things as well. There he likewise affirms that among men the intellect of the disciple and his light are corroborated from this, that he receives from the teacher some principle from which he can know certain things.[1630][1631] Wherefore, according to Cajetan's sense, we could interpret the mind of St. Thomas thus, that the corroboration of the intellect of the inferior Angel by the superior is nothing else than to receive some truth from him. Yet it is always difficult for me to reconcile this with what the Holy Doctor himself teaches in this part, q. 117, a. 1, where he marks the difference between a man who is taught by another and an Angel who is illumined by a superior, as we reported above. Moreover, that there is no difference between the illumination by which one Angel is illumined by another and that by which one man is taught by another, we shall show below.[1632]

Caput IV - Three other ways of explaining, and of defending, the prior opinion

Besides the mode set forth in the preceding chapter, which Capreolus proves in II, dist. 11, question 2, article 3, reply to Durandus's first argument against the second conclusion, Capreolus also defends the prior opinion in another way: he says, therefore, that the intellect of the Angel who is illumined by a superior Angel is corroborated because the superior inflows with his own light into the inferior by a certain power, which he himself calls "intentional," in the way in which the agent intellect inflows into the phantasms. He compares this intentional power to the species of colors in the medium and to the power of the principal agent in an instrument, by which the instrument is said in some way to be strengthened.[1633]

Impugned. Although this mode of philosophizing, in that it grants some peculiar influx in the intellect (*intellectus*) of the inferior Angel who is illumined - a thing it does not grant in the intellect of a man who is taught by another - may more agree with the mind of St. Thomas, nevertheless it does not persuade me. For either that power derived from the superior Angel into the inferior inheres in the intellect of the inferior Angel, as the species of color truly inheres in the medium - and this can be nothing other than some species; wherefore the illumination would be effected by the impression of a species in the intellect of the inferior Angel, as another author cited above asserted; which we impugned above in Disputation 210, chapter 5[1634] - or that power derived into the inferior Angel is merely the assistance of the illuminating Angel, as a principal agent assists an instrument and is said to strengthen or raise it; but this can be nothing other than the very proposition of the truth which the superior Angel, as a teacher, manifests; unless perchance one were to say that the superior Angel assists the inferior as a principal agent, or that he is as it

1630. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 9, a. 1, in solut. 2.
1631. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 111, a. 1 (in corp.).
1632. St. Thomas, q. 117, a. 1.
1633. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1 (against Durandus's second conclusion).
1634. See Disputation 210, ch. 5.

were an instrument for the same intellection - which is absurd. Therefore Capreolus must fall back into Cajetan's opinion, which he had previously impugned, so that the superior Angel stands to the inferior as, among men, the teacher to the disciple; although Capreolus himself concedes something more to the illuminating Angel than befits a human teacher. For he seems to suppose that this "intentional" thing derived from the illuminating Angel into the illumined inferior Angel is some quality according to the mode of a transient cause - just as he also thinks that something is derived into the sacraments when they are assumed as instruments of grace, and into every instrument in the same way; which we showed above to be a fiction in Disputation 176, chapter 3.[1635]

Finally, Hervaeus explains in three ways the manner by which one Angel is illumined by another; of which, in this chapter, we shall report only two. The first way is by an intensification of the natural light of the very Angel who is illumined; which way we impugned with Durandus's arguments in chapter 1 of this Disputation: first, because if the Angel who illumines another could increase the natural light of that one's intellect, he could also produce it absolutely; which is absurd. Hervaeus, however, replies that it can happen that some agent increases a form already produced, which it cannot produce from the beginning: for some agent, by rarefaction, can bring about a greater quantity than it can produce from the beginning. The reply, however, is frivolous; for the reason for producing quantity from the beginning is not the same as that for augmenting it after it has been produced: for it can be augmented without a new production of substance, but from the beginning it cannot be produced without a substance, even if only just produced. But the production of a quality and the intensification of it do not require a new production of substance; therefore an agent that can augment a quality will be able to produce it anew.[1636]

Next Durandus objected: If the light of the intellect of the Angel who is illumined were made greater by the light of the intellect of the Angel who illumines, it would follow that the intellect of the one Angel is of the same kind; for one form is not intensified by another unless it be of the same kind. But the intellect of the inferior Angel, who is illumined, and of the superior, who illumines, cannot be of the same kind, because they differ in species; therefore neither can the intellect of the one be made more intense by the intellect of the other. Hervaeus replies that from the fact that the intellect of the inferior Angel is rendered more intense by the intellect of the superior, it does not rightly follow that the intellect of the one and of the other is of the same kind: for although one form cannot be made more intense by another formally unless it be of the same kind with it, nevertheless it can well happen that one form is rendered more intense by another of a different kind, not formally, but efficiently. By this solution Hervaeus very well satisfies the difficulty; nonetheless his opinion does not persuade me. For since the intellect is the proper passion of a spiritual creature, it is a fiction to assert that it is made more intense in one way or another by another form, whether of the same kind or of a different: since the proper passion of a given nature does not admit of more and less.

1635. See Disputation 176, ch. 3.
1636. Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 3; and see above, ch. 1 of this Disputation.

Second, Hervaeus explains in another way the mode by which one Angel illumines another, namely, because one Angel concurs with another in eliciting a cognition, by which he reveals hidden things to him. This way also Durandus impugns in II, dist. 11, question 3, by the argument we set out above in chapter 1 of this Disputation.[1636][1637]

Because understanding is an immanent action, it must remain in the operating principle; and therefore the principle of the intellection which is in one Angel cannot be in another. But for this argument to have any force, it must presuppose that the superior Angel who illumines the inferior is the proximate and proper principle of the intellection which the inferior receives in himself and by which he is illumined; otherwise it would not be repugnant that a common principle, such as God, be extrinsic to the intellection, and that the intellection not be received in Him. Moreover, not even in this way can the aforesaid opinion be defended: first, because one Angel cannot imprint anything on the intellect of another, as was said in chapter 1; second, because it does not seem how the intellect of one Angel could concur with the intellect of another as a partial cause, or be in any way subject to it: for one of them seems superfluous for the same operation. This is the first opinion, which, after setting it forth in various ways, we judged it proper to report and refute, so that it may be altogether established that illumination is not effected by any internal change in the Angel who is illumined.

I pass over the manner of speaking of Henry, Quodlibet, question 15, article 3, who explains the preceding opinion thus, that illumination occurs by some disposition, whereby one Angel is disposed by another to receive a knowledge of the things he reveals: for this mode of opinion can easily be refuted from what has been said.[1638]

That one Angel is illumined by another by an external proposition alone - the more probable opinion holds.

Caput V - That one Angel illumines another by an external proposition alone; confirmation of this opinion

For my part, I have always favored the opinion of those who say that one Angel illumines another by an external proposition alone (as among men the teacher is said to illumine the disciple), without anything being imprinted on the Angel illumined, as the prior opinion had claimed. This was the opinion of Alexander; St. Bonaventure; Ægidius; Thomas de Argentina; Marsilius; and finally Cajetan; add also St. Thomas, if we are willing to interpret him as Cajetan understood him.[1639][1640]

1636. Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 3; and see above, ch. 1 of this Disputation.

1637. See above, ch. 1 of this Disputation.

1638. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, q. 15, a. 3.

1639. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 1, q. 38, memb. 3; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 10, a. 1, q. 2; Ægidius (Giles of Rome), In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 5; Thomas de Argentina, qq. 1 - 3; Marsilius, In II (Sentences), q. 7, a. 4, concl. 2, and in the solutions of the arguments; Cajetan, ad I, q. 106, a. 1.

1640. Add also St. Thomas, if we interpret him as Cajetan understood him.

But in order to explain and confirm this opinion, it must be noted that to illumine is not the same as to manifest just any truth; and hence not every locution is an illumination, but only that by which a truth is explained which is a second perfection of the intellect (that is, the knowledge of which is said to perfect the hearer's intellect). Such are the truths of mysteries and of future things which depend upon the will of God alone, even if they are of the natural order - for example, that God will punish someone, or will do something of this sort. This definition of illumination is approved also by the Doctors of the prior opinion - Scotus, Bassolis, and Ockham, Gabriel, Richard, Hervaeus, Thomas de Argentina in the cited places, and Ægidius in the place cited.[1641] But St. Thomas, below in question 109, article 3, teaches that to illumine is not the same as to manifest any truth whatsoever, but only that which leads to God. Whether it pertains only to supernatural things, or also to natural things that bear upon God, he does not determine.[1642] Wherefore, although an inferior Angel may reveal the secrets of his heart to a superior Angel, he is not said to illumine him, as Richard rightly warns in the place cited in reply to the second, but only to speak with him; just as if a disciple were to speak with his teacher and disclose to him the secrets of his heart, he would not be said to illumine him, but to converse with him. Illumination, therefore, is the explication of a truth which renders the hearer's intellect more perfect; for to know the secrets of another's heart does not perfect the hearer's intellect, as if it were something great to know those things. From the same principle it follows that illumination does not concern natural things and acts; for since each Angel beholds them by his own concept, he is not said to be illumined by another Angel, even a superior one, nor to be instructed about them.

This opinion, thus explained, is confirmed first by the testimonies of the Fathers. The first is St. Augustine, on Psalm 118, sermon 18, toward the end; after he had taught that understanding is given to us by God, he says: "But if for this He uses an Angel as minister, an Angel can indeed do something in a man's mind, that he may grasp the light of God and by this understand; but he is thus said to give understanding to man, and, as it were (so to speak), to intellectuate the man, just as someone is said to give light to a house, or to illumine a house, to which he makes a window." And later: "God, however, made the mind of man rational and intellectual, which could receive His light; and He made such an Angel, who could do something whereby the human mind might be helped to receive the light of God." These are Augustine's words, from which one may gather that man is illumined by an Angel in such a way that the Angel works absolutely nothing in that man's mind, nor in any way changes it; rather, he explains the truth from without, with merely the external office of a teacher. For Augustine says that the Angel, in order to illumine man, works in no other way than he who opens a window that the house may receive bodily light; such a one, however, does nothing within the house, nor does he produce the light; he only opens a way and removes external impediments. Therefore the Angel, too, illumines man only in this manner, so

1641. Scotus; Bassolis; Ockham; Gabriel; Richard; Hervaeus; Thomas de Argentina in the cited places; and Ægidius, art. illos, dub. 4.

1642. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 109, a. 3.

that he does nothing in the man's intellect, but illumines by an extrinsic doctrine alone. And consequently, with much greater reason, he will do nothing in an angelic intellect, but, as a teacher proposing the truth from without, he will illumine it and, as it were, will teach him as a disciple.

Next, there is the testimony of St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 1 on John, chapter 9, where at the beginning he asks how it is true that every man coming into this world is illumined by God, since one Angel is illumined by another; and that one Angel is illumined by another he proves by many testimonies, such as that of Zechariah 2, where one Angel said to another: "Run and speak to the youth." Then he increases the difficulty, because men are illumined by Angels: for in Acts 10 Cornelius learned from an Angel. Finally, because one man also illumines another: for in Acts 8 the Eunuch learned from Philip; and in Matthew 10, for this reason the Apostles are called the light of the world. Since these things are so, how is it true that every man is illumined by God? Cyril answers in these words: "Thus, therefore, we also confess the Saints to be light; and we added this, that every rational creature, once illumined, illumines, and by transmission pours its doctrine from its own mind into the mind of another; since we call illumination rather the power of learning than revelation. But the Word of God illumines every man coming into this world, not by teaching, as men do, nor perhaps Angels, but rather by creating, as God inserts into each the seeds of Wisdom - that is, the roots of piety and of understanding." These are Cyril's words, by which he seems to have expressed our opinion in explicit terms - except that, by adding the particle "perhaps," he seems in some way to doubt whether Angels are said to illumine in any other way than by external doctrine. Yet on account of that particle "perhaps," we ought not to think that Cyril in any way doubted the matter. First, because a little earlier he had affirmed it without any doubt, when he said that the illumination of the Angels is rather called the power of learning than revelation; from which it follows that the illumination of the Angels is effected solely by the doctrine of the illumining Angel and by the proposition of the truth, together with the discipline of the hearer. Then also because the particle "perhaps," in Greek isos, which Cyril uses, although it be the particle of one doubting, is sometimes nevertheless accustomed to be added, for the sake of modesty, to signify something certain, as those skilled in the Greek tongue have observed, and Aristotle used it in this sense in Rhetoric, book 3.[1643] Moreover, that particle signifies "equally" or "in like manner"; in which sense Cyril seems to have employed it: for thus the context and the meaning stand better with themselves. For there he endeavors to establish a distinction between the Word of God and all rational creatures: because the Word of God illumines by moving inwardly; whereas any creature, proposing only from without after the manner of a teacher and doctor, is said to illumine. Finally, Cyril added "perhaps" because it is rarely that a man is taught by Angels: and what rarely occurs is said "perhaps" to happen. Yet for that reason he does not teach that, when it happens that a man is taught by Angels, he is illumined in any other way than by the proposition of doctrine alone.

But indeed the chief foundations of this opinion are all the arguments which were set forth above against the second opinion and the various ways of explaining it: for thus it follows that illumination is effected in no other way than by external doctrine alone and the proposition of the truth. However, not all who embrace our opinion philosophize in the same way: they vary in

1643. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III.

assigning the mode by which one Angel speaks to another; and since illumination is a kind of locution, as was noted above, they likewise do not agree in explaining the mode of this external illumination and proposition. Yet there is no need to report their various ways of thinking: for in Disputation 211 we recounted them individually. Therefore, in this present difficulty one should embrace that account which will seem more probable, in accordance with what we said there when we disputed about locution: for the reasoning is entirely the same, as has been said.[1644]

Caput VI - Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine

It remains that we add a few things by which the preceding opinion may be more illustrated. First, illumination can be effected in two ways by a mere showing of the truth: in one way, by a certain simple proposition of truth, as when one Angel reveals to another the decree of the will of God, which previously was unknown to him, for example, that he has decreed to destroy this city or that, to change kingdoms, etc. And this showing and revelation of the mystery cannot precisely and properly, but only in the common way of speaking, be called illumination, just as the narration of any history can also be so called. For this reason we noted above that it is not the same thing to manifest the secret of the heart to another angel and to illuminate him; otherwise we too should illuminate angels. In another way illumination can be made properly, and it is of this that Pseudo-Dionysius is to be understood; and this is not by a mere simple showing of truth, but because by a certain peculiar mode the mystery is proposed in such a way that it may be better perceived: in which kind of thing the Angel who illuminates plays the part of a teacher; but he who is illuminated has the part of a disciple. For just as a disciple, when he receives from the teacher first principles and the way of deducing conclusions thence, and just as, when he hears a difficult matter through analogy to another and through various examples, he may better understand it, he is said to be illuminated by the teacher; so too a higher Angel, explaining to an inferior the mysteries of faith not by a simple showing and narration but in a peculiar mode, so that he may better understand them, is said to illuminate him. About this latter mode we shall speak expressly in the following disputation.

Second, it must be noted that the three acts which we call hierarchical, namely to illuminate, to purge, and to perfect, about which Pseudo-Dionysius treats in the places cited, are not distinct in reality, but are the same act under a different formal ratio: for inasmuch as it removes ignorance in the angel who is illuminated, which is a defect of the intellect, it is said to purge; but inasmuch as it enlightens the intellect, manifesting to it the truth, it is said to illuminate; and because the knowledge of truth is a perfection of the intellect, it is also said to perfect. Moreover, that these three acts are not distinguished according to reality, but according to various respects, is taught by St. Thomas below in question 106, article 2, to the first, and by the other Scholastics above cited.[1645] However, although the various respects are not assigned in the same way by all authors, especially

1644. See Disputation 211, where the several modes of angelic locution are discussed.
1645. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 106, a. 2, ad 1; and the other Scholastics cited above.

the respect of illuminating, on account of the various opinions above mentioned; nevertheless, in our opinion the ratio of illumination is completed solely under the respect of showing the truth on the part of the object.

Yet there are some Theologians who try to show, not by the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius alone, but also by Scripture, that certain angels are illuminated by others, indeed even purged. For in Job 41 it is said: "The angels shall fear, terrified they shall be purged." But in that place Job denoted something far different: for in that chapter, setting forth the ferocity of that sea-beast Leviathan, that is, the whale or balena, he says: "When he shall be lifted up, the angels shall fear, terrified they shall be purged"; that is, when this beast, being taken, shall appear upon the waters, the mighty also, the giants and the bold, by fear terrified, shall be purged. Therefore Job does not speak of a purgation of the intellect by which one angel is purged by another, but of the fear that is conceived from the sight of this beast; he says moreover "they shall be purged" either because in contrition and penance, through fear, they will ask for help and aid from the Lord, or because through fear they will clear the bowels. In either way, as Eugubinus rightly explains, it is also in our Spain a similar phrase by which notable fear is denoted. Furthermore, that by "angels" are signified the mighty and the strong is clear, first, because in the Hebrew is set down Elohim, which denotes "the powerful," as we taught above in disputation 179, chap. 4; then, because the mighty and the giants are called angels in Scripture, as was there noted.

Third, it should be observed that not only can one angel be illuminated by another, but also a man can be illuminated by an angel by the mere proposition of an object, yet the soul of man is illuminated in a different mode when it is separated and when it is conjoined: for when it is a separated soul, it is illuminated in exactly the same way as an angel; but when it is conjoined, it ought to be illuminated through the senses, as a disciple by a teacher. This, however, can be done in one of two ways: either because the angel uses some corporeal sign, either in an assumed body or without it; or because he changes the phantasy, or through it moves the intellect: what efficacy he has upon the phantasy and our senses, we shall show in disputation 217.

But Albert, in the book "De quatuor ...," in the first part, question 6, article 11, asserts that angels who illuminate have power over the intellect of man, so that they can insert light into it: for just as corporeal matter obeys the angel that he assume a body from it, so too he thinks that the intellect and sense of man obey the angel, so that from the phantasms which he has he abstracts intelligible species, and inserts them into the human intellect, and by this he is said to illuminate it; nay more, he affirms that phantasms can be newly produced by an angel, or those already produced be ordered; all of which he confirms by no reason at all. Bassolis also follows Albert in II, distinction 11, the only question, at § "Et tunc dicitur," on the fifth mode of operating, which he judges to be probable.[1646]

On the contrary, Richard, with most just right, taught the opposite in II, distinction 10, article 2, question 2, and commonly the Theologians whom we shall report in disputation 217, who assert that no creature can be changed by an angel except by local motion. Moreover, Alexander in the

Second Part, question 40, member 4, teaches that man is illuminated by an angel because the angel infuses his intellection into the intellect of man by a certain wondrous mode, and by a certain mighty power causes that his intellection be the man's intellection; he compares angels to mirrors, and therefore thinks that species and notions are derived from angels into men as from a mirror by a kind of irradiation or by a mirror carrying them; and he confirms this by the testimony of St. Augustine, book 12 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 30, where in truth St. Augustine speaks only doubtfully in these words: "Whether the visions beheld by the angel (to wit) by some easy and overmastering conjoining or commixing also with our own, making them to be ours, whether knowing, I know not how, they inform our vision in our spirit - this is a thing hard to perceive and harder to say." Yet better St. Bonaventure, in the cited place, says that he does not sufficiently understand by what other mode than by the proposition of truth a man can be illuminated by an angel, as a disciple is taught by a master; but he does not admit that mode of irradiation or of a mirror carrying. And if the angel can be called a mirror, he is not therefore so called because from him the same cognition results into our intellect, but because, since he is an intelligence, he has in himself the similitudes of things; and since by the mode of a teacher he communicates the knowledge of the same things to us and to another angel, he can be called by a not inept reason a mirror

Disputatio CCXVII - Whether only an inferior angel can be illuminated by a superior, or also a superior by an inferior

- That only the inferior is illuminated by the superior is the common opinion. Cap. 1.
- Corollaries of the preceding doctrine. Cap. 2.

Caput I - That only the inferior is illuminated by the superior is the common opinion

Durandus, following a peculiar opinion, dared to affirm that all angels are illuminated proximately by God, as we noted in the preceding disputation, chap. 1; and therefore, in his view, no difficulty remained. But since it has been shown against him that not all angels are illuminated by God, but that some by others, others however by God himself, it remains that we see whether any angel can be illuminated by any other indiscriminately, or only the inferior by the superior. In this matter, among those who teach against Durandus that not all angels are proximately illuminated by God, there is no variety of opinions, but all with unanimous consent affirm that the inferiors only are illuminated by the superiors: thus assert St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists, below in question 106, arts. 3 and 4; Ægidius in II, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, especially in dub. 2; Maior in the same distinction, q. 2; Hervaeus, q. 1, art. ...; Marsilius, in II, q. 7, art. 4, conclusion 2.[1648] Whether, however, this suits them by their own nature, or only by the will of God,

1646. Albertus, "libro de quatuor ...," I, q. 6, a. 11; Bassolis, II, dist. 11, unica quaest., § "Et tunc dicitur," on the fifth mode of operating.

1648. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 106, aa. 3 - 4; Cajetan ad loc.; Ægidius (Giles of Rome), In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 4, dub. 2; Maior, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2; Hervaeus, q. 1, art. ...; Marsilius, In II (Sentences), q. 7, a. 4, concl. 2.

they do not explain. Other Scholastics, while they agree in this general position against Durandus, yet say that, according to a law laid down by God, it does not so happen that inferiors alone are illuminated by superiors; and hence it can happen that inferiors are illuminated immediately by God, and superiors by inferiors: thus teach Scotus in II, dist. 9, q. 2, ad aliam quaestionem; Gabriel, q. 2, art. 4, conclusion 4; Bassolis, q. 1, art. 2. Therefore Richard says, article 2, q. 2 and 3, where he asserts that inferiors are illuminated by superiors, not conversely; and in that question 3, at the end, he says that God indeed can illuminate superiors through inferior angels.[1649] Therefore it must be explained what belongs to angels by their nature, and what can be communicated to them by the will of God alone. First, let us speak as to the simple explication and proposition of the truth of the mysteries of God or of his will itself: this can be communicated to inferior angels just as also to superiors; and this is clearly shown by Scotus's reason: for since this belongs to angels out of sheer grace and the gift of God, it can be given in such a way to the inferiors as also to the superiors by God: by which same reason it can happen that a man reveals mysteries to all the angels. In this sense not a few understand that [which is] to the Ephesians 3: "That it may be made known to the principalities, etc.," in that the angels were taught through the men who were evangelizing in the Church of God. Yet this simple showing and proposition of the truth is not precisely and properly called illumination, as was said in the previous disputation, at the last chapter.

Second, it must be said that there is something peculiar pertaining to the ratio of illumination which superior angels have by their nature, which cannot by nature befit the inferiors, namely thus to propose and explicate mysteries through the various concepts and similitudes of other things, as happens among men, so that they may be better perceived by inferior angels: as St. Thomas and Cajetan quite rightly taught in the place cited.[1650] Pseudo-Dionysius has beautifully described for us this natural virtue and faculty of the superior angels in the last chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy: for he applies to angels, by a certain metaphorical reason, human members; and thus he speaks of the teeth: "Teeth (so to speak) are that which, being applied to nourishment, divides it; for each essence which has been endowed with mind has received from a more divine source a certain power by which it consults for others by nature, divides, and amplifies according to the capacity and leading of the inferior." Therefore to divide a thing into many concepts, which is as it were to distribute nourishment, is the same as to explain it by more examples; which Pseudo-Dionysius affirms to belong to the angels by a power of their nature. In this kind of explication is completed the ratio of illumination, as was noted above. Moreover, this explication of mysteries belongs to superior angels by reason of natural perspicacity and acuteness, with which they abound: for he who is strong in genius knows excellently how to explain the same thing in various ways.

However, this genus of explication of a thing conceived has place only in those matters which are spoken of through another's concepts which the angels understand, such as are supernatural mysteries. For around natural things it cannot have place; for both inferior and superior angels

1649. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 2, ad aliam quaestionem; Gabriel, q. 2, a. 4, concl. 4; Bassolis, q. 1, a. 2; Richard, In II Sent., dist. 10, art. 2, qq. 2 - 3.

1650. St. Thomas; Cajetan, in the place cited.

behold and understand them as they are in themselves; but explication (by similitudes and the various concepts of them) can only be of things which are not known as they are, but in the likeness of other things - unless we say that certain natural things are not known by all angels, as Pseudo-Dionysius seems to indicate in the last chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy when he says that to superior angels a more universal science belongs than to inferiors: thus even around natural things there could be illumination by way of explication, as has been said. For it would be possible that one angel instruct another about natural things which he is ignorant of, and, dividing the concept of that thing into several, propose them; or, if we say that all natural things are known naturally by angels, yet not all their properties and effects: thus even around those [things] illumination could have place.

But Bassolis objects to us in the cited question, § "Contra ipsam opinionem," with this reason: if this explication of truth and illustration could be made by illumination, it would be done in one of two ways. Either thus, that the angel who illuminates and proposes the truth himself conceive it, and divide it into several concepts, changing the natural mode in which he knows things: and this cannot be done, because an angel who understands a thing by its proper concept cannot divide it into many others; for to this it would have been necessary to conceive it not by its proper but by an alien concept, after the manner of other things. Or thus, that the superior angel, who conceives that thing by his proper concept, signify it to the inferior by some signs, in the likeness of other things, and explain it by various similitudes, just as God can explain to us any thing at all by some voice in this manner: and this among angels is feigned, because, as was shown above in disputation 111, chapter 10, angels do not use signs of this kind when they speak to others, unless with an assumed body, or in some other way form certain voices in the air; which is not necessary...

From the foregoing it is not necessary that they speak to others or enlighten others. On this ground, confuted, Bassolis thus explains the testimony of Dionysius brought forward above: that for angels to divide their concepts, on account of which they are said to have teeth, is nothing else than to propose to others what they themselves conceive; and therefore they are said to divide their concepts, not because he grants to them several other concepts, but because he ministers them to individual angels.

Reply. Nevertheless, this reasoning proves nothing; and this author plainly did not understand the testimony of Dionysius. For he says that a superior angel divides and amplifies that single understanding which he has received, according to the capacity of the inferior, as we have above recited; which words, even if we speak simply, cannot signify what Bassolis contends. For to amplify an understanding and the concept of a thing is not to propose it to several angels, but to show it, variously explained, to one and the same inferior angel. But to his argument I reply that the superior angel does not change the mode which he has by which he knows the thing for himself, that is, he does not understand the same thing for himself in a different mode; nevertheless, because he rightly knows the suitable mode by which the interior angel can grasp that thing, namely, by the likeness and analogy of the thing, he can express it to him by the word of his mind, so that one thing may be known in the likeness of another, by saying that by this and that comparison that thing can be known; just as if an angel were to assume a body and put on the

person of a teacher, he could teach us and express by the word of his voice through likenesses and various concepts those things which he in simple knowledge beholds; because he rightly knows the mode by which we are led into the knowledge of something.

Thirdly, finally, that which we said befits superior angels by their nature can be granted to inferiors by the grace of God. For God could reveal to them by a higher mode not only the thing and the mystery, but also the mode by which they would expound and explain it to superiors; and by this pact the opinion of Scotus ought to grant it, nor would St. Thomas and his disciples deny it. For when they say that inferiors are enlightened only by their superiors, they understand this by their own nature, with special grace excluded; but by a special gift of God the contrary can happen, they do not deny. And that this grace was granted to Christ, I would not doubt, so that by it he enlightened the highest angels whom by his own nature he could not enlighten.

Caput II - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

From the preceding doctrine several things can be gathered, by which it will be more and more elucidated. First, that the illumination of angels cannot be concerned with things which are said to be seen in the Word. Thus taught Capreolus in II, distinction 11, question, article 3, at the end, in the arguments against the third conclusion; and Hervaeus in II, distinction 9, question 1, articles, to the third argument. This, moreover, I truly hold, first if we speak of illumination, so far as it is a simple proposition of truth; then, if the discussion is about those things which are properly said to be seen in the Word. I say that properly and strictly that is said to be seen in the Word which either is seen by force of the knowledge and vision of the essence of God, or by a special revelation of God which is appropriated to the divine Word; whether this revelation be joined at the same time with the vision by which the Word is seen, or (which I think more probable) be distinct. The reason truly is manifest: because those things which the blessed see either by force of the vision by which they see God, or by God himself revealing, they do not receive from another angel; therefore, about those things he is not illuminated by another. I grant, nonetheless, that none the less, about things which are seen in the Word, one angel could be illuminated by another, if we say that a thing is seen in the Word in the mode in which Scotus and others said, namely, that those things are said to be seen in the Word whatsoever are known by the blessed by any cognition. For these, in their opinion, are said to be seen in the Word either because they are seen in such wise that at the same time there is known the connection which those things have with God, or because they are seen by the man who at the same time sees God: for some call the vision of things in the intellect of the blessed one seeing God the vision of things in the Word; in which way Cajetan speaks in the commentary on this article, and the authors immediately to be cited.[1651] Thus, then, it can happen that there is an illumination touching those things which are said in this manner to be seen in the Word, as teach Scotus in II, distinction 9, question 2, "To another question," and Bassolis, question 1; therefore Aegidius, question 1, article 5, and Aureol, as Capreolus reports in the place cited,

1651. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 11, q., art. 3, in fine ad argumenta contra tertiam conclusionem; Hervaeus, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art., ad tertium argumentum; Cajetan, ad St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 106, a. 3.

article "c.", at the end, add that they do not deny this illumination to be by a simple proposition of truth. I, however, think that even angels seeing God can be illuminated by superiors not only by a proposition of truth, but also by that special mode of explication, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter; moreover, those things, concerning which inferior angels are illuminated by superiors, strictly and properly are not said to be seen in the Word: because for a thing to be seen in the Word is nothing else than either to be known by the force of the divine vision of the essence, or to be known as revealed by God, as was shown above in Disputation 50, chapter 7.

Secondly, from the same doctrine it is gathered that the opinion of Scotus and Bassolis is false in that which they immediately teach about the illumination of angels concerning those things which are said to be seen in the Word; for they say that an angel is illuminated in three modes. First, inasmuch as an angel hears that thing from another angel speaking; for illumination is a certain locution; wherefore to be illuminated will be to hear. But this cognition, in their opinion, by the force of hearing alone, is only a certain belief, of a higher order indeed than human credulity, because the angel illumined sees that the superior angel, who illuminates him, cannot lie because he is blessed. Secondly, inasmuch as from this hearing the angel illumined is converted to see that thing in the intellect of the angel who illuminates; from which it comes to pass that he desires to behold it in God, and thus there is the third cognition, by which that thing is said to be seen in the Word. This doctrine, therefore, in general does not please me: for it seems to me fabricated that so many modes of cognition be contrived from the force of illumination and locution; and that from hearing alone in the angel illumined there can only be generated a certain assent of credulity; nor do I think it is anything else to know a thing in the mind of the angel illuminating, than to hear it itself. Therefore, although these two thoughts might be diverse, nevertheless in the doctrine of Scotus there would not seem to be posited another cognition of things in the Word; because, as we reported above, he calls the vision in the Word the cogitation of things existing in the intellect of the one seeing God: but such would be hearing. Finally, whatever Scotus may say, that hearing does occur; even if afterwards the inferior angel understand and know that thing in the mind of the superior angel speaking, nevertheless that cognition in the mind of another cannot exceed the limits of credulity. Wherefore, neither from that second cognition could another, higher one, arise which he himself called the vision in the Word.

Thirdly, finally, note that among demons, considered according to their own nature, there is a power such that the superior enlightens the inferior as far as the explanation goes, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter; but those things, about which inferiors are enlightened by superiors, strictly and properly are not said to be seen in the Word: because for a thing to be seen in the Word is nothing else than either to be known by force of the divine vision of the essence, or by God revealing it, as was shown above in Disputation 50, chapter 7.

Hitherto we have said in what way, by illumination, one angel can operate upon the intellect of another angel or of a man. It remained that we should say something about the efficacy of one angel upon the will of another; yet, because all without controversy admit that the will can be moved by God alone, but by an angel, or a demon, only by a change of the imagination, therefore

about this matter there is no need to delay further. In what manner, however, the imagination, or a corporeal creature, can be moved by angels with their native power will become clear in the following disputation.

Disputatio CCXVIII - Whether corporeal and material nature obeys an angel with respect to any form whatsoever

- That matter does not obey an angel with respect to a substantial form is the common opinion of all. Cap. 1.
- The preceding opinion is confirmed by reason. Cap. 2.
- What accidental form an angel can produce in matter. Cap. 3.
- What an angel or a demon can effect in our imagination. Cap. 4.

Caput I - That matter does not obey an angel with respect to a substantial form is the common opinion of all

There are three things to be examined by us in this controversy. The first is about a substantial form, in whatever nature. The second is about an accidental form, in whatever nature. The third is about the imagination of man and of animals. About the first, the common sentence of the Scholastics is the consensus of those asserting that matter does not obey an angel for a substantial form, that is, that it is not possible for a substantial form to be infused or produced by an angel in any matter. Thus expressly teach St. Thomas below, question 110, article 2; St. Bonaventure, in II, distinction 8, part 1, article 2, question 1, and in distinction 7, part 2, article 2, question 2; Albert, distinction 7, article 8, in the body and to the third; Durandus, question 4; Aegidius, question 3, article 1; Richard, article 4, question 1; Scotus, distinction 8, question unique; Thomas of Argentina, question in the middle of that of Thomas of Argentina, article first; Bassolis, question unique; and, finally, the Ferraran, in his Summa against the gentiles, cap. 103; to these add Albertus, who, from what precedes, asserts that things which are generated from putrefaction and of themselves are generated, cannot be made by angels without nature itself helping.[1652]

Caput II - The preceding opinion is confirmed by reason

St. Thomas, Aegidius, St. Bonaventure, Richard, Thomas of Argentina, and the Ferraran bring forward a certain argument taken from Aristotle's Metaphysics; another argument is proposed by others.

1652. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 110, a. 2; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 8, pars 1, art. 2, q. 1; and dist. 7, pars 2, art. 2, q. 2; Albert the Great, In II Sent., dist. 7, art. 8, in corpore et ad tertium; Durandus, In II Sent., q. 4; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), q. 3, a. 1; Richard, In II Sent., art. 4, q. 1; Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 8, unica; Thomas de Argentina, in medio illius quaestionis, art. 1; Bassolis, quaestio unica; Ferrarien. (Ferrariensis), Summa contra gentiles (cap. 103); add also Albertus, as cited.

Ferrariensis, in Book 3 of Contra gentes, chapter 103, adds Albert's point, that those things which come to be from the putrefaction of the earth and are generated spontaneously cannot be made by an angel unless nature itself aids. This was also the express position of St. Augustine, On the Trinity 3, chapter 8, whom St. Thomas cites in the argument But on the contrary, where Augustine compares angels to husbandmen, who do not bestow increase on plants, but only sow, or apply other things which are necessary. Nor does it stand in the way that Augustine there also compares the man in the generation of man to the husbandman: for he does not on that account compare them because in all respects they are similarly disposed, but because, once the seed has been emitted, he does nothing further around the thing generated, just as the husbandman does nothing further around the plants; rather, he is said to act only insofar as the part cut off from him acts. But God in a far more excellent manner produces all things, because in all He acts in act. Add also St. Ambrose in the first book On the Faith against the Arians, chapter 8, where he asserts that when angels assume bodies in which they appear, the substance is not changed. This truth is also defined in the First Council of Braga, canon 12, regarding the forming and conception of man: for it is said, If anyone says that the forming of the human body is a figment of the devil, and that conceptions in the wombs of mothers are fashioned by the works of demons, on account of which he does not believe the resurrection of the flesh, as the Manichee Priscillian said: let him be anathema. But universally, in canon 8, it seems to be defined in these words: If anyone believes that the devil has made some natures in the world; that thunder and lightning, tempests and droughts, the devil himself by his authority brings about, as Priscillian said: let him be anathema. Moreover, in rendering the reason for this conclusion the Scholastics differ among themselves, as we shall see in the following chapter.

But a more effective argument can be made against the reasoning of St. Thomas, Aegidius, and others, in this way: God is a form per se subsisting without matter, and He does not share with these lower things either in matter or in composition, but differs from them by more than a genus; nevertheless He produces all these lower things: therefore that major proposition is not true. Aristotle would perhaps have responded that no substance composed of matter is produced immediately by God: for he thought eternal things to be eternal by their very nature, and that they cannot be generated and corrupted, as he taught in On the Heavens I, chapters 10, 11, and 12, although in chapter 9 he concedes that other things have being and life from the first intelligence. Thus, perhaps Aristotle would judge that no substance not composed of matter and form is produced by God. However, in true philosophy reason itself demonstrates the opposite, namely, that all things are produced in act by God alone, or by Him together with created causes, as we shall show more fully below, I - II, question 79, articles 1 and 2. The foregoing argument therefore remains still in its force and strength.

A true reason on behalf of the proposed position is confirmed by Durandus, which, in my judgment, proves it effectively in this way: Of the forms which are in matter, the only one that is not educed from its potency, and which alone is created by God, is the rational soul; whereas all the other forms, both of animals and of living and of inanimate things, are sufficiently produced by a secondary cause composed of matter, as experience shows: so that if at any time it happens that

something is spontaneously generated from the earth, this is done by the sun and by other material causes, God aiding: therefore an angel would be vainly constituted the cause of the same things: for God and nature do nothing in vain. Bassolis also asserts another reason, which is this: if an angel were to produce some substantial form, he would not produce it by his nature and substance, but by an affection of the will and an act of the intellect: for if he produced it by his substance, then, insofar as he is, he would always and necessarily produce it, which is known to be false; but by the will and the intellect he cannot produce a substance, because the will, which would have to be the formal principle, is a certain accident, and no accident can be the formal principle of producing a substance: therefore an angel cannot move matter to a substantial form. Finally, the last reason is that, if for some cause we were to say that matter obeys an angel to a substantial form, it would be because he is of a nobler and more perfect nature: but by this same reason our soul could be the cause that by the mere nod of its will it would produce a substantial form, which manifestly is false: for our soul is more perfect than any material form. But this argument proves in the same way concerning our soul conjoined as also concerning it separated: therefore, if it ever happens by the works of a demon that men, or animals, or some similar thing, are generated, one must say that this is not done by the proper effective power of the demon of those forms, but by the application of seed, or of some other occult cause, which an angel can bring about by motion alone.

Caput III - What accidental form an Angel can produce in matter

It was the opinion of Avicenna, as St. Thomas reports, in Contra Gentiles 3, chapter 103, that a corporeal nature can be altered by an angel to an accidental form, beyond local motion, for example, to heat and another similar quality, not only by applying an agent cause to the patient, but even by the angel's own proper power operating proximally. He proved this on the grounds that, just as fascination takes place by the power of the imagination alone of the one who fascinates - and by fascination there is a change of qualities - so in like manner the cognition alone and the will of the angel can be the cause of some accidental form in matter.[1653]

However, the common opinion of the Scholastics is that a corporeal nature cannot be moved by an angel to any accidental form, beyond local motion. Thus explicitly teach, among the authors cited above, St. Thomas in the article there, Richard, Thomas of Argentina, and Ferrariensis; St. Bonaventure in the place cited in the solution to the third; Durandus in the question cited, to the first objection. But that bodies can be moved locally by angels is known to all, even from Scripture, in which it is often said that men have been carried by angels or by demons to various places; indeed, Christ Himself suffered to be taken up to the pinnacle of the Temple. But as to the reason why angels cannot move matter to any accidental form beyond local motion, I do not see it proved by the doctors alleged: perhaps they thought the same reason to hold as that on account of which an angel cannot move to a substantial form, and about the accidental form enough and more than enough was said in the preceding chapter. I, however, judge that to be a universal reason: for if for some cause an angel could move to an accidental form, this would be most of all, because he is

1653. St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles III, c. 103.

much more excellent; for we have no other reason or cause on account of which we should assert this; and by the same reason we would have to say that a rational soul can move any body whatever to any accidental form whatever, which yet by experience is known to be false: therefore by that reason alone we ought not to attribute this to angels.

Hence it follows, first, that light cannot be produced by an angel, nor any sensible species, except by the application of a luminous body or of a sensible object: likewise an angel cannot produce form except by the medium of the motion of percussion in the air, which is its proper cause. Moreover, besides these accidents there are other accidental forms which are dispositions of substantial forms, or which follow upon the substantial forms themselves: and these accidents cannot be produced by an angel for the very same reason by which the substantial forms themselves cannot be made.

Then it is gathered that not only can local motion be impressed by an angel, but even impetus, which is a certain quality by which motion is made or impeded. This, however, I am persuaded of not from a motion which is by an angel - for such a motion could be easily understood by us without any impetus first impressed - but from this, that he holds back a heavy body lest it be moved: for he can hold a stone suspended in midair, and can move a heavy body not only when it is resting on the earth, as a sphere upon the ground, but even when it is lifted up: in which kind of motion it is necessary to move the stone in one direction and to sustain it lest it descend, as when an angel led Habakkuk. Now that an impressed impetus without motion is necessary, so that a stone or heavy body be held in the middle of the air, can be shown by this effective reasoning. For although God by the mere nod of His will can hold a stone, by subtracting only His concurrence, which is necessary for motion, nevertheless an angel cannot hold a body in this manner; because the concurrence of an angel is not necessary so that a body be moved, and therefore, even if an angel is unwilling to concur, the motion of the stone will not on that account be impeded. It remains, therefore, that he can only hold it by impressing something else contrary to the motion, whereby the motion is impeded. Wherefore false is the opinion of those who assert that a body can be held by an angel in the middle of the air with no impression made upon the body: for an angel cannot hold it, with his concurrence denied, as we have proved; nor by taking hold of it with his hand, as is manifest: how, then, will he hold suspended in the air that which leans on nothing and hangs from no body?

Lastly, concerning the power and motory faculty of an angel, against Cajetan above on question 54, article 5, it must be observed that his opinion is false when he asserts that this motory faculty is something distinct from the intellect and the will, so that in angels there is an executing faculty in the way in which in us there is one distinct from the intellect and will. Rather we ought to think that this faculty is nothing other than the intellect and will in act: for the angel, by understanding and willing, moves, nor does he need any other thing for the effect. The same I said about the omnipotence of God above, disputation 101, chapter 3, namely that there is nothing else in God, even according to reason, than intellect and will in act. In which view Cajetan agrees with us; although, in order to speak consistently with his own principles, he ought, in the same way as in

angels, to distinguish this power at least according to reason from the intellect and will in God also. As for the authors who taught our opinion about the power of God, I have commonly noted them in that chapter.

Caput IV - What an angel, or a demon, can do in our imagination

Since we experience marvelous effects in man to take place by the disturbance of the imagination caused by a demon, it remains that we say something about the power which the demon has over it. On this matter the opinion of Alexander was, in Second Part, question 40, member 4, who taught that not only can the animal spirits in man be moved by the power of a demon or an angel, by reason of which motion the phantasms are set in motion, but that the phantasms themselves can also be...

...to be produced by an angel and poured into our imagination, just as by the sensible things themselves; but he confirms this opinion by no reason at all.

But the truer opinion is that of others, who teach that our imagination cannot be otherwise altered by an angel than through the disturbance of the animal spirits. Thus affirm St. Thomas below at question 111, article 3, together with Cajetan and the Thomists there; Bonaventure in 2, distinction 8, first part, article 1, question 3; Thomas of Argentina, question 1, article 3; Durandus, question 4; Richard, in 2, distinction 10, article 2, question 1; Aegidius, Quodlibet 6, question 16.[1654] And that phantasms cannot be produced in us by an angel must be proved by the same reason by which we showed above that an angel cannot produce in matter any form except an accidental one. But that by the mere disturbance of the animal spirits the imagination can be aroused in us is expressly taught by Aristotle, On Dreams, book, chapter 3, a little before the middle: for he says that when much blood descends to the sensitive principle, motions of sensibles are at once aroused. He calls the sensitive principle the common sense, which he thought to be, as to the thing, the same faculty as the imagination - a point I myself proved by many philosophical arguments in On the Soul I, in a certain place. The same Aristotle taught a little earlier that in those with fever several apparitions arise from the commotion of the spirits.[1655]

Therefore, since demons either by applying active causes, whose nature they well know, or by local motion are able to stir in us the animal spirits, they can also bring about in us various apparitions of things and thoughts. Wherefore, as Bonaventure rightly warns, demons cannot arouse thoughts in us, even in this way, except of those things of which we have likenesses, yet in such a manner that from those likenesses we compose various things. Hence a blind man who has never seen colors and light can never be aroused so as to think about light and color. But whether the likenesses themselves and the phantasms are, as to their subject, in the spirits that are stirred

1654. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 111, a. 3; Cajetan and the Thomists ad loc.; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 8, pars 1, a. 1, q. 3; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, a. 3; Durandus, In II Sent., q. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, In II Sent., d. 10, a. 2, q. 1; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), Quodlibet 6, q. 16.

1655. Aristotle, On Dreams, c. 3 (middle).

up, or in another part of the organ from which they cannot be moved, is not certain. By experience, however, I have found that by this sole commotion of the spirits and blood various thoughts are aroused in us, as Aristotle said.

Moreover, authors also teach various points about this stirring of phantasms. First, Richard, in the place cited, says that by this kind of motion of the spirits it also happens that at times things a little distant from one another appear very far apart, because the distance of the phantasms themselves, which the commotion of the spirits effects in us, also makes the things which they represent appear distant. Yet Scotus attacks this opinion in 2, distinction 11, the single question, §9. First, because motion of the spirits does not make the phantasms move - a point that seems probable, if the phantasm is not in the spirits themselves; for thus it does not follow that the phantasm is moved when the spirits are moved. But it must necessarily be said that the phantasms are in the brain itself, whose substance is fluid and can easily be moved when the spirits are moved, and even if we once assert that they are not in the spirits themselves, it also follows that the phantasms are moved together with the substance of the brain. Still, Richard's opinion can be more easily refuted because the distance which the species and phantasms have in themselves does not represent the distance of things. From that it does not follow that things appear distant because the phantasms are distant; but since distance is nothing other than some space of an intervening body, it follows that then things will appear at a greater distance when another phantasm is at the same time moved which represents some intervening body.

Second, Aegidius thinks that phantasms, thus moved by an angel, act upon the intellect in a more excellent way than before - a point I do not see by what reason it could be proved.

Third, Thomas of Argentina teaches that our intellect can be moved by an angel when the imagination is moved, so that he does only this - namely, arousing the species as it were drowsing, and ordering them among themselves. But since an angel can only move the substance and the humors of the body according to place, I do not see how he could arouse the species, or order them, in any other way than by motion of the substance of the brain, in which the species reside.

Fourth, Bonaventure asserts in the second distinction 8, second part, article r, question 4, to the last, that it seems to him more probable that a man cannot be induced by an evil angel to think about an evil thing by the motion of his imagination, unless the man is idle. For this reason many - whom we shall cite at I - II, question 74, article 6, and 4 - thought that the first motions of the appetite, arising from mere thought without any bodily perturbation, are venial sins. Omitting, however, this opinion about sins, of which we shall discourse in that place, I do not see why a man's imagination could not be so moved by a demon that, whether he will or not, a thought springs up in the imagination, the previous one being left aside, upon which the man had been engaged; for that new rising motion could be stronger than the former.

Furthermore, Scotus asks in the place cited whether an angel can transfer the phantasms of one man into another, with the spirit and humor also transferred in which the phantasm resides, or not. But disputing on either side, he says that neither can be proved or shown. I for my part judge

that they cannot be moved; for the phantasm is in an organ, but an organ lives according to each of its parts, and therefore a living thing cannot be moved from one into another, although in the same man it can be stirred a little.[1656]

Quaestio LVIII - On the mode of the cognition of angels

After these things it must be considered concerning the angelic mode of cognition. And about this seven things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the intellect of an angel is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act

To the first, the procedure is as follows. It seems that the intellect of an angel is sometimes in potency.

1. For motion is the act of that which exists in potency, as is said in Physics 3. But angelic minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, book 4. Therefore angelic minds are sometimes in potency.
2. Further, since desire is of a thing not yet had but able to be had, whoever desires to understand something is in potency to it. But 1 Pet. 1 says: "Into which things the angels desire to look." Therefore the intellect of an angel is sometimes in potency.
3. Further, in the Book of Causes it is said that an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance. But the substance of an angel has something of potency mixed in. Therefore sometimes it understands in potency.

But on the contrary: Augustine says on the Literal Meaning of Genesis II that from the time they were created the angels enjoy holy and pious contemplation in the very eternity of the Word. But a contemplating intellect is not in potency, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potency.

I answer that, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3 and in Physics 8, the intellect is in potency in a twofold way. In one way, as before learning or discovering, that is, before it has the habit of science. In another way, it is said to be in potency as when it already has the habit of science but does not consider. Therefore, in the first way, the intellect of an angel is never in potency with respect to those things to which his natural cognition can extend. For just as the superior bodies, namely the celestial bodies, do not have a potency to being that is not completed by act, so the celestial intellects, namely the angels, do not have any intelligible potency that is not totally completed by connatural intelligible species. But as to those things which are divinely revealed to them, nothing prevents their intellect from being in potency: for even the heavenly bodies are sometimes in potency so as to be illumined by the sun. In the second way, however, the

1656. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 11, quaestio unica, §9.

intellect of an angel can be in potency to those things which he knows by natural cognition. For he does not always actually consider all the things which he knows by natural cognition. But to the cognition of the Word, and of the things which he sees in the Word, he is never in potency in this way, because he always actually beholds the Word and the things he sees in the Word. For in this vision their beatitude consists. But beatitude does not consist in a habit, but in an act, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1, chapter 8.

Reply to the first: Motion is not taken there according to that whereby it is the act of an imperfect thing, that is, of that existing in potency, but according to that whereby it is the act of a perfect thing, that is, of that existing in act. For thus understanding and sensing are called motions, as is said in On the Soul 3.

Reply to the second: That desire of the angels does not exclude the thing desired, but the satiety of it; or they are said to desire the vision of God as to the new revelations which they receive from God according to the fitting circumstances of affairs.

Reply to the third: In an angelic substance there is not any potency denuded of act. And similarly the intellect of an angel is not in potency in such a way as to be without act.

Notes on the article.

The first conclusion is this: If we speak of the first act for understanding with respect to those things which an angel can know, he is always in act and never in potency; yet with respect to those things which are divinely revealed, the angelic intellect is sometimes in potency.

The second conclusion: If we speak of the second act, which is intellection, the intellect is sometimes in potency even with respect to those things which he can know naturally; for not all things which he knows naturally does he always consider in act; but with respect to the cognition of God and of those things which are seen in the Word, he is always in the act of clear vision.

Concerning this third conclusion it should be noted that when the Holy Doctor says that the things seen in the Word are always actually seen by the blessed angel, he is not to be understood to mean that from the beginning of his beatitude - according to what he had taught at question 57, article 5 - but after they are reported as occurring in time. In the same way should be understood what he says in the following article, that all these things are seen together; of which we have said enough above in Disputation 6.

Disputatio CCXIX - How the intellect of an angel is in potency and in act

Caput I - On the first act of an angel for understanding supernatural things

In article 1 St. Thomas seems to have spoken thus about the first act of an angel for understanding supernatural things, that he did not understand by it supernatural habits; and now he said thus, that with respect to those things which an angel knows only by divine revelation, the intellect of the angel is not always in first act. Moreover, by the first act for knowing these mysteries he does not understand certain infused supernatural species; for the angel in the

wayfarer state knows supernatural mysteries by species of natural things; therefore by the first act he also understands by revelation: for the intellect needs, as a principle, not only species, but also divine revelation in order to know supernatural mysteries. Furthermore, although an infused supernatural habit should also be required, nevertheless St. Thomas made no mention of it. Some Thomists think it probable that the infused habit of believing in angels was not distinct from the intelligible species, or at least that it makes no difference to refer this one way or another, namely, to theologize that there was an infused habit in angels. My own view, however, is that it must be said the same way about angels as must be said about men: that in the way they had the infused habit of faith for believing supernatural mysteries; and that habit is infused for the efficacy of the act of believing and a loftier mode, about which we shall speak in its own place. Nor is the contrary reported by Cajetan or by others. Indeed, Cajetan himself, on I, question 50, article 6, thus interprets the holy Doctor in that article when he says that in angels there are intellectual habits both of natural and of supernatural things, and infused: because in the way they had the habit of faith, in the homeland indeed the habit of light; and the same must be said, moreover, about other infused habits in the will. And the reason is the same: for since in man such a habit is required in order that piety produce facility, or a mode of act...

Act is not taken there as the act of what is imperfect, that is, of what exists in potency, but as the act of what is perfect, that is, of what exists in act; so too "act," as is said in De anima III.

Reply to the second: That desire of the angels does not exclude the thing desired, but its satiety. Or they are said to desire the vision of God as to the revelations made to us, which they receive from God according to the fittingness of the affairs.

Reply to the third: In the substance of the angel there is not any potency stripped of act; and in like manner neither is the angel's intellect so in potency as to be without act.

Notationes circa Articulum.

The first conclusion is: If we speak of the first act (*actus primus*) for understanding with respect to the things which the angel can know, it is always in act, never in potency; yet with respect to those things which are divinely revealed, the intellect of the angel is at times in potency.

The second conclusion: If we speak of the second act (*actus secundus*), which is intellection, at times the intellect is in potency, even with respect to those things which it can naturally know; for it does not always actually consider all the things which it naturally knows.

The third conclusion: With respect to God, and to those things which are seen in the Word, it is always in the act of clear vision. But concerning this third conclusion it must be noted, when the Holy Doctor says that those things which are seen in the Word are always seen by the blessed angel in act, that one must understand this not from the beginning of his beatitude, according to what he himself taught in question 57, article 5, but after they have been revealed in time. In the same way one must understand what he says in the following article, that "all these things are seen at once," about which we have said enough above in disputation 54.

St. Thomas in article I seems to have spoken thus of the first act of the angel for understanding supernaturally, in such a way that he did not understand it of supernatural habits; and so he said, with respect to those things which the angel knows only by divine revelation, that the angel's intellect is not always in first act. Moreover, by the first act for knowing these mysteries he does not understand any infused supernatural species; for the angel on the way knows supernatural mysteries through the species of natural things; therefore by the first act he also understands a revelation: for the intellect needs as a principle not only species but also divine revelation, that it may know the supernatural mysteries. Furthermore, although besides species there is also required an infused supernatural habit, yet St. Thomas made no mention of that. Some Thomists think it probable that the infused habit for believing in angels was not distinct from the intelligible species, or at least that it makes no difference whether one holds this or some other way of theologizing about the infused habit in angels. My opinion, however, is that in angels, just as in men, one must say that there was an infused habit of faith on the way for believing the supernatural mysteries, whether that habit be infused for effecting the substance of the act of believing, or for some manner of the act - of which we shall speak in its proper place. Nor did Cajetan teach the opposite, as is falsely reported by some; rather, Cajetan himself, at I-II, q. 50, a. 6, thus interprets the holy Doctor in that article when he says that in angels there are habits, so that it be understood both of natural and of supernatural and infused [habits]: for on the way they had the habit of faith, but in the homeland the habit of light; and thus the same must be said concerning the other infused habits in the will. And the reason is the same: for in man such a habit is required that it may produce the substance or the mode of the act through a natural, intrinsic form inhering in him, by whose force he may operate connaturally, and not only by the aid of God assisting and cooperating; by the same reason in angels such a habit must be posited: for in the same way their potency is related to the supernatural act or to its mode.[1657]

Caput II - On the natural habits by which the intellect of the angel is in first act

Concerning the natural habits also by which the intellect of the angel is constituted in first act, Doctors do not think in the same way.

- Some Thomists teach, first, that there are in the angel's intellect some acquired habits distinct from intelligible species; they say these are habits of opinion and of acquired faith about those objects which he cannot naturally know - whether they be supernatural, such as the mysteries of grace, or natural, such as future contingents; for not all beings of the natural order, under every condition of theirs, can be naturally known by the angel without revelation. Then they assert that, with respect to other natural objects which can be clearly known naturally by the angel, there are not in angels habits distinct from intelligible species. Wherefore neither the habit of philosophy nor of mathematics is to be assigned to angels. Now the reason for this opinion is that, just as for those natural objects which we referred to in the second place the angel is carried with the highest promptness of intellect, and

1657. Cajetan, I-II, q. 50, a. 6.

therefore does not need a habit by which he may be determined and made apt; so too, for those objects which we set in the first place, the angel's intellect is not wholly determined, and consequently needs some habit by which it may be determined and made apt. Those who follow this opinion think it to be also St. Thomas's in I-II, q. 50, a. 6; for since a habit ought to be a quality distinct from species, it follows that St. Thomas posited, besides intelligible species, other habits of the intellect in angels.

- My true opinion, however, is that no natural habit, besides supernatural and infused ones, ought by its nature to be assigned to the angel's intellect as distinct from intelligible species. This opinion was handed on by Cajetan in the same article 6, nay even by St. Thomas himself, as Cajetan himself interprets him there: for when he had said that the angel, in the genus of intelligibles, is not pure potency nor pure act, but is partly in act and partly in potency, he then subjoins that the intellect, insofar as it is in potency, is habitually perfected by certain intelligible species, that it may operate, namely about intelligible objects other than itself; for to understand itself it is indeed partly in act through its essence, because it is in first act for understanding itself. Therefore St. Thomas teaches that the habit by which the angel's intellect is perfected and rendered in first act with respect to those things which it can naturally know (for of these he is speaking) is the intelligible species themselves; which, although they do not have all that another habit has - because they are not intensified and remitted - are nevertheless like habits in this, that together with potency they are principles of operating, and therefore are not undeservedly called habits.[1658]

The reason for our opinion is that a habit must be assigned to a potency in one of two ways: either for simply operating, that is, for producing the very substance of the act, or for facility, so that the intellect may operate more easily. Now at present I am not disputing whether supernatural habits are assigned to the substance of the act or to facility or to some other mode which some contrive. Concerning natural habits, then, it is true that they must be posited only in one of those two ways. But in neither way do natural habits seem necessary in the angel: therefore to posit them is vain.

- First, they are not necessary for the substance of the act; for for the cognition of the things which the angel can naturally know, he has within himself a sufficient and complete principle, namely the very faculty of intellect and the species, if indeed in us these two suffice for producing any acts whatsoever of natural understanding: for we understand before we acquire these [acquired] habits. Therefore, for the angel to believe by acquired faith and not infused, or to opine by some opinion and conjecture about those things which he cannot know with evidence, the sufficient principle for him is the very faculty of knowing and the species for producing the substance of the act: whenever there is a complete principle of some effect, another on the part of the cause is added in vain, and it can be of no efficacy.

1658. Cajetan, in the same place, ad loc., interpreting St. Thomas's teaching about species as "habits" constituting first act.

Therefore we add in vain to the angel's intellect, over and above the intelligible species, an acquired habit for believing by acquired faith, or an opinion, by which he might concur to the substance of the act.

- Nor, in the second way, can a habit be necessary or of any efficacy in the angel, namely for the facility of believing by natural faith, or of opining about those things which by the nature of the thing he cannot know: for the intellect of the angel is of itself so perspicacious, and free from every impediment, that with the highest facility it is carried to that which appears to it credible or probable, and it represents it to itself with the highest readiness; therefore it has no need of any acquired habit, by which with greater facility it might acquire this cognition. By the same reasoning the demons, who "believe and tremble" (Jas 2), do not need any acquired habit in order to believe; for they are so convinced by the very event of the matter that they cannot not believe; but for the affect which follows of necessity in this way no other facility and promptitude can be required.

Finally, observe with St. Thomas in the same article that in the angel there is no natural acquired habit which disposes toward being, such as in man is the disposition of health and soundness. The reason, moreover, is manifest: for since the angel is a simple essence in reality, and this kind of habit is only necessary for preserving the union of parts of an essence and substance, or of soul and body, it seems by no reason necessary in angels. And thus far concerning the first conclusion of the article.

Caput III - On the second act of the angelic intellect, which is to understand

Concerning the second conclusion, which is about the act of understanding - called the second act of the intellect - Scholastics also have various opinions. St. Thomas merely said that the angel, with respect to those things which he can naturally understand, is not always in second act, that is, he does not always actually consider the same things, but is at times only in potency to understand. From which opinion it does not follow that with respect to some of those things which he naturally knows he is always in the act of consideration.

There are nevertheless some Thomists and Scholastic theologians who teach that the angel always actually understands himself: thus teach Cajetan in the following article; concerning the fifth conclusion, and "For elucidation"; Ferrariensis on Contra gentiles, chapter 97; Hervaeus in II, dist. 3, q. 4, ad primum in oppositum; Aegidius on the same, dist. 2, pars, q. 2, a. 1, dub. 1, ad secundum argumentum; Capreolus, q. 2, a. 3, ad sextum; Gregory, against the ninth conclusion in the second solution; Durandus, q. 8, n. 9; indeed St. Thomas himself in that book II Contra gentiles, chapter 97, and in De veritate, q. 8, a. 6, ad 7, and a. 14, ad 6.[1659] And the first point can be confirmed because the knowledge of self in the angel hinders nothing of the knowledge of other

1659. Cajetan, in the following article; Ferrariensis, on Contra gentiles, c. 97; Hervaeus, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 4, ad 1 in oppositum; Aegidius, ead. dist. 2, pars, q. 2, a. 1, dub. 1, ad 2; Capreolus, q. 2, a. 3, ad 6; Gregory, against the ninth conclusion, in the second solution; Durandus, q. 8, n. 9; St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles II, c. 97; De veritate q. 8, a. 6, ad 7; a. 14, ad 6.

things, since it is the foundation of all of them; why therefore shall we say that the angel sometimes ceases from it? Then, if the angel could cease from this knowledge of self, in the same way he could be idle from all other [knowledges], not only one by one but also all together; which seems absurd, since a living substance ought not to be without some operation of life. Lastly, the Holy Doctor proves this in that article 14, ad 6, because the angel knows himself through his own essence and is always informed by it; therefore through it he always understands. I omit other reasons which St. Thomas brings forward in the second book of Contra gentiles, chapter 97, because they are of less moment.

I indeed have not read any one of the writers who teaches the opposite; nor is there any reason which proves that an angel can cease from the knowledge of himself. Moreover, neither do the reasons brought forward for the opposite efficaciously demonstrate [it], as will be clear from their solution. To the first one it could be answered that the angel does not for that reason cease from the knowledge of himself because he is hindered by the knowledge of some other thing, but because he may freely be able to cease from it, since there is nothing which necessarily moves him to it; for the intellect not only ceases from the knowledge of one thing because it is hindered by the knowledge of another, but because it wills to cease altogether from it. Add that what is assumed is not sufficiently proved, namely that the knowledge of self in the angel is the foundation of other intellections.

To the second reason one could say that nothing hinders a purely understanding nature, such as a spirit, from ceasing from every operation of life, since every operation of this kind is from the will ...

...are voluntary, in a different way than in other living beings. For these latter have other necessary operations, from which they are not able to cease: thus an animal can naturally cease from every operation of sense; what wonder, then, if an angel can at will suspend himself from all knowledge of the intellect? How, moreover, an angel is brought back

to the first natural cognition, we have already said above in Disputation 211, cap. 6, and in Disputation 221, cap. 3; at the end we shall speak again. On this matter Gregory does not dare to define anything, in II, dist. 11, in the final words of the question, where he touched upon this difficulty. Then also one could reply to the second reason, that an angel cannot cease from all thought at once: yet he can cease from any particular one, as it happens in our imagination, from which we cannot by any means pluck out every thought, yet we can well remove any one whatsoever. The third reason too proves little: for that an angel is always informed by his essence is not sufficient for him always to know it, since even from the beginning of creation he has intelligible species of things, according to the view of St. Thomas, and yet he does not always know other things; but the essence of the angel, even in his opinion, is only in the place of an impressed species, which is a principle of cognition. The reason, however, would prove something, if the essence of the angel himself were to him not a species for eliciting knowledge, but knowledge itself, which St. Thomas and others expressly denied, as we saw in Disputation 198.

Moreover, some Theologians also teach not only that an angel cannot cease from the knowledge of himself, but not even from the natural knowledge of God. In this opinion Cajetan seems to be, and Capreolus in the places cited, and some more recent professors of Theology follow them; yet they judge it not to be as certain as the preceding. They prove, first, that if an angel knows himself always, it follows that he also knows whatever is represented in him; but God is represented in the essence of the angel: therefore He is always understood by the angel. Secondly, the angel knows himself with a comprehension of himself; therefore, if he always knows himself, he will also know the relation that he has to God, and consequently he will also always actually know God Himself. Thirdly, the very essence of the angel is, as it were, a species and a principle of cognition, not only of itself but also of God; therefore, by the same reason by which it brings it about that the angel always considers himself, it will also bring it about that he likewise always remains in the consideration of God.

I for my part see in this opinion no firm foundation, since it leans upon the preceding view, which is quite ambiguous; yet if once we admit that the angel is always engaged in the consideration of himself, it is rightly inferred that God also is always known by him, not indeed on account of the first and third reason, but on account of the second: because, since the essence of the angel is always actually known by the angel himself with a knowledge of comprehension, he cannot but actually consider himself as a creature and handiwork of God, and hence actually know God Himself. For an intellect that conceives a thing as it is cannot in it conceive one thing without the other, especially if they are not really distinct, as was said in Disputation 116, cap. 2. But the relation of the angel, by which he is referred to God, is not really distinct from the angel, neither by the nature of the thing; and even from those things that are really distinct one from another, the angel cannot consider one without the other, but the principle of knowing, naturally and not freely, inclines the intellect to understand both the one and the other. Now such is the essence of the angel, which - if we follow the higher opinion - so naturally inclines the angel to know himself that he cannot be free from the consideration of himself. Wherefore in neither this, nor in the preceding difficulty, can anything certain be had, although the common opinion is in itself plausible and quite probable.

Thirdly, some add that an angel is always engaged in the consideration of this universe; yet I see no foundation for this, any more than for the opinion of Durandus, who affirms that all natural beings are always actually known by an angel, as I shall say in the following disputation.

Articulus II - Whether an angel can understand many things at once

To the second question one proceeds thus.

It seems that an angel cannot understand many things at once. For the Philosopher says in III, q. 3, art. 2 of the Topics, that it happens that one can know many things, but understand only one.

1. Further, nothing is understood except according as the intellect is informed by an intelligible species, as a body is formed by a figure. But one body cannot be formed by diverse figures. Therefore one intellect cannot at once understand diverse intelligibles.

2. Further, to understand is a certain motion; but no motion is terminated to diverse termini. Therefore it does not happen to understand many things at once.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says, IV super Genesis ad litteram: The spiritual power of the angelic mind most easily comprehends at once all the things it will.

I answer that, just as unity of motion requires unity of terminus, so unity of operation requires unity of object. Now some things can be taken as many and as one: as the parts of a continuum. For if each one is taken according to itself, they are many; whence neither are they apprehended by one operation, nor if they are apprehended at once by sense and intellect. In another way they are taken according as they are one in the whole; and thus they are known at once by one operation both by sense and by intellect, when the whole continuum is considered, as is said in III De anima. And thus too our intellect at once understands the subject and predicate insofar as they are parts of one proposition, and two things compared according as they agree in one comparison. From which it is clear that many, according as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but according as they are united in one intelligible, thus they are understood at once. Now each thing is actually intelligible according as its likeness is in the intellect. Therefore whatever can be known through one intelligible species are known as one intelligible, and therefore they are known at once. But those that are known through diverse intelligible species, as diverse intelligibles are grasped, are not known at once. Therefore, by that cognition whereby they know things through the Word, angels know all things together by one intelligible species, which is the divine essence; and thus, as regards such cognition, they know all things at once: and in the fatherland our thoughts will not be volatile, going from one thing to another and returning, but we shall see our whole knowledge at once in one view, as Augustine says in XV De Trinitate, cap. 16. But by that cognition whereby they know things through innate species, they can at once understand those things that are known by one species, but not those that are known by diverse species.

Reply to the first: To understand many things as one is in a certain way to understand one thing.

Reply to the second: The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has with it; and therefore in this way by one intelligible species it can at once contemplate many intelligibles, just as by one figure a body can at once be similar to many bodies.

Reply to the third: As to the first.

Conclusion: Whatever things are known under the mode of one, even if they are many in themselves, can be known at once by an angel; but many things as many cannot be known at once. What, however, it is for many to be known under the mode of one, or under the mode of many at once, will be explained in the following disputation.

Disputatio CCXX

Caput I - That many things cannot be known at once by an angel except under the mode of one, various Theologians defend.

Not a few Theologians, with St. Thomas, affirm that many things cannot be known at once by an angel except under the mode of one. So the Angelic Doctor seems to hold in this article, and in Contra gentiles I, c. 55, and II, c. 101, and in De veritate q. 8, a. 14, in the body and to the sixth; whom Cajetan and Ferrariensis follow in the places cited, Aegidius in the treatise De cognitione Angelorum, q. 7, and in II Sent., dist. 3, part 2, q. 2, a. 3; Durandus, II Sent., dist. 8, q. 8, n. 70; and Capreolus on the same distinction, q. 2, a. 1, after the new conclusion and against the same conclusion. The foundations of this view are set forth thus in general; we shall gradually adduce them in the fourth way of explaining it, for although they follow it, they do not defend it in the same way: wherefore we shall also distinctly recount the several ways by which they explain it.

The first way is of Aegidius in the place cited, who teaches that indeed many things can be understood under the mode of many - that is, as altogether diverse among themselves and without order - if, however, they are understood in a different way; for if they are understood in the same way, they cannot (says Aegidius) be understood as many, unless under the mode of one. Now for many things to be understood in a different way and in the same way happens in three manners (says he). First, when one is seen through essence, and another through a species added to the essence: in this way the Angel understands himself through his essence, and other things through species added to the essence. Secondly, when one is known by grace, another by nature: thus God is seen by the Blessed by grace, and other things by nature. Thirdly, when one is known principally, but another less perfectly or consequently: in this manner the subject and predicate are known, cause and effect, the subject and its accidents; for of these parts, in whatever order, that which is known principally is first, the other later less perfectly and consequently. On the contrary, for certain many things to be known in the same way happens also in three opposite manners, as can be shown by induction.

This prefatory notation having been laid down, says Aegidius, many things can indeed be understood by the angel under the mode of many, yet such that they are not known in the same way, but in a different way. He further adds that it happens in three ways that certain things are known under the mode of one and under the mode of many. First, on account of the reason and principle of knowing: in this way the angel knows his essence and other things under the mode of many; because he knows his essence through itself, but other things through species. Secondly, on account of the act of understanding: and then many are known under the mode of many when each of them is known in itself and equally perfectly known; and in this way the subject and the accidents are not known as many, because they are not equally and principally understood. Thirdly, on the part of the object, when many are known under the mode of many, when of each of

them that which is the whole principal thing is known, and neither is one less principal with respect to the other. Conversely, in three ways it happens that certain things are understood under the mode of one.

From these it is clear, says Aegidius, in what way the angel understands many under the mode of many and under the mode of one: for he knows himself and other things under the mode of many in the first and third way, not, however, in the second; but the subject and the accidents, and the rest which are known by reference to something one, the angel does not know as many, nor in the same way, but in a different way and under the mode of one according to that second way. This discourse, so prolix and obscure, is supported by Aegidius with no reason; nor do I see in what way it can be upheld. Thus far, however, the point is that many things cannot be known under the mode of many in the same way by an angel - indeed they can in a different way - which seems not to agree altogether with the opinion of others.

The second way of explaining the aforesaid view is that of Durandus in the place cited, who teaches that many things cannot be known by an angel with one single act of the intellect under the mode of many; yet they can, if they are understood in an order, under the mode of one. Indeed, on this account, in a certain way the angel at once knows all the things that can naturally be understood by him, because they are his own - his very essence - and all natural beings present ...

The second way of explaining the aforesaid opinion is that of Durandus in the place cited, who teaches that many things cannot be known by an angel with a single act of the intellect (actus intellectus) under the mode of many; yet they can, if they are understood in an order among themselves: for thus they are known under the mode of one. Indeed, on this account he thinks that at once there are known by the angel all the things that can naturally be understood by him, such as the very essence (essentia) of the angel himself, and all present natural beings (not future contingents), at once, I say, by the same act of the intellect, and with a certain order of the inferior or of the superior to the angel's own essence. And since in question 1 of the Prologue, number 24, he holds that it is not possible for there to be naturally in the intellect distinct acts simultaneously, it follows, in his opinion, that it is thus possible for many things to be understood by the angel under the mode of one, that is, to be known with a certain order, so that they cannot, even with an order, be known by several acts. By what reason he judges that the angel is always in act considering all these things, we shall say in the following disputation. But Durandus proves this his opinion, or the foregoing mode of explaining it, by this argument: because of one action there can be only one single terminus: therefore also of one intellection there is one object: wherefore, if the angel understands many things, he must understand them under the mode of one; because it is necessary that by one and the same act he should know all things, of which act there ought to be one object: but many things without order cannot have the ratio of one object. This reason shows that many things without order cannot be understood by the same act; yet it does not prove that several acts cannot be simultaneously in the same intellect.

The third mode seems to be that of St. Thomas in this article, and above in question 12, article 10, and below in question 85, article 4, where he hands on the same doctrine about the human intellect; and in the first book against the Gentiles, chapter 55; and in question 8 of De veritate,

article 14, in the body, where he teaches that those things are understood under the mode of one which are by one intelligible species (species intelligibilis); but under the mode of many, those which are known by many species. Wherefore his opinion seems to be that many things cannot be considered simultaneously by the angel through many species, but only through one and the same. And in his doctrine I also judge it to be the same thing that many things be known by one species or by many: namely, that they be known by one or by many formal concepts (conceptus formales). And this happens universally, that whenever the principle of intellection is one simple species, the intellection itself, that is, the formal concept, which we call the expressed species, is also a simple quality (qualitas). Wherefore, since in the proposition and division which the intellect forms in itself about things, many are known, namely, the subject and the predicate - and these are known at once - it seems one must say, in St. Thomas's opinion thus explained, that those many things in a proposition are known by one species and a simple quality. Which the Holy Doctor himself said seems to him in Against the Gentiles I, chapter 55, at the end of the first argument, where he says that the subject and predicate are known at once, because by one species of the whole proposition all its parts are apprehended.[1660] He seems to have taught the same in this First Part, question 25, article 4, to the fourth, if it be compared with solution 3; for there he had said that the extremes of a proposition are known as parts of a whole.[1661] Ferrarensis followed this opinion in the same Against the Gentiles I, chapter 55. For the elucidation of these points, he says, when our intellect understands that man is not a horse in the proposition in which it understands that man differs from a horse, out of the species of man and of horse there is produced one species which represents the difference of man and horse.[1662]

This way of thinking is proved first by the reason which St. Thomas uses above in question 12, article 10: just as it is impossible that the same body be figured by diverse figures, so it is impossible that our intellect be informed by various intelligible forms: therefore, when it understands many things, it cannot express many species in the intellect of the angel, but it is necessary that by one only species it understand them at once. To this reason there seems to allude another reason which the same Holy Doctor uses in the first book against the Gentiles, that same chapter 55, and in this First Part, question 85, article 4, which is as follows. It is impossible that the same subject be at once informed by many forms of the same genus, as by diverse colors; although it can at once have diverse forms of diverse genera: therefore it is impossible that the intellect be at once informed by diverse cogitations and species. Then it can be proved by the reason of this article, which is of this sort: just as to the unity of motion unity of term is required, so to the unity of cognition unity of object is necessary: therefore many things cannot be understood at once, unless at least in the ratio of intelligible they be in some way one. This reason, that it may have some weight, presupposes that which the prior reason proved, namely, that the same intellect cannot be at once informed by many intellections and species.[1663]

1660. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 55.

1661. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 4, ad 4; compared with ad 3.

1662. Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), on Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 55.

1663. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 10; De veritate q. 8, a. 14, corpus; Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 55.

The fourth mode of defending the aforesaid opinion is that of Hervaeus in the tractate On the Motion of the Angel, question 1, to the third difficulty, of Cajetan in this article and below in question 85, article 4, and of Ferrariensis in the first book against the Gentiles, that chapter 35. They teach first that many things can indeed be understood at once under the mode of one; then they assert that many things which are understood under the mode of one can be understood by many species distinct in the genus of quality, yet representing different objects with an order among themselves - and that this is to know many things under the mode of one. Wherefore, in their opinion, of one affirmative or negative proposition there will not be one expressed species in the genus of quality, as one species is wont to be assigned to some whole representing its various parts, but there will be many species in the genus of quality representing many things, yet mutually ordered.[1664]

The former part of this opinion will be confirmed below by a common foundation. But the latter part, which asserts that the extremes of a proposition are understood by many species, even if they are understood under the mode of one, is proved first, because if the extremes of a proposition are always understood by one simple species in the genus of quality - since they are always understood, by whomever they are understood, under the mode of one - it would follow that there is never composition and division, even in our intellect. For this is the reason why we say that the angel does not compose and divide in his intellect, even if he understands many things at once, and one of them affirms of the other that it is this, or that it is not that, because he understands by one simple quality and formal concept; otherwise, if from the side of the things many were understood and the intellect knew them by many concepts, from the mere number of the things known composition and division cannot be inferred: for God too understands many things, yet he does not compose or divide in his intellect. Therefore, if composition and division in the intellect must be taken from the side of the concepts and species which we call formal concepts, and whenever many things are at once understood by the intellect by one simple quality and concept, there will never be composition or division in any intellect, which I by no means concede.

Second, from the opposite position it would also follow that there is never a whole syllogism and discourse at once in the intellect, because many things are understood in it: wherefore, if they must be known by one expressed species, so that they be said to be understood under the mode of one, and cannot be known otherwise than under the mode of one, it results that no syllogism can ever be made at once by anyone in an intellect: for by this reason we shall say below that a man, when he understands many things, knows them under the mode of one and by one quality; it would follow also that a man would never discourse.

Third, the same opinion is confirmed, because from the opposite there would also follow that the human intellect alone can compose and divide and form propositions from extremes distinct according to reality, as from man and whiteness, when one says, Man is white, but not from those things which differ only by reason: wherefore no intellect could say, Man is an animal; for these extremes differ only by reason. But that this rightly follows from the opposite opinion is proved,

1664. Hervaeus Natalis, De motu angelico, q. 1, ad 3; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 85, a. 4, and on this article; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, on Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 35.

because in order that a proposition be made from those extremes which differ only by reason, it is necessary that they be distinguished by our reason; but those things which are the same according to reality cannot be thus distinguished, unless they be conceived as diverse - and this cannot be done unless they be known by diverse concepts, as we showed above in disputation 118, chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, if every proposition in the intellect were made by one simple quality and concept, no proposition could consist of extremes distinct only by reason.

But the former part of this opinion, in which all the other opinions mentioned agree, is wont to be confirmed by the testimony of Aristotle, Topics, chapter 4, place 32, where, in order to prove that to know and to think are not the same, he assigns the difference in these words: It happens to know many things; to think, however, not: for to know denotes a habit; wherefore even those sleeping are said to know; but to think denotes actually to contemplate: it happens, therefore (says Aristotle), to know many things by habit, as is manifest, but to contemplate many things actually does not happen.[1665] Then Cajetan, on this article, adduces Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 4, text 50, asserting these words: He who does not understand one, understands nothing; from which he infers that whoever understands something either understands only one thing to be true, or many under the mode of one.[1666]

Caput II - The more probable opinion, which even the Thomists embrace, consists in two points

One is that many things can be known under the mode of one, not only through one formal concept (conceptus formalis), which is one simple quality (qualitas), but also through many expressed concepts and species mutually, however, ordered, and representing the objects with a certain order among themselves. The other is that indeed many things can be known through many expressed species and through many formal concepts without any order among themselves, yet not so perfectly as if one object of them were understood through itself.

The first part of this opinion, in which together with Ferrariensis and with Cajetan we concur, has not obscurely been proved by us in the preceding chapter, where we showed that the extremes of a proposition and the propositions of a syllogism cannot be one simple quality and formal concept, but must be many, yet representing the objects themselves with an order. Now, however, the same part can be confirmed, first, because although according to the opinion of some a blessed soul with the same simple vision sees the divine essence and certain created things, nevertheless no one denies that some things also at the same time are seen by the blessed with a vision distinct from the divine essence. But if someone should respond that this indeed happens by grace, while it is only denied that it can happen by nature, still from this line of reasoning it is gathered that it is not so repugnant for many things to be known at once by diverse formal concepts, as it is repugnant for the same body to be figured at once by two figures: for this latter cannot be brought about even by grace and by the absolute power of God.

1665. Aristotle, Topics, book 1 (or 2), ch. 4, locus 32 (scholastic numbering).
1666. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, ch. 4, text 50 (scholastic division); Cajetan, on this article.

Then the first part of this opinion is proved from the doctrine of St. Thomas: for the angel knows himself through his essence, as we showed above in disputation 204, chapter 2, as through a principle eliciting cognition; and from this cognition he never ceases, as the same Saint holds, and as we noted above. But besides his essence the angel knows other things, and not through the same formal concept by which he understands his essence: therefore at the same time he understands many things through many expressed species and concepts. Moreover, there is no one who is ignorant that other things are not known by the angel at the same time with his essence through the same species; especially if the common opinion is true which asserts that the angel understands things other than himself through infused species, but himself through his own essence: for since the principle eliciting the cognition is different, the species also and the expressed formal concept will be different.[1667] St. Thomas answers, in De veritate, question 8, article 14, to the sixth objection, that the angel indeed understands himself and other things under the mode of one, because he understands the rest by reason of his essence as by reason of the first-object of an imperfect cognition; for if we speak of perfect cognition, he says that other things are known by the angels through the proper species of those things infused into them.[1667] This solution, however, does not seem to satisfy. For we readily grant that many things can be known by an angel under the mode of one, in that they are known with some order among themselves. We contend, however, that those many things can indeed be known through many expressed species and formal concepts: which in the angel seems to be conceded at least when the angel would know other things through their proper species and not by reason of his essence. But that other things can be known perfectly by the angel at the same time even when he knows himself is beyond doubt. Add also that that twofold cognition of other things in the angel - one through the angel's essence, the other through the proper species of things - does not seem necessary: indeed, if we were to concede that imperfect cognition of other things in the angel by reason of his essence, we would be forced to attribute to the angel some discourse about natural things. For his essence could not be for him the ratio of knowing other things by the knowledge they call intuitive; and consequently the angel could not but in some way discourse: for, as we shall say below in disputation 222, discourse arises solely from this, that things are not known by an intuitive, proper, and perfect concept. Wherefore I would not hesitate, with Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and other Thomists, to interpret the holy Doctor so benevolently, that he understands the cognition of many things under the mode of one to be effected not only through one simple quality of a formal and expressed concept, but also through many [qualities] representing objects with a certain order among themselves; and that composition or division be effected in us not through one simple quality, as we clearly showed above, but through many qualities of concepts, which, by reason of the order under which they represent the objects, are called one concept, as it were integral, and the extremes of the proposition are represented as it were by parts of this concept in an integral way.[1668][1669]

1667. St. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 8, a. 14, ad 6; see also Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 10; I, q. 85, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 55.

1667. St. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 8, a. 14, ad 6; see also Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 10; I, q. 85, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 55.

1668. Hervaeus Natalis, De motu angelico, q. 1, ad 3; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 85, a. 4, and on this article; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), on Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 35.

The latter part of our opinion is that indeed many things can at the same time be known by an angel, nay even by us, under the mode of many - that is, through many qualities and concepts - efficaciously and without order of the representation of the objects among themselves; yet not so perfectly as if the individual things were known through themselves, or as if those many things were [known] under the mode of one with a certain order; which opinion I am first persuaded of, because I find no reasoning that efficaciously proves this to be repugnant to the faculty and power of the angelic or human intellect, as we shall see in the following chapter. Besides, the aforesaid opinion is proved because sense, both external and internal, knows many things at the same time under the mode of many, not only because [it knows] through many species, but also because [it knows] without order of composition or division among themselves. And in this matter by experience in seeing it is plain that many things are seen by us under the mode of many: for we see many men, many animals, and many other things placed in the view; but no one would say that such various visible things are seen through one simple quality. Moreover, no one is ignorant that those things are seen without composition and division; for who ever said that sight composes or divides? Finally, those things are sometimes seen without even the order of local distance, which, in my judgment, would matter little for us to say that those many things are seen under the mode of one, which also we have learned by experience: because often we do not notice the distance of the objects among themselves, but simply apprehend the things themselves. Or if the example of sight does not please, let us bring forward the sense of hearing, which at the same time hears many sounds represented without any order among themselves; and likewise [consider] him who perceives many qualities in the same thing at once, namely, cold, hardness, or softness. In the internal sense also the same is manifest; for we perceive at the same time by the internal sense the objects of sight, of hearing, of taste, and of the other external senses, inasmuch as the common sense is said, in presence, to perceive only the objects. By the same internal sense we also think and remember many objects of the diverse senses; and yet sense does not compose nor divide, and hence neither does it sense those many things with a necessary order. Why, then, shall we not attribute this to the intellect, which is a much more perfect faculty?

Moreover, as I said, whenever a faculty, whether of the angelic intellect or of ours, whether of the external sense or of the internal, knows many things at once, it does not operate about the individual items, nor does it know them so perfectly as it would understand or sense the individual items through themselves. Indeed, the intellect has such a mode of operating by the collation of the things it knows, that it hardly understands many things without order, and hence almost always knows many things under the mode of one: which anyone can easily experience in himself. This, however, comes from that natural mode whereby our intellect, in this present state, understands by collation and relation. Nevertheless, I do not see anything that would hinder it from being able at times to understand certain things imperfectly at the same time under the mode of many; but this is done much better by an angel, who understands things by intuitive knowledge (as they say), as they are in themselves: although he understands individual things much less perfectly in this way than when he knows under the mode of one. This latter part of our opinion was followed by

1669. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, ch. 4, text 50 (scholastic division); Cajetan, on this article.

Dominic Soto in book I of the Posterior Analytics, question 1, and in this sense he interprets the mind and opinion of St. Thomas, about which there is no need any further to contend.[1670] Our opinion is also favored by St. Gregory, whom in the next disputation we shall cite, inasmuch as he affirms that an angel can understand many things at the same time through many species and concepts.

Some try to prove our opinion from St. Augustine, On Genesis Literally, book 4, chapter 32, at the beginning, where he writes thus about the angel: "But according to the spiritual power of the angelic mind he embraces all the things he wills at once with most easy knowledge." These words, however, do indeed prove that many things are known by an angel, but not [that they are known] under the mode of one, or [that they are known] under the mode of many. Yet someone could gather from the following words of the same Augustine that he was of the opinion that the angel knew those many things under the mode of one - that is, with a certain order among themselves; for he says: "Nor, however, is it without order, by which the connection of preceding and consequent causes appears; for cognition cannot be effected unless the things to be known precede." But not even from these words can that opinion be gathered. For Augustine is not there treating of the order of objects among themselves, as if he were saying that they cannot be known at the same time unless with a certain order among themselves; but he teaches that things are known by an angel with the order of causes, so that first they are seen by the morning vision in the Word, then by the evening cognition in their proper genus and nature. For since, according to Augustine's judgment, the things to be known precede the cognition, they ought to be known in the order in which they themselves are: wherefore Augustine does not treat of the order of the objects among themselves which are known by an angel at the same time, but of the order of each thing according as it is in the Word and in itself, and of the order of morning and evening cognition: about which matters enough and more than enough has been said by us above in disputation 51.[1671]

Respondetur argumentis, quae videntur oppositum probare.

To the first, which was brought forward in the first chapter in the third way of explaining the opinion there mentioned, we say that there is a difference in nature between figure in quantity and intelligible species: wherefore, although the same body cannot be figured at the same time by many figures, nevertheless the same intellect can be informed at the same time by many species. For figure is, as it were, the extremity and terminus of quantity; but it is manifest that no body can have many termini of its quantity, but must necessarily be terminated by one; hence it cannot be figured at the same time by many figures. An intelligible species, however, whether impressed or expressed, is not a figure of quantity, but it is a certain quality which is called a figure because it is an image of the object; wherefore, since it is not repugnant for the same subject to be informed at the same time by diverse qualities, it will not be repugnant for it to have at the same time many species. And indeed no one to this day has denied that in the same intellect and in the same sense there are many intelligible or sensible impressed species, which constitute the faculty in first act, without any order among themselves: why then do we disallow that there can also be many

1670. Dominic Soto, In Posteriora Analytica, book 1, q. 1.
1671. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 32.

expressed species, which are the very acts either of thinking or of understanding? I well see that there can be more species impressed at once than expressed in the same faculty: because there is greater difficulty in the faculty's actually operating than in its receiving and keeping the impressed species; and therefore its power for acting and expressing is lesser than for receiving them and at the same time retaining them. And thus the argument from forms as if they were figures does not pass from impressed to expressed [species]: for if it were repugnant to have many species expressed at once without order among themselves, because they are as it were figures, and a body cannot at once be figured by many figures; by the same reasoning it would be repugnant to be informed at once by many impressed species, which also are as it were figures and images of the objects.

To the second argument, which there in the same place was drawn about qualities of the same genus, it is answered that something false is assumed therein - namely, that many qualities of the same genus cannot be in the same subject. For it is clear that there can be many qualities at once of the same genus so long as they are not contraries: thus no one denies that in the same intelligent faculty there are many intelligible impressed species, by which we say the intellect is constituted in first act; which, nevertheless, are under the same genus. Therefore by this reasoning it is not repugnant that there be many species which we call expressed and [which are] in second act: although by some other reasoning this could not be.

And to the third, which in the same third mode of opinion was brought forward about opining, I say that one motion cannot be terminated to one terminus; whence, although it would follow that one cognition in the intellect, which is one simple quality, cannot be terminated except to one object, it does not follow that many objects cannot at the same time be known through many cognitions. For we do not contend that many things, as many, can be known through one simple cognition and quality; but through many, which occur at the same time in a human and in an angelic intellect: whose opposite the foregoing reasoning does not prove.

It remains to explain two testimonies of Aristotle, which are customarily adduced as a common foundation to prove that many things cannot at the same time be understood under the mode of many. The first testimony, which is taken from the fourth book of the Topics and is commonly cited under these words, "It happens that one can know many things; to think, however, many, not," is set out by Aristotle in this manner: "It happens that one can know many things; to think, however, not [so] with respect to all truths."[1672]

To the first, which in the first head was brought under the third way of explaining the opinion there mentioned, I say that the ratio differs between figure in quantity and the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*): wherefore, although the same body cannot be at once figured by many figures, nevertheless the same intellect can at once be informed by many species. For figure of quantity is the extremity and terminus of that [quantity]: but it is manifest that no body can have many termini of its quantity, but must of necessity be terminated by one; therefore it cannot be figured at once by many figures. But the intelligible species, whether impressed or expressed, is not

1672. Aristotle, Topics, book 1 (or 2), ch. 4, locus 32 (scholastic numbering).

a figure of quantity, but is a certain quality, which therefore is called a figure, because it is an image of the object: wherefore, since it is not repugnant that the same subject be informed at once by diverse qualities, it will not be repugnant that it have at once many species.

And indeed no one to this point has denied that in the same intellect and sense there are many intelligible, or sensible, impressed species, which constitute the faculty in first act, without any order among themselves: why then shall we deny that there can also be many expressed species, which are the very acts of understanding or sensing? I see well that more impressed species can be together than expressed species in the same faculty: because there is greater difficulty in the faculty itself so as to operate, than truly to receive and conserve impressed species; and therefore its power for operating and expressing species is less than for receiving them and at the same time retaining them. But for that reason I took the argument from impressed to expressed species: because, if it were repugnant to have many species at once expressed without order among themselves on the ground that they are, as it were, figures, and a body cannot be at once figured by many figures; by the same reasoning it would be repugnant to be informed at once by many impressed species, which also are as it were figures and images of objects.

To the second argument, which there likewise was brought from qualities of the same genus, it is answered that it assumes falsely, namely, that many qualities of the same genus cannot be in the same subject: for it is plain that many qualities of the same genus can be together when they are not contrary. For no one denies that in the same intelligent faculty there are many impressed intelligible species, through which we say the intellect is constituted in first act; which nevertheless are under the same genus. Therefore, by this reasoning it will not be repugnant that there be many species which we call expressed and in second act; although by another reasoning it could not be so.

To the third, which in that same third way of opining was brought, I say that one motion cannot be terminated except to one terminus: whence, although it would follow that one intellection, which is one simple quality, cannot be terminated except to one object, it would not be licit to infer that many objects cannot be known at once, at least by many cognitions. For we do not contend that many, as many, can be known by one simple cognition and quality, but by many, which are at once in the human and angelic intellect: the opposite of which the aforesaid reasoning does not prove.

It remains that we explain two testimonies of Aristotle, which are commonly adduced as a common foundation to prove that many things cannot be understood at once by way of many. The first testimony, which is taken from the fourth book of the Topics, and is wont to be reported under these words, "It happens that one can know many things; to think, however, only one," is set out by Aristotle in this manner: "It happens that one can know many things; to think, however, not."[1673] By which words he does not signify that only one thing can be thought, whereas many can be known; but Aristotle denotes that it does not thus happen that one thinks many things, as it happens that one knows them.

1673. Aristotle, Topics, book 1 (or 2), ch. 4, locus 32 (scholastic numbering).

To know: for to know happens with things so various and diverse, that no man is able to think them at once: yet from this it does not follow that one cannot think more than one thing, as some contend. The later testimony from the fourth [book] of the Metaphysics, if we rightly consider Aristotle's plan in that chapter, has no weight: for there Aristotle is only striving to prove that whatever name we use signifies one thing only, in order that there may be disputation and refutation among men: wherefore, he says, when names are assumed which of themselves signify many and various [things], by the very use they are applied to signify some determinate thing; otherwise all disputation among men would be taken away. And Aristotle subjoins the reason in these words: "For it happens that they understand nothing, who understand nothing one."[1674] By which words Cajetan strove to prove that many cannot be understood by way of many;[1675] nevertheless Aristotle's sense is this: if names, when men speak with one another, do not signify some one determinate thing, all refutation and all disputation is taken away, because they cannot understand one another, who do not use names that signify some one determinate thing. For if they do not understand what one thing it is about which the disputation is held, they will understand nothing of the disputation. Therefore, and for this reason, he rightly said: "For it happens that they understand nothing (namely, of the disputation), who understand nothing one": that is, those who do not understand some one determinate thing, about which the disputation is undertaken.

Disputatio CCXXI

1 Quid sentiat Durandus. Caput I. Tres aliae Scholasticorum opiniones. Caput II. Probabilior sententia. Caput III. Dissoluitur argumentum primae opinionis. Caput IV.

Caput I - What Durandus holds

In the preceding disputation it was shown that an Angel can in his own intellect understand many things at once, and actually consider them even by way of many. Now indeed there is a greater difficulty, whether he is able to think at once not only many, but even all the things which by a certain succession he can consider by his natural power. In which controversy the first opinion is that of Durandus, on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 8. He first teaches that the Angel always understands some things at once, and some things he does not: and that he understands at once those that are present and exist in act; about past things he says nothing: perhaps he would think the same entirely, if he had remembered them.

He confirms this part by this reason: all things which actually exist are sufficiently present to the angelic intellect, and are compared to it as objects accommodated to it: but each thing is actually understood according as it is present to the intellect: therefore all these things are always actually understood.

1674. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, ch. 4, text 50 (scholastic division).
1675. Cajetan, on this article.

Then he affirms that future things which depend upon free choice are not always known by the Angel: for, as we saw above in disputation 207, according to his opinion, these future things cannot be evidently known by the Angel by his own proper power.

But Durandus does not clearly explain whether from the cognition of the things which the Angel can naturally know he can freely cease, or rather whether he necessarily considers all those things in act in such a way that he cannot cease from the thought of any one of them. Perhaps he thought that this is not free to the Angel: for if it were free, he would not always consider all those things. Now this opinion can be proved thus: if the Angel should cease from the cognition of something present or past, he could not be brought back again to the cognition of that thing by any cause: for either he would be brought back by some external cause and object, or by some cognition of another thing, in which the Angel remains, because he never ceases from all cognition, or by the will of the Angel himself. Besides these, no other cause seems to remain by which he could be brought back. But by none of these could he be brought back, as will be clear by induction. First, not by any external cause: for if by any, especially by the object itself, as some think future things then begin to be known by the Angel when they begin to be present, because then the object determines the faculty of the angelic intellect, either by impressing a species, or by moving in another way, in which way it could not move when it was still future: but in this manner the intellect of the Angel cannot be determined by a present or past thing, because previously he considered that, from the consideration of which he ceased, since on the part of the thing itself no change has been made (for it is present or past in the same way as it was when previously it was considered). There does not appear, therefore, any greater reason why it should now determine and bring back the intellect to its consideration, than before. Next, the intellect of the Angel cannot be determined by some interior thought of another thing: for if, for example, he ceased from the consideration of a horse, which previously he was considering together with a man, and remained in the consideration of the man alone, from the sole consideration of the man he could not be brought back to the consideration of the horse which previously he was considering; and universally, from the consideration of one object to the consideration of another, by no reason can the intellect of the Angel be brought back: because there does not appear any greater reason why from the consideration of one [object] he should be determined to the consideration of this one rather than of that. Lastly, the intellect cannot be determined by the will: because the first thought about some object cannot proceed from the will, since thought by its nature ought to precede every operation of the will; and it is impossible for the will to apply the intellect to think about a man, unless it be aroused by some prior thought about that man, since the will cannot be carried to the unknown.

This opinion does not please me. For that created things existing in act are present, not only by real existence, but also (as it is said) objectively, that is, that they are objects accommodated and in due proportion to the Angel's intellect, indeed that the angelic intellect is constituted in first act for their intellection, is not sufficient for the Angel to understand all of them always at once: first, because nevertheless he can cease from the cognition and thought of some one of them; then also

because the Angel's power for understanding does not seem so efficacious that he can be carried by thought to all things at once. The argument truly which was brought for this opinion we shall solve below.

Caput II - The second opinion

The second opinion is that of St. Gregory, on the Second Book, distinction 11, question 1, who also asserts two things. One is, that an Angel can rightly understand at once and distinctly all those things of which he has species, and that by many acts and species and expressed and formal concepts. The other is, that an Angel can cease from the consideration of any particular thing, and be brought back to it again.

He proves the first part, both because it is not repugnant that there be many concepts together in the same intellect of the Angel, as was proved in the previous disputation - something which St. Gregory himself had taught in our first distinction 1, question 1, article 3 - and also because it is not repugnant that many acts be elicited at once by the same intellect through many impressed intelligible species, by which it is constituted in first act. For an agent, which is commonly called a partial cause, can elicit many operations at once, using many forms for operating, unless by its nature it be wearied in operating: but the intellect is a partial cause, which with the impressed species elicits the operation, and in operating is not wearied, as the phantasy or some other sense is: therefore it can at once understand all things of which it has species and principles. Then he confirms the same from St. Augustine, On Genesis literally explained, book 4, chapter 32, whose words we reported in the preceding disputation, cap. 2, and in the same book chapter 33 at the beginning, where he says: "But if the angelic mind can at once [embrace] all the things which speech distinguishes singly and in order by the nexus of causes," etc.[1676]

He proves the latter part of his opinion thus: because it is free to the Angel to use this or that species and principle of understanding in order to elicit an intellection: nor can any reason be adduced why we should say that it is necessary for the Angel to operate at once through all his species. For it is not less, but much more, in the Angel's power than in man's, to use habits and species when he wills. Now man is free to cease from the consideration of any thing whatsoever: and if sometimes he cannot, that is because phantasy does not so obey the beck of the will as to yield despotically and without repugnance: but the intellect, if it were not moved by phantasy, would obey the will without any resistance at all: therefore it is free to the Angel, when he wills, to cease from the thought and consideration of any object whatsoever.

Tertia sententia fit Ferrarienfis, on the second book of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 101, § Circa illud; where he teaches two things. One is, that the things which are known by the Angel through the same species can be known by the Angel at the same time, and that in the same thought. The other is, that even those things which can be known through the same species can indeed be considered by the Angel one without the other. This opinion seems to have been handed down by St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article, and by Capreolus on the Second Book, distinction 3,

1676. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 32; see also IV, c. 33.

question 2, article 1, conclusion 9: when they assert that many things can indeed be known at once by the Angel by way of one; and that to be known by way of one is nothing other than to be known through one species. Yet none of them defines whether all the things, of which the Angel has various species, can be known by him at once, or not.

The first part of this opinion can be proved, since, if one impressed species is with respect to knowing many diverse objects, as representing them in first act, it does not seem doubtful for the Angel to use that same species for understanding at once all the things which by that species are represented in first act. The latter part Ferrarienfis shows thus: first, because we, through the species which we have of man, do not always consider all the things which we can think about man, but sometimes we think only certain [things], while we omit others: therefore the Angel too, through the same species, will be able to consider something represented in it in first act, and something not to consider; which is nothing other than to use that species to arouse the cognition of one thing and not of another. Then it is proved thus: because, although our intellect can by the same habit of a science consider one conclusion and not another of that same science; why cannot the Angel use the same species to consider one thing and not another? And it seems to have been the opinion of St. Thomas in De veritate, q. 8, a. 13, ad 2 and ad ultimum, where he concedes that the Angel knows the intelligible species in his intellect, yet not what by that species, or also by another, the intellect considers: because he can consider various [things] through the same species according to the adventitious determination of the angel's intellect.[1677]

A fourth opinion is that of many more recent theologians, who agree with Ferrarienfis in the foregoing: they add, however, that the Angel can through the same impressed species not only successively understand all those things of which that species is a species, by diverse expressed concepts and cognitions, but also that through the same species he can know all those things not only by one expressed concept and cognition, but indeed by various and diverse expressed concepts, according to the variety of the objects and things of which that species is; at the same time. Yet they do not teach that the Angel can think all the diverse things of which he has impressed species, at once. Moreover, that the Angel can through the same species at once express various concepts of the various things of which that species is, they think for this sole reason, that it is not repugnant that in the same intelligent faculty, or in one that holds various cognitions, there be together those which differ only in number, just as two accidents which differ only in number can exist together in the same subject.

Caput III - The more probable opinion

This opinion can be refuted in three ways. First, it is not sufficiently proved that the Angel can consider all the things of which he has species: this part I affirm against St. Gregory, whom Maior also attacks, on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 9. Likewise, that the Angel can think at once, to consider [all things] by us cannot be proven, just as neither can it be proven that they can

1677. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 8, a. 13, ad 2, ad ult.; Cajetan, on this article; John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 9; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), on Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 101, § Circa illud.

be considered at once by way of one, and that they can be considered at once by the Angel by way of many. This in truth is poorly proved from that alone: for although Gregory's reason proves that nothing repugns on the part of the receiving intellect, that there be in it at once so many diverse intellections and of many things, nevertheless it does not prove that this is not repugnant on the part of the eliciting power which brings the intellection to act. Wherefore, if by God alone so many intellections could be infused into the Angel without the Angel's own power and efficacy, it would not be repugnant for him by those to understand all things at once. But since the more probable opinion is that intellection cannot at all be infused into an intellect from without, but of necessity must proceed from the efficacy of that intellect itself, and it cannot be proved what sort of power a created intellect has, that concerning all these created things it might be able to operate at once; this is not certain, nor can it by any probable reason be shown...

The third opinion is that of Ferrariensis, on Summa contra Gentiles, book 2, chapter 101, § Circa illud, where he teaches two things. One is that those things which are known by an angel through the same species can be known by the angel at the same time with one and the same thought; the other is that, from among those things also which can be known through the same species, it is possible that one be considered by the angel without the other. St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article, and Capreolus in the Second Book, distinction 3, question 2, article 1, conclusion 9, seem to have handed down this opinion, since they affirm that several things can indeed be known by an angel at once in the manner of one; but to be known in the manner of one is nothing else than to be known through one species: yet none of them determines whether all those things of which the angel has diverse species can be known by him at once, or not.[1678][1679][1680][1681]

The first part of this opinion can be proved. It is proved thus: if one impressed species is a principle of knowing diverse objects, and itself represents them in first act (actu primo), it does not seem difficult for an angel to use the same species for understanding at once all the things that are represented by that species in first act. Ferrariensis shows the second part in this way: first, because we, through the species we have of man, do not always consider all the things we can think about man, but sometimes we think only certain ones, and omit others; therefore the angel too, through the same species, will be able to consider something represented in it in first act, and not consider something else: which is nothing other than to use that species for expressing the cognition of one thing and not another. Then it is likewise proved, because just as our intellect can use the same habit of a science to consider one conclusion and not another of the same science: why could not the angel use the same species to consider one thing and not another? And this seems to have been the opinion of St. Thomas in De veritate, question 8, article 13, to the second and the last replies, where he grants that the angel knows the intelligible species (species

1678. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 8, a. 13, ad 2, ad ult.
1679. Cajetan, on this article.
1680. John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 9.
1681. Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), on Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 101, § Circa illud.

intelligibiles) in our intellect, yet not what our intellect considers by that species or another, because he can consider various things through the same species; and the same line of reasoning seems to hold of the angelic intellect.[1678]

The fourth opinion is that of more recent theologians, who agree with Ferrariensis in the preceding point. They add, however, that an angel can, through the same impressed species, not only successively understand, by distinct expressed concepts and cognitions, all those things of which that species is the species, nor only be able through the same species to know all those things by one expressed concept and cognition, but also, by various and diverse expressed concepts, according to the variety of objects and of the things of which that species is the species, know them at the same time. Whether, however, he can at the same time think all the things of which the angel has impressed species, they do not teach. And they think the angel can through the same species at once express various concepts of various things of which that species is the impressed species for this reason alone, namely because it is not repugnant that in the same faculty, whether intelligent or sentient, there be various cognitions at once differing only in number, just as neither is it repugnant that two accidents differing only in number be in the same subject.

A more probable opinion.

This more probable opinion consists in three positions. The first is that it is not sufficiently proved that an angel can consider all the things of which he has species. I affirm this part against Gregory, whom Major also impugns on the Second Book, distinction 3, question 8. Nor does it stand with us how many things an angel can consider at once, just as it does not stand with us how many things he can consider in succession in the manner of many. This part, in truth, is proved only on this ground, that although Gregory's argument proves that on the side of the recipient intellect there is no repugnance that there be in it at once so many intellections of diverse and many things, nevertheless he does not prove that this is not repugnant on the side of the virtue of the intellect as eliciting and expressing intellection. Wherefore, if so many intellections could be infused into the angel by God alone without the angel's own power and efficacy, then by means of them it would not be repugnant to understand all things at once. But since the more probable opinion is that intellection cannot at all be infused into an intellect from without, but of necessity must proceed from the efficacy of that intellect itself, and since it cannot be proved that the power of a created intellect is so great that, with respect to these created things, it can operate simultaneously; it is certain that it cannot be shown by any probable reason that an angel can at once understand all these created things. For since the efficacy of an angelic intellect is finite, of necessity it must have a terminus: and therefore it will be able to produce so many intellections at once that it cannot produce more. Whether these be four, or five, or more, can be defined by no reason. Wherefore without foundation would someone affirm that an angel can at once understand all the created things of which he has species in first act; without foundation likewise would someone assert that an angel has one only species impressed of all things and that through it he is able to consider all created objects at once.

1678. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 8, a. 13, ad 2, ad ult.

Response of Gregory. Gregory, however, responds that therefore an angel can at once understand all those things of which he has intelligible species impressed, because it is not a matter of greater power to understand one thing than many; therefore, since he can understand one, he will be able to understand many, indeed even all, at the same time. Furthermore, that it is not of greater efficacy to understand one thing with one species than many with many species, Gregory proves by this reason: because, although it be of greater power to produce a greater effect - just as to sustain a heavier weight requires a greater power in the agent than to sustain a lighter - yet this is understood only of a cause they call total, which alone produces the effect; for if we speak of a cause, as they call it, partial, it is not of greater efficacy to produce a greater effect with another partial cause than that which without the other it could not produce: just as it is not of greater efficacy to sustain a weight of eight with another partial cause helping as four, than to sustain four without that other. So, therefore, it is not of greater power in the intellect to produce more intellections with more partial causes, namely species, than to produce fewer by itself alone or with fewer partial causes and species.

It is refuted. But this solution has no weight. First, indeed, although in partial causes which they call non-subordinate, to which severally there corresponds some measure of weight or of intensity in the effect, such as is the cause sustaining or bearing a stone, we grant this - that some cause may be able to produce a double-greater effect with another assisting than it could by itself alone - nevertheless on that account we ought not to concede that subordinate partial causes can, more and more without terminus, operate at once together with other partial causes; otherwise they could also operate infinite things at once, if they were aided by infinite partial causes. But if some terminus must be prefixed, so that a partial cause of this sort may be able to operate at once with some and not with more, there will be no reason by which it can be proved that the angelic intellect can operate at once with all the species that it has. The School calls that partial cause subordinate which concurs together with another to the effect in such a way that there does not correspond to it some degree of intensity or of weight in the effect, but some common or particular reason which together with the other constitutes the effect: as we are wont to say that to the intellect there corresponds in intellection the formal reason of cognition and intellection; and that the reason of such, namely which is about such an object, corresponds to the species by which the intellect is constituted in first act as an integral principle of this intellection, as above was shown in disputation 43, chapter 4. Although, therefore, we say that a partial cause of the former kind, to which in the effect there corresponds a degree of intensity or of weight, can do something greater together with another partial cause than it could by itself alone; nevertheless it does not follow that a partial cause of the latter kind, which we call subordinate, does not have a determined power such that it operates at once with one or with several partial and subordinate causes: rather, it must necessarily be said to have a determined power such that it can operate with so many subordinate partial causes, and not with more. And this is especially true in the intellect: because intelligible species aid the intellect like partial causes subordinate to it, so that they receive from it a power and fecundity of concurring with it after the mode of a conjoined instrument; and since the

intellect has finite efficacy and power, it will not be able to communicate this force to many species without a terminus. But if a terminus must be prefixed to it, there is no reason why we should say that it can operate at once with all the species.

Another reason against Gregory. Then, if Gregory's argument had any force, it would also prove that the internal sense could operate at once with all the species which it has received from things previously sensed - which is absurd. But Gregory replies that the internal sense cannot operate with all the species because it grows fatigued, whereas otherwise, unless fatigue impeded, it could no less, in a much longer time, think on all things than the angelic intellect. About our intellect indeed he should say the same as about the internal sense, yet for a different reason: for although our intellect, considered in itself, cannot grow weary, yet because it needs for its operation the working of the imagination and of the internal sense, and this faculty of sense is wont to be fatigued in its operation, therefore it will not be able to use at once all the species that it has.

This reply of Gregory, however, can easily be refuted: for although the weariness of the sentient faculties has the result that a potency cannot last long in operation nor attend long to the same thing, nevertheless this does not prevent its being able, in the beginning, when the sense is not fatigued, to attend to all the things at once of which it has species, and to think all of them at once - if otherwise its power for operating is not limited. And the example Gregory employed can excellently be turned back upon himself. For just as a power that can sustain a weight of eight with another partial cause assisting as four, can at the beginning, before its strengths grow weary, sustain that weight, but afterwards, when fatigued, cannot: so likewise a sentient faculty, if it is not limited in itself, will be able in the beginning to think at once all the things of which it has species, although in their consideration it cannot persevere long on account of weariness.

The example Gregory adduces proves nothing, but rather effectively is turned against himself. For an agent of partial type, which can do something greater together with another agent than by itself, is of limited power, such that it cannot operate conjoined with many other partial agents. For one who can carry by himself a weight of four, and thus with another weight, as eight, will not be able at the same time with two equal carriers to bear a weight of sixteen; because his power, being finite, cannot be communicated to many partial agents; and thus Gregory's reasoning is undone.

The second part of our opinion is that an angel can at once think all those things for which he has one impressed species (as they call it) in first act; for nothing seems to stand in the way, such that by means of that species the intellect might not elicit an adequate act completing and actually representing at once whatever, after the manner of a habit, were in that species; otherwise, if he could never understand all those at once, in vain would one single species for many objects have been given to him by God or by nature itself. I understand this, however, only of objects which differ by specific nature; that is, if through the same impressed intelligible species many such specific objects are represented in first act, the angelic intellect can through it express the formal concept and expressed species, which they call in second act (actu secundo), by which he actually knows all those objects at once. But when through the same impressed species of a specific nature the angel knows the singulars and all the individuals of that nature, and could know infinite such individuals in the succession of time, if they were to be multiplied to infinity, it seems difficult that

the angel can through that species at once actually consider all the individuals of that nature: especially since the angel rightly knows by his own power all future individuals from natural causes without any intervention of free choice, as I noted in disputation 207, chapter 2. If, however, he could through the same species of a specific nature know at once all the singulars of that nature, he could also know at once all future, past, and present individuals - which are in great multitude - which seems difficult; indeed, even if the causes were to endure forever, the angel could know at once infinite of their individuals, which is the more incredible.

St. Augustine, however, in the places cited on behalf of Gregory's opinion, wished to establish only this difference between the angelic intellect and ours: that we understand through a process and the delay of time, because, by the difficulty of a body weighing us down, we first perceive through the senses of the body those things that have been done, and then our mind, according to its measure, takes their knowledge; afterward it seeks their causes, if in any way it can find them: but the angel at once understands what he wills - not because, if he wills, he is able to consider all the things of the world at once, but because those things which he can consider at once he considers without delay and without discursiveness, whereas man knows those things only by discourse. This difference Blessed Augustine wished to assign in book 4 of De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 32; yet in chapter 33 he seems to concede that all created things were at once in the angel's morning and evening knowledge, as he himself...[1682]

→ The third part of our position is that it lies within the Angel's power to consider one thing without another, if he wills, from among those which are represented in the same species. I understand this, however, after the Angel's intellect has been aroused by some natural cognition of some object: for we too use habits and species as we will. Yet by the same intelligible species representing many things as many, the angelic intellect cannot, even if it wills, elicit many cognitions at once; but if it wills actually to consider many things from among those which that impressed species represents, it ought to understand them by the same expressed knowledge. Therefore through that species not a double knowledge at once, but only one can be expressed: for the unity of intellection must be taken from the unity of its principle. For if an Angel should will to use an intelligible species according to the whole latitude of the objects which it represents in first act, he cannot but express another common species which represents all those objects in second act.

Solution of Gregory. To this argument Gregory, in the place cited above, endeavors to reply, which for the most part attacks his own opinion. He therefore answers in that question to the argument opposed against the second conclusion, not only that natural cognition, which comes about suddenly, is not from any antecedent act of the will, but also that there can be free cognition and consideration without its being commanded by a preceding free will. Wherefore, he says, it is possible for an Angel freely to apply himself to consider this rather than that after he has ceased from the consideration of them, even if no free will had preceded by which the Angel would will to think this rather than that. He proves this thus: because when someone freely perseveres in some

1682. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 32; see also IV, c. 33.

thought, from which he can at any moment freely cease, he is not said freely to persevere in it because he has an express will of persevering in it; for he does not always have a reflex knowledge by which he would consider that he is thinking, and that it is good to remain in that consideration. For if he had a reflex knowledge, either the will would have been elicited before it, or it would not; if it were not, then there would be granted a reflex knowledge free without a preceding will of thinking - which Gregory maintains; but if it had preceded, before it there ought to be another reflex knowledge, and so on to infinity. Therefore there is granted a free thought, in which the Angel and man freely perseveres, and yet without a will of persevering in it: in the same way, therefore, the Angel will be able freely to reduce himself to his first thought, even if he had not previously had a will of reducing himself to it.

This solution, however, is not approved by Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, to the arguments of Gregory 2, in the place against the ninth conclusion, in solution 5; and he teaches that in this way there is no satisfaction given to the argument set forth above by us for the opinion of Durandus. And he proves it also from Henry, that before every act of the will there always precedes some act of the intellect: which neither Gregory nor any other denies; Gregory only contends to defend that the act of the intellect is free, even if it is not commanded, or depends on some express cause of the will, from this alone, that man, or an Angel, can cease from it at will.[1683][1684]

The argument of the first opinion is dissolved.

This argument Gregory, in the place cited above, strives to dissolve, as being urged chiefly against his own opinion. Therefore, he replies in that question to the argument opposed against the second conclusion, not only that natural cognition which happens suddenly is not from any antecedent will, but also that there can be free cognition and consideration without its being commanded by a preceding free will. Wherefore, he says, the Angel can freely apply himself to consider this rather than that, after he has ceased from the consideration of them, even if no free will had preceded by which the Angel would will to think this rather than that. He proves this for the reason set out above, namely because someone can freely persevere in some thought, from which he can at any moment cease, without having an express will of persevering in it, since he does not always have a reflex knowledge. If, however, a reflex knowledge preceded, before it there would have to be another reflex knowledge, and so to infinity: therefore there is granted a free thought, in which the Angel freely perseveres, and yet without a will of persevering in it; and likewise he will also be able freely to reduce himself to a first thought even when he had not previously had a will of reducing himself to it.

But this opinion and the solution of Gregory do not please me, because the case is not the same for an act of the intellect to begin freely as to be freely continued. For, that it may begin freely, I think an express act of the will is necessary; but that it may be freely continued, an express will of remaining in it does not seem necessary: it is enough if the intellect attend that it is remaining in that thought, even if the will do not have a positive act of continuing. But the intellect can attend

1683. John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad argumenta Gregorii 2, loco contra nonam conclusionem, in solutione 5.

1684. Henry of Ghent, Summa (ordinaria), lib. 1, q. 12; Quodlibeta, quodlib. 9, q. 5.

that it is engaged in such a thought either by a reflex act, or perhaps sometimes by the very direct thought itself, which is of itself manifest to the one thinking. A reflex thought, however, by which the intellect considers that it is engaged in such a thought, is not free, proceeding from a prior will - which would have to be preceded by some cognition, for thus there would be a progress to infinity - but it is natural, which naturally arises from the very direct thought in which the intellect is. Therefore, that some thought may be freely continued, there is no need that it be preceded by an express will of remaining in it: it is enough if the will, since it can hinder it, does not hinder it. But that some thought may newly begin in the intellect from liberty, a positive act of the will is required, by which the Angel or man wills to think: for if the will is disposed negatively, the thought cannot depend on it freely so as to begin, from this alone that the will could have forbidden the thought to begin: for the intellect ought to be applied positively to thinking whenever it is not applied by a natural principle; but whenever it is applied by a natural and of necessity determining principle, it is not in the power of the will to hinder the thought from beginning, but only that it not afterwards continue. Let then Gregory's solution stand.

Ferrarensis, however, on Summa contra Gentiles, book II, chapter 101, at "Ad secundum dicitur," contends to dissolve in another way the difficulty of the aforesaid argument. Therefore he grants that it is necessary that there precede some thought, either confused or distinct, before every elicited act of the will: and also that it is necessary that there precede an elicited will by which man or Angel wills to think about some matter, before he freely and distinctly think about it: but that an Angel be brought back by himself freely to a first distinct thought about some matter in this way: for since he is always naturally engaged in the consideration of himself, actually [engaged] with his own essence and perfections, he also always considers all the intelligible species which he has in his intellect in first act for understanding by them; whence also, consequently, he knows, at least confusedly, all the objects of which he has the species. For when the species and the formal concepts, which are in some intellect, are known, the objects of them are known, at least confusedly, though not clearly and by a proper concept, as was said in Disputation 38, chapter 4. From this, therefore, cognition, whereby he considers all the species which he has, it can happen that this or that species be applied, so that by it he distinctly consider this or that object of which that species is, which already by the species itself he had known confusedly, knowing that by that species his intellect can operate about such an object. Of man, however, he thinks there is another account: for since his operation depends on sense as ministering the object, he is also determined by it to consider this rather than that, according as it variously occurs to sense.[1685]

Truly, this solution does not seem to me to have a firm foundation: for it is not sufficiently certain that an Angel is always engaged in the consideration of himself; or, if he always actually knows his substance, it is not so certain that he actually considers all the intelligible species of his intellect, if he has them in first act. Therefore I answer that to the first thought about some object an Angel is determined neither by an external created object, nor by himself in any way, but by God the author of nature: and this is proper to a rational creature, that it is not determined by itself to the first thought, as is shown in I - II, question 109, article 4. And although man is sometimes

1685. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 101, at "Ad secundum dicitur."

determined by an object occurring and arousing his consideration, yet this determination ought to be referred back to God as the first author: because by his providence he made it that there should be such an order of natural causes that rather this object than that should occur on this rather than on another occasion. Sometimes, however, and no less frequently, without any external occasion the human intellect is aroused and determined to consider this rather than that, in accordance with the variety of the thoughts which are wont to arise in the imagination and internal sense: for we daily experience in ourselves that, while we are thinking about some matter, suddenly in the imagination there are aroused images of other things, which are wont to be so varied that they cannot be reduced to a natural cause which always operates in the same way. Wherefore I think that, by the ministry either of a good or of an evil Angel, such thoughts are aroused in us, or that we are moved by God immediately and sense is determined, although there can be an internal natural cause of some thought, why rather this than another has arisen in us.

But since an Angel can be determined by no other external created cause, natural or free, because none can act physically upon him, nor by any internal cause: both because there is no natural one, nor can one be assigned; and also because a free one cannot be: for we can scarcely explain in what way by his own will an Angel could be brought back to a first thought; it remains that he is determined by God alone: which solution of the present difficulty Capreolus indicated in the place cited, and St. Thomas inculcates this doctrine everywhere, especially in I - II, question 9, article 4, and question 109, article 2; and it is Aristotle's doctrine, as we shall show there.[1683][1686]

Articulus III - Whether an Angel knows by discursive reasoning

To the third, thus it is proceeded. It seems that an Angel does know by discursive reasoning. For discourse of the intellect is considered according to this, that one thing is known through another. But Angels know one thing through another. For they know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an Angel knows by discursive reasoning.[1687]

Furthermore, whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can also. But the human intellect can syllogize and know causes in effects, according to which discourse is considered. Therefore the intellect of the Angel, which is superior in the order of nature, can do this much more.

Furthermore, Isidore says that demons know many things by experience. But experimental knowledge is discursive. For out of many memories one experience is made; and out of many experiences one universal is made; as is said at the end of the Posterior Analytics, and in the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore the knowledge of angels is discursive.[1688][1689]

1683. John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad argumenta Gregorii 2, loco contra nonam conclusionem, in solutione 5.

1686. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 9, a. 4; I - II, q. 109, a. 2; and see also I - II, q. 109, a. 4.

1687. For parallel Thomistic loci see, e.g., Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 44 and 91; De veritate q. 8, a. 15; Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 2 - 3.

1688. Isidore of Seville, commonly cited on the demons' knowledge by experience.

1689. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II (at the end), and Metaphysics I (at the beginning).

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says, in chapter 7 of On the Divine Names, that angels do not collect their divine knowledge from discursive words, nor are they led from something common to these particulars taken together.[1690]

I answer that, as has often been said, angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances. For heavenly minds also are named by Dionysius. Now this is the difference between the heavenly and the earthly bodies: that earthly bodies, by change and motion, attain their ultimate perfection; but heavenly bodies have their ultimate perfection immediately from their very nature. So therefore do the lower intellects, namely of men: by a certain motion and discourse of intellectual operation they attain perfection in the knowledge of truth, when namely they proceed from one known thing to another known thing. But if, immediately in the very cognition of the known principle, they should look upon, as it were, all the consequent conclusions as noted, discourse would have no place in them. And this is the case in angels, because immediately in those things which they first naturally know, they behold all the things whatever can be known in them. And therefore they are called intellectual, because also among us those things which are immediately apprehended naturally are said to be understood. Whence the intellect is called the habit of first principles. But human souls, which acquire knowledge of truth through a certain discourse, are called rational. And this indeed happens from the weakness of the intellectual light in them. For if they had the fullness of intellectual light, as Angels have, then immediately at the first view of principles they would comprehend all the power of them, intuiting whatever could be syllogized from them.

Reply to the first:

Reply to the first: Discourse names a kind of motion. But every motion is from one thing prior to another posterior. Hence discursive cognition is attended according to this, that from something earlier known one arrives into the cognition of another later known which previously was unknown. But if, when one thing is looked upon, another is looked upon at the same time - as in a mirror the image of the thing and the thing itself are at once inspected - on that account the cognition is not discursive. And in this way angels know things in the Word.

Reply to the second: Angels can syllogize as those who know the syllogism. And in causes they see effects, and in effects causes; yet not in such wise that they acquire the cognition of an unknown truth by syllogizing from causes into caused things, and from caused things into causes.

Reply to the third: Experience in angels and demons is said according to a certain likeness, namely, that they know sensibles present, yet altogether without any discourse.

The conclusion is: Angels do not know by discursing; nor does St. Thomas limit this, so that it should have place only around intelligibles which the angel can naturally know, and not around supernatural mysteries; of both we shall dispute in what follows.[1691]

1690. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus VII.

1691. For parallel Thomistic loci see, e.g., Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 44 and 91; De veritate q. 8, a. 15; Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 2 - 3.

Disputatio CCXXII - Whether an angel understands by discursive reasoning

Wherefore that which we understand by discourse is not of itself manifest and intelligible to us, but by another known previously in time or in causality. On the other hand, to understand something without discourse is for it to be for us through itself, not through another known before. Therefore the difficulty proposed is, whether the things which an angel knows he knows by discourse, or whether all things are for him known through themselves without discourse. It is, however, undoubted that certain things are for the angel through themselves known and without discourse - as also certain things are for men - such as the first principles are known in this way. But whether any things are for the angel known by discourse is the question.

The first opinion is of those who say that by an angel some things are known no less by discourse than by a man, even if those things are objects naturally and in a certain way known to him. Thus teach Scotus in II, dist. 7, quaestio prima, "Contra conclusionem," a little before the verse "Contra secundam viam," and in II, dist. 1, q. 6, 9 "Contra anima," at the verse "Item quaeritur," and in III, prologue, q. 4 and 5 lateral at the beginning; Greg. in II, dist. 7, q. 5, a. 2; Ockham in II, q. 16, against the second dictum of the first opinion, and the sixth conclusion at the end; Gabriel in II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, p. 1, article, conclusion 9.[1692][1693][1694][1695] The chief foundation of this opinion is that to the ratio of discourse no delay or interval of time is necessary, but it can be in one moment of time; only it is required that the principle be prior by nature and be a cause of knowing another: but this happens in angels, as Gregory teaches, and in the blessed, as Scotus teaches in that question 3 of the prologue: for not all truths which an angel knows are without a middle and through themselves known; and the same must be said of the blessed, it seems. For if all truths were such as to be through themselves known and, as related to their intellect, were without, or vacated, a middle, for us also they would be through themselves known and would lack a middle. For example, this proposition, "The sun will be eclipsed," is indeed evidently known to the angel, but not otherwise than to the astrologer; to the latter, however, it is not through itself known and without a middle; otherwise, if for the angel or the astrologer it were through itself known and without a middle, it would be so for us all also, which is absurd. Therefore there will be some proposition known to the angel not through itself, but from another - for instance, this is known from that, because one knows that the sun will be at such a point and in opposition with the moon; but this is to discourse. Therefore the angel, even about objects naturally known to him, discourses. Moreover, this mode of discoursing is not in angels from known to unknown as if the notice of one had preceded in the angel before the other in time; rather, he is so disposed in his state, that from those things which are at once known in time, one is a cause of knowing the other.

1692. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 7, quaestio prima, "Contra conclusionem," paulo ante versiculum "Contra secundam viam"; et In II, dist. 1, q. 6, 9 "Contra anima," versiculo "Item quaeritur"; et in III, prologi quaest. 4 et 5, laterali in principio.

1693. Greg., In II Sent., dist. 7, q. 5, a. 2.

1694. Ockham, In II Sent., q. 16, contra secundum dictu primae opinionis, et conclusione sexta in fine.

1695. Gabriel, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3, p. 1, articulus, conclusio 9.

Further, Gregory adds - and with him come together Gabriel and Ockham - that in angels there can also be a discourse from known to unknown with some delay of time, which is the same. They prove this because, if the world and its motion were going to last unto eternity, there would be infinite eclipses, which the angel would not all know at once - I mean both the good angel and the bad, though Gregory speaks only of the bad - then therefore he could a little while discourse for a thousand years, and thereafter for another thousand, always proceeding from known things to unknown. If these reasons have any weight, they not only prove that the angel can, if he wills, discourse in either way, but even that each kind of discourse, about certain natural objects, so necessarily fits him that he cannot understand otherwise than by discourse.

Moreover, among supernatural objects, some have asserted that certain things are understood by an angel by discourse; since greater reason seems, that about supernatural objects the angel discourses, than about natural. But expressly about supernatural things, or about those which are known only by supernatural revelation, they grant to an angel a discourse, or conjecture - which is the same - Ockham in that question 16, conclusion 6, and Gabriel in II, part 1, conclusion 3. For as to the secrets of hearts they philosophize in this way, that although by the proper power of the angelic intellect they can be known, yet in fact they are not known by an angel with a clear and evident notice, but only with a certain conjecture, because they are impeded from an evident and clear knowledge of secrets by God. The same conjecture alone they concede to the angel about the mysteries of grace and about things that will be free in the future; and they add that by his own power they cannot be known by an angel. Finally, Marsilius in II, q. 6, a. 2, in the last notable and conclusion 1, teaches that the secrets of the human heart are known by angels only by discourse - and rightly indeed, because the conjecture which theologians grant to them alone is altogether the same as discourse. But it is proved by reason: for since these three which we have mentioned, namely the secrets of hearts, the mysteries of grace, and the future of free choice, are not through themselves known to the angel, it follows that they can be known by the angel only through another; but to be known through another is the same as to be known by discourse, as we noted at the beginning. But that they are not for the angel through themselves known is manifest: because they are not evidently known to the angel, as all grant; but whatever things are through themselves known to any angelic intellect are evidently known to it.

The second opinion is Cajetan's, on article 9 of this question. To this doubt, which he thinks to be that of St. Thomas - and Thomists readily embrace it - he asserts that both in supernatural things and in natural the angel understands without discourse; to which St. Thomas seems to favor, in De veritate q. 8, a. 15, ad 2, where he speaks of supernatural objects, and in solution 4, where he treats of the secrets of hearts.[1696][1691] But the Thomists' reason, which Cajetan seems to have insinuated when he disputed about composition and division with respect to the angelic intellect, is this: angels know supernatural objects in the same way as natural; because their intellect uses the supernatural light in the same way as the natural, and supernatural things are

1696. Cajetan, In I, q. 58, a. 9.

1691. For parallel Thomistic loci see, e.g., Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 44 and 91; De veritate q. 8, a. 15; Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 2 - 3.

known by an angel after the manner of natural things, just as we also know them; but an angel knows natural things without discourse: therefore also supernatural things. The minor proposition of this reason needed confirmation; but since I judge this opinion to be more probable on that side, I shall confirm it the more.

Caput II - The first, more probable part of the opinion

The more probable opinion, in my judgment, holding the mean between these two extremes, asserts two things. One is, that an angel understands all natural objects, of which he has the proper species, without discourse. The other is, that objects supernatural according to their substance, and those which are of the natural order according to themselves, are known to an angel only by revelation, so however that there be in their notice something of discourse, yet not everything which is found in our discourse. In this chapter I shall strive to confirm only the former part; in the following, the latter.

And the former part was handed down among the Scholastics by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists in this article; Ferrariensis, III Contra gentes, c. 91 at the end; Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 10; Aegidius, In III, dist. 3, part 2, q. 2, a. 3: and in this we oppose the first sentence of Scotus and of others.[1696][1697][1698][1699]

But some strive to confirm it by authority: and first from various places of Pseudo-Dionysius; yet there is none who, in my judgment, proves anything. Then from St. Augustine in IV De Genesi ad litteram, and there in c. 29 he indeed teaches only that angels, in the morning cognition in the Word, contemplate the rationes of creatures, but in the evening cognition in the creatures themselves they know the same rationes, which was to be understood by way of intellection; above I have explained that in its own place. But about the discourse with which our controversy is concerned, or which it indeed has: for that all those things are known at once does not take away the true ratio of discourse, as we shall show below. Finally, others confirm this opinion by the authority of St. Bernard in Sermon 5 on the Canticles, a little before the middle. But St. Bernard in that place only teaches that God is known invisibly through these visible things from the creature; this he says of man living in this world, but he does not speak of angels still wayfarers.[1700][1701][1702]

A different reason. It is also wont to be proved in various ways by seven reasons; and the same opinion St. Thomas in this article - especially in the reply to the first - seems to expound in such a way that the true ratio of discourse would import some time, so that from things earlier known the intellect would proceed to things later known: therefore, since an angel without delay of time understands whatever he can know, it seems to follow that no discourse is found in his intellect. But I deny the position's reason. Scotus and others of his opinion do not require, for the true ratio

1696. Cajetan, In I, q. 58, a. 9.
1697. Ferrarien., in III Contra gentes, cap. 91, in fine.
1698. John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 1, conclusio 10.
1699. Aegidius, In III Sent., dist. 3, pars 2, q. 2, a. 3.
1700. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus VII.
1701. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 29.
1702. St. Bernard, Sermon 5 on the Canticle of Canticles.

of discourse, any delay of time, but that in the same instant there can be true discourse. For if in the same point of time he were to know one thing from another, not by one simple act but by two, and if the cognition of one were elicited from the cognition of the other, that cognition of his would have the true ratio of discourse.[1692]

Moreover, it is by no means repugnant that in the same intellect there be at once two items of notice, and that one arise from the other: for just as at once there is a luminous body and the light produced by it in the medium, in the same way there can be in the intellect a certain primary notice and another as it were secondary, arising in an order of causality from the primary. This foundation having been laid, we must strive to demonstrate that an angel cannot understand natural objects that are evidently known to him by natural power, by discourse.

Others, however, think that ignorance in the one who discourses belongs to the ratio of discourse, so that discourse is a process from known things to unknown; and for this reason St. John Damascene denies that there was deliberation in Christ (De fide orthodoxa II, c. 22). But although on this side it would not be repugnant that there be discourse in an angel - because he can be ignorant of some things - yet because ignorance is not of the ratio of discourse, unless when first it is the will's business to obtain, as is to be seen in the third part of the disputation, q. 2, c. 3, therefore by this reason it is not to be proved that there is no discourse in angels.[1703]

Therefore for two causes I think a full and perfect ratio of discourse is not to be found in angels. The first is, if we say - as the more probable opinion asserts - that any natural thing with its natural properties is by a single simple concept known by an angel. For the angel has an impressed species in first act, by which he can know the thing and its properties; yes, even that one and the same impressed species, in diverse natures residing in one understanding, elicits by that single formal concept the thing's own nature and its properties; which I now teach. And by the same reason discourse will not be in the angel about these objects - a discourse which consists in this, that one concept should arise from another as from a cause.

The latter cause, on account of which it must be said that there is no discourse in an angel about natural objects, which are evidently known by the angel by natural power, is this: because although an angel knows any thing and its properties or accidents by several concepts, yet the notice of one is not the cause of the notice of another. For an angel knows natural things, their properties and accidents, by a proper - and, as some say, intuitive - notice, in the very mode in which they are; on the part of the thing, each one of those is in such wise through itself and known through itself, that it does not appear through another...[1704]

[Within Quaestio LVIII]

By another, of the kind of knowing which we call intuitive and proper, one cannot know that which is known as cause, and in turn that which is known as effect, in such a way that the knowledge of the one would be the cause of the knowledge of the other, when each is known by a

1692. Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 7, quaestio prima, "Contra conclusionem," paulo ante versiculum "Contra secundam viam"; et In II, dist. 1, q. 6, 9 "Contra anima," versiculo "Item quaeritur"; et in III, prologi quaest. 4 et 5, laterali in principio.

1703. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 22.

1704. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II (at the end), and Metaphysics I (at the beginning).

proper and intuitive knowing. For although that which is the cause of another is known in reality by the angel as the cause of it, and again that which is from another as from a cause is known by the angel as its effect; nevertheless the knowledge of the one is not the cause of the knowledge of the other when each is known by a proper and intuitive knowing, whether there be one knowledge of both or diverse. For example: an angel knows of fire such a nature of it, and such a property, namely, that it is hot and dry; yet it is per se known to the angel that fire is hot and dry, just as it is per se known to him that such is its substantial nature. And thus he cannot deduce the knowledge of one from the knowledge of the other, even if he rightly knows that the heat and dryness of fire arise from its very substance. For it is no less per se known to the angel that fire is hot than that water is hot when it is heated - who would doubt this? Now that water is hot is per se known to an angel's intellect just as it is to sense; but the knowledge of an object that is known per se is not deduced from another knowledge; otherwise that thing too would not be per se known to an intellect that reasons in such a way. In the same way, the melting of wax follows upon heat per se; and yet that wax is melted is per se known to the angel no less than that it is heated.

Wherefore, when the logicians say that among propositions some are per se known, which we call immediate or lacking a middle, while others are known through another, which we call mediate or having a middle through which they are known, this must be understood not comparatively with an intellect that beholds the thing as it is by a proper and quidditative concept, but with an intellect that knows a thing through alien concepts, as we know spiritual things by corporeal ones and substance by accidents. And although in reality the one is the cause that the other be, as the substance of fire is the cause of heat, nevertheless each effect has in itself its own proper entity formally, by which formally it is an object per se of the intellect; just as color, which has a cause of its being, has in itself the notion of such an entity by which it is per se an object of sight, not because it is seen through another previously seen, or because the vision of it is deduced from another prior. Therefore, since an angel's intellect, like an eye, clearly and distinctly beholds natural things, which by natural power it can know evidently, it will not be said to discourse, nor to pass from the knowledge of one thing into the knowledge of another, even if he knows that one thing is born from another.

But someone will ask in this way: how then do we say that certain propositions are mediate, that is, probable through another, with respect to us only and not in themselves, as are the first principles; while certain others are mediate according to themselves and with respect to us, such as are the propositions in which we enunciate proper passions of a subject? For these are demonstrable not according to themselves, but only to our intellect through some medium; yet for an intellect that sees the thing as it is, there is no mediate proposition, but every proposition is per se known; and only for an intellect knowing through alien species can a proposition be mediate.

I answer that a proposition is mediate - that is, probable through another - only with respect to an intellect that understands a thing through alien species, and not as it is. But there is a difference between the first principles, in so far as in our mode of understanding they can be proved through another, and the propositions in which passions are predicated of subjects. For although both kinds of propositions are per se and without a middle for an intellect that sees the thing as it is, and

for an intellect that does not see the thing as it is both kinds of proposition can be mediate, nevertheless it happens in different ways that first principles and other propositions are demonstrated. For first principles are proved only from effects and through something posterior, which we call demonstration a posteriori; but other propositions can be demonstrated through something prior by nature or by causality, as is manifest. And for this reason we say that the principles lack a middle according to themselves, because they do not have by their nature anything prior by which they may be known, but only in our mode of understanding are they proved by posteriors; whereas other propositions are mediate according to themselves, because by their own nature they have something prior that can be assumed as a middle for their demonstration.

This doctrine, namely, that we said every proposition is per se known to an angel and therefore that he has no discursive process, must be understood not only of necessary propositions, but also of contingent ones when they are actually true; for then it is per se known to the angel what is enunciated by such a proposition, as that Peter is white, that Peter is running, or that he is still living; just as to our sense it is per se evident, of such and such an object, what is actually sensed. For we ought to philosophize about the intellect (intellectus) of an angel as about the eye simply beholding its object, as we said above; and the same judgment in all things ought to be made of the separated human intellect, if it knows objects by infused species (species intelligibilis) with a proper and quidditative concept. For this reason also, in III, q. 11, a. 3, I shall show that Christ, by his infused knowledge, by which he knows the essences of things quidditatively, never understood by discursive reasoning; this I taught in this manner publicly in our college of Complutum in the year of our Lord 1585, and I later learned that it was ably proved and published by some of our theologians.[1705]

Caput III - The posterior part of the more probable opinion

The posterior part of our position is that, in knowing supernatural objects, or things known in a supernatural mode, the angel's intellect has not nothing of discursive process, though it does not have everything that is required for the true notion of discursive reasoning. In confirmation of which it must be observed that in every true discursus two things are found.

The first is this: among several objects that must of necessity be known by discursus, one is the cause or reason of knowing another, so that, the former not being known, it follows intrinsically that the other cannot be known. Now of those things which in the previous chapter we said are known by an angel per se and not through another, even if many are known at once, one is not the cause or reason of knowing another. This, however, can occur in one and the same simple act by which one is carried to two objects, of which the one is the reason of knowing the other; as, in the opinion of those who say that the blessed by the force of the vision of the essence of God as the primary object also see creatures by that same simple and individual vision.

1705. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 11, a. 3.

The second, which is found in true discursus, is a plurality of cognitions and concepts; for not only is one object the cause of knowing another, but also the cognition of the one is the cause of a different cognition which is concerned with the other. And I therefore said that this is required for the true notion of discursus, because to discourse is not only to know one thing on account of another, but also to infer the concept of one from another. But where a concept is gathered from a concept, there must of necessity be found a plurality of concepts; for where there is only one knowing, it will not be said that one is deduced from another.

Of these two I think that the former can be found in an angel's intellect with respect only to an object known in a supernatural mode. For an angel can indeed so know several things that one is the reason of knowing another as the primary object. This is proved as follows: since an angel does not behold these objects by a proper and quidditative concept, nor evidently, but only by probable conjecture, or by the evidence of testimony alone - what one calls evidence in the attesting person - it follows that he knows all those things through another more known to him. For none of those things which an angel knows by conjecture or sole testimony is per se probable to him, but only through another more known: for that Christ is true God was probable to the demons from effects, not from itself; and in the same way it would be to any angel considered according to his nature alone. Likewise, that Peter now has such a secret in his heart and will is per se known to no angel by his own nature. Therefore, whenever an angel has some knowledge of this sort of thing, he relies on something prior and known as on a principle.

But the latter element, which I said is required for the notion of discursus - namely, that it require a plurality of formal conceptions and knowings - I think is not found in an angel when he knows these objects in a supernatural mode, or attains to them by conjecture alone. For if it is true, as we said above, that many things utterly diverse, as many natures of things, are known by an angel at once through one species and through one formal concept, why shall we not also say that by the same formal concept there is known, for example, Christ's miracle and his divinity which that miracle indicated? Likewise, the sign of the will and its secret? And on this ground one could defend the opinion of St. Thomas, who universally teaches that in an angel there is no discursus. But if someone were nevertheless to contend that, in the knowing of these matters, there are two formal concepts in an angel, and thus the entire notion of discursus, he could not easily be refuted; then we could interpret St. Thomas as speaking only of those objects which are evidently and quidditatively known by an angel - in which I in no way doubt, for the reason alleged above, that there is no vestige of discursus.

Caput IV - The argument of Scotus and Gregory is solved

Now the single argument which in the first chapter was advanced for the opinion of Scotus and Gregory can easily be dissolved. I concede that an angel sometimes comes to the knowledge of some thing or property previously unknown; for it can happen that he does not at once in the beginning consider all the properties. This we ought plainly to grant in the case posited in that argument about a future eclipse, if the world were going to last forever, as that line of reasoning

proves; nonetheless we say that an angel does not discourse, because discursus does not arise from this alone, that one thing is known after another, but because the knowledge of one is gathered from the knowing of another - which does not befall an angel, as we have already shown. Therefore, in the blessed with respect to the clear vision of God, there is no discursive process.

... that there is no discursive process; and Scotus himself admits this in that question of the Prologue. But, as to the species which they have received from phantasms, we admit that the blessed do discourse, as did Christ himself; because the blessed retain the mode of knowing which they had on the way (in this life). Yet someone will ask whether an angel, if he wishes, can discourse in those things which he knows naturally, or even in other things which he knows supernaturally. Some more recent authors think that an angel can, if he wishes, discourse; as also certain others, whom St. Thomas favors, judge that Christ and the blessed can use infused, quidditative species of things with a turning toward phantasms in the same way in which one uses species abstracted from phantasms.[1706] However that may be concerning the use of infused species with an order to phantasms - about which matter, in the place cited, we shall dispute - by no reasoning can it be proved that an angel can, if he wishes, use discursion (*discursus*) in understanding. Unless we speak of the things which he himself naturally knows by intuitive and proper knowledge, it is manifest that he cannot discourse with that kind of knowledge: because in that way all things are to him known per se, and quidditatively, as the first principles themselves are; but in the knowledge of things which are per se known, there can be no kind of discursive process, since nothing is known there through another. If, however, the discussion is about other things, which we said are not clearly known to an angel by nature: since the things which he knows with this kind of knowledge are connected among themselves, he knows them in such a way that, although the one is the ground of knowing the other, nevertheless he knows them by a single individual act; and this is the angel's natural mode of knowing. He cannot himself divide into many knowings those things which he knows by a single simple concept; for, as we said above, indeed an angel can understand many things which he understands through one impressed species, by many concepts expressed from that species - yet not simultaneously, but in succession. But in order to discourse, it is necessary that he at once retain in mind many conceptions, one of which he derives from another.

Articulus IV - Whether angels understand by composing and dividing

It is objected:

1) Where there is a multitude of intellections, there is composition of intellections, as is said in the third book On the Soul. But in the angel's intellect there is a multitude of intellections, since by diverse species he understands diverse things, and them at once. Therefore, in the angel's intellect there is composition and division.

1706. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 11, a. 2.

2) Further, negation is at a greater distance from affirmation than any two opposite natures are from one another; for the first distinction is by affirmation and negation. But the angel does not know certain distinct natures by one [species], but by diverse species, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore it must be that he knows affirmation and negation by diverse [species]. And so it seems that an angel understands by composing and dividing.

3) Further, speech is a sign of intellect. But angels, speaking to men, utter affirmative and negative enunciations, which are signs of composition and division in the intellect, as appears from many places of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that an angel understands by composing and dividing.

But on the contrary: Dionysius says that the intellectual power of the angels shines forth with the perspicacity of the simplicity of their intellect; but simple intelligence is without composition and division, as is said in the third book On the Soul.[1707] Therefore an angel understands without composition and division.

I answer: Just as in a ratiocinative intellect the conclusion is compared to the principle, so in an intellect that composes and divides the predicate is compared to the subject. For if our intellect immediately in the very principle saw [what follows] by the virtuality of the conclusion, it would never understand by discoursing or ratiocinating. Likewise, if the intellect immediately, in the apprehension of the quidditative nature of the subject, had knowledge of all the things that can be attributed to the subject or removed from it, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding what the thing is. Thus, therefore, it is clear that from the same source it comes that our intellect understands by discoursing and by composing and dividing, namely, from this, that it cannot immediately, in the first apprehension of something first apprehended, inspect whatever is contained in it virtually. This happens from a weakness of intellectual light in us, as has been said. Whence, since in the angel the intellectual light is perfect, since it is most pure and most clear like a perfectly pure heaven, as Dionysius says,[1708] it follows that just as he does not understand by ratiocinating, so neither does he understand by composing and dividing. Nevertheless he understands the composition and division of enunciations, as he does ratiocination by syllogisms. For he understands composite things in a simple way, and changeable things in an unchangeable way, and material things immaterially.

Reply to the first: Not every multitude of intellections causes composition, but the multitude of those intellections of which one is attributed to another or is removed from another. But an angel, by understanding the quidditative nature of a thing, at once understands whatever can be attributed to it or removed from it. Hence, by understanding what a thing is, he understands whatever we are able to understand by composing and dividing, by one simple intellection of his.

1707. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus; Aristotle, De anima III.
1708. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.

Reply to the second: Although diverse quidditative natures of things differ less as to the notion of existing than affirmation and negation do, nevertheless, as to the notion of knowing, affirmation and negation are more closely conjoined: because immediately through the fact that the truth of the affirmation is known, the falsity of the opposite negation is known.

Reply to the third: That angels speak affirmative and negative enunciations manifests that angels know composition and division, not, however, that they know by composing and dividing, but by simply knowing what the thing is.

Conclusion: An angel does not understand by composing and dividing, but by a simple intuitive concept (*conceptus*) he knows whatever things do or do not befit any given thing.

Disputatio CCXXIII - Whether an angel knows that a thing is, or is not, by composition or by division

Caput I - On composition in the angelic intellect

Most familiar among logicians is composition and division in cognition, about which Aristotle treats in the first book On Interpretation.[1709] Now composition is an affirmation, whereby the intellect enunciates one thing of another, which we explicate by these affirmative propositions and the like: "Man is rational," "Man is white," etc. But division is a negation, whereby we deny one thing of another, and we express it by these propositions: "Man is not a horse," "Man is not black." The present controversy, therefore, is whether the angelic intellect, by a composition of concepts, affirms one of another; or rather by a simple concept says and understands that one thing is another; and the same difficulty obtains concerning division. Now about composition, of which we shall treat in this chapter, theologians commonly teach that an angel understands and enunciates that one thing is another, without any composition of concepts, but by a simple intellection only: thus St. Thomas teaches in this article; Cajetan and more recent Thomists; Aegidius in the Second Book, distinction 3, question 2, article 3 at the beginning; and the same is gathered from the doctrine of Durandus in the Second Book, distinction 3, question 3, number 7, for he affirms that by an angel all things present are understood together by one most simple act.[1710] St. Thomas proves this opinion, because composition arises from an imperfection of the light of the intellect which does not manifest all the things that can befit the thing, whence it comes about that with one concept he conceives the predicate, but with another the subject, and, comparing them to each other, by affirming one of the other, he composes. Since, therefore, when the angelic intellect sees any thing whatsoever, by the same concept it knows whatever can befit it, it follows that in understanding it does not compose. For my part, I judge first that those things which are distinguished only by reason cannot be known by the angel through composition, nor enunciated of one another; for there is no composition unless there are many formal concepts presenting

1709. Aristotle, De interpretatione I.

1710. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4; Cajetan, ad loc.; Aegidius Romanus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, a. 3; Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, n. 7.

diverse things. But when the intellect understands a thing as it is, by a proper and intuitive concept, it does not distinguish by many formal concepts those things which in reality are the same, as we showed in Disputation 118, chapter 2; and consequently, inasmuch as he does not conceive as many what we distinguish as many and know, but understands the thing by one simple concept, therefore he cannot compose those things which we, distinct only by our reason, compose. Next, I say that all things which befit some thing ...

Next, I say that all things which befit some thing as properties or common accidents, even if they are really distinguished from the subject itself, are known by the angel, and are predicated of the subject without any composition. For I think it more probable that all these are not understood by the angel through many species and formal concepts, but through one and the same: for since he understands any given thing by a proper concept, it is no wonder if by the same simple intuition he understands whatever things befit it.

I clearly see that this cannot be sufficiently demonstrated; for it is not manifest that an angel knows many things through one simple concept. Yet this seems more probable, and more consonant with the perspicacity of an angelic intellect. However, that we may still maintain that the angelic intellect does not compose, it is no obstacle that the very objects which he knows are really distinct among themselves. For if this sufficed for composition, the divine intellect too would compose, since it knows many things really distinct, and compares them among themselves. But because the notion of composition requires many formal concepts, and because God knows many distinct objects by the same most simple concept, which is his essence, therefore in him there is no composition. By the same reasoning, then, in the intellect of an angel there is no composition, even if he understands many distinct objects, since by one single simple concept he knows them together.

Lastly, it seems difficult to me that an angel, without composition, should understand all that can be predicated of some thing - whether natural or supernatural, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. For as to intrinsic natural things, it can easily be defended that there is no composition in the angel: for all these can be understood by the angel through one species and concept; this is not difficult. And indeed, concerning these, Cajetan said that they are understood by the angel through one species - such are the soul and body in man, proper passions, common accidents whether inseparable, separable, or fortuitous.[1711] But since an angel can know, concerning some thing, supernatural accidents, it seems difficult to assert these of a thing, and to understand them, without any composition - whether they be known by proper knowledge, or only by conjecture and through alien species. First, supposing a proper species: for we ought not to assert the same species to be that of a natural thing and of a supernatural thing, unless we say that into the angel there is infused an alien species distinct from the proper species of the natural thing which he had from the beginning, by which both the natural thing and the supernatural are known together. Next, if the supernatural thing is known by conjecture and through alien species, it seems difficult that, by the same species and concept, the natural thing itself be known by a proper and quidditative concept,

1711. Cajetan, on the articles of this question (ad hunc articulum).

and the supernatural thing not by a proper and quidditative, but by an alien one, and yet without any composition. For why must we say that into one simple quality there concur both the proper concept of one thing and the non-proper, merely conjectural, concept of another? And as to what Cajetan says in his remarks on the articles of this question - that the supernatural are known by the angel after the mode of natural things, and thus that there is no composition in them either - I do not know by what efficacious reason this could be proved.[1711]

Moreover, since an angel not only predicates of a given thing what is intrinsic to it, but also [predicates of it] things entirely diverse (for of one substance he predicates any other distinct species), it seems difficult in these matters not to concede composition to the angel. Furthermore, that a thing entirely diverse be predicated by the angel's intellect of another is manifest: for an angel not only denies one thing of another, by saying that one is not the other, but he also affirms that one differs from another, and that one is contrary to, or diverse from, another, or finally that it is in some way related to it - by a relation at least of the second genus. But this seems unable to be done through the same species and concept; otherwise the angel would have a single species of all natural things, which, by referring them to one another, he could also predicate of one another by a single simple concept. For it is evident that only those things are conceived by the angel with a simple concept of which he has only a single impressed species. Yet no one from the School of the holy Doctor has hitherto conceded that in any angel there is given one single species of all created things. Besides, this matter is of lesser moment and quite uncertain for us, since it is hidden from us whether the angel has proper species of each singular thing, or rather one species of all things.

On division in the same intellect of an angel

Caput II - On division in the same intellect of an angel

Now that an angel can understand by dividing is a greater difficulty. In this point indeed many Doctors, cited in the preceding doubt, who teach that an angel understands without composition, also assert that he knows without division; and St. Thomas in the present article plainly teaches that by one simple concept and intuition the angel understands a thing, and whatever befits it or does not befit it.[1712] This opinion has always seemed difficult to me. I shall therefore propose a reason drawn from the principles of St. Thomas's doctrine, which can bring difficulty to bear on this matter; and I shall report the solutions of others, and, if there be anything difficult in them, I shall explain it.

The reason is as follows. From the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor we hold that any angel understands many things through one species, though not all; even if the more perfect the angel is, the fewer species he understands through. Therefore he cannot by one simple concept deny of man all the things in the world which he cannot predicate of him. For, in order that he deny one thing of another and divide them both, he ought by a simple thought to apprehend both by one species.

1711. Cajetan, on the articles of this question (ad hunc articulum).
1712. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4.

Although, then, he can deny one animal of another by a simple cognition, if he knows the natures of all animals through one species - which is still difficult - nevertheless he will not be able to deny in this same way, without division and plurality of concepts, any other thing in the world: since no angel understands every thing in the world through one species, and consequently neither through one expressed concept, except the supreme, as Caietanus thinks - a view which does not commend itself to us in this part, as we said in Disputation 203, chapter 2.

Solution of certain Thomists. Some Thomists answer that not all natures of things are known by an angel through one species nor through one simple concept; nevertheless it can happen that the angel, by a simple concept without division, knows that one thing is not another among those which the angel does not know through the same species and concept. Thus we would posit that man and horse are not known through the same species by an angel; nevertheless the angel will be able to know that man is not a horse, after the manner in which the common sense, without division, judges that color is not sound, perceiving by a simple operation the difference of the one from the other.

Refutation. But this reply is not without difficulty. First, because if the angel judged in the same way as sense judges, then as in sense there is not truth or falsity as in cognition, so neither would there be in the angel - which is absurd. Next, it would follow that the mode of knowing belonging to our sense, which by a simple operation judges that one thing is not another, would be more perfect, as is the angel's [mode], than that of our intellect, which cannot effect this without composition and division. Or if one must say that sense neither composes nor divides, nor judges that one is not another, but rather simultaneously understands many things in diverse ways - as necessarily must be asserted - then it follows that a different kind of judgment must be attributed to the angel and explained in a different way than by the judgment of sense.

Finally, as we were just saying, sense, both interior and exterior, thus simultaneously conceives many diverse sensibles as diverse, that it does not refer one to another nor compare it with that other, but conceives each thing by itself, and is altered by each in a different way and by a different cognition, without any mutual comparison. Yet the judgment of the angel, by which he understands that one thing is another or is not, cannot be made except by a comparison set between the objects; that is, in order to have such a judgment about them, he must conceive the one as referred to the other - whether this be done by one concept or by many - and the judgment of composition or of division must embrace both extremes. For when man and horse are apprehended, and the intellect judges that the one is not the other, it has a judgment about each of them. Therefore, if the extremes of a division are not known by the angel through one species and formal concept, the judgment about them will not be without division; for division is the enunciation by which we say that one is not another, with diverse concepts of the extremes compared among themselves.

Another solution. Secondly, other Thomists answer that sometimes indeed the extremes of a division are understood by an angel and apprehended through diverse species and formal concepts, about which the angel judges that one is not another, as the argument made shows; yet when the

angel knows these extremes as compared with each other, and by judging about them that the one is not the other, from the diverse intelligible species which the angel has of them he elicits one formal concept of division, in which he judges that the one does not belong to the other.

This, however, seems to me an evasion contrived without foundation. For as often as we dispute about diversity of formal concepts, whence can we gather that there are more expressed formal concepts than from the diversity of impressed species? And it is in vain that we begin to posit one formal concept...

...not only one by order, but simply one, if it is expressed by the intellect by virtue of many species. For that the intellect, through various species, understands many things in an ordered way is not a sufficient cause for it to express one simple-in-quality formal concept, but rather various concepts of various things, with, however, the order of one to another. Otherwise even man, through diverse species, would necessarily express one simple concept of division and of composition, by the very fact that he conceived the extremes in an ordered way; or, if to conceive them in an ordered way is not a sufficient cause in man, neither will it be in the angel, unless something further be added, which our adversaries ought to explain to us. Wherefore by this reasoning, as if compelled, Ferrar. grants that even in man, through various species of the extremes, there is produced by the intellect a simple concept of enunciation, by which we enunciate one extreme of the other; which indeed who would doubt is plainly false? For thus even in man there will be neither composition nor division of enunciation; but only in the simple apprehension of the extremes, before they are brought together by enunciation, there will be diverse concepts - which could also happen in angels; therefore there would be no difference between Angels and men in composing and dividing.[1713]

Others reply. Thirdly, other Thomists reply (whose reply I the more readily embrace): first, that the Angel does not understand by dividing, when he does not apprehend the extremes distinctly, but apprehends only the one confusedly; and this is all that St. Thomas wished to teach. Next, if the extremes are apprehended distinctly, the angel cannot without composition understand those extremes of which he has diverse species. Finally, those extremes of which he has a single species can be understood by the angel, and one can be denied of the other without division of concepts. They explain the first part in this way, that when the angel judges that man is a singular thing, and is not anything of the things that are irrational, or non-living, without division, by one simple concept he judges universally that man is not anything of those. This is not hard for me to believe; for in order that the Angel should judge thus universally that man is not inanimate, the species of man himself seems sufficient, by which he sees that he is animate, and so of the others; and in this sense it pleases me, with these Thomists, to interpret the mind of St. Thomas, lest we be forced to assert something against his doctrine on the multitude of species in the angelic intellect. But the second and third part of this position are sufficiently confirmed by those things which were adduced above, to which I judged it fitting to forbear.

Corollary of the preceding doctrine.

1713. Ferrar., Contra gentiles, I, c. 55.

Caput III - On composition, division, and discourse

Since the ancient and very common opinion has always been that composition and division and discourse are not one concept in the mind, but several ordered, there have not been lacking in our age some philosophical professors who said that both composition and division and the syllogism are one quality composed from several by a physical and real union, just as from two waters, by conjunction and continuation, there is made one water; so that the copula in composition and division have the force of a physical and real nexus, like a point between the parts of a line; and in the same way the particle of illation "ergo" should have entirely the same force in a consequence, connecting, to wit, the antecedent with the consequent and making one quality. And because in this way they philosophize, they must assert that all the things we have said are one simple quality - not that I say one quality so simple that it is not composite, nor has parts, but so one that there are not two having only an order between themselves. Now they persuade themselves of this position because it can happen that one apprehends the subject and the predicate and the copula of a proposition, not only each of them separately, but even the three together which we have mentioned, even if he has not yet come to judgment and assent. They add, moreover, that it cannot be understood and explained how those species representing the extremes and the copula of the proposition pass into judgment and assent, unless because the expressed species of the copula becomes really a physical nexus, by which those two expressed species of the extremes are connected and thus composition is made. Therefore, by the same proportion, he says this of the syllogism, namely, that it is a composition by physical conjunction and real nexus, which is denoted by the note of illation "ergo." But when it is asked of them how the judgment which the Angels have differs from ours, he answers that it is a simple quality without this composition and real nexus; whereas ours is composite by conjunction and real nexus.

This opinion displeases me exceedingly, first because it rests on a weak foundation, such that it cannot stand against the ancient and common view; then because it can be refuted by an efficacious argument; finally because in a much easier way the nature of composition and division and discourse will be explained by us, so that we may uphold the common opinion.

First, the argument of the preceding position is weak; for although we can apprehend the extremes of a proposition (add also, if you please, the copula) before we judge and give assent, it is not lawful to infer that judgment and assent are made because those concepts are bound by the concept of the copula as by a real bond and union, if it can be done in some other easier way. For the authors of this position ought to refute all the other ways by which it could be said that assent is made without this physical nexus and conjunction, in order to prove that it is made in the way which they contend.

Next, the aforesaid position is refuted by an efficacious reason: for either that nexus of the copula binds the integral concepts of the extremes which the intellect previously had in mere apprehension, or it does not bind integral concepts which of themselves were, or could be, integral and without conjunction, but the parts of one and the same concept, of which, the copula being loosed, neither part can be an integral concept. But this position cannot be defended in either way;

therefore that kind of composition is fictitious. Further, that this position cannot be defended in either way is easily proved. First, because that copula cannot bind integral concepts and physically unite them, since before they were divided. For although two corporeal substances, as two waters, or two quantities as in the sacrament of the Eucharist, can in reality be so conjoined that there be made either one water or one quantity, nevertheless it has hitherto been unheard of in philosophy that two accidents previously divided and distinct are afterwards so physically conjoined among themselves that one accident be made - unless the substances or quantities in which the accidents were be themselves conjoined and physically united among themselves, as when two coldnesses are united by two waters united and made one water, or by two quantities consecrated in the chalice; yet the accidents by themselves alone cannot physically be united so that one accident be made and a composite. Therefore neither can two concepts previously divided be physically united so that one composite concept be made. From which it is plain that it cannot be brought about that the same concepts of the extremes, which the intellect had separated among themselves in mere apprehension, should remain in composition connected by a real and physical union through the concept "is," conceived in such a way that assent be made. And although the same concepts of the extremes, namely of subject and predicate, which were in apprehension without judgment, could be connected by the concept of the copula "is," nevertheless one should not assert that by the same concept of the copula "is" which was in apprehension they are physically united; for if in apprehension there can be concepts of the extremes and of the copula without judgment and assent, as the adversaries themselves admit, certainly when afterwards there would be assent and the extremes would be connected by the copula, it would be necessary that the concept of the copula which was in apprehension be varied, and that by it something new be represented which was not represented in apprehension. But then it would not be the same concept of the copula, since it would not represent in the same way.

Moreover, if the concept of the copula is to unite not different concepts but parts of one and the same concept - so that there be one concept of composition and division having some extension of representation - it follows that composition could also be found in the intellect of an Angel; for he can have a concept having some extension of representation by the very fact that it represents a thing with extension, that is, as varied in its own being. And in the same way it follows that an Angel could understand all things by discourse, if indeed one composite concept can have what we can have; or rather it follows that neither can we discourse, if discourse is one composite concept, since in one concept the intellect cannot proceed from one thing to another. Add also that, although the conclusion of a syllogism could be connected with the antecedent by the particle "ergo," yet the two premises in a syllogism could by no copula be physically conjoined. Finally, although an affirmative copula could connect the predicate with the subject in a proposition, nevertheless I do not know by what reason a negative copula could connect by such a physical nexus.

Lastly, by a much easier account, according to the common position, we can explain the nature of composition and division: namely, that they are two concepts, one of the predicate, the other of the subject, by which the extremes are not conceived absolutely, but so relatively that one be represented as agreeing with the other, and that this, together with the other, make one judgment.

...to compose one: but to divide is to conceive the extremes, not absolutely, but in such a relative way that one is represented as not agreeing with the other, but as dissenting from it. Now the agreement of the extremes is denoted by us through the copula "is" affirmed; the disagreement, however, through the same copula negated; so that in our mind there does not correspond to the copula a peculiar concept of a thing, although we also have some concept of the word corresponding to the copula: rather, composition and division are of two concepts representing things in the way we said; and therefore it is called a composition of concepts, because the extremes are represented as agreeing in that way; but a division, because the extremes are conceived as divided, that is, as mutually repugnant and in no way agreeing. There is also in discourse, in the premises and the conclusion, a certain connexion, not physical and real, but of representation, in that a thing is represented by various concepts with some order: for the minor proposition represents the extremes conjoined with the major, because one extreme of the minor is in the major; and finally the conclusion represents its extremes under the same order with the premises, as it arises from them, which is denoted by the particle of illation, "therefore"; and thus rightly is preserved the notion of composition and division, namely of concepts in the proposition, and of consequence in discourse. Moreover, before composition and division there is not one concept, but several ordered and a discourse, as likewise the Schoolmen alleged in this disputation openly suppose, and those also cited above in the preceding disputation.

From what has been said it follows that there is never composition and division in mere apprehension without judgment and assent, because there is never composition unless the agreement of the extremes be known, and there is never division unless the intellect know the extremes to clash with one another and in no way to agree. Now in this cognition there is assent, as we shall expressly show 1.2, disp. 62, c. 3, and disp. 79, c. 3; whereupon Aristotle, in the first chapter of De interpretatione, numbers among the three acts and operations of the intellect apprehension, composition and division, and then judgment, and finally discourse; but if simple apprehension, composition, and division were all counted as one way, then he would not have numbered three acts of the intellect, but four, as is clear, by adding the simple apprehension. From which also is refuted the opinion of those who think that assent is a new act of the intellect after cognition even of the agreement of the extremes, as we shall show 1.3, disp. 79, c. 3.[1714]

Then it follows that the opinion of those is false, who say that in relatives the agreement of the one with the other in respect of order can be apprehended by a simple apprehension. First, because since assent and composition in us are nothing else than the concept of two things or natures agreeing with each other, and by that very fact, when one apprehends the Father as related to the Son, he knows the agreement between them, it follows that nothing is lacking for true composition

1714. Aristotle, De interpretatione, c. 1.

and judgment. Besides, because that cannot be called a simple apprehension of the relation of one to another, along with which there cannot be a dissent denying that thing to be referred to another; whereas with simple apprehension there can be assent and dissent about that thing in comparison with any other: but with the simple apprehension by which one apprehends the Father as related to the Son, there cannot be a dissent denying him to be the Father of that Son; therefore the apprehension of that relation was not simple, but a composite cognition with assent and judgment.

Articulus V - Whether falsity can be in the intellect of an angel

Objicitur. To the fifth the procedure is as follows. It seems that falsity can be in the intellect of an angel. For perversity pertains to falsity. But in the demons there is a perverse fantasy, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, book 4.[1715] Therefore it seems that in the intellect of angels there can be falsity.

1. Further, ignorance is a cause of false estimation. But in angels there can be ignorance, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, book 6.[1716] Therefore it seems that in them there can be falsity.
2. Further, whatever falls away from the truth of wisdom and has the note of depravation, has falsity or error in its intellect. But this Pseudo-Dionysius says of the demons in On the Divine Names, book 7.[1715] Therefore...

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in De anima III that the intellect is always true; and St. Augustine also says in the book of the 83 Questions that nothing is understood except what is true.[1717][1718] But angels do not know anything except by understanding. Therefore in angelic cognition there cannot be deception and falsity.

I answer: The truth of this question in some measure depends on what was premised. For it was said that an angel does not understand by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. But the intellect concerning what a thing is is always true, as also sense is concerning its proper object, as is said in De anima III.[1717] But by accident in us deception and falsity occur in understanding what a thing is, namely, according to the account of some composition: either when we take the definition of one thing as the definition of another, or when the parts of a definition do not cohere with one another. As if there be taken for the definition of some thing "a four-footed winged animal": no animal is such an animal. And this indeed happens in composites, whose definition is taken from diverse things, one of which is material to the other. But in understanding simple quiddities (as is said in Metaphysics IX) there is no falsity: for either they are not at all attained, and we understand and know nothing about them, or they are known as they are.[1719] Thus

1715. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4; see also c. 7.
1716. Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastica hierarchia, c. 6.
1715. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4; see also c. 7.
1717. Aristotle, De anima, III, texts 26 and 51.
1718. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (83 Questions).
1717. Aristotle, De anima, III, texts 26 and 51.
1719. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 2.

therefore of itself there cannot be falsity or error or deception in the intellect of any angel. But by accident it happens, yet in another way than in us. For by composing and dividing we sometimes arrive at the intellect of the quiddity, as when by dividing and demonstrating we investigate the definition. Which indeed does not happen in angels: but by the what-it-is of the thing they know all the enunciations that pertain to that thing.

Now it is manifest that the quiddity of a thing can be a principle of knowing with respect to those things which naturally agree with the thing, or are removed from it: but not of those things which depend on the supernatural ordination of God. The good angels therefore, having a right will, by the cognition of the quiddity of a thing do not judge about those things which supernaturally pertain to the thing, except saving the divine ordination. Hence in them there cannot be falsity or error. But the demons, by a perverse will subducing the intellect from divine wisdom, sometimes judge absolutely about things according to natural condition. And in those things which naturally pertain to the thing, they are not deceived. But they can be deceived as to those things which are supernatural. As if, considering a dead man, he should judge that he will not rise again. And if, seeing the man Christ, he should judge him not to be God. And by this the answer to the things objected on both sides is evident. For the perversity of the demons is according to that by which they are not subject to divine wisdom. But ignorance is in angels, not with respect to natural knowables, but to supernatural ones. It is also clear that the intellect of what a thing is is always true, unless by accident according as it is unduly ordered to some composition or division.

Notes on the Article. The prior conclusion of the Article is this: In the intellect of an angel there cannot be falsity per se, that is, in the proper and quidditative cognition which he has of things naturally. And the reason is manifest: because if an angel understands a thing by a quidditative concept, it follows that he understands it as it itself is, and hence is not deceived in the cognition of it: for deception consists in this, that a thing be understood otherwise than it is, by asserting of it that something is which is not. And therefore Aristotle said in Metaphysics IX, text 2, that in the cognition of quiddity there is not falsity, because either a thing is attained wholly, or wholly ignored; about which testimony and the sentence of Aristotle enough and more than enough has been said by us above, disputation 75, chapter 2.[1719]

A later conclusion: By accident falsity can be in the intellect of an angel. St. Thomas says "by accident," that is, in the cognition of those things which he knows not by a proper and quidditative concept, but by conjecture, and from elsewhere than by supernatural revelation, such as are supernatural mysteries, if he were to know them by conjecture only; or likewise the secrets of hearts, or free future events. Nevertheless St. Thomas notes that the good angels in this conjecture are not deceived: because they behave so prudently that they do not dare to pass judgment about these things: but the demons, by their malice rashly judging, are sometimes deceived. Wherefore he does not deny that it belongs to an angel according to nature to incur per se deception about such objects thus known.

1719. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 2.

Moreover, since falsity of the intellect is not found in the apprehension of simples, but in composition and division, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of De interpretatione, chapter 1, and, as we saw in the preceding disputation, an angel does not always judge by composition and division: Cajetan notes, in the commentary on this article, that in the simple apprehension which our intellect forms there is not truth or falsity as in an enunciating one: because neither is there composition on the part of the formal concept, since it is one simple quality; nor on the part of the object, since only one thing is apprehended; or if two are apprehended, they are not known as referred to each other: but truly, in the intellect of the angel judging that a thing is or is not, there is truth and falsity, as in one who enunciates: because although the intellect makes that judgment by a certain simple quality of the formal concept, and thus on the part of that there is not in the intellect of the angel composition and division, nevertheless on the part of the object there is true composition and division: because in reality, by the same simple quality the angel enunciates one thing of another.[1714][1720]

Yet this opinion of Cajetan, although it is true, whenever an angel knows diverse things, and enunciates one of another, or denies it, as when he predicates whiteness of man, and denies horse of lion (for thus on the part of the object there is a distinction of predicate and subject), nevertheless, because sometimes an angel can have a judgment about the same thing, in which he does not distinguish predicate from subject even on the side of the object, as we distinguish; and then he would say the truth no less than if we were to enunciate by composition: therefore I think that one should philosophize otherwise about truth. Furthermore, that an angel can have a judgment in which there is truth as in one enunciating, he proves from this, that he can no less judge that man is an animal and is rational than we judge: yet he cannot distinguish the notion of animal from man, as above in disputation 118, chapter 4, was shown: wherefore neither on the part of the formal concept, nor on the part of the known object, is there in the angel composition. Nevertheless there can be in him truth as in one enunciating, and there could be in him falsity in the same way even in those things which are distinguished by our reason alone, if about these he could be deceived by not distinguishing on the part of the object the notion of predicate from that of subject. In which matter I answer that therefore an angel by a simple concept can no less judge a thing to be or not to be than we by composition and division; and in him there can be found truth as in one enunciating something true; yea, and falsity, if some other thing did not stand in the way, as I said: because that simple cognition, on the part of the formal and objective concept, is equivalent to our composition, nay in many ways, as being more perfect, has the force of enunciation than that one. By this same reason, in the divine intellect there is found truth as in one enunciating, as in question 16, article 5, was said by us. But whether in the intellect of an angel there is practical falsity, or by what rationale there is in him the defect which always precedes sin, we shall say below in disputation 235, c. 3.

1714. Aristotle, De interpretatione, c. 1.
1720. Cajetan, commentary on this article.

Articulus VI - Whether in angels there is morning and evening knowledge

To the sixth the procedure is as follows. It seems that in angels there is neither vespertine nor matutinal knowledge. For evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But in the cognition of an angel there is no kind of obscurity: since there is in it neither error nor falsity. Therefore the knowledge of an angel ought not to be called morning or evening.

1. Further,

To the sixth the procedure is as follows. It seems that in angels there is neither vespertine nor matutinal cognition. For evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But in the cognition of an angel there is no kind of obscurity, since there is in it neither error nor falsity. Therefore the knowledge of an angel ought not to be called morning or evening.

1. Further, between evening and morning night falls, and between morning and evening midday falls. Therefore, if in angels there is matutinal and vespertine cognition, by parity of reason it seems that in them there ought also to be meridian and nocturnal cognition.
2. Further, cognition is distinguished according to the difference of the things known: hence in De anima III the Philosopher says that the sciences follow, as things do, and are diversified accordingly. But there is a threefold being of things, namely in the Word, in their proper nature, and in the angelic intellect, as St. Augustine says in De Genesi ad litteram II. Therefore, if there be posited in angels a matutinal cognition and a vespertine cognition on account of the being of things in the Word and in their proper nature, there ought also to be posited in them a third cognition on account of the being of things in the angelic intellect.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine in De Genesi ad litteram IV, and in The City of God XI, distinguishes the cognition of the angels by morning and evening.

I answer that this that is said of morning and evening cognition in angels was introduced by St. Augustine, who wishes those six days in which God is read Genesis 1 to have made all things to be understood not of these customary days that are traversed by the circuit of the sun (since the sun is read to have been made on the fourth day), but of one day, namely, angelic cognition as set forth to the six genera of things. But as in the customary day morning is the beginning of day and evening its term, so the cognition of the primordial being of things is called morning cognition; and this is according to that whereby things are in the Word. But the cognition of the very being of a created thing, according as it subsists in its proper nature, is called evening cognition. For the being of things flows from the Word as from a certain primordial principle, and this outflow is terminated at the being of things which they have in their proper nature.

To the first, therefore, it is answered that evening and morning are not taken in angelic cognition according to a likeness to the admixture of darkness, but according to the likeness of principle and term. Or it must be said that nothing prevents, as Augustine says in De Genesi ad litteram IV, something from being called light in comparison to one thing, and in comparison to

another being called darkness: just as the life of the faithful and just in comparison to the impious is called light, according to that of Eph. 5:8, "You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord." Which life of the faithful, however, in comparison to the life of glory is called dark, according to that of 2 Pet. 1:19, "You have the prophetic word, to which you do well to attend as to a lamp shining in a dark place." Thus, therefore, the cognition of an angel, whereby he knows things in their proper nature, is day in comparison to ignorance or error, but is obscure in comparison to the vision of the Word.[1721]

Reply to the second: Morning and evening cognition belong to the day, that is, to the angels illuminated, who are distinct from darkness, that is, from evil angels. But the good angels, knowing the creature, are not fixed in it so that they would be darkened and make night; but they refer this very thing to the praise of God, in whom as in the beginning they know all things. And therefore after evening there is not placed night but morning, so that morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the following, inasmuch as angels refer the cognition of the preceding work to the praise of God. Midday, however, is comprised under the name of day, as the mean between two extremes. Or midday can be referred to the cognition of God himself, which has neither beginning nor end.

Reply to the third: Even the angels themselves are creatures. Hence the being of things in the angelic intellect is comprised under evening cognition, just as the being of things in their proper nature.

Conclusion is affirmative.

To the seventh the procedure is as follows. It seems that vespertine and matutinal cognition are one. For it is said in Genesis 1: "There was evening and morning, one day." But by day angelic cognition is understood, as St. Augustine says. Therefore one and the same is the cognition in angels, morning and evening.

1. Further, it is impossible for one potency to have two operations at once. But the angels are always in act of matutinal cognition, because they always see God and things in God, according to that of Matt. 18:10: "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father." Therefore, if vespertine cognition were something other than matutinal, in no way could an angel be at once in act of vespertine cognition.
2. Further, the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 13:10, "When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away." But if vespertine cognition is other than matutinal, it is compared to it as imperfect to perfect. Therefore vespertine cognition cannot be together with matutinal.

On the contrary is what Augustine says in De Genesi ad litteram IV: that there is much difference between the cognition of any thing whatsoever in the Word of God and the cognition of it in its own nature, so that the former rightly pertains to day, the latter to evening

1721. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 23.

I answer that, as was said above, vespertine cognition is called that whereby the angels know things in their proper nature. Which cannot be so understood as though they receive their cognition from the things, as that preposition "in" would indicate a relation to the principle; because angels do not receive cognition from things, as was held above. It remains, therefore, that this "in their proper nature" be taken according to the notion of the thing known, according as it is subject to cognition, so that vespertine cognition in angels be said according to that whereby they know the being of things which things have in their proper nature. Which indeed they know through a twofold medium, namely through innate species and through the rationes of things existing in the Word. For by seeing the Word they do not know only that being of things which they have in the Word, but that being which they have in their proper nature, just as God by the fact that he sees himself knows the being of things which they have in their proper nature. If, therefore, vespertine cognition be said according as they know the being of things which they have in their proper nature by seeing the Word, then one and the same according to essence is vespertine and matutinal cognition, differing only according to the things known. But if vespertine cognition be said according as the angels know the being of things which they have in their proper nature by innate forms, then vespertine cognition is other than matutinal. And thus Augustine seems to understand it, when he sets it as imperfect in respect of the other.

Reply to the first: If the number of six days is, according to Augustine's understanding, taken according to the six genera of things which are known by angels, so the unity of the day is taken according to the unity of the thing known, which nevertheless can be known by diverse cognitions.

Reply to the second: Two operations can be at once of one potency, whereof one is referred to the other: as is clear when the will at the same time wills the end and the things that are to the end; and the intellect at the same time understands principles and conclusions through the principles when already it has acquired science. Now vespertine cognition in angels is referred to the matutinal, as Augustine says. Hence nothing prevents both being together in angels.[1723]

Reply to the third: When the perfect comes, the imperfect is done away, namely that which is opposed to it; as faith, which is of things that are not seen, is done away when vision comes. But the imperfection of vespertine cognition is not opposed to the perfection of matutinal. For that something be known in itself is not opposed to its being known in its cause. Nor again does it involve repugnance that something be known through two media, of which one is more perfect and the other less perfect. Thus to the same conclusion we can have both a demonstrative and a dialectical medium. And in like manner the same thing can be known by an angel through the uncreated Word and through an innate species.

Conclusion is: The vespertine cognition, whereby creatures are known according to their proper formal reasons by the same vision whereby the Word is seen, is not a distinct formal vision, although it is of a different object; nevertheless, the vespertine cognition, insofar as it is through the innate species of things proper to them, is different from the vision of the Word; and in this sense Augustine speaks. In this article only it seems worth noting that St. Thomas openly grants

1723. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV.

that by the same vision whereby God is seen, creatures also are seen according to their own proper reasons; the opposite of which we said seems to us more probable above in disputation 50, chapter 7. Concerning the matter of these Articles and concerning Augustine's mind about it, enough and more than enough has been said by us above in disputation 51.

Quaestio LIX - On the will of the angels

Consequently, what pertains to the will of the angels is to be considered. And first we shall consider the will itself; second, its movement, which is love or dilection.

Concerning the first there are four questions.

Articulus I - Whether in angels there is will

To the first the procedure is as follows. It seems that in angels there is no will. For, as the Philosopher says in De anima III, will is in reason. But in angels there is not reason, but something higher than reason. Therefore in angels there is not will, but something higher than will.

1. Further, will is contained under appetite, as is clear from the Philosopher in De anima III. But appetite is of the imperfect: for it is of that which one does not yet have. Since therefore in angels, especially in the blessed, there is no imperfection, it seems that there is not will in them.
2. Further, the Philosopher says in De anima III that will is a mover of motion: for it is moved by the intelligible appetible. But angels are immobile, since they are incorporeal. Therefore in angels there is no will.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the tenth book on the Trinity: that the image of the Trinity is found in the mind according to memory, understanding, and will. But the image of God is found not only in the human mind but also in the angelic mind, since the angelic mind also is capable of God. Therefore in angels there is will.[1724]

I answer that it is necessary to posit will in angels. For the evidence of which it must be considered that, since all things proceed from the divine will, all are in their own mode inclined by appetite to the good, but in different ways. For certain things are inclined to the good by a merely natural aptitude without cognition, as plants and inanimate bodies. And such an inclination to the good is called natural appetite. Certain things, however, are inclined to the good by cognition: those that apprehend by sense have sensitive appetite, while those that apprehend by intellect have will.

...they are inclined along with some cognition, not indeed so that they know the very notion of the good, but they know some particular good, as sense does when it knows sweet and white and the like. The inclination that follows upon this cognition is called the sensitive appetite. But some

1724. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, X (esp. c. 11 - 12).

are inclined to the good with a cognition by which they know the very notion of the good, which is proper to the intellect. And these are most perfectly inclined to the good: not in such a way as to be directed to the good only by another, as are those that are without cognition; nor only to a particular good, as are those in which there is only sensitive cognition; but rather they are inclined to the good itself in its universality. And this inclination is called will (voluntas). Hence, since angels by the intellect (intellectus) know the universal notion of the good itself, it is manifest that in them there is will.

Reply to the first: Reason transcends sense in one way, and intellect transcends reason in another. For reason transcends sense according to a diversity of things known: sense is of particulars, but reason is of universals. And therefore there must be one appetite tending to the universal good, which is owed to reason; and another tending to a particular good, which is owed to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to mode of knowing: for intellect knows by a simple intuition, whereas reason proceeds discursively from one thing to another. Yet by discourse reason arrives at knowing that which intellect knows without discourse, namely the universal. Therefore the same object is proposed to the appetitive power both on the side of reason and on the side of intellect. Hence, in angels, who are only intellectual, there is no appetite superior to will.

Reply to the second: Although the name of the appetitive part is taken from desiring things not had, nevertheless the appetitive part is not extended only to these, but also to many other things. Thus too the name of stone (lapis) is taken from the injury to the foot (laesio pedis), although this is not the only thing that belongs to a stone. Likewise the irascible power is denominated from anger, although in it there are many other passions, such as hope and daring and the like.

Reply to the third: Will is said to move as a movement according as willing is a certain movement, and so is understanding; and nothing prevents there being such a movement in angels, because such a movement is the act of something perfect, as is said in De Anima III.

Conclusion is affirmative. For its proof nothing worthy of note occurs beyond what we said above in Question 19, Article 1, about the reason by which St. Thomas proves that in God there is will; for all those same points serve to prove that there is will also in an angel.

Articulus II - Whether in angels the will differs from the intellect

It is objected that in angels will (voluntas) does not differ from intellect (intellectus). For an angel is more simple than a natural body; but a natural body by its form is inclined to its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so an angel. Now the form of an angel is either the very nature in which he subsists, or the species which is in his intellect. Therefore an angel is inclined to the good by his nature and by the intelligible species. But this inclination to the good pertains to will. Therefore the will of an angel is nothing other than his nature or his intellect.

1. Further, the object of intellect is the true, but the object of will is the good. But the good and the true do not differ really, but only according to the account. Therefore will and intellect do not differ really.

2. Further, a distinction between what is common and what is proper does not diversify powers. For the same visual power is of color and of whiteness. But the good and the true seem to stand as common and proper: for the true is a certain good, namely of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

But on the contrary: In angels will is of goods only, but intellect is of goods and of evils; for they know both. Therefore in angels will is other than their intellect.

I answer that will in angels is a certain power or potency (potentia), which is neither their very nature, nor their intellect. And that it is not their nature appears from this: that the nature or essence (essentia) of a thing is contained within the thing itself; therefore whatever extends itself to that which is outside the thing is not the essence of the thing. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination which is to the being of the thing is not through something superadded to the essence, but through the matter, which desires to be before it has it, and through the form, which holds the thing in being after it has been brought to be. But the inclination to something extrinsic is through something superadded to the essence, as inclination to place is through heaviness or lightness. And the inclination to make something like itself is through active qualities. But will has an inclination to the good naturally. Hence there only is essence and will the same where the good is wholly contained in the essence of the one willing, namely in God, who wills nothing outside himself except by reason of his goodness. This can be said of no creature, since the infinite good is outside the essence of any caused thing. Hence neither the will of an angel nor of any other creature can be the same as its essence. Likewise neither can it be the same as the intellect of an angel or of a man. For cognition takes place through this, that what is known is in the knower. Hence for that reason the intellect extends itself to what is outside itself inasmuch as that which is outside is by its essence naturally apt to be in it in some way. But will extends itself to that which is outside inasmuch as, by a certain inclination, it in some way tends to the external thing. It belongs to a different power that something have within itself what is outside itself, and that it itself tend to an external thing. And therefore it is necessary that in any creature there be one thing as intellect, and another as will. Not so in God, who has both universal being and universal good in himself; hence both will and intellect are his essence.

Reply to the first: A natural body by its substantial form is inclined to its own being; but to what is external it is inclined by something added, as has been said.

Reply to the second: Powers are not diversified according to a material distinction of objects, but according to a formal distinction, which is attended according to the account of the object. And therefore diversity according to the account of the good and the true suffices for the diversity of intellect and will.

Reply to the third: Because the good and the true are convertible according to the thing, it follows that the good is understood by the intellect under the aspect of the true, and the true is desired by the will under the aspect of the good. Yet the diversity of the accounts suffices to diversify the powers, as has been said.

Conclusion is affirmative; concerning the confirmation of which Cajetan spends many words, which I have judged it worthwhile to pass over; for there is the same common difficulty concerning the intellect and will of angel and of man.

Articulus III - Whether in angels there is free choice

D. In the third way this proceeds. It seems that in angels there is not free choice (liberum arbitrium). For the act of free choice is to choose; but choice cannot be in angels, since choice is an appetite following upon counsel. But counsel is a kind of inquiry, as is said in Ethics III. Angels, however, do not know by inquiring, because this belongs to the discourse of reason. Therefore it seems that in angels there is not free choice.

1. Further, free choice is related to either side. But on the part of intellect there is not in angels anything that is related to either side, because their intellect is not deceived concerning intelligible things that are natural, as has been said. Therefore neither on the part of appetite can free choice be in them.
2. Further, the things that are natural in angels belong to them according to more and less; for in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But free choice does not admit of more and less. Therefore in angels there is not free choice.

But on the contrary: Freedom of choice pertains to the dignity of man; but angels are more dignified than men. Therefore, since freedom of choice is in men, much more is it in angels.

I answer that some things do not act by any choice, but as it were are acted and moved by others, as an arrow is moved by the archer to its end. But some act by a kind of choice, yet not by a free one, as irrational animals. For who flees the wolf by a certain judgment whereby he esteems it harmful to himself. But this judgment is not free to him, but is implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by a free judgment, inasmuch as it knows the universal notion of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice. And thus it is clear that there is free choice in angels, even more excellently than in men, as also intellect.

Reply to the first: The Philosopher speaks of choice as it is in man. But just as the estimation of a man in speculative matters differs from the estimation of an angel in this, that one is without inquiry, the other through inquiry; so also in practical matters. Hence in angels there is choice, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by a sudden acceptance of the truth.

Reply to the second: As has been said, cognition takes place through this, that the things known are in the knower. But it belongs to the imperfection of a thing if there is not in it that which is by nature apt to be in it. Hence an angel would not be perfect in his nature if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can naturally know. But the act of the appetitive power is through this, that the affection is inclined to an external thing. Now the perfection of a thing does not depend on every thing to which it is inclined, but only on what is superior. And therefore it

does not pertain to the imperfection of an angel if he does not have a will determined with respect to those things which are beneath him. It would pertain, however, to his imperfection if he were indeterminate with respect to that which is above him.

Reply to the third: Free choice is in a more noble mode in higher angels than in lower ones, as also the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that freedom itself, insofar as in it there is considered a certain removal of coercion, does not admit of more and less; for privations and negations are not remitted or intensified in themselves, but only by their cause, or according to some added affirmation.

Conclusion is affirmative.

Articulus IV - Whether in angels there is an irascible and a concupiscible

It is objected that in angels there is an irascible (irascibilis) and a concupiscible (concupiscibilis). For Dionysius says, in On the Divine Names IV, that in demons there is irrational fury and insatiable concupiscence. But demons are of the same nature as angels, because sin did not change their nature. Therefore in angels there is an irascible and a concupiscible.

1. Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; but anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible. But these are attributed to good and evil angels in the Scriptures. Therefore in angels there is an irascible and a concupiscible.
2. Further, certain virtues are said to be in the irascible and in the concupiscible, as charity and temperance seem to be in the concupiscible, but hope and fortitude in the irascible. But these virtues are in angels. Therefore in angels there is a concupiscible and an irascible.

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in De Anima III that the irascible and the concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which is not in angels. Therefore in them there is not an irascible and a concupiscible.

I answer that the intellectual appetite does not divide by the irascible and the concupiscible, but only the sensitive appetite does. The reason is that, since powers are not distinguished according to a material distinction of objects, but only according to the formal account of the object, if to some power there correspond an object according to a common account, there will not be a distinction of powers according to the diversity of the proper objects that are contained under that common [account]. Just as, if the proper object of some power were the white as white, the visual power would not be distinguished according to the white and black. But it is manifest from what has been said that the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called will, is the good according to the common account of the good. Nor can there be any appetite unless it be divided according to the distinction of certain particular goods, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which regards the good only under a common account or some particular good. Hence, since in angels there is only an intellectual appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible, but remains undivided, and is called will.

Reply to the first: Fury and concupiscence are said metaphorically to be in demons; thus also anger is sometimes attributed to God on account of a likeness of effect.

Reply to the second: Love and joy, insofar as they are passions, are in the concupiscible. But insofar as they name a simple act of will, they are also in the intellective part: for to love is to will the good of another, and to rejoice is for the will to rest in something.

[from the preceding question, conclusion and notes]

...in some good possessed. And universally none of these is said of the angels according to passion, as St. Augustine says in City of God IX.[1725]

Reply to the third: Charity, insofar as it is a virtue, is not in the concupiscible, but in the will. For the object of the concupiscible is a good delectable according to sense. But of this sort the divine good is not, which is the object of charity. And the same reason is to be given that hope is not in the irascible: because the object of the irascible is some arduous thing which is sensible, about which there is not hope, which is a virtue, but rather about an arduous divine thing. Temperance, however, insofar as it is a human virtue, is about the concupiscences of sensible delights, which pertain to the concupiscible power; and likewise fortitude is about daring and fears, which are in the irascible. And therefore temperance, insofar as it is a human virtue, is in the concupiscible, and fortitude in the irascible. But in this mode they are not in the angels. For in them there are not passions of concupiscences or of fear and daring, which would have to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance in them is said insofar as they exhibit their will moderately according to the rule of the divine will. And fortitude in them is said insofar as they firmly carry out the divine will. All of which is done by the will, and not by the irascible and concupiscible.

Notations concerning the article, and the whole question.

The conclusion is: The intellective appetite in the angels is not divided by the irascible and the concupiscible as by two powers, but it is one and the same individual faculty.

St. Thomas does not deny that the faculty of the will in the angels has an act of appetiting, which pertains to the appetitive power, and an act pertaining to the irascible; but he denies that there are diverse faculties. Concerning the rationale of this article, recall what we said above, disputation 9, chapter 3, namely that the practical and the speculative do not constitute diverse faculties according to species, because they pertain to the same faculty according to reality; and varied respects to varied acts under one common account are in the same faculty, or habit according to reality, just as the respects to white and black in the faculty of seeing do not vary the faculties or habits according to species.[1726] The rest of the points worthy of disputation in this question commonly have their difficulty in man and in the angel; about which, God leading the way, when a more opportune time has been found in the matter of the soul, we shall speak more at length: but about the free decision of man, whether freedom be in it, we have said many things above, disputation 68, chapter 1; which, in the same way, are to be understood of the angel.[1727]

1725. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, book 9.
1726. See above, disputation 9, chapter 3.

Quaestio LX - On love, or dilection, of the angels

Then there is to be considered the act of the will, which is love or dilection. For every act of the appetitive virtue is derived from love or dilection. And concerning this five things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether in the angels there is natural love or dilection

It is argued that in the angels there is not natural love or dilection.

1. For natural love is divided against intellectual, as is clear from Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, book 4.[1728] But the love of an angel is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
2. Further, those things which love by natural love are acted upon more than they act. For nothing has dominion of its nature. But the angels are not acted upon, but act, since they are of free decision, as has been shown. Therefore in the angels there is not natural love or dilection.
3. Further, every dilection is either right or not right. But right dilection pertains to charity; not-right dilection pertains to iniquity. Neither of these pertains to nature. For charity is above nature; iniquity is against nature. Therefore no natural dilection is in the angels.

But on the contrary: Dilection follows cognition. For nothing is loved unless known, as Augustine says in On the Trinity.[1729] But in the angels there is natural cognition.

I answer that it is necessary to posit natural dilection in the angels. For the manifestation of which it must be considered that what is prior is always saved in the posterior. But nature is prior to intellect. For the nature of anything whatsoever is its essence. Whence that which is of nature must be saved also in those that have intellect. Now this is common to every nature, that it have some inclination, which is a natural appetite or love. Yet this inclination is found diversely in diverse natures, in each according to its mode. Whence in an intellectual nature there is found a natural inclination according to the will; in a sensitive nature according to the sensitive appetite; while in a nature lacking cognition, according to the order of nature to something. Whence, since an angel is an intellectual nature, it is necessary that in his will there be natural dilection.

Reply to the first: Intellectual love is divided against natural, which is solely natural insofar as it is of a nature which does not add beyond the notion of nature the perfection of sense or of intellect.

Reply to the second: All the things that are in the whole world are acted upon by something other than the first agent, which acts in such a way that it is in no way acted upon by another; in which there is the same nature and will. And therefore it is not unfitting if the angel be acted upon insofar as the natural inclination is indited to him by the author of his nature. Yet he is not so acted upon that he does not act, since he has a free will.

1727. See above, disputation 68, chapter 1.
1728. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 4.
1729. St. Augustine, De Trinitate.

Reply to the third: Just as natural cognition is always true, so natural dilection is always right, since natural love is nothing other than the inclination of nature given by the author of nature. To say, then, that the inclination of nature is not right, is to derogate from the author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural dilection is one thing, and the rectitude of charity and of virtue is another, because one rectitude is perfective of the other: just as also the truth of natural cognition is one thing, and the truth of infused or acquired cognition is another.

Notations concerning the article.

The conclusion is: In the will of the angel there is natural dilection. Concerning which conclusion and the doctrine of the article, it is to be noted first that St. Thomas here treats of dilection which is an elicited act of the will: for he speaks of the angel's natural inclination according to the will, about which he had disputed in the preceding question; but about the angel's will he teaches that it is borne also naturally to its object, and he calls this operation natural love. Now the natural love of the will is said to be that which is after the mode of nature, that is, necessary and determined in some way, as nature is in its operation; not indifferent to either part, which is proper to the will. For the will is either free; in which respect St. Thomas, I - II, q.10, a.1, teaches that the will wills some things naturally, like sense and life: that is, necessarily and in some determinate way, as we shall explain more abundantly in that place. Moreover, this natural love is distinguished from elective love: for the elective is free and indifferent to either side; the natural, however, is necessary and determined to one part. And since in an act of the will there can be a twofold necessity, as we shall say in that place: one which they call as to exercise, when the will so loves or operates that it cannot not love or operate; the other which they call as to specification, when the will so loves that it cannot have hatred, or so hates that it cannot love: Cajetan rightly warns, in his commentary on St. Thomas, that here he is teaching only this universally, that there is some act of love natural, that is, necessary, in the will: but whether it be necessary as to exercise, or rather as to specification, he does not define. For that there be in the angel some act of natural love suffices that it be necessary as to specification.[1730]

Next, upon the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article, Cajetan spends many things which there is no need to repeat. This, however, is to be observed: by that reasoning it is proved not only that in the angel there is an elicited act of love, but also that some elicited act is natural: because where what is posterior is, there is always what is prior. But to love naturally and necessarily is something prior to loving from choice. Now by what rationale the will of an angel be borne to something naturally, that is, necessarily as to specification; and whether toward some object it can be borne naturally, that is, necessarily as to exercise - about this one must philosophize in the same way as about the human will: but about this we shall treat in the Prima Secundae in that question.

1730. Cajetan, Commentary on the Summa of St. Thomas, ad loc.

Articulus II - Whether in the angels there is elective dilection

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that in the angels there is not elective dilection. For elective dilection seems to be rational love, since choice follows counsel, which consists in inquiry, as is said in Ethics II. But rational love is divided against intellectual, which is proper to the angels, as is said in book 4 of the Divine Names. Therefore in the angels there is not elective dilection.[1731]

1. Further, in the angels there is nothing but natural cognition besides infused cognition, since they do not discourse from principles to draw conclusions. And thus, with respect to all the things which they can know naturally, they are disposed as the intellect is to first principles which it can know naturally. But dilection follows cognition, as was said. Therefore in the angels, besides gratuitous dilection, there is only natural dilection. Therefore not elective.

But on the contrary: By nature neither do we merit nor demerit. But the angels by some dilection of theirs do merit or demerit. Therefore in them there is some elective dilection.

I answer that in the angels there is a certain natural dilection, and a certain elective. And natural dilection in them is the principle of the elective; because that which pertains to what is prior always has the character of a principle. Hence, since nature is the first thing that is in anything whatsoever, it is necessary that that which pertains to nature be a principle in any order. And this appears in man as to the intellect and as to the will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from this cognition there is caused in man the science of conclusions, which are not known naturally by man, but through intention or teaching. Similarly, in the will the end ought in this way to follow the principle in the intellect, as is said in Physics II. Hence the will naturally tends to its ultimate end: for every man naturally wills beatitude. And from this natural will all other volitions are caused, since whatever a man wills, he wills for the sake of the end. Therefore the dilection of the good which a man naturally wills as an end is natural dilection; but the dilection derived from this, which is of the good that is loved for the sake of the end, is elective dilection.

The will so loves that it cannot have hatred, or so hates that it cannot love: rightly does Cajetan warn in his commentary that St. Thomas here teaches only in general that some act of love is natural, that is, necessary to be in the will; but whether it is necessary as to exercise, or rather as to specification, he does not define: for that in an angel there be some act of love that is natural, it suffices that it be necessary as to specification.

Next, as to St. Thomas's reasoning in this article, Cajetan expends much which there is no need to repeat: only this is to be observed, that by that reasoning it is proved not only that there is in the angel an elicited act of love, but also that some elicited act is natural: because where there is what is posterior, there is always what is prior; but to love naturally and necessarily is something prior to loving by choice. By what account, however, the angel's will is borne naturally toward something,

1731. Ethics II; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 4.

that is, necessarily as to specification; and whether it can be borne naturally toward some object, that is, necessarily as to exercise, one must philosophize in the same way as about the human will; about the latter we shall treat in the First of the Second Part, question 10.

Whether in angels there is elective love.

Objicitur. It seems that in angels there is not elective love. For elective love seems to be rational love, since choice follows counsel which consists in inquiry, as is said in Ethics II. But rational love is divided against intellectual love, which is proper to angels, as is said in On the Divine Names, book 4. Therefore in angels there is no elective love.

1. Besides, in angels there is only natural cognition apart from infused cognition, because they do not proceed discursively from principles to acquire conclusions; and thus for all the things they can naturally know they are disposed as the intellect is to first principles, which it can naturally know. But love follows cognition, as was said. Therefore in angels, besides gratuitous love, there is only natural love. Therefore not elective.

But on the contrary: Naturally we neither merit nor demerit. But by some of their love angels merit or demerit. Therefore in them there is some elective love.

I answer: In angels there is a certain natural love (dilectio), and a certain elective love. And natural love in them is the principle of the elective, because what pertains to what is prior always has the account of a principle. Hence, since nature is what is first in each thing, it must be that that which pertains to nature be a principle in each. And this is evident in man both as to the intellect and as to the will. For the intellect knows first principles naturally; and from this cognition there is caused in man the science of conclusions, which are not known naturally by man, but through intention or teaching. Similarly, in the will the end in this way has the condition of a principle in the intellect, as is said in Physics II. Hence the will naturally tends to its ultimate end: for every man naturally wills beatitude. And from this natural will all other volitions are caused, since whatever a man wills, he wills for the sake of the end. Therefore the love of the good which a man naturally wills as an end is natural love; but the love derived from this, which is of the good that is loved for the sake of the end, is elective love.

This, however, stands differently on the side of the intellect and of the will. For, as was said above, the intellect's cognition is according as the things known are in the knower. But it is from the imperfection of intellectual nature in man that his intellect does not straightway have naturally all intelligibles, but certain ones, by which he is in a way moved to others. But the act of the appetitive power is conversely according to the order of the one appetiting to things: some of which are good in themselves, and therefore appetible in themselves; others, however, have the character of goodness from an order to another, and are appetible for the sake of another. Hence, it is not from an imperfection of the one appetiting that he should naturally desire something as an end, and something by choice as ordered to the end. Therefore, since intellectual nature in angels is

perfect, there is found in them only natural cognition, not ratiocinative; but there is found in them both natural and elective love. These things, however, are said passing over those which are above nature; for for those, nature is not a sufficient principle. About these, below will be said.

Reply to the first: Not every elective love is rational love, according to the division by which rational love is set against intellectual. For that love is called rational which follows ratiocinative cognition. But not every choice follows discourse of reason, as was said above when treating of free choice, but only the choice of man. Hence reason is not required.

Reply to the second: The response is clear from what has been said.

Notationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion of the Article is affirmative. Around that doctrine, however, it must be noted that by the name of natural love St. Thomas understands the love of the end; by the name of elective, the love of the means, which are of course subordinated to the end. Moreover, by the name of end he does not understand any end whatever, but beatitude universally, toward which any created will is borne necessarily as to specification, because no one can have it in hatred. Other ends, however, the created will does not all love necessarily as to specification: because in many of those, whether they be desired under the ratio of the honest or under the ratio of the delectable, there can appear the ratio of evil on account of which they can be had in hatred, even in the very work of virtue. I do not say that the very ratio of honesty can be had in hatred; but the work itself, which is desired under the ratio of honesty, can be had in hatred. Which objects are such that in themselves, and as such, they cannot be had in hatred, and thus are loved necessarily as to specification, we shall say in I-II, in that question 10, article 1. And elective love is called by St. Thomas the love of the means, which are useful for some end. But if it be so understood that choice be taken in its proper and primary signification, then truly elective love can only be of means, and not of one only, but among several, as we shall show in I-II, q.13, a.6; for choice, as choice, must be by consultation the choice of one means preferred to others. But if by the name of elective love we understand free love, then elective love will be whatever willing of a singular end of the honest or of the delectable, which is not desired necessarily as to exercise nor as to specification: although in a certain way this will is wont to be called of the means, insofar as the will is said to desire all things for the sake of the ultimate end of beatitude, as we shall explain according to St. Thomas's mind in I-II, q.1, a.6. But Alexander, as is gathered from II, q.30, memb.1, and q.31, memb.3, calls natural love in angels the love of something as fitting; choice, however, he calls the love of one rather than another.[1732]

Next, in this article it could be disputed why the angel wills one thing for the sake of another, and yet does not understand one for the sake of another: about this matter, however, we shall treat in I-II, q.1, a.4, where we shall elucidate the opinion of St. Thomas handed down in this present article.

1732. Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q.30, memb.1; q.31, memb.3.

Articulus III - Whether an angel loves himself by natural love and by elective love.

Objicitur. It seems that an angel does not love himself by natural and by elective love. For natural love is of the end; as indeed it is said, natural love is of the end, but elective love is of the things that are for the end. But the same cannot be both an end and a for-the-end with respect to the same. Therefore there cannot be of the same both natural and elective love.

1. Besides, love is a uniting and concreting power, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, book 4.[1733] But union and concretion is of different things reduced into one. Therefore an angel cannot love himself.
2. Besides, love is a certain motion. But every motion tends into another. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself by natural love nor by elective.

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in Ethics IX that the lovable things which are toward another come forth from the lovable things which are toward oneself.

I answer: Since love is of the good, and the good is in substance and in accident, as is evident in Ethics I, something is loved in a twofold way. In one way as a subsisting good. In another way as an accidental or inherent good: that indeed is loved as a subsisting good which is so loved that someone wills good to it; but as an accidental or inherent good is loved that which is desired for another. Thus, science is loved, not that it be good in itself, but that it be had. And this mode of love some have named concupiscence, the former friendship.

Now it is manifest that in things lacking cognition each thing naturally seeks to attain that which is good for itself, as fire seeks the place above. Whence both the angel and man naturally seek their own good and their own perfection. And this is to love oneself. Whence naturally both angel and man love themselves, insofar as by natural appetite they desire some good for themselves. But insofar as they desire some good for themselves by choice, so far they love themselves by elective love.

Reply to the first: An angel or a man does not love himself by natural and by elective love according to the same, but according to different respects, as has been said.

Reply to the second: Just as it is more to be one than to be made one, so love is more one toward oneself than toward diverse things which are united to him. But therefore Pseudo-Dionysius used the name of union and concretion, so as to show the derivation of love from oneself to others, as unity is derived from the one.

Reply to the third: Just as love is an action abiding in the agent, so it is a motion abiding in the lover: not however tending of necessity into something else, but it can be reflected back upon the lover, so that he love himself, just as cognition is reflected upon the knower, that he know himself.

Notationes circa Articulum.

1733. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 4.

The conclusion is that in both ways the angel loves himself. This conclusion St. Thomas thus explains: since to love is to will good to someone, from Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c.4, and from the same St. Thomas, I-II, q.26, a.4, and Cajetan there: it follows, as Cajetan most excellently noted, and as St. Thomas indicates in both places, that in every act of love there is a twofold respect: one toward the subsisting thing to which we will good; the other toward the good desired. With respect to the subsisting thing to which we will good, it is called love of friendship - understand, if it be a rational thing (for irrational things we do not love except with the love of concupiscence, as I showed in book 3 De Adoratione, disp. 1, c. 6, from Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c.2 and 7, and St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c.91); with respect to the good which we will to someone, it is called love of concupiscence. That both respects are in the same act of love is evident from this, because the very concupiscence of the good is referred to some subsistent thing to which we will that good, and conversely there is no respect of friendship toward a subsistent thing unless in the concupiscence itself of the good.

Since these things are so, it follows that an angel can love himself with natural love and with elective: because he can will to himself some good by natural love and appetite, that is, so necessarily that he cannot not will it to himself, that is, hate it - thus he loves for himself beatitude, grace, and other things of this sort - and he can will to himself some good, not naturally but by choice, that is, so freely that in no way necessarily he desires it.

Cajetan notes, and well, that it is not only possible to love, that is, by concupiscence, some accident of a subsistent (as we love health for ourselves or for a friend), but also to love for ourselves or for another a distinct supposit thing, such as money, wine, and other things of this sort, which can be joined to us by some operation - of which sense I-II, q.4, a.1 treats at length - and in this sense he interprets St. Thomas in this article: from whose doctrine Aristotle in Ethics I, c.6, teaches that something can be loved in a twofold way, both a true subsistent, to which we will some good, and some other accidental good which we will to someone; understanding by accidental good even a thing that is a distinct supposit, to be conjoined, however, only accidentally by some operation.

Then from the doctrine premised of the love of friendship and of concupiscence it is gathered in what way the angel's love by which he loves himself is natural and elective. For if it be considered as love of friendship, it is always natural love, because natural love is that which is necessary in some way, that is, either as to exercise or as to specification: but the love by which the angel loves insofar as it is love of friendship is necessary as to specification, because he so loves himself that he cannot hate himself; "for no one ever hated his own flesh," says Paul to the Ephesians; for if some inflict on themselves evils of death or of punishment, which seems to induce some hatred toward themselves, they do not do so from displeasure at themselves, and thus they do not pursue themselves with the hatred of enmity, but rather they love themselves, desiring to free themselves from one evil by another greater.

But if the love by which the angel loves himself be considered as love of concupiscence, namely insofar as it is referred to the very thing and to the good which they desire for themselves, it can be natural and elective, according to the diversity of the things which the angels desire for themselves, in keeping with what in the preceding article was noted.

Moreover, there are some Thomists who think that the angel always and necessarily loves himself, not only as to specification, but even as to exercise - just as, according to some men's view, he always and necessarily understands himself. And this latter among them is the more approved, which also Ferrarensis taught on III Contra Gentiles, c.109. For evidence of this, the reason is manifest: as we shall say in I-II, ... then the will cannot fail to be in some act, but is borne of necessity as to its exercise, whenever in the very act there does not appear a ratio of evil. But an angel can apprehend a ratio of evil, or of a lesser good, in the very act of loving himself - namely, that he should love God with his whole heart, being even forgetful of himself. Add that in other objects which he loves for himself as good, nothing is found besides God clearly seen, from the love of whom he cannot cease: and so the source of the love of friendship by which the angel loves himself is not distinct from the love of concupiscence by which he desires some good for himself; whence it follows that no act of love of himself is necessary as to exercise, except the love by which he loves for himself God clearly seen; although of necessity it would follow, as to exercise, that he would love for himself some good - this at least still remains certain to me in these matters. Whether he always understands himself we said above, disputation 129, chapter 3.

Articulus IV - Whether an angel by natural love loves another angel as himself.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. It seems that one angel does not by natural love love another as himself. For love follows cognition. But one angel does not know another as himself. For he knows himself by his own essence, but another by that other's likeness, as was said above. Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another as himself

1. Besides, a cause is greater than the caused, and a principle than that which is derived from the principle. But the love which is toward another is derived from that which is toward oneself, as the Philosopher says in Ethics IX. Therefore an angel does not love another as himself, but himself more.
2. Besides, natural love is of ali... whose [text breaks].

Deinde note, with good reason, by Cajetan, that not only can something be loved with love insofar as it is concupiscence (concupiscence, as it were, being an accident of some subsistent supposit), as we love health for ourselves or for a friend; but also a single thing numerically distinct in supposit can be loved for us or for another, as we love money, wine, and other such things, insofar as they can be conjoined to us by some mediating operation, as we shall explain more fully at I - II, q. 4, a. 1; and in this sense he interprets St. Thomas in this article, since from the doctrine of Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, he teaches that something can be loved in two ways, both as a subsistent

thing to which we will some good, and as an accidental good which we will for someone: understanding by accidental good even a thing numerically distinct in supposit, yet to be conjoined accidentally by some mediating operation.[1734][1735]

Then from the foregoing doctrine on love of friendship and of concupiscence it is gathered in what way the angel's love by which he loves himself is natural and elective: for if it be considered as love of friendship, it is always natural love, because natural love is that which is necessary in some way, that is, either with respect to exercise or with respect to specification. Now the love by which the angel loves himself, insofar as it is love of friendship, is necessary with respect to specification, because he loves himself in such a way that he cannot hate himself: for no one ever hated his own flesh, as Paul says to the Ephesians (Eph. 5). For if some inflict on themselves the evil of death or of punishment, which seems some indication of hatred toward themselves, they do not do so from displeasure at themselves, and thus they do not pursue themselves with the hatred of enmity, but rather they love themselves, desiring to free themselves from one evil by another greater.

But if the love whereby angels love themselves be considered as love of concupiscence, namely insofar as it is referred to the thing itself and to the good which they desire for themselves, it can be natural or elective according to the diversity of the things which the angels desire for themselves, according to what was noted in the preceding article.

Moreover, there are some Thomists who judge that an angel always and necessarily loves himself, not only with respect to specification, but also with respect to exercise, just as he always and necessarily understands himself, according to the sentence and opinion of some. Yet the contrary is more probable to me - which also the Ferrariensis taught upon III Contra Gentiles, c. 109, in the section "Ad evidentiam" - and the reason is manifest. For, as we shall say at I - II, q. 4, a. 1, then the will cannot cease from some act, but is of necessity carried as to the exercise, whenever in the very operation and exercise the ratio of evil cannot be apprehended. But an angel can apprehend the ratio of evil, or of a lesser good, in the very act of loving himself, namely, that he love God with his whole heart, even to the forgetfulness of himself. Add that, as to other objects which he loves for himself as goods, there is found nothing, except God clearly seen, from the love of which he cannot cease; and therefore, since the love of friendship by which the angel loves himself is not distinct from the love of concupiscence by which he desires some thing as a good for himself, it follows that there is no act of self-love necessary as to exercise, except the love by which he loves for himself God clearly seen - although it would be necessary as to exercise to love some good for himself, this or that - which, however, is still not sufficiently certain to me, whether indeed he always understands himself; we said above, disp. 219, cap. 3.[1736][1735]

1734. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, I, c. 6.
1735. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 4, a. 1.
1736. Ferrariensis, on Contra Gentiles III, c. 109, "Ad evidentiam."
1735. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 4, a. 1.

Whether an angel by natural love loves another angel as himself.

But on the contrary: Because that which is found in all things, even in those lacking reason, seems to be natural. But as it is said in Eccles. 13, "Every animal loves its like." Therefore an angel by natural love loves another as himself.

I answer that, as has been said, the angel and man naturally love themselves. Now that which is one with something is that very thing. Hence each thing loves that which is one with itself. And indeed, if it be one with itself by natural union, it loves that by natural love; but if it be one with it by a non-natural union, it loves it by a non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow citizen by the love of political virtue, but his blood relative by natural love, insofar as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation. Now it is manifest that that which is one with something in genus or species is one by nature. And therefore by natural love each thing loves that which is one with it according to species, insofar as it loves its own species. And this also appears in those which lack cognition. For fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another, which is its good; just as it naturally inclines to seek its own good, to be aloft. Thus therefore it must be said that one angel loves another by natural love, insofar as he agrees with him in nature. But insofar as he agrees with him in certain other things, or even insofar as he differs from him according to certain other things, he does not love him by natural love.

Reply to the first: That phrase "as himself" can in one way determine cognition or love on the part of the known and loved; and thus he knows another as himself, because he knows another to be, just as he knows himself to be. In another way it can determine cognition and love on the part of the lover and knower; and thus he does not know another as himself. For he knows himself through his own essence, but another not through his essence. And similarly he does not love another as himself, because he loves himself through his own will, but does not love another through that other's will.

Reply to the second: The word "as" does not designate equality, but likeness. For since natural love is founded upon natural unity, that which is less one with it, it naturally loves less. Hence naturally it loves more that which is one in number than what is one in species or in genus. But it is natural that it have like love toward another as toward itself, as to this, that just as it loves itself insofar as it wills a good for itself, so it love another insofar as it wills his good.

Reply to the third: Natural love is said to be of the end itself, not as of that to which someone wills a good, but as of the good which one wills for oneself, and consequently for another, insofar as he is one with oneself. Nor can this natural love be removed even from evil angels, so that they would not have a natural love toward other angels, insofar as they communicate with them in nature. But they hate them insofar as they are diversified according to justice and injustice.

Conclusion: One angel loves another by natural love, insofar as he agrees with him in nature. But insofar as he agrees with him in other things, and insofar as he differs from him, he does not love him by natural love, but by elective love. The doctrine of this article is from the preceding.

Articulus V - Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than himself.

To the fifth, the procedure is thus. It seems that an angel by natural love does not love God more than himself. For, as has been said, natural love is founded upon natural union. Therefore by natural love an angel loves God less than himself, or even than another angel.

1. Besides, that on account of which a thing is [loved], that is itself loved more. But by natural love each one loves another on account of himself. For each thing loves something insofar as it is a good for itself. Therefore by natural love an angel does not love God more than himself.
2. Besides, nature reflects back upon itself. For we see that every agent naturally acts for the conservation of itself. But nature would not be reflected back upon itself if it tended toward another more than toward itself. Therefore by natural love the angel does not love God more than himself.
3. Besides, this seems to be proper to charity, that someone love God more than himself. But the love of charity is not natural in angels, but is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to them, as St. Augustine says in the City of God, book 12. Therefore angels do not love God by natural love more than themselves.[1737]
4. Besides, natural love always remains as long as the nature remains. But to love God more than oneself does not remain in a sinning angel or man. For (as Augustine says in the City of God, book 14) two loves made two cities: the earthly, namely love of self even to the contempt of God; the heavenly, however, love of God even to the contempt of self. Therefore to love God above oneself is not natural.[1738]

But on the contrary, all the moral precepts of the Law are of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God above oneself is a moral precept of the Law. Therefore it is of the law of nature. Therefore by natural love an angel loves God above himself.

I answer that, some have said that an angel by natural love loves God more than himself by love of concupiscence, because namely he more desires for himself the divine good than his own good; and in a certain way by love of friendship, insofar as namely the angel naturally wills that God have a greater good than he himself has. For he naturally wills that God be God, but that he himself have his own proper nature.

But simply speaking, by natural love he loves himself more than God, because more intensely and more principally he naturally loves himself than God. But the falsity of this opinion plainly appears if one considers in natural things toward what things are naturally moved. For natural inclination in those things which are without reason, and in those which are according to reason, manifests a natural inclination in the will of an intellectual nature. Now in natural things, that which, according to nature, is what it is, is principally another's, and is more inclined into that of

1737. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII.
1738. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIV.

which it is, than into itself. And this natural inclination is shown from those things which are naturally done. For as a thing is naturally acted upon, so is it apt by nature to be acted upon, as is said in the Physics, book 2. We see that naturally a part exposes itself to the preservation of the whole body. Thus the hand exposes itself to a blow without deliberation for the preservation of the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find such an imitation in the political virtues. For it is the mark of a virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the whole commonwealth. And if man were a natural part of that city, this inclination would be natural to him. Therefore, since the universal good is God Himself, and under this good there is contained also the angel and man and every creature - for every creature naturally, according to that which it is, belongs to God - it follows that by natural love even the angel and man love God more and more principally than themselves; otherwise, if naturally they loved themselves more than God, it would follow that natural love was perverse, and that it would not be perfected by charity, but destroyed.

Reply to the first: That reasoning holds in those things which are divided equally, because one is not the whole of the other, nor the whole account of the other's existence (*esse*) and goodness. But in those where the one is the whole account of the existence and goodness of the other, that other is naturally loved more than itself, as has been said, namely that each part naturally loves the whole more than itself. And every singular thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own singular good. But God is not only the good of one species, but is the universal good simply. Whence each thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply to the second: When it is said that God is loved by the angel insofar as He is good, if the phrase "insofar as" designates an end, thus it is false. For he does not naturally love God on account of his own good, but on account of God Himself. But if it designates the reason of love on the side of the beloved, thus it is true. For there would not be in the nature of any being that it should love God, unless from the fact that each thing depends on the good which is God.

Reply to the third: Nature is reflected upon itself not only as regards that which is singular to it, but much more as regards what is common. For each thing is inclined to preserve not only its own individual, but also its species; and it has a much greater natural inclination into that which is the universal good simply.

Reply to the fourth: Insofar as God is the universal good, on which every natural good depends, He is loved by natural love by each thing. But insofar as He is the good that beatifies all naturally with a supernatural beatitude, thus He is loved by the love of charity.

Reply to the fifth: Since in God there is one and the same being, substance, and common good, all who see the very essence of God are moved by the same motion of love toward the very essence of God, as it is distinct from other things, and as it is a certain common good. And because, insofar as it is the common good, it is naturally loved by all, whoever sees Him through His essence cannot but love Him. But those who do not see His essence know Him through certain particular effects

which sometimes are contrary to their will. And thus in this way they are said to hate God, whereas nevertheless insofar as He is the common good of all, each thing naturally loves God more than itself.

Notationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion is: An angel naturally loves God even with love of friendship (*amicitia*) more than himself. This conclusion, in my judgment, seems to be understood in two ways in St. Thomas. In one way, such that the angel loves God more than himself either by a supernatural love through charity, insofar as he loves Him as the end of beatitude; or by a non-supernatural love, insofar as he loves Him as the universal good upon which all things depend: and by both loves the angel is said to love God naturally, that is, by way of nature, or necessarily as to the specification, for the reason set forth above. In another way, the conclusion seems to be understood, so as to distinguish the love of charity, which is of the supernatural order and is referred to God insofar as He is the object of beatitude, from the love of the natural order, which is borne toward God as He is the universal good upon which all things depend; and in both ways the angel loves God more than himself. Moreover, as regards the twofold mode of the love of friendship toward God, as He is the end and as He is the universal good of all, and as He is the end of beatitude, whether it is necessary thus to distinguish, we shall say in I - II, q. 109, a. 3.[1739] But whether or not we make that distinction, we must never concede any act of love of friendship toward God without any aid of the grace of God, as will there be proved; nor indeed does St. Thomas in this article, in the solution, concede that in the demons there remains any act of friendship toward God: for this would seem too absurd. Rather, he says only that demons or men can hate God by reason of the effects which they experience as contrary to themselves; he adds, however, that insofar as He is the common good of all, each thing naturally loves God more than itself: that is, the demon or man cannot hate God according to Himself, because he naturally loves Him according to Himself, that is, necessarily, at least as to the specification, as was set out above: from which it does not follow that the demon now in any way remains in the love of friendship toward God.

From the authors, moreover, whom we shall adduce in I - II, q. 109, a. 3,[1740] asserting that God is loved by the angel naturally with love of friendship, insofar as He is our highest good, all say that God is loved by the angel by this love more than the angel loves himself, except St. Bonaventure, who makes no mention of this matter. Furthermore, in order that we understand how it can be true that an angel can love God more than himself by this love of friendship, it must be noted that in the same act of love there is that twofold respect of friendship and of concupiscence, as we noted in the second article. Moreover, as Aristotle and St. Thomas, there cited, say, the things that are loved with love of friendship are said to be loved per se; but the things that are loved with love of concupiscence are said to be loved per accidens. Wherefore, if they be compared with one another, although the respect of love is not the same, it must be said that those things which we love with love of friendship are loved more than those which we love with love of concupiscence. And for this reason alone the angel loves God more than himself when he loves God with love of friendship.

1739. I - II, q. 109, a. 3.
1740. I - II, q. 109, a. 3.

And I understand this whether the love of friendship be called natural or supernatural. Yet this does not hinder that an angel or man may love God for himself as a good for himself; then, however, he will love himself more than God, because he will love himself with love of friendship, but God as a thing desired with love of concupiscence. Nor in this love is there a perverse mind, or a preposterous order; otherwise to love for ourselves beatitude and the clear vision of God, or to hope for it, would be against the due order. For in this love we are ourselves the object of the love of friendship; but God, as our good to be united to us by a mediating operation, is the object of the love of concupiscence. And no one will dare to condemn such an affection: because we must necessarily concede that in some love the angel and man love themselves more than God. But as to the example used by the Holy Doctor to prove that an angel loves God more than himself - namely the example of the arm, which is inclined more to the defense of the head than of itself - we shall speak in I - II, disputation 26, chapter 5.

Finally, it is to be noted that some more recent theologians have thought that God, even obscurely known by the angel, is loved naturally, that is, necessarily not only as to the specification, but also as to the exercise - just as also concerning the love by which the angel loves himself, they philosophize, as we have seen above. But whether we speak of the love of friendship or of concupiscence toward God, there is no reason why we should affirm that God is loved necessarily as to the exercise, unless He be clearly seen: because in the exercise of such love the account of every good cannot appear: which indeed would have been altogether necessary, in order that the angel love God necessarily as to the exercise, as was said in art. 3.

Quaestio LXI - On the production of the angels into the existence of nature

After the things that have been set forth concerning the nature of the angel and their cognition and will, there remains to be considered their creation; either universally about their origin. And this consideration is tripartite.

Articulus I - Whether the angels have a cause of their existence

Ad primum sic proceditur. It seems that the angels do not have a cause of their existence. For of those things which are created by God, it is treated in Genesis, chapter one. But no mention is made there of the angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God

1. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VIII that if some substance is form without matter, immediately through itself it is being and one, and it does not have a cause which makes it being and one. But angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above. Therefore they do not have a cause of their existence.
2. Moreover, whatever is made by some agent, by the fact that it is made, receives form from it. But angels, since they are forms, do not receive a form from any agent. Therefore angels do not have an efficient cause.

But on the contrary is what is said in Psalm 148: "Praise Him, all His angels"; and afterwards it is added: "for He commanded, and they were created."

I answer that, it is necessary to say that both the angels and everything that is other than God was made by God. For God alone is His own existence (*esse*); but in all others the essence (*essentia*) of a thing and its existence differ, as is clear from the foregoing. And from this it is manifest that God alone is being through His essence, but all other things are beings by participation. Now whatever is by participation is caused by that which is by essence, just as whatever is ignited is caused by fire. Whence it is necessary that angels be created by God.

Reply to the first: St. Augustine says in book 11 of the City of God that the angels were not omitted in that first creation of things, but are signified by the name of "heaven," or even of "light." And they were either omitted, or signified by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was speaking to a rude people, who as yet could not grasp the nature of incorporeal things. And if it had been expressly stated to them that there are things above every corporeal nature, it would have been for them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were prone, and from which Moses especially intended to call them back.

Articulus II - Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity

Reply to the second: Substances which are subsisting forms do not have any formal cause of their existence (*esse*) and of their unity, nor an agent cause through a transmutation of matter from potency (*potentia*) to act (*actus*), but they have a cause producing the whole substance. And by this the solution to the third is clear.

Note on the Article. The conclusion is affirmative. The reason by which St. Thomas proves it is that God alone is his own existence (*esse*), and thus he alone is being by essence (*essentia*); whereas other beings, because they are not their existence, are beings by participation. But every being by participation ought to be made by that which is such by essence. In this line of reasoning the difficult point is how, in created things, existence is distinguished from essence; about which there is to be a disputation in III, q. 17. Therefore by a much easier reasoning this catholic position can be proved from the doctrine handed down above in disputation 19, where we established that there must be some being not having its cause; and also from what we said in disputation 25, that infinity by essence - that is, to lack a cause of oneself - agrees to God alone.

It is asked whether the angel was produced by God from eternity. And it proceeds thus.

1. It seems that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by his existence; for he does not act by anything added to his essence. But his existence is eternal. Therefore from eternity he produced the angels.
2. Further, whatever sometimes is and sometimes is not, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is said in the Book of Causes. Therefore the angel is not sometimes and sometimes not, but always.

3. Further, St. Augustine proves the incorruptibility of the soul from this, that through the intellect it is capable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so it is eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature, and that of the soul and of the angel, is not only incorruptible, but also eternal.

But on the contrary: It is said in Proverbs 8, in the person of begotten Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything at the beginning." But the angels were made by God, as has been shown. Therefore there was a time when the angels were not.

I answer: One must say that God alone - the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit - is from eternity. For the catholic faith holds this without doubting, and whatever is contrary is to be refuted as heretical. Likewise God so produced creatures that he made them from nothing, that is, after there had been nothing.

Reply to the first: The existence of God is his very willing. Therefore, from the fact that God produced the angels and the other creatures by his existence, it does not follow that he did not produce them by his will. But the will of God is not of necessity disposed with respect to the production of creatures, as was said above. And therefore he produced both what he willed, and when he willed.

Reply to the second: The angel is above time which is the number of the motion of the heavens, because he is above every motion of corporeal nature. He is not, however, above time which is the number of the succession of his being after not being, and also which is the number of the succession that exists in his operations. Whence St. Augustine says in book 8 On Genesis ad litteram that God moves the spiritual creature through time.

Reply to the third: Angels and intellective souls, from this very fact that they have a nature by which they are capable of truth, are incorruptible. But they did not have this nature from eternity; it was given to them by God when he willed. Whence it does not follow that the angels are from eternity.

Conclusion. The conclusion is negative, and it is of faith, as is clear from the things we have said in disputation 178, chapter 1, and as we shall say in the following disputation.[1742]

Articulus III - Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world

It is objected first: It seems that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For St. Jerome, on the Epistle to Titus, says: "Six thousand years of our time are not yet fulfilled. And what lengths of time, and what origins of ages, are we to think there were, in which the Angels, Thrones,

1742. Vazquez cross-references his own disputations (disp. 178, cap. 1; and the sequens disputatio).

Dominations, and the other orders served God?"[1743] St. John Damascene also says in book 2: "Certain people say that before every creation the angels were begotten, as the Theologian Gregory says: He first conceived the angelic and celestial powers, and the conception was his work."[1744]

1. Further, the angelic nature is a middle between the divine nature and corporeal nature. But the divine nature is from eternity, and corporeal nature is in time. Therefore the angelic nature was made before the creation of time, and after eternity.
2. Further, the angelic nature is further distant from corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another. Whence also the six days of the production of things are described in the beginning of Genesis. Therefore much more was the angelic nature made before all corporeal nature.

But on the contrary: It is said in Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But this would not be true if he had created anything before these. Therefore the angels were not created before corporeal nature.

I answer: Concerning this a twofold opinion is found among the holy Doctors; yet the more probable seems to be that the angels were created together with the corporeal creature. For the angels are a certain part of the universe. For they do not constitute of themselves one universe; but both they and the corporeal creature concur to the constitution of one universe. This appears from the order of one creature to another. For the order of things among themselves is the good of the universe. But no part is perfect when separated from its whole. It is therefore not probable that God, whose works are perfect, as is said in Deuteronomy 32, created the angelic creature separately before the other creatures. Although the contrary is not to be reckoned erroneous, especially because of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is so great that no one has ever presumed to cast blame upon his sayings, just as neither upon the documents of Athanasius, as St. Jerome says.[1745]

Reply to the first: St. Jerome speaks according to the opinion of the Greek Doctors, who all agree in this, that the angels were created before the corporeal world.

Reply to the second: God is not any part of the universe, but is above the whole universe, precontaining in himself in a more eminent mode the whole perfection of the universe. But the angel is a part of the universe. Whence the reasoning is not the same.

Reply to the third: The corporeal creatures are all one in matter (*materia*); but angels do not agree in matter with the corporeal creature. Whence, once the matter of the corporeal creature is created, all things are in a certain manner created; but the universe itself would not be created if the angels were not created. If, however, the contrary be held - because it is said in Genesis 1, "In

1743. St. Jerome, Commentary on Titus 1:2.
1744. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II; citing St. Gregory Nazianzen.
1745. St. Gregory Nazianzen; cf. St. Jerome's testimony of the authority of Nazianzen and Athanasius.

the beginning God created heaven and earth" - it must be expounded: "in the beginning," that is, in the Son; or "in the beginning" of time; not, however, "in the beginning," that is, before anything was made, unless it be said, "before anything in the genus of corporeal creatures was made."

Conclusion: The conclusion is negative; concerning which a disputation will be forthcoming for us.

Disputatio CCXXIV - On whether the angels were created before the corporeal world

- Angels were created at the beginning of duration, yet before the visible world - this is the opinion of not a few Fathers. Chapter 1.
- The aforesaid opinion cannot be openly condemned from Scripture. Chapter 2.
- Nor would there have been sufficient other foundation for that opinion to be condemned. Chapter 3.
- The words of the Lateran Council do not contain a condemnation of the foregoing opinion. Chapter 4.
- That the angels were created together in duration with the corporeal creature is perhaps the more probable opinion. Chapter 5.
- The reasons of the former opinion are answered. Chapter 6.

Angels were created at the beginning of duration, yet before the visible world - this is the opinion of not a few Fathers.

Caput I - Against Aristotle and other philosophers, it is a faith undoubted among the Fathers and the Catholic Church that no spiritual creature was from eternity, but had a beginning of its duration.

For in Proverbs 8 it is said: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything," according to the reading of our Vulgate; for the Septuagint, for "before he made anything," translated "his works," a reading followed by not a few Latin and Greek Fathers, whom we cited in III, q. 1, a. 3.[1746] This truth is also defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the supreme Trinity and the catholic faith.[1747]

However, whether at some time before every corporeal creature, or truly together with it, the angels were produced, is not, among the ancient Fathers, beyond controversy. For many affirm that before the visible and corporeal world the angels were produced by God. In this opinion were, among the Greek Fathers, Origen, homily 4 on Isaiah "In principio" (although in the preface to the books Periarchon at the end he thinks the matter doubtful), St. Basil, homily 1 on Genesis before the middle, and homily 2 on those words "The earth was void and empty"; St. Gregory Nazianzen,

1746. On the Vulgate and LXX readings and patristic followers, see Vazquez's earlier citation at III, q. 1, a. 3.
1747. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), c. Firmiter, on the Trinity and the catholic faith.

in the panegyric oration on the Nativity of the Lord, which is the 38th, before the middle, "Sic nimirum," and the following, which Nicetas follows in the same place. Moreover the same Nicetas in oration 39 of Nazianzen, which is on the holy lights, on those words "At vero nobis," and the same Nazianzen in oration 42, which is the second on Easter, "Quoniam autem," where he repeats what he had said in that oration 38; and St. John Damascene judges Nazianzen's opinion truer, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, toward the end.[1748]

Among the Latins this same thing was taught by St. Hilary, book 12 On the Trinity, after the middle; St. Ambrose in the preface to Psalm 1, and book 1 of the Hexaemeron, chapter 5, after the middle; St. Jerome on the Epistle to Titus, in the large commentaries found in tome 6, on the words of chapter 1, "Which God, who does not lie, promised"; and Cassian, Conference 8, chapter 7, who not only considers this opinion truer, but also affirms that none of the faithful doubts it. Also usually referred to this opinion is the author of the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, cited by St. Augustine, chapter 10; there, however, he only teaches that when the darkness still concealed the very water which God had created out of nothing upon the earth, and the water itself hid the earth, then the angels and all the heavenly powers were made, so that the goodness of God might not be idle, but that God might have those in whom, through many spaces beforehand, he might show forth his goodness. By which words this author does not signify that the angels were created before every corporeal creature, since the earth and the water were already existent; but that they were produced before light, when as yet there were darknesses upon the face of the abyss, and before the earth was rendered visible by the light itself. St. Augustine is also referred in favor of this opinion on that Psalm 89, "Before the mountains were made," etc.; yet he does not teach it there. Finally St. John Chrysostom is usually alleged, homily 22 on Genesis; but in that place he only teaches that the angel sinned before our first parent was formed.[1749]

Nevertheless, the following seem to favor this opinion: St. Gregory, book 28 of the Morals, chapter 7, on that text "When the morning stars praised me," where he says: "First in time was the nature of rational spirits created." Add also Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, sentence 4, who seems to hold this same; nay, he even adds that the devil was created before the good angels, and proves it from that Job 4 "He..."

... Moreover, many understand by the name Behemoth (namely Behemoth) the demon; and Bede also agrees, in the Book of Questions, q. 9, in the eighth tome, who reports the words of Isidore; yet he explains them in this way, that the devil is said to have been created before the good angel according to the order of the dignity of nature, not according to duration; and in this sense we can even interpret Bede himself, Isidore, and Gregory, in that in which they teach that the angel was created before the corporeal world, so that they be understood of the order according to dignity, not according to duration; from which explanation Gregory himself does not shrink, book

1748. Origen, Hom. 4 in Isaiam; St. Basil, Hom. 1 in Genesim; Hom. 2 on "Terra erat inanis et vacua"; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 38 (In Theophania) and related orations; Nicetas the Paphlagonian on Nazianzen; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3.

1749. St. Hilary, De Trinitate XII; St. Ambrose, Praefatio in Ps. 1; Hexaemeron I, 5; St. Jerome, In Titum 1:2; John Cassian, Collationes VIII, 7; Ps.-Augustine, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus c. 10; St. Augustine on Ps. 89; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 22 in Genesim.

28 of the Moralia, chapter 18, where he says of the devil that he was the first created, because God made him more eminent. But the foundations of that opinion which affirms that the angel was created before the corporeal world we shall allege below and refute.

But against what above we premised from the common sense of the Fathers - namely, that the angel was created at the beginning of duration and not from eternity - Basil seems to teach the contrary in the place cited above; for he says: "There was indeed a certain state older than the generation of the world, suitable to the supermundane powers, supratemporal, eternal, sempiternal; but the maker and artificer of all brought it to perfection." By these words he seems to hold that the supermundane substances (substances: substantiae), which he calls powers, were in an eternal age suitable to them. Yet I would understand Basil thus, that the angels existed before the motion of the heaven, which we call time; but before time there was an imaginary interval, as we explained above from the mind of certain Saints, disputation 31, chapter 6, which is conceived after the manner of a flowing now. In this sense, therefore, Basil says that the angels were, not because they were created without a beginning, but because as yet there was not time, which is in the motion of bodies: this indeed he denoted when he said that there is "a certain state older than time and generation, and supratemporal." I confess indeed that Augustine, in the imperfect work on Genesis, chapter 3, teaches that, if the angel had been before the creation of the corporeal world, nevertheless he would be in time; for he himself calls the succession of any operations of the angel "time": he would, however, admit that in this way the angel would be above our time, which consists in the motion of a body.

Caput II - That the aforesaid opinion cannot be plainly condemned from Scripture

More recent theologians not only follow the opposing opinion - which also to us seems much more probable than the aforesaid opinion of the Fathers which we reported in the previous chapter - nor do they hesitate to imprint upon it the mark of demerit: both because all the Scholastics, with the Master and many Fathers, follow the opposite; and also because there is not altogether satisfaction given to the testimonies of Scripture and of the Lateran Council which are alleged against it. However, every learned and prudent man ought to imitate the modesty of the Angelic Doctor, who in this article not only deferred to so many ancient and most weighty Fathers, but even yielded to one only, Nazianzen alone, so that he did not dare in any way to condemn the former opinion; by which his modesty the holy Doctor very gravely reproves the license of the theologians of our time in judging the opinions of others. There are indeed others also, theologians much more recent than the former, who dare to affirm that the aforesaid opinion of Nazianzen is manifestly confuted by Scripture, as if St. Thomas were ignorant of this Scripture. Others truly believe that it is manifestly condemned in the Lateran Council. But, that we may defend the authority of Nazianzen, of Hilary, and of so many Fathers, in this chapter and the following we shall show that their opinion was never condemned either in Scripture or by the Church; from which we shall also gather that it must not be branded with the name of demerit. And indeed to this point that the opinion of Nazianzen has not been condemned, Cajetan in this article, and Sixtus of Siena in the place to be alleged below, teach.[1750]

First, therefore, we shall show by induction that it cannot be proved from Scripture that the angels were not created before the corporeal creation. For there are three testimonies which seem able to be alleged against Nazianzen; yet they prove nothing. The first testimony is Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": that is, by saying "in the beginning," he means before all the rest; because before the heavens and the earth were created nothing had been made. But it is not certain that "in the beginning" signifies a beginning of order in comparison with all creatures universally, but some take it to signify the beginning of time, which consists in the motion of a body, as if he said, "At the beginning of time God created heaven and earth"; or, if it denotes a priority of duration, it is not taken simply with respect to all creatures universally, but with respect to corporeal things, of which there is express mention in that chapter.

The second testimony is Ecclesiasticus 18: "He who lives forever created all things together." Here indeed, if the place has any weight so as to show that the angels were created together with the corporeal creation and not before, it also proves that all bodies of the elements and of living things were created together in duration, as Augustine wanted; whose opinion in this matter is commonly rejected by all: therefore we must all interpret this place so that it does not prove that all bodies, nor that the angels were produced together with all bodies in duration. The Doctors have variously understood the aforesaid testimony; Gregory, book 32 of the Moralia, chapter 9, elsewhere 10, explaining that Job 40, "Behemoth, whom I made with you," with these words expounds the aforesaid place of Ecclesiasticus: "Since heaven and earth are together described,

1750. Cajetan, on I, q. 61, and Sixtus of Siena, as cited below.

together, both spiritual and corporeal [things]; together whatever rises from the heaven; together whatever is brought forth from the earth, is indicated. Therefore it is said that God made all things together, because all the things which afterwards were made were made from these two." Therefore Gregory refers the particle "together" not to the corporeal and the spiritual, but to those things which afterwards were made by propagation: for these are said to have been together made in their cause. For the stars afterwards were made from the heaven; living things, however, from the waters and from the earth, as is clear from Genesis 1. This interpretation St. Thomas followed in this place, I, q. 74, article 2, reply to the second.[1751]

I indeed think that the aforesaid place also can be explained in one of two other ways, such that nothing against Nazianzen is proved from it: first, indeed, so that all things are said to have been created together because they were brought forth in a most brief time. For this reason Genesis 2 says: "These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth," where the particle "in the day" is put for "in the days," on account of the short interval of time. And Mark 10: "From the beginning of the creation God made them male and female"; although they were not from the very first moment of the beginning of the world in the individual, but a little afterwards, as is clear from Genesis 1, since on the sixth day our first parents were created. And John 8: "He (namely the devil) was a murderer from the beginning"; nevertheless he was not from the very moment of the world's beginning a murderer, or a deceiver of our first parents, or the persuader of the murder of Abel by his brother Cain.

According to this interpretation someone could say that from that place it is sufficiently proved that the angelic spirits were produced together with the corporeal creation, but that the angels were created a little before. However, because many of the Saints and Fathers alleged for the preceding opinion not only said that the angels were not created together with the corporeal creation, but were brought forth much earlier, the aforesaid interpretation would not suffice to defend their opinion from the mark of error. Then the aforesaid place of Ecclesiasticus can also be explained in another, more fitting way, such that the particle "together" is not referred to the duration of time, nor denotes that "at the same time" all things were produced by God, but that it signifies the same as "equally" or "in common"; by which it signifies only a collection of things. In this sense then it would be: "He who lives forever created all things together," that is, he created all alike, with nothing excepted except himself; and the Greek adverb koinê, which our Vulgate has translated "simul" (together), signifies this. Moreover, the Latin adverb simul in Scripture itself and in the Vulgate edition is already used in this sense: Psalm 13: "They have all gone aside, together they have become useless"; Psalm 48: "Together the senseless and the fool shall perish."

Finally, someone could interpret the same place with Rupert, book 2 on Genesis, chapter 28, in this way: he created all things together not in their own proper natures, but in his own wisdom, so that afterwards he might bring them all forth outside. Because God first had in his mind all the things which he was going to make, by which he would bring them forth outside himself. Of these interpretations the one immediately preceding seems more probable to me.[1752]

1751. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2; Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 32, c. 9 (alias 10), on Job 40 "Behemoth, whom I made with you."

The third testimony against the opinion of Nazianzen could be that Hebrews 1: "Are they not all (namely the angels) ministering spirits, sent to minister...?" which Theodoret uses in the place alleged below, to prove that the angels were produced at the same moment of time with the visible world. For if they had been produced earlier, they would not be ministering spirits sent for the ministry of the corporeal creation: because they would have been before there was a corporeal creation to which they could minister. But this testimony is weak: for although the angels were constituted as ministering spirits of our salvation after Christ had been made conformed to us, nevertheless it was not necessary that this ministry should always have been assigned to them; especially since this does not befit the angel by his nature, but by office and duty; nor was man created for their sake, but only after he had been created were they deputed to this ministry. From which one may gather that there is no testimony of Scripture by which the Fathers who hold the aforesaid opinion can be convincingly refuted; which Epiphanius, who followed the opposite opinion, noted when he said that nowhere does Scripture clearly indicate the time of the creation of the angels.

That there was not sufficient other foundation whereby the aforesaid opinion should be condemned.

Caput III - That there was not sufficient other foundation whereby the aforesaid opinion should be condemned

From the Scholastic Doctors, Ferrar., book 2 against the Gentiles, chapter 83, § 9. But as to the last point, he judges that the aforesaid opinion of the Fathers was condemned, and that the opposite was plainly defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the Trinity and the catholic faith, where it is said thus: "The creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporal, who by his almighty power at once, from the beginning of time, created from nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporal, the angelic namely and the mundane." Wherefore Ferrar. judges that the aforesaid opinion of the Fathers cannot be defended without the sin of heresy after this definition of the Council. With Ferrar. some more recent Thomists agree, whom, as I said above, the modesty of St. Thomas does not lightly reprove, who pronounced openly concerning the opinion of the Fathers that it is not erroneous.

But Ferrar. thus interprets the holy Doctor, that he says that opinion is not erroneous directly, but indirectly. He calls that erroneous directly which is against those things which are plainly revealed to us in Scripture as articles of faith; but indirectly, that which is not against anything revealed as an article of faith; yet from it there follows something against faith and Scripture: which indeed, after the Church's determination, cannot be defended without the sin of heresy. Wherefore neither could the aforesaid opinion of the Fathers be defended without heresy, after the time when in the Lateran Council the opposite was defined de fide. But against this last point I show that in the Council of Lateran nothing was defined de fide against the opinion of Nazianzen.

1752. Rupert of Deutz, In Genesim, lib. 2, c. 28.

For that a council may define this truth, it must rest either on Scripture, or on tradition, or on a reasoning deduced from principles of faith: on none of these could it rest. First, not on Scripture, as was proved in the previous chapter. Secondly, not on tradition: for the tradition of the Church among the Doctors and Fathers of the Church is preserved when their common consent teaches something as a certain dogma of faith: but in this controversy the Fathers of the Church do not commonly consent; rather they are divided among themselves: for neither are fewer, nor less weighty, who follow the former opinion than those who follow the opposite; where then did the Church acknowledge the tradition? especially since Cassian, in the place alleged in chapter one, says that no faithful man doubts that the angels were created before the world and the corporeal creation. Furthermore Augustine, who thinks that the angels were created in duration together with the corporeal creation, admits that the matter is uncertain, in the book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 6 - if indeed that book is Augustine's; and in the imperfect work on Genesis, chapter 3, he says that it is impenetrable to conjectures; but in the City of God, book 11, chapter 23, speaking of the opinion of those Fathers who said that for many ages before the corporeal creation the angels had been created, at length he concludes in these words: "Accordingly let each one take it as he will: for it is so profound that, for the exercise of readers, it can generate several opinions not wandering from the rule of faith; provided, however, that no one doubts that the holy angels are not coeternal with God." Theod. also...[1753]

Caput IV - That the words of the Lateran Council do not contain the condemnation of the foregoing opinion

Even if we were to concede that the Church could have defined as certain, against the aforesaid Fathers, that the angels were produced together in time with the corporeal creature, and that for this it had an excellent and solid foundation; nonetheless, that this was not defined by the words of the council is judged not without reason by the weighty theologians of our age, with Cajetan in this article, and Sixtus of Siena in book 5 of the Bibliotheca sancta, annotation 5. They think that, just as Cajetan interpreted the words of the council cited in the preceding chapter, by which that sentence seemed to be defined against Nazianzen, one should attend, not so much to the words themselves of the council, as to its mind. But the mind of the council was to condemn the error of Origen, who said that God in the beginning made only spiritual creatures; afterwards, however, when certain of them sinned, He made bodies, so as to thrust them into them as into a prison-house and there to punish them; and on that occasion He made every corporeal creature, which in itself is not good, nor would it otherwise have been made except on account of the aforesaid occasion. That this error was condemned in the council St. Thomas expressly affirms in opuscule 23, a little before the middle.[1754] From this Cajetan infers as follows: although that Decretal in its words embraces both that the spiritual creature as well as the corporeal was produced by God, each

1753. Augustine, De Incarnatione Verbi c. 6 (attributed), In Genesim imperfectus liber c. 3, and De civitate Dei XI, 23. Theodoret is cited below on Heb. 1:14. Lateran IV (1215), c. Firmiter: "Creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium... simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam."

1754. St. Thomas, Opusculum 23, "Contra errores Graecorum" (attributed), a little before the middle, on the Lateran decree.

in itself and not on occasion of the other, and that the corporeal was made together in duration in the beginning of time with the spiritual: nevertheless, the former point is defined only as certain against Origen. But in that opuscule St. Thomas only asserts that in that Decretal of the Lateran Council that error of Origen is condemned; whether, however, the words of the council ought to be understood only in that sense, that the error of Origen is condemned, or also so that it is defined that both creatures were produced simultaneously in duration - this St. Thomas does not teach. And since, when explaining in that opuscule that Decretal, he says nothing about the production of the angels with the corporeal creature, he clearly indicated that nothing about this matter was defined therein. Add that, since in this article he openly says that nothing against the opinion of Nazianzen has been declared by the Church, about the mind of St. Thomas in this matter it is not permitted to doubt. It is also clear from that opuscule that, without foundation, certain Thomists, as Cajetan reports, said that therefore the Holy Doctor in this article thought that the Church had decreed nothing against Nazianzen, because he did not have knowledge of that decree of the Lateran Council; yet he explicitly expounded that decree in opuscule 23. Those Thomists, however, say that the aforesaid opuscule is not by the Angelic Doctor, and in this sentence Ferrara seems to consent in the place cited. Still, even if that opuscule were not St. Thomas's, he himself could not have been ignorant of the decree of the Lateran Council, both because that council was celebrated before the times of St. Thomas, and also because the decretal epistles had already been compiled in his time.

This interpretation of Cajetan and Sixtus of Siena, which he applied to the words of the council, some nevertheless impugn at the outset on the ground that that error of Origen had long before been condemned by the Church; therefore, in that council nothing against Origen was defined a second time. Next, because that council was not convened against the errors of Origen, but against Joachim the Abbot and Almeric, who thought ill about the Trinity. Yet these reasons against Cajetan's interpretation have little strength. For although that council was not convened against the errors of Origen, but against Joachim and Almeric, nevertheless the error of Origen could have been condemned by the way, since many other things also are defined in chapter 2 of that council, where the symbol of faith is set down, before in the second chapter the error of Joachim and Almeric is condemned. In the first chapter, in fact, many things about the sacraments are premitted, for the definition of which the council had not been convened. Therefore the council could also have condemned by the way the error of Origen, so that in this manner it might preface a complete symbol of faith. Moreover, that the error of Origen had been condemned in the fifth Council of Constantinople - whose canons Nicephorus reports in book 17 of the History, chapter 27 - would not have prevented its being condemned anew in the aforesaid Lateran Council. For in the Council of Trent too, session 6, in canons 1, 2, and 3, certain dogmas of Pelagius are confirmed which had long before been condemned in the Councils of Milevum and Africa.[1755]

For my own part I judge that that error of Origen was not condemned in the Lateran Council - in which matter I dissent from Cajetan; nor was it defined therein that the angels were created simultaneously in duration of time with the corporeal creature - in which I agree with the same

Cajetan; yet I am led to this sentence on a different ground. For if, with Cajetan, we once conceded that the very words of the council plainly contain that definition which the adversaries contend for, we should vainly divine about any other intention of the council. For, as we said above, although the council had not been convened for that end, nevertheless if in express words it had once defined it, it would not be permitted to doubt the truth of such a definition. But if that particle "simul" which the Lateran Council uses in its definition denoted duration of time, and hence that the angels were created simultaneously in duration with the corporeal creature, we could not but assert that this was defined by the Pontiff as a certain dogma of faith; for at the beginning of the chapter he premits: "We firmly believe and simply confess," etc., and under this form he subjoins that God created both creatures from nothing simultaneously. From which form it is plainly gathered that that dogma was defined by the council. I judge, then, that the council did not define that the angels were created simultaneously in duration with the corporeal creature. For the particle "simul," which seemed to signify this, is not always referred to duration, but sometimes signifies the same as "together" (pariter), as we noted in chapter 2. We can therefore interpret the mind and the words of the council just as in chapter 2 we explained that word of Ecclesiasticus 18: "He created all things simul." And this interpretation is most approved by me for this reason, that it in no way pertained to that symbol of faith which the council wished to preface, to define anew at that time that both creatures were produced by God simultaneously in duration; but that both were created together (pariter) by God very much pertained to the explication of the article of God the almighty and creator. And since, as was shown in chapter 3, there was no firm foundation for the council to define that all things were created simultaneously in time, we ought not to suppose that the council wished to define this. Wherefore advisedly did the council say: "Simul, ab initio temporis, utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam," and did not say "simul tempore," so as to define that each creature had the beginning of its duration together (pariter), although not simultaneously at the same point of time. In the same sense we shall explain below in the last chapter, in the reply to the fourth argument, the particle "with thee" (tecum) in that Job 40: "Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee." Which particle indeed seemed to signify the same as "simultaneously in duration."

But someone may say that time began with the motion of the corporeal creature, and that the angel began from the beginning of time. For in this way Augustine says, City of God XI, 6, that before the world there was no time, because there was no creature by whose motions time might be measured; whom Hugo of St. Victor and the Master, to be cited in the next chapter, follow. Therefore, the angel began in the same moment of time with the corporeal creature. I answer: "beginning of time" is not used by the council for the beginning of that which we commonly call time, which is in the motion of the heavenly body and serves us as the measure of other motions and durations; but it took it for the beginning of any duration whatsoever, even of a permanent one, such as is the duration of the angelic substance. In this way, even if no corporeal creature had been created, we could say that the angel was created, not from eternity, but in the beginning of

1755. Nicephorus Callistus, Historia ecclesiastica, lib. 17, c. 27; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 1 - 3; on the prior condemnations of Pelagian propositions at Milevum and in Africa.

duration, if he had been created after not-being. It is therefore the same to be created "from the beginning of time," and "not to be created from eternity." And it seemed necessary to define this, so that the article of creation might be exactly explained.

Caput V - The more probable opinion is that the angels were created simultaneously in duration with the corporeal creature

A far more probable opinion is that of those who assert that the angels were created simultaneously in duration with the corporeal creature; yet, as from the foregoing is clear, the opposite sentence ought not to be branded either with error or with rashness. This is taught first, among the Latin Fathers, by St. Augustine in City of God XI, chs. 6, 9, and 21; in Contra Faustum XX, ch. 21; and in the book On Genesis ad litteram, chs. 7 and 8.[1756] Although in the book On the Incarnation of the Word, ch. 6, he says that it is uncertain when the angels were created - indeed that book is Augustine's - and in the Imperfect Work on Genesis, ch. 3, he calls this matter most secret and impenetrable to human conjectures. The same is handed on by Bede in the Hexaemeron, in the part after the beginning in tome 4; by Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, book 1, part 1, chs. 8 and 4; and by Rupert in Genesis, book ..., ch. 10; and it is referred by St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, book 32, ch. 9 (alias 10), where he says that together both the corporeal and the spiritual creation are to be understood.[1757] Then among the Greeks consent Epiphanius, Heresy 65, against Aëtius, and Theodoret, Question 3 on Genesis.[1758] Finally the Scholastics, with the Master in II Sentences, dist. ..., whom there is no need to rehearse one by one; and the same sentence is held by St. Thomas with Cajetan, and by the Thomists, in this article.

Reasons more probable are also brought forward for this. First, they prove it from Nazianzen, Oration 39, which is on the holy Lights (In sancta lumina), "a little while from the beginning" (parvum ab initio); from Augustine on that Psalm 103, "That dragon"; from Isidore, De summo bono, book 1, ch. 12, sentence 7; which some confirm from that Apocalypse 12, "There was made a great battle in heaven," and so forth - although we shall see in the following disputation, in the chapter which follows, that from that place it cannot be proved.[1759] Next they prove the same from this, that for the angels who sinned "eternal fire" was prepared, as in Matthew 25: "Depart into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels"; and in 2 Peter 2: "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but thrust them down into the darkness of hell, and delivered them to be tormented in Tartarus"; and in Jude: "The angels who kept not their first estate ... he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." Therefore, if they then sinned, everlasting fire in hell - corporeal - was already destined; and hence they did not sin before the corporeal creature was established. Nor did they sin after the corporeal creature

1756. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, 6; 9; 21; Contra Faustum XX, 21; De Genesi ad litteram, chs. 7 - 8; cf. De Incarnatione Verbi c. 6 (attributed), and In Genesim imperfectus liber c. 3.

1757. Bede, Hexaemeron (post initium), in tome 4; Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, lib. 1, pars 1, c. 8 and c. 4; Rupert of Deutz, In Genesim, and St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 32, c. 9 (alias 10).

1758. Epiphanius, Haeresis 65 (adversus Aëtian), and Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 3.

1759. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 39, In sancta lumina; Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. 103 (on "Draco iste"); Isidore of Seville, De summo bono, lib. 1, c. 12, sententia 7; Apoc. 12 "Factum est praelium magnum in caelo."

had been produced with any long interval; for then, by the opposite, it would follow that the evil angels persevered for a long time in the grace of God, which is not credible. It seems more in accord with reason that the angels are readier by nature for their operation and choice than men; therefore, if they were created before men and before bodies by many ages, they would either have sinned long before or been confirmed; and neither squarely fits the tradition that their fall followed very quickly upon their creation. But if one were to say that the angels were produced only a little before the corporeal creature, so that they would have been created a short while before the creation of bodies, it is more fitting, given the whole corporeal universe was created together, that those who by office are ministers with respect to corporeal things should also have been created together in duration with the corporeal creature, rather than a little before it.

If the good and the evil angels were created before the corporeal world, they were either created many ages before, or a little before. If many ages before, as the authors of the prior sentence expressly teach - Jerome and Cassian, to whom Basil would seem to consent - then they either sinned before the corporeal world was made, or after it was made. But it cannot be said that they sinned before the world was made; for as soon as the angel sinned, Michael and his angels fought with Lucifer in heaven, and from that Lucifer and his angels fell into hell - as the common and ancient opinion holds, which Chrysostom relates - so that their punishment, which belongs to a corporeal place and corporeal fire, would have been before the creation of corporeal things; which is absurd. Nor can it be said that they sinned after the world was made, but before man was created; for then they would have persevered for a notable time in grace before their sin, whereas their very promptitude in the operation of their nature makes it more credible that their probation was short. Therefore it seems more reasonable that the angels were produced at the same time in duration with the corporeal creature.

Caput VI - The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved

The remaining reasons, by which the former party is supported, are to be refuted. Let the first reason be that which Cassian uses in the place cited, to this effect: it is not to be believed that God was for so many ages before the creation of the corporeal creature idle as it were and without the exercise of His power; therefore He created first the spiritual creatures, through whom He might exercise His governance, before He produced corporeal creatures. To this we must answer in due order.

A far more probable opinion is that of those who affirm that the angels were created simultaneously in duration with the corporeal creature; yet the opposing opinion, as is evident from what was set forth above, ought not to be branded either with error or with rashness. Among the Latin Fathers, St. Augustine taught this first, in the City of God, book 11, chapters 6 and 9 and 22; in Contra Faustum, book 20, chapters 1 and 21; in On Genesis according to the Letter, chapters 7 and 8; although in the book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 6, he says it is uncertain

when the angels were created - if indeed this book is Augustine's. And in the Unfinished Work on Genesis, chapter 3, he calls this matter most secret and scarcely penetrable by human conjectures.[1760]

The same was handed down by Bede in the Hexaemeron a little after the beginning in tome 4, by Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 On the Sacraments, part 1, chapters 3 and 4, and by Rupert, book On Genesis, chapters 10 and 11; it is also reported by St. Gregory the Great, book 32 of the Moralia, chapter 9 (alias 10), where he says that when "heaven and earth" are said to have been made together, one should understand both corporeal and spiritual things.[1761] Then among the Greek Fathers, Epiphanius in Heresy 65 (against Aëtius), and Theodoret in Questions on Genesis, question 3, agree.[1762] Lastly the Scholastic doctors together with the Master in II Sentences, distinction 2 - whom it is not necessary to set forth one by one - hold the same; likewise St. Thomas with Cajetan and the other Thomists in this article. And since, as we have shown above, this opinion is not plainly defined by Scripture, nor by tradition, nor by a decree of the Church, it remains that it be confirmed by us with this more solid and more probable reason.

If the good and bad angels were created before the corporeal world: either they were created many ages before, or a short time before. If many ages before - as Jerome and Cassian expressly taught from among the Fathers of the former opinion, to whom Basil seems to agree - then either they sinned before the corporeal world was made, or after it was made. But it cannot be said that they sinned before the corporeal world was created: because immediately upon the angel's sin, Michael and his angels were fighting with Lucifer in heaven, whence Lucifer and his angels were cast into hell, as the common opinion of the Fathers holds: St. John Chrysostom, Homily 3 on the words of Isaiah (after the middle), and Homily 15 on John (near the end); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 39, On the Holy Lights; Augustine on that verse of Psalm 103, "Draco iste"; Isidore, On the Supreme Good, book 1, chapter 12, sentence 7; and the Apocalypse 12, "There was a great battle in heaven."[1763] Next, this same point is proved: because, when the angels sinned, there was prepared for them the eternal fire (Matt. 25). Likewise, "the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. 25); and 2 Peter 2, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but, dragging them down to the lower hell, delivered them to be tormented in chains of darkness"; and Jude in his canonical epistle says of the angels that sinned, that he did not spare them, but "reserved them under darkness in eternal bonds unto the judgment of the great day": therefore, immediately upon their sin, the eternal corporeal fire in hell was assigned to them, and consequently they did not sin before the corporeal creature was brought into being.

1760. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, 6; 9; 22; Contra Faustum XX, 1; 21; De Genesi ad litteram, chs. 7 - 8; cf. De Incarnatione Verbi c. 6 (attributed), and In Genesim imperfectus liber c. 3.

1761. Bede, Hexaemeron (post initium), in tome 4; Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, lib. 1, pars 1, c. 3 - 4; Rupert of Deutz, In Genesim, c. 10 - 11; and St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 32, c. 9 (alias 10).

1762. Epiphanius, Haeresis 65 (adversus Aëtian), and Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 3.

1763. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 3 on the words of Isaiah; Hom. 15 on John; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 39, In sancta lumina; St. Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. 103 (on "Draco iste"); Isidore of Seville, De summo bono, lib. 1, c. 12, sententia 7; Apoc. 12, "Factum est praelium magnum in caelo."

Nor did they sin after the production of the corporeal creature, if they were created together with it many ages before: because on the contrary it would follow that for many ages the evil angels persevered in the grace of God; which is not credible: for it seems more consonant with reason that the road of the angels should be finished in a briefer span than that of men; since angels by their very nature are more prompt than men in operation and in choice. But if it be said that the angels were brought forth a little before the corporeal creature, this will be said without any foundation: for why, indeed, should they be created a little before, when they could be created together with the whole corporeal universe? Or by what reasoning could this be made plausible? Therefore it seems more probable and more consonant with reason to assert that the angels were not before the corporeal creature, but were brought forth simultaneously in duration with it.

The arguments for the prior opinion are dissolved

It remains to dissolve the reasons on which the prior opinion rests.

The first reason is that which Cassian uses in the place cited, in this way: one must not believe that God was idle for so many ages before the creation of the corporeal creature; therefore we must assert that God, by his goodness, communicated himself to spiritual creatures before he produced corporeal creatures. By this line of reasoning it would be empty and vain to hold that the angels were created together in duration with the corporeal world; for then it would follow that for many ages the world was without light, which is absurd.

I answer: if the argument had any force, it would certainly prove that the angels were produced by God from eternity, lest through an eternal duration God be idle. For however God had created spirits "from the beginning," even if he had produced them before the corporeal creature, it would follow that, for the eternal duration before their production, God would have been idle: but no Catholic will judge this an absurdity; on the contrary, according to the Catholic faith, it must necessarily be confessed, since it is certain that God created nothing from eternity. Some made use of this same argument of Cassian, as Augustine reports, City of God, book 11, chapter 5, to prove that the world was produced from eternity. But Augustine replies, first, that nothing is proved: for if it proved anything, by the same reasoning it would follow, as Epicurus said, that there were an infinite number of worlds produced by God, lest God be idle through those infinite imaginary spaces; how he infers this Augustine explained above, disputation 29, chapter 4. Then he also replies that no perfection accrues to God from his doing something outside himself; and on the contrary, no perfection is lacking to him if he does nothing; and accordingly it matters little that, through infinite ages, he produced nothing outside himself.

The second reason is: if the angels had been created together with the corporeal world, Moses would have made some mention of their creation; but he made no mention of them when he spoke of the creation of the corporeal world: therefore it is a sign that they were not created together with the corporeal world. Augustine, in the places cited in this disputation and above in disputation 51, and Bede in the Hexaemeron, think that the creation of the angels was not omitted by Moses, but that he signified it to us under the name of "light." Yet this opinion is commonly rejected, and with

good reason: because since Moses's Scripture was a historical narrative, its words should be used in their common and popular signification, not in metaphorical ones; wherefore the Doctors commonly, by the name of light, understand not angels but corporeal light. Augustine, however, understood Scripture in that sense in order to defend that all things were created in one day; but the days which are numbered in the first chapter of Genesis are distinguished only according to the light of angelic understanding; which opinion is deservedly exploded by all.

Others, however, think that Moses omitted the creation of the angels lest the people, too prone to idolatry, should adore angels as God: so Athanasius said in the Questions to Antiochus, question 2, and Theodoret in the Questions on Genesis. But this opinion does not commend itself to me: because by the same reasoning Moses ought nowhere to have made mention of angels; yet he speaks of them often in Genesis, Exodus, and in other books; therefore, by that reasoning, he would not have omitted their creation. Wherefore I judge more truly that Moses did not make mention of the angels' creation because the purpose of his work did not require it: for, as St. Jerome writes in epistle 139, Moses wished only to describe the order of the creation of corporeal things - either, as some think, because that people was rude; or, what is truer, because only in corporeal things created was there that series and variety of days which required explanation; that the angels had been produced by God was sufficiently established.

A third reason is taken by Cassian from the book of Job 38, where the Lord says to Job, "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth," etc.; and a little after, "When the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy"; and according to the Septuagint translation, as Cassian reads, "When the stars were made together, all my good angels praised me with a loud voice." Now those who are said to be present at the production of some thing and to praise the maker on account of it seem to have been before that thing: therefore the angels who stood by at the creation of the stars, and praised God the maker on account of it, preceded the creation of the stars.

I reply, first, that according to our Vulgate edition, which is deservedly received by all as authentic, nothing can be proved from that place; and our Vulgate fits the context and the Hebrew reading better. Then, even if we admit the Septuagint reading, Theodoret very well replies that those who argue from that place do not rightly consider that the stars were not created on the first day but on the fourth, as is manifest from the first chapter of Genesis, and consequently the angels could very well have been present at the creation of the stars, even if they had not been created before every corporeal creature. Add also that, even if the stars had been made on the first day, it would not be inept to say that the angels stood by at their creation and praised the Lord and maker because of it; for the angels too, on account of their own creation, in the very first moment, praised their God and returned thanks to him. We adduced this in the place cited from the author of the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas among Augustine's works, chapter 10.

The fourth argument someone could make for the prior opinion is from Job 40, where of Behemoth it is said, "He is the beginning of the ways of God"; but by Behemoth is understood the devil. I reply that, even if by Behemoth the demon is figuratively understood, nevertheless in the primary and literal sense an elephant is signified, or some other terrestrial animal from the race of

dragons, as some judge; of that animal Eugubinus rightly expounds that it is rightly said to be "the beginning of the ways of God," that is, of the works of God and of his inventions - not because it precedes the rest of God's works in the order of duration (as is manifest), but because in vastness of body, magnitude, and strength, it excels the other brute animals; in which sense James 1 says: "Of his own will he has begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be some beginning of his creature." For "beginning" in Greek is ἀπαρχή, which signifies an offering, libation, and first-fruits; and the same can be signified by the word ἀρχή, for it is the same as principality and magistracy; this is the word found in Job in the place cited; for the first-fruits are the best part of the thing itself and hold the primacy among the rest. In this same manner we will explain that in Proverbs 8, "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways," as St. Thomas expounds, I, q. 3, a. 3, where the Seventy use the word ἀρχή. But if it be understood of the demon - something that ought to be taken only figuratively - then it must be understood likewise of the order, not of duration, but of dignity, as is evident from Bede and Isidore, whom we mentioned in chapter 1, whose opinion St. Gregory indicates, book 32 of the Moralia, chapter 18 (alias 24). But what is said in that same chapter 40 of Job, "Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee," does not denote that Behemoth was produced simultaneously in duration with Job, or with man; but the particle "with thee" signifies the same as the particle "together," as we noted in chapter 4.

We could argue fifth from that in Titus 1: "Which blessed hope God promised before secular times": for if such a promise was made before these secular times, which are numbered from the beginning of the world (for the age of the world is called a "seculum," as I observed in disputation 35, chapter 1), it must have been made to some creature; and no other seems to have been that creature than an angel: therefore the angel was created before these secular times. I reply, as I said in that disputation, that the word "promised" does not signify some promise made by a spoken word, but the eternal predestination of God, as St. John Chrysostom and Anselm note on that place, and Augustine in the City of God, chapter 16. In what sense Paul says "before secular times" was explained in that same disputation.

Articulus IV - Whether the angels were created in the Empyrean heaven

Objicitur: It seems that the angels were not created in the Empyrean heaven. For angels are incorporeal substances (substance: substantia). But an incorporeal substance does not depend on a body either according to its existence (esse) or, consequently, according to its coming-to-be. Therefore the angels were not created in a corporeal place.

1. Furthermore, Augustine says, 3 On Genesis according to the Letter, that the angels were created in the higher part of the air. Therefore not in the Empyrean heaven.
2. Furthermore, the Empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If, therefore, the angels had been created in the Empyrean heaven, it would not have suited them to ascend thence; which is contrary to what is said in Isaiah 14 in the person of the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven."

But on the contrary: Strabus says on that text, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," that "heaven" here is not the visible firmament, as he calls the firmament later, but the Empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual one, which is called fiery not from heat but from splendor. What was straightway made was filled with angels.

I answer: It must be said that, as has been said, from corporeal and spiritual creatures one universe is constituted. Whence thus were spiritual creatures created...

... I answer, even if by Behemoth a demon be figuratively understood; yet in the primary and literal sense an elephant is signified, or some other terrestrial animal of the dragon kind, as some think; just as by Leviathan is signified a whale of the sea, or some kind of fish. Concerning that animal Eugubinus rightly explains why it is rightly called the beginning of the ways of God, that is, of the works of God and of his devices: not because in the order of duration it precedes the other works of God, as is manifest, but because by the vastness of its body, its greatness, and its strength it excels the other brute animals; in which sense James 1 says: "Of his own will he begot us by the word of truth, that we might be some beginning of his creature" - beginning in Greek is aparchē, which signifies an offering and first-fruits; the word archē can signify the same, for it is that which is principality and magistracy, which word occurs in Job in the cited place; for first-fruits are the best of the thing itself, and they hold the primacy among the rest. In the same way we shall explain that of Proverbs 8: "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways," etc. But if it be understood of a demon - which is to be taken only figuratively - it must in the same way be understood of order, not of duration, but of dignity, as is clear from Bede and Isidore, whom we mentioned in chapter 1, whose opinion St. Gregory also indicated in book 32 of the Moralia, chapter 18 (alias 24). And what in that same book, chapter 40, is said in Job, "Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee," does not denote that Behemoth was produced in duration together with Job, or with man, but the particle "with thee" signifies the same as "together," namely a collection of things, just as above concerning the particle "together" I noted in chapter 4.

Fifth, we could argue from that of Titus 1: "In hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, promised before the secular times." For if such a promise was made before these secular times, which are numbered from the beginning of the world (for the age of the world is called a saeculum, as I observed in Disputation 35, q. 1), it ought to have been made to some creature; but no other creature seems to have existed before the secular times. I answer that, as has been said, the universe is constituted of rational and spiritual creatures as well as corporeal; whence it was fitting that such a promise be referred not to a temporal promise then made to an actually existing creature, but to the eternal preordination of God. Hence Chrysostom and Augustine explain that word "before the secular times" as signifying the eternal decree of God rather than a temporal promulgation.[1764]

1764. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. on Titus 1:2; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, 6; 9; 22; Contra Faustum XX, 1; 21; De Genesi ad litteram VII - VIII (passim), where "before the secular times" is taken of God's eternal decree rather than a temporal promissory act.

Whether the Angels were created in the Empyrean heaven

It is objected that Angels were not created in the Empyrean heaven, because: 1) Angels are substances incorporeal, and do not depend on a body either according to their essence (*essentia*) or according to their coming-to-be; therefore they were not created in a corporeal place. 2) Moreover, Augustine says that certain angels sinned in the superior part of the air; therefore they were not created in the Empyrean heaven. 3) Moreover, Heaven is said to be the throne of God; but the angel who sinned said: "I will ascend into heaven" (Isa. 14); therefore he was not in heaven.

But on the contrary: In the beginning God created heaven and earth: by "heaven" the firmament is here not named, but that highest heaven which is called Empyrean, not from fire, but from splendor; which heaven is filled with spiritual creatures, and with respect to the corporeal creation they have a certain order; and presiding over the whole corporeal creation, it was fitting that Angels be created in the highest body as presidents of the whole corporeal nature, whether it be called the Empyrean heaven or by whatever other name. Hence Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the Angels, upon that of Deuteronomy 10: "The heaven and the heaven of heavens are the Lord thy God's."

I answer: Angels were not created in a corporeal place as if dependent on a body either according to their essence or according to their becoming. For God could have created the Angels before the whole corporeal creation, as many holy doctors hold. But they were made in a corporeal place to manifest the order of their relation to corporeal nature, and what things they accomplish by their power concerning bodies.

Reply to the first: Augustine perhaps by "the highest part of the air" understands the highest part of heaven; for with heaven the air has a certain affinity because of its subtlety and diaphaneity. Or he speaks not of all the Angels, but of those who sinned, who according to some were of the inferior orders. Yet nothing prohibits us from saying that the higher Angels, having a power elevated and universal above all bodies, were created in the highest body of creation, and others, having more particular powers, were created in inferior bodies.

Reply to the second: There it is not speaking of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Holy Trinity; into which the sinning Angel wished to ascend, when he wished in some way to be made equal, as will be made clear below.

Conclusion: The Angels were created in the Empyrean heaven.

Various opinions

Summa Sententiarum, tract. 2, c. 1; the Ordinary Gloss also taught the same on the earlier words of Genesis. Their opinion is wont to be confirmed from this, that Lucifer and his Angels fell from heaven, according to Luke 10: "I beheld Satan like lightning falling from heaven," which place some understand of the demon's fall from heaven when he first sinned; Origen in book 1 of the Periarchon, ch. 5, Ambrose in the book De fuga saeculi, ch. 7 before the middle, St. John Chrysostom, Homily 10 De paenitentia in the fifth tome before the middle, Gregory, Moralia 13, ch.

4, Theodoret, book 5 of the Fables of the Heretics, on the devil, Prosper, the book De diurnis temporibus, ch. 3, Bernard, Sermon 2 Ad fratres, and Theophylact on that place, although he also applies another interpretation which we shall report below.[1765] Following, then, this sense, Gregory expounds the said place thus: when Christ saw his disciples - who had been sent endowed with the power of casting out demons - return with joy, saying, "Even the demons are made subject to us in thy name," in order, after the example of Lucifer who fell by the affection of pride, to repress their immoderate affection of vainglory, he said: "I beheld Satan like lightning falling from heaven"; then he subjoins: "Nevertheless in this rejoice not, that spirits are subject to you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven" (Luke 10).

Likewise, the same opinion of the Scholastics is wont to be confirmed from that of Apocalypse 12, where the battle of Michael with the dragon is described in heaven; whence some infer that Lucifer fell from heaven through sin, and therefore that previously he had been there; whence they further conclude, not without probable conjecture, that he was first created there.

And yet, although the opinion of the Scholastics asserting that the Angels were created in the Empyrean heaven is more probable, nevertheless we have no firm testimony of Scripture from which we could certainly gather it. Therefore this opinion of the Scholastics seems to me probable, because just as man was created on earth, so likewise it seemed fitting that an Angel be created in heaven. But that there be two genera of Angels, and that demons were first produced outside heaven, but the good Angels in heaven itself - this they said without any firm foundation, as Augustine notes in the cited place. Moreover, that Angels were first produced outside heaven, then by grace translated into heaven, as Rupert thinks, is no less without reason. It remains, therefore, that they were produced in heaven itself as in their native and proper soil; and since the other heavens, besides the Empyrean, are moved, they were created in the Empyrean as in a quiet place.

The testimonies of Scripture by which some confirm that common opinion of the Scholastics, if we follow the more probable interpretation, are not of great weight. The first testimony is that of Luke 10: "I beheld Satan," etc. Even if it were understood of the first fall of the devil, as the above-cited in the preceding chapter understand it, it would only prove that all angels were in the Empyrean before they sinned; from this, however, it does not follow that they were also first created there. For someone could say with Rupert that he indeed fell from heaven, not because he had been created there, but because he had been translated there by grace, and afterwards fell from the state of grace and from heaven itself. Then, it does not seem that the Lord in that chapter of Luke 10 spoke of the first fall of the demon by sin, nor that he said those words to repress the affect of vainglory of the disciples, as Gregory thought. For, as Theophylact noted, from the things which are there narrated to have been done and said by the Lord's disciples, one cannot gather any spirit of vainglory or pride: for the disciples glory that demons were subject to them, but in the name of Christ, to whom they referred the glory of the victory; and therefore they said, "The demons are subject to us in thy name." But when Christ adds, "Nevertheless in this rejoice not, that spirits are

1765. Origen, Periarchon I, 5; St. Ambrose, De fuga saeculi c. 7; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 10 De paenitentia; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XIII, 4; Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum lib. V, cap. De diabolo; Prosper, De diurnis temporibus c. 3; St. Bernard, Sermo 2 ad fratres; Theophylact on Luke 10.

subject to you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven," he does not repress the joy of victory against the demons - as if it were of vainglory - but he shows that in which they ought principally to rejoice. For many were going to cast out demons in the name of Christ whose names were not written in the book of predestination, to whom he would say, "I know you not."

Therefore Theophylact interprets the aforesaid place, first indeed in this way, that along with the Fathers alleged by us in the first chapter he speaks of the fall of Lucifer from heaven, and thence he has no strength thereafter: as if Christ were saying, Do not marvel that demons are subject to you; for since Lucifer fell from heaven, he has no strength. Then the same Theophylact and Euthymius explain "heaven" as dignity which he had in the world before the Incarnation of Christ, besieging human affairs and being adored by them as God; to which exposition Basil in homily 9 seems to favor, where by "heaven" he understands the air, which he says is the place of the principality of the demon who dominated in the world.[1766]

For my part, I especially approve the interpretation of Jansen, chapter 80 of the Concordia Evangelica: that when the disciples were returning from preaching and said that they also had cast out demons in the name of Christ, Christ himself answered in this manner: "I beheld Satan like lightning falling from heaven" - that is, do not think you report something new to me; I also, with you, together with power, surely knew that all the forces of Satan were ruined. I further judge that when you were casting out demons, I was seeing Satan falling without any delay, like lightning is wont to fall swiftly from heaven; and the imperfect tense verb "I was seeing" indicates this sense not obscurely. The words ought then to be joined thus: "I beheld Satan falling like lightning from heaven"; wherefore that phrase "from heaven" ought not to be joined with "Satan falling," so that from that place it be sufficiently proved that Lucifer fell from the Empyrean heaven, but from bodies possessed he fell, as lightning is wont to fall down from the middle air.

Then that place of Apocalypse 12, where the battle of Michael is described with the Dragon in heaven, if it be understood of the first fall of Lucifer, only proves that the evil angels were in heaven before they sinned and then by sin fell thence; but from this one ought not to gather that Angels were created in the Empyrean heaven. Certain of the holy Fathers follow this sense, nor can it be proved from there that the first battle of the Angels was in the Empyrean with Michael, whom John saw fighting with the Dragon; some understand Christ by Michael, and by the Angels the Apostles of Christ fighting under Christ; and the Apostles themselves, when they cast out demons, drove from the world the idols with which the pagans were ensnared, and by death were victors with Christ and after Christ are alive. Others think that John did not see the first battle of Michael with Lucifer, when Michael, set over the proud angels, stood against them with those words, "Who is like God?" but the last battle of Michael with the demon for human souls, which was accomplished in heaven, that is, in the Church: and thus Anselm interprets that common sentence in Apocalypse; so also Augustine, in the book De vera et falsa poenitentia, does not think the "now is made" to

1766. Basil, Homily 9, where by "heaven" he understands the air as the seat of the demon's principality.

have been said by Angels in heaven, but by men on earth. However it be, according to the common opinion of the Fathers, we cannot from this place gather that Angels fell from heaven by sin, much less that they were created in heaven.[1767]

Quaestio LXII - On the perfection of the Angels in the state of grace and glory

Consequently, it must be investigated in what way the Angels were made to be in the state of grace or of glory. And concerning this there are nine questions.

Articulus I - Whether the Angels were in their creation blessed

To the first we proceed thus: It seems that the Angels were created blessed, because...

But, as I noted a little above, even if we follow the mind of the holy Fathers, it cannot be proved from that place that the battle of the Angels was in heaven. For Ambrose, on that passage, understands by Michael, whom John saw fighting with the Dragon, Christ; and by the Angels, the Apostles of Christ: therefore Christ and his Apostles fought against the demon and his Angels, because the demons stirred up the Jews against Christ, thinking they would overcome Christ by death; and they were overcome by the death of Christ. Others think that John did not there see the first battle of Michael with Lucifer, when Michael with those words "Who is like God?" resisted the proud evil Angels; but the battle of Michael with the demon for the souls of the just by a secret inspiration. It is said, moreover, to have been done "in heaven," that is, in the Church: thus the author of the commentary on the Apocalypse published among Augustine interprets that place; and in the ninth tome, Homily 6, Bede, Anselm, Primasius, Rupertus, Arethas, St. Thomas, Dionysius the Carthusian, Gagneius on that place of the Apocalypse, and Richard of St. Victor interpret it so.[1768]

Wherefore, rightly and at once there is subjoined in the same chapter an act of thanksgiving, wherein the Angels congratulate one another for the victory by these words: "Now is made salvation, and power, and the kingdom of our God, and the authority of his Christ: for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, who accused them before our God day and night. And they overcame him by the blood of the Lamb, and by the word of their testimony; and they loved not their lives unto death" (Apoc. 12). From which it is clear that "brethren" are there understood of men, who were being accused by the demon, and they themselves bravely resisted even to the shedding of blood and to death; or, as Anselm, Oecumenius, the Gloss, and the Scholastics explain, "they loved not their lives," that is, their animal life, "unto death," that is, so that souls should perish; but lest souls should perish, they did not hesitate to lose animal life - which cannot be said of Angels. The

1767. Cornelius Jansen, Concordia Evangelica c. 80; cf. Anselm, Oecumenius, the Ordinary Gloss, and the Scholastics on Apoc. 12, who understand "they loved not their lives unto death" of human martyrs, not of Angels.

1768. Primasius, Rupert of Deutz, Arethas, St. Thomas, Dionysius the Carthusian, Jacques Gagnée (Gagneius), and Richard of St. Victor are cited as interpreting Apoc. 12 of ecclesial conflict; cf. Richard of St. Victor, In Apocalypsim IV, c. 2; the "author of the commentary" printed among Augustine; Bede, Hom. 6 (ninth tome); Anselm.

author, indeed, of the commentary published among Augustine judges that that voice "Now is made" was not of Angels in heaven, but of men on earth. However it be, according to the common opinion we cannot gather from this place that the Angels fell from heaven through sin, nor therefore collect that they were created in heaven.

Consequently, there must be investigated in what manner the Angels were made to be in the state of grace or of glory. And concerning this nine things are asked.

Whether the Angels were in their creation blessed

Objection 1. It seems that the Angels were created blessed. For it is said in the fourth book On the Dogmas of the Church, that "the angels who persevere in that beatitude in which they were created, do not possess by nature the good which they have." Therefore the Angels were created in beatitude.

Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal. But the corporeal creature was, at the very beginning of its creation, created, formed, and perfected; nor did formlessness precede formation in it in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says in I On Genesis to the Letter. Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature formless and imperfect. But its formation and perfection is through beatitude, inasmuch as it enjoys God. Therefore it was created blessed.

Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter, those things which are read to have been made in the works of the six days were made together. And so it is necessary that at the very beginning of the creation of things all those six days were at once. But in those six days (according to his exposition) morning was the angelic cognition, according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore at the very beginning of creation they knew the Word and things in the Word. But Angels are blessed by this, that they see the Word. Therefore at the very beginning of their creation the Angels were blessed.

But on the contrary: Stability or confirmation in good belongs to the notion of beatitude. But the Angels, as soon as they were created, were not confirmed in good; which the fall of some shows. Therefore the Angels were not blessed in their creation.

I answer: By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired. For each thing naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature is twofold. One indeed which they can attain by the power of their nature; and this is called, in a certain way, beatitude or happiness. And hence also the Philosopher teaches that the most perfect operation of man is contemplation, in which the best intelligible, which is God, can be contemplated in this life; he says that this is man's ultimate felicity: but above this felicity there is another felicity which we expect in the future, by which we shall see God as he is. Now this is above the capacity of any created intellect, as was shown above. Thus, therefore, it must be said that, as to the first beatitude which an angel could attain by the power of his nature, he was created blessed. For an Angel does not acquire such a perfection by some discursive motion, as man does; but it is at once present to him on account of the dignity of his nature, as was said above. But the ultimate beatitude, which

exceeds the capacity of nature, the Angels did not have immediately at the beginning of their creation: because this beatitude is not something of nature, but the end of nature. And therefore they ought not to have had it immediately from the beginning.

Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 2. The corporeal creature could not at the very beginning of its creation have the perfection to which it is led by its operation. Whence, according to Augustine, the germination of plants from the earth was not immediately in the first works, in which only the generative power of plants was given to the earth. And similarly the angelic creature at the beginning of its creation had the perfection of its nature; but not the perfection to which it ought to reach by its operation.

Reply to Objection 3. The angel has a twofold cognition of the Word. One, natural; and another, of glory. Natural indeed, by which he knows the Word through its likeness shining in his own nature. The cognition of glory, by which he knows the Word through its essence. And by both he knows things in the Word. But by the natural cognition, imperfectly; by the cognition of glory, perfectly. Therefore the first cognition of things in the Word was present to the Angel from the beginning of his creation; but the second, not, but when they were made blessed by conversion to the good. And this is properly called "morning cognition."

Prior conclusion: The Angels were created in natural beatitude, that is, such as they were naturally able to have. Later conclusion: The Angels were not created in supernatural beatitude. The doctrine of these conclusions, and of this whole article, we shall examine in the following disputation.

Disputatio CCXXVI - Whether the Angels were created in beatitude only natural, or also supernatural

- Who have held that the Angels were created in natural beatitude. Caput I.
- The contemplation of the way in Angels does not have the true notion of beatitude, though it is akin to beatitude. Caput II.
- That the evil Angels were not created in the beatitude of the fatherland. Caput III.
- That it was not granted to the good Angels to have the beatitude of the fatherland from the first moment of their existence. Caput IV.

Caput I - Who have held that the Angels were created in natural beatitude

Not a few Scholastics with St. Thomas maintain that the Angels were created in a certain natural beatitude. Thus taught, with St. Thomas, Durandus in II distinction 4, question 1; and more recent Thomists in this article; the same also Scotus seems to have followed in II, dist. 3, question 9, Ad quaestorem, at the words "Quod autem talem," where he teaches that in the angel there was an evident cognition of God, which they call quiditative and proper, inferior indeed to an intuitive one,

of which we have said a little in disputation 134, chapters 1 and 3; and this they held to be the angel's natural beatitude. He taught the same in II, dist. 4, question 1, in the first argument, at the beginning of the question. And the same natural beatitude of the Angel St. Thomas, Durandus, and other Scholastics placed in the natural contemplation of God, with Aristotle, Ethics X, chapters 7 - 8, where he taught that the beatitude which he knew in men consists in the contemplation of God.

But because to some Thomists it seemed difficult to attribute to Angels any natural beatitude without rectitude of will; and this cannot be in the way by the sole contemplation of the highest good, such as can be had in this life: therefore some doctors of the School of St. Thomas said that to the natural beatitude of the Angel there pertains not only the contemplation of the highest good, but also the natural rectitude of the will, which they call a natural friendship-love and affection toward God, which accompanies the intellect's natural acumen in contemplating. They assigned, moreover, the difference between natural beatitude, which is granted in the way, and supernatural, which comes only in the fatherland, to be this: that the beatitude of the fatherland consists in the sole operation of the intellect clearly seeing God; because that clear vision of itself suffices to generate the rectitude of the will, which seems so necessary to beatitude that neither can one be blessed, nor be thought to be, with sin. But the beatitude of the way cannot consist wholly in the operation of the intellect alone contemplating God with whatever highest contemplation; because no contemplation of the way is sufficient of itself to generate rectitude of will, without which, as we have said, beatitude cannot consist. Therefore to the contemplation of God which is had in the way, there must be added the natural rectitude of the will toward God, so that from both there be made an integral state of natural beatitude.

Further, since perpetuity belongs to the notion of true beatitude, as we shall show in I - II, question 5, article 4, they say that that natural beatitude of the Angel is perpetual and cannot be lost, so that by this reason they may defend that the true notion of beatitude befits it. For the clarity of which they note that this natural beatitude can be considered in two ways. First, according to itself alone, as the ultimate perfection of a natural creature, not conjoined with nor constituted under supernatural beatitude; and in this way they say it is by its nature perpetual in angels, because there always remains in them the contemplation of that highest good, nay even the friendship-love natural toward it, as St. Thomas indicates in I, question 60, article 5, reply to the fifth. Then this natural beatitude can be considered as conjoined to the supernatural and, as it were, established under it: not because it is actually conjoined to it, but because, as is wont to be said, it is subordinated to it; and in this mode they say that only when the supernatural beatitude is lost, is that quasi-subordination also lost, by which the natural beatitude is ordered to the supernatural; and the natural remains in its prior mode, that is, according to itself.

Caput II - The contemplation of the way in Angels does not have the true notion of beatitude, though it is akin to beatitude

If we attend closely to the true and proper notion of beatitude, it will easily be clear that there is no natural operation in the way which can truly and properly make a rational creature blessed; but only a certain vestige and likeness of beatitude, which by a broader manner of speaking we can call beatitude. For I judge the difference to lie here between a rational and an irrational creature: that the irrational, if it can be blessed or have true felicity, can attain it by the gift of creation alone; either because by the very fact that it is created it would be created perfect and happy; or, if its perfection had to be acquired by operation, by the sole influx and concurrence of God owed by the gift of its creation, and provided no violence be done to its natural power, it could obtain it, unless it were impeded by some contrary extrinsic cause: because if an irrational creature were capable of grace and a benefit collated by God, or of a gift, it would only be capable of the gift or grace of creation; for the irrational creature, of narrow nature, is open to one thing and determined to one mode of operation: therefore, from the gift of its creation it could have the divine influx it needed for obtaining its perfection, and would need only a new gift and new grace for removing contraries by which it would be impeded from attaining its beatitude. But the rational creature, since by the gift of creation it is not determined to one mode of acting, but can be moved to diverse things by various objects, and by its nature has not its own determination, needs a new grace of God and protection, beyond the gift of creation - as we shall show more at length in I - II, question 109, article 6. And therefore it is of itself indifferent to fall into the height of the misery of sin, and to come to felicity and its beatitude. Since, then, saving the gift and grace collated to it in creation, it can fall into mortal sin, which is the greatest misery of a rational creature, and since true felicity cannot consist together with the highest misery: it follows that there is no true felicity and beatitude natural to an angel which should befit him from the gift of creation alone and which he could not lose. Although it be a lofty thing for him to have by nature the knowledge and consideration of God, and although it would necessarily befit the Angel to consider God, so that he could not but love him - as some are pleased to say - nevertheless, because from the will there can spring that highest misery of sin, it ought not to be called true beatitude.

Moreover, whether an angel can, without new grace beyond the gift of creation, love God with a love of friendship by a natural love, and whether for this he is always moved by new grace, will be clearly established from what we shall say at I - II, question 109, article 3. Meanwhile, if it be asked whether, even if by new grace he could love God in that mode, yet if together with that love there can be sin: then by no reason ought we to say that by it the angel's natural beatitude would be completed; since, as I said, the highest misery, which is sin, is at odds with true felicity.

Objection: They object, however, to this in this way. Even if the contemplation of God, which Angels can naturally have in the way, and the natural friendship-love by which he can love God as a friend, do not expel every misery and evil of his nature, nevertheless it can be called true beatitude: because to expel every misery seems to belong only to the notion of most perfect beatitude, such as is that of the other life; not, however, to the notion of beatitude simply, such as can also be had in

this life. For also Augustine, City of God XI, c. 11, teaches that the name "beatitude" is not to be used so strictly as to signify only the most perfect felicity of the other life, than which a greater cannot be.

I answer: It can indeed be called beatitude by a manner of speaking, and as bearing a likeness to beatitude; but not true and proper beatitude, in the rigorous and exact sense which the thing itself requires. For, as has been said, where there can stand together with it the greatest misery, there cannot be true beatitude; and thus the contemplation of the way in Angels, however lofty, together with natural love, does not suffice to constitute true beatitude.

By the beatitude of a rational creature we can understand some happiness of this life, even if it be not the highest: thus also St. Augustine calls blessed both our first parent in his creation and many other men in this life; yet he most rightly calls blessed only those, in chapter 11, who live according to reason. For since in this life that perfect beatitude toward which we tend cannot be had, we ought to be called blessed in this life only so far as we tend toward that perfect beatitude; and the notion of merit and of the way by which one goes to that supreme happiness fits only with a right life and good morals. Therefore with good reason Augustine called only him blessed in this life who lives according to right reason and virtue; and for the same reason we shall prove in I - II, question 3, article 4, that the beatitude of this life in men, if anything in this life deserves the name of beatitude, is set rather in charity and in good works, in which merit consists, than in contemplation of the intellect alone.[1769]

But what those Thomists cited in the preceding chapter were saying, namely, that the natural beatitude of the Angels is in the cognition of the true God joined with a natural love by which they love God with the love of friendship, is in no way proved to me.

- First, even if we were to distinguish a twofold love of friendship toward God - which we shall discuss below in I - II, question 109, article 3 - still we ought not to concede that any love can be had by an Angel without a new grace of God beyond the gift of creation, as we shall also prove there.[1770]
- Note: No love of God, even though natural, could be had without his grace.
- Next, to say that a right natural love of God exists and can never be lost, as those Thomists think, is altogether false and against St. Thomas: for although that love were right and good, nevertheless it ought not to be said to remain in the demons, since they persecute God with hatred; and, as St. Thomas says, in question 64, article 2, to the fifth, in all their operation they always sin.[1771] Moreover, that among Angels in via there was not a quidditative and proper knowledge of God in which their beatitude would consist, we showed above in disputation 206, chapter 2.[1772]

1769. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q.3, a.4.
1770. I - II, q.109, a.3.
1771. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q.64, a.2, ad 5.
1772. Vázquez, Disputation 206, cap. 2.

Furthermore, although no act of the knowledge of God in via is to be called the beatitude of the way, as if our beatitude were placed in it as in the principal operation, nevertheless an act of the intellect is likened to the beatitude of the homeland more than an act of the will, which is in via; but to the act of the will in via there more fittingly belongs the notion of the beatitude of the way, because it more closely approaches the true beatitude of the other life; and in this sense we can interpret the opinion of those who teach that the beatitude of the way consists in an act of the intellect.

But because all our merit, in which is the beatitude of this life, takes its beginning from knowledge, knowledge itself also deserves the name of beatitude: just as faith itself is called the grace of justification, as we noted above in disputation 88, chapter 1, because justification takes its beginning from it.[1773] For this reason it is said in John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the true God," etc., which we shall show must be understood of knowledge through faith, in I - II, question 3, article 3.[1774]

Caput III - The bad Angels were not created in the beatitude of the homeland.

Among the Scholastics it is beyond doubt that the bad Angels were not only not created in the beatitude of the homeland, but also did not see God even in a passing manner. On purpose I distinguished between beatitude and the vision of God, when I said that the Angels were neither blessed nor saw God: for not every clear vision of God is the beatitude of the homeland, but only that which is perpetual; for that perpetuity belongs to the notion of beatitude must be proved in I - II, question 5, article 4.[1775] Moreover, when in this chapter and the next we speak of beatitude, the discourse is of the beatitude of the homeland, which theologians say is in the clear vision of God, or in the fruition of God clearly seen. For if we speak of the beatitude of the way, it is the same to say that the bad Angels were or were not blessed, as to say that they were or were not just, about which we must discuss in the following disputation.

It is proved:

- First, the bad Angels were not created in true beatitude. This is gathered first from the fact that, as we shall say below, the bad Angels never clearly saw God; therefore they were never blessed: for true beatitude of the other life cannot consist without the clear vision of God.
- Second, because even if the bad angels had seen God before they sinned, they would not have been blessed, since perpetuity belongs to the notion of beatitude, as we shall show in the place cited; and the bad Angels sinned; for thus they would have lost the clear vision of God shortly thereafter through sin, and consequently would not have been blessed before.

1773. Vázquez, Disputation 88, cap. 1.
1774. I - II, q.3, a.3.
1775. I - II, q.5, a.4.

- Third, Augustine argues thus in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 11, to prove that the demons were never blessed: because either in that state in which they were created they were foreknowing of their fall, and thus fear and anxiety about their fall did not allow them to be blessed; or they did not know that they would fall, and thus neither could they be blessed, because error took away the true notion of their beatitude. For Augustine thinks it to be against the true notion of beatitude to have that ignorance of one's fall, whether it were of pure negation, as they say, or of a perverse disposition, that is, conjoined with error, namely, that an Angel should think he would never fall: for it would not be a slight misery which would fight against the notion of true beatitude, either to waver with uncertain reasons to either side through ignorance, or to be deceived by some error about the state of his beatitude: all of which we shall show to be at odds with the notion of true beatitude in I - II, question 5, article 4.[1776]
- Note: The bad Angels did not see God clearly, not even for a short time.

Next, that the damned Angels never saw God clearly, not even for a brief time, can be proved no less easily: for it is certain that after sin, having fallen into hell, they no longer saw God; either, then, they ceased from the vision on account of sin, or solely by God's will, who, after he had shown himself clearly to them, afterward by his will alone hid himself. Neither of these can be said: not the first, because, as we shall show in I - II, question 4, article 4, those who see God can by no means sin, and hence cannot lose the vision by sin.[1777] Nor can the second be said: because it would be said without any foundation that God for a short or a long time clearly showed himself to the Angels, and then, without any demerit, hid himself from them.

But against what we have said there seems to be Augustine in many places, in which he teaches that the good and the bad Angels were created together in beatitude. Thus the author of the Ecclesiastical Dogmas, found among Augustine's works, seems to have taught this, in chapter 28, where he writes thus: Such were the Angels created, that if they willed, they would persevere in the light of beatitude; if, however, they willed, they could also fall: whence also Satan with the legions following him fell: but after the fall of the wicked he teaches that the good were confirmed so that they could not sin.[1778] And Augustine himself, in book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, from chapter 14 up to 26, handling this question, doubts greatly whether the bad angels were at some time in the company of the good, just, and equally blessed, or not; and finally in chapter 26 he concludes that the Angel sinned from the beginning, and thus was never blessed, but fell from that beatitude which he had not yet had but would have had; or that there are other Angels of an inferior order created in this world, among whom the demon lived in a certain state of beatitude without a foreknowledge of his fall: of which two, he says, the latter is not to be affirmed. For as he taught in that book, chapter 19, those two orders of angels are not to be asserted, of which the inferior would have been created in this world. But the former is marvelous (says Augustine), if it can be said: and immediately he subjoins, Or certainly a rationale is to be sought, how all the holy Angels - if the

1776. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, c.11; cf. I - II, q.5, a.4.
1777. I - II, q.4, a.4.
1778. Auctor de Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, cap. 28 (among the works printed under Augustine's name).

devil at some time lived among them blessed together with his own Angels - did not yet themselves have a certain foreknowledge of their perpetual happiness, but received it after his fall; or by what merit before his sin the devil was set apart from his own and from the other Angels, so that he was ignorant of his future fall, but they were certain of their own perseverance. So Augustine; who indeed seems to have been of this opinion: that, if it be not said that the evil angel sinned from the beginning - which does not seem to be said - then from the beginning he was a companion of beatitude with the good angels, whether he himself was ignorant of his fall while they were certain of their perpetual happiness, or all alike were ignorant of that which was going to happen to them, before the demon sinned; from which it seems that all the angels, even the bad, had previously clearly seen God.[1779]

And in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 13, he teaches concerning the bad angels that they had some beatitude, although without a foreknowledge of its perpetuity, if at some time, namely in the beginning, they were without sin - which we shall show with certitude to be the case in disputation 236, chapter 1 - or at least that all the Angels were in beatitude equally ignorant of their future perseverance or fall, until the wicked sinned. And in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 10, he speaks thus of the bad angels: Yet fleeing his (that is, God's) goodness, by which they were blessed, they could not escape his judgment.[178017811782]

The passage of Augustine is explained:

I answer: Although Augustine in the places alleged - except in the book On Correction and Grace - remained in doubt whether the bad angels sinned in the first instant and were never blessed, or, if they were ever blessed, were nevertheless never foreknowing ...

Further, that the damned angels never clearly saw God, not even for a short time, is established: for it is certain that after their sin they no longer saw God; therefore either they ceased from the vision on account of sin, or solely by the will of God, who, after He had clearly shown Himself to them, thereafter by His own will hid Himself. But neither can be said. Not the former: because, as we shall show in the Prima Secundae, question 4, article 4, those who see God are in no way able to sin, and consequently cannot lose the vision through sin.[1783] Nor can the latter be said: because it would then without any foundation be said that God for a short or for a long time clearly manifested Himself to the angels, and then without any demerit hid Himself from them.

But against the things we have said, there seems to be a difficult passage of St. Augustine. Augustine in many places teaches that the good and the bad angels were created together in beatitude. Thus the author of the Ecclesiastical Dogmas, among the works printed under Augustine's name, seems to have taught this in cap. 28, where he writes as follows: "Such were the angels created, that, if they willed, they might persist in the light of beatitude; but, if they willed, they also could fall: whence also Satan with the legions following him fell: but after the fall of the

1779. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, cc.14 - 26, esp. c.19, 26.
1780. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, c.13.
1781. Vázquez, Disputation 236, cap. 1.
1782. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c.10.
1783. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q.4, a.4.

wicked, he teaches that the good were confirmed, so that they could not sin."[1784] And Augustine himself, in the book On the Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, and elsewhere on that question, discusses at length whether the evil angels sinned at some time together with the good, and finally concludes that the devil lived not yet blessed, and so never sinned from that beatitude which he would have had, but fell from a certain inferior beatitude without foreknowledge of his future fall; and that the other angels - among whom the demon's fall happened - were of an inferior order, and that among them there was some beatitude without certainty of perseverance; from which two things it is not to be affirmed that they were blessed with the beatitude which pertains to the fatherland.[1785]

It is therefore a constant doctrine of the Scholastic theologians that the evil angels never saw God, not even for a little time. What some more recent writers report for the opposite opinion - namely Alexander, Hugh, and Gabriel - I indeed have not been able to find. Gregory, however, in II, distinction 4, question 1, article 3, only teaches that the good and the bad angels were not created in perfect beatitude: not because he thought that the bad at the instant of their creation clearly beheld God, but because all were created in grace, and thus in a certain imperfect beatitude. For if he thought that the good had the clear vision of God, since they never lost it, he ought to have said that they were created in perfect beatitude.

Bonis Angelis non fuisse concessam beatitudinem patriae a principio sui esse.

Caput IV - That to the good angels the beatitude of the fatherland was not granted from the beginning of their being

Not less certain ought it to be to us that to the good angels, who persevered in the grace of God, the beatitude of the fatherland, or the clear vision of God, was not granted from the beginning; although Ludovicus Vives, book 11 on the City of God, cap. 9, because of words of Augustine ill-understood, which we shall explain below, said that the good angels from the beginning saw God, and always persevered in the vision of God.[1786] But in order to confirm the common and for the rest undoubted opinion, we must recall what we noted in the preceding chapter, namely, that "the beatitude of the fatherland" and "the vision" are not the same: for a vision without perpetuity does not have the true notion of beatitude. This posited, it will be sufficiently proved that the angels were not blessed from the beginning, if we shall first have shown that from the beginning the divine essence was not clearly revealed to them, but that they were created in the grace of God, which is a certain beatitude: this, however, is shown thus.

Reason is inferred. If the good angels were produced with the clear vision of God, then either that vision was granted to them for a short time and afterwards they were reduced to the state of faith, or they perpetually persevere in it. The first must not be said, because it is altogether without foundation, and for that sole reason is rightly rejected. The latter also cannot be: first, because it

1784. Auctor de Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, cap. 28 (among the works printed under Augustine's name).
1785. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, with the discussion spread through cc. 14 - 26.
1786. Ludovicus Vives, In civitatem Dei, lib. 11, cap. 9.

would follow from it that the good angels were never in a state in which they could sin: for the clear vision of God is of such efficacy that it does not permit the one who sees God at all to cease from His charity, or in any way to sin, as we shall show in the Prima Secundae, question 4, article 4. But this is contrary to Augustine in the book On Correction and Grace, cap. 11, after the middle, where, speaking of the evil angels, he says that it was their fault that they did not remain, whereas it would have been their merit if they had willed to remain; he then adds: "As the holy Angels did, who, when others fell by free choice, by the same free choice stood firm themselves, and received the due reward of this abiding." What, I ask, is it to fall by free choice, unless to fall so freely that they could have stood? Therefore it will be the same to stand by free choice, as to stand so freely that one could fall. It is therefore false that the good angels were never in combat and struggle, with liberty left to them. Next, it would follow that the good angels were never in a state of meriting: because that state of the clear vision of God is incompatible with the merit of that very vision and of their own beatitude. That one who sees God can merit other things for others, as Christ merited for us, does not conflict, as I shall show in the Tertia Pars, question 19, articles 3 and 4; but that an angel should be at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor is not possible, as we shall show below in Disputation 228, cap. 3 and the following; and there it will be proved that no one can merit for himself beatitude by works subsequent to beatitude; otherwise a man would perpetually merit an increase of beatitude - which are all absurdities.[1787]

It remains for us to explain Augustine's meaning in some places where he teaches that the good angels were created "in beatitude": it must, however, be understood of the imperfect beatitude of the way, which is justice and holiness. And although in that book On the City of God he does not define that question, whether the good were secure from the beginning of their perseverance and rectitude, and the evil uncertain, or rather all were alike as regards knowledge of the future event, as we saw in the preceding chapter: nevertheless, in the book On Correction and Grace he plainly teaches that the good angels were not secure of their perseverance, but merited this by persevering in the state from which others fell. Thus he teaches in cap. 11, whose words we cited a little before; he had taught the same in cap. 10 of the same book. They are therefore said to have been created "in beatitude," not of the fatherland and perfect, but of the way, which is granted to the just: but Augustine never teaches that the clear vision of God was granted to them.

A more difficult is the place of the same Augustine, book 11 On the City of God, cap. 9, at the beginning, where of that part of the angels who remained good he teaches: "there is a great part more blessed, which has never sojourned abroad (peregrinata)"; by which words Augustine seems to denote that the good angels never walked by faith, which is proper to those who are far away from the Lord, according to that 2 Corinthians 5: "While we are in the body, we are pilgrims from the Lord: for by faith we walk, and not by sight." I answer that Augustine therefore said that the good angels were never "pilgrims," either because they walked by faith only for a short time, which, however, is reckoned as nothing; or because they were always in the place of the heavenly fatherland, namely in heaven, from which we are far; or finally - which more pleases me - because

1787. Vázquez, Disputation 228, cap. 3; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q.19, a.3 - 4; St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, cc. 10 - 11; cf. 2 Corinthians 5:7; 1 Peter 4.

they never through sin departed from the state of grace: so that "to be a pilgrim" is not the same in Paul and in Augustine; but since "to be a pilgrim" is the same as to be alien, Paul refers it to the beatitude of the fatherland, whereas Augustine to the state of grace, in which the angels were created, and from which also we, when we sin, depart: as also Peter says that we are "pilgrims" when we sin, in the first epistle, cap. 4, using the same word "to be a pilgrim" in different senses, when he says: "Do not think it strange (ne peregrinari) concerning the fervor, which is to your temptation; but rejoice...": that is, do not be struck as by a new and foreign thing by the fervor and fire of temptation, by which you are tried and examined; the temptation is external and foreign to you.

But when the same Augustine, in the same cap. 5, says that the angels from the beginning were "partakers of the eternal light," he did not say this because by that light they saw God evidently and clearly: but because by their own nature they are light, since they are of an intelligent nature; which reason in all places exists in this disputation. Likewise the same Augustine explains that text of Genesis 1: "God said, Let there be light, and there was light." Finally, that which St. Thomas adduces here from Augustine in the article in the Argument "But on the contrary," by which Augustine seems to teach that there was in the angels a prior "morning" knowledge, which is the vision of the divine essence, than the "evening" knowledge, which is the cognition of creatures, we explained above in Disputation 1, cap. 2.

Therefore that the good angels had the clear vision of God after the battle with the evil, and after they persevered in grace by faith, is taught, together with St. Thomas in this article, by Alexander and the Scholastics all, each in his own place; but it is indeed the same: for they were equally left in the state of trial on the way, because of the common cause of perseverance, under the fear of falling, until they cooperated with divine grace, if they willed.

Articulus II - Whether an angel needed grace for this, that he might be converted to God

It is objected that it seems not. It seems that an angel did not need grace for this, that he might be converted to God. For to those things which we are able to do naturally, we do not need grace. But naturally an angel is converted to God, because naturally he loves God, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore an angel did not need grace for this, that he might be converted to God.

1. Further: We only need aid for those things which are difficult; but to be converted to God was not difficult for the angel, since there was nothing in him that would resist this conversion. Therefore an angel did not need the help of grace for this, that he might be converted to God.
2. Further: To be converted to God is to prepare oneself to grace by God. Whence Zechariah 1 says: "Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you." But we do not need grace for this, that we prepare ourselves to grace, because thus one would proceed to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace for this, that he might be converted to God.

But on the contrary: By conversion to God the angel attains to beatitude. If, therefore, he did not need grace for this, that he might be converted to God, it would follow that he did not need grace for having eternal life. But this is against the Apostle, Romans 6: "The grace of God is eternal life."

I answer that the angels needed grace for this, that they might be converted to God, insofar as He is the object of beatitude. For, as was said above, the natural motion of the will is the principle of all the things which we will. Now the natural inclination of the will is toward that which is fitting according to nature. And therefore, if there is something above nature, the will cannot be borne toward it, unless it be aided by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is evident that fire has a natural inclination to give heat and to generate fire; but to generate flesh is above the natural power of fire; wherefore to this it has no inclination; nor can it be moved to it except as an instrument of a higher agent. It has been shown above, when we treated of the knowledge of God, that to see God through His essence, in which the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists, is above the nature of any created intellect. Whence no rational creature can have a motion of will ordered to that beatitude, unless it be moved by a supernatural agent: and this we call the help of grace.

Objicitur 1. It seems that an angel did not need grace in order to be converted to God. For we do not need grace for those things which we can do naturally. But an angel is naturally converted to God, because he naturally loves God, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to be converted to God.

Objicitur 2. Further, we seem to need help only for things that are difficult; but to be converted to God was not difficult for an angel, since there was nothing in him that resisted this conversion. Therefore an angel did not need the help of grace for this, that he might be converted to God.

Objicitur 3. Further, to be converted to God is to prepare oneself for grace. Whence in Zachariah it is said: "Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you" (Zech. 1). But we would need grace for this, that we might prepare ourselves for grace; otherwise one would go on to infinity. Therefore an angel did not need grace for this, that he might be converted to God.

Sed contra: By conversion to God an angel attains to beatitude. If therefore he did not need grace in order to be converted to God, it would follow that he would not need grace for having eternal life. But this is against the Apostle: Romans 6, "The grace of God [is] life everlasting."

Respondeo: It is answered that angels needed grace in order to be converted to God, insofar as He is the object of beatitude. For, as was said above, the natural motion of the will is the principle of all the things that we will. Now the natural inclination of the will is to that which is fitting according to nature (*natura*). And therefore, if something is above nature, the will cannot be borne toward it unless it be aided by some other supernatural principle. As is evident in the case of fire: it has an inclination to give heat and to generate fire; but to generate flesh is above the natural power of fire. Whence fire has no inclination to this, except insofar as it is moved as an instrument by the nutritive soul. But it was shown above, when the knowledge of God was treated, that to see God through His essence, in which the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists, is above the nature of any created intellect. Whence no rational creature can have a motion of will ordered to

that beatitude, unless it be moved by a supernatural agent: and this we call the help of grace (*gratia*). And therefore it must be said that an angel could not by his will be converted to that beatitude, except through the help of grace.

Ad primum ergo: An angel naturally loves God insofar as He is the principle of natural existence (*esse*). But here we are speaking of conversion to God insofar as He beatifies by the vision of His essence

Ad secundum: Difficulty is of that which transcends a power. But this can happen in two ways. In one way, because it transcends the power according to its natural order; and then, if it can be reached by some aid, it is called difficult. But if in no way, it is called impossible, as it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way something transcends a power, not according to the natural order of the power, but on account of some impediment added to the power. Thus to ascend is not against the natural order of the power of the motive soul. For the soul, as far as it is of itself, is by nature apt to move into any direction. But it is hindered from this by the heaviness of the body. Whence it is difficult for a man to ascend. But to be converted to ultimate beatitude is difficult for man both because it is above nature, and because he has an impediment from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. For an angel it is difficult for this alone, that it is supernatural

Ad tertium: Any motion of the will toward God can be called a conversion to Him. And therefore there is a threefold conversion to God. One indeed through perfect love, which belongs to the creature already enjoying God; and to this conversion consummate grace is required. Another conversion is that which is the merit of beatitude; and to this is required habitual grace, which is the principle of meriting. The third conversion is that by which someone prepares himself for the having of grace; and to this there is not required any habitual grace, but the operation of God converting the soul to Himself: according to that of Lamentations 5: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Whence it is plain that there is no proceeding to infinity

Conclufio est affirmans. In this article there was to be disputed the necessity of grace in angels; because, however, I judge the same reasoning to hold for them as for man in integral nature, we shall treat this question in I-II, q.109, a.1, and elsewhere. About the necessity of grace for moral works we shall dispute in q.109, a.2; about the necessity of grace for loving God, a.3; about the same for persevering, a.10; and so of the others. But what certain persons have said, that angels do not need the help of grace for consenting to a calling, but that this befits them from free choice alone, I showed to be false above in Disputation 98, c.2, and I proved that opinion manifestly to clash with the words of St. Augustine, from which he himself was trying to deduce it. By what reasoning habitual grace is required in angels for meriting eternal life we shall say at I-II, q.114, for the reason is entirely the same. The difficulty also that could be in this article around the solution of the third point will be handled likewise at I-II, q.113, a.8.[1788]

1788. Vázquez points forward to discussions parallel to St. Thomas: I-II, q.109 (a.1 - 2), q.113 (a.8), and q.114; and back to his own Disputation 98, cap. 2, against the view that angels could consent to vocation by free choice without grace.

Articulus III - Whether the angels were created in grace

D tertium sic proceditur. It seems that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says in the second book On Genesis to the Letter, that the angels in their nature were first created informally, and the heaven was so called; afterwards however they were formed, and were called light.[1789] But this formation is through grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

1. Further, grace inclines a rational creature toward God. If therefore an angel had been created in grace, no angel would have been turned away from God.
2. Further, grace is a mean between nature and glory. But the angels were not blessed in their creation. Therefore it seems that neither were they created in grace; but first in nature only; then afterwards they obtained grace; and finally they were made blessed.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the twelfth book of the City of God, chapter 9: "Who made a good will in the angels, unless He who created them at the same time with their will, that is, with the chaste love by which they adhere to Him, creating their nature and bestowing grace?"[1790]

I answer: Although concerning this there are different opinions, some saying that the angels were created only in natural endowments; others indeed that they were created in grace; yet this seems more probable to be held, and is more consonant with the sayings of the saints, namely, that they were created in grace making-pleasing (what we call "grace that makes one acceptable"). For thus we observe that all the things which in the course of time were produced by the operation of divine providence out of created nature by God were, in the first establishment of things, produced according to certain seminal reasons, as Augustine says upon Genesis to the Letter, like trees, and animals, and other things of this sort. But it is manifest that grace making-pleasing is related to beatitude in this way, as a seminal reason in nature to a natural effect. Whence in 1 John 3 grace is named the seed of God. Therefore, just as according to Augustine's opinion it is posited that immediately in the first creation of the bodily creature seminal reasons of all natural effects were implanted in it, so immediately from the beginning the angels were created in grace.

Ad primum: That formlessness of the angel can be understood either in comparison to the formation of glory; and thus the formlessness preceded the formation in time; or in comparison to the formation of grace; and thus it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature: just as Augustine also posits about bodily formation

Ad secundum: Every form inclines its subject according to the mode of its nature. But the mode of the intellectual nature is to be borne freely toward those things which it wills. And therefore the inclination of grace does not impose necessity, but one having grace can sin

1789. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram II (on the initial "inform" creation of angels as "heaven," and their later "formation" as "light").

1790. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, c. 9.

Ad tertium: Although grace is a mean between nature and glory in the order of nature, yet in the order of time glory ought not to have been given together with nature in a nature newly created, because it is the end of the operation of the nature itself aided by grace. But grace does not stand as the end of operation, because it is not "of works," but as the principle of acting well. And therefore it was fitting at once to give grace together with nature

Conclusion: The angels were created in grace; and this is to be understood of the grace which we call making-pleasing, by which we are constituted just and holy before God, and heirs of the heavenly kingdom. Yet about this there is some controversy among the doctors, which we shall postpone to the following disputation.

Disputatio CCXXVII - Whether the angels were created in sanctity and justice before God, or in pure nature

Caput I - Setting aside the opinion that the evil angels sinned in the first instant

Setting aside the opinion of those who think that the evil angels sinned in the first moment of their creation (about which we must differ in Disputation 236), between those who teach that the angels did not sin from the beginning, concerning the proposed controversy there are two opposing positions. The first is that the angels were not in justice and sanctity before God, but were created in pure nature, neither just nor unjust. Thus thought Hugh of St. Victor in the first book On the Sacraments, part 5, chapter 29, and in the Summa of Sentences, tractate 2, chapter 2; and Rupert in the first book On Genesis, chapters 14, 15, and 16: for although he says that the angels were created innocent, that is, without sin, nevertheless he adds that they did not at once have the love of God; indeed, of the evil he asserts that they never had it. But what he further teaches in the same book, chapters 11 and 17, namely, that the angels were created in this lower world and afterwards by the grace of God were translated into heaven, is not to be understood of the grace of justification, but of that by which, by God's gratuitous gift, those heavenly seats were granted to them; and that the wicked, before they sinned, were translated into heaven he expressly teaches; and yet, he says, they never had the love of God.[1791]

For he also expressly teaches that even the wicked, before they sinned, were translated into heaven; and yet, he says, they never had the love of God.[1792] The Master is also reported as holding this opinion in II, dist. 4; although, in my judgment, he ought rather to be alleged for the contrary, unless he taught it more clearly in dist. 5, cap. c., for there he asserts that the angels were not created in conversion to God, but only in potency so that they could be converted; and in cap. 4 and 6 he affirms that a cooperating grace was given to them so that they might be converted to God, because the good persevered without sin by free choice, whereas to the wicked such grace was never granted, since by sin they merited to be without it; he taught the same in dist. 3, cap. 6. Yet in

1791. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis I, V, c. 29; Summa sententiarum, tract. 2, c. 2. Rupert of Deutz, In Genesim I, cc. 14 - 16 (and cf. cc. 11, 17).

1792. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, c. 3; cf. the Master (Peter Lombard), II, dist. 4.

this opinion, insofar as he asserts that the angels were not created in holiness and grace, he agrees with the Master. To this opinion agree: the author of the Summa of Sens, book 2, tract. 1, cap. 1; Henry, Quodlibet 4, q. 10, after the middle; although he says nothing certain can be had about this matter, still he affirms that this is more probable. Likewise agree St. Bonaventure on II, dist. 4, art. 1, q. 2; Richard, art. 2, q. 2; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, art. 2; Basso, q. 1, art. 3; Aegidius, quaest. 1, art. 4; Marsilius on II, dist. 4, art. 1, conclusion 1, and in the second proof of that conclusion; Scotus indeed, on II, dist. 5, q. 1, no. 9, To inquire, toward the end, although at the beginning he follows the opposite opinion when he assigns the morals of the angels on the way, nevertheless assigning the same later, seems rather to incline to this opinion; finally Alexander, II, part, q. 19, m. 2, although he defends both as probable, yet says that this one is more probable. All the Doctors cited agree in this, that the evil angels were never in grace.[1793]

This opinion is proved first by authority, then by reason.

By authority, first, by the testimony of Pope John, in cap. Visis litteris, 16, q. 2, where speaking of the devil he says: "I grieve enough, that he blushes to hold in the earth men constant out of clayey nature with that charity which he was not able to have in heaven." But men on earth have the charity by which they are justified before God; therefore the devil did not have that in heaven; and since it is the more probable opinion that all the angels were created in the first instant of their being in the same manner, the same must be said for the good angels for that first instant. Second, St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, cap. 3, in the same place teaches of the demons that they never tasted the sweetness of the blessed and angelic life; and yet he says that heavenly seats had been granted to them not by the grace of justification, but by God's gratuitous gift; and he plainly feels that the evil angel was never in God's grace - especially since he seems to think that the evil angels fell as soon as they were created.[1794] Third, St. Gregory, book 32 of the Moralia, cap. 18, alias 25, explaining that of Ezekiel 28, "Thou art the signet of the likeness of God," says: "Accordingly, in the day of his creation the sockets for this stone were prepared," that is, he was created as one capable of charity, as it were wishing to be filled, so that, the angels standing like stones set in the ornament of a king, he could have cleaved to them. By which words he seems to signify that the evil angel was created only capable of divine charity, but did not wish to receive it.[1795] Fourth, the same is proved from Scripture: for in Job 4, where the Vulgate has, "And in his angels he found perversity," the Hebrew text says, "And in his angels he put not praise," or "light"; and by the name "light" grace and justice before God seem to be signified. And since the same reason obtains for the good and the wicked as to their first condition (as was said above), it follows that even those who persevered were not created in grace.

Then by reason the same opinion is recommended.

1793. Author of the Summa of Sens, II, tract. 1, c. 1; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. 10; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 4, a. 1, q. 2; Richard (of Mediavilla), d. 4, a. 2, q. 2; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, a. 2; Basso, q. 1, a. 3; Giles of Rome, q. 1, a. 4; Marsilius, In II Sent. d. 4, a. 1, concl. 1; Scotus, In II Sent. d. 5, q. 1, n. 9; Alexander of Hales, II, p., q. 19, m. 2.

1794. Pope John, cap. Visis litteris, 16, q. 2 (in Gratian); St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, c. 3; cf. ibid. c. 28.

1795. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 32, c. 18 (alias 25), on Ezekiel 28.

First: because our first parent was not created in justice and holiness before God; therefore neither was the angel. For since man holds a lower place among rational creatures and has greater incentives to evil, he ought rather to have been created in grace, in order that against greater incitements he might also have from God greater remedies. But that the first parent was not created in grace is proved by Thomas of Argentina, Aegidius, and others who use this reasoning from St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, cap. 12, where he teaches that, as regards the delight of present good, the first man in paradise was more blessed than any just man in fallen nature, because then he felt no evil; but as regards the hope of future life, the just in fallen nature are more blessed. Which could not be true if the first parent had been created in God's grace and justice, as is clear enough.

Second: if the evil angel had been created in grace, he would not have fallen in the way in which he fell; because, as St. Augustine says, De Genesi ad litteram XI, cap. 28, "swollen with pride and corrupted by delight in his own power, he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed and angelic life." But if the demon had been created in grace, he would have known full well that he was in grace, and that it was for him a necessary means to attain beatitude; and hence he would not have been proud, corrupted by delight in his own power.

Third: if the angels had been created in grace in the same moment in which they were created, they would have merited eternal life; wherefore, immediately after the first merit they would have obtained eternal life, just as the evil angels, after the first sin, were condemned.

Tam malos, quam bonos Angelos in gratia fuisse creatos, auctoritate Scholasticorum, et Patrum probatur.

Caput II - That both bad and good angels were created in grace, justice, and holiness before God; and that this is proved by the authority of the Scholastics and the Fathers

A much more probable, and in the schools more received, opinion is that all the angels, both bad and good, were created in grace, justice, and holiness before God. This opinion is plainly followed by St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent Thomists on this article; by Albert, II part of the Summa, tract. 4, q. 18, m. 1; by Durandus on II, dist. 4, q. 2; by Capreolus, q. 1, art. 3, ad 1, against the fifth conclusion; by Gregory the Great? Major, q. 1; by Holcot on II, q. 3; by Jodocus Clichtoveus, book 6 on John, cap. 6, which is among the commentaries of St. Cyril on John; and Gabriel, indeed, on II, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 2, judges both opinions to be probable, since he thinks neither can be proved by an efficacious reason. Among the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, very many can be alleged for this opinion.[1796]

From the Greeks, indeed, St. Basil, on that Psalm 32, "And the spirit of his mouth all their power," thus writes: "For the angels at the beginning, that they might be, the craftsman of all things, the Word, created; sanctification, however, at the same time the Holy Spirit bestowed upon

1796. St. Thomas Aquinas; Cajetan; Albert the Great, Summa, II, tract. 4, q. 18, m. 1; Durandus, In II Sent. d. 4, q. 2; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1, contra quintam conclusionem; Gregory (of Rimini?) Major, q. 1; Holcot, In II Sent. q. 3; Jodocus Clichtoveus, In Ioannem VI, c. 6 (among the commentaries on St. Cyril); Gabriel (Biel), In II Sent. d. 4, q. 1, a. 2.

them. For they were not created in infantile stature, then afterwards by degrees awakened and made perfect, and so judged worthy of reception by the Spirit; but at their first constitution, and, as it were, by a certain sprinkling of their own substance, they at once had their sanctity." These words are so very clear for our opinion that they need no explanation.[1797] No less clearly did St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book I, cap. 3, teach the same in these words: "Through the Word, therefore, all the angels were created; and through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit they all received the measures of perfection, yet so that, according to each one's dignity and rank, they became partakers of light and grace." The same is gathered from the same Damascene in the following chapter, when he says that the devil lost the splendor and honor with which he was created by God. For since he did not lose natural splendor, as all admit, it plainly follows that Damascene is speaking of the splendor of grace.

To these we can add first the testimony of Anastasius, in the Questions on Sacred Scripture, q. 61, in tome 6 of the Bibliotheca sacra, where, speaking of the demons, he says that the better as well as the worse fell, and thus were cut off and deprived of the honor which had been given them from the beginning; which would not be the case if they had been created in pure nature, for then they would not have been deprived of any good or gift which they had had from the beginning - for the natural endowments have remained intact in the demons, as will be proved below from Pseudo-Dionysius. Then let us add Theodoret, in the book On the Cult of God, whom the same Anastasius cites, and in the book against the heretical fables, in the chapter on the devil and demons, where he too teaches that the angels fell from the state in which they were created, and did not remain in it, according to that of John 8, "He did not stand in the truth."[1798]

From the Latin Fathers also many can be alleged for this opinion. Chiefly St. Augustine is usually cited, whom, however, we shall set forth below, so as to show expressly what he thought in various places on this matter. St. Jerome, therefore, in the first chapter of the Preface among the commentaries on St. Cyril on John, openly handed down this opinion; for he says: "Just as the demons who fell from their own dignity, possessing nothing of their ancient grace, are dry"; and on Job 4, "In his angels he found perversity," he says that these words are to be understood of the devil who once was holy and fell from that angelic height, and yet in book 15, cap. 13 of the same work he teaches that the evil angels were created in the truth.[1799]

But if anyone objects that from these places of Jerome it is proved only that the demon was at some time just and holy, not, however, that he was created in holiness, I say first that at least by these testimonies the Doctors of the preceding opinion are openly refuted, insofar as they affirm not only that the demons were not created in grace and holiness, but that they never had it. Then, if they themselves concede that the demons were just and holy before they sinned, there is no reason why they should deny that they were created in justice and holiness.

1797. St. Basil, On Psalm 32 (33): "Et spiritus oris eius omnis virtus eorum."

1798. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 3 - 4; Anastasius, Quaestiones in Sacram Scripturam, q. 61 (in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 6); Theodoret, De cultu Dei; idem, Haereticarum fabularum compendium, cap. de diabolo et daemonibus; cf. John 8: "In veritate non stetit."

1799. St. Jerome, Preface I among the commentaries on St. Cyril on John; and on Job 4: "In angelis suis reperit pravitatem."

Most clearly, however, St. Gregory, book 32 of the Moralia, cap. 18, alias 25, when explaining that of Ezekiel 28, "Thou didst walk perfect in the midst of the stones of fire," expressed this opinion in these words: "Because, among the hearts of the angels, set ablaze with the fire of charity, he stood out bright with the glory of his condition." He speaks of Lucifer, and by the aforesaid words plainly bears witness that he was created glorious with charity. Nay more, in the following words he pronounces that he was rightly called "the haughty" (extensus), because by the cooperation of his brightness he overshadowed the brightness of others. And of the same Lucifer, in the same chapter, alias 24, he says: "For what good did he not have, if he was the signet of the likeness of God? Very much, however, would have been lacking to him, if he had not been created in the grace of God."

Prosper also seems to have taught the same, book 3 De vita contemplativa, cap. 3, where he says that all the angels were created without sin and appointed to serve God happily; which could not have been done except through justice and grace. Add Isidore, book 1 of the Sentences, or On the Highest Good, cap. 12, sentence 7, where he says of the devil: "He was one who was constituted in the Truth, but not standing he straightway fell from the Truth"; but among the Fathers "truth" is called justice and holiness before God. Likewise St. Anselm, in the book De casu diaboli, cap. 4, 17, and 27, openly supposes that both the evil and the good angels were created in justice, which they did not have from themselves but from God; the evil, however, at their beginning lost it.[1800]

But truly St. Augustine, who is chiefly alleged for this opinion, taught variously about this matter. For in book XI of De Genesi ad litteram, cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 3, he either thought that many angels sinned in the very first instant of their being, or left that point in doubt; about the good angels, however, he seems to think that they were created in grace and in the beatitude of this life, that is, in grace and justice before God. He seems to think the very same in book 21 of De civitate Dei, cap. 13; and in book 12 of the same work, cap. 9, after the middle, after he has said of all the angels that they were created in the love of God, and that God created their nature and at the same time bestowed grace, he subjoins: "Whence it is not to be believed that the holy angels ever were without good will, that is, the love of God. But those who, though created good, are evil, are so by their own evil will, which the good nature did not make. Either they received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in it, or, if indeed they were created equally good, then, these falling by an evil will, those, being more helped, arrived at that fullness of beatitude whence they were most certain that they would never fall." In which place he does not hesitate to assert that all angels, both good and evil, were created in grace. Quite wrongly, however, does Basso interpret this testimony of Augustine as not about grace that makes pleasing (gratia gratum faciens), but about some grace gratuitously given (gratia gratis data), that is, about some habit or supernatural species for understanding; for Augustine speaks in express words of the grace of charity and divine love, which exists only in the holy and just before God. In the same way

1800. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vita contemplativa, lib. 3, c. 3; St. Isidore, Sententiae I, cap. 12; St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, cc. 4, 17, 27.

must the same Augustine be understood in the book De correptione et gratia, cap. 10, when elsewhere he says that all the angels and demons were created in the beatitude of this life, which, as we said in the preceding disputation, consists in holiness and justice of works before God.[1801]

One could object St. Augustine, who in De correptione et gratia, cap. 10, says in these words: "Thus indeed did God ordain the life of the angels and of men, that in it he might first show what free will could do, and then what the benefit of his grace could do." Therefore, first the angels and the first man were created in pure nature, that they might receive grace from God. I answer: in that place Augustine is not disputing about the first creation, and about justifying grace, whether in it the angels were created, or in pure nature; but about the life of the angels and of men, that is, about perseverance in the state of grace. About this he very well says that it was thus disposed by God - that he might first make trial in them of what their pure free choice could do without the help of congruent grace, since both sinned; then what free choice helped by grace could do. He is speaking, however, not of all the angels, but only of those who sinned.

Caput III - The aforesaid opinion is confirmed by testimonies of Scripture and by reason

Nor indeed did St. Augustine teach that, in the case of the evil angels, God first tried what their free choice could do - namely, by sinning - and then the benefit of his grace by calling them back to repentance; for he did not believe that the apostate angels were converted to penitence. Therefore he added, "then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do," for the reason that in man God afterwards experienced the benefit of his grace by bringing him himself back to repentance; but in the apostate angels, what the judgment of his justice and of punishment could do, by condemning them forever.

The aforesaid opinion is confirmed by the testimony of Scripture and by reason.

Some of the more recent Scholastics are wont to pile up testimonies of Scripture so as to confirm the preceding opinion; it will not be useless briefly to report and weigh them, so that at length it may be clearer to us whether the aforesaid view has some firm foundation. Then indeed we shall commend it by reason.

The first testimony is usually Ezekiel 28, where the devil is said to have been "full of wisdom and beauty" and to have "walked perfect in the midst of the stones of fire"; which would certainly give outstanding approval to this opinion, if it were to be understood of the devil according to the literal sense. Whether however it ought to be understood thus we shall see below in Disputation 231, cap. 4.

Second, some allege that testimony of John 8: "He" (namely the devil) "did not stand in the truth," that is, in grace and holiness with God, which the Fathers are wont to call "truth," he did not persevere; for "to stand" signifies "to remain"; but what remains in some state is understood to have previously been in it. Therefore it is the same to say that an angel "did not stand in the truth" as to say he "did not persevere" or "remain" in the holiness in which he was created. By the name of

1801. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, c. 9; De correptione et gratia, c. 10.

"truth" in that place they understand rectitude of life, as St. John Chrysostom in homily 53 on John, and Euthymius, on those words, so that the devil is said not to have stood in the truth because he did not persevere or did not rest in rectitude of life.[1802] In which sense no slight argument can be drawn from the aforesaid testimony. But, since the other Fathers variously understand the cited words, in my judgment little strength can be derived from that testimony. St. Cyprian in the book On the Lord's Prayer, in the beginning, explains that passage this way: "He did not stand by fidelity." And St. Augustine, in the book against Adimantus, cap. 4, uses "truth" for a law given to the angels, so that the sense is, "he did not stand in the law given to him"; which indeed could have happened even if an angel, created not in God's grace but in pure nature, had received a law to be observed and had not observed it. Finally, not a few, nor less weighty Fathers, understand by "truth" veracity itself, which the Scholastics call truthfulness in speaking. Thus explains St. Irenaeus, book 5 against heresies, cap. 22; St. John Chrysostom, homily 1 on the fall of the first man, a little from the beginning; St. Epiphanius, heresy 38; and Theophylact on that place in John. And their interpretation, as being most agreeable to the Evangelist's context, greatly pleases me; for Christ willed in that place to lash the Jews, because they were liars and murderers, and therefore he said to them: "You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you are willing to do." And what those desires were, and in what they wished to imitate their father the devil, he presently explained in these words: "He was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth; there is no truth in him: when he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own, because he is a liar, and the father of it." He therefore called the devil a liar, indeed the father of lies, because the first lie, which we know was said in the world, was invented and uttered by the devil, when he said to our parents in paradise: "You shall not by any means die: for God knows that on whatever day you shall eat of it, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." Behold the first and remarkable lie. Therefore John rightly inferred that, when the devil lies, he does not borrow the sin from others but "speaks of his own": that is, he takes up the lie which he himself first contrived and introduced into the world. Since therefore the Jews were plainly lying, as is clear from that chapter - for they pretended the intention not to kill Christ, while secretly they were plotting his death - he rightly said, "You are of your father the devil," both because in the lie they were imitating him, who was the author of the lie, and chiefly in their intention of killing Christ himself; because the devil, from the beginning of the world, has been a murderer of men, that is, a seeker after and suggester of the death of men, and a persuader to Cain of the first homicide, namely of Abel his brother, as will be explained below in Disputation 236, cap. 1. Therefore the Fathers alleged rightly understand "truth" in John as "veracity."

Moreover the verb "stood" does not always in Scripture denote perseverance. For that of Psalm 1, "He did not stand in the way of sinners," some take, by a figure of speech, as equivalent to what in the same verse is said, "he did not walk in the counsel of the ungodly," as if it were said, "he was not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor in the way of sinners." Much more clearly "to stand" is used for "to be," as in St. Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word stand," that is, "shall be." In Scripture also "to stand" is taken for "to be firm" and "to

1802. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 53 in Ioannem; Euthymius Zigabenus, In Ioannem, ad 8:44.

subsist," which is the same as "not to fall," as in Romans 14: "He stands or falls to his own Lord." Therefore the devil is said not to have "stood" in the truth not because he had first been in it and then did not remain or persevere in it, but because by the lie he fell, even if before he had fallen by pride. And if "truth" in that place is taken for veracity, the verb "stood" cannot denote perseverance in some earlier state or work; for before he spoke those words to our parents he had neither spoken a lie nor anything true in which he ought to have persevered: therefore, when he first lied to our parents, he is said "not to have stood in the truth," that is, to have fallen by a lie.

Therefore there remains only the testimony of Jude, which, in my judgment, not slightly confirms the aforesaid opinion; for he says in his Epistle: "The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he has reserved under darkness in eternal bonds, unto the judgment of the great God." For he states that the apostate angels did not lose the "principality" which by its nature befitted them toward others; for in angels the natural endowments remained intact, and consequently the natural dignity by which one excelled others - their own natural principality - remained intact. Therefore by "habitation" and "principality" Jude understood the dignity of grace, by which one was more excellent than others.[1803] I know that certain of the more recent men explain that place of princes of the land of promise, whom, he says, were reserved to eternal judgment because they did not keep their royal dignity which they had: but the common exposition, which we have followed, is to be preferred.

Finally, this opinion can be commended by reason: because it is much more probable that the first man was created in grace than in pure nature without grace and justice; therefore the same must be said of the angels. But concerning man the more recent theologians prove this: indeed they think it is of faith, from the Council of Trent, Session Five, in the decree on original sin, Canon One, where it is said that Adam by sin lost the justice and holiness in which he had been established by God - as though it were the same "to have been established in justice" and "to have been created in it." But from that place this cannot be sufficiently proved; for "to have been established" does not signify "to have been created," but "to have been ordered." Wherefore in the Council only this is defined as certain, that Adam, before he sinned, had justice and holiness. However, that the first parents also were created in holiness is held from the Greek Fathers by Pseudo-Dionysius, cap. 3 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, part 3; by St. Irenaeus, book 3 against heresies, cap. 37, explaining what it is "to have been made according to the image of God," and more clearly book 5, cap. 20; by St. John Chrysostom, homilies 8 and 9 on Genesis; by St. Cyril, book 1 on John, cap. 9; and book 2, cap. 3; and book 11, cap. 25; and book 12, cap. 56; and book 6 of the Dialogues with Hermias; and in the book On Adoration in Spirit. Among the Latins, St. Cyprian in Sermon 3 De patientia; and St. Ambrose, book 6 of the Hexameron, cap. 7, explaining the image according to which man was made; St. Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, caps. 11 and 17; and book 13, cap. 19; and On the Spirit and the Letter, cap. 27; and Prosper, Response 8 to the Capitula of the Gauls, which he made together with 214 priests.[1804] Scripture also not obscurely testifies to it, Ecclesiasticus 7: "God made man right." For "rectitude" in Scripture is holiness and justice with God. For although to "do right" in the sight of God is said in Scripture also of certain

1803. Jude 6.

sinners who did some good works of virtues (for those are called "right" before God which are according to his will), nevertheless to "be right" before the Lord is the same as to be just and holy before him; for "to be right" embraces not one or some work, but every work; but "the doers of the law are just before God," Romans 2. Since therefore the first parent was created in holiness and justice before God, it follows that the angels too were created in God's grace and justice: since God's perfect works are such.

This moreover is asserted in the same way of the angels who were to sin as of those who were to persevere: for of both reason proves it. But what was alleged for the contrary opinion in the first reason set out in cap. 10 avails nothing; for although man by his own nature feels the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which an angel does not feel, it does not follow from this that man rather than the angel was created in justice and holiness; for the sanctity of the soul did not remove in the first parent that rebellion of the flesh (as we shall show in Disputation 231, cap. 8), but a special protection and care of God did. Therefore, that reason would prove only this, that God, as a helper, should come more to the aid of man who is more in need; not that it was necessary that he be created in holiness and justice, but in a certain integrity of nature, which would come from that special protection of God, not from a state of sanctity which could not exist before God without justice and holiness.

Caput IV - The foundation of the prior opinion is overthrown

So then, in order to overthrow the foundations of the prior opinion, let us first set forth the testimonies which are brought forward for it and explain them, and then let us give reasons.

First among the testimonies was that of Pope John, whose words some Scholastics, together with the Gloss on that chapter, expound as though John were speaking of the consummate charity of the fatherland, which the demon did not have, and not of the charity of the way. I reply, however, first, that John did not say that the demon had not had that charity, but that he "could not have" it; therefore it is still difficult to determine of what sort of charity he speaks in that testimony. Further, since he said of that same charity, namely of charity, "which he could not have," it is hard to understand this of the charity of the way; for it seems true that the demon, before he sinned, really had the charity of the way; and that he could truly have had the charity of the fatherland, to which he was tending. And again, because of that same charity - both of the charity of the way and of the consummated charity of the fatherland - he said, "which he could not have": therefore, if we follow that letter, which also stands in the aforesaid testimony, about which charity it is difficult to decide; for the demon either did not have or did not retain the charity of the way, and did not consequently attain to the charity of the fatherland; yet nevertheless he could

1804. Pseudo-Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, cap. 3, pars 3; St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses III, c. 37; V, c. 20; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 8 - 9 in Genesim; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem I, c. 9; II, c. 3; XI, c. 25; XII, c. 56; Dialogi VI cum Hermia; De adoratione in spiritu; St. Cyprian, Sermo 3 De patientia; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron VI, c. 7; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XIV, cc. 11, 17; XIII, c. 19; De spiritu et littera, c. 27; Prosper of Aquitaine, Responsio 8 ad capitula Gallorum. See also Council of Trent, Session V, De peccato originali, can. 1; Ecclesiasticus 7:29 (Vulg. 7:30): "Deus fecit hominem rectum"; Romans 2:13.

have had, retained, and obtained it. Wherefore I think the sense of that decretal is clearer if the verb be not read "could not have had" in the past, but "cannot have" in the present - which reading also is found in some codices - and then it will be most true, of charity in general, that the demon cannot now have charity, because he is destitute of all help of grace, as we shall see in Disputation 239.[1805]

But if the verb "could not have had" be put in the past, we ought to understand that impotence, with respect to the demon, as consequent and penal, which does not take away free choice; for, since the demon did not have a congruous vocation, he could not have a charity that would remain; to have charity indeed he was able, but not to retain it: and thus he did not have it.

The second testimony is that of St. Augustine, whose mind on this matter we have now sufficiently set forth, and we have shown that in some places, concerning this question, a doubt remained.

The third testimony is that of St. Gregory; and it is clear that this Doctor, in that same chapter, plainly says that all the angels were created in charity; when therefore he says that the demons "had not" the "connexions" of charity prepared, he is to be understood of the consummate charity; and thus he said that the demon had indeed been deprived of charity - which signifies the habit - and that he did not have that charity such as could cohere with the other angels; and therefore he could not be confirmed in charity, which, once separated from the others, he cannot now obtain; which belongs only to the blessed. Finally, those places of Ezekiel 28, "You were the seal of the likeness of God," which Gregory explains, are to the same purpose.

This, moreover, is asserted of the Angels who were going to sin in the same way as of those who were going to persevere; for the reasoning proves it of both. But what was alleged for the prior opinion in the first reason set forth in chapter 1 is worth nothing. For although man by his own nature feels the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which an Angel does not feel, it does not follow from this that man rather than the Angel was created in justice and holiness. For the holiness of the soul did not take away in the first parent this rebellion of the flesh, as we will show in I - II, disp. 12, c. 7; but it was taken away by a special protection and care of God. Therefore, for this reason, so that aid might be given more to man as more needy, it was not necessary that he be created in holiness and justice, but in a certain integrity of nature, which, together with that special protection of God, would be provided - not from a state of sanctity, which could not subsist with God apart from justice and sanctity.

The foundations of the prior opinion are overthrown

It is clear that we must overturn the foundations of the prior opinion that were brought in chapter 1. And first indeed let us explain the true meanings of the testimonies that are alleged for it; then let us dissolve the reasons.

1805. The decretal cited under the name of Pope John is transmitted with variant readings "nequivit" (could not have had) and "nequit" (cannot have). The author judges the latter to express more clearly the present impotence of the demon, deprived of grace.

Of the testimonies, the first was that of Pope John, whose words some Scholastics, together with the gloss upon that chapter, explain in such a way that John is speaking of the consummated charity of the homeland, which the demon did not have, and not of the charity of the way. Two things, however, stand against this response: one is that John did not say "which" - namely, charity - "the demon did not have," but "which he could not have." But this, as it seems false of the charity of the way, so also of the charity of the homeland; for just as he really had the charity of the way, he could also have had the charity of the homeland, toward which he was striving. The other is that concerning the same charity which the demons try to take away from men and to hinder, he said: "Which he could not have"; but this is charity absolutely and universally, whether it be of the way or of the homeland. If we follow that letter as it is cited in the aforesaid testimony, it is difficult to understand the aforesaid testimony of any charity whatsoever: for the demon thus either did not have or did not retain the charity of the way, or he did not obtain the charity of the homeland, yet in such a way that he could have had, retained, and obtained it; and yet John in the aforesaid words said "which," namely charity, "he could not have": therefore it is still difficult to understand those words of any sort of charity at all. And although we should say that the demon did not have the charity of the way in the first instant of his condition, because he had no previous calling and grace to it, nevertheless we could not interpret the words of John in this way. For when he says of the demon "which he could not have," he attributes it to the vice of the demon himself that he did not have grace; from which part also the aforesaid testimony is rendered difficult: because if by his own fault he did not have charity, it follows that he could have had it; otherwise it could not be attributed to his fault that he did not have it.

Wherefore I think the clearer sense of that decretal is had if the verb is not put "could not have" (nequivit) in the past tense, but "cannot have" (nequit) in the present, as it is had in some codices; and thus it is most true, concerning charity in general, that the demon cannot now have charity, because he is deprived of every aid of grace, as we will see in disp. 239.[1806] Or if the verb "could not have" (nequivit) is put in the past, we ought to understand by this the consequent impotence of the demon, which does not take away free choice, as we have shown at length elsewhere.[1807] For since the demon did not have a congruent calling so as to remain in charity, he consequently could not have charity; then, however, the word "to have" ought not to signify "to obtain in any manner," but "to retain what once was had."

The second testimony was Augustine, whose mind we have already sufficiently explained in c. 2, and we have shown that in some places a doubt remained about this difficulty. The third testimony, which was Gregory's, ought to be explained of confirmed grace and charity. For since this Doctor, in the same chapter, plainly says that all the Angels were created in charity, when afterwards he says that the demons had cavities prepared so that they might be connected with the others by charity, this ought to be understood of consummated charity; and therefore the demon was indeed

1806. The decretal cited under the name of Pope John is transmitted with variant readings "nequivit" (could not have had) and "nequit" (cannot have). The present reading expresses more clearly the demon's impotence now, as deprived of grace.

1807. See the extended treatment of consequent impotence and free choice in disp. 98 and disp. 80.

capable of the charity which the gold signifies - and this is "to have had prepared cavities" - but he did not wish to be filled with this gold of charity so as to be forever connected with the other Angels; but "to be filled with the gold of charity" is to be confirmed in charity, so that henceforth he cannot be separated from the others, which is granted to the blessed alone. As for the sense of that place of Ezekiel 28, "You are the seal of the likeness of God," Gregory himself explains it in the same place; we shall speak to it in disp. 236, c. 4.

The fourth testimony is Job 4 according to the Hebrew reading, from which indeed a slight argument can be drawn. For our Vulgate, to which as to a rule we must stand, has thus: "And in his Angels he found perversity," from which words it cannot be proved that the evil Angels were not created in grace. Moreover, even if we read according to the Hebrew text, "And in his Angels he did not put praise," nothing can be proved from it; for in Hebrew for "praise" there is תהלה, Tahalah, which some render "light," "splendor," but others "foolishness." And if you render word for word from the Hebrew, that testimony must be read thus: "He will not believe his servants," for what is read in the Vulgate, "Behold, those who serve him are not stable." Then it follows in the same Hebrew text, "And in his Angels he will put light" (or "foolishness"), for what is in the Vulgate, "And in his Angels he found perversity." Nor indeed is it read with a negation, as it is cited - namely, "he will not put" - but affirmatively, "he will put." The sense, however, as regards that former part, "He will not believe his servants," is of men; or, as the Chaldean renders, "He will not entrust to the Prophets his secret counsels," because he does not deem them faithful to whom he might worthily commit all his secrets and counsels. Which sense the words of the Vulgate can bear, "Behold, those who serve him are not stable," that is, they are not faithful to whom God might commit all his secret counsels. Or certainly that part, "those who serve him," can also be referred to the Angels, so that there is a repetition when it is said, "and in his Angels," etc.; or if the former part is referred to men and the latter to Angels, the sense is the same. But when it is said in the Hebrew text, "And in his Angels he will put foolishness," it signifies what he had said of men - namely, that God does not entrust to the Angels all his counsels and secrets, because he knows them to be weak; as if he were to say, as Eugubinus interprets that chapter, "and in his Angels he will put," that is, "he will discover foolishness" or "perversity," which our Vulgate renders, "He found perversity": which ought not to be understood of the perversity of sin, but of the weakness of nature, on account of which God ought not to entrust to them all his secrets. Or, if we interpret the Hebrew word Tahalah as "light" (for it signifies either), the sense is: since Angels of themselves are nothing, their knowledge and light are from God, who reveals his mysteries to them. But if we read it with a negation thus, "And in his Angels he will not put light," so that the prior negation which is in the prior part, "Behold, he will not believe his servants," is repeated, the sense comes to the same thing, as if he were to say, "And he did not reveal to his Angels the hidden things of his counsel," which is "not to put in them light," namely, of revelation. And this sense coheres best with the preceding: for he had said, "Shall man, in comparison with God, be justified, or be purer than his maker?" scarcely, or, so to speak, by no means. Which he excellently confirms by what follows in

this way, "Behold, he will not believe his servants," etc., by which he shows the weakness of creatures, even spiritual ones, such as the Angels, in comparison with God, to such a degree that even to them God does not commit his secret counsels.

Reply to the first reason: I answer that the first parent was constituted in grace, as was proved in the preceding chapter. Wherefore it ought not to be a wonder if we say that the Angel too was created in grace. Nor indeed did Augustine, in the place alleged in the first reason, say that a just man in this state is more blessed than the first parent in paradise with respect to the hope of future life, as the authors of the prior opinion falsely report. Rather, he said as follows: "Therefore, as far as the delight of present good is concerned, the first man in paradise was more blessed than any just man in this mortal infirmity; but as far as the hope of future good is concerned, more blessed is any man in whatever torments of the body, to whom it is manifest not by opinion but by certain truth that he will have without end the society of Angels, lacking all trouble, in the participation of the Most High God," whereas that man, being uncertain of his fall, was in that great felicity of paradise. Thus far Augustine; and by these words he does not compare any just man whatsoever with the first parent because the first parent had not grace and holiness before God as long as he was in paradise, but he compares them only as concerns certainty about future perseverance in good and in felicity. Nor does he assert that a just man in this life is certain of his perseverance - of which the first Adam was not - but that those just men of this state are more blessed, who, even if they are in torments, have nevertheless learned by revelation and are certain of their future perseverance. For Augustine does not there deal so much with the delectable and pleasant state lacking all trouble as with justice and the certainty of perseverance in it, for constituting man as blessed.

Reply to the second reason: I answer that although the Angel was created in grace, he did not know his state evidently, because the mysteries of grace are not evidently known to him; yet he had a most certain knowledge of it. Or, if he had evidence, since he could evidently know the act of charity by which he was cleaving to God, nevertheless, since he did not have charity and the love of God from the clear vision of him, he was not so firm in charity that he could not be moved from it by a contrary love. For his own excellence could be set before him more efficaciously than that divine goodness which was revealed through faith and which moved him to the charity of God; but only charity arising from the clear vision of the goodness of God, which thus appears under every aspect of good - even in the very exercise - cannot be overcome by contrary love, as we shall see in disp. 231, c. 4. As to the third reason - why, after the first merit, the demons did not immediately receive the beatitude of glory, and whether the good obtained it after one merit or after more - we shall speak in the following disputation, c. 10.[1808]

1808. On the invincibility of charity from the clear vision of God's goodness, see disp. 231, c. 4; on the timing of the reward after the first merit, see the following disputation, c. 10.

Disputatio CCXXVIII - Whether all the Angels were created equal in sanctity and justice

- The truer opinion is that the Angels were disposed by their own operation aided by grace unto justification. c. 1.
- Angels more perfect by connatural dignity obtained greater grace from God. c. 2.
- The foregoing doctrine is illustrated by certain notes. c. 3.
- The truer opinion is that the Angels could not have been disposed by their own operation without grace unto justification. c. ...

Caput I - On the disposition of the Angels to grace

Concerning the inequality of grace among the Angels, St. Bonaventure disputes in this question (q. 3, a. 8); and we too have resolved to treat it in this disputation, because it seems connected with the matter of the preceding disputation: first, however, about the disposition of the Angels unto grace. On this point, among those Theologians who teach that the Angels were created by God in sanctity and justice, it is not sufficiently certain whether the Angels were disposed unto their justification by some proper operation of theirs proceeding from the aid of grace, from the inequality of which disposition the inequality of sanctity itself and of grace making [them] pleasing would be determined. For Capreolus in II, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1, contra 4, concl. 8, ad 1 contra quintam, and some Thomists, affirm that indeed in the first instant of their existence the Angels were justified, but that they had no disposition unto justification. And their reason is this: just as St. Thomas teaches (De malo q. 16, a. 4, ad 3), the operations of the Angel ought to have such an order among themselves that the natural and without-grace operations come first, before the supernatural or from grace; but no operation not proceeding from the aid of grace can be a disposition unto grace, as we have clearly proved above (disp. 91, c. 11 and the following). Therefore, if the Angel in the first instant was created in grace making [him] pleasing and in holiness, he did not have it from his own disposition; because then he could not have had any other operation than a natural one and not from the aid of grace. This opinion, if he should wish to defend that an Angel was created in grace, ought also to be favored by Alexander; for he posits both questions as problems. For he, according to the doctrine which he follows,[1809] must affirm that in the first instant the Angels could not operate, because, as he teaches in the solutions of the arguments, the same thing cannot in the same instant be produced and operate. In which, in part, he embraces the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor, in the Summa sententiarum tract. 1, c. 2, where he teaches that no thing can operate freely in the first instant of its being. The same Henry would be compelled to assert, if he were to say that the Angels were created in sanctity and justice; for he also held (lib. 8, q. 10) that an Angel could not in the first instant sin, nor merit, nor operate freely;

1809. See Alexander, II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 2, a. 7 (as cited), along with his principle that "the same thing cannot be produced and operate in the same instant." Also Hugh of St. Victor, Summa sententiarum, tract. 1, c. 2; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 8, q. 10.

but if he had had some disposition, it ought to have been free. Concerning their opinion, as it pertains to free operation in the first instant of a thing, we have spoken above (disp. 68, c. 6), and we shall speak (disp. 236, c. 3).

But I for my part judge far truer the opinion of those who say that the Angels were not justified without some disposition of their own operation; they grant, indeed, that in the first instant the Angels had an act of charity and of meritorious glory; and that act of charity, which together with it is the infusion of the habit, all the Scholastics call a disposition. Yet about the order which that act has with the habit there is among them no slight controversy. We shall explain this opinion...

I for my part judge far truer the opinion of those who say that the angels were not justified without some disposition (*dispositio*) of their own operation, which was present together in the same first instant with the very infusion of habitual grace. Thus taught Cajetan in 2.2, q. 24, a. 3, around solution 3; and the same opinion is also reported for Ferrarien. on III Contra Gentiles, c. 110; for although there he only asserts that the angels in their first instant were and merited, yet according to the doctrine of St. Thomas which I shall explain below, he ought consequently to teach that that merit of life eternal was a disposition to justification; and the same are forced to affirm, whoever concede that in the first instant an angel had an act of charity and merited glory: for the act of charity, which is together with the infusion of the habit, all the Schoolmen call a disposition - though as to the order which that act has with the habit there is among them no slight controversy. In order to explain this opinion, note that "disposition to justification" is employed variously among the Doctors.

For "disposition" is said of any operation by which a man little by little tends to justification and obtains for himself other help all the way to the remission of sins and justification itself; and of this sort alone I think the Fathers of the Council of Trent spoke in session 6, c. 6, and session 14, c. 4, where the contrition which they there call a disposition to grace, they do not use for sorrow for sins from love of God above all things precisely, but for sorrow from another end, or for sorrow in general. For in that c. 4, when they speak of contrition formed by charity, they do not call it a disposition to grace, but they say that by it a man is reconciled with God; of which relation we shall speak better elsewhere.[1810]

Therefore, if we speak of this kind of disposition which precedes in time: for all who teach that the angel was created in grace, it is indubitable that he was not disposed by any kind of operation to grace and justification, as is clear enough. For if at some time the angel had been without justice and holiness, so as to be gradually disposed by some works, he would have needed the help of grace for those works; for the same reasons and testimonies which we have at length adduced in disputation 91 altogether prove of the angels, as of men, that no one can even be disposed to the grace of God by his own powers. There is also another disposition which is wont in time to precede

1810. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6; sess. 14, c. 4. On reconciliation and formed contrition, see the loci adduced by Vazquez to I - II, q. 113, a. 8.

justification, and which by itself alone cannot justify, nor of itself is necessarily conjoined with justification, as attrition, whereas with the sacrament it always brings justification with it and has it conjoined, as is decreed in the Council of Trent, session 14, c. 4.

A disposition to justification is also called by the Schoolmen the act of charity and of contrition, which in the justified is together in time with grace itself habitual. Whether, however, this act proceeds as from an efficient cause by help alone, and in the genus of efficient cause precedes the habit; or rather proceeds from the very habit as from an efficient [cause], and thus supposes the infusion of the habit on the part of the efficient cause but precedes the reception of the habit on the part of the patient, is a very great question. In the same way, in the order of philosophizing, we must proceed; about which we shall speak more fully elsewhere; for now it is enough for us to show that this kind of disposition existed no less in the angels than it is asserted to be in men who are justified by their own act - although in men after sin this disposition has the special feature that love of God is conjoined with sorrow for sins. And this first is proved from St. Augustine in the place cited in the preceding disputation, where he plainly says that the angels were created in love of God and with the love of charity. Then, because if once we admit that the angels were just in the first instant, there is no reason why we should deny that they also had from the beginning the love of charity toward God. For what Capreolus used to say - that prior in duration there must be an act natural from pure nature than an operation from grace - I do not see on what grounds it is asserted. I admit that St. Thomas taught so in the place cited, in favor of Capreolus's opinion; yet he clearly felt the opposite in this work, I, q. 63, a. 5, ad 4, where he admits that the angels in the first instant merited glory: why, then, shall we deny that from the beginning they also loved God by charity? Moreover, what Alexander said, that in the first instant in which a thing is produced it cannot operate; and what Hugh and Henry said, that a rational creature in its first instant cannot operate freely or by deliberation - we shall show below in disputation 236, c. 3, to be false; and about liberty in the same instant against those same authors we have already said above.[1811]

Caput II - That the angels who by natural dignity are more perfect obtained greater grace from God

As in the preceding chapter we supposed as indubitable that in the angels there preceded no natural disposition, nor from their own powers, by reason of which they might obtain from God the grace of justification; now in like manner we must suppose that the natural perfection of each, in which they were created by God - what is called the grace of creation (gratia creationis), as we explained in disputation 68, c. 1 - was in no way a cause of obtaining from God the grace of justification. But in the angels this is proved by altogether the same reason which has place in men, about which above in disputation 91 more than enough has been said. And for the same reason I

1811. Alexander of Hales, II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 7; Hugh of St. Victor, Summa sententiarum, tract. 1, c. 2; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 8, q. 10; cf. Vazquez, disp. 236, c. 3.

think it is no less a matter of faith in angels than in men, that this natural dignity was not the cause of the grace bestowed on them, just as a good natural disposition and talent in men was not the cause of their grace.

However, whether God by His will, in no way regarding the dignity of creation as a cause, distributed His grace of justification in varying measure to the angels according to their dignity and natural excellence, or not, can be called into question. I have read none of the Schoolmen thus far who disputed about this, except the Master in II, dist. 3, and St. Thomas, and Cajetan, and more recent Theologians on article 6 of this question and on 2.2, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3. But all, by a common sentence, teach that to the higher angels in their very creation a greater grace of justification was bestowed. And this was openly the opinion of St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3 (before the middle), where after he has said that all the angels in their creation were perfected by the grace of God, he subjoins: "Yet so, that according to each one's dignity and rank they are made participants of the grace and light." It is also clear from the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius, who distributes the hierarchies of the angels and orders in beatitude according to the measure of natural perfection, as is seen in c. 6 of the Celestial Hierarchy and the following, and in that same chapter he teaches about the first hierarchy that none is more divine, and that it is more occupied in divine illuminations; which doctrine of the hierarchies he testifies he received from his master, namely Paul; and in c. 7, on the first hierarchy, he says again: "Rightly, therefore, is the first of the heavenly hierarchies administered over the highest and most excellent natures by merit." Add also St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, c. 16 (a little from the beginning), who says that the angels, according to the proportion of their preeminence among themselves, received from the Holy Spirit the measure of sanctification. Nor indeed have I read thus far anyone who defended the opposite. Wherefore a different distribution of grace is observed among angels than among men. For among men there are many of nobler disposition and native ability to whom less of the grace of God is communicated, as was noted in disputation 91. Whether, however, the first angel who fell by sin was by his nature the most outstanding of all, and therefore received from God a greater grace of justification, we shall see below in disputation 237, c. - . Yet this opinion about the distribution of grace I judge true not only in the angels who remained, of whom Dionysius and Basil seem to speak, but also of those who fell: both because Damascene seems to speak universally of all; and also because there does not seem greater reason to be had for those who persevered than for those who fell - at least as regards the first instant of their creation, in which all were just, and loved God, and merited life eternal. For they did merit: for in the following instant the evil angels had less preventing help of God than the good; this those ought to admit who assert that men who do not respond to God calling are prevented by a lesser grace than those who respond; about which in disputation 98 we have said more than enough.[1812]

1812. Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 3; Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 6 - 7; Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, c. 16; cf. Vazquez, disp. 91; disp. 98.

Caput III - The foregoing doctrine is illustrated by certain notes

First, so that we may sincerely understand the foregoing doctrine of the Fathers and of the Schoolmen, and that we may have no occasion for error, certain observations are to be noted. First, not only did God without any debt bestow grace on the angels, but also on their side nothing worthy, nothing congruent, preceded which might be the cause of the bestowal of grace. For thus God conferred those gifts that He did not regard the gift of creation as a cause; for thus grace of justification from first help all the way to the last would have the character of retribution, and not of mercy or of wholly liberal donation, as we set out in that disputation 91, c. 15; which, as we noted there, is against the nature of divine grace whereby a rational creature is justified.

Second, the doctrine of Cajetan on 2.2, q. 24, a. 3, around solution 3, must be examined. For Cajetan says that charity was distributed to the angels by the will of God as by a per se cause: because although to an angel of more perfect nature, who of himself works more perfectly and endeavors, a greater grace was given, this was (Cajetan says) per accidens, because God so willed to make the striving of a more perfect angel more worthy as a convenient disposition to a greater grace, according to the proportion by which a higher angel strives more perfectly than a lower; yet God could, if He had so willed, have made the striving of some angel more worthy for a greater grace than the striving of a superior. This doctrine, however, needs explanation. First, if Cajetan understands the natural endeavors and works of the angels as made worthy effects by the favor and acceptance of God according to the proportion of one angel's nature to another, so that they were dispositions to grace, that is, to charity - absurd is the doctrine, whether you understand by grace habitual charity, by which a man is just and sins are remitted, or the first calling of operative grace: because no action from pure nature can be a worthy or congruent disposition to obtain grace; for thus the true notion of grace would be destroyed, as we have sufficiently shown in that disputation 91, c. 15. Therefore, if Cajetan understands that the natural endeavors of an angel were rendered worthy to a greater or lesser aptitude for grace and charity according to the proportion of the nature of one angel to another, or in some other way - namely, that a more perfect angel, who has more perfect natural endowments, was more powerfully prevented by grace, so that by its strength he might cooperate more efficaciously, and thus his consent might be a more congruent disposition to grace and habitual charity - his opinion is true: for that ultimate disposition, of which in the first chapter of this disputation we spoke, which precedes the infusion of the habit on the side of the efficient cause (or, if you separate the infusion on the side of the efficient cause, precedes the reception of the habit on the side of the patient), as we shall say elsewhere, is always an elicited act in us; and in the angels there was some congruent thought pertaining to operative, that is, preventing grace, and from that also a cooperation of free choice in each, so that the consent might be free, with both concurring, and not from free choice alone.

Their opinion, therefore, however you take it about any sort of grace, is absurd. First, if we speak of grace and habitual charity, and of the ultimate disposition to it which the Schoolmen posit, it cannot without error be said that the angels could be disposed to it by their own powers.

Thirdly, I shall report the opinion of certain theologians of our time, who, concerning the disposition to grace in the angels, in my judgment did not think rightly. For they asserted that the angels were justified from the disposition of free choice alone, without the gift of God: because they thought that to receive and to retain grace is not in the angels a gift of God; and they held the same about the grace given to the first man in the state of integral nature. Wherefore they also said that the measure of justification and of habitual charity ought to be taken from the measure of the disposition proceeding from free choice alone. Thus indeed did they philosophize, leaning upon the authority of St. Augustine, whose mind they did not follow.

The opinion of these men, however it is taken about any sort of grace, is absurd. First, if we speak of grace and habitual charity, and of the ultimate disposition to it which the Schoolmen posit, it cannot without error be said that an angel could be disposed to it by his own powers from the sole gift of creation, without any other gift of the grace of God; because that ultimate disposition is said to consist of certain acts of charity: but this cannot be from free choice alone. For no one doubts that the affection of charity exists even in the angels and in a nature entire only by the gift of God. Nay rather, St. Basil, in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter sixteen, a little from the beginning, teaches that the angels could not have said that, "Glory in the highest to God," etc., unless they had received from the Holy Spirit the power, that is, grace: because no one, not even an angel, can say, "Lord Jesus," except in the Holy Spirit. Who then would dare to assert that the angels could, by their own powers, without the grace of God distinct from the gift of creation, love God, and by this love be disposed for receiving habitual justice and charity?[1813]

Now the testimony upon which the adversaries rely is from St. Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter eleven, after the middle, where he says that the first man did not need help so as to receive the good, namely holiness: and therefore, since an angel is of the same virtue, neither ought he to have needed the help of grace for this affect. But, as we said above in Disputation 98, chapter two, and as we shall say in 1 - 2, question 109, article 10, Augustine said that the first man did not need the help of grace so as to receive the good of holiness, because he already had it from his first origin; and thus there only remained that he should need help in order to retain and to persevere. But we, because we have lost that good, have needed help also in order to receive it back restored.[181418151816]

Next, it is also absurd to assert that for retaining this grace of justification and persevering in it the angels did not need the special help of the grace of God, but were able to effect it by their own powers. For even in integral nature perseverance is the gift of God, as the Second Council of Orange defines in canon nineteen. But if the angels could persevere by their own virtue, they could glory in themselves, nor could we say to them that of 1 Corinthians 4: "What have you that you have not received?" - which indeed, as of men, so also of angels, Anselm rightly thinks must be understood, in the book On the Fall of the Devil, from chapter 1 to 3.[18171818]

1813. St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 16 (paene ab initio).
1814. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.
1815. Disputatio 98, cap. 2 (Vázquez).
1816. 1 - 2, q. 109, a. 10.
1817. Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 19.

Finally, all the reasons and testimonies which prove that the help of God is necessary for men in order that they persevere, prove also that it was necessary likewise for the angels. Now the reasons are taken from prayer, by which not only men, but even angels could profitably ask for the help of grace to persevere; similarly, they could and ought to give thanks to God for the perseverance granted to them. But from the usefulness of prayer and thanksgiving we rightly gather the necessity of grace, as in 1 - 2, question 109, article 2.[1819]

But if the aforesaid moderns speak not of habitual grace, but of what they call actual grace, when they say that the angels did not need the help of the grace of God for receiving grace, either they speak of operative grace, or of prevenient grace, as it is received before consent, as I explained sufficiently in Disputation 88; and for receiving this it is rightly said that another grace is not necessary: because the very calling, bestowed by God alone without our consent, is received in us without another grace. Or they speak of receiving this grace by consent, as they plainly seem to assert; and their opinion is absurd, inasmuch as they assert that an angel can receive grace, that is, consent to it, by his own powers without any help of grace itself. For one who has once been called by God cannot consent to the calling save by the power of that very calling cooperating, as we have amply shown above in Disputation 97, chapter 2.

But the aforesaid Doctors bring forward for themselves as testimony St. Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where concerning the first man (and the same reasoning seems to be about the angels) he says: "He gave help, without which he could not remain in it (namely, justice), if he wished; but that he should wish, He left to his free choice": therefore Augustine says that to retain grace is the work of free choice alone. I answer: Augustine did not say that it is the work of free choice alone without the help of grace, but that it was left in the liberty of free choice; which indeed is rightly said, even if it is done by the help of grace. For the consent which we render to grace by its help is placed in our liberty, since we are also able to resist grace.

Someone will object again from the same Augustine in the same chapter 11, near the end, those words: "But what will be freer than free will, when it will not be able to serve sin?" which was to be for man in the future, as it was made the reward of merit for the holy angels; now, however, by sin, when the merited good was lost, in those who are freed it has been made the gift of grace which was to be the reward of merit. From which someone could in this way argue: Not to be able to sin happens only in beatitude: therefore Augustine said that beatitude was to be in the future for man in integral nature as a reward, just as it was also for the angels, if they had persevered; now, however, he says that for man after fallen nature it is grace. But in fallen nature grace is not simply grace, but grace for grace, because although it rises from grace, it also has the ratio of reward and retribution. Therefore, if in integral nature and in the angels it was to be a reward and not grace, then it was not to be grace for grace; and yet it was to be and to be given back to those persevering: therefore perseverance in grace was not then to be grace.

1818. Anselm, De casu diaboli, cap. 1 - 3.
1819. 1 - 2, q. 109, a. 2.

I answer: In integral nature future glory was both a reward and grace for grace, and likewise in the angels. For, as I said, in both glory was to be from perseverance; but perseverance was to be from grace, as we have proved. After fallen nature also, future beatitude for those who will persevere is both a reward and grace: nevertheless Augustine said with a special reason that the beatitude which to the first parent and to the angels was to be a reward, to us after fallen nature was grace. Because, since angels and man in integral nature already had grace, it only seemed that beatitude remained as a reward. But because to man after fallen nature grace was restored, which had been altogether lost, and upon which, as upon a root, glory depended, Augustine, with deliberate purpose, called glory grace by reason of the gratuitous restoration and the new grace which was bestowed upon man.[1814]

Articulus IV - Whether the created angel merited his beatitude

Objicitur 1. It seems that the created angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of a meritorious act. But the angel had no difficulty in doing well. Therefore his good operation was not meritorious.

Objicitur 2. Further, we do not merit what is natural. But it was natural to the angel that he be converted to God. Therefore by this he did not merit beatitude.

Objicitur 3. Further, if the blessed angel merited his beatitude, then either before he had it, or after; but not before, because (as it seems to many) before he did not have grace, without which there is no merit; nor even after: for thus he would even now merit. Which seems false. For thus a lesser angel, by meriting, could attain to the rank of a superior angel; and the distinctions of the degrees of grace would not be stable; which is incongruous. Therefore the blessed angel did not merit his beatitude. And similarly, if someone were to say that in some fashion he had grace before glory; but if he did not have grace before he was blessed, then one must say that he had beatitude without merit, as we have grace. But this is against the nature of beatitude, which has the nature of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Or one must say that the angels merit beatitude by those things which already blessed they perform in divine ministries, as some have said. But this is against the nature of merit. For merit has the nature of a way to the end. But for one who is already at the term it is not fitting to be moved to the term; and indeed no one merits what he already has. Or one must say that one and the same act of conversion to God, inasmuch as it is from free choice, is meritorious, and inasmuch as it attains to the end, is the fruition of beatitude. But neither does this seem fitting: because free choice is not a sufficient cause of merit. Hence an act cannot be meritorious inasmuch as it is from free choice, unless inasmuch as it is informed by grace. Now it cannot at once be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not seem possible that one should at once finally enjoy and merit his enjoyment. And therefore it is better to say that the angel had grace before he was blessed, by which he merited beatitude.

1814. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.

But on the contrary: In Apocalypse 21 it is said that in that city Jerusalem "the measure of the angel" is "the measure of a man." But man cannot attain to beatitude except through merit. Therefore neither can the angels.

I answer that, to God alone perfect beatitude is natural, because for Him to be and to be blessed is the same. But for any creature at all, to be blessed is not natural, but is the ultimate end. Now anything whatever attains to its ultimate end through its operation. And an operation leading to an end is sometimes easy, when the end does not exceed the power of that which operates for the sake of the end, as medical treatment is an easy means to health; and sometimes it is difficult, when the end exceeds the power of the one acting for the end; then the work counts as meritorious of the end when, in order to reach the end, the agent operates by a help given from another. But ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature; wherefore it cannot be given by nature. Hence it remains that both man and angel merited their beatitude.

Reply to the first: The difficulty of acting well is not in the angels from any contrariety or hindrance of natural power, but from this, that the good sought is above natural power; whence there is need of a help superadded.

Reply to the second: By natural conversion the angel did not merit anything of God; but by the conversion of charity, which is through grace.

Reply to the third: The reply is evident from what has been said in the body of the article. And indeed, if the angels were created with grace, without which there is no merit, it is plain how to speak. But if anyone should say that he did not have grace before he was blessed, one must say that he had beatitude without merit, as we have grace. Which, however, is against the nature of beatitude, which is an end and a reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Or if one were to say that angels merit beatitude by what already blessed they do in divine ministries, that is against the ratio of merit, which is a way to the end; and no one merits what he already has. Or if one were to say that the same act, inasmuch as it is from free choice, is meritorious, and inasmuch as it reaches the end, is fruition, that is not fitting; for free choice is not a sufficient cause of merit, so that an act cannot be meritorious as from free choice unless it is informed by grace. But it cannot at once be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it is better to say that the angel had grace before he was blessed, by which he merited beatitude.

Articulus V - Whether the angel immediately after one act of merit had beatitude

The conclusion is affirmative.

Objicitur 1. It seems that the angel did not immediately after one meritorious act have beatitude. For it is more difficult for man to act well than for an angel. But man is not at once rewarded after one act. Therefore neither is the angel.

Objicitur 2. Further, the angel at once in the beginning of his creation was able to have some act in an instant; since even natural bodies, in the very instant of their creation, begin to be moved; and if bodily motion could be in an instant, intellectual and voluntary operations have motion in the first instant of their generation. If therefore the angel by one movement of his will merited beatitude, in the first instant of his creation he merited beatitude; therefore if at its rise beatitude was not delayed, at once in the first instant he would have been blessed.

Objicitur 3. Further, between a mean and an end there ought to be many means. But the state of the angels' beatitude is far distant from the state of their nature. Now the mean between both is merit. Therefore it was necessary that through many means they should be advanced to beatitude.

Sed contra: The soul of man and the angel are similarly ordered to beatitude. Whence to the Saints equality with the angels is promised. But a soul separated from the body, if it have the merit of beatitude, at once attains beatitude, unless there be some other impediment. Therefore by like reasoning an angel also. But in the very first act of charity he had the merit of beatitude. Therefore now there remains for him no other impediment; hence he attained to beatitude through one meritorious act alone.

I answer that, after the first act of charity by which he merited beatitude, the angel was at once blessed. The reason of which is this. Grace perfects nature according to the mode of nature, and every perfection is received in what can be perfected according to its own mode. Now this is proper to angelic nature, that it does not acquire its natural perfection by discourse, but at once by nature it has it, as was shown above. And as from his nature the angel has an order to natural perfection, so from merit he has an order to glory; and thus immediately after merit beatitude was placed in the angel. Moreover, the merit of beatitude can be not only in an angel but even in a man by one act; for any act informed by charity merits beatitude. Whence it remains that immediately after one act informed by charity the angel was blessed.

Reply to the first: Man, according to his nature, does not at once receive his perfection, as the angel does; and therefore to man a longer way is given for reaching beatitude than to an angel.

Reply to the second: The "instants" which regard angels are not taken as divisions of time in corporeal change, but only according to succession in their own acts. Now it cannot be that in them there should be at once the meritorious act of beatitude and the act of beatitude which is fruition, since the one is of imperfect grace and the other of consummate grace. Hence it follows that distinct instants must be posited: in one of which he merited beatitude, and in another he was blessed.

Reply to the third: It is of the nature of an angel that he should obtain his entire perfection, to which he is ordered, without many steps of discursus; and therefore there is not required more than one meritorious act, which by the ratio of a means can be so called, because according to it the angel is ordered to beatitude.

To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that the angel did not have beatitude immediately after one meritorious act. For it is more difficult for a man to act well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded immediately after one act. Therefore neither is the angel.

1. Further, an angel could at once in the beginning of his creation have some act in an instant, since even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation. And if the motion of a body could be in an instant, then the works of intellect and will would have motion in the first instant of their generation. If therefore the angel by one motion of his will merited beatitude, he merited beatitude in the first instant of his creation. Therefore, if their beatitude is not delayed, they were blessed in the first instant.
2. Further, between things greatly distant there ought to be many means. But the state of the angels' beatitude is greatly distant from the state of their nature. Now the mean between the two is merit. Therefore it was necessary that through many means the angel should arrive at beatitude.

But on the contrary: the soul of man and the angel are alike ordered to beatitude; whence to the Saints equality with the angels is promised. But the soul separated from the body, if it has the merit of beatitude, at once attains beatitude, unless there be some other impediment. Therefore by the same reasoning also an angel. But at once in the first act of charity he had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since in him there was no impediment, straightway he arrived at beatitude through one meritorious act alone.

I answer: it must be said that the angel, after the first act of charity by which he merited beatitude, was immediately blessed. The reason of this is that grace perfects nature according to the mode of nature, just as every perfection is received in what is perfectible according to its mode. Now it is proper to angelic nature not to acquire natural perfection through discursus, but to have it immediately by nature, as was shown above. But just as by his nature the angel has an ordination to natural perfection, so by merit he has an ordination to glory. And thus immediately after merit, beatitude ensued in the angel. Moreover, the merit of beatitude can be not only in an angel but also in a man through a single act. For by any act informed by charity man merits beatitude. Whence it follows that immediately after one act informed by charity the angel was blessed.

Reply to the first: Man according to his nature is not born to acquire his ultimate perfection immediately, as an angel is; and therefore to man a longer way has been appointed for meriting beatitude than to an angel.

Reply to the second: The angel is above the time of bodily things. Hence diverse instants in matters that pertain to angels are taken only according to succession in their own acts. Now there could not be in them at once the meritorious act of beatitude and the act of beatitude, which is fruition, since the one belongs to imperfect grace and the other to consummate grace. Whence it remains that distinct instants must be taken: in one of which he merited beatitude, and in another he was blessed.

Reply to the third: It belongs to the nature of an angel that he should immediately attain his perfection to which he is ordered. And therefore there is not required more than one meritorious act, which for this reason can be called a mean, because according to it the angel is ordered to beatitude.

Disputatio CCXXIX - Whether the angel obtained beatitude after one act of merit, or after several

The conclusion is affirmative. Concerning these two articles the matters that are difficult we shall examine in the following disputation.

- Angels were meritorious of beatitude. Cap. 1.
- That angels, by works following beatitude, merited that beatitude for themselves, was the opinion of the Master and others. Cap. 2.
- The foregoing opinion is refuted. Cap. 3.
- That, at the same time as in duration, angels were blessed and merited their beatitude, was taught by many other Scholastics. Cap. 4.
- The foregoing opinion is explained and defended in various ways. Cap. 5.
- What Cajetan and others think about this matter. Cap. 6.
- The latter part of the foregoing opinion is rejected. Cap. 7.
- Other opinions of the theologians. Cap. 8.
- The opinion of the Ferrarian. Cap. 9.
- The more probable opinion. Cap. 10.
- The foregoing opinion is confirmed. Cap. 11.

Caput I - That the angels merited beatitude

Before we proceed to dispute that which among the Scholastics is set in controversy, it must be premised that the angels truly were meritorious of their beatitude, which no one until now has dared to deny: and this was expressly taught by St. Thomas in the first article, and more recently by the theologians together with Cajetan in the same place, and by all the Scholastics in the places to be alleged below. It was also the express sentiment of St. Augustine in De correptione et gratia, chapter 11, after the middle, where he says that the good angels stood fast, others falling; and that they merited to receive the due reward of such stability, namely so great a plenitude of beatitude that they are most certain they will not fall from it of themselves. This follows from the position which we pursued in Disputation 223, namely, that the angels were not created in beatitude. Nor ought it be held more or less certain that the angels merited beatitude than that they were not created in it: for if they had been created in beatitude, they could not have merited it. But if they were not created in beatitude, and later attained it, it follows that they merited it, as men do: for neither is glory given to the angels without merits, as it is not given to men without merits, as is held.

St. Thomas, moreover, adduces in article 4, in the argument But on the contrary, to confirm this truth, that passage of Apocalypse 21: "The measure of a man, which is of an angel," where John describes the measurement of the holy city which he had seen. From which place he thus argues: the measure of that city is the same in a man and in an angel; but in a man the measure is merit: therefore also in angels. Yet this sense is entirely alien to the context of the chapter; for when John had said that the one who spoke with him had measured the city, and that the measure was of cubits, lest anyone should suppose that it was a man who had measured the city by cubits, he adds, "The measure of a man, which is of an angel," as if he said: although that measure may seem to be a man's, yet in truth it was an angel under the appearance of a man measuring the city - not by an intellectual measure, but by a human measure, which is of cubits. Thus does Arethas explain this passage. Others indeed expound it of Christ, who was at once man and the angel of great counsel, and whose measure, namely wisdom and justice, measured the holy city. Others finally expound it so that the sense is, that in the same way God protects the state of a blessed man, so also that of an angel; for in this place the "measure" of the holy city seems to denote protection. Next it must be observed that what Nicetas taught in Oration 42 upon St. Gregory Nazianzen, question 2, on Easter, is true, in the words: "I stood and looked," treating namely that passage of Apocalypse 12: "And I heard a loud voice in heaven saying: Now is made salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ"; he says that salvation was wrought for the visible and the invisible world, that is, for angels.[1820] But in explaining what kind of salvation was made for the angels, he proposes various modes: first, as some say according to the parable of the lost sheep, because what was lacking to the celestial angels through sin was made up from men. Second, that the angels, who before had it that they could be moved to evil, although with difficulty and with reluctance, after the resurrection of Christ can no longer be moved to evil. A third mode he assigns, which seems to fall back into the first. Yet the second is manifestly false, because before Christ's resurrection the angels saw the essence of God, according to Matthew 18: "Their angels always see the face of my Father" - which place we proved in Disputation 37, chapter 5, against St. John Chrysostom and other Greek Fathers, is to be understood of the clear vision of the divine essence; and the clear vision of God renders the blessed immovable from good to evil. Therefore before Christ rose from the dead, the angels had been confirmed in good. And if from the clarity of the vision of the essence of God that immobility should not follow, as Scotus thinks, about which we shall speak below at I-II, q. 4, a. 4, at least since beatitude brings that immobility from another source, and the angels were blessed before Christ's Resurrection, it follows that before it they had been made immovable from good to evil.[182118221823]

1820. St. Thomas, art. 4, in the Sed contra; the locus is Apocalypse 21:17 ("the measure of a man, which is of an angel").

1821. Arethas, Commentary on the Apocalypse, ad loc.

1822. Nicetas, on Oration 42 of St. Gregory Nazianzen, question 2, in Pascha, on "Et steti, et speculatus sum"; also on Apocalypse 12:10.

1823. See above, Disputation 37, cap. 5, against St. John Chrysostom and other Greek Fathers; and below at I-II, q. 4, a. 4.

Caput II - That the Master and others held the angels to have merited beatitude by works following it

Among the Scholastics who clearly held that the angels merited their beatitude, there is no controversy except about how they merited it. Whose opinions it is necessary to pursue in detail, so that at length what is approved by us we may more easily set forth.

The first opinion is that of the Master, who in II, dist. 5, in the last chapter, teaches that the angels were first blessed, and then by their subsequent works merited that beatitude for themselves. This opinion was afterwards followed by the author of the Summa of St. Victor (Antissiodorensis), in book 3, tract 1, chapter 7, at the beginning and before the middle and in the solution of a certain argument; and Albert thinks it probable in III, dist. 18, a. 4; and for it also Marcellus reports Praepositivus.[1824][1825][1826][1827] Now the works following beatitude, by which the angels merited it, he says, are the ministries exhibited in the grace of men out of obedience to God.

The first reason for this opinion, which is of this sort, can be proved most readily by the argument of Albert: Works which follow from grace can merit grace itself, from which they proceed, as Alexander expressly also held; just as a soldier can be given a horse because of the good future use which the king hopes for from him: therefore the works even following beatitude could in the angels have been merits of beatitude. Nor does it stand in the way that such works are later in time than beatitude itself: for the merit of Christ too was later in time than the grace given to the ancient Fathers, and yet that grace was bestowed on them from the future merits of Christ.[1828][1829]

Second: Angels, while they minister to us out of charity, merit something, just as Christ too, who in this mortal life was a comprehensor, merited something by the ministry which he exhibited toward the grace of men: therefore either by such ministry the angels merit glory to be newly conferred upon themselves - and thus their beatitude would increase excessively, which must not be conceded - or they merit the glory already given to them, which is what this opinion maintains.

Third: the great glory which the angels have was bestowed upon them only on account of great merits: but they could not have great merits on a road so short, closed within a narrow span of time: therefore we must necessarily have recourse to merits following beatitude itself.

Moreover, it must first be observed that, in the opinion of these doctors, it is not necessary to assert that the angels were created in beatitude: for as we saw in Disputation 226, chapter 1, the Master plainly taught that all the angels were created in pure nature, and afterwards had grace; and thus either they must say that they had grace and glory together, or, if first they had grace without glory, and through grace they merited glory, they are consequently compelled to say that the merits preceding glory were not sufficient to merit so great a glory, and therefore that they

1824. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences II, dist. 5, cap. ult.

1825. The author of the Summa of St. Victor (Antissiodorensis), book 3, tract 1, cap. 7 (at the beginning, before the middle, and in the solution of an argument).

1826. Albert the Great, In II Sent., dist. 18, a. 4.

1827. Marcellus reports Praepositivus for the same view.

1828. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 28, memb. 3, a. 3.

1829. The grace given to the ancient Fathers was collated from the future merits of Christ.

merited it also by subsequent merits. And since no one besides Ludovicus Vives has up to now said that the angels were created in the beatitude of the fatherland, as we noted in Disputation 225, chapters 3 and 4, it remains that those who follow this opinion affirm one of the two which we have said.[1830][1831]

Wherefore, if they divide the instants, or the delays, by which the way of the angels was completed, in such a way that they say there was a common one instant of the good angels before beatitude, they ought also to assert that in that instant they did not merit anything of beatitude, but after beatitude had been obtained. If however they say that they merited something of beatitude before they attained it, they ought also to assert that there were at least two instants in the way of the angels, in the first of which they existed in pure nature, and in the later that by grace they merited something of beatitude: for, according to what we shall say below, one instant cannot be assigned to pure nature and to grace.

Caput III - The preceding opinion is refuted

St. Thomas rightly refutes that opinion in this question; so too St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others to be cited below. And first, that line of reasoning of Scotus in II Sentences, dist. 5, q. 1, and in the first article, and of Richard in ar. 2, q. 2, can be impugned as follows.

First, even if man had not been created for whom the angel might minister, nevertheless the angel would have obtained the beatitude which he now has; and then he would not have had it by merits that were still future: therefore neither does he now have it by such merits. This reason can be confirmed by a similar one: for if men had been created, but the first parent had not sinned, much less would there be the ministry of angels in the defense and custody of men than there is now, because temptations would be fewer; therefore they have not obtained the beatitude which they now have on account of the merits of a future ministry. For when something is granted on account of certain merits that are also in the future, one must say that otherwise it would not have been granted, unless such merits were going to be future; for when the cause is taken away, the effect is taken away: just as he who concedes that the coming of Christ had as its cause the remedy for sin, consequently affirms that, sin being removed, Christ would not have come.

Second, against the aforesaid opinion there fights that doctrine which we have at length pursued against Alexander above, Disputation 91, cap. 6, namely, that the principle of merit cannot fall under the very merit of which it is the principle; and so neither can grace, which is the principle of the good use, fall under the merit of the good use: although otherwise it does not repel that merit be later in time than that which is given on account of merit. But all the works subsequent to beatitude are in some way from beatitude itself as from a principle: therefore an angel cannot by those subsequent works merit his beatitude. This reason most excellently shows the falsity of the preceding opinion, if we shall show that works subsequent to beatitude are from beatitude itself as

1830. See Disputation 226, cap. 1; and Disputation 225, cap. 3 - 4.

1831. Ludovicus Vives, who alone is said to have maintained that the angels were created in the beatitude of the fatherland.

from a principle. For if we say that beatitude consists in the clear vision of God, the work of charity arises from that very vision: therefore by charity one could not merit the vision. But if we say that beatitude is in the act of charity, then by the same reasoning beatitude is not from the merit of charity itself; because the same thing cannot merit itself. Moreover, the works of the other virtues also arise from charity itself and from vision, or else they presuppose them as something prior, as we shall show below: therefore those works too cannot be meritorious of glory which they presuppose as prior. Now the other works arise from charity itself in the blessed: because they are commanded by charity, or at least they somehow presuppose it as prior, as we shall also say below.

Third, the same opinion is rejected because it would follow that any blessed person could day by day, by new works, merit greater glory; and thus men would obtain glory not only by the good works which they did in this life, but also by works done in beatitude itself - which is absurd. But if you say that to the notion of merit there is required not only condignity in the works, but also a pact and a promise; and therefore the blessed do not merit greater glory by subsequent works - this we shall easily impugn in I-II, q. 14, a. 2, where expressly we shall show that to the true and perfect notion of merit a promise is not necessary, nor any pact or acceptance; something which we have shown by some reasoning above, Disputation 85, cap. 4. Wherefore he who once concedes that works subsequent to beatitude are condign of greater glory, is forced to concede in the blessed a merit condign of beatitude, or of an increase of beatitude, which is the same. And truly, even if a promise or pact between God and the creature were required so that a condign work might have the notion of merit, it would be ridiculous to assert that such a pact intervened between God and the angels, to the effect that he would at once, without preceding merit, give them glory on this condition and pact, that in glory they should keep watch in the ministry of men. Add also that, if the works subsequent to beatitude were in themselves condign in men of greater glory, it ought not to be asserted that God would deny to them the increase of which they themselves, being blessed, were worthy: for God does not deny that of which someone is worthy. Why, however, works done in beatitude are neither meritorious nor worthy of greater glory and increase, we shall say more abundantly in the article cited.

Fourth, if God had given glory to the good angels because of subsequent works, and had made no election to glory between the good and the bad from merits of grace in time, God would not seem to have kept equity in the distribution of glory: since the bad likewise would not less have merited those things by good subsequent works, if glory had been given to them before merits, than the good; for both would have labored as much as was necessary for so great a compensation of glory. And although in the distribution of grace God so behaves freely that he denies to one what he grants to another, this is not a wonder: because he distributes grace without any regard of merits either preceding or subsequent. But if indeed he assigns glory to certain ones because of future merits, why did he not assign the same to others, in whom he knew that there were to be so great and so notable future merits as would have deserved glory? And although God could have

done this without injustice, nevertheless it does not seem consonant with his doctrine, who promised his glory not to those neglecting the commandments, but to those doing rightly, and to those who by good works distinguished themselves from others.

- From these things indeed the arguments which in the previous chapter were brought forward for that opinion can easily be dissolved. To the first, what must be responded is manifest from what we have said in Disputation 91, cap. 6, where we showed that the principle of merit cannot fall under the merit itself; and hence neither can works from grace merit grace itself, nor can works subsequent to beatitude merit beatitude. But what Durandus replies in II Sentences, in the distinctions and questions, namely why it is that a soldier obtains from a king a horse as a reward on account of the future good use of it, but that no one can obtain from God glory on account of consequent works - we have reported and impugned in that same place, and we have assigned the true difference of each.

To the second I say that Christ, because he was a comprehensor, could not merit for himself essential glory, nor an increase of it; but for others he could rightly merit by certain free works. Why indeed he who is already blessed, and Christ, do not merit for themselves eternal life, we shall say in I-II, q. 114, a. 4, and III, q. 19, a. 5. Wherefore also the angels can merit for us many gifts, just as one wayfarer for another wayfarer, and as Christ merited for us: for the fact that Christ was a wayfarer by reason of the body mattered little for his being able to merit for us, although otherwise a blessed angel cannot merit for us, as in that article 3 we shall show at length.

To the third we say that, in one instant of discrete time, which corresponds to our time, an angel could by one or by several acts merit so great a reward of recompense as he now has in beatitude.

There are many and very weighty Scholastic Doctors who followed another opinion not much different from the preceding: for they say that the angels were created in the first instant in pure nature, and then in the second, not earlier in time, they merited eternal life, but simultaneously in duration were blessed, and merited it for themselves, yet in such a way that the merit, in the order of cause and (as they say) by nature, preceded the beatitude. This opinion was handed down by Albert the Great; St. Thomas; St. Bonaventure; Aegidius; Richard; Marsilius; John Maior; and, finally, Thomas of Argentina, who teaches that it is in fact hidden whether the merit was prior or simultaneous in duration with the beatitude itself, so that no mortal can know it unless God reveal it; and he adds that all the things which are alleged against this opinion are of no weight; wherefore he also judges it to be probable. Add also Maior in the place to be alleged below, who at least in this agrees with the Doctors of this opinion, namely that even if it did not thus happen, nevertheless it could have been that the merit of eternal life was simultaneous in duration with the thing itself. All the authors of this opinion agree with the Doctors of the preceding in this, that the merit of eternal life was not prior to the very attainment of beatitude. Its common foundation is this, that all of them think, first, that the angels were not created in grace: wherefore also in the first instant they were neither blessed nor had they merited eternal life; then, that nothing prevents the merit and the reward from being simultaneous in duration, as happens in the increase of charity and in the merit of it: therefore, the merit of eternal life could have been simultaneous in duration with

eternal life itself, or beatitude. Not without foundation, it seems, was it said that the merit of beatitude and beatitude itself were simultaneous in duration in the angels; nay indeed, Aegidius adds that one ought to philosophize in the same way even in the opinion of those who say that the angels were created in grace, namely that they were simultaneously in duration created in grace and in beatitude with the merit of that very beatitude. Moreover, because all the doctors alleged teach that the angels were not created in grace or in beatitude, the course of the angels, according to this opinion, is set out by distinct instants of discrete time, as we shall say below: in the first instant they were in pure nature; in the second instant they were converted to God in grace, with merit and with beatitude; but the wicked in the first instant were in pure nature, in the second were stained by sin, in the third were consigned to judgment.

They explain this opinion in various ways, and the defenses of its doctors; but before in the following chapter we bring forward each one's reasons with their explications, and examine them, it has pleased us in this present place to impugn it universally, insofar as it affirms that the angels were not, prior in time, promised beatitude such as beatitude is. It is plain that men first in time merit eternal life than obtain it; and thus they are said to labor in the state of wayfarer by faith and hope for eternal life: and the same thing could have been the case in the angels; and if it had been so, it would seem most in accord with the providence of God concerning a rational creature, namely that he should first distinguish between good and bad, than that he should assign to them either reward or punishment: therefore it must be asserted that it was done thus; especially since no reason compels us to assert that it was done in the opposite way. For the reasons alleged which they think prove the opposite opinion show only this, namely, that nothing repugns to merit and reward being simultaneously in duration in the angels; which is enough for us, if it be allowed that the state was such.

But this most greatly fights with the true ratio of the merit of eternal life, as we shall show more at large in the following chapter. This is, I say, what most truly refutes the aforesaid opinion. Yet there are also other doubts which the doctors who propose it are wont to offer; before we proceed to those, it has seemed good briefly to examine certain points.

The prior reason is that of Scotus, and of Gabriel, and of Maior in the places cited above, in this fashion: to the notion of merit there seems necessary a will which operates mutably, that is, a free will which is able to will the opposite; but the will, the seat of perfect charity, in the state of beatitude does not operate mutably: therefore, in that state one cannot merit beatitude itself. But this reason proves nothing: for the blessed Christ, accepting a precept, merited in the world, and yet his will did not then operate so mutably that it could will the opposite. Finally, for the ratio of merit some sort of liberty is necessary; and it suffices as regards the exercise: a liberty, namely, of acting freely; the liberty of sinning and of willing the opposite is by no means required; indeed, if that were present, it would seem absurd: for from such an opinion it would follow that Christ could not have merited by works of precept, because he could not sin against them; as the Third Part, q. 9, a. 9 shows at length. Moreover, I cannot but marvel at Scotus, that, since he himself plainly holds - as I shall report in I-II, q. 4, a. 4 - that it is not necessary for the blessed man's will, from the

clear vision of God, to be free for deliberation and choice so that he can suspend his act and will the contrary and sin; for thus rather he ought to infer that angels in beatitude could have merited for themselves beatitude, even if that mutability of will were necessary to the notion of merit.

The later reason is that of St. Thomas in this question, article 4, whose tenor is this: every merit of glory presupposes grace that is imperfect and not yet consummated, for it is as it were the root of its own effect; but he who is in beatitude already has grace consummated; therefore he cannot merit. Scotus impugns this reason in the place alleged, because it can happen that one in the way has as much grace as another has in the fatherland; therefore, from that side nothing prevents him who is in the fatherland from meriting, just as he who is on the way. But truly the sentiment of St. Thomas is not sufficiently broken by this reply of Scotus: for St. Thomas does not therefore call the grace, which is the principle of merit, "imperfect and not yet consummated" because it is remiss in degree when compared to the grace of beatitude, but because it is not yet consummated in this, that it has not yet reached its term, and the state of beatitude is a consummate state. Therefore, even if according to intensity someone on the way might have as much grace as another has in the fatherland, nevertheless, because in the blessed there is the state of consummation and possession of the end already attained, and in the wayfarers there is the state of tending toward the end, not of possession, St. Thomas rightly infers that no merit can be found simultaneously in duration with the state of beatitude, whose very notion excludes merit and posits consummation; for grace which is the principle of merit is ordered to remission of sin and to the grace of beatitude, which is given only when the state of the way is ended and the state of beatitude is confirmed. Consequently, although in other ways one might frame an intellectual proposition, the mind of the Saint remains firm: the merit of augment in grace cannot at the same time in duration be the cause of an increase of glory. For the rest, as we shall show, the increase of beatitude does not befall in the blessed by any meriting state; and thus, neither could angels in beatitude merit beatitude itself, even if a mutability of will, to the notion of merit, were thought necessary.

Notes on the prior opinion (from the preceding context):

- They said moreover that the works subsequent to beatitude, by which the angels are said to have merited it, are ministries in grace offered to men out of obedience to God. This opinion, they think, can be proved first by the reasoning of Albert: works that proceed from grace can merit the very grace from which they proceed, as Alexander expressly also thought; just as a horse can be given to a soldier on account of the future good use of the horse which the king expects from him; therefore, the works even that followed beatitude could have been in the angels merits of beatitude. Nor does it at all stand in the way that such works are later in time than beatitude itself: for the merit of Christ also was later in time than the grace given earlier to others from Christ's future merits. Second, they urge that angels minister out of charity; and Christ likewise, though already a comprehensor, undertook the ministry: not that his glory might newly increase by that ministry - which is not to be conceded - but with glory already given; and thus, they conclude, there is nothing repugnant if in the angels also ministry and glory were conjoined. Third, they press the magnitude of the glory given: a

great reward is not assigned except on account of great merits and much exercise; therefore, since the way was most brief, the merits, they say, must necessarily have been subsequent. Finally, they are accustomed to explain the matter by positing two instants in the angels' course: that before beatitude there was one common instant of the angels in pure nature, in which they merited something proportioned to nature; then a later instant in grace, in which they merited beatitude; or else that before beatitude they did not merit anything condign, but only after beatitude they merited something consequent upon it.

- But we have plainly taught elsewhere that the angels were created in pure nature, and thereafter had grace without at once having glory, and that they merited glory; hence it is false to say that merits sufficient for such a reward preceded as to priority of time, or that they obtained it without meriting, save for the paradox of Ludovicus Vives alone, who is said to have maintained that the angels were created in the fatherland. What remains of that opinion we leave to the following chapters, where we shall establish what is to be established, and refute what is to be refuted: namely, that those who divide the course of the angels should say that there were two instants, one in which they were in pure nature, and a second in which they were in grace; not that anything was merited after beatitude such as to be its cause, as will be said more fully below.

They variously explain and defend this opinion; but before, in the following chapter, we examine the reasons of each as they explain and defend it, it has seemed good in this present chapter to impugn it universally, insofar as it affirms that the angels did not first in time merit their beatitude. For it is established that men first in time merit eternal life before they attain it; and then they are said to be on the way and to labor in hope of eternal life. And this could have been done in the angels; and if it had been done, it would have seemed most consonant with divine providence concerning a rational creature, especially so as first to distinguish between the wicked and the good before assigning to them either reward or punishment. Therefore it must be asserted that it was done thus, especially since no reason compels us to assert that it was done in the opposite way; for if the opposing reasons prove anything, it is surely only this, that there is no repugnance in merit and reward being simultaneous in duration in the angels, which is not enough for us to assert that it was actually done thus. Moreover, this very much conflicts with the true ratio of merit for eternal life, as we shall not obscurely show in the following chapter. This, in my judgment, is the most weighty reason which refutes the aforesaid opinion universally. Yet two other reasons that are commonly brought against it, before we proceed to other matters, I have thought should be briefly examined.

Objicitur: The first reason is Scotus's and Gabriel's, and of others in places to be cited below, in this way: for the notion of merit there seems necessary a will that operates mutably, that is, a free will which can will the opposite or desist from its proposal; but in the state of beatitude the will does not operate mutably; therefore in that state beatitude itself cannot be merited.

Respondetur: This reason proves nothing. For that liberty does not seem necessary for the notion of merit: indeed, Christ, accepting the precept of dying, merited, and yet his will did not then operate so mutably as to be able to will the opposite. Finally, although some liberty is indeed necessary for the notion of merit and suffices as to the exercise, nevertheless the liberty of sinning and of willing the opposite is in no way required; indeed, to assert this seems absurd, because from such an opinion it would follow that Christ could not have merited by the works of precept, since he could not sin against them, as is shown at length in the Third Part, question 19, article 3.[1832] Moreover, I cannot but wonder at Scotus, that he uses his own reasoning here; for he himself plainly holds, as I will report below in I - II, q. 4, a. 1, that the blessed is not necessarily moved to the love of God from the clear vision, but can cease and will the contrary and sin; thus rather it ought to be inferred that the angels in beatitude could have merited beatitude for themselves, even if that mutability of will were necessary for the notion of merit.

Objicitur: The second reason is St. Thomas's in this question, article 4: every merit of glory presupposes imperfect and not yet consummated grace as its root; but he who is in beatitude already has consummated grace; therefore he cannot merit.

Respondetur: Scotus impugns this, in the place cited, because it can happen that someone on the way have as much grace as another has in the fatherland; therefore on that score nothing prevents him who is in the fatherland from being able to merit, just as he who is on the way.

But Scotus did not sufficiently understand St. Thomas's mind in this argument. For the holy Doctor does not therefore call the grace which ought to be the principle of merit imperfect and not yet consummated because it is more remiss than the grace of beatitude, but because it is not yet in the term and confirmed in the state of beatitude. However, even so understood, from the major proposition which St. Thomas assumes one could rightly infer that there can be no merit simultaneous in duration with the state of beatitude; yet that major proposition ought first to have been made good; for around it seems to lie the principal difficulty in the aforesaid opinion. I pass over a third reason which some use against this opinion, assuming as its principle that merit must universally be prior in duration to the reward. For this proposition is manifestly false, as is clear from the foundation of this opinion which has been adduced above, since the merit of an increase of grace can be simultaneous in duration with the increase of grace itself.

Note: Nevertheless, all the doctors cited teach that the angels were not created in grace nor in beatitude; so, according to this opinion, the course of the angels ought to be so disposed that the good had only one instant of discrete time, according to what we shall say below, in which they were in pure nature; in a second instant they were in grace, merit, and beatitude. But the wicked were in the first instant in pure nature; in the second, stained by sin; in the third, consigned to punishment.

Note also: If someone should wish to posit an act of love of God that is free - even as is attributed by some to Christ - terminated to God not as clearly seen but as known by another kind of cognition, we shall easily show in the Third Part, question 19, article 3, that this cannot stand.[1832]

1832. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 3.

Caput V - Various ways in which the preceding opinion is explained and defended

Since the preceding opinion is not a little difficult, the Doctors who follow it do not defend it in the same way, but they try by various methods to elucidate it and render it easier. Indeed Ægidius explains it not in one way but in many, of which I have proposed here to recount and impugn three principal ones.

First mode of Ægidius. He understands it thus: that the reward of beatitude does not consist in any operation of the blessed - neither of the intellect nor of the will - but that it is God himself, who is the object of the vision and love which the blessed has, and so it should be called the objective beatitude; but the merit of beatitude is the very act of love by which he loved God as his beatitude. Wherefore this author, explaining the opinion in this way, does not constitute the notion of merit in other operations of the blessed, but in the very love of God clearly seen, so that the love of God be the merit, but God himself, whom it has for object, be the reward.

Refellitur: But this explanation rests on a false foundation, constituting the reward, which is beatitude, not in operation but in God himself whom the blessed has for his object; whereas from the common teaching of all the Scholastics it is established that our formal beatitude ought to be our operation, as we shall see below in I - II, question 3, articles 2 and 3.[1833] Therefore that which ought to fall under merit is not God alone, but the operation by which God as our highest good is conjoined to us. For neither are we formally blessed by God himself taken alone, nor by the attainment of God Himself - which is our operation - or by the fruition of Him - which likewise is our operation. Whence also it results that, although one may obtain a greater reward of beatitude than another, nevertheless, if God taken in Himself were the reward of our merits, it could not be understood how one would obtain a greater reward than another. Nor can we say, as Ægidius thinks, that the principal reward of our beatitude is God, but in a less principal way our operation about Him; for, as we shall show in I - II, question 4, article 1, there are not two ends, God and our operation, but from both together there is constituted one single entire end and our good. For God cannot be our good unless He be conjoined by operation; and thus neither is God alone our end, nor is operation without its object our beatitude. How, however, from both there is made one entire end, must be explained in its proper place.

Grant, however, to Ægidius that God according to Himself is our beatitude and our essential reward principally; nevertheless, by no reason can he defend that the love of God in the fatherland is the merit of God Himself whom it has for object and is prior in nature to God Himself. First, because in the very term act is said that which is conversant about some object to be meritorious of that object. Next, because an act cannot be prior in its own nature to the object about which it is conversant; for it is impossible in any way to understand or conceive an operation of love without the object about which it is conversant; therefore the operation of love cannot be meritorious of God, whom it has for object. And although an operation which is motion and production of some

1832. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 3.

1833. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 3, a. 1 - 3; q. 4, a. 1. Also Aristotle, Physics III, c. 2; see above Disputation 141, cap. 4.

terminus be prior by nature as a way than the terminus is in actual being, because it is an imperfect act of a being in potency as potency, as is defined in Physics III, chapter 2, and is called Entelecheia, nevertheless the operation of the will and of the intellect is not of this sort, nor is it thus compared with the object about which it is conversant; because it is not the production of the object itself, but is conversant about objects already produced, namely by knowing or by loving, and therefore it is called a grammatical action, as we explained above in Disputation 141, chapter 4.

Second mode of Ægidius. He also defends and explains the same opinion by distinguishing the act of love of God in the fatherland, and he considers it in two ways - both as merit and as reward - so that the very same act of love be according to itself both reward and merit, lest he assert that God according to Himself is our reward. And he considers the love of God in the fatherland, in one way indeed as it is elicited first in nature by grace and charity, and in this respect he says it is merit; in another way, as it is terminated in God as object, by whom God is conjoined and had as reward, and in this respect he says that the very act of love also has the notion of a reward compared to itself considered in the former way.

Rejicitur: But this mode likewise is no less false and is demonstrable without any foundation. First, because merit and reward are universally distinguished according to reality, as is clear by induction in all other cases; therefore in the angels the same thing must not be said. Second, from the aforesaid opinion thus explained it would follow that men also merit beatitude for themselves by the same act by which they are blessed, or by which in the fatherland they love God; for in them too that act can be considered in those two modes, just as in the angels. Nor will it do to reply that in the angels it had the nature of merit by reason of the pact which is required for the notion of merit, but not in men because no pact intervened; for it is ridiculous to admit a pact of such a kind that the very work be meritorious of itself - who does not see this? Third, it is altogether feigned to distinguish the act of love in this twofold way, as though such a distinction could be made in an act that is elicited by the intellect or will before it is considered as terminated to the object. For however you wish to consider love, it must include and regard its object, since love is the love of something as an object. Wherefore there is altogether one and the same indivisible notion of the act, both as elicited by the will and as respecting its object; and although two diverse notions can be conceived, at least it cannot happen that one be understood before the other; but both would of necessity be included in the same act of love, insofar as it is love.

By these reasons it remains proved that by the very act of love of God in the fatherland no one can merit beatitude, if we say that it consists in the very act of love, as Ægidius thinks. But if we say that it is in the vision itself, it can easily likewise be shown that the blessed cannot merit beatitude by the love of God clearly seen, for this reason, that a principle of merit cannot fall under merit. Wherefore, since the act of charity about God clearly seen arises from the vision as from a principle, it rightly follows that one cannot merit beatitude, if beatitude is constituted in the vision of God, as we have proved above. Lastly, if someone says that beatitude is in the act of love, the same is proved: for although delight follows the act of love of God, it could not be ascribed to the merit of love, because delight arises by a certain natural necessity most closely from the vision.

Third mode - Richard. A third mode of defending the aforesaid opinion is Richard's, who, when he says that in the angels there were simultaneously in time the reward in the blessed and the merit, assigns this order between them: first there was a movement of free will into God, in which the angel's conversion to God began; second, the habit of grace was infused; third, the habit of glory was infused, by which his conversion was confirmed. In which manner he seems to teach that the reward which the angels merited in the fatherland was the infusion of the habit of grace and of glory.

Refellitur: But this mode of explaining the aforesaid opinion is less sufficient. First, because it is not the same thing to merit beatitude and to merit the habit of grace and of glory; for our beatitude is not placed in habits, but in operation, as we shall say in I - II, question 3, article 1, from the common teaching of the Scholastics.[1833] Next, because neither can the infusion of these habits in the fatherland be merited by the blessed through an act of conversion into God, which is love of Him; for the act of love of God in the fatherland, as we were just saying, is necessary both as to specification and as to exercise; therefore it cannot be meritorious of the infusion of the habit of grace or of glory. I grant indeed that by such an act the angels could have merited such an infusion, if in the order of the efficient cause that act had preceded and had been free; but because it was necessary, they could not merit by it. Moreover, even if they had merited the infusion of these habits, they could not be said to have merited beatitude itself; for beatitude is not in a habit, but, as we said a little earlier, it is constituted in the operation of the intellect or of the will. But the operation of the intellect cannot fall under the merit of an act of charity, because charity arises from vision, and the principle of merit does not fall under the merit of which it is the principle. Then the operation of the will, which is love of God, cannot fall under the merit of beatitude itself. And in general, nothing after what has been proved above can be the case: finally, if someone should say that beatitude is in the act of love, the same thing is proved; because, although delight follows the act of love of God, it cannot be attributed to the merit of love, inasmuch as delight by a certain natural necessity most closely arises from the vision.

The fourth way of explaining the aforesaid opinion is that of John Mairon, in the place cited, where he teaches that the blessed angels merited their beatitude, not by an act of love and charity toward God, but by other acts - not, however, by acts to come later, as the Master and others said, whom in the third chapter I refuted, but by other acts which were simultaneous in duration with the vision and with charity. For then the blessed angels could have had the will to render obedience to God in procuring the salvation of souls, and in other things which God might have commanded.

Non placet. But in this way also I judge it impossible that the angels were meritorious of their beatitude, whether that beatitude be placed in the vision or in the love of God. First, if we say that the beatitude of the angels was placed in the love of God, they could not have merited it by other works: for, in order that some work be meritorious of some reward, it must be, at least in order according to nature, prior to the reward itself. Now this order of priority ought not to be assigned from a free will - even the free will of God - but from the very nature of the work and the reward

1833. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 3, a. 1 - 3; q. 4, a. 1. Also Aristotle, Physics III, c. 2; see above Disputation 141, cap. 4.

considered in themselves. Yet the other works of the blessed, apart from love, cannot by their nature be prior to the reward itself inasmuch as they are worthy of it, by which very reason they would have to be prior. For, in order that some work of the blessed be worthy of life eternal, by its very nature it demands that it proceed from a man who is just and existing in charity, as is manifest to all. Therefore, in order that one who is blessed, by some work simultaneous in time or subsequent in time, merit beatitude, he must already be considered holy by grace and charity. But charity is previously the principle of love, which is its proper operation, rather than that the subject having charity be understood to perform other works; or at least it cannot be understood that a holy man, by a priority of nature, should perform other works before the proper work of the charity that he has - especially since by the very fact that we suppose charity in some angel, we suppose also the principle of the knowledge of God, which in the blessed is the clear vision. And since, naturally and necessarily, without any other operation being awaited, the light of glory, which is given for seeing God, moves the intellect to the vision of God; and the vision of God is at once followed, naturally and necessarily, by love, no other operation being awaited; it cannot be that by other works the blessed should merit the vision itself or love, in one of which, or in both of which, we say beatitude is placed. And the same argument can be made if we say that beatitude is in delight: for, in order that by other works someone should merit beatitude, it would have been necessary that those prior works be in some way prior to the very vision and love or delight. But, as has been proved, without any other operation being awaited, in no way does one who is endowed with the light of glory fail to see, love, and delight in God. Therefore by no other work can anyone merit any of those operations.

Add that, since these operations of the vision of God, of love, and of delight follow one another altogether necessarily, once the light of glory has been posited, it seems altogether superfluous, indeed impossible, to grant in the same instant of time any merit of those operations, since the things which follow necessarily are not given out of merits. Hence we can assign merit only as obtaining the light of glory, which the rest follow necessarily. And although the angels may have merited the light of glory in the same instant, it would not be said that they merited beatitude, as we noted above against Richard. Whether, however, love of God in patria in some way operates or exerts an influence upon the other works of that instant and of the following one, by reason of which love itself cannot fall under the merit of those works, we shall say in the ninth question, article 4; for there we must also dispute concerning Christ, whether he could have merited his own beatitude, which he had from the beginning of his conception.[1834]

Two other ways of defending the aforesaid opinion are noted by Aegidius in the place cited. One is that the act of love, insofar as it is from free choice, is merit; but the same act, insofar as it is informed by grace, is the reward. The other way is that in the blessed there was, by a priority of nature, imperfect grace, and in this respect it was the principle of merit; afterwards it was consummated and perfected, and in this respect it was the principle of reward. This latter way indeed seems to have been that of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas in the places cited. However, Aegidius with good reason makes nothing of these two ways: for they are manifestly absurd. The

1834. See below Disputation 229, quaest. 9, art. 4; and on Christ, the same place.

former indeed, because love of God, especially in patria, cannot be considered as from free choice alone: for the consent of the will, which is a work of grace, is wholly from free choice and wholly from grace, not inversely but simultaneously; not separately, but conjointly, as we noted above from Bernard, disputation 88, chapter 5. The latter way also is absurd: because perfect grace, that is, consummated grace, which is the principle of reward, and imperfect grace, that is, not consummated, which is the principle of merit, do not differ by intensity and remissness, but by the state of wayfarers and of the homeland: for grace of the way is called not consummated; but grace of the homeland is called consummated. But it is impossible that in the same instant of time the same grace be in patria and in via; for this would be to be at once in the homeland and outside the homeland. Therefore it is impossible that grace be simultaneously in duration both consummated and not consummated; and, by a priority of nature, that it be not consummated and be the principle of merit.

From what has been said it is gathered that the second opinion which we reported in the preceding chapter, however it be explained, is false. It is also clear that the persuasive argument for the aforesaid opinion which was brought in the preceding chapter is very weak. For although it is not repugnant that merit and some reward - such as an increase of charity, which can rightly exist together with the merit itself - be simultaneous in duration; nevertheless merit cannot be simultaneous in duration with every kind of reward: for it is altogether repugnant that merit be simultaneous with the reward of beatitude, as has been proved up to now. Wherefore all the other Doctors, who dispute concerning the way and the reward of the angels, to be cited below, agree in this, that the angel ought to have merited beatitude prior in time and duration to having it.

Caput VI - What Cajetan and others think concerning this matter

Although, as I said, the other Doctors agree in this, that the angel first, in duration, merited eternal life before he obtained it, yet they differ in assigning this way and merit of the angels, as we shall consider in detail. Moreover, the Doctors whose opinions we shall report below speak not only of the merit of the good for beatitude, but also of the way of the wicked, and they compare the one with the other.

The third opinion, then, is that of Cajetan, below in question 63, article 6,[1835] who teaches first that the way of the good angels lasted only one instant, in which they were created and merited beatitude, but did not yet obtain it; afterwards, however, in the following instant, the merit of those angels was terminated, and at the same time beatitude was granted to them. In which point Cajetan seems in some sense to agree with the preceding opinion. He says, moreover, that in the second instant the merit of the angels was terminated, because it was as it were on the threshold and in act, which however was still in via, as in becoming. Cajetan supports this part of the opinion by no reason, nor do I see how it could be confirmed. It only seems to have been devised by Cajetan in order to explain the mind of St. Thomas below in q. 63, a. 6, where he asserts that the good angels by one meritorious act obtained beatitude, which nevertheless they would have obtained

1835. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 63, a. 6.

after the first instant in which they merited, had they not put the impediment of sin; for Cajetan thinks that there could have been no other difference between the good and the evil, since both were created in grace in the first instant and merited glory, except that the evil did not consummate their merit nor had it terminated; but the good had it all the way to the term of beatitude. In the same opinion Cajetan thinks St. Thomas to have been in Quodlibet 9, a. 8, according to this opinion and the difference assigned between the good and the evil.[1836]

Some more recent theologians, who agree with Cajetan, teach further that the way of the evil angels was so disposed that in the first instant they merited glory with the good, in the second, however, they sinned, and at the same time were at the term of damnation and punishment; yet in such a way that sin and damnation were indeed simultaneous, but by a priority of nature sin was the merit of damnation. They speak, however, of the damnation which is called the punishment of loss, not of the punishment of sense, which is the punishment of fire. Wherefore, consequently, they affirm that in the second instant, in which the angels sinned, they still remained in heaven; and in the following, namely in the third, they descended to the fire of hell. In this manner, therefore, some recent authors philosophize about the wicked, so as to seem to keep a parallel observation of reason in the way of the good and of the evil.

Yet this opinion does not at all commend itself to me: for besides the fact that it can be supported by no foundation, nor is it necessary for explaining the mind of the holy Doctor, it manifestly contradicts reason. First, if we speak of St. Thomas in that Quodlibet, he was certainly of the opinion which we just now impugned, namely, that at the same time there were the merit of the good angels and the reward of beatitude; nor does he there say that the merit of the good angels was terminated in beatitude and begun in via, but he plainly taught that their meriting began at once, and at once their very beatitude - and not before. How what we cited from him is to be understood in article 6 of the following question will be explained below.

Next, however Cajetan may understand the consummation and termination of merit in patria, his opinion cannot be defended, as will be clear by induction. For either by the consummation and termination of merit in patria he understands something other than the attainment of the reward itself, by which merit seems to be, as it were, confirmed and determined by its own end: and in this sense it is indeed true that every merit, not only of an angel but also of a man, is confirmed in patria; but in this way nothing peculiar would have belonged to the merit of the good angels which did not belong to the demons, on account of which beatitude was given to the good and denied to the demons; for if to both parties there had belonged in via such and such shares with respect to faith and charity and merit (that is, to virtue and holiness), and if their way had been of equal duration in both, then to the demons also there would only have been owing, after their first merit, the retribution of glory, by which their merit would have been terminated - just as the merit of the good would also have drawn after it consummation and termination.

Or else, by the consummation and termination of the merit of the good in patria and in beatitude, Cajetan understands some continuation of the preceding merit, or at least some new merit added to the merit of the way; and in neither manner can the aforesaid opinion be defended.

First, because it has been sufficiently proved that there can be in the blessed no merit at all; therefore neither a new merit nor a continuation of the prior. For if a continuation could exist, the very same conditions would be required for the continuation of the old merit as for some new merit. Next, because if, after the merit of the way by which they would have been made capable of the good things, beatitude had been given to the demons, at once there would have been granted to them, in the same way, merit consummated and terminated; wherefore the judgment of the Lord would not have been equitable in the distribution.

Moreover, let us see by what reason one might conceive some continuation of merit in the angels, and a termination coinciding with liberty in the first instant of beatitude. For my part, I do not see how such a continuation and consummation in that first instant could be devised, unless one should also grant what we have very recently impugned, that merit and the reward of beatitude were simultaneous in time; or else that in that same instant there remained in the blessed a liberty for sinning, so that the merit might then be brought to its term. But this cannot be said: for although a rational creature, considered according to its own nature, is free for sinning, and on this side nothing hinders the consummation of merit; nevertheless, because that liberty cannot remain in a rational creature together with the clear vision of God, in no way could it be that, in the same instant of duration and time, even with a priority of nature, an angel seeing God should be able to sin. Therefore, neither can there be in that first instant of beatitude any continuation or termination of merit that requires liberty for sinning. Consequently, the whole device collapses with which Cajetan endeavored to support that opinion.

Moreover, that by the clear vision of God every liberty for sinning is impeded, St. Thomas teaches in I-II, question 4, article 4, and Cajetan himself in the same place; for only with an obscure knowledge of God does the rational creature remain free for sinning, as we shall prove more fully in that place.[1837]

It matters little that we were saying that an angel is by his own nature free; so as to affirm that, in the first instant of beatitude, prior by nature he could have sinned, and thus could have consummated merit. First, because, as we noted immediately above, if we were to say that in him there remained a liberty prior by nature, it ought in that instant to be without impediment. Second, because if for that sole reason it were said that an angel, prior by nature, remained free for sinning together with the vision, it would not only be said that in the first instant of beatitude according to duration he could have consummated merit, but also that for the whole time of beatitude he could merit, since for the whole time the angel remained by himself free to sin. Third, for the same reason we could say that Christ, in the first instant, indeed for the whole following time, was in fear for his essential beatitude; for his humanity by itself was always free to sin.

On account of these considerations lately set forth, it must be observed that therefore the angels could not in beatitude remain free for sinning, and for consummating merit together with the clear vision; because sin could not be simultaneously with the clear vision, but the latter necessarily

1836. St. Thomas, Quodlibet IX, a. 8.
1837. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 4, a. 4; Cajetan, ad loc.

draws one back from sin; and this necessity is antecedent to our liberty (libertas), in no way depending on it; therefore, with such a necessity he could not sin freely; for an antecedent necessity is contrary to liberty, as was said in Disputations 88 and 99. Hence, although God from eternity decreed to produce some man, and such a decree cannot be changed, and once it is posited he necessarily wills that which he decreed, nor was his will ever without this necessity, since from eternity he had it, just as he decreed from eternity; nevertheless we say that God simply and freely willed that, because of itself it was indifferent for willing and for decreeing the opposite, so that he could have willed the opposite, and under no antecedent necessity's impulse did he will it, but only under a consequent necessity, which follows upon the position of the determination of his will: and therefore there is another account of the necessity which the rational creature has from the clear vision of God; because it is antecedent. Finally, according to this opinion of Cajetan, the way of the Lord does not appear equal which he observed with the good and the evil angels: for if it was not enough that both in the first instant had merited their beatitude, but it was necessary that the merit be consummated by them; why, just as he waited for the good, granting them beatitude, that in the same they might consummate their merit, while they could sin, did he not in the same way wait for the wicked? And if any reason could be assigned for this inequality; but certainly none can be assigned, so that we should say that God waited for the good angels and for their merit, good or evil, in beatitude: for how could he wait for those whom he already beatifies? By these reasons Cajetan's opinion remains refuted as to the former part; but as to the latter, it will be impugned in the following chapter

Caput VII - On the way and the term of the wicked angels, as posited by the aforesaid opinion

Now as to that which pertains to the way and the term of the wicked angels, as the preceding opinion posits, it too will easily be refuted. Thus it is shown that an angel could not have sinned and at the same time, in duration, incurred eternal punishment: for either the discussion is about the punishment of sense, or about the punishment of loss. The aforesaid opinion is not understood of the punishment of sense; indeed by no reason could that be said, nor has anyone thus far affirmed it. First, because the angels, in the first instant in which they sinned, were in heaven, whence they were excluded and sent to the torments of hell; then also because the punishment of sense is a certain incentive to sin against God, which God never inflicts for a first sin, but on account of one's own sins. But about the punishment of loss the same is shown: for if by some reason one could say that in the same instant the demons sinned and incurred this punishment - especially since this punishment consists in the privation of justifying, or habitual, grace - this reason does not suffice. For such a privation, taken in any manner whatsoever, is not the eternal punishment of loss; otherwise even men, when they sin in this life and deprive themselves of habitual or justifying grace, would be said to incur eternal punishment; especially those who are now not going to rise again from sin, nor will they ever have justice; which, however, no one will

concede. Since therefore this privation is only the punishment of loss from that point of time at which, by the law of God, it cannot be restored, and this law does not begin to condemn a man or an angel ...

But as to what pertains to the way and the term of the wicked angels, as the preceding opinion establishes them, this too will easily be refuted. Accordingly, that the demons could not have sinned and incurred eternal punishment at the same time in duration is shown as follows: for either the question is about the punishment of sense, or about the punishment of loss. About the punishment of sense that opinion is not intelligible, and indeed by no reason could it be said, nor has anyone hitherto affirmed it. For the angels in the first instant in which they sinned were in heaven, whence they were cast out, and sent to the fire of hell; further, because the punishment of sense is a certain incitement to sinning against God, which God never inflicts in the first sin, but on account of subsequent sins. But about the punishment of loss the same is shown: for if by some reason one could say that in the same instant the demons sinned and incurred this punishment - especially since this punishment consists in the privation of justifying, or habitual, grace - this reason does not suffice. For such a privation, taken in any manner whatsoever, is not the eternal punishment of loss; otherwise even men, when they sin in this life and deprive themselves of habitual or justifying grace, would be said to incur eternal punishment, especially those who are now not going to rise again from sin, nor will they ever have justice; which, however, no one will concede. Since therefore this privation is only the punishment of loss from that point of time at which, by the law of God, it cannot be restored, and this law does not begin to condemn a man or an angel from the first instant in which he begins to sin, but only in the subsequent time: it follows that the angel did not incur the punishment of loss in the first instant, even if in that instant he was deprived of habitual or justifying grace. Wherefore the angels are not said in the first instant to have lacked sufficient help, since they were still in the way; but only from the subsequent time of sin. What moreover this sufficient help is, of which the damned are deprived, we shall say in disputation 240 and the following.

Moreover, those who follow the preceding opinion try to prove it by three Fathers. First, by St. Augustine - or rather Fulgentius - in the book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, about the middle, where he writes thus: "A part of the angels withdrew from their Creator God (by whom alone they had been blessed) by a wholly voluntary aversion; and by the judgment of supernal equity found the beginning of their damnation in the very aversion of the will, so that nothing else was for them to begin now to be punished than to be deprived of the love of that beatific good." These words of Fulgentius seem to express the aforesaid opinion.[1838] I answer, that the first sin of the angel can be understood to have been the beginning of damnation in a twofold way. In one way extrinsically, as afterwards damnation closely followed upon it. In another way intrinsically, as if the very voluntary aversion had been an intrinsic part of damnation. I say, therefore, that Fulgentius spoke in the former way, that the beginning of damnation was in the aversion itself; not, however, in the latter way. And I speak of that voluntary aversion which was first, so that this could not have been the intrinsic beginning of damnation in the first instant - not of discrete time, but corresponding to our

1838. Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, cap. 3 (circa medium).

time. For the same instant of discrete time can correspond to our time; but on that part by which it corresponds to the first instant of our time, it could not be the intrinsic beginning of damnation, for the reasons adduced; although the same aversion, enduring on into the subsequent time, could have been the punishment of loss, as will be explained in disputation 240. Wherefore, what Fulgentius said, that the angel begins now to be punished, is nothing else than to be deprived of the love of God; and in the same way it must be understood of the extrinsic beginning of damnation.

Then our adversaries object to us St. Gregory of Nyssa in the first book of Philosophy, chapter 3, and St. John Damascene, in the second book On the Faith, chapter 4, at the end, who teaches that for the angels the fall was the same as death is for men. But at the very point of death men are already damned; therefore also the angels in the very moment of the fall incur damnation. I answer: Damascene and Nyssa are not speaking of death as a thing-in-act, that is, of that moment of the separation of the soul from the body, but of the prior dispositions which proximate a man to death: then indeed a man is said to be dying; but in the instant of separation he is said already to be dead; and to this instant he compares the fall of the angels. This I gather from the words which Damascene subjoins, whose sense Nyssa also expressed in other words. For Damascene says: "After the fall indeed every faculty of repentance is now shut off to them (that is, to the angels), just as to men after they have departed from this life." He did not say that to the angels in the very fall the way of salvation was shut off, but after the fall; nor to men in the very migration and death, but after death. Now it is established that for men the way of salvation is shut off at the very point at which the soul is separated from the body; therefore by "state of death" he did not understand the separation itself, but the prior dispositions which we have mentioned; and to these he compares the fall of the angels. In the same way Elias of Crete, on the third oration of St. Gregory Nazianzen, which is the third invective against Julian, on those words, "Quocirca cum potentia, etc.," said: "After the fall there is no place of repentance for the angels, just as neither for men after death." He did not say, "in the very fall," nor "in the very death," but "after the fall" for the angels, and "after death" for men.[1839]

Caput VIII - Other theologians' opinions

A certain opinion is that of Capreolus in the Second Book of the Sentences, distinction 4, question 1, conclusion 5; and he more expressly hands it on in article 3, reply to the first, against the fifth conclusion; which the more recent Thomists gladly embrace. And, as to the assigning of instants by which the way of the angels was completed, Scotus also followed it in III Sentences, distinction 1, question 9, to the first question; Gabriel in the same distinction and question, article 4; Baiolis, question 1, article 3; although Gabriel and Baiolis assign otherwise the instants of the angels' way: yet they reckon this opinion among the more probable ones; they all differ, however,

1839. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Philosophiae l. 1, c. 3; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa l. 2, c. 4 (in fine). See also Elias Cretensis, in Oratio III S. Gregorii Nazianzeni (Invectiva III contra Iulianum), ad verba: "Quocirca cum potentia..."

from Capreolus only in assigning the first instant, because Capreolus thought that all the angels were created in grace and in it did not merit glory; whereas the others thought that all the angels were produced in pure nature.[1840]

Capreolus thus establishes three instants of discrete time for both good and bad angels: in the first and second both classes were in the way, yet in a different mode: in the first, both were created in grace, but none merited beatitude, because they received grace without a proper act and disposition; in the second, the good merited beatitude by acting from grace, but the evil sinned, losing grace; in the third, the good received beatitude as reward, but the evil incurred damnation. Capreolus furthermore judges it impossible that the angels in the first instant could have merited beatitude, even if they had been created in grace; whereas Scotus denies to them such a merit, because he holds that they were created in pure nature.

As far as the first instant is concerned, as it is defended by Scotus, this opinion has been impugned above in disputation 226, chapter 2, and the following, where we proved that all the angels were created in grace; then against Capreolus we showed in disputation 227, chapter 1, that the angels by a proper disposition of free will, from the grace of God, received grace as a habit (habitus), which very last disposition in man is meritorious of eternal life; this we shall expressly demonstrate at II-II, q. 113, a. 8; and the same reason will hold in the angels. Moreover, that the angels were able to merit in the first instant will be proved below, in disputation 236, chapter 4. From all which it is clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.

There are, besides, three other ways by which Scotus and Gabriel, in the places cited, assign those instants in the angels - ways which, in my judgment, are improbable. The first way is that in the first instant all were in pure nature; in the second, the good with merit and the evil with sin; in the third, finally, the good received grace and glory, but the evil were damned. Now as to that merit for grace and glory which Scotus and Gabriel concede in the second instant, they say it was not condign to eternal life, but what they call "of congruity" toward grace, and they admit that it was from their own powers. But this way of philosophizing, besides what it teaches about the first instant - of which enough has been said - contains two other absurdities. One is that a congruous merit toward grace should be from one's own powers; which is no less condemned in angels than it is in men: for thus the true notion of grace is taken away, as in disputation 91, chapter 12, and the following, has been sufficiently proved. The other absurdity is that grace and glory were simultaneously conceded to the angels; for thus they are forced to assert that glory was given to the good angels without any condign merit, which is absurd: nor indeed is there greater reason why glory should not be given to men unless they condignly labor and merit, while to angels it should be granted without any condign merit. Moreover, that absurdity follows manifestly from what we established in chapters 5 and 6, where we showed that merit and beatitude could not have coexisted in duration at the same time.

1840. Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, conclus. 5; ibid., art. 3 ad 1 contra quintam conclusionem. Scotus, In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 9, ad primam quaestionem. Gabriel (locis citatis). Baiolis, q. 1, art. 3.

The second way of assigning those instants in the angels is brought forward also by the same Scotus, so that four instants or delays (as he himself calls them) are assigned: in the first of which all were in pure nature; in the second all in the same way persevered; in the third the good merited beatitude through grace, but the evil sinned; in the fourth the good received the reward of good works, but the evil received punishment. In this way, besides what he says of the first instant, this also does not approve itself to me - nor do I see by what reason it could be proved - namely, what he says about the second: from which it can in no way be established or gathered that in the second instant all still persevered in pure nature without grace and without sin. Add also that there is no need to divide two instants in the way of the good angels, as we shall show in chapter 10 from the mind of St. Thomas.

The third way of assigning instants, also found in Scotus, is that there were four delays or instants: in the first all were created in pure nature; in the second, in which all were in grace without merit; in the third, the good both merited and persevered in grace, but the evil sinned; in the fourth the good received the reward of beatitude for good works, but the evil the punishment for sin. Now this way - besides what it asserts of the first instant, which has already been refuted often - what it says of the second and third is not probable: for in the same instant grace can begin and merit, as we have shown above.

Caput IX - The opinion of Ferrariensis

Of these opinions, which do not approve themselves to me, the last is that of Ferrariensis, on III Contra Gentes, chapter 10 and following; where he teaches that the whole way of the good angels up to beatitude consisted of two instants: in the first of which they merited beatitude; in the second, they received it. About the first, however, he philosophizes thus, that he affirms the angels were so meritorious of their beatitude in it that in it they could not sin - about which we must defer to disputation 235. In the latter, in which the blessed attained glory, he says they did not merit, nor could they merit, supposing the state of beatitude; because merit cannot be with beatitude itself, as has already been shown. Absolutely speaking, however, they could have merited and sinned, if they had not attained beatitude.

The way, moreover, of the wicked angels up to damnation he likewise completes in two instants: in the first of which, created in grace, they merited glory; in the latter, however, they sinned, and at the same time incurred the punishment of damnation. This, however, he proves by no other reason, except that no other mode seems to remain more probable by which we might assign the angels' way; and so as to defend in part the sentence of St. Thomas, who teaches that the good angels, after one act of merit, received beatitude, of which we shall speak below.[1841]

1841. Ferrariensis, In III Contra Gentes, cap. 10 sqq.

This opinion commends itself to me by no reason, since from it certain absurdities follow. First, from it there follows that the good angels never had liberty to sin. For in the prior instant, according to Ferrariensis' own doctrine, they could not sin; nor yet in the latter, inasmuch as in it they attained the glory of the blessed, in which any blessed person cannot sin, but is detained from sin by a necessity preceding from the clear vision of God.

However, Ferrariensis replies that the good angels had a faculty of liberty, by which they were able to sin in the first instant; but after the supposition of the clear vision of God, they could not sin; yet that this supposition does nothing to harm the natural liberty of the angels - as, for example, from the fact that Peter is sitting, his liberty is not removed nor hindered, although from this supposition some necessity follows.

This reply, however, is of no moment. For although the supposition of a present operation does not take away the liberty by which that operation is said to be done - even if, the supposition being made, some necessity should follow - yet the same reasoning does not seem to hold about the clear vision of God, considered together with the liberty of sinning. For the necessity by which we suppose a present free operation is a consequent necessity, as has often been said in disputation 68 and 99 and elsewhere. Now consequent necessity, as we there proved from the doctrine of Anselm, does not take away, nor impede, nor harm liberty; but the necessity of not sinning, which follows from the vision, is assuredly a necessity preceding liberty: because the necessity proceeding from cognition - since it is prior to the liberty of the will and to indifference - is always a preceding necessity; and this impedes liberty, as from the same Anselm and the reason there set forth we have proved. Wherefore, since in the first instant the angels were in no way free to sin - either Ferrariensis supposes (and this indeed not only the supposition being made that they did not sin, but absolutely, because the first instant of creation is not capable of sin); and then in the second instant the angels were endowed with the clear vision, with which the will cannot sin but necessarily perseveres in grace by a preceding necessity - it follows that the good angels were never free to sin. Therefore they could not be praised for the fact that they never transgressed the precept of God and in no way sinned, but only for the fact that they acted well. But if this is true, they were not worthy of praise because they did not imitate the example of Lucifer, as the others who are said to have sinned after his example. Moreover, that an angel so kept justice that he could not lose it by sin, Anselm plainly judges absurd in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapters 5 and 6; because otherwise, by necessity and not by liberty, the good angels would have kept justice; which Anselm thinks absurd, and he gathers it from Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, where he places the merit of the holy angels in this, that, the wicked falling, they themselves stood - as if he were saying: since they could transgress, they did not transgress.[1842]

Secondly, from the aforesaid opinion it is gathered that -

1842. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, cc. 5 - 6; St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.

This opinion is proved to me by no reason, and from it no absurdities follow. First, in fact, it follows from it that the good angels never had freedom to sin: for in the first instant, according to the doctrine of the same Ferrariensis, they could not sin; nor even in the second: for in that instant they obtained beatitude, and no blessed one can sin, but by a necessity antecedent arising from the very power of that vision he is withheld from sinning.

But Ferrariensis replies that the angels, although with beatitude itself, had the faculty of liberty, by which they could sin; yet, on the supposition of the clear vision of God, they could not sin: and a supposition harms nothing by its nature; just as from the fact that Peter is seated, the faculty of his standing is not taken away nor hindered, although from that supposition another necessity follows.

However, this reply has no weight. For although the supposition of the operation of an agent does not take away the liberty by which that action is said to be done - even if, the supposition being made, some necessity follows - nevertheless not the same account holds of the clear vision of God as of liberty to sin: because the necessity which we suppose in the present case is a consequent necessity, as was often taught in disputations 68 and 99 and elsewhere. But a consequent necessity, as we proved in the same place from the doctrine of St. Anselm, neither takes away, nor hinders, nor harms liberty: whereas the necessity of not sinning which follows from the vision is surely an antecedent necessity and harms liberty, because the necessity arising from cognition, since it is prior to the liberty of the will and to indifference, is always antecedent; this, as we proved there from Anselm and by reason, impedes liberty. Wherefore, since in the first instant the angels were in no way free to sin, as Ferrariensis himself supposes (and this, indeed, not on the supposition being made that they did not sin, but absolutely, because the first instant of creation is not capable of sin), and then in the second instant the angels were endowed with the clear vision, with which the will cannot sin, but necessarily perseveres in grace by antecedent necessity, it follows that the good angels were never free to sin: wherefore neither could they be praised for the fact that, when the precept of God was laid upon them, they did not sin at all, but only for the fact that they acted well. But if this is true, they were worthy of praise because they did not imitate Lucifer, as the others who are said to have sinned by his example; rather, they kept their rule so, their justice so, that they judged that they ought never to lose it by sin - which St. Anselm plainly thinks in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapters 5 - 6 - otherwise the good angels would have kept justice by necessity and not freely, which he judges absurd; and he gathers this from St. Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where he places the merit of the holy angels in this, that, the wicked falling, they themselves stood - as if he were saying: since they could transgress, they did not transgress.

Secondly, from the aforesaid opinion it is gathered that God would have kept an unequal mode of retribution between the good and the wicked: for since to each party in the first instant beatitude had been promised, there does not seem to have been a greater reason why God should have conferred beatitude in the second instant upon some and by it have confirmed them in justice, while leaving others in their liberty so that they could sin - whence it happened, in point of fact, that they sinned. This we judge absurd in merit: for although God by his absolute power could have done this, nevertheless to assert that he did so is not to be done without the greatest foundation,

since God is said, in retribution, to have regard to merit and perseverance; and in the wicked there was not less merit nor lesser perseverance, before they sinned, than in the good. For in the good angels beatitude was conferred in the second instant without any regard to the work which was done then or was to be done afterwards, because together with beatitude neither merit nor the consummation of merit could be, as was proved above. But that the way of the good and of the wicked angels was equal is gathered from St. Gregory the Great, book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 7 (elsewhere 4), where he teaches that the good angels were confirmed so that now they could not sin by the fall of the wicked angels - as if the fall of the wicked came first, and the confirmation of the good followed it, which is effected by merit consummated in the way and by beatitude in the homeland.[1843]

A third absurdity, which is expressly conceded by the aforesaid opinion, is that, in the same duration, there was in the wicked angels both evil merit, that is, sin, and their damnation; this was sufficiently impugned in chapter 7.

A more probable opinion is explained. More true and probable to me has always seemed the opinion which assigns the instants or little instants (*instans*, morula) of the angels' way in this manner: that in the first instant both the good and the wicked, created in the grace of God, merited life eternal; but the good, prolonging their merit and persevering in merit, preserved grace, although they could at the same time lose it by sin; the wicked, however, interrupting the merit of grace, sinned in the second instant corresponding to the first instant of the good angels, who persevered in merit. Finally, in the second [instant] the good received the reward of beatitude; in the third, however, the wicked were consigned to eternal punishment and were perpetually damned; so that in that third instant, and not before, the pain of sense and of loss began, because the law of damnation begins from that instant, even if the privation of grace was in the second instant. That there is, besides the privation of grace, another punishment of eternal damnation we proved in chapter 7. Gregory indicated this opinion not obscurely, in 2, d. s., q. 1, art. 3, after the fourth conclusion, at the words "Their reason does not conclude," where he teaches that, whether an angel acquires his natural perfection in the course of time or not, nevertheless he always attains supernatural beatitude by merit - not by any merit whatsoever, but by some perseverance confirmed, as it pleased God to expect the duration of perseverance. About the wicked angels he teaches nothing peculiar; but that there were in them those three instants will be shown clearly below; for about these there is scarcely any difficulty. And St. Anselm, in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 6, plainly teaches that the wicked angels who fell would have been better if they had not sinned, by persevering in the sanctity and justice received - he understands this in the way up to beatitude. This opinion, as we have proposed it, is now common in the schools, even among Thomists; indeed, it is very much conformable to the doctrine of St. Thomas.[1844]

1843. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 34, c. 7 (elsewhere counted c. 4).

1844. Gregory, in II Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 3, after the fourth conclusion, at the words "Ratio eorum non concludit"; St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 6. Also Gregory (loc. cit.) and Almain, Quaestio de libertate voluntatis, art. 7, in the second opinion, arg. 3.

In the explanation of which, however, two things must first be premised, then it must be confirmed by its own reasons. First, then, it is to be noted that the instants or little instants of the angels' way are not the indivisible instants of our successive time, such as are the instants of our time and the indivisibles of any successive motion, but are certain durations without succession and indivisible, not conjoined to successive motion, yet coexisting with some successive motion and lasting through successive time - just as the angels' existence (*esse angelorum*), which in itself is indeed indivisible, as we said in disputation 33, nevertheless coexists with our divisible time, indeed we can measure it by successive time, as we noted in disputation 35, chapter 2. Now one "mora," or one instant for an angel, which is called an instant of "discrete time," is one operation of the angel, whether of the intellect or of the will; which can coexist with greater and lesser duration and time, inasmuch as the angel can, more or less, without any intrinsic succession in the operation itself, persevere in it. I judge it much more probable that no operation of an angel - just as no thing in the world - can be defined by the last instant of its being, and so cannot last for only an instant of our time, but must of necessity coexist with our successive time. Thus Gregory taught in 2, 1, 3, q. 1, art. 2, ad 4; and Almain in the question On the Liberty of the Will, art. 7, in the second opinion, argument 3. Not that the angel, when he is in a continuous action, does not have liberty - as some falsely impute to the aforesaid doctors - for it is manifest that the angel can at any instant of time after the first cease from an operation, nor is there any [instant] in which he cannot cease; but because the same instant cannot be the first and the last of the action, rather the action must end by the first non-being; and between the first instant in which the action is and begins, and that in which it is not when it ends, there must be a middle time. The reason indeed is that, in the cessation of any thing and operation, it is necessary that there be given a first non-being, and hence, since two instants of our time cannot be immediate or even conceived as such, the same thing cannot be finished by its last being and at the same time by its first non-being: for the last being of that thing would coexist with one instant of our time, and the first non-being ought to correspond to another next to it, because it could not to the same; and thus there would be two instants immediately following - an impossibility.

Furthermore, for any thing and operation whatsoever it must necessarily be granted that the first non-being is given corresponding to the first instant of our time; this is proved in this way. The non-being of a thing is a whole at once and without any succession; but whatever begins whole at once and without succession necessarily begins in a first instant; therefore the first non-being of any thing that ceases is given. I do not know on what foundation some more recent men, against the common opinion of philosophers, have not hesitated to assert that the being or non-being of a thing, which is whole at once, can begin successively and not necessarily in some first instant. For if the whole is at once and not successive, the whole also ought to begin at once and not successively; but what begins at once begins by a first being and in an instant begins. But they argue thus: permanent things, since they are wholly at once, nevertheless last through successive time without intrinsic succession in themselves; therefore they also can begin in time. I reply that the account of beginning and of remaining is different: for since in order to begin it is necessary "to have being after non-being," the thing which begins, on that side of its duration, ought to be bounded; and the

terminus ought necessarily to be intrinsic in the thing which has its whole being at once. For an extrinsic terminus is assigned only to a thing which, since it is successive, has not in itself the first part nor the first extremity of its duration; it ought to be terminated by some extrinsic extremity, which we call non-being. But the duration and perseverance of a permanent thing only requires an extremity in which it ceases; but in itself it has neither succession, nor can any extremity coexist with successive time; nay rather, it cannot but coexist with it, because it ought to last up to the first non-being. Wherefore the argument drawn from permanence and duration to inception is taken from a dissimilar [case]. Add, that, for a thing which is wholly at once to begin in time "by the last non-being," which is apt by nature to begin in an instant, it ought in some way to vary in itself: for the same thing, remaining altogether the same, cannot at once, as to inception, correspond to our time, and correspond to the instant of its indistinction, merely by the nod and will of God. However, from this rule and doctrine of cessation I except the instant of our time and the changed being of any motion: for the non-being of these is not per se, but necessarily conjoined with the being of the part that succeeds. For the non-being of this changed being or instant is the being of the part that succeeds in time or in motion; and because these begin successively "by the last non-being," therefore the instants themselves and the changed beings cease by the last being, so that the last being of them be the last non-being of the succeeding part.

But someone will object in this manner. The substantial generation of a thing lasts only for an instant and thus ought to end by the last instant of its being; therefore an immanent operation of the will or of the intellect could be defined in the same way. The same is true of creation, which, after the first instant of the thing created, no longer is; and therefore it ends by the last being. I answer that the account of creation and of the generation of any thing is different. For creation, since it is the same as the thing created, lasts always together with that thing and remains as long as the created thing remains, unless that relation which they call the dependence of the creature upon the creator - although it be altogether of the same kind - is called, in the first instant, creation, and in the remaining time conservation: yet it is always a relation of the production of some thing out of nothing, and never ceases until the thing itself is annihilated, as is evident from those things which we said above in disputation 175, chapter 3. But substantial generation, which is a relation, or a "way" by which the thing generated comes to be, depends upon the agent, and it ceases by the last being, and yet in an instant; for the production, in its continuation, depends upon the efficient cause; just as conservation depends upon it, and that order which the philosophers call the dependence of the thing generated upon the generator, does not regard proximately the substance of the cause as such, but its action and the disposition of the qualities which prepare matter for the form: because in successive generation - which consists in the eduction of form from the potentiality of matter - the operations are in matter, and the dispositions and alterations of it which prepare it are successive; therefore generation is terminated by the last being, because, the eduction being then completed, that way no longer remains by which the thing was tending to its terminus; but it had truly existed in the prior time. For which reason generation, although it is said

to be in an instant as to its formal terminus, nevertheless, as to the dispositions which are ordered to the form, is successive, and is said to cease by the last being with respect to that way which was then completed.

This, moreover, is the philosophical mode concerning the way of the good and of the bad: nothing else is required ...

Substantial generation, which is the relation or way whereby the generated thing comes to be and depends upon the agent, is defined by the ultimate existence, and is only for an instant, if the thing produced does not depend in its conservation upon the efficient cause, as the light produced in the air depends upon the luminous body. For that order which the Philosophers call the dependence of the generated thing upon the generator does not look immediately to the substance of the very cause that begets and generates according to itself, but to generation and to the accounts of dispositions and qualities which by creation were gradually prepared for the reduction into the form of the generated thing; to which there also correspond certain things that are in the very one generated which are similar in ultimate existence: but they do not remain in the same state; rather, as soon as the generated thing begins, it begins to operate and to be changed inwardly by a certain non-existence. Therefore, since the same is not the generation as the existence of the generated thing, not absolutely and in the first instant, but as already thereafter operating within itself and changing the dispositions which remain in it, on that account generation is defined by the ultimate existence; from which it follows that its non-existence results from some successive existence which is in the generated thing, as we have explained. But this is true only in the generation of animals and living things, which is in an instant in a determinate part; for I do not think non-living things are always generated successively; because through contact and conjunction with the substance of the generator the nearer part is first disposed, then the more remote; and thus there is not a determinate part in which first the form of the non-living is introduced. The things we have said are true of the natural mode of generation both of living and of non-living things. Wherefore, since the operation of the will and of the intellect is not like substantial generation through some successive existence to which its non-existence is joined, it must of necessity endure through time. And although by absolute power the operation of the will could end at an ultimate existence, nevertheless the created will and intellect of themselves cannot cease from operation at the last instant of that operation. The reason is that the instants, or pauses, in this time must be assigned in such a way that one wholly succeeds another; but an operation which in part coexists with another is not said to succeed it; therefore neither will it be said to constitute a diverse instant or pause on that account.

With these things posited we say, the first instant of the way of the good angels was the operation of a certain love of God, in which they persevered in the way; whereas the bad angel in the first instant loved God, and in the second instant sinned. And although the good angel in that first instant would have had other operations under that one which persevered, nevertheless there was always for him one instant on account of that one operation, as we have said. This, moreover, seems to me a philosophizing consistent with reason concerning the way of the good and of the bad. First, because it is necessary to assign an instant of the way distinct from the instant of

beatitude and of punishment, since merit and reward cannot be at the same time; as has been sufficiently proved above; and by this mode we rightly assign in the good and in the bad angels instants distinct from the term of beatitude and of damnation. Second, because in this way we can rightly explain how God behaved toward the good and the bad by waiting, so that to those persevering in the precept He might render beatitude: which in other opinions cannot be explained; for in this way God so waited for the good angels persevering in their merit in the precept, that with the same duration He also waited for the bad, who, just as the good could have persevered in the same merit, by their own malice lost it through sin, while the good persevered. Third, because in this way we rightly explain the mind and sense of St. Thomas, who in the following Question, Article 6, taught that the good angel after one act of merit obtained beatitude: because he persevered in the love in which he was created, until he was crowned by God with beatitude; whereas on the contrary what he taught of the bad is explained and defended by the same plan without any difficulty: for he says that the bad angels immediately after the first merit which they had would have received the reward of beatitude, had not the obstacle of sin been interposed. For he understands that to be about to happen after one act of merit continued with perseverance, as it was in the good angels. But whereas in the bad it was indeed begun, it was not sufficiently continued, as God had disposed to wait for their way, but meanwhile, while God waited, it was broken off by sin: therefore in the following instant they were damned.

Therefore even if the ways of the good and of the bad angels were equal, in the way of the bad we assign two instants and a third of damnation; in the way of the good one instant, and another of beatitude bestowed as reward.

But someone may ask whether it could have so happened that there would be only one instant of the way that was continued together with beatitude for the good angels. For in angels on the way and blessed the instants must be distinguished by their operations, and one love of God could have been continued up to beatitude, and to remain therein. I answer, that it cannot be said that there was one instant of the way and of the fatherland by reason of the same love: because although the same would remain in the fatherland which was in the way, it could not remain in the same mode, but of necessity had to be intensified in beatitude, since it had its origin from clearer knowledge. The same must be said in the bad: for although the same sin which was in the way could remain at the term of damnation, nevertheless with the addition of the pain of sense, a new sin would always be committed, or that same sin in a different mode, on account of diverse incentives. It could be better understood that there would be one instant under the same sin continued in the way and at the term of damnation without the pain of sense, with only the pain of loss: thus indeed there would be no new incentive to sin, if the angel were ignorant of his damnation, as truly he could have been. From this, however, we do not fall into the opinion of those who said that the sin of the angel and damnation were simultaneous: for they used to say that they were together as being in the same instant of our time. But when we say that there can be the same instant of sin and of damnation, we do not mean of our time, but of discrete time; that is, that the same operation of sin which was in the way can persevere and be continued until damnation is added, which is not only the privation of grace, but with the law of God damning the angel perpetually on account of sin;

nonetheless, by an order to God's law and by an extrinsic constitution there would be some succession between the way and the term of damnation; although not on the part of the operation of the angel. Wherefore on that side two instants would not incongruously be assigned.

Moreover, two things remain to be observed. The one is, that what we have set forth concerning the disposition of the way of the good and of the bad angels must be understood in such a way that it cannot be established for us by a certain reason that it was thus, and not otherwise; since this is not clear from Scripture or from the tradition of the Fathers, and it could have happened otherwise; for who will deny that it could have happened that a good angel through two or more merits altogether sufficient and antecedent could have reached glory, and again that an evil angel after several merits of grace committed sin? And if it could so have happened, I do not see whence it can be proved that it was done in this way or that. As for the bad, this is certain: after only one sin (as we have reported above from Nyssen and Damascene, and we shall see below from the teaching of the Fathers and of Scripture) they were immediately damned. But that they had several merits of grace succeeding each other in diverse instants before they sinned, certainly cannot be established. Another thing must be held, that the way of the bad and of the good was brief: for, as Bernard says in Sermon 1 on Advent, the devil fell in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye; and the Gloss also on that of Genesis 1, "God divided the light from the darkness," teaches that the demons fell on the first day. It is proved also from that which is most certain, that the devil fell before our first parents sinned. For the angels were on the first day along with the visible world, as we have shown in Disputation 224, chapter 5; but man fell a little after the seventh day, as is evident from Genesis 3. There are indeed some Fathers who think that the angel fell before our first parents were created. Thus taught Cyprian in the book On Fasting and the Temptations of Christ, St. John Chrysostom in Homily 22 on Genesis, the author of the book On the Marvels of Holy Scripture cited by St. Augustine in the third volume, Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, sentence 7, and Bede in book 8 of the book of Questions, question 9.[1845] Therefore, since man was created on the sixth day, according to this opinion the devil fell before the sixth day. But they prove this opinion from that of John 8: "He (namely, the devil) was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth." From that, however, I do not see how it can be proved that the angel sinned before our parents were formed; and first, in Disputation 236, chapter 1, we shall plainly show that the speech there is not about the first fall of the demon. Next, if anything is proved from there, it would be only that the devil sinned before our first parent sinned; for this is why it is said that the devil did not stand in the truth, because by a lie he deceived our first parents; nor does "from the beginning" there signify from the very first instant of his being, but shortly after the beginning of the world. But Gregory of Nyssa in the Oratio Catechetica, chapter 6, thinks that the angel sinned from envy after he saw man created by God to His likeness and image; of which we shall treat more fully in Disputation 233, chapter 1. I, however, am certainly persuaded that the devil sinned a little after his creation.

1845. St. Bernard, Sermon 1 De Adventu; the Gloss on Genesis 1, "Divisit Deus lucem a tenebris"; St. Cyprian, De ieiunio et tentationibus Christi; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 22 on Genesis; the author of the book De mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae, cited by St. Augustine, Contra adversarios legis et prophetarum, in the third tome; St. Isidore, De summo bono, book 1, c. 12, sent. 7; Bede, In librum quaestionum, book 8, q. 9.

Articulus VI - Whether the good angels obtained grace and glory according to the quantity of their natural endowments

It seems that the angels did not obtain grace and glory according to the quantity of their natural endowments. For grace is given from the mere will of God. Therefore both the quantity of grace depends on the will of God and not on the quantity of natural endowments.

1. Moreover, human act seems more proximate to grace than nature does: because human act is preparatory to grace. But grace is not from works, as is said in Romans 11. Much less therefore is the quantity of grace in the angels according to the quantity of their natural endowments.
2. Moreover, man and angel are equally ordained to beatitude or grace. But to man more grace is not given according to the degree of natural endowments. Therefore neither to the angel.

But on the contrary: the Master says in the third book of the Sentences, distinction 2, that the angels who by nature were created more subtle and more perspicacious in wisdom, these also were endowed with greater gifts of grace.

I answer: It is reasonable that according to the degree of their natural endowments there were given to the angels the gifts of graces and the perfection of beatitude. The reason for which can be taken from two sources. First, indeed, on the part of God Himself, who by the order of His wisdom constituted diverse degrees in the angelic nature. But just as the angelic nature was made by God to obtain grace and beatitude, so also the degrees of angelic nature seem to be ordered to the diverse degrees of grace and glory. As, for instance, if a builder polishes stones for the construction of a house: from this very thing that he fits some more beautifully and becomingly, he seems to ordain them to the more honorable part of the house. Thus, therefore, it seems that God ordained the angels whom He made of higher nature to greater gifts of grace and to ampler beatitude.

Second, the same appears on the part of the angel himself. For an angel is not composed of diverse natures, so that the inclination of one nature would impede or retard the impetus of another, as happens in man: in whom the motion of the intellectual part is either retarded or impeded by the inclination of the sensitive part. But when there is nothing that retards or impedes, nature is moved to that according to its whole virtue. And therefore it is reasonable that the angels who had the better nature were also more strongly and efficaciously converted to God. This also happens in men: because according to the intensity of conversion to God there is given greater grace and glory. Whence it seems that the angels who had better natural endowments had more of grace and glory.

Reply to the first: If grace is from the mere will of God, so also is the nature of the angel; and just as God's will ordained nature to grace, so also the degrees of nature to the degrees of grace.

Reply to the second: The acts of a rational creature are from itself; but nature is immediately from God. Whence it seems more fitting that grace be given according to the degree of nature than from works.

Reply to the third: The diversity of natural endowments is one way in angels, who differ by species, and another way in men, who differ by number alone. For difference according to species is on account of form, but difference according to number is on account of matter. In man also there is something that can impede or retard the motion of the intellectual nature, but not in angels. Hence there is not the same reason for both.

Conclusion: The more perfect angels according to nature had more grace and glory. Concerning this conclusion and the matter of this article enough has been said by us above in Disputation 228.

Articulus VII - Whether in the blessed angels there remains natural cognition and love

The seventh is argued thus. It seems that in the blessed angels there does not remain natural cognition and love; for it is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But natural love and cognition are imperfect with respect to blessed cognition and love. Therefore, when beatitude comes, natural cognition and love cease.

1. Moreover, where one thing suffices, another exists superfluously. But in the blessed angels suffice the cognition and love of glory. Therefore it would be superfluous that in them there remain natural cognition and love.
2. Moreover, the same power does not have two acts at once, just as neither is one line terminated on the same side at two points. But the blessed angels are always in the act of blessed cognition and love. For happiness is not according to habit but according to act, as is said in the first book of the Ethics. Therefore never in the angels can there be natural cognition and love.

But on the contrary: when the nature of a thing remains, its operation remains. But beatitude does not take away nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural cognition and love.

I answer: In the blessed angels remain natural cognition and love. For as the principles of operations stand to one another, so also do the operations themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is related to beatitude as the first to the second, because beatitude is added to nature. But it is always necessary that the first be saved in the second. Hence it must be that nature be saved in beatitude. And likewise it must be that in the act of beatitude the act of nature be saved.

Reply to the first: A perfection that comes takes away the imperfection opposed to it. But the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude; rather, the privation which is opposed to form is taken away, not the potency. Likewise, the natural imperfection and defect are not opposed to the perfection of the cognition of glory. For nothing prevents something from being known at the same time through two media, just as at the same time something can be known

through a probable medium and a demonstrative one. And similarly an angel can at once know God through the divine essence, which pertains to the cognition of glory, and through his own essence, which pertains to natural cognition.

Reply to the second: Those things which belong to beatitude suffice for beatitude itself; yet for these to be present, those things which pertain to nature are presupposed: since no beatitude is self-subsisting, unless the uncreated beatitude.

Reply to the third: As to operations, the same power cannot be actually in two diverse acts at once, unless one be ordered to the other. But natural cognition and love are ordered to the cognition and love of glory. Hence nothing prevents in an angel there being at the same time the acts of natural cognition and love together with the act of glory, insofar as the one is subordinated to and perfected by the other.

However, in the angels it is otherwise. Hence there is not the same account of both. The conclusion is: The angels more perfect according to nature had more grace and glory. About this conclusion and the matter of this article enough has been said by us in Disputation 228.[1846]

Whether in the blessed angels there remain natural cognition and love

It is objected: It seems that in the blessed angels there does not remain natural cognition and love. For as it is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "When that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be done away." But natural love and cognition are imperfect with respect to blessed cognition and love. Therefore, when beatitude comes, natural cognition and love cease.

Further, where one thing suffices, another exists superfluously. But in the blessed angels the cognition and love of glory suffice. Therefore it would be superfluous that there remain in them natural cognition and love.

Further, the same power does not at once have two acts, just as one line is not terminated on the same side at two points. But the blessed angels are always in act of blessed cognition and love. For happiness is not according to habit, but according to act, as is said in the first book of the Ethics.[1847] Therefore never in the angels can there be natural cognition and love.

But on the contrary: As long as any nature remains, its operation remains. But beatitude does not take away nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural cognition and love.

I answer: In the blessed angels there remains natural cognition and love. For as the principles of operations are related to each other, so are the operations themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is related to beatitude as the first to the second, because beatitude is added to nature. But one must always preserve the first in the second. Hence it is necessary that nature be preserved in beatitude. And in like manner it is necessary that in the act of beatitude the act of nature be preserved.

1846. Disputatio 228 (in this work) is cited by the author for prior treatment.
1847. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, c. 8.

Reply to the first: An adventitious perfection takes away the imperfection opposed to it. But the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude, rather it is underlain by it, as the imperfection of potency is underlain by the perfection of form. Nor is potency taken away by form, but the privation which is opposed to form is taken away. And likewise the imperfection of natural cognition is not opposed to the perfection of the cognition of glory. For nothing prevents one and the same thing from being known at once through diverse media, as at once something can be known through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. And similarly an angel can at once know God through the divine essence, which pertains to the cognition of glory, and through his own essence, which pertains to natural cognition.

Reply to the second: Those things which belong to beatitude suffice of themselves; but for these to be present, those things which pertain to nature are presupposed: since no beatitude is self-subsisting, unless the uncreated beatitude.

Reply to the third: Two operations cannot at once belong to the same power, unless one be ordered to the other. But natural cognition and love are ordered to the cognition and love of glory. Hence nothing prevents in an angel there being cognition and love of nature, and also cognition and love of glory.

The conclusion is: In the blessed angels there remain natural cognition and love.

Articulus VIII - Whether a blessed angel can sin

It is objected: It seems that a blessed angel can sin. For beatitude does not take away nature, as was said. But it belongs to the notion of nature to be able to fail. Therefore a blessed angel can sin.

Further, rational powers are with respect to opposites, as the Philosopher says. But the will of the blessed angel does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is related to good and to evil.[1848]

Further, it belongs to the freedom of choice that a man can choose good and evil. But the freedom of choice is not diminished in the blessed angels. Therefore they can sin.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says in the first book On Genesis according to the Letter: that nature which cannot sin is in the holy angels. Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.[1849]

I answer: The blessed angels cannot sin. The reason for this is that their beatitude consists in this, that they see God through his essence. But the essence of God is the very essence of goodness. Hence the angel seeing God is related to him in the same way as anyone not seeing God is related to the common notion of the good. Now it is impossible that anyone should will or do anything except by attending to the good, or that he should will to turn away from the good as such. Therefore a blessed angel cannot will or act except by attending to God; but one willing or acting thus cannot sin. Hence a blessed angel can in no way sin.

1848. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 3.
1849. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, book I.

Reply to the first: A created good considered in itself can fail. But from perfect conjunction to the uncreated good, such as is the conjunction of beatitude, it acquires that it cannot sin, for the reason already stated.

Reply to the second: Rational virtues are related to opposites in those matters to which they are not ordered naturally. But with respect to those to which they are ordered naturally, they are not related to opposites. For the intellect cannot not assent to principles naturally known. And similarly the will cannot not adhere to the good insofar as it is good: because it is naturally ordered to the good as to its own object. Therefore the will of the angel is related to opposites as regards many things to be done or not done. But with respect to God himself, whom he sees to be the very essence of goodness, it is not related to opposites; rather, according to him all things are directed, whatever of the opposites they may choose. And this is without sin.

Reply to the third: Free choice is related to choosing the things which are for the end, as the intellect is related to conclusions. Now it is manifest that it pertains to the virtue of the intellect to be able to proceed to diverse conclusions according to given principles. But that it proceed to some conclusion while neglecting the order of principles, this is from a defect of the intellect itself. Hence that free choice can choose diverse things with the order of the end preserved pertains to the perfection of its freedom. But that it choose something by turning aside from the order of the end, which is to sin, pertains to a defect of freedom. Hence there is greater freedom of choice in the angels who cannot sin than in us who can sin.

The conclusion is negative, about which there is here no need to dispute: because the First Part of the Second Part, question 4, article 4, universally shows that the blessed can by no account sin, even venially; and that the cause of impeccability comes from the clear vision of God.[1850]

Articulus IX - Whether the blessed angels can make progress in beatitude

It is objected: It seems the blessed angels can make progress in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But in the angels charity is perfect. Therefore the blessed angels can merit.

Further, with merit increasing, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the blessed angels can make progress in beatitude.

Further, St. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine, that God uses us for our utility and for his goodness; and similarly the angels, whom he uses in spiritual ministries, since they are ministering spirits sent for ministry on account of those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, as is said in Hebrews 1. But this would not be to their utility if by this they did not merit nor make progress in beatitude. Therefore the blessed angels can both merit and make progress in beatitude.[1851]

1850. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I - II, q. 4, a. 4.
1851. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana I, c. 32; see also Hebrews 1.

Further, it pertains to imperfection that he who is not in the highest cannot make progress. But the angels are not in the highest. If therefore they cannot make progress to something greater, it seems that in them there is imperfection and defect - which is unfitting.

But on the contrary: To merit and to make progress pertain to the state of wayfarers. But the angels are not wayfarers but comprehensors. Therefore the blessed angels cannot merit nor make progress in beatitude.

I answer: In every motion the intention of the mover is borne toward something determinate to which he intends to lead the mobile. For intention is of the end, to which the infinite is repugnant. Now it is manifest that, since a rational creature cannot by its own power attain its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has been said above, it needs to be moved by God to beatitude. Therefore there must be something determinate to which each rational creature is directed as to its ultimate end. And this determinate cannot be, in the divine vision, on the part of that which is seen - for the highest truth is beheld by all the blessed according to diverse grades - but it is preassigned on the part of the mode of vision, and diversely the term is fixed by the intention of him who directs to the end. For it is not possible that, just as the rational creature is produced unto seeing the supreme essence, so it be produced unto the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension. This mode can belong to God alone, as is clear from what was said above. But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, whereas the creature's efficacy in seeing can only be finite, and since from the infinite any finite thing is distant by infinite degrees, it happens in many ways that the rational creature understands God, more clearly and less clearly. And as beatitude consists in the very vision, so the grades of beatitude consist in a determinate mode of vision. Thus therefore each rational creature is led by God to the end of beatitude, in such wise that it is also led, by God's predestination, to a determinate grade of beatitude. Wherefore, once that grade has been obtained, it cannot pass to a higher.

Reply to the first: To merit belongs to that which is being moved to an end. Now the rational creature is moved to the end not only by suffering but also by operating. And if indeed that end fall under the virtue of the rational creature, that operation will be called acquisitive of that end, as a man by meditating acquires science. But if the end is not in its power, but is expected from another, the operation will be meritorious of the end. But it does not befit that which is in the ultimate term to be moved, but rather to have been changed unto it. Hence, to merit belongs to imperfect charity, which is of the way; but to perfect charity it does not belong to merit, but rather to enjoy the reward. Likewise, in acquired habits the operation preceding the habit is acquisitive of the habit; but that which is from the habit already acquired is an operation now perfect with delight. And in like manner the act of perfect charity does not have the notion of merit, but rather is of the perfection of the reward.

Reply to the second: Something is called useful in two ways. In one way, as that which is on the way to the end: and thus the merit of beatitude is useful. In another way, as a part is to the whole in a civil thing, as parts are to a house. And in this way the ministries of the angels are useful to the blessed angels, inasmuch as they are a certain part of their own beatitude. For to diffuse the perfection one possesses into others is of the notion of the perfect, as perfect.

Reply to the third: Although a blessed angel is not in the highest grade of beatitude simply speaking, yet he is in the ultimate with respect to himself according to the divine predestination. Nevertheless, the joy of the angels can be increased concerning the salvation of those who are saved through their ministries, according to Luke 15: "There is joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." But this joy pertains to the accidental reward, which indeed can be increased even until the day of judgment. Whence some say that, as regards the accidental reward, they can even merit. But it is better to say that in no way can anyone who is blessed merit, unless he be at once wayfarer and comprehensor, as Christ alone was both wayfarer and comprehensor. For the aforesaid joy they rather receive from the power of beatitude than merit it.

The conclusion is affirmative. About this there is some controversy among the Scholastics, which we shall examine in the following disputation.

Disputatio CCXXX - Whether the blessed angels can grow in essential beatitude, or only in accidental

Caput I - That the blessed angels do not grow in essential beatitude

It occurs to me, however, that testimony of 2 Corinthians 5: We must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each may receive the proper things of the body, as he has done, whether good or evil. From which the Master can plainly be refuted: for all the Fathers thus expound this place, that man will render account to Christ only for those things which, while he lived, he did, whether that be good or evil; so that for these works alone he receives reward or punishment. For that phrase, "the proper things of the body," amounts to the same as "what he did while he lived."

Wherefore also the Greek Fathers, with whom St. Augustine agrees in the Enchiridion, c. 110, and in De praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 12, do not read, "the proper things of the body, as he has done," but "the things which he has done through the body." Therefore the things which a man has done outside the body are not to be judged by Christ; and hence for them man is to receive neither reward nor punishment. But the things which a man does in glory and beatitude after this life, before the day of the resurrection, are not the proper things of the body: therefore for them he will not receive a recompense, nor will he be judged concerning them. Since then the souls of the blessed in the fatherland ask and pray for our salvation, and nevertheless for this prayer are not going to receive the recompense of essential beatitude (*beatitudo essentialis*), why should the angels, for the guardianship and vigilance by which they procure our salvation, receive an increase of essential beatitude? The aforesaid likeness, by which we argue from just souls to angels, can by no reason be denied.

That men alone are to receive a reward on account of the works of the present life, besides the testimony adduced from the Epistle to the Corinthians, other testimonies also confirm. First, from that to the Galatians 6: Therefore, while we have time, let us do good, etc. Expounding this passage, St. Jerome in the great commentaries which are had in the sixth tome, says: "The time of

sowing (as we have said) is the present time, and the life which we run." Which sense the very context of Paul plainly indicates: for he had immediately said, But in doing good let us not fail: for in due season we shall reap. Therefore Paul means that one time is that of sowing good works, namely the time of the present life; but another, that of gathering the fruit of eternal life, namely after death. He then subjoins: Therefore, while we have time, etc., designating clearly the time of the present life. Rightly, therefore, did St. Jerome say: "When this life shall have passed away, the time of sowing is taken from us."

But it is proved also from that of John 9: Work while it is day. Like to it too is that of Ecclesiastes 9: Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, work instantly: because neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge shall be in the infernal regions, whither thou art hastening, that is, in the sepulcher and in death: for not all hasten to hell, the place of punishments, yet all hasten to the sepulcher. Therefore "inferi" in that place signify the sepulcher, which place in this sense St. Jerome interprets in those commentaries; and in Ecclesiasticus 14 it is said, Before thy death work justice: because there is no finding food in the infernal regions. The same is constantly taught by St. Ambrose and Theophylact on that of Luke 16, "Render the account of thy stewardship"; St. Jerome, book 6, to Algasius, Epistle 151; and St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 on Lazarus, and 37 on Matthew.[1852][1853]

Why indeed are works done in beatitude not meritorious of eternal life? Some refer this to the divine will: because he did not promise any reward for those works; for they think promise to belong to the notion of merit. That this reason, however, is not sufficient, we have already noted above in Disputatio 228, cap. 3; and we shall expressly show in I - II, q. 114, a. 2, etc.; where also we shall show that from the nature of the state of beatitude (because it is the state of the fatherland and of reward, not of the way and of combat, or struggle) the works done there are not worthy of the remuneration of the vision of God and of beatitude, but are fruits of it. Which indeed does not hinder but that one blessed can merit for another, as we shall say more fully in III, q. 19, a. 3. By this very reason St. Thomas is to be understood in this article, when he says that the blessed angels no longer merit further, because they are at the term.

Nor is it a wonder that the Master was of that opinion, asserting that the angels grow in beatitude until the day of judgment: since he himself had already held that an angel merited beatitude for himself by subsequent works, and not by works preceding beatitude. But if a promise were necessary for the merit of beatitude, whence could the Master prove that an increase of beatitude was promised to the blessed angels on account of subsequent works? Or, if it was promised, whence could it have been clear to him that this promise was only until the day of judgment? But if promise is not necessary, why then would the glory and merit of the angels not also grow after the day of judgment? For indeed they will have more works, by which they could no

1852. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 110; De praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 12.

1853. St. Ambrose; Theophylact on Luke 16, "Redde rationem villicationis tuae"; St. Jerome, Ep. 151 ad Algasiam (book 6); St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 on Lazarus, and Homily 37 on Matthew.

less merit than by the care and guardianship which they have of souls. That which, moreover, can be adduced for this opinion, from 1 Corinthians 6, Do you not know that we shall judge angels?, will be explained in the following chapter.

Caput II - In what way the accidental beatitude of the angels grows

The unanimous agreement of all the Scholastics, except for the opinion of the Master, is that the angels' accidental glory grows until the day of judgment. They call "glory," or accidental beatitude (*beatitudo accidentaria*), the joy from any other thing besides God; but essential beatitude, the vision and fruition of God himself. Thus teach St. Thomas, and the more recent Thomists on this article; Albert, in the second part of the Summa, treatise 4, question 19, in the incidental question; St. Bonaventure in II, distinction 11, article 2, question 2; Gabriel, question 1, article 3, doubt 2; Ricardus, article 2, question 1, to the fourth; Thomas of Argentina, question 1, article 4: whose opinion, thus universally understood, is expressed in Luke 15 by these words: Thus I say to you, there will be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance, rather than upon ninety-nine just men who need not penance. For since this joy begins in the angels only from that time when the sinner in this life does penance for his sin, from which time alone the angels begin to see the penance of that man, it follows that the angels in heaven are day by day heaped up with new joys; and since these new events of penance are to last only until the day of judgment, it follows that even until that day similar joys will newly be in heaven.

But when it is said, Rather than upon ninety-nine just men who need not penance, with whom the sinner who repents of having sinned is compared, either it must be understood of those who, judging themselves just, do not do penance, when nevertheless in truth they no less need it than other sinners - against whom Christ seemed in that chapter to be speaking, namely against the Pharisees (for these despised him because he ate with sinners, with whom they therefore disdained to converse, because they reckoned themselves just) - then the particle "than" is not one of comparison, nor does it denote that joy is taken in heaven of both, but more of sinners doing penance; rather that particle has the force of negation and exception, to denote that indeed the penance of one sinner brings great joy to the blessed, but that from the arrogance of those who without cause think themselves just there will be no joy to the blessed. Or if we interpret the aforesaid place of truly just men, Christ is to be understood as speaking after the manner of men: for since from the penance of a sinner joy newly begins in heaven, but of the just it does not begin, but already before was there, among men that joy is accounted the greater which newly begins from some thing, than that which before was had from a thing long possessed; therefore Christ said: There will be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance, rather than upon ninety-nine just men - as if he said, "a greater joy" - and the particle "than" has the force of comparison, yet in the sense explained.

Moreover, that this increase of accidental joy will not be after the day of judgment is manifest: for since nothing new can come to the blessed, but all things are to remain in the same state, there will be nothing that can newly bring joy to the blessed.

However, although it is most certain to the Scholastics that the blessed are daily heaped up with new accidental joy until the day of judgment, not all agree in the same way in this opinion. For Ricardus and Thomas of Argentina teach only that accidental joy grows in the blessed; whether, however, the blessed merit that increase, or not, they by no means determine. The others, however, in this difficulty are divided among themselves: Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Gabriel judge that the blessed daily merit for themselves that accidental reward, which they newly receive each day. The reason, however, which is wont to be brought for their opinion, we shall resolve below. But St. Thomas, and his disciples - whose opinion seems to me more probable - affirm that the blessed, now established in beatitude, do not newly merit for themselves that increase of beatitude, but already on the way merited it together with the essential reward. Which St. Thomas confirms by this reasoning: for someone to merit for himself any accidental reward of beatitude, it stands much in the way that he is in every respect a comprehensor; for if some blessed person could merit anything for himself, as Christ merited for himself the exaltation of his name and the glory of the body, it would be necessary that he, in that respect in which he merited, were not a comprehensor and blessed, but still a wayfarer, as Christ was. Since therefore the blessed angels are wholly comprehensors, and in no way on the way, they could not merit anything for themselves, even of accidental joy.

Yet another, easier reason presents itself to me for confirming this: for that it was necessary that Christ be a wayfarer in that respect in which he merited something for himself, seemed necessary only for this reason, that he lacked that perfection which he had to merit for his own body. For if he had already had it, he could not have merited it.

non could not have done so. Add that if he had been a comprehensor (comprehensor) and blessed according to the body, nothing would have seemed to prevent him from meriting by good works among the nations the exaltation of his name: for the fact that he was already blessed would only seem to hinder his being able to merit for himself the beatitude which he had, as we shall show more at length in the Third Part, question 19, article 3.[1854] Therefore, with that reason set aside, which is not without some difficulty, there is another, easier reason: because that joy of the angels over the conversion of souls is an act of charity, or arises from an act of charity, and hence has rather the character of a fruit of beatitude than the character of merit. But no fruit of beatitude merits another new fruit; otherwise there would be a process to infinity in merits and in retribution, and that increase would not only last until the extreme day of judgment. We say, then, that the blessed angels and men, while they were on the way, merited for themselves by good works done on the way not only essential beatitude, which consists in the vision of God and in fruition, but also accidental beatitude, which lies in that joy. They merited, moreover, in this life that such joy be granted to them in its time, knowledge also of such penitence having been granted to them, according as was fitting to each one by reason of his state, according to what we said in Disputation 51, chapter 2.

1854. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 3.

Moreover, someone will ask why blessed men cannot in beatitude merit for themselves the glory of the body, or at least an increase of it: for it is not repugnant to the state of the blessed to merit the glory of the body which they do not have. I answer that the glory of the body simply does not fall under any merit performed in beatitude: because in this life the blessed person merited for himself not only the glory of the soul, but also of the body. Then I say that a blessed person cannot merit an increase of the glory of the body by new merits performed in beatitude: because the glory of the body is set down as the accidental and secondary reward of good works, but in a measure and due proportion with the glory of the soul; wherefore, since that cannot grow by subsequent merits, as was said above, neither can the glory of the body grow, nor can the Blessed in the other life merit an increase of it.

Furthermore, against our foregoing doctrine there seems to be that passage, 1 Corinthians 6: "Do you not know that we shall judge angels?" For if on the day of judgment the Apostles, sitting upon twelve thrones, are to judge... However, as to good angels, inasmuch as the custody of souls has been entrusted to them, rewards too will be assigned to them, as also to the other just, on whose account judgment will be held that day. But as regards essential beatitude, it is manifest that the angels are not then to be judged. For since they did not have that through Christ, just as neither grace, as the more probable opinion holds, which we shall defend in the Third Part, question 8, article 4,[1855] it follows that they are not to be judged by Christ as to essential glory. It remains, therefore, that they be judged concerning the custody of souls and the accidental reward, as St. Thomas teaches in the Third Part, question 19, the last article.[1856] I answer: on the day of judgment the angels also will appear, not that they may be judged concerning the custody and care which they had of souls (for they will have no reward thence), but that God may show his justice in the spiritual care and governance of souls. Whether, however, he will in some way judge the life of the angels and the works which they did on the way, as to substantial or accidental reward, we shall speak in the Third Part in the place cited. This, however, is certain: that good angels will not be judged concerning any merit which they had after beatitude, even as to accidental reward: since in beatitude they merit nothing further, nor anything accidental to their glory. Wherefore, although in this Article 9 St. Thomas says that the angels after beatitude do not merit even an accidental reward, yet afterwards in the Third Part, question 59, where he says that the judgment of angels, as regards a certain accidental reward, pertains to Christ inasmuch as he is man, this ought not to be understood as though Christ retributed to the angels some reward for the custody of souls: for this he expressly denies in this article; but because the reward of joy over the penance of the sinner in a certain way, namely consequently, pertains to Christ, by whose merit the gift of penitence is conferred.[1857]

Moreover, that passage, 1 Corinthians 6, is not about the last judgment, in which the living and the dead are to be judged by Christ and by the just, but, as the Greeks expound it, it is to be understood otherwise: for there "our judging angels" is nothing else, as all the Greeks expound,

1855. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 8, a. 4.
1856. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 12 (ad fin.).
1857. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 59.

than that the demons - who were previously good angels - or those who are angels by nature are convicted and refuted by our good life. And this sense suits the intention of Paul in that place. For he undertakes to show the Corinthians that they do wrong in referring their cases and judgments to the Gentiles, since among them were many Christians who could do this much more conveniently. He argues thus: "Do you not know that we shall judge angels? how much more secular matters?" as if he said: if the life of Christians in mortal flesh will be sufficient to convince and to refute in judgment (for this is what "to judge" there signifies) evil angels, who by nature are angels and spiritual, then surely also a Christian will be sufficient to compose lawsuits and contentions arisen among us. Then, commending the dignity of Christians for this task, he subjoins: "If then you have secular matters, set them to judge who are contemptible in the Church" - to your shame I say - "Is there not among you any wise man who can judge between his brethren?" as if he said: if need be, and you have contentions about secular things, and there is not found among you someone very wise, appoint rather the lowest and most abject Christian than an unbeliever to judge: for it is better to plead causes before a less wise Christian than before the most wise unbeliever. But I have said this to make you blush, because up to now you have carried your cases to unbelieving judges: but is there not found among you also a wise man, as among the unbelievers, that he be appointed judge? as if he said: surely one will be found. Incidentally it is to be observed here that Paul does not will that the jurisdiction of unbelievers be usurped by Christians: for a Christian is not exempted by baptism from such jurisdiction as regards civil and secular causes; but he is speaking of arbitral judgments, which are held by judges chosen by the consent of the litigants: for in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 he bids that we obey kings and princes, even pagans, and pay them tribute.[1858]

Quaestio LXIII - On the malice of the angels as to fault

Then it is to be considered how the angels were made evil. And first as to the evil of fault; second, as to the evil of punishment. Concerning the first, nine things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels

Objicitur primo: It seems that the evil of fault cannot be in the angels. For the evil of fault cannot be in those things which are in potency, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics; for the subject of privation is being in potency. But the angels, since they are subsisting forms, do not have existence in potency. Therefore in them the evil of fault cannot be.

Objicitur secundo: Further, angels are more noble than the heavenly bodies. But in the heavenly bodies evil cannot be, as the philosophers say. Therefore neither in the angels.

Objicitur tertio: Further, that which is natural is always present. But it is natural to the angels to be moved with the motion of love toward God. Therefore this cannot be removed from them. But by loving God they do not sin. Therefore angels cannot sin.

1858. Romans 13; 1 Peter 2.

Objicitur quarto: Further, appetite is only of the good or of the apparent good. But in the angels there cannot be an apparent good which is not a true good, because there can by no means be error in them, or at least error cannot precede fault. Therefore angels cannot appetite except that which is truly good. But no one sins by appetiting that which is truly good. Therefore the angel does not sin by appetiting.

Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob 4: "In angelis suis reperit pravitatem."

Respondetur: I answer that both the angel and any rational creature, if it be considered in its own nature, can sin. And if it befit any creature that it cannot sin, it has this from the gift of grace, not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is that to sin is nothing other than to deviate from the rectitude of the act which it ought to have, whether sin be taken in natural things, or in artificial, or in moral. Only that act fails from rectitude whose rule is not the very virtue of the agent. For if the hand of the craftsman were itself the rule of incision, he could never cut wood except rightly; but the straying of the rectitude of an incision always comes from some other rule. Now the will of any creature is not of itself the rule of its act, because it is not ordered to the ultimate end as principal; but every will of an inferior ought to be regulated according to the will of a superior: as the will of a soldier according to the will of the general of the army. Thus, then, in the divine will alone sin cannot be; but in any created will there can be sin, according to the condition of its nature, inasmuch as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimate end pertains.

Reply to the first: In the angels there is no potency to natural existence; yet in them there is potency, according to the intellective part, to be turned to this or to that; and as to this there can be evil in them.

Reply to the second: The heavenly bodies have no operation except natural. And therefore, as in their nature there cannot be corruption except natural, so neither in their natural action can there be the evil of inordination. But above natural action in the angels there is the action of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), according to which it happens that there can be evil in them.

Reply to the third: It is natural to the angel to be turned with the motion of love toward God, inasmuch as he is the principle of natural existence. But to be turned to him as the object of supernatural beatitude is from gratuitous love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.

Reply to the fourth: Sin in the act of free choice happens in two ways. In one way, from this, that some evil is chosen: as a man sins by choosing adultery, which in itself is evil. And such sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error: otherwise that which is evil would not be chosen as good. One errs, to be sure, in the particular, choosing this pleasure of an inordinate act as some good to be done now, because of the inclination of passion or of habit, even if in the universal he does not err, but holds the true judgment about this. In this way, however, sin could not be in an angel: because neither are there passions in angels by which reason or intellect may be bound, as is clear from what was said above; nor again could a prior habit precede the first sin so as to incline to sin. In another way it happens to sin through free choice, by choosing something which in itself is good, but not with the order of due measure or rule: so that the defect inducing sin be only on the part of the election, which does not have due order, not on the part of the thing chosen; as if someone were

to choose to pray, not attending to the order instituted by the Church. And a sin of this sort does not presuppose ignorance, but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered. And in this way the angel sinned, turning himself by free choice to his own good without order to the rule of the divine will.

The conclusion is affirmative, and of faith, as is evident from those same places in which it is said that the demons sinned: John 8, "He" (namely, the devil) "was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth." Which passage I treated more fully in Disputation 227, chapter 3. St. Thomas proves it from that Job 4, "In his angels he found depravity"; around which passage we said many things above in that disputation cited, chapter 4.

Ad the first, therefore, it must be said that in the angels there is no potency to natural existence (*esse naturale*). And yet there is in them a potency, according to the intellectual part, for this, that they be turned to this or to that. And in so far as this is so, there can be in them evil

Ad the second it must be said that the heavenly bodies have no operation except a natural one. And therefore, just as in their nature there cannot be corruption, so neither in their natural action is there to be evil of inordination. But above natural action in the angels there is the action of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), according to which it can happen that there be evil in them

Ad the third it must be said that it is natural to an angel to be turned by a motion of love to God, in so far as he is the good principle of natural existence. But that he be turned to him in so far as he is the object of supernatural beatitude: this is from gratuitous love, from which he could turn away by sinning

Ad the fourth it must be said that sin in an act of free choice happens to be in a twofold way. In one way, from the fact that something evil is chosen: thus a man sins by choosing adultery, which in itself is evil. And such a sin is always from ignorance or error, because the will is not borne to that which is evil as good. He errs indeed at least in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as some good for acting now, on account of the inclination of passion or of habit: even if in the universal he does not err, but holds the true judgment. But in this way sin could not be in the angel, because in them there are no passions by which the intellect be bound, as is clear from their condition: nor again could the first sin be preceded by another sin. In another way, sin can happen in an act of free choice by choosing something which in itself is good, but not with the order of due measure and rule: so that the defect inducing evil on the part of the choice - which does not have due order - be not on the part of the thing chosen: as if someone should choose to pray, not attending to the order required. And a sin of this sort does not require ignorance, but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered. And in this way the angel sinned, turning himself by free choice to his own good without order to the rule of the divine will

But on the contrary: The conclusion is affirmative, and of faith, as is evident from those same places in which it is said that the demons sinned: John 8, "He" (namely, the devil) "was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth." Which passage I treated more fully in Disputation 227, chapter 3. St. Thomas proves it from that Job 4, "In his angels he found depravity"; around which passage we said many things above in that disputation cited, chapter 4.

Disputatio CCXXXI - Whether there can be made by God some rational creature "Anamartetos," that is, impeccable

Caput I - Two scholastic opinions

The present controversy is not whether some rational nature can be made impeccable by the grace of God: for about this elsewhere it must be disputed. First indeed, whether the potency and liberty (*libertas*) of sinning be impeded in the humanity by the substantial union with God: this must be treated in the Third Part, q. 15, a. 1. Then, whether by the blessed virtue of the clear vision of God they are perpetually impeded, so that they cannot sin: we shall see in I-II, q. 4, a. 4. Lastly, whether in another way than by the clear vision of God, or by union, our liberty be impeded, namely by divine predetermination: above we spoke in Disputation 99, cap. 8, and Disputation 100, cap. 2. About those also who are confirmed in grace, whether they have necessity not to sin mortally, and for what reason they are said to be confirmed in grace, was said by us in that Disputation 90, cap. 2. There remains therefore only the controversy whether any rational creature, with none of the aforesaid modes of grace put, but by its own nature, can be created by God impeccable, that is, without liberty and potency (*potentia*) of sinning. In which question there have been various Scholastic positions, of which two we shall report in this chapter, that in the following we may set forth the truer opinion.

- The first, then, is the opinion of those who teach that there can be produced a rational creature which is by its own nature impeccable around the matter of virtue and the natural end: not, however, around the end and the matter of supernatural virtue. Thus taught Durandus in II, dist. 23, q. 1; indeed he even affirms that perhaps angels were produced of such a nature; which can be gathered manifestly also from his reasoning, and in II, dist. 6, q. 1, n. 16 he had openly pronounced it; whose opinion is embraced by Capreolus in II, dist. 22, the sole question, art. 3 from the beginning, and Cajetan in this article, no. 9. Concerning the consequence take note.[1859]

The reasoning of Durandus, in which Capreolus consents, conceding whatever it endeavors to prove, is of this sort. That from which in a rational creature sin is known is a defect in the intellect (*intellectus*), either of error or of inconsideration: without this, however, it is impossible that there be a defect in the will (*voluntas*), as by the common sense of the Scholastics we shall prove in I-II,

1859. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In II Sent., dist. 23, q. 1; dist. 6, q. 1, n. 16; Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 22, q. unica, art. 3 (a principio); Cajetan, on this article, no. 9.

q. 77, a. 2. But the angel is so perspicacious in intellect that, around the natural end and the moral virtue of the same order, he cannot have a similar defect: for indeed he can have neither error nor inconsideration: therefore neither can he sin about such matter. Moreover, that an angel cannot suffer such a defect in the intellect concerning those objects Durandus proves thus. For as among bodies grades are constituted, so ought they among spirituals: and yet among bodies there is something which in its operation does not fail, nor can fail, but is always perfect both in substance and in operation, namely the heaven: therefore among spirituals there ought to be some nature, namely a pure spirit, as the angel, which in its substance and operation cannot suffer defect. However, that every creature and pure spirit around its supernatural end and the virtues of that order can fail, he shows by a contrary reasoning. For around all these there can precede a defect in the intellect of the angel, either by error or by inconsideration. Since the angel understands and considers these by a supernatural light, with principles more exalted than natural ones, he can easily fail about those. For about those the intellect of the angel is disposed in no other way than ours is about spirituals of the natural order, about which it has a thousand defects daily. To this St. Thomas alludes by his reasoning in the third book Contra the Gentiles, chapter 110, when he replies to the first argument by which in chapter 109 it was being contended to prove that angels could not sin, because in their intellect error or defect cannot be. For he answers that they sinned from inconsideration of the superior good. He understands indeed the supernatural, which is of a superior order.[1860]

- The second opinion is Gabriel's, in II, dist. 25, arts. 1 and 2, who asserts that the rational will can be double: one which is moved freely by the object; and in this mode it cannot be created impeccable, because that would be against the notion of liberty, which is able to be bent to either part: another which is moved necessarily by the object, even if the object be proposed to it by reason and intellect: and in this mode a rational creature can be produced impeccable, because no creature without liberty can sin. This opinion had previously been set out by Ockham, in I, dist. 44, q., ad 1 dub., where he deems it probable that there can be produced an angel, or a man, of another species than he who is produced, who cannot sin. Major followed the same in II, dist. 23, q. 2, conclusions 4 and 5, in such a manner indeed, that a man, or an angel, of another species would be impeccable, because he would be created without liberty. It can be confirmed moreover by the testimony of Augustine, whose sentence the Master reports in I, dist. 44, cap. 2, in these words: "Such a man God could have made, who neither could sin, nor would sin: and if he had so made him, who doubts but that he would have been better?" To this opinion likewise there assent those who in our age teach that there can be produced some rational creature, to which the light of glory and to see God clearly be connatural; for thus also grace would be connatural to it.[1861]

1860. St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles, III, c. 110, in reply to the first argument proposed in c. 109.
1861. Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., dist. 25, arts. 1 - 2; William of Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 44, quaest., ad 1 dubium; John Major, In II Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, concl. 4 - 5; Augustine as reported by the Master of the Sentences, I, dist. 44, c. 2.

Caput II - No rational creature can be impeccable, and to be without freedom: it is proved by authority

To me the common sentence has always so much pleased, which affirms that no rational creature can be created impeccable, that I have judged the opposite to have no foundation of probability, since it can be persuaded neither by any authority of the Fathers, nor even by a slight theological reason. I say, moreover, that no rational creature can be impeccable absolutely; even with respect to the end and supernatural virtue: for with respect to the natural end, and moral and natural virtues, that they can sin, I hold so much the truer and more probable against Capreolus, Cajetan, and others of the first opinion - and in the following chapter I shall prove it - that I do not judge their sentence to be grounded on so light a foundation as is the opinion of Gabriel and the other Nominalists. This opinion, therefore, understood universally, has been expressly handed down by the Scholastic Doctors: St. Thomas and the more recent Thomists in this article; Scotus in II, dist. 23, q. 1; Basso in article 3; Ricardus in article 1, question 1; Thomas of Argentina, question t., article 4, which he had also taught in dist. 6, q. 1; Aegidius also follows in that distinction, question 1, article 1; the Carthusian, question 1, around the end. Then for the same sentence one can allege Bonaventure in the same distinction 23, article 1, question 1, who indeed says that God made man assailable, nor did he wish to confirm him in good, that the man himself might experience that only God is he who cannot be assailed, nor fail; he holds, therefore, that no one can be made, except God, who cannot sin. The same teaches Holcot in II, question 2, article 6, to the arguments of the third doubt; Hervaeus in II, distinctiones, question 1, article 1, and distinction 7, question 1. To these also number Alexander, part II, question 91, mem. 1, article 2, § 3: who although he teaches that there can be made by God's absolute power a rational creature impeccable, yet he understands it by grace, not by nature. Moreover, of these Doctors none, except Scotus, expressly says that there cannot be made a rational creature which cannot sin around its natural end. But neither is there anyone who openly affirms the opposite. Scotus pronounces Durandus's sentence, that the created will in pure nature cannot be immutable in the good and in sin; and he plainly understands this to be about natural precepts and the natural end; which about angels already produced Paludanus not obscurely asserts in IV, distinction co., question 1, article 2, around the natural end. But if about angels already produced this is to be asserted, about any creature whatsoever which can be produced by God, the same also seems to be said, since the reason is the same for all. And from the reasons of the Doctors whom in this chapter we have alleged for this sentence, this too is not obscurely gathered.[1862]

1862. St. Thomas and later Thomists on this article; John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 23, q. 1; Basso, art. 3; Richard [of Mediavilla], art. 1, q. 1; Thomas of Argentina, q. t., art. 4, and dist. 6, q. 1; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), in the same distinction, q. 1, art. 1; the Carthusian, q. 1, on the end; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 23, art. 1, q. 1; Holcot, In II, q. 2, art. 6, ad arg. dub. 3; Hervaeus Natalis, In II, distinctiones, q. 1, art. 1, and dist. 7, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 91, mem. 1, art. 2, § 3; Paludanus (Peter of Palude), In IV Sent., dist. [co.], q. 1, art. 2. For the patristic testimonies: St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, l. 3, c. 2; Elias Cretensis, Or. 3 in St. Gregory Nazianzen (Apologia I in Julianum); St. Jerome, Comm. in Gal., c. 6; Ep. 146; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 12, cc. 1, 6; Contra Maximinum, l. 3, c. 12; Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c. 3 and c. 23; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, l. 25, c. 5; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 3.

It can be confirmed, moreover, first by the testimonies of the Fathers, then by reason. First indeed Ambrose, book 3 On the Faith to Gratian, chapter 2, after the middle, proves that immortality suits God alone: because he alone cannot sin: but that immortality does not suit the creature, because it can die through sin. The same teaches Elias of Crete in the third oration of Nazianzen, which is the first Apology against Julian, on those words, "And then how," etc. But true immortality, which is a proper attribute of God, can suit to no creature, even a possible one: therefore neither to be immutable with respect to sin. Then St. Jerome in the great commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians, chapter 6, immediately in the beginning, says: "Knowing that Paul, except for the Trinity, every creature, although it does not sin, nevertheless can sin," etc. And in Epistle 146, near the end, explaining that Psalm 143: "In thy sight no man living shall be justified," he says that attention has been given to say "every living one," not however, "every man," so that he might comprehend all men and angels. He subjoins then thereafter: "God alone is he upon whom sin does not fall: the rest, since they are endowed with free will, made to the image and likeness of God, can bend their own will now to the true and now to the false." Finally, in this sense he explains that 1 Timothy 1, where God is called immortal, namely for this reason immortality is attributed to God, as Ambrose was saying, because neither can he be changed by sin. Nor does it matter that in these places St. Jerome speaks only of men and of angels who have been created: for from his very reasoning it plainly follows that no angel, and no rational creature, can be created which cannot be bent to either part of virtue and of sin: for every rational creature must be created to the image and likeness of God, by this very fact that it is rational, and accordingly free. Wherefore when St. Jerome says that only God is he into whom sin does not fall, he does not speak only with a comparison made with creatures which have been produced, but also with possibles, attributing to God this peculiar attribute: for if this could suit to any creature, it would not be said to be proper to God alone.

Lastly, St. Augustine in book 12 of the City of God, chapter 1, thus writes: "We say therefore that the immutable good is not except the one true blessed God: but the things which he made are indeed good, because from him; yet, however, mutable, because they were made not from him, but from nothing." The same sentence, and confirmed by the same reason, he delivered in the same book, chapter 6. In which places indeed he treats of the mutability of sin by which the creature is turned away from its good. Wherefore also in that chapter 6 he proves that sin can have no other cause than the created will, not in so far as it is good from God, but in so far as it has been produced from nothing. The very same and for the same reason has Fulgentius in the book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, and St. Gregory in book 25 of the Moralia, chapter 5; from which St. Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 12, and Fulgentius in that book, chapter 23, gather the same in this way: "Whenever it is bestowed upon a rational creature that it cannot sin: it is not of its own nature, but of grace." Which they understand openly not only of creatures which are made, but also of possibles: for the same common reason belongs to all, namely to be from nothing. For if creatures which are made cannot by their own nature be outside the hazard of the mutability of sin, because they are from nothing: this very thing will suit to any other possible creature. To these also add St. John Damascene, who in De fide, chapter 3, at the beginning, speaks

thus about creatures: "Whatever has been created is necessarily subject to change: for that one thing is outside the hazard of change which has nothing from which it has been created." But Damascene speaks about the change of sin, according to which a rational creature can be changed, as is clear from the context of the chapter. He thinks therefore, with the other Fathers already alleged, that God alone cannot sin: because he alone has not been made by another: the rest, indeed, therefore can sin, because they have the cause of themselves: but that which has the cause of itself has also that it has been created from nothing: it suits therefore in doctrine and reason with the other Fathers alleged. And since every possible creature, by this very fact that it is a creature, has the cause of itself and ought to be produced from nothing: it cannot be, according to the sentence of these Fathers, that it be by its own nature outside the hazard of the mutability of sin. But before by reason we prove this sentence, it is to be observed from the doctrine of these Fathers, not only that which is against the second opinion, that a rational creature cannot be produced altogether impeccable around the supernatural end: but also, that none has been produced nor can be produced which, around the end and natural law, be by its own nature impeccable. For the Fathers indeed speak in the same way of all creatures which have been made and of those which can be made, since the same reason of all is, namely that they are from nothing.

The same is taught by Elias the Cretan, Oration 3 on St. Gregory Nazianzen (Apology I against Julian), on those words, "But immortality is truly a proper attribute of God; it can befit no creature, nor any possible being." St. Jerome in the great Commentary on Galatians, chapter 6, says at once: "Paul knowing that, except God, every creature, even if it does not actually sin, can sin," etc. And in Epistle 146, explaining that of Psalm 143, "No one living shall be justified in your sight," he says that by "every living one" Scripture said not only "man" but so that it might also be understood of all men and Angels. He adds, however, that God alone is he "into whom sin does not fall," although men and Angels are of free choice, made to the image and likeness of God and placed on the razor's edge, so to speak, of the will to turn either way. Finally, he applies to this that of 1 Timothy, where God is said to be immortal - that is, he has immortality as a proper attribute; as Ambrose says, because not even by sin can he die. Nor does it matter that in these places Jerome speaks of men and Angels who have been created; for from this it plainly follows that no Angel, nor any rational creature possible to be created, could be such that it could not be bent to either part of virtue and vice: for every rational creature must be created to the image and likeness of God as such, and therefore be free. Hence Jerome, when he says that God alone is he into whom sin does not fall, speaks not only by way of comparison with creatures already made, but also with possible ones: that this peculiar attribute of God could not agree to any creature; for if it could agree to any creature, it would be no longer the proper attribute of God alone. Lastly, St. Augustine in The City of God, book 12, chapter 1, thus writes: "The immutable good is not created; God alone is truly blessed. Those things, however, which are, are so because of that which is - "[he proceeds] - but the things that are mutable are those which are made not of him, but of nothing. He hands on the same doctrine, confirmed by the same reason, in the same book, chapter 6, where in those places he treats of the mutability with respect to sin (*mutabilitas peccati*), by which the creature is turned away from its own good. And so also in that chapter 6 he proves that sin can have no other cause

than a created will, not insofar as it is good from God, but insofar as it is produced from nothing. The very same, and for the same reason, is held by Fulgentius in the book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, and Gregory [the Great] in book 25 of the Moralia, chapter 5; from which Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 12, and Fulgentius in that book, chapter 23, gather the same in this way: Whatever is granted to a rational creature, that it cannot sin, is not of its own nature, but of grace. And they clearly understand this not only of creatures that have been made, but also of possible ones: for that common reason applies to all, namely, that they are from nothing. For if creatures that have been made cannot by their own nature be outside the hazard of the change that is sin, because they are from nothing: this very thing will agree to any other possible creature. To these also add St. John Damascene, who, book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 3, speaking from the beginning about creatures, says thus: "Whatever is created must needs be subject to change: for there is one thing alone outside the hazard of change, that which has nothing from which it is created." Now Damascene speaks of change with respect to sin, according to which a rational creature can be changed, as is clear from the context of the chapter. Therefore Damascene thinks that God alone cannot sin, because he alone is not made by another; the rest indeed can sin because they have a cause of themselves; and what has a cause of itself has also that it is created from nothing. Therefore he agrees in doctrine and in reason with the other Fathers alleged. And since every possible creature, by the very fact that it is a creature, has a cause of itself and ought to be produced from nothing: it cannot happen, according to the sententia of those Fathers, that by its own nature it be outside the hazard of the change that is sin. But before we prove this sententia by reason, it is to be observed from the doctrine of those Fathers, not only that a rational creature cannot be produced altogether impeccable with respect to a supernatural end; but also that none has been produced nor can be produced which by its own nature is impeccable with respect to the end and law of nature. For the Fathers, making no distinction, speak absolutely of the change that is sin, from which they exempt no creature.[1863]

They will perhaps reply, on behalf of the Doctors of the second opinion, that the Fathers speak of a rational creature which would be of free choice: and of this they most truly taught that none can be made by God which by its own nature is impeccable; but that they do not dispute about a rational creature without liberty, but necessarily determined to one part only; and that of this the second opinion is true which asserts that some rational nature can be made impeccable, namely without liberty and determined to one [part]: for if it were of free choice, the Doctors of that other sententia would not deny that any rational creature, even if only possible, must be peccable.

Reiicitur. But this objection is frivolous. First, because Jerome, cited above, plainly supposes that a creature, by the very fact that it is rational, is of free choice: for a rational creature is therefore said to be made to the image and likeness of God, according to his opinion, because it is endowed with free choice. Then also because, as we shall prove in the following chapter, it is

1863. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, l. 3, c. 2; Elias Cretensis, Or. 3 in St. Gregory Nazianzen (Apologia I in Julianum); St. Jerome, Comm. in Gal., c. 6; Ep. 146; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 12, cc. 1, 6; Contra Maximinum, l. 3, c. 12; Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c. 3 and c. 23; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, l. 25, c. 5; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, l. 2, c. 3.

impossible to produce a rational creature which is necessarily bound to one part with respect to whatever objects can be proposed to it: but, unless it be an irrational brute, it must be free with respect to at least some genus of object: but by this very fact, that it has the least share of liberty, it cannot be free with respect to virtue and vice, because it is made from nothing: for this alone we concede to God, that he is of free choice, but that with respect to good and evil he has no liberty. The reason of this difference between us and him we shall set forth in the following chapter.

Caput III - The foundation of the reasons for the preceding sententia

Let us confirm the preceding sententia by reason, and plainly show that a rational creature, by the very fact that it is a creature made from nothing, cannot be impeccable: first it must be proved that no rational creature can be made without free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). For those who follow the second sententia concede this at least universally, that no creature endowed with reason can be produced without some liberty with respect to at least some genus of object. But this is proved first by the authority of Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, where he writes thus: "Again, whatever uses reason is also endowed with freedom of choice. Therefore the Angel, as a partaker of reason and intelligence, has free choice; but as created, he was in that condition, that he could receive change, and it was free to him to remain either in good or in evil." He is speaking, as is manifest, of the change that is sin; and in chapter 27 of the same book, after he said that brute animals lack freedom of choice, and are led rather by nature than they lead it, and are naturally borne into action as soon as they have desired something, he adds these words: "Man, on the contrary, as one who partakes of reason, leads nature rather than is led by it." And below: "Moreover we must know that Angels, as endowed with reason, are of free choice, both as created and as liable to change." Therefore Damascene gathers liberty in man and Angel from reason: not because of some special kind of reason, but because they are endowed with reason as such. From the fact, however, that they are created from nothing he gathers that they can be changed by sin. So also Augustine gathers in the passages cited in the preceding chapter.

Furthermore, that Damascene does not prove that Angels and men are free because they have a peculiar kind of reason, but because they are simply endowed with reason, is clear from the reason which he gives in that chapter 27, which is as follows. Where there is reason, that force, that rational faculty is conversant partly in contemplation, partly in action: it is placed in action which deliberates and prescribes a mode for things to be done; but he who deliberates, deliberates just as if the choice of things to be done were in his own power. Therefore he who has reason, by that very fact is of free choice. And this reason plainly holds in every rational creature, of whatever kind of reason it be endowed, because there is none that cannot compare two goods among themselves and deliberate of them, which of them is more expedient.

Then this very point is proved by reason: for among those rational natures which now exist - even if I include the uncreated nature of God - there is none which does not have some liberty. By what foundation, then, could the Nominalists have been moved to imagine another kind of possible rational nature which would have no liberty at all? Lastly, since there is no thing besides God which

so appears good that in it, and in the love of it, there cannot appear a reason of evil: it follows that a rational nature, considering that reason of evil, is free both to love it and not to love it, and also both to love it and to hate it: for from this variety of cognition, which they call indifference (*indifferentia*), there arises in the appetitive faculty itself liberty. But if some particular good, which is not God, is so constituted as to be thought by some nature in such a way that it cannot fail to move the affection, it is a manifest sign that such a nature does not have reason but sense only: for either that nature which, according to the Nominalists' opinion, can be created, is so necessarily determined to virtue that it cannot sin - then it is superior to man and the Angel and inferior to God - or it is inferior to man himself and the Angel. If it is inferior to God and superior to man and Angel, it cannot lack liberty at least with respect to some object: since the most perfect rational nature, which is God, has some liberty; nor indeed because it would be more perfect than man and Angel should it lack liberty: rather it ought to have it; since the supreme God of all is free with respect to certain things. But if it were inferior to the Angel and superior to man, in the same manner as the Angel it would be free: for to lack liberty altogether would not be a greater perfection than to have some. And since a superior rational nature and an inferior are free, the middle one also, whether by reason of perfection or of imperfection, ought to be free. But if it were inferior to man: either it would be brute, or it would have liberty to sin: for how could it be that the most perfect and a more perfect rational creature, as an Angel and a man, should have liberty to evil, but an inferior be impeccable, and always necessarily determined to good? It remains, therefore, that there is no possible creature endowed with reason which is not of free choice with respect to some [objects].

Caput IV - The opinion opposed to the second sententia is confirmed by reason

Thus far we have only proved that no creature endowed with reason can be produced which does not have liberty with respect to some objects, a point which by no reason can the Nominalists deny. But since there is in God a certain liberty of will with respect to some objects conjoined at once with a necessary determination to virtue and without liberty to sin; it remains to be proved that a created liberty, by the very fact that it is created, cannot be conjoined with a necessary determination to virtue as it is in God. For Damascene, from a different principle, proves liberty of nature absolutely, and liberty to sin. He proves indeed liberty of nature absolutely with respect to some universal object from the fact that it is rational; but liberty to sin from the fact that it is a rational creature created. This principle the other Fathers also handed down with Augustine, as we saw above in chapter 2. Upon this single and most solid foundation seem to me to rest the reasons which St. Thomas and Scotus use in confirmation of the preceding sententia, if we expound them rightly: although Scotus, thinking the reason of St. Thomas less sufficient, impugns it.

Now the reason of the holy Doctor in this article is of this sort: to sin is nothing else than to turn aside and deviate from the rectitude and rule which one ought to follow in acting, as much in things natural as in things moral. But that operation alone cannot deviate from rectitude whose right rule is the very virtue of acting: just as, if the hand of the craftsman were itself the straight rule of the art, a work not right could not proceed from the hand. But in no rational nature, except

God, is the just rule of acting morally the agent's will itself: for the rule of all human and angelic operations is the divine will. Therefore no created will is impeccable, not able to deviate from rectitude and rule.

But this reason seemed less sufficient to Scotus in the place alleged, and against it he objects in this way. Although some operative faculty is not itself the rule of acting, nevertheless nothing hinders its being so necessarily determined by the rightness of the rule that it cannot decline from it: thus the intellect about first principles, which are to it the rule of knowing, cannot err; and yet the faculty that understands principles is not itself the principles. And other things of this sort he adds.

To this we say, explaining the mind of St. Thomas, that his argument proceeds thus: namely, if an operative faculty were of itself a sufficient cause in acting, and had in itself a sufficient cause by which it should be immutably constituted, then indeed either, first, it would be its own rule formally; or, second, it would have its own rule in such wise as to be necessarily conformed to it. But St. Thomas's intent is that neither of these befits a created faculty. And because in God alone the love of every good is immutable, whereas in creatures the contrary is easily observed: therefore in creatures the operative faculty is not itself the rule, which is the love of all good, neither in the former way nor in the latter. And thus far seems to go the reasoning of Scotus in the place cited, which can be put thus: whatever nature is not its own rule, and is not of necessary conformity to its rule, can fall away from the rule; but such is the rational created nature: therefore it can fall away from its rule, and consequently sin.

Yet this very reasoning needs confirmation: for it still remains to be proved why a created will, even when adhering to God by the clearest vision, could be impeccable; or rather, why it is not from its own nature necessarily and immutably conformed to the rule. Moreover, the mode by which Cajetan explains the reason of St. Thomas, not less than the very reason of Scotus, requires confirmation. For Cajetan ought to attend to this: by what reason the love of good according to its own nature, which is the principle of right acting, cannot of necessity and immutably agree to a rational creature. Then too Scotus ought to prove what he assumed in the minor proposition, namely, that a rational creature is neither its own rule nor necessarily conformed to its rule.

Scotus also employs another reason to prove this same thesis, which runs thus. Every will that is not yet steadfast enough in its appetition - because it has not yet its fixed good, namely God - to which it always can prefer some apparent good that is in truth against reason and against that highest good, is such that it can will an apparent good which is against reason, and so can sin. But the human will is of this sort. Therefore it can will some apparent good which is against reason, and consequently sin. This reason likewise needs confirmation: for it still remains to be proved why a created will, once adhering to God by clear vision, should be impeccable; and that, if it be impeccable, this is not from its created nature as such, but from that most efficacious vision by which the divine good is proposed as supremely lovable, moving the intellect efficaciously and, through the intellect, sweetly and victoriously inclining the will, so that it cannot be effectively withdrawn by any opposite appearance of good from the consideration of the true good according to reason. For that clear vision of God (as we shall show below in its place) by its very nature

inserts an efficacious consideration in every operation and choice of good to be done, which consideration, being joined with the love of the divine will, so establishes the will that it cannot be perturbed by any contrary operation in such wise that it should efficaciously depart from that knowledge born of the vision, which the blessed grasp, and from the will of God bound to it; nor can the will, unless first the cognition be darkened and the efficacious consideration of the good be taken away, depart from the rule of reason, and so sin.

But that [argument] seemed less sufficient to Scotus; and against it he objects in this way: although some faculty of acting is not its own rule (*regula*), nevertheless nothing seems to stand in the way why it should not be so necessarily determined with respect to its rule that it cannot deflect from it: just as the intellect concerning first principles, which are themselves the rule of knowing for it, cannot err; and yet the intellect, which is the faculty of understanding principles, is not the principles themselves.

Cajetan, in this article, says to this, and he explains St. Thomas's mind thus, namely, that it is the same thing to say that some power of acting is its own rule in acting, and to say that it has a cause immutably conjoined that is like a rule. In the former way, says Cajetan, the will (*voluntas*) in acting is its own rule formally; in the latter way it is its own rule virtually. And because in God alone the love of every good is immutable, whereas in creatures it can easily change, therefore in creatures the faculty of acting is not the rule itself, which is the love of every good, neither in the former nor in the latter way. The same also seems to be Scotus's reason in the place alleged, which is of this sort: every nature which is not its own rule, nor necessarily conforming to its rule, can fail from the rule; but such is created rational nature: therefore it can fail from its rule, and accordingly sin.

But both Cajetan's reason, or the way in which he explains St. Thomas's reason, and Scotus's reason itself, need stronger confirmation. For Cajetan ought to have considered by what account the love of the good, which is the principle of acting rightly, could not necessarily and immutably agree by nature itself to a rational creature. Then too Scotus ought to have proved what he assumed in the minor proposition, namely, that the rational creature is not its own rule, nor necessarily conforming to its rule.

Scotus's reason. Scotus employs another reason to prove this very point, which is of this sort: every will that is not satiated in desiring, because it does not yet have its good, namely God, to whom it aspires, can desire some apparent good which in reality is against reason, and against that highest good, until it inseparably cleaves to that highest good; but the human will is of this sort: therefore it can desire some apparent good which is against reason, and accordingly sin. This reason too stands in need of confirmation: for it still remains to be proved why a created will, so long as it adheres to God by clear vision, cannot be impeccable.

But in truth we can confirm almost in the same way all these reasons: wherefore they also seem to agree solidly with us. In confirmation of them we must first premise that the proximate rule (*regula*) of human actions is the operation of reason (*ratio*) proposing that which is right, as we shall show in I-II, question 19, article 3.[1864] For although rational nature itself is the first rule of the

just and the unjust, the good and the evil in morals - for that is called good which is agreeable and fitting to rational nature as rational; but that evil which is unfitting to rational nature as rational - nevertheless, because this fittingness and unfittingness is imputed to us to the extent that it is proposed through reason, therefore I would say that the proximate rule of these actions is reason proposing that which is to be done.

Then note that by the clear vision of God (*visio clara Dei*) God is proposed to us so efficaciously to be loved above all things that we not only cannot hate him, or even fail to love him, but he also efficaciously moves the intellect (*intellectus*) so that it much more efficaciously apprehends that which is according to reason and according to the will (*voluntas*) of God, than the opposite: so that by reason of some apparent good it cannot be diverted from the more efficacious consideration of the true good, which is according to reason. For that clear vision of God, which shows how it is just and equitable to love God above all things, by its very nature necessarily inserts the most efficacious consideration of each operation and of the particular good which is according to the will of God; and just as the clear vision of God itself cannot be perturbed by any contrary operation, in the same way that efficacious knowledge born of the vision, by which the blessed apprehends that which is according to reason and the will of God, cannot be overcome by any other more efficacious cognition by which a delectable good would be apprehended that is against reason. But as we said in Disputation 98, chapter [x], and as we shall say in I-II, question 77, article 2, the will cannot sin unless there first precedes on the part of the intellect a defect of consideration: therefore, with the vision remaining, and with that efficacious consideration of the good which cannot be overcome by the contrary, the will will not be able to fail and to sin.[1865][1866]

Lastly, it must be observed that as long as a rational creature does not see God clearly as he is, it is so disposed by its own nature on the part of the intellect that it can apprehend particular goods and God himself in various ways, now this one more intensely and efficaciously than that one, now the opposite: because particular goods are by nature apt to appear in one way and another; indeed even God himself, as long as he is not seen as he is. And since the root of the liberty of the will lies in this indifference of the intellect and of reason, as the holy Doctor teaches below, question 8, article 3, it follows that in this life the will can be determined by no thing; but thus it can be borne to this or that, that it can also not be borne to it, and similarly to the opposite: because there is no cognition so manifest and clear representing every aspect of good in the object for this state, that a certain aspect of evil could not appear in it more efficaciously than the aspect of good; and that some opposite apparent good could not appear more efficaciously and move the will.[1867]

From these foundations an efficacious reason of our opinion is gathered. For since the ratio of virtue is a particular good, that which is according to virtue cannot so clearly appear under every aspect of good as to draw to itself necessarily a will that is free of itself: because it cannot be represented under every aspect of good more efficaciously than the opposite; but when the will is

1864. St. Thomas, I-II, q.19, a.3.
1865. Disputation 98, cap. [as cited in the author].
1866. St. Thomas, I-II, q.77, a.2.
1867. St. Thomas, below, q.8, a.3.

freely enticed by something opposite to virtue, it already fails from the rule, and sins. Therefore rightly from the liberty of the created will with respect to some objects we gather its liberty with respect to virtue and vice. For if the will is free with respect to some things, by its very nature it is free: now a faculty that is free of itself has this, that it cannot be necessarily drawn by a good which is not proposed more efficaciously under every aspect of good; and since the good of virtue is such, it follows that with respect to that it ought to be free...

Hence it is evident first that those Fathers rightly said, cited above, that the creature, by this very fact that it is rational, is free; but by this very fact that it is from nothing, it is peccable. For by this very fact that it is from nothing, it can apprehend the good of sin more efficaciously than the good of virtue: because it does not always consider the good of virtue more efficaciously, in that it does not see God clearly and as he is.

Then by our reason the position of St. Thomas can be confirmed: because any nature which is not the rule itself, namely the very consideration of the good, just as God is his own goodness and his own knowledge, cannot immutably be conformed to the rule itself, because the consideration of the good, by which it is led, can vary in it, as we have said.

Lastly, Scotus's later reason also can be strengthened and made clear by ours: because a nature which of itself is not satiated with the highest good, until it attains it and adheres to it immutably, can desire other particular goods in various ways, just as it can apprehend them variously: but every rational creature has this as long as it sojourns away from the Lord, and does not look upon him clearly, but beholds him through an enigma.

But in truth the aforesaid reason supposes that there is no rational creature which by its own nature and from an intrinsic principle necessarily sees God clearly and as he is, without a new gift and benefit of God, beyond the gift of creation; which I do not see can be denied by any reason. Indeed, some Theologians in our age have said that it is a matter of opinion whether some rational creature could be created to which the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) for seeing God is connatural, which indeed nature would be of the supernatural order; whose opinion we refuted above in Disputation 6: because it is inept to imagine some created substance which would be called of the supernatural order, since this is proper to an accidental form, as we showed there. Then also, because if to some creature some light for seeing God clearly were connatural, the vision of God and the light itself could not be said to be of the supernatural order according to their substance and nature, but only according to the mode on the part of the efficient cause: for as we said above in Disputation 214, chapter 2, that alone is said to be supernatural according to substance, which no creature by its nature demands. But it is frivolous to understand this only of the creatures which actually exist: for if fewer creatures had been made, we could say the natural perfections of those which were not created to be called supernatural according to substance; which is absurd.

But surely no one so far has said that there can be created some creature to which it so naturally and necessarily from intrinsic principles would belong to behold God clearly that it would not need some light added to its nature: which, although it would be connatural to it as species of things are said to be connatural to the angels, yet it would not belong to it necessarily and from intrinsic

principles to have that light, or to behold God clearly; but nevertheless it would be communicated to it by God so freely that without any violence it could be denied: just as even now the natural species of many things are not granted to me, which I could have, either because the presence of the object is not granted, or for some other reason. Although therefore that creature would be of such an order that the light of glory would be connatural to it, nevertheless it would be a new benefit to it, beyond the gift of creation, if such a light were granted to it for seeing God. But with God left only under the veil of faith, it could not be impeccable: therefore no rational creature by the sole gift of creation, as has been proved, can by its nature be impeccable; but to become impeccable would be the effect of a particular gift. Nay rather, although some creature could be produced which by the sole gift of creation would necessarily see God, nevertheless it could sin: for God could impede its intellect that it not see him: and thus, deprived of the vision and with him left only under the veil of faith, it could sin. Wherefore it would not be repugnant to its nature to sin: although, if left to its own virtue and not impeded, it could never sin.

However, this solution does not please me. First, because if an Angel were by his nature impeccable with respect to the natural law, by no end or incentive could he be moved to sin against that law: yet Angels hate God himself and men; they also envy the divine providence and majesty: which are against the natural law. Now the motive cause for these affections is to see themselves tormented by him. And this would suffice, even if they did not see themselves deprived of supernatural beatitude, but only tormented by God.

Moreover, even if they sin against the natural law by hating God on the ground that they see themselves deprived by God of supernatural beatitude, it does not therefore follow that they sin consequently against the natural law because they first sin against the supernatural law: for then they do not sin against the supernatural law itself directly, but from the privation of the supernatural gift they are moved to hatred and envy against God.

But someone may say on behalf of Capreolus and others of the first opinion that they did not deny that Angels can sin against the natural law absolutely; but that they cannot be moved to sin within the limits of the natural law except from some motive of another order. Yet I for my part do not see by what reason, if an Angel's will can sin against the natural law with a preceding defect on the part of the intellect from that incentive of the higher order, as in the example just given, the Angel could not also, within the limits even of the natural law, without consideration of any other thing of a higher order, sin against the natural law itself. For since the defect on the part of the intellect, which ought to precede every sin, is not necessarily an error, but a defect of consideration suffices, namely because the delectable which moves to sin is considered more efficaciously than the honesty of virtue, or the evil of punishment, which ought to hold the will back from sin; therefore I do not see why an Angel could not suffer such a defect of perfect consideration within the limits of the natural law, and thus sin against it. From which doctrine the argument of Capreolus for that first opinion is plainly dissolved. For although the Angel's intellect is perspicacious, nevertheless because it is created and can be drawn to diverse [objects], it could also consider more remissly the good of virtue and the things which ought to remove it from sin, than the opposite.

Caput V - Lastly, against the first opinion

Lastly, against the first opinion, which was that of Capreolus and others, it remains to be proved that Angels also can sin against the law and precepts of nature: whence our view too will be confirmed. And this is clearly gathered from the fact that after the fall they daily sin against natural precepts, by persuading men to all kinds of sins and by pursuing men with hatred.

But the more recent Thomists, who embrace Capreolus's opinion, respond that Angels indeed can sin, not primarily and per se against the natural law, but concomitantly or consequently, because they sin against the supernatural law, and from that they are moved also to violate the natural law. This solution, however, does not please me. First, because if an Angel were by his nature impeccable with respect to the natural law, by no end or incentive could he be moved to sin against that law: yet Angels hate God himself and men; they also envy the divine providence and majesty: which are against the natural law. The moving cause to these affections is to see themselves tormented by him. And this would suffice, even if they did not see themselves deprived of supernatural beatitude, but only tormented by God. Moreover, even if they sin against the natural law by hating God on the ground that they see themselves deprived by God of supernatural beatitude, it does not therefore follow that they sin consequently against the natural law because they first sin against the supernatural law: for then they do not sin against the supernatural law itself directly, but from the privation of the supernatural gift they are moved to hatred and envy against God.

But someone may say on behalf of Capreolus and others of the first opinion that they did not deny that Angels can sin against the natural law absolutely; but that they cannot be moved to sin within the limits of the natural law, unless from a motive of some other order. Yet I do not see by what reason, if an Angel's will can sin against the natural law with a preceding defect on the part of the intellect from that incentive of the higher order, as in the example just given, the Angel could not also, within the limits even of the natural law and without consideration of any other thing of a higher order, sin against the natural law itself. For since the defect on the part of the intellect, which ought to precede every sin, is not necessarily an error, but a defect of consideration suffices, namely because the delectable which moves to sin is considered more efficaciously than the honesty of virtue, or the evil of punishment, which ought to hold the will back from sin, therefore I do not see why an Angel could not suffer such a defect of perfect consideration within the limits of the natural law, and thus sin against it. From which doctrine the argument of Capreolus for that first opinion is plainly dissolved. For although the Angel's intellect is perspicacious, nevertheless because it is created and can be drawn to diverse [objects], it could also consider more remissly the good of virtue, and the things which ought to remove it from sin, than the opposite.

But lastly, against the first opinion, which was that of Capreolus and others, it remains to be proved that Angels also can sin against the law and the precepts of the natural [law]: whence our position too will be confirmed. But that is plainly gathered from this, that after their fall they daily

sin against the natural precepts, persuading men to all kinds of sins, and pursuing the men themselves with hatred. And if by their nature an Angel were impeccable against the natural law, he could not incite to such things.

However, some more recent Thomists, who embrace the opinion of Capreolus, reply that Angels can indeed sin, not primarily and per se against the natural law, but concomitantly or consequently, inasmuch as they sin against the supernatural law, and thence they are moved to those affections against God. Yet even if they do not see themselves as deprived of the supernatural but only - (so they say) - to be suffering under some motion toward acts which are against the natural law, and to be tormented by God himself, and although they would not see themselves to be deprived of the supernatural but merely to be punished, nevertheless even if they sin against the supernatural law by hating God and men, and the divine providence, and what things are against the law of nature, the mover to these affections is the deprivation of the supernatural gift; from that they are led to hatred and envy. And thus, they add, although they do not sin directly against the natural law, yet they are moved against God by the deprivation of the supernatural, and consequently they sin against the very law of the supernatural, from whose privation they are brought to hatred and envy.

These things nevertheless are rejected. First, because, if an Angel by nature were impeccable, he would be impeccable without any end or incentive to sin. Next, I do not approve this solution, namely that the Angel by his own nature within the limits of the natural law could not be moved by any incentive contrary to that law. For although all sin, on the part of the intellect, does not necessarily require an error, still a defect of consideration suffices, namely that the delectable which moves to sin is considered more efficaciously than the honesty of virtue, or the evil of punishment which ought to hold the will back from sin; therefore I do not see why an Angel could not suffer such a defect of perfect consideration within the limits of the natural law, and thus sin against it. From which doctrine the argument of Capreolus for that first opinion is plainly dissolved. For although the Angel's intellect is perspicacious, nevertheless, because it is created and can be drawn to diverse objects, it could also consider more remissly the good of virtue, and those things which ought to remove it from sin, than the opposite.

In reply to Durandus's argument for the same opinion, I answer that among bodies indeed there is something most perfect, which can in no respect fail: first, because there is nothing extrinsic to it which can impede its operations, since nothing is so efficacious as itself; next, because every body from within is determined to one side, nor can it operate indifferently in one side and another: but a rational creature, since it is free, even if by nothing extrinsic it can be compelled to sin, can nevertheless from within operate to whichever side it shall have pleased; and it would be against the nature of a rational creature not to be free, and therefore not to be able to sin, as was proved above.

To the testimony of St. Augustine which the Master adduces in I, distinction 44, chapter 10, 2, in confirmation of the same opinion, I reply that those words are not in Augustine, book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 7; but in that chapter Augustine only says that the created nature which does not will to sin is better than that which not only can sin but even wills to sin. [1868][1869]

Others finally argue for the aforesaid opinion in this way: An Angel does not have a natural inclination to sin; therefore within the limits of the natural law he could not sin. But this reason has no weight, as we shall also say below in disputation 236, chapter: for that a nature sin, a natural inclination to sin is not required; but liberty suffices and is necessary.

Articulus II - Whether in Angels there can be only the sins of pride and envy

It seems that in Angels there cannot be only the sin of pride and envy. For wherever there falls the delectation of some sin, there the sin itself can fall. But demons are delighted even in the obscenities of carnal sins, as St. Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the City of God. Therefore in demons even carnal sins can be present.[1870][1871]

1. Further, just as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so also sloth and avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins befit the spirit, just as carnal sins befit the flesh. Therefore not only pride and envy can be in Angels, but also sloth and avarice.
2. Further, according to St. Gregory in the Moralia, from pride many vices arise, and similarly from envy. But when the cause is posited, the effect is posited. If therefore pride and envy can be in Angels, by equal reason other vices can be in them.[1872]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the City of God that the devil is not a fornicator or a drunkard, nor anything of this sort. Yet he is proud and envious.[1871]

I answer that a sin can be in someone in a twofold way. In one way according to the guilt; in another way according to the affect. According to guilt indeed all sins happen to be in demons, because while they induce men to all sins, they incur the guilt of all sins. But according to the affect only those sins can be in evil Angels to which it befalls a spiritual nature to be affected.

But it does not befall a spiritual nature to be affected to goods which are proper to the body, but to those which can be found in spiritual things; for nothing can be affected except to that which is in some way suitable to its nature to be. But in spiritual goods there cannot be sin while someone is affected to them, except insofar as in such an affection the rule of a superior is not observed; and this is the sin of pride, namely not to be subject to the superior in that in which one ought. Whence

1868. The Master (Peter Lombard), I, dist. 44, cap. 10, 2.
1869. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, 7.
1870. A cluster of scholastic references is placed here by the author: a. disting. q. 2. artic. 3; dist. 10:22.9; arte 1.art.1; 3, cont. c. 109. co.; c. mal. q. 16.
1871. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XIV.
1872. St. Gregory, Moralia.
1871. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XIV.

the first sin of the Angel cannot be anything other than pride. But consequently there could also be in them envy. For it is of the same account that the affect tend to something to be desired, and that it resist the opposite. Now the envious man grieves at the good of another, insofar as he esteems another's good to be an impediment of his own good. But the good of another could not be esteemed an impediment of the good affected by the evil Angel, unless insofar as he affected a singular excellence; and that singularity ceases by the excellence of another. And therefore after the sin of pride there followed in the Angel the sin of envy: he grieved over the good of man; and also over the divine excellence, insofar as God uses that good against the will of the devil himself unto divine glory.

Reply to the first: Demons do not delight in the obscenities of carnal sins, as if they themselves were affected to carnal delights. But this whole thing proceeds from envy, namely that they are delighted in whatsoever sins of men, insofar as they are impediments of human good.

Reply to the second: Avarice, insofar as it is a special sin, is the immoderate appetite of temporal things which come into the use of human life, whatever things are estimated by money. And to such things demons are not affected, just as neither to carnal delights. Whence avarice properly so taken cannot be in them. But if by avarice is said every immoderate cupidity to have and possess any created good whatsoever, then avarice is contained under pride which is in the demons. But anger is a passion, as concupiscence is. Whence anger cannot be in demons, except metaphorically. Sloth moreover is a certain sadness by which a man is rendered slow to spiritual acts by reason of bodily labor, which does not befit demons. And thus it is clear that only pride and envy are purely spiritual sins which can befit demons: yet so that envy not be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply to the third: Under envy and pride, as they are posited in the demons, all the sins which are derived from them are comprehended.

Notes concerning the doctrine of the Article.

The prior conclusion is: All sins, according to guilt, can be in demons. The posterior conclusion is: In demons there can be formally two genera of sins, namely pride and envy. For whose perspicuity it is to be noted first, when a sin is imputed formally to the agent, when not only the malice itself is imputed to him, but also the proper act of that sin is from him as from a cause. Then indeed the sin is imputed according to guilt, and not formally, when to the agent there is imputed only the malice, yet he is not the proper cause of the act and operation to which that malice is annexed; for example, if someone persuade another that he should kill an enemy, and he kill, the sin of homicide is said to be imputed to the persuader according to guilt only: because he is a partaker of the same malice by his persuasion, since persuasion takes its species from the same [source] whence homicide itself takes [its species]; but to the killer inflicting death by the sword or some other instrument the sin is attributed formally. Therefore St. Thomas says that in Angels there can be found all sins according to guilt, because an Angel can persuade any genus of sin and

move to it; but formally, that is, according to the proper act, there can be found in an Angel only those two genera of sins, namely pride and envy: because only the proper acts of those sins can be done by Angels as a proximate cause.[1873]

Then it is to be noted that when it is said that some sin is attributed to an agent according to guilt, this is to be understood not only of the guilt of punishment, but also of the guilt of fault, that is, of the very malice of the sin, which is said to be imputed to someone. For, as we shall show in I-II, question 73, article 8, a work which is the cause of someone's sin - for example, a seduction, persuasion, and the like - has the same species of malice as the very sin of which it is the cause: nor ought we to constitute a peculiar species of scandal without a special intention of the neighbor's ruin, as we shall show there; but then, when a like intention is present, the work by which one is the cause of sin is, first indeed, in that species of malice in which is the sin to which it invites; then in the peculiar species of scandal from a direct intention of the ruin of one's neighbor.[1874]

But whether a work which is the cause in another of a sin which is consummated in a lower affect - such as of hatred, envy, and the like - depends, in the same species of fault, upon hatred or together with envy, hinges on those things which are treated in II-II, question 18, article 6, and in the treatment concerning whether the reflex act of the will be of the same malice as the interior act of the same will which it has for its object, and whether a will having hatred be of the same malice as the very act of hatred. Let this at least be certain: to him who is the cause of hatred in another, the sin of hatred is not imputed formally, but according to guilt - either in the same species of malice or in another. And from these things which we have noted, the prior conclusion of this article remains sufficiently explained, namely, that in an Angel there can be every kind of sin according to guilt.

Moreover, Cajetan endeavored to expound the mind of St. Thomas, in such a way that he understands the Doctor to have spoken not universally of whatsoever sins which can be in Angels, but of sins with which the Angels who sin first turned themselves, and from which they begin.[1875] Yet to me it still seems difficult enough to accommodate this interpretation to the mind of the holy Doctor: both because there is not at hand an efficacious reason by which we might prove that the first sin of the Angel necessarily had to be pride or envy; and also because the reason of St. Thomas seems to prove, not only of the first act, but of any other as well. For the reasoning is of this sort: in Angels there cannot be sin except spiritual - that is, about spiritual objects. But in spiritual objects there cannot be sin, while one is affected to them, unless in such an affect the rule of the superior be not observed; and this is the sin of pride, not to be subject to the superior in that in which one ought. Therefore the first sin of the Angel cannot be anything but pride; and consequently there could be in them also envy, of the same account as has been said.

Yet this reasoning - besides that, by very clear steps, it would prove in an Angel no other sin could in any way be than pride - still is not without difficulty. For not every transgression of the superior's rule is pride, since this can happen by the special sin of disobedience alone, which is a

1873. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 8.
1874. On scandal and intention, see the discussion indicated by the author at II-II, q. 18, a. 6.
1875. Cajetan.

distinct sin from pride and envy; indeed, the transgression of the rule, precisely as such, seems rather to pertain to the sin of disobedience than to pride. For the affection of pride consists, as will be explained in the following disputations, not in the proximate transgression of a rule or precept, but in an appetite of excellence beyond due measure; in which there appears a certain kind of transgression, not indeed of a rule and precept, but of the measure of one's own dignity. If, then, one were to speak...

Moreover, we shall number among these also the sin of special disobedience, which consists in a like intention, the direct intention of not obeying a superior, as we shall say at I-II, q. 73, a. 8; for by this intention the Angel could transgress the precept of God.[1876]

But as to whether a work which is the cause of sin in another, a work which is consummated in an interior affection, as hatred, envy, and the like, is in the same species as the hatred itself or as envy, depends upon what we shall say at I-II, q. 18, a. 6, where we shall treat of whether a reflex act of the will (*voluntas*) is of the same malice as the interior act of the same will which it has for its object; for example, whether the will to hate hatred is of the same malice as the very act of hatred. This is certain: he who is the cause of hatred in another is not imputed the sin of hatred formally, but according to guilt, either in the same species of malice or in another. And from these things which we have noted, the prior conclusion of this article remains sufficiently explained, namely, that in the Angel every kind of sin can exist as to guilt and affection.

However, the later conclusion, namely that other sins besides pride and envy cannot be formally in the Angel, but that only two genera of sins can be formally in him, to wit, pride and envy, in my judgment does not lack very great difficulty. First, because in an Angel there can be formally the sin of injustice, and he himself can be formally unjust: not indeed against another Angel, but against a man, not only persuading some man to something unjust, as theft and homicide, but also doing it himself, or inflicting damage on some man in domestic matters, or defaming him in reputation, or killing him against his will. Although God sometimes permits all these things, nevertheless they are sins of the Angel himself, and none of them is of pride or envy.

Then too, among the sins which are consummated within, there can be in an Angel the sin of hatred against God and the neighbor, which is contrary to charity and beneficence; but those [other sins] are of pride and envy, [which are] contrary to humility. Manifest it is that God can be held by an angel in hatred. There can also be in an angel the sin of idolatry, if he praise another Angel as his God, and pray to him as his God, and vow to him: all which, from their object, would be against religion and against the worship of the true God, transferring it to a creature; and thus it would come to idolatry.

St. Thomas defines pride in II-II, q. 162, a. 1; Isidore agrees, book 10 of the Etymologies, ch. 28, when he says: "He is called proud who wishes to seem greater than he is." Although therefore an Angel could sin only about spiritual objects - which, however, as has been said, is also difficult - nevertheless he could sin by another sin, namely disobedience, and not only by pride and envy.

1876. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 8; see also I-II, q. 18, a. 6.

Add that the sin of hatred is not evil because it exceeds some rule set and established, below which it would not be sin; rather, in whatever least degree it is sin. I confess these things to be difficult, the solution of which I would gladly hear from others.

The doctrine also seems to me difficult which the holy Doctor has in the reply, namely, that in Angels there cannot be the sin of anger, because (he says) anger is with a certain passion, which nevertheless cannot befit Angels. This, however, is no less difficult for me: both because it does not sufficiently agree with the doctrine which St. Thomas himself handed down above in question 20, article 1, to the first; and also because it seems to be against the formal definition of anger. For, as he himself says in the same place, and as we proved in disputation 84, chapter 4, to the formal notion of anger there does not pertain a stirring of passion; nor do we deny anger to God by a defect of this; but of the formal notion of anger is the appetite (*appetitus*) of vengeance, or the recrudescence for sadness on account of an evil which one has suffered from another. And according to this notion we said that it does not befit God, because he can be suffered from by no one. Since therefore an Angel can be affected by sadness by another, he can also desire vengeance for that, and accordingly be angry. But if the stirring of the body were of the notion of anger, then, in like manner, of the notion of mercy would be the same stirring; and therefore mercy would not properly befit God - which is false, as we showed there.

Furthermore, Cajetan has tried to explain the mind of St. Thomas in this way, that he is to be understood as having spoken not universally of whatever sins which can be in Angels, but of those sins which could be first, and from which the Angel who sins begins.

Yet to me it still seems difficult that this interpretation can be accommodated to the mind of the holy Doctor: both because there does not present itself an efficacious reason by which we might prove that the first sin of the angel necessarily had to be pride or envy; and also because St. Thomas's reasoning seems to prove not only about the first sin, but also about whatever other [sin]. For the reasoning is of this sort: in Angels there cannot be sin unless it be spiritual, that is, about spiritual objects; but an affection about spiritual objects cannot be sin unless such be the affection that, the rule of a superior being contemned, it be borne toward such objects. For, as Cajetan says explaining this reasoning, spiritual objects in themselves, the greater they are, the better they are; and thus in themselves they cannot be loved too much, except inasmuch as in their love the rule of a superior is contemned; but to contemn the rule of a superior is a sin of pride; therefore in Angels there can only be the sin of pride, and that which arises therefrom, which is envy.

However, this reasoning, besides that - if it is of any weight - it proves that in the Angel no other sin can in any way exist than that of pride, still does not lack difficulty. For not every transgression of the rule of a superior is pride, since this can happen by the sin of special disobedience alone, which is a distinct sin from pride and envy; indeed, a transgression of the rule, as such, pertains rather to the sin of disobedience than to pride. What sort of affection of pride it is which disdains to be subject to another will be explained in the following disputations. For the proper pride is not the transgression of a rule set by a superior in the mode of a precept, but the appetite of excellence beyond due measure; in which there appears a certain kind of transgression, not indeed of rule and precept, but of the measure of one's own dignity.

Articulus III - Whether the Angel desired to be as God

It proceeds in the third way as follows. It seems that the devil did not desire to be as God. For that which does not fall under apprehension does not fall under appetite, since an apprehended good moves appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; for it is only in appetite of this sort that sin happens. But that any creature be equal to God does not fall under apprehension: for it implies a contradiction, because it is necessary that the finite be infinite, if it be equalled to the infinite. Therefore the Angel could not desire to be as God.

Further, that which is the end of nature can be desired without sin. But to be made like to God is the end toward which every creature tends naturally. Therefore, if the Angel desired to be as God, not by equality but by likeness, it seems that in this he did not sin.

Further, the Angel was created in a greater fullness of wisdom than man. But no man, unless altogether out of his mind, chooses to be equal to an Angel, much less to God: because choice is only of things possible, about which there is deliberation. Therefore much less did the Angel sin by desiring to be as God.

But on the contrary: it is said in Isaiah 14, in the person of the devil: "I will ascend into heaven, and I will be like the Most High." And St. Augustine says in the book of Questions on the Old Testament that, puffed up with elation, he wished to be called God.[1877]

I answer: the Angel, beyond all doubt, sinned by desiring to be as God. But this can be understood in a twofold way. In one way, by equality. In another way, by likeness.

In the first way, indeed, he could not desire to be as God, because he knew this to be impossible by natural cognition. Nor did the first act of sinning in him have either habit or passion going before it, binding his cognitive power, so that, failing in a particular, he would choose an impossible thing, as sometimes happens in us. And therefore, granted even that it were possible, this would be against the natural desire: for to each thing there is a natural desire to preserve its own being; which would not be preserved if it were changed into another nature. Whence no thing which is in an inferior grade of nature can desire the grade of a superior nature, just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: because, if it were transferred into the grade of a superior nature, it would no longer be itself.

But imagination deceives in this matter. For because man desires to be in a higher grade as to some accidentals which can increase without the corruption of the subject, it is judged that he can desire a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain unless he ceased to be. But it is manifest that God exceeds the Angel not according to certain accidentals, but according to the grade of nature; and likewise one Angel [exceeds] another. Whence it is impossible that an inferior Angel should desire to be equal to a superior, much less that he should desire to be equal to God.

1877. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum.

To desire, however, to be as God by likeness happens in a twofold way. In one way, with respect to that in which a thing is born to be made like to God. And thus, if someone as to this desires to be like to God, he does not sin, provided he desires to attain the likeness of God in due order, that is, that he have it from God. But if someone were to desire, according to right order, to be like to God as though by his own power, and not by the power of God, he would sin.

In another way, one can desire to be like to God as to that in which he is not born to be made like: as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; and in such a desire there would be sin. And in this way the devil desired to be as God, not so that he should be made like as to this, namely, to be subject to none simply - for to desire this would not stand, since no creature can exist save by this, that it participates in being under God - but he inordinately desired to be like to God, because he desired as last end the beatitude to which by the power of his nature he could attain, averting his appetite from supernatural beatitude, which is of the grace (*gratia*) of God. Or, if he desired as ultimate end that likeness of God which is given by grace, he willed to have this by the power of his own nature, not by divine aid according to God's disposition. And this agrees with the sayings of Anselm, who says that he desired that to which he would have come had he stood.

And these two things in a certain way come back to the same, because according to either he desired to have final beatitude by his own power, which is proper to God. And because what is per se is the principle and cause of what is by another, from this there also followed that he desired to have some principality over others, in which too he perversely wished to be made like to God.

And by this the reply to all the objections is clear.

The prior conclusion is: The Angel did not desire to be God by nature. The later conclusion: The Angel sinned by desiring to be like God in some respect exceeding the mode of his own excellence and perfection. About which doctrine there are many controversies that must be disputed by us.

Disputatio CCXXXII - Whether the sin of the Angel was pride, or of another kind

- What Scotus and Gabriel held. Cap. I.
- The opinion of Scotus and Gabriel is impugned. Cap. 2.
- That the first sin of the Angel was pride, the true and common opinion of the Fathers and the Scholastics. Cap. 3.
- Certain testimonies of Scripture for the same opinion are weighed. Cap. 4.

We read that indeed difficult things about the first sin of the Angels have been written by the Doctors; nor is it a wonder, the matter being withdrawn from the senses and far remote from human reasoning. But because the plan of our work does not allow us wholly to decline the treatment of this topic, we shall, so far as it can be done, take pains, when inquiring into the sin of the Angels, to affirm nothing as certain except what can be gathered either from Scripture, or from

the doctrine of the Fathers, or from certain reason; but where our disputation cannot rely on one of these foundations, let us assert nothing rashly, led by mere human conjecture. For it is better ingenuously to confess the smallness of one's talent in any matter, much more in hidden ones, than to pronounce anything rashly; and since, concerning the things which in very fact happened in the sin of the Angels, bare reason without authority avails nothing, we will indeed use reason only to show in what way an Angel could sin, about which matter there is no small dissension among the Scholastics, and in it reason itself has very great weight. First, then, we must in general investigate the kind of sin by which the Angel fell. Then, in particular, we must inquire what that was in regard to which the Angel transgressed.

Now, in the present controversy, in which we investigate in general the kind of sin of the Angels, there was not one single opinion of all the Scholastics. The first opinion was that of Scotus in II, distinction 6, question 2, § Quantum ad secundum, and in IX, Ad argumenta, solution 1, who affirms that the sin of the Angels was not pride, which is constituted as a proper sin, but lust; not, as some Fathers, whom we reported above in disputation 178, chapter 2, said, thinking that the Angels burned for the daughters of men and from them begot Giants (for this opinion is with good reason exploded by all the Scholastics, as we said in that place); but spiritual lust, which consists in a certain excessive delight or desire. This is the opinion of Scotus, which Caietan reports otherwise in this article; yet the one which he himself reports is Gabriel's, which we shall adduce below.[1878]

For the confirmation and explanation of this opinion, Scotus himself notes in that question, § In ista quaestione, the doctrine received from Gabriel, to be cited below, namely, that in the acts of the will there is a twofold love: one of concupiscence, which is conversant about a thing and the good which we will for someone; the other of friendship, which regards the person for whom we will a good. He subjoins that the love of concupiscence proceeds from the love of friendship as from a prior cause. This notation premised, Scotus says that the first sin of the Angel was an excessive love of friendship, by which he loved himself, that is, a certain immoderate self-complacency. He proves it thus: an excessive love of friendship could not be toward God; for God cannot be loved immoderately by an excessive intensity: for this love cannot exceed its due mode; nor could it be immoderate in any other way. But it is likely that the Angel did not love another besides himself: therefore the first sin was an excessive love of friendship, which it pleased Scotus to call spiritual lust. He next adds that from this inordinate love of friendship there arose also an inordinate love of concupiscence, by which he desired for himself some good beyond due measure; and that this was the love of beatitude.[1879]

Cajetan, indeed, in this article judged that Scotus was of the opinion that the first sin of the Angel was pride in that immoderate affection of love of friendship; but that the second sin, properly of lust, was in that love of concupiscence. But in truth Scotus said that both the love of friendship and of concupiscence were the first sin of lust, not of proper pride; yet that by a certain common reason it can be called pride, as can plainly be seen by one who reads that § Quantum ad

1878. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 2, § "Quantum ad secundum"; and In IX, Ad argumenta, sol. 1. For the Fathers' opinion see above, Disputatio 178, cap. 2.

1879. Cajetan, In I, q. 63, art. 3, on this article, ad secundum dubium.

secundum, and in that solution of the first argument. For although Scotus says that that sin was presumption, nevertheless he does not concede it insofar as presumption is said to be the special sin of pride, but in a certain general way, inasmuch as an excessive love of oneself is wont to be called the sin of presumption. And when in that §, about the middle of it, he says that the first species of pride, which is called presumption, does not consist in this, that someone should wish to prefer himself to others, but in an appetite of excellence in oneself, that is, of one's own dignity in oneself, he does not understand that to be the proper species of pride, but to be numbered among the degrees of pride, although it is pride according to the common and general notion, as he plainly concedes in that § and in that first solution. This is Scotus's opinion faithfully reported, as far as I could gather from that place.[1880]

The foundations of that opinion are these. First, he proves that that sin of the Angel was not the sin of pride properly so called, because it is of the same nature to love oneself too much with the love of friendship and to love another too much with the same kind of love; but to love another too much is not the sin of pride; therefore neither is it to love oneself too much. Next he proves that the sin of pride is thus an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence as to be borne toward an excellence not absolutely, but relatively to others whom one desires to surpass; but the Angel did not desire an excellence relatively to others, but an excellence absolutely in himself; therefore he did not sin by the sin of pride properly. From which reasons it is plainly gathered that Scotus never held that the first sin of the Angel was the sin of pride properly so called, but only in a certain common sense.

Then he shows that the Angel's sin was the sin of lust, because this kind of sin consists in an excessive delight, such as also is wont to be that which someone takes from the speculation of some geometrical conclusion, which sin he himself calls the lust of spiritual delight. Nor does it stand in the way that Scotus himself dissolves these arguments in a mitigated fashion, so that we should not say that he was of the opinion which we have reported. For he dissolves those arguments only in order to defend that that sin was of pride, not in its proper and peculiar notion, but only commonly; and he shows that the aforesaid arguments prove nothing against this, as Lichetus notes in the place to be cited below. Wherefore he only grants that the aforesaid arguments prove that the sin of the Angels was not pride in its proper and peculiar notion; not, however, that it was not pride in the common sense. That this was Scotus's mind is gathered from the same Scotus in the questions reported in II, dist. 6, q. 1, near the end, where his opinion is thus plainly had. So also Basolus understood Scotus in II, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 5, especially in the reply to the first, in solution 5, which opinion, although he himself leaves under doubt, he nevertheless asserts can be defended. Lichetus likewise in the same distinction, question, conclusion, article 2, interprets Scotus's opinion in the same way. The same opinion was followed by Holcot in II, q. 3, when he says that the sin of the Angels can be called the sin of lust, insofar as they loved themselves too much; but insofar as they desired their own excellence, it can be called the sin of pride, indeed even the vice of ingratitude.[1881]

1880. Scotus, loc. cit., and again In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, near the end.
1881. Basolus, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, art. 5; Lichetus, eadem d., q., conclus., art. 2; Holcot, In II Sent., q. 3.

The second opinion is that of Gabriel in II, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, who, in almost the same way as Scotus, teaches that the first sin, in the order of cause, was an excessive love of friendship toward himself, according to the altitude of his own nature above the supernatural of God; or, if he desired a likeness of the divine countenance by grace, he willed to have this by the power of his own nature, not by divine assistance, as we shall say below. And the second sin, in the order of cause, was the sin of concupiscence, whereby the Angel immoderately desired for himself beatitude. Only in this does he differ from Scotus, that he asserts that first sin of love of friendship toward himself to have been pride, not in the common sense, but a special pride, diverse in species from avarice and the other vices. Nor does it stand in the way that in the third conclusion he asserts that sin to be reduced to the sin of pride, by which he seems to insinuate that it is not pride properly and directly, but (as they say) reductively; this, I say, does not stand in the way, for afterwards he expressly affirms that sin to have been a sin of special pride. Gabriel also differs from Scotus because, in conclusion 4, he says that that love of concupiscence, which was the second sin in the order of cause, was the sin of lust commonly so called, as it befits any immoderate appetite of carnal or spiritual delight; but Scotus said only that it was the sin of lust of spiritual delight, in which, in my judgment, they differ little or not at all.[1882]

Caput II - The opinions of Scotus and Gabriel are refuted

It will not be difficult manifestly to refute the opinions of Scotus and Gabriel. First indeed by the reasons of Cajetan, which fight against each in the same way; then by a peculiar reason which has force against Scotus's opinion.

- First, therefore, Cajetan argues in the preceding article, to the second doubt, against the common foundation of both opinions: that there is never found any act of love of friendship which is a pure complacency in some person unless it has mixed with it an affection of concupiscence, by which some good of the person is loved; whether that good is really distinguished from the person loved, or whether it is apprehended by reason alone as a good of that person; whether it be a future good or a present good. Nor, indeed, can one love exist without the other; rather, neither is really distinguished from the other as if it were an act toward a different object; but in the same individual act are found both the respect to the thing desired - by reason of which it is called the love of concupiscence - and the respect to the person to whom we will the good - by reason of which it is called the love of friendship. This is rightly taught also by Cajetan in I-II, q. 26, a. 4, and by St. Thomas above in q. 37, a. 3, as we noted in that article and in the book On Adoration, disputation 1, c. 6.[1883] The reason indeed is manifest: for to love is universally defined by Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 4, in this way: It is to will a good to someone; in which act it is necessary that both respects be included.[1884]

1882. Gabriel (Biel), In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3 - 4.
1883. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 26, a. 4; St. Thomas, In I, q. 37, a. 3; cf. our De adoratione, disp. 1, c. 6.
1884. Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 4.

- From this we lay down this proposition, which is common, as St. Thomas sets forth in the said places, and we also noted: that in every act of love of friendship, the complacency is not in the person taken absolutely, unless together with the will of some good for that person; indeed the complacency itself arises from this, that the person is judged good, pleasant, or useful to us, or that we judge it fitting to will some good for him: hence it is easy to see that the name "good" pleases, and "not pleasing" does not please; but a good that pleases someone is someone's good; therefore every good that pleases is a good of someone; and so in the same complacency both respects are included.
- Second, those Doctors are in error when they assert that love of friendship is compared with love of concupiscence as love of the end is compared with love of the means. For from our demonstration in I-II, q. 26, a. 1, it is plainly to be understood that the person, to whom we will some good, is loved as an end; but the good which we will for someone is loved as a means for that person's good: yet if that good be a delight, or a state, and if because of that delight or state the person is loved, then the delight is loved on account of the person; and the person is loved on account of himself, and thus the same relation of end remains. Nevertheless, both respects - of love of concupiscence and of friendship - are in the same act of love.
- Third, and rightly does Cajetan argue further, that even if love of friendship and of concupiscence were two distinct acts of love, yet they would not be two sins differing in species. For that love of friendship, by which the Angel loved himself with a mere complacency in himself, unless he also willed or desired for himself some inordinate good, no matter how intense it might be, would not be a sin (for what malice can there be from the object in a pure complacency with oneself?). Moreover, whenever some affection is not evil from its object, it cannot be evil merely because it becomes more intense: for intensity alone cannot give first malice, but can only augment a preexistent one, as we shall show in common doctrine in I-II, q. 18.[1885]
- Fourth, with their foundation removed, these Doctors say that in any genus of immoderate delight the sin of lust is found; for when delight is in venereal matters, it is called lust; but where it is not lust, if it tends toward empty praise it is the sin of vain glory; and if it tends toward excellence, it is pride. Besides these species I do not see what other species of lust can be devised. Further, delight without proportion to its object would be called lust of spiritual delectation, as Scotus seems to have spoken; but that inference is false, that such delight is sin, or if it is sin, that it is of the species of lust. For sometimes delight arises from knowledge: whence also there arises the sin of curiosity; and on the contrary, the studious pursuit of knowledge belongs to the virtue of studiosity by reason of the object, about which vice St. Thomas treats in II-II, q. 167. Therefore by the same reason, if delight should be spiritual, and according to the same measure added, there is no sin, however much the delight grows, unless there be the cause and occasion of another sin, as the desire of

1885. See below on the common doctrine: I-II, q. 18.

another's praise, or some omission of a due good; but by itself it has no other malice than that. Wherefore, although inordinate delight must be denied to be the first sin, as if standing by itself; and although, as Cajetan says, from its nature it does not of itself constitute determinate species of sin; nevertheless, those Doctors have wrongly named it lust; or at least, if it pleased them so to speak, they ought to have assigned the first sin of the Angel not according to a general notion, but in some determinate species.

Third, as Cajetan rightly argues, even if the love of friendship and of concupiscence were two different acts of love, nevertheless they would not be two sins different in species: for that love of friendship by which the Angel loves himself solely from complacency in himself, unless he should will or desire for himself some disordered good, however intense it might be, would not be sinful; for what malice could there be in a pure complacency with oneself? Moreover, as often as some affection is evil, it is evil from its object, not from becoming more intense: mere intensity cannot confer the first malice, but can only increase a prior malice, as we shall show in the First of the Second, question, article 11.

Wherefore, although in every sin the love of friendship and of concupiscence is included - because by whatever sinful affection we desire or will some good for ourselves or for others against reason - nonetheless a twofold species of sin, or a double sin, is not found, one in respect of friendship, the other in respect of concupiscence; rather, from the very good desired and from the love, insofar as it is a love of concupiscence, the species of the sin in the affection must be considered.

Fourth, I do not know on what foundation these Doctors say that, in any kind of immoderate delight whatsoever, the sin of lust is found. For although delight in venereal matters is lust, in food and drink it is not lust but gluttony; in the appetite for praise it is the sin of vain glory; in the appetite for excellence it is pride; in the appetite for a neighbor's evil it is hatred. Beyond these species I do not see what other species of lust could be devised. Moreover, the delight in knowledge - for example, in a geometrical demonstration - of which Scotus speaks, is ineptly called lust; but if that is sometimes a sin, or some similar delight in knowledge, it is so because it is against right reason and against the due mode of learning: by its object it will pertain to the sin of curiosity against the virtue of studiousness, as St. Thomas treats of that vice in II-II, question 167. But if the knowledge be according to right reason and the right mode of learning, there will be no sin, however much the delight grow, unless it be the cause and occasion of another sin, such as vain glory or the omission of a precept; then, however, it will have no other malice than that of that act. Wherefore, although we cannot deny that inordinate delight is, as it were, a genus with respect to various species of sins, just as sadness is with respect to others - which Cajetan, though by reason he refuses to concede, in fact acknowledges - nonetheless it is inept that this common ratio should be called by these Doctors "lust"; or at least, if it pleased them to use the term, they ought to have assigned the first sin of the Angel not according to a generic notion, but in some determinate

species, as indeed Scotus and Gabriel wished. However, this cannot be lust even of spiritual delectation, because in it there is found no sin of lust distinct in species from the others which are commonly assigned according to species.

Moreover, against Scotus we shall bring forward a peculiar reasoning, and we shall show him that love of one's own excellence can be the sin of pride not only in that sense in which it is commonly so called, but properly so, although in that love one's own excellence is not desired in comparison with others and in relation to others, but absolutely - which indeed Gabriel readily admits, and in this part he opposes Scotus himself. The reasoning is of this sort: pride properly consists in this, that one should crave for himself a higher degree of excellence than befits him or than can befit him according to right reason, as St. Thomas teaches in II-II, q. 162, a. 1; but this can be considered in itself absolutely, without reference to others whom he might wish to surpass. For this reason Gregory, in another enumeration of the modes of pride, puts first presumption, which happens when one thinks the good which he has he has from himself, and rejoices or delights in it so apprehended; secondly, when he thinks he has received it for his merits, and in this complacency he is pleased with himself - in which two modes there is not expressly a reference of excellence to others whom someone should desire to surpass. Therefore, Scotus wrongly denies the sin of pride in the appetite for immoderate excellence without relation to others whom someone should desire to surpass. Nor do the things which we reported from Scotus stand in the way, namely, that Scotus himself concedes in this appetite for excellence absolutely the sin of pride and of presumption: for he concedes this only according to a certain generic and common ratio, not according to the specific ratio which we contend for against himself to prove. And this suffices against the opinions of Scotus and of Gabriel. From which is also refuted that which Holcot followed, insofar as he agrees with the aforesaid. For what he added - that the sin of the Angels was the sin of ingratitude, because they did not render thanks to God for benefits - will be refuted in the following disputation.

The universal definition of loving is handed on by the Philosopher in this way: to love is to will good to someone. In this act, of course, it is necessary that both respects be included, as is manifest. Moreover, no love of complacency toward any person can exist unless either we will some good, or through that person as delightful or useful we will something for ourselves; anyone can easily know this by experience: for everything that pleases, pleases as good, and every good that pleases is some good of someone; therefore every good pleases as someone's good, and hence in every complacency toward a person that twofold respect is included. Of which we shall also speak in the First of the Second, question, article 1, against the same Gabriel and Ockham.[1886][1887] Therefore Scotus and Gabriel are wrong in enumerating as two sins and as two acts the love of friendship and of concupiscence.

Second, the aforesaid Doctors, when they assert that love of friendship is compared with love of concupiscence as love of the end is compared with love of the means, are manifestly deceived, as we shall more at large show in the First of the Second, question, article 1. Now I prove thus: the

1886. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 26, a. 4; St. Thomas, In I, q. 37, a. 3; and our De adoratione, disp. 1, c. 6.
1887. See below, in the First of the Second, question, article 1, against Gabriel and Ockham.

person for whom we will some good is the "end to whom" (finis cui); but the good which we will for him, if it be an honest or a delightful good, is the "end for the sake of which" (finis cuius gratia): for thus it is desired for the person's sake, on account of himself, and not for the sake of another good. But the "end to whom" and the "end for the sake of which" do not stand as end and means: rather, means are goods useful to the end "for the sake of which"; but the "end to whom" is necessarily conjoined with the "end for the sake of which," just as the respect of love of friendship with the respect of love of concupiscence, because there is no "end for the sake of which" unless in respect of some person for whom it is desired; for every honest or delightful good - which alone has the rationale of an end - is someone's honest or delightful good.

Note also, as is rightly taught by Cajetan in I-II, q. 26, a. 4, and by St. Thomas above at I, q. 37, a. 3, and as we have noted in this article and in our book On Adoration, disputation 1, c. 6.[1888] The reason indeed is manifest, for to love is universally defined by Aristotle in Rhetoric II, c. 4 as this: it is to will good to someone.[1889]

Caput III - The same common and true opinion: that the Angel first sinned by pride; but as to what sort that was, this will be shown later

Which sort or around what genus of excellence that was, we shall show in the following disputations.

This opinion has been handed down by the most weighty and most learned among the Scholastics - Albert in the Summa, second part, tract 5, q. 21, m. 2; Anselm of Canterbury, book 2 of the Summa, tract 2, c. 2; St. Thomas in the preceding article - and it is gathered from the doctrine of this very article, which Cajetan and more recent Thomists follow; Alexander of Hales also agrees in the second part, question 98, m. secundo, where he plainly teaches that the first sin was pride, which constitutes a special sin. But when he says that the root was cupidity and avarice, he does not mean the special sin of avarice, which is about money and spiritual things, but cupidity taken generally for inordinate love, which in truth was not the root as cause, but because in the very sin of pride it was included implicitly. The same had earlier been handed down by the Master in II, dist. 6, c. 2; which was afterwards followed by his commentators - St. Bonaventure in II, dist. 6, a. 1, q. 1; Aegidius, q. 1, a. 3, in the body, where he speaks of Lucifer, and without doubt literally, where he speaks of the others; Richard, a. 1, q. 1, where he speaks of Lucifer, and q. 2, where he speaks of the other Angels. The same is gathered from the doctrine of Durandus, question 1, article 2, when he asserts that the demon sinned by an immoderate appetite for beatitude. The same is the view of Thomas of Argentina in II, dist. 6, q. 5, a. 2, and of other Scholastics, whom we shall relate in the following disputation, who assert that the demon sinned by envy of men - a sin which, without pride, is never found.[1890]

From the Fathers, both Greeks and Latins, all agree in this one point. Among the Greeks, besides those whom we shall cite in the next chapter in the exposition of certain places of Scripture, are Athanasius in the book of Questions to Antiochus, question 14; Nazianzen in the sixth poem

1888. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 26, a. 4; St. Thomas, In I, q. 37, a. 3; and our De adoratione, disp. 1, c. 6.

and in the oration 27, which is against those who said that he sought the see of Constantinople; Elias of Crete in the third oration on Nazianzen's Apology against Julian, on those words "Quocirca," etc.; St. John Chrysostom in the homily on the words of Isaiah, and the homily on Adam and Eve, and the homily on the fall of the first man in the first tome, and the homily 15 on John in the third tome; Cyril, book 1 on Genesis, after the middle, and on Isaiah 11; St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, c. 3. Of the Latin Fathers: St. Ambrose on that of Psalm 118, "Thou hast trodden down the proud," and epistle 84; St. Augustine, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 14, and City of God, book 12, c. 1, and book 14, c. 11, and book 22, c. 1; Prosper, book 1 On the Contemplative Life, c. 3; St. Gregory, book 4 of the Moralia, c. 17 (alias 14), and book 3, c. 18 (alias 23); St. Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, c. 126, sentence 8; Bede in tome 8 of the book of Questions, q. 9; St. Anselm, book On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4; St. Bernard, sermon 17 on the Canticles; and Leo I in epistle 91, c. 6, when he says that the devil was made evil by himself, because he misused his proper excellence. The authority of all these Fathers and of the Scholastics is of great weight for me, especially in this question, which is a matter of fact and is controverted.

And although more Scriptural testimonies are wont to be adduced by the Scholastics to confirm this opinion - which must be examined by us in the following chapter - yet it has pleased me in this chapter to confirm it by one testimony only and by a single reason. The testimony is Tobit 4, where Tobias said to his son: "Never allow pride to rule in your mind or in your word, for from it all perdition took its beginning." There he said that the beginning of all sin that is committed in this world was pride. But before any other sin there was the pride of the Angel; from which it also came about that the first man, tempted by the devil, fell. And although someone could refer these words only to the sins of men - of whom pride was the first - yet it is more fitting to refer every sin, even of the Angels, since Scripture says absolutely that the beginning of all perdition was pride. But a single reason should suffice for us, taken from Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, c. 3, after the middle, where he says that Angels by their nature are scarcely able to be moved to evil. He said "scarcely" because they lack the repugnance of that lower part which inclines to evil and contrary to right reason. Elias of Crete taught the same in almost the same words in the oration on Nazianzen, which is the first Apology against Julian, on those words "At hec quomodo." Since this is so, to no sin does it seem that an Angel could be moved with less difficulty than to pride and the appetite for his own excellence. For although there can be other sins in an Angel besides the sins of pride and envy, as we noted above in article 2, nevertheless the Angel is not so easily moved to those as to pride, and consequently to envy: for that an Angel could attack a man by killing him or by destroying his property proceeds from hatred toward him; but the demon would hardly be moved to hatred against man in the first sin, unless for this reason, that he apprehended man as in some way contrary to his honor and excellence; by the same reason neither would the Angel conceive

1890. Albert the Great, Summa, II, tract. 5, q. 21, m. 2; Anselm of Canterbury, Summa, II, tract. 2, c. 2; St. Thomas, in the preceding article; Cajetan ad loc.; Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 98; the Master, II, dist. 6, c. 2; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 6, a. 1, q. 1; Aegidius, q. 1, a. 3; Richard, a. 1, q. 1 and q. 2; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2; Thomas of Argentina, II, dist. 6, q. 5, a. 2.

1889. Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 4.

hatred against God, unless he apprehended God as somehow contrary to his honor. Therefore there would have been no fault and sin in the Angel, if he had not been held by an excessive desire of his dignity and excellence.

Caput IV - Certain Scriptural testimonies are weighed for the same opinion

There are not a few testimonies of Scripture which the Scholastics use in the confirmation of this opinion, which I judged it necessary to examine more deeply. The first is Luke 10: "I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven," which words Christ seems to have said to repress the elation of the disciples, as Gregory sets forth in Moralia 23, c. 7, when they were returning rejoicing that they had cast out demons in Christ's name. However, I have proved above that to be the sense of that place in disputation 225, c. 2.[1891]

The second testimony is that of Job 41, at the end: "He sees every high thing: he is king over all the sons of pride"; which words some interpret of the demon, as if he were the prince of all those who are proud. But this place is understood literally of the great beast Behemoth (that is, Leviathan), about whom he had spoken in the preceding chapter. Of him, however, he says: that he was made so that he should fear nothing, "he sees all sublime things," that is, he looks down on all things outstanding in magnitude and strength, and as it were sees them as inferior to himself; it follows, "he is king over all the sons of pride," that is, among the robust and the powerful he himself holds the principality. He is speaking chiefly about the sea beasts, among which Behemoth occupies the first place.

Although in an Angel there can be other sins besides the sin of pride and of envy, as we noted above in article 2, nevertheless an Angel is not so easily moved to those as to pride, and consequently to envy. For that an Angel can assail a man, either by killing him or by destroying his property, proceeds from hatred against him; now the demon would with great difficulty have been moved to hatred against man in the first sin, unless for this reason, that he apprehended man as contrary to himself; and man would not have seemed contrary to him, unless he were in some way opposed to his honor and excellence. By the same reason, neither would an Angel conceive hatred against God, unless he apprehended God as in some manner contrary to his own honor. Therefore no fault and sin would have been in the Angel, unless he had been held by an excessive desire of his own dignity and excellence.

There are some testimonies of Scripture weighed in favor of the same opinion.

There are, moreover, not a few testimonies of Scripture which the Scholastics use in confirmation of this opinion, which I judged it necessary to examine more deeply. The first is Luke 10: "I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven," which words Christ seems to have said to rebuke the elation of the disciples, as St. Gregory expounds, Moral. 23, c. 7, when they returned rejoicing that they had seen demons expelled in the name of Christ. Yet I have proved above that the sense of that place is another, Disputatio 225, c. 2.[1892]

1891. Gregory the Great, Moralia 23, c. 7; see above, Disputatio 225, c. 2.
1892. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 23, c. 7; and see above, Disputatio 225, c. 2.

The second testimony is that of Job 41 at the end: "He sees every high thing; he is king over all the sons of pride." Some interpret these words of the demon, as though he were the prince of all those who are proud. But this place is understood literally of Behemoth, the great sea-monster, of which he had spoken in the preceding chapter. Concerning this he says that he was made so that he should fear none; "he sees every high thing," that is, he despises all things outstanding in greatness and strength, and as it were sees himself their superior; it follows, "he is king over all the sons of pride," that is, among the strong and the mighty he himself holds the primacy. He is speaking especially of sea beasts, among which Behemoth holds sway, as the Hebrews explain; which exposition agrees with the translation of the Seventy, which has thus: "King of all things that are in the waters." If these words be taken of the devil by accommodation, they could not from themselves prove that his first sin was pride, but only that he is king and prince among all the proud; for no one denies that now the demon sins by the sin of pride, and that among all the proud he is the proudest.

The third testimony, very celebrated among Scholastic doctors, is Isaiah 14: "How have you fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who rose in the morning? who said in your heart: I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of God I will exalt my throne; I will sit in the mount of the testament, on the sides of the North; I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the Most High." Not a few recent writers understand this place of the fall of the devil by the sin of pride from the heaven in which he was created; yet not all explain it in the same way. Some interpreters of Scripture even expound the aforesaid place so of Lucifer that it cannot be understood of any other according to the literal sense. For if we could interpret it of any other, most of all of Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon; but they prove that it cannot be understood of him, because that king did not fall from heaven, nor did he say in his heart, "I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of God I will exalt my throne," as in that testimony it is said of Lucifer. These recent writers in this explanation have followed Origen, On First Principles, book 4, c. 2, who plainly teaches that the Prophet's words cannot fit any man, but only the demon; and Tertullian, Against Marcion, book 5, c. 17, who asserts that the Prophet's words fit no one more than the demon. The remaining statements, which even seemed difficult to befit the demon, they explain thus: "I will sit on the sides of the North" signifies, "I will sit in the higher part of heaven"; "in the mount of the testament" denotes "in the Church of God," in which the demon wished to be adored as God and to be worshiped. And not only do the aforesaid Doctors wish the place cited to be understood according to the letter of the demon alone, but they even contend that the whole chapter can be explained of none other than Lucifer and of the redemption effected by Christ, but in no way of the Babylonian redemption. However, this interpretation is so devoid of foundation that it seems unworthy to linger much on its refutation; for all the other Doctors, as well ancient as recent, understand several parts at least, if not all, of that chapter of the king of Babylon. For a little before in that chapter it is said: "And it shall be in that day, when the Lord shall give you rest from your labor, and from your confusion, and from the servitude in which you formerly served, you shall take up this parable against the king of Babylon and say..." The parable indeed was: "How has the exactor ceased, the tribute ceased," etc. Who, then, will deny that the Prophet in that chapter

spoke, according to the letter, of the king of Babylon and of the redemption of the Babylonian captivity; although in figure he signified the redemption of the captivity of sin wrought by Christ? For the history of the redemption of the Babylonian captivity is so manifest that it plainly seems unworthy to deny that Isaiah predicted it.

Moreover, those words alleged above from Isaiah 14, "How have you fallen," etc., most of the Fathers understand of Lucifer: thus Origen and Tertullian in the places cited; likewise Origen, On First Principles, book 5, c. 5, and book 8 on the Epistle to the Romans on that of chapter 10, "I say then: Have they not stumbled?" And St. Gregory, book 1, epistle 3, now placed in order 30; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 4, c. 9; Athanasius, book On the Passion of Christ and the Cross; St. Ambrose on that of Psalm 118, "You have rebuked the proud," and on that of the same Psalm, "Take your servant unto good"; Prosper in the book entitled "De vocatione" (books 1 and 2); and St. Bernard in the sermon on St. Benedict the Abbot, and sermon 8 for the octave of Easter, and elsewhere very often. These Fathers, however, except Origen and Tertullian, of whom we spoke above, interpret this testimony of Lucifer in such a way that they do not deny it can also be understood of that king of Babylon.[1893]

But St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, book 2, c. 37, according to the seventh rule of Ticonius, which he himself approves, namely, concerning the devil and his body (for the devil is the head of the impious), expounds this testimony of Lucifer under the figure and person of the king of Babylon, of whom Lucifer himself was the head: just as those things which belong to the body of the Church are attributed to Christ according to the first rule of the same Ticonius; in the same way, those things which belong to the king of Babylon as a member of the devil, are attributed also to the devil himself.[1894] Yet that which follows in the same chapter, according to the reading of the Augsburg edition, "He is broken on the earth who sent unto all nations" - but according to the Vulgate, "You have fallen to the earth, you who wounded the nations" - Augustine himself explains of the body of the devil alone, not of the devil himself. With Augustine agree Jerome and Haymo on that place, who understand it literally of the king of Babylon, but by figure of Lucifer. The same was altogether taught by Augustine himself, On Genesis ad litteram, book 11, c. 24, where he expressly proves that those words, said under the figure of the king of Babylon, fit Lucifer by reason of his body; and the Author of the first book On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture, among the works of Augustine, in tome 3, c. 2, plainly teaches that from that place the fall of the devil and its occasion are not proved, because the historical narration is understood of the king of Babylon, but by allegory, he says, and figure, it is transferred from the body to the head. Jerome, however, expounds this testimony of Lucifer only by figure, or parable, because the Prophet says, "You shall take up this parable," as we have cited above. Finally, Haymo interprets these words only in a

1893. Origen, On First Principles 5, c. 5; Origen, Homilies on Romans 8, on Romans 10: "Dico ergo: numquid non offenderunt"; St. Gregory the Great, Epist. 1.3 (now numbered 30); Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 4.9; St. Athanasius, On the Passion of Christ and the Cross; St. Ambrose, Expositio in Psalmum 118 (on "Increpasti superbos" and "Suscipe servum tuum in bonum"); Prosper, De vocatione (books 1 - 2); St. Bernard, Sermon on St. Benedict the Abbot; Sermon 8 in the Octave of Easter.

1894. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana 2.37, receiving the seventh rule of Ticonius concerning the devil and his body.

mystical sense; nor do either Jerome or Haymo say that such a figurative sense is expressed by the Holy Spirit. To all these there is to be added St. Cyril on that chapter of Isaiah in the words, "But you were saying," etc., who, after he had explained the whole prophecy of the king of Babylon, subjoins: "One may adapt, and very deservedly, these things which were said historically, by a certain accommodation, to the dragon, I mean the prince of evils" - namely, in this following the rule of Ticonius, which Augustine also embraced.[1895] From which it is clear that from this place, when it is explained according to the letter and history, the sin of Lucifer is not gathered, but only by a certain kind of application or figure, as the aforesaid Fathers have taught, and as Adam notes on that place, who learnedly warned, against Jerome, that this figurative sense, by which we apply these words to Lucifer, is not rightly collected from the Prophet's saying, "You shall take up a parable," etc. For "parable" in Scripture does not always signify a similitude containing a parabolic sense, but sometimes is called a tale or a proverb of the common people used in derision, as Psalm 68: "I am made to them a parable," that is, they used me as a proverb, for my reproach; and 2 Paralipomenon 7: "The house which I have built I will make into a parable." In like manner Job 17 says, "He has set me for a proverb of the people." In the same sense the Prophet Isaiah said, "You shall take up this parable against the king of Babylon." For the king of Babylon was in derision of all, when the people captive under his power was set free, and all, hissing, said: "How has the exactor ceased?"

It remains to show briefly that each of the prophetic words fits rightly in the king of Babylon, and that there is none which cannot fit him. For if there were any which could not be understood of him, most of all those, "I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of God I will exalt my throne; I will sit in the mount of the testament, on the sides of the North," would be of that sort. These, however, as Adam rightly expounds, wonderfully fit the king of Babylon. First, he is aptly called Lucifer, that is, the herald of the dawn; for Lucifer is that morning star which by brightness very much excels the rest. By this name the Prophet, by a metaphor, addresses the king of Babylon, to denote the splendor of his dignity, just as if we were to call a king or emperor the very bright Sun, or the star of Europe or of some other region. Nor in the least does it hinder this exposition that these words are used by a metaphor. For if we applied the same to the demon, they would have to be understood only by a metaphor. The sense, therefore, is: You, who are the king of Babylon, who were most illustrious like the Sun and the most shining morning star, have fallen from your kingdom and majesty, after the manner of stars, which seem to men to fall from heaven. But the words, "I will ascend into heaven," Adam judges to have been said by hyperbole, as also, "I will ascend above the height of the clouds": as if that king were saying, I, as far as shall be possible, will strive to exalt the throne of my kingdom. But when it is said, "I will sit in the mount of the testament, on the sides of the North," it signifies that king's excessive desire of ruling: for he desired to occupy the citadel of Jerusalem, which was called Sion, which for that reason he called "the mount of the testament," because it was on the mount in which the temple was, in which the ark of the testament was; and since that was toward the northern region, it is rightly also said, "on

1895. St. Cyril of Alexandria, on Isaiah 14: "Tu autem dicebas," adapting the historically spoken words to the dragon, the prince of evils, according to the rule of Ticonius.

the sides of the North." For of the same city Sion it is said in Psalm 47: "Mount Sion, the sides of the North, the city of the great King," where all those are set by apposition as epithets of the city Sion.

Let the last testimony be that of Ezekiel 28: "You the seal of the likeness of God, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; in the delights of the paradise of God you were: every precious stone was your covering, sardius, topaz, jasper," and below, "And your apertures on the day you were made were prepared; you a Cherub outstretched and protecting: I placed you on the holy mount of God; you walked in the midst of the fiery stones; perfect were you in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you." And describing the sort of sin and iniquity of him, the Prophet says: "In the multitude of your traffic your inner parts were filled with iniquity, and you have sinned." And below: "And your heart was lifted up in your beauty," etc. This place St. Gregory interprets of the demon, Moral. 23, c. 18 (also c. 24 and 25); Tertullian, Against Marcion, book 2, c. 10; and Origen, On First Principles, book 1, c. 5; indeed Tertullian and Origen so expound it of the devil that they think it cannot be understood literally of any man, because, says Tertullian, no man was born in the paradise of God; and because all those words which we have recited cannot fit any man. But St. Ambrose, in the book De paradiso, c. 2, St. Jerome, and Theodoret, explain that place of Ezekiel itself according to the literal sense of the prince of Tyre, but figuratively of the devil: which is recommended to us by the words placed at the beginning of the chapter: "Son of man, say to the prince of Tyre: Thus says the Lord God: Because your heart is lifted up, and you have said, I am God, I sit in the seat of God, in the heart of the sea; whereas you are a man and not God; and you have given your heart as the heart of God," etc.; and again, "Son of man, take up a lamentation over the king of Tyre, and say: Thus says the Lord: You the seal of the likeness, full of wisdom," and the rest which we have cited above. Surely these words are so manifest that no one, unless rashly, could deny that the Prophet is speaking with the prince of Tyre. For if he had wished to speak with him, I know not how he could have signified it more clearly. And since the other things which we cited at the beginning can very well be interpreted of the very king of Tyre, there is no reason why we should take refuge in metaphors, understanding the aforesaid words only of the devil and Lucifer. And this will be made manifest, if we explain each of the following words, which seem to have difficulty, of the prince of Tyre himself.

First, when the Prophet says, "You the seal of the likeness," he exalts him, so that thereafter he may appear the more pitiable. He calls him the "seal," that is, the signet and exemplar expressed by God, in order to show his power, greatness, and wisdom. Secondly, "In the paradise of God you were," that is, in a place of delights and in great abundance of things; which words, properly speaking, fit a man rather than an Angel: for the Angels were not in paradise, but established in heaven. Thirdly, "Every precious stone was your covering," that is, you were adorned with gems and precious garments. Fourthly, "And your apertures on the day you were born were prepared," that is, the laces or openings of your garments, from the day you were born, were joined with gems and adorned; or he understands the pits in which gold and gems were enclosed. Fifthly, "You a Cherub outstretched and protecting," that is, you were as it were a Cherub who with his wings protected the ark of the testament. For you spread your power and your name far and wide, and

you defended your city, as it were the ark of the testament, from enemies, with the wings of your power. Sixthly, "I placed you on the holy mount of God," that is, you were on your island Tyre, as if you were placed like a Cherub on Mount Sion. For oftentimes in Scripture the particle "as" or the particle "as it were" must be supplied; or by the "holy mount of God" he understands the island of Tyre itself, which more agrees with what follows. Seventhly, "You walked in the midst of fiery stones," that is, you went forth adorned with shining gems. Eighthly, "And I cast you out from the mount of God, and I destroyed you, O Cherub," that is, from your flourishing estate in which I placed you; and from the midst of the gems with which you went forth adorned I hurled you down. But the earlier words, "Because your heart was lifted up, you have said, I am God," are understood as spoken by hyperbole, in order to express that prince's excessive pride and arrogance, so that he seemed to esteem himself as a god; not, however, that he uttered such words. Therefore, since we have on our side the testimonies of the Fathers whom we have cited, and since all the words fit aptly the very prince of Tyre, we shall, without any foundation, refuse to understand them of him, especially since at the beginning of the chapter and thereafter the Prophet directed his words to the prince himself.

To all these add St. Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram, book 11, c. 25, where he expressly strives to prove that the aforesaid testimony cannot be understood of the demon.[1896]

The place Ezekiel 28: "You are the seal of the likeness of God, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; in the delights of paradise you were; every precious stone was your adornment, Sardius, Topaz, Jasper, ..." and below: "And your perforations were prepared on the day on which you were created; you, the outspread Cherub protecting; I set you on the holy mountain of God; in the midst of fiery stones you walked; perfect were you in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you"; and describing, moreover, the kind of sin and iniquity, the Prophet says: "In the multitude of your trafficking your inner parts were filled with iniquity, and you sinned." And further on: "And your heart was lifted up in your beauty," etc. This passage is interpreted of the demon by St. Gregory, book 23 of the Moralia, chapters 18 (elsewhere 24) and 25; by Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, chapter 10; and by Origen, book 1 of the Periarchon, chapter 5. Indeed, Tertullian and Origen so expound it of the devil as to judge that it can be understood to the letter of no man, because, says Tertullian, no man was born in the paradise of God; and because all those words which we have recited cannot fit any man.[1897]

But St. Ambrose in the book De paradiso, chapter 2, St. Jerome, and Theodoret explain the place of Ezekiel itself according to the literal sense of the prince of Tyre, but figuratively of the devil; which the words set at the beginning of the chapter persuade us to do: "Son of man, say to the prince of Tyre, Thus says the Lord God: Because your heart is lifted up, and you have said, I am God, I sit in the seat of God in the heart of the sea; whereas you are a man and not God; and you have set your heart as the heart of God," etc.; and again: "Son of man, take up a lamentation over

1896. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.24 - 25; Pseudo-Augustine, De mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae, book 1 (tome 3), c. 2; St. Ambrose, De paradiso c. 2; St. Jerome, Commentaries on Ezekiel 28; Theodoret, In Ezechielem; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 23, cc. 18, 24 - 25; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 2.10; Origen, De principiis 1.5.

1897. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 23, cc. 18, 24 - 25; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 2.10; Origen, De principiis 1.5.

the king of Tyre, and you shall say: Thus says the Lord, You are the seal of likeness, full of wisdom," and the rest which we have recited above. These words truly are so manifest that no one, unless rashly, could deny that the Prophet is speaking to the prince of Tyre. For if he wished to speak with him, I know not how he could have signified it more clearly in any other way. And since the other things which we cited at the beginning can most fittingly be interpreted of the king of Tyre himself, there is no reason why we should take refuge in metaphors, understanding the words said above only of the devil and Lucifer. But this will be made manifest if we explain one by one the following words, which seem to have difficulty, of the prince of Tyre himself. First, when the Prophet says, "You are the seal of likeness," he extols him, that thereafter he may appear the more wretched.

Further exposition of Ezekiel 28 concerning the prince of Tyre

Moreover he calls him a seal, that is, an image and exemplar expressed by God, to point out his power and greatness and wisdom. Secondly, it is said, "You were in the paradise of God," that is, in a place of delight with great abundance of things; which fit a man rather than an Angel according to propriety; for Angels were not in paradise, but were established in heaven. Thirdly, "Every precious stone was your adornment," that is, you were adorned with precious stones and garments. Fourthly, "And your perforations were prepared on the day on which you were born," that is, the doors of the tower, or the slits of garments, on the day on which you were born, were joined to the gems and were fittingly adjusted; or he understands the sockets in which also the gems were set. Fifthly, "You, the outspread Cherub protecting," that is, you were as it were a Cherub who with his wings protected the Ark of the Testament. For you enlarged your power and propagated your name, and defended your city as the Ark of the Testament from enemies by your power. Sixthly, "I set you on the holy mountain of God," that is, you were on your island, as if you were set like a Cherub in Zion. For oftentimes in Scripture the particle "as" is to be understood, or the particle "like," or by "the holy mountain of God" the island of Tyre itself is understood; which agrees with what follows. Seventhly, "In the midst of fiery stones you walked," that is, you went forth adorned with glittering things. "And I cast you out from the mountain of God, and I destroyed you, O protecting Cherub," that is, I threw you down from your flourishing state, and I cast you out from the midst of gems, among which you walked adorned. Those earlier words, "Because your heart was lifted up, you said, I am God," are spoken by hyperbole, to express the pride and arrogance of that prince, as if he held himself to be seen as God; not, however, that he spoke like words. Since therefore we have on our side the testimonies of the Fathers whom I have related, and all the words aptly agree to the very prince of Tyre, we shall not without any foundation deny that they are to be understood of him, especially since at the beginning of the chapter and thereafter throughout the Prophet directs the words to that prince himself. To these add St. Augustine, the books De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 25, where he strives earnestly to prove that the aforesaid passage cannot be understood of the demon.[1898]

1898. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.25.

Disputatio CCXXXIII - Whether the Angel sinned by desiring the hypostatic union with God, or by envying it to man

Angel to have sinned by the appetite of the hypostatic union, and by envy of it, is what certain more recent authors maintain. Caput I.

Angel to have been able to sin by the appetite of the union, but not to have sinned: the truer opinion holds. Caput II.

Caput I - The opinion that the Angel sinned by the appetite of the hypostatic union, or by envying it to man

With the kind of sin already explained in the preceding disputation, by which the Angel first fell, it remains that we investigate that, by the immoderate appetite of which he fell into the sin of pride. Now since that kind of sin consists in the appetite of one's own excellence beyond the due measure, it is beyond doubt that it could have happened not in one, but in many ways. In what way, however, it happened, no one can so easily define. Therefore, as we run through the individual ways, we shall show two things: first, what it was possible for an Angel to desire; for even about this no light controversy will at times occur. Then, by the appetite of what excellence he first sinned.

Concerning the proposed controversy there have been various opinions of Theologians. The first is of those who said that the Angel not only could have sinned, but also did sin by the appetite of the hypostatic union, whereby he desired his own nature to be united to the divine person, and at the same time transgressed by envy of the union of the human nature with the Word. The authors of this opinion were Catherinus in the little work On the glory of the good Angels and the fall of the bad, and on that Genesis 3, "The serpent was more crafty"; Jacobus de Valentia on Psalm 82 explaining those words, "Arise, O God, judge the earth," etc.; Viguerius in the Theological Institutions, chapter three, question two, verse 15; there is also alleged in favor of this opinion by some Jacobus Naclantus on the Epistle to the Ephesians; and Alexander, third part, question two, m. 13; and, which is capital, St. Bernard, sermon 17 on the Canticle.[1899] But Alexander and Bernard in those places teach only that Lucifer sinned by envy of the union of the human nature with the Word. Yet it could happen that the Angel envied the hypostatic union granted to man, even if he did not desire it for himself. For envy can arise merely from this, that someone is saddened at another's good, even if he does not desire it for himself, but elsewhere delights excessively in his own excellence, desiring that it not be diminished by a greater excellence in another: therefore the Angel could, desiring that by his own nature and excellence he be placed over all men as their teacher, envy man the dignity granted from the hypostatic union. And thus only, says Bernard, the demon took ill the mystery of the Incarnation, and said, "To what purpose is this waste?" as if he said that the Divine Word was to be incarnate in vain for the restoration of men. Wherefore, in the

1899. St. Ambrose Catharinus, De gloria bonorum Angelorum et lapsu malorum; idem on Genesis 3; Jacobus de Valentia on Psalm 82; Viguerius, Institutiones theologicae, cap. 3, q. 2, v. 15; Jacobus Naclantus on Ephesians; Alexander (third part, question 2, m. 13); St. Bernard, Sermon 17 on the Canticle.

same sermon Bernard affirms only that the Angel desired to preside over men as their teacher, and for that reason said, "To what purpose is this waste," etc. Bernard himself is also cited to this in the first sermon on the Advent of God; but neither there did he teach such a thing. He only said that man and the Angel sinned by the proud appetite of equality of knowledge and of the wisdom of God; which things being attributed to the Son, Bernard brings in the very Son of God saying, "If for my sake this storm has arisen, cast me into the sea," namely, of the human flesh which he assumed. Nor did William of Paris in the book De universo, first part of the second of the principal parts, from chapter 106 to 110, nor Dionysius the Carthusian in the second book, distinction five, question one, teach anything else, who are reported in favor of this opinion, than that which Bernard said in that sermon 17.[1900] Finally, Rupert is wont to be cited for the same opinion, book 8 on John, near the end, on that of chapter 8, "He was a murderer from the beginning." There, however, he only says that the devil sinned by the sin of hatred against Christ as soon as he knew the mystery of the Incarnation, and thereafter contrived his death, and for that reason was said to be a murderer from the beginning.[1901]

This opinion is approved by some more recent Theologians, and in the Schools is not a little plausible. Moreover, it can be confirmed by testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers. First, Catherinus gathers it from that place to the Hebrews 1: "And again, when he brings the first-begotten into the world, he says, Let all the Angels of God adore him." Paul says "again," because the eternal Father had already once brought in Christ and set him forth to be adored by the Angels, when from the beginning he revealed this mystery to them. Therefore the eternal Father brought in Christ again when truly he sent him to be incarnate. Therefore, in that former proposition and revelation Lucifer and his Angels, unwilling to adore Christ and to subject themselves to him, sinned. Then it can be proved in this way: from the common doctrine of the Fathers it is certain that the demon sinned by envy of men; but it is more probable that he sinned before man was created, as we noted from the opinion of Isidore, Cyprian, and Bede in disputation 229, chapter 11. Nor ought we to think that the Angel sinned by envy of human excellence according to its own proper nature. For by what reason would the demon envy that man was created to the image and likeness of God? for thus he would more easily envy another Angel. Therefore it is more plausible that the demon sinned by envy of human dignity, which he foresaw would be raised to the dignity of hypostatic union, rather than by envy of man's natural excellence. Moreover, that the Angel sinned by envy of human dignity, more and graver Fathers bear witness: Cyprian in the little work On zeal and envy, a little from the beginning, affirms this in these words: "What an evil it is, brethren most beloved, by which the Angel fell, by which that lofty and eminent sublimity could be circumvented and overthrown, by which he himself was deceived who deceived; whence thereafter envy runs riot on earth, while one who is to perish with the lynx's eye obeys the Master of perdition: while he imitates the devil who is jealous; as it is written, By the envy of the devil death entered into the world." And Irenaeus, book 4 against heresies, chapter 78, explaining that of

1900. William of Paris, De universo, prima pars secundae partis principalis, cc. 106 - 110; Dionysius the Carthusian, book 2, dist. 5, q. 1.

1901. Rupert of Deutz, In Ioannem, book 8, on John 8:44 ("He was a murderer from the beginning").

Matthew 13, "An enemy has done this," teaches the very same: "From then on" (he says) "the Angel is apostate and an enemy, from the time when he was jealous of the formation of God's handiwork, and undertook to make that thing an enemy to God." Tertullian agrees in the book On patience, chapter 5, where he teaches that the devil bore it impatiently when he saw man made by God to his likeness, and from this impatience he envied: whether indeed he was evil before he was impatient, he does not wish to inquire; wherefore he does not determine whether envy was the first sin. The same is taught by St. Basil in the homily On envy, a little from the beginning, and by St. Gregory of Nyssa in the Catechetical Oration, chapter 6, before the middle; to all of whom add Bernard in the place alleged above. Their opinion St. Augustine recounts, book 11 of the Literal Genesis, chapter 14, and he does not disapprove it, but only warns that, if thus the Angel sinned, envy arose from pride, not the other way round.[1902]

The second opinion, altogether opposed to this, is of certain more recent writers, who affirm that the Angel could not have sinned by the proud appetite of the hypostatic union. They confirm it by a twofold reason. First, because if the Angel had desired for his own proper nature, in another individual, the hypostatic union, he would have desired his own destruction; but this it is not possible to desire unless some error first precede in the intellect. But in the intellect of the Angel no error could be; therefore neither such a desire. Catherinus, following the opinion of Scotus, who asserts that a person above nature in creatures adds nothing real but only a negation, replies that even if the Angel had desired the hypostatic union, he would not have desired any corruption of himself, but only the supplement of a certain negation. But because, as we shall show in the third part, question four, article two, a person above nature does not only add a negation, but also a positive mode per se, the aforesaid argument still seems to retain its force. Then they prove the aforesaid opinion because in the desire of such sanctity there does not seem to be sin: for who could not desire the highest degree of sanctity, which is through the hypostatic union, if he desired it and expected to have it from him who could confer it, unless some positive precept stood in the way? But no precept was imposed on the Angel - it is manifest, since none is known - and by the nature of the matter there was no such precept. Nay rather, those Doctors add that, if such a precept had existed, the Angel could not have sinned by the sin of pride, but by another kind of sin; because the sin of pride is conversant only about one's own excellence.

Caput II - The truer opinion: the Angel could have sinned by the appetite of the union, yet did not

A middle way seems to me much more probable, and safer. First indeed, let us say against the second opinion, that the Angel could have sinned by the proud appetite of the hypostatic union. Then, let us say that by this appetite he did not sin at the first when he fell from heaven and from that most happy state. To establish each of these will not require much labor. As to the first part,

1902. St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 4.78; Tertullian, De patientia 5; St. Basil, Homily on envy; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica 6; St. Bernard, loc. cit.; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.14.

two things must be proved for us: first, that nothing stood in the way by reason of which the Angel could not desire such a union; second, that in such an appetite there could have been the sin of pride. These two things, once proved together, overthrow the foundations of the second opinion.

Therefore, that such an appetite was possible to the Angel is shown thus. If anything had hindered the Angel from being able to desire this union, that would chiefly have been lest he should aim at his own destruction; which without error - of which the Angel is not capable - he could not do. But in fact this would have stood in the way not at all. First, because by such an appetite the Angel would not have desired the corruption of his nature, but only a certain mode which we call perfection; that is, he would have desired that his nature not exist "of itself" and "in itself": but this the Angel could have desired without error; since it is better for the nature of each thing to exist in the Word than to exist in itself alone by itself. Moreover, that there can inhere in the Angel an appetite of some excellence, from which there would necessarily arise the "destruction," that is, the not-being of his own nature, without any error in the intellect, we shall show more fully in the following disputation, chapter two. Nothing therefore would have stood in the way whereby the Angel could not have desired the hypostatic union, if he were to desire it and expect to have it from him who could confer it, unless some positive precept stood in the way; but no such precept was imposed on the Angel, as is manifest since none is known, and by the nature of the case there was no such precept. Nay rather, the aforesaid Doctors add that, if such a precept had existed, the Angel could not have sinned by the sin of pride, but by another kind of sin; because the sin of pride is conversant only about one's own excellence. Nothing, therefore, would stand in the way ...

First indeed, if we say, against the second opinion, that an angel certainly could have sinned by the proud appetite for the hypostatic union. Next, if we say that by this appetite he did not sin at the first moment when he fell from heaven and from that most happy state. To confirm each part will not be laborious.

As to the first part, two things must be proved for us: one is that nothing hinders an angel from being able to desire such a union; the other, that in such an appetite there could have been the sin of pride. By proving these two together, we shall undermine the two foundations of the second opinion.

Therefore, that such an appetite was possible for an angel is shown thus. If something stood in the way, so that the angel could not desire this union, that would most of all be lest he should aim at his own destruction, which without error (of which an angel is not capable) he could not do. But in fact this would not hinder: both because by such an appetite the angel would not have desired the corruption of his nature, but only a certain mode which we call of personality, that is, he would have desired that his nature not be per se and in se; and this an angel could have desired without error, since for the nature of any given thing it is better to be in the Word than to be in itself alone and per se. Then too, an angel could have had an appetite for some excellence from which there would necessarily arise the destruction or the non-being of what is proper to his own nature, without any error in the intellect; in the subsequent dispute, in the next chapter, second, we shall

show this more at length. Therefore nothing would hinder an angel from having desired the hypostatic union: which we had proposed first to be proved, in confirmation of the first part of our position. Whence also the prior reason of the second opinion remains weakened.

Moreover, that in such an appetite for union there could be the sin of pride is proved. First indeed, if a precept had been imposed, not to desire such an excellence; then it is altogether manifest that the appetite for that would be a sin of pride - so much so that I do not at all understand on what basis those more recent authors affirmed the opposite: for the sin of pride is not in an excessive appetite for natural excellence, that is, for what naturally befits us, as those Doctors seem to assert. Rather, in the appetite for this thing there does not seem to be sin, since then a man desires only that which naturally befits him - unless he should desire it in contempt of others; for the desire of this perfection seems to be within the bounds and measure of reason. But the sin of pride is rather in the appetite for an excellence that does not naturally befit one: for he who desires that beyond measure seems to desire the dignity of an excellence, which is proper to pride; nor would it be any less, indeed it would be a much greater, kind of pride to desire the dignity of a divine excellence. Wherefore, since the devil could, under this ratio, desire the hypostatic union, he could also sin proudly in the desire of it.

I grant indeed that one could, with a moderated affection and according to right reason, desire the hypostatic union of his nature with God - not out of envy, and not that he might be over others, but that he might be joined to God in a closer mode of holiness and impeccability. If, however, he were to desire such a dignity either contrary to a positive precept, or out of an affection that he might excel others - even if there were no positive precept forbidding such an appetite - it would indeed be a sin of pride. This is clear by natural right: because here there would be an appetite for one's own excellence, not indeed for that which would naturally befit the one desiring, but for that which someone would desire as proper to himself. And this is understood when pride is defined as an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. By positive law too this is manifest: because a positive law, whatever it forbids, constitutes within it the nature of some particular vice; and its transgression is not a special sin of disobedience, unless it be done with the expressed intention of transgressing the precept with contempt, as we shall show in I-II, question 73, article 8, from the doctrine of St. Thomas; and consequently a simple transgression of a positive precept ought to be weighed according to the nature of the matter. And since the appetite for union is an appetite for excellence, if it be against the precept, it will be a sin of pride. From these considerations the later reason of the second opinion remains dissolved, and the former part of our position is sufficiently confirmed.

The latter part of our position, namely, that the angel did not sin by the appetite for the hypostatic union, can also be proved in two ways. First, by an argument taken from the common doctrine which, in the Third Part of St. Thomas, question 8, article 4, will be more fully confirmed by us: namely, that Christ was not predestined in the order of divine foreknowledge prior to the justification and sin of the angels. For in the order of cause, or of occasion, the foreknowledge of Adam's sin was prior to the predestination of Christ. And since the sin of the angels was, in the order of cause, prior to the sin of the first parents - because the first parents were driven to sin by

the devil's temptation - it follows that the predestination of Christ, in divine foreknowledge according to the order of cause or of occasion, was later than the sin itself of the angels, by which they first fell. But if the angel had first sinned from envy of Christ and of the hypostatic union of the human nature with God, the predestination of Christ to come would be prior to the sin of the angels, and consequently to the sin of the first parent: which is against what we have supposed. For then Christ to be would, in the order of cause, precede as the matter about which the sin of envy would be conversant; nor indeed is it to be believed that the angel sinned with envy of a union apprehended only under opinion, if he sinned with this kind of envy and pride, but with envy of the union of the human nature in the Word already revealed by faith. And since that sin, in the order of cause, would presuppose the revelation and the thing revealed as future, it would follow that, prior in the order of cause in divine foreknowledge, there was Christ to come, rather than the sin of the angels and of the first parents. This is the most weighty reason for this part of our position.

For what some more recent authors say against it - that it is the common opinion of the Fathers asserting that the sin of the angels was pride, as we saw in the preceding disputation, and therefore that they did not sin from envy of the Incarnation - is of no moment. For if the angels had sinned in that way, the common doctrine of the Fathers, who say that their sin was pride, could also be saved: because in the appetite for the hypostatic union there would be pride, as we explained above.

Moreover, the same part of our position will be confirmed when we shall have shown that no testimony adduced in favor of Catharinus's opinion has any weight. And indeed the testimony of Scripture, which the adversaries greatly esteem, is, for two reasons, weak and has no weight at all. First, because the particle "Again," when it is said, "And when again he introduces the first-begotten," etc., does not signify a second introduction of Christ into the sight of the angels, as if it supposed some other prior introduction; but, as Adamus rightly notes, the particle "Again" is of one citing another testimony: wherefore it does not pertain to the testimony alleged itself. As if Paul were saying, as Erasmus renders it, "And again, when he introduces," etc. - that is, "And in another place of Scripture, when he introduces the first-begotten," etc., he says, "And let all his angels adore him." Wherefore also the Greek interpreters do not expound the particle "Again" as if they saw that it pertained to the testimony cited itself.

Then also, even if we were to concede that that particle pertains to the testimony, and that there were two introductions of Christ before the angels - one in the beginning, when the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to them by faith before they sinned, the other when the thing itself occurred in time, when he was incarnate - thence it does not follow that the angels sinned from envy of the Incarnation and by the proud appetite of the hypostatic union of their nature with the Word: for this is not said in that testimony; but from it only this can be gathered, that an angel could indeed have sinned by that kind of sin, which we do not deny. Add that Genebrard interprets that Psalm 96, from which Paul cited the testimony, of the last coming of Christ, when he will come to judge: with which sense the exposition cannot stand that the adversaries followed in order to uphold the aforesaid opinion.

I am amazed, moreover, that the testimonies of the holy Fathers whom we have cited are alleged for this opinion: for although all, except Tertullian, speak of the first sin of the angel, by which he became apostate, nevertheless none of them said that the sin of the angel was an appetite of pride for the hypostatic union, or envy of the Incarnation; but only that he sinned from envy of human dignity, in that he had seen a corporeal creature created to the image and likeness of God, namely a participant in reason and free will. Wherefore, according to the opinion of these Fathers, the angel did not sin before the first parent was created; nor ought it to be reckoned impossible that an angel could have sinned from envy of human dignity, namely that man was created to the likeness of God. And he would be more easily moved by this affection than by envy of another angel, since he would see a man far inferior to himself created in so great a dignity. But whether the angel would more easily have sinned through envy of the Incarnation, since he would see this to be the greatest dignity of all, cannot easily be determined: for since the affection of sin depends very much on the manner in which the object is proposed on the part of the intellect, human dignity could certainly be more efficaciously proposed as contrary to the angel - since it is natural to man and common to all men - than the dignity of the Incarnation, which was not natural to human nature nor common to all human natures. Since these things are so, and the holy Fathers cited for this opinion made no mention of any other envy-sin than the aforesaid, the adversaries cannot use their testimony to confirm this opinion.

But as to what the Author of De mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae says, cited under the name of Augustine, book 1, chapter 2, that an angel could not have sinned by the affection of envy of human dignity unless he himself had lost his own by sin: I do not see how that is true; for in either way the angel could have sinned: who can doubt it?

Angel could not have sinned by an appetite for equality of nature with God, not a few have taught. cap. 1.

Others of the Schoolmen probably judge that it was equality with God according to nature. cap. 2.

That the angel sinned by an appetite for equality with God according to essence is not certain. cap. 3.

Disputatio CCXXXIV - Whether the angel sinned by the proud appetite of equality with God

Caput I - Not a few have taught that an angel could not sin by an appetite for equality of nature with God

No small part of the common opinion among the Schoolmen and the Fathers is that the angel sinned by the proud appetite of some equality with God. This is taught by all the Schoolmen whom we shall cite in this disputation; and among the Fathers, St. Ambrose on that Psalm 118, "Thou hast rebuked the proud," and Epistle 84, before the middle; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 27, which is

addressed to those who said he was hankering after the Constantinopolitan chair, and poem 6; and his commentator Elias of Crete on Oration 3, which is the first invective against Julian, explaining those words, "Wherefore with power," etc.; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 3 on the words of Isaiah, after the middle, in tome 1; St. Gregory the Great, book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 17 (elsewhere 14); Isidore, book 1 De summo bono, chapter 12, sentence 8; Bede, tome 8, in the Books of Questions, question 9; St. John Damascene, book 2 De fide, chapter 4, when he says that the devil "exalted himself against his Maker God and wished to rebel against him": which is the same as to have aimed at some equality with God.[1903]

But among the Schoolmen there is no small controversy whether the angel sinned by an appetite for equality with God according to nature, or only according to some likeness. Of these, not a few say that the angel could not sin by an appetite for equality with God according to nature, but only according to likeness. Thus teach St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the recent Thomists on this article; and the same holy Doctor in De malo, question 16, article 3; Alexander, II Pars, question 98, member 3; Albert in II, dist. 5, question 2, article 3; St. Bonaventure, article 1, question 2; Giles, question 1, article 2; Hervaeus, question 1, article 3; Durandus, question 1, no. 13; Marsilius, in II, question 5, article 2, conclusion 7; Capreolus, in II, distinction 4, question 1, article 10, conclusion 2, and article 3, in the solutions.[1904]

But on the contrary: William of Paris argues against the foregoing in the First Part, Second Principal Part, On the Universe, cap. 109.[1905]

The first reason for this opinion is of this sort. The demon was not so dull of wit that he did not see it was impossible for him to attain equality with God according to nature: therefore he could not will and desire that; for no one desires what he sees to be impossible; or it must be said that there was an error in the angel's mind about this matter, which is not to be believed. For which reason Anselm employed the words in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter four: "If God cannot be thought except as so uniquely one that nothing like unto Him can be thought, how could the devil will what he could not judge? For he was not of so obtuse a mind as not to know that nothing else like unto God could be thought."[1906]

But if someone were to say that the will also can be of impossibles, as Aristotle teaches in the third book of the Ethics, chapter two,[1907] against this we can first object what Aristotle himself says in the same chapter, that the will indeed can be of impossibles - this is the simple affection, which some call velleity - whereas choice, however, cannot be of impossibles; but the angel sinned by a will of choice, because by a free will: therefore he could not sin by desiring equality with God.

1903. St. Ambrose, on Psalm 118; Epistle 84; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 27 and carmen 6; Elias Cretensis on Oration 3 against Julian; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 3 de verbis Isaiae; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 34, c. 17 (14); Isidore, De summo bono 1.12.8; Bede, tom. 8, in libris Quaestionum q. 9; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.4.

1904. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., and De malo q. 16, a. 3; Cajetan on this article; Alexander of Hales, II p., q. 98, m. 3; Albert the Great, In II Sent., dist. 5, q. 2, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 5, a. 1, q. 2; Giles of Rome, q. 1, a. 2; Hervaeus Natalis, q. 1, a. 3; Durandus, In II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, n. 13; Marsilius of Inghen, In II Sent., q. 5, a. 2, concl. 7; Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 10, concl. 2; and a. 3, in the solutions.

1905. William of Paris (William of Auvergne), De universo, pars I, pars II principalis, cap. 109.

1906. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 4.

1907. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 2.

Secondly, because (as St. Bonaventure says) if the angel had desired equality with God according to nature, since in his intellect he could feign it to himself, it would follow that the angel only desired a certain figment of his own thought, not however equality with God in reality.[1908] Thirdly they object - St. Thomas in that question 16 of De malo, article 3, to the third; Hervaeus in the place cited; Capreolus in that solution of the second; William in this way: although there can be some will of impossibles, nevertheless it is only the imperfect one which is wont to be called velleity, or a conditional will; but this is not capable of merit or demerit: therefore by such a will the angel could not sin.[1909]

The subsequent reason is, as St. Thomas, Giles, and Marsilius say: in each thing there is a natural desire of its own being (*esse*); but if the angel were to desire to be God by nature, he would desire not to be himself; which would be against the natural desire. But this, however, could not happen: therefore neither could the angel desire equality with God by nature. To explain and confirm this argument, one must set forth what the natural desire (*desiderium naturale*) is. Now natural desire is, first, the inclination of a passive potency (*potentia*) to its perfection, as water is inclined to coldness: and of this we are not speaking at present. Next, there is the natural desire of an active faculty for its act, and of this we are not speaking: for it is manifest that we are able to desire beatitude, and a life in which the faculty of nourishment does not need food, nor has its own distinct operation. Finally, there is the natural desire elicited, namely of the will, by which we desire something after the mode of nature, as we will show in the First Part of the Second [Part], question 5, last article, and question 10, first article; now the mode of desiring after the mode of nature is a mode of desiring something either necessarily as to exercise, or with a determination to one part, as St. Thomas teaches in the First of the Second [Part], in that question 10, article 1, namely because we love something in such a way that we cannot fail to love it, or as to specification, namely when we so love something that we cannot hate it at all, which kind of desire makes us seek sense and life. And for this reason Aristotle in the first book of the Metaphysics, chapter 1, and St. Thomas in the First of the Second [Part], question 10, article 1, said that man naturally desires to know, and in this same way to love sense and life.[1910]

Therefore the angel naturally desires his own being, in such a way that he cannot hate it, or that he cannot fail to desire it - which is the same thing. This is what Aristotle seems expressly to have taught in the ninth book of the Ethics, chapter 4, where, after he had said that each one desires to be and to live, and that part by which he understands, he subjoins these words: "For it is a good for a man to be earnest; and each man wills goods for himself. But as for another, no one desires to have all that which has been made his." As if he were saying: each one desires goods for himself that he may be better; but if he were to be changed into another, he would not desire to be made better nor to have goods - not, indeed, for any other reason than that no one can desire to be

1908. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, cited by later authors.

1909. St. Thomas Aquinas, De malo q. 16, a. 3, ad 3; Hervaeus Natalis, loc. cit.; John Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, in solutions; and William [of Paris] as above.

1910. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

another; for if he were to desire to be another, he would also desire that other, into whom he were being transformed, to have all goods, just as he desires them for himself, and he would desire him to become better, just as he also desires to become better.

Angelum potuisse peccare superbo appetitu aequalitatis Dei secundum naturam, alii Scholastici probabiliter censent.

Caput II - With deference to so many, that the angel could sin by the proud desire of equality with God according to nature is sufficiently probable

With due reverence for so many Scholastics whom we alleged in the preceding chapter, I cannot but judge it sufficiently probable that the angel could sin by the proud desire of equality with God according to nature. Thus taught Scotus in the Second [Book of the Sentences], distinction six, question one, s. dicitur and s. quia tamen; Gabriel in the same distinction, question one, article three, second doubt; Major, question one; Bassolis, question one, § Quia tamen ad primum.[1911] The opinion of these men will be able to be confirmed only if we shall have shown that the reasons for the aforesaid opinion do not sufficiently prove such a desire in the angel to be impossible. And indeed, as to the former reason, we readily admit, in the first place, that equality with God according to nature is impossible for any creature whatsoever. But as to this impossible object, that even when known as impossible there could have been in the angel some will with respect to it, does not seem able to be denied.

In the confirmation of this I presuppose what Aristotle teaches in the third of the Ethics, chapter two - and the adversaries frankly admit - that with respect to impossibles, which are even known as impossibles, there can be some will, which they are wont to call either velleity (*velleitas*), or a simple affection, not however efficacious: that is, a will which consists in a certain complacency in the thing apprehended, and is not an efficacious principle of procuring it; which we will prove expressly against Cajetan in the First of the Second [Part], question 13, article 4, and, against the same, we will show that this is true of will with respect to the impossible per se, just as it is true of will with respect to the impossible per accidens. Now what is called impossible per se is that which, considered according to its own nature, is impossible in any state, as that a man be equal to God, or that God be a creature according to essence (*essentia*). But impossible per accidens is said of what was of itself possible, considering the nature of the thing - as that Peter had not sinned - but by reason of time, because he has already sinned, it is impossible that he has not sinned now, after he sinned. For this cause Aristotle said in that same chapter, that will indeed is of impossibles, understanding a simple complacency; but that choice is not of impossibles, because choice is a will efficaciously seeking that which is chosen.[1907] Moreover, that Aristotle is speaking of impossibles which are in truth judged to be impossible, is clear: for with respect to the impossible which is judged possible, there can be not only will but even choice. Now this impossible which was

1911. John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1 (s. dicitur; s. quia tamen); Gabriel [Biel], In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3 (dub. 2); John Major, In II Sent., q. 1; Bassolis, In II Sent., q. 1, § Quia tamen ad primum.

1907. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 2.

judged truly impossible could nonetheless be apprehended by the angel after the mode of being and of the suitable - not, to be sure, by a judgment of assent, but by a simple cognition and apprehension, which is sufficient to move the will, as we will show in the First of the Second [Part], question 14: just as one can take delight in thinking that God is not, even if he sees that to be impossible, by apprehending that as suitable to himself. Wherefore I do not know by what reason St. Bonaventure and Giles said that the angel could not desire equality with God, because such a thing could not come into his mind: for this could have happened without error in the intellect of the angel, as will be made clear in the following disputation.[1910]

What things, however, were urged in confirmation of this first reason for the preceding opinion can easily be dissolved. To the first we admit indeed that the angel sinned freely; but when it is inferred, therefore he sinned by choice, we judge that a distinction must be made. For either by the name of choice, or of elective (as they call it) will, we understand only a free will, and in this way he sinned by choice; and, if he was going to sin, he was necessarily going to sin in this way. But this genus of elective will can be inefficacious and a simple affect of delectation; as when someone hates God, by a simple affect of hatred desiring evil for Him, he indeed sins, even if that affect be not efficacious, because he sees it to be impossible that such an evil befall God. Or by the name of choice we understand an efficacious will, which tends to the thing in execution; and this is not required for sin, as is manifest from what has been said. About this kind Aristotle said that choice is not of impossibles, as we will show in the First of the Second [Part], question 13, article 4, where we will also reprehend Scotus, because in the place cited he teaches that there can be choice of impossibles. By what reason he is worthy of reprehension we will show there. The angel, therefore, could sin freely and by choice, insofar as is required for sin, even if he should desire equality with God according to nature.[1912]

To the second we say: if the angel had desired equality with God according to nature, he would indeed have desired a figment which he himself would have fabricated to himself by his intellect; nevertheless even in this way he could truly have sinned: for even in such figments a most grave sin can be committed; as if someone were to imagine that he inflicts some evil on God, so that in that he would take delight out of hatred; though his appetite were detained by a figment, nevertheless his sin would be grave. Thus, therefore, even if that equality with God were only a figment of a created thought, nothing could stand in the way why the sin about it should not be grave.

To the third we admit that the angel could not sin about that equality of God, except by a simple affect which they call velleity. What those Doctors further add, to whom also Albert agrees, in 2. part, treatise 5, question 21, m. 1, to the next to last and to the last, namely that in such an affect there cannot be merit, good, or evil - I do not know by what reason this could be true. For who denies that there is an act of most perfect charity and very great with God, whereby (as is commonly read) St. Augustine, speaking with God, used to say: "If I could be God, I would prefer that Thou, rather than I, be God"? But this act is of simple complacency and of velleity, and concerns an impossible. Moreover, an act is meritorious when someone, after he has sinned, thinks

1910. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 10, a. 1.
1912. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 13, a. 4; cf. Scotus, loc. cit.

that he has sinned, and takes delight in this, and yet that act is a simple affection which they call velleity. In a similar affect too there can be a most grave sin, as we said above: as when someone takes delight out of hatred against God, by thinking some evil about Him; in which kind of sin now also the demons are engaged, there is no doubt.[1913]

Capreolus, however, replies that the angel after the fall, because he had a disturbed reason, could sin by this kind of delectation; but his first sin could not consist in such an affect. Yet even if I were to grant him this, the force of our solution remains: for in such a simple affect, if it be granted, there could be a most grave sin, as there is now in the demons. That such a simple affect could have been then, the first Doctors of that third objection readily admit, only wishing to assert that in such an act there cannot be sin. Next, from the nature of the thing this is sufficiently manifest. For if now the demons sin by this kind of sin, it is not on account of an error which they have about God; for in them the natural powers have remained entire: but without error, apprehending that as good, as will be explained in the following disputation, they take delight in it. Why, therefore, could not this same thing have happened to them in the first sin?

But someone will say: since the angel knows himself as he is, by what reason can he feign, as if it were his perfection, that which on the other hand he rightly knows can in no way befit him? For in disputation 118, chapter two, we said that the intellect, seeing a thing as it is, cannot distinguish many things in a thing which are not really distinct: because such a distinction is a figment which cannot fall upon the intellect regarding a thing as it is.

I answer: although the angel knows himself as he is, nevertheless since he does not understand God as He is, he can apprehend himself as if he were God, that is, as if he had not above himself God; and he could be displeased at being subject and inferior to God, and contrariwise take delight in thinking himself not inferior to any other than God, which is to will in a certain manner equality with God according to nature.

And let these things suffice about the first reason of the preceding opinion.

The latter reason can also easily be dissolved. We therefore concede that, from the fact that the angel were in reality God, it would follow necessarily that he would not be an angel; nevertheless from the fact that the angel desires to be God, it does not follow that he desires not to be himself: for although these two are in reality conjoined indivisibly, yet the angel's reason can propose to the will one without the other; and thus it can present to the angel the goodness which he conceives in equality itself with God, without proposing or thinking the evil...

Moreover, as to the evil which consists in one's not being oneself, this can also be desired without any judgment affirming or denying; for it is not necessary that an error in the intellect precede, in order that the will may sin, as we shall show in the following disputation and in I-II, q. 77, a. 2. For the defect on the part of the intellect which is necessary for sin, as we shall there show, consists only in this, that the good which entices to sin be proposed more efficaciously than the good or evil which ought to draw one back from sin, as we shall prove there from Aristotle: and thus we see men every day take delight by thinking of themselves as changed into spirits, nay even

1913. Albert the Great, De anima, pars 2, tract. 5, q. 21, m. 1, ad penult. et ult.; John Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1.

into birds or beasts, on account of some convenience or pleasure which they consider in that figment. And in what way that axiom is to be understood, "he who wills the antecedent, wills the consequent," we shall also explain in I-II, q. 13, a. 4: namely, that one is said to will the consequent only virtually (as they say), not because he always expressly wills it, the antecedent being willed. Wherefore, although someone should expressly desire to be changed into something else, it is not necessary that he should also expressly will not to be; although this latter follows upon the former.

Furthermore, what was said in that argument, that there is in man a natural desire eliciting the act by which he wills his own existence, so that he cannot hate it, must be understood of his own existence by reason of itself; for by reason of an accompanying evil nothing prevents someone from being able to desire not to be. For men, too, sometimes grieve so much on account of infamy or some other grave evil, especially those who see themselves consigned to the perpetual torments of hell, that they would rather wish to be reduced to nothing than to suffer them; although otherwise life and existence, considered in themselves, cannot be the object of anyone's hatred, and for this reason there is said to be a natural desire of them, that is, a desire necessary as to its specification, as we declared above. Thus, therefore, the angel also could will equality with God according to nature, because he could apprehend himself as to be changed for the better; for I see no reason why this should be repugnant to a created mind, even an angelic one. Nay rather, even now the demon, since he sees himself damned by God and consigned to eternal torments, so hates God that without doubt he desires to have himself changed into a nature better than the divine, and expressly wills not to be, in order in this way to oppress God himself. I do not say that this is procured by the angel, or efficaciously desired, but that in this vain thought his will, out of hatred against God, lingers.

But as to the testimony of St. Anselm, which in the same argument was adduced, I answer that the words there cited, by which he seems to teach that the angel could not have desired equality with God according to nature, are not Anselm's in his own person, but in the person of the disciple whom he introduces in that dialogue. The teacher, however, who speaks there in Anselm's person, only answers that the angel desired a certain equality with God, not according to nature, but in another way, as we shall see in the following disputations; neither granting what the disciple had objected, nor denying it, but only asserting that in which the angel seemed more probably to him to have sinned.[1914]

Finally, that which in confirmation of the latter reason was brought from Aristotle, Ethics IX, chapter twenty-one, has a sense far different. For, as Eustratius explains in his commentaries, and Lambinus in his Scholia on that place, Aristotle's meaning is this: although each one desires goods for himself; yet if someone were turned into something else, as into a stone or an ass, he would not wish, having been made an ass or a stone, to abound in all human goods, but only in those which befit the nature of an ass or of a stone; so that in this way Aristotle shows, not indeed, as the adversaries were saying, that no one can desire his own non-existence, but that each one desires for

1914. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 4.

himself only those goods which he has judged to be suitable to his own state: wherefore, the state being changed, the appetite for things is also changed; because things themselves are not judged good in the same manner.

But someone will ask whether to desire to be God by nature, and to linger in that thought, is a sin of pride against the natural precept. I answer: if someone should linger in such a delight, thinking that he is God, but should be delighted for this reason alone, namely that he would be free from sin, he would not sin with the sin of pride; but if he should linger in that thought because he would take it ill that he is under the power of God, or for that reason should desire to be preeminent over all: this would be a most grave sin of pride.

Caput III - That it is not certain that the angel sinned by the desire of equality with God according to essence

Although by a reason not to be disapproved it has been shown that the angel could have sinned by the proud desire of equality with God according to nature; nevertheless, whether his sin, by which he first fell from that most happy state, was of that sort, has not yet been explained by us. In this controversy, which is a matter of fact, strong reasons are not at hand: for in everything and everywhere reasons or demonstrations are not to be demanded. I shall nevertheless relate what the Doctors have thought in this difficulty.

Of the authors cited in the preceding chapter, who say that the angel could have sinned by this kind of pride, there is none, besides John Major, who affirms that the angels sinned by such pride. But Major proves that the demon desired equality with God according to nature from that Isaiah 14: "I will ascend into heaven, I will be like the Most High"; which, he says, cannot be understood of the corporeal heaven, since the angel who fell was already in heaven when he sinned; but of the spiritual heaven of the Trinity. But since those words are historically said of the King of Babylon, as we already showed in the preceding disputation, chapter 4, it is necessary to understand them of the corporeal heaven; not that that king wished really to be lifted up into the bodily heaven, but so that by a turn of phrase and figure of speech the Prophet might explain by hyperbole the excessive affection of pride by which that king sinned. Now in that figure the same words ought to be accommodated to the demon, and not otherwise, as we there also taught.

From the Fathers adduced in the first chapter, who teach that the demons desired some kind of equality and likeness with God, none is found, besides St. Gregory Nazianzen, who seems to speak of equality according to nature: for in the oration about himself, against those who were saying that he was aiming at the chair of Constantinople, which is Oration 27, number 8, he thus writes: "This (namely envy) clouded Lucifer on account of the puffing up of his mind by measures; a fall: for it was unworthy and intolerable to him, since he was divine, not to be thought God too." By which words the proud appetite of equality with God according to nature, which the angel had, seems to be described. Nor does that word "to be thought" stand in the way, which seems only to denote an appetite not of equality according to the thing, but according to appearance and mere estimation: for that word can signify either a true or a false estimation; and more easily would the angel's

appetite be borne toward a true estimation of deity, than toward a false one with an appetite of simple complacency. Moreover, the same Nazianzen in Poem 6, which is "On substances endowed with mind," expressed this opinion more clearly by these words:

"Wherefore, first swelling with an unsound mind, Lucifer (for that he enjoyed eminent honor, He was hoping for the royal throne and glory of God), Fell, his cheap splendor lost, miserably, While he desired to be God, he was entirely overwhelmed by earthly darkness."[1915]

Add also the Gloss on that Psalm 68, "What I did not seize, then I paid back." Where it says that the devil and our first parents sinned, wishing to seize divinity; and the Master in II Sentences, distinction six, chapter one, who affirms that the angel sinned because he wished to be like God.[1916]

But although it would be by no means absurd to affirm that the angel sinned by the proud desire of equality with God according to nature, since this too was possible; nevertheless, because we have no firm foundation for asserting this, it is not to be affirmed thus without reason; but the aforesaid testimonies, and whatever others there are, are to be expounded about some equality through likeness, which is found in a certain way in any sin of pride. For since it is certain that the angel sinned the sin of pride, it will also be certain that he aimed at some likeness of God.

- What the Scholastics think without controversy. Cap. 1.
- Three ways of explaining and defending the common opinion. Cap. 2.
- A more probable way of defending the common opinion. Cap. 3.
- An objection against the foregoing doctrine. Cap. 4.
- By what reasoning the angel could sin by the appetite of natural beatitude. Cap. 5.
- How the angel could sin by desiring to be preferred to others. Cap. 6.

What the Scholastics think without controversy

Among the Scholastic theologians there is a no less certain and uncontroversial opinion, that the angel sinned by an immoderate appetite of his beatitude, than that he sinned by the sin of pride. For all establish, in this kind of excellence, an affection of pride by which the angel first sinned; just as all also have said that the angel's first sin was pride. But all those whom I shall here cite speak of supernatural beatitude, which a rational creature hopes for as the reward of good works. For of natural beatitude they scarcely make mention, as we shall see below.

Therefore that the angel's first sin was an immoderate affection of his supernatural beatitude is taught among our Scholastics by the Antissiodorensis in the second book of the Summa, tractate 2, chapter 2; by Albert the Great in the Summa, part 5, tractate 5, question 21, member 1; by Alexander of Hales in part 2, question 98, member 3, in the body and to the fifth, and in the same

1915. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Poemata dogmatica 6 (De substantiis mente praeditis), lines cited in Oration 27, n. 8.

1916. Glossa ordinaria on Ps 68:5 (Vulg. 68:5), "Quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam"; Peter Lombard, Sentences II, dist. 6, c. 1.

member 9, to the first and to the fifth; by St. Thomas, by Cajetan, and by recent Thomists on this article; Albert also, in the Book of Sentences, distinction 5, article 3; Aegidius, question 1, article 2; Richard, article 1, question 3; Durandus, question 1, number 14; Hervaeus, question 1, article 6.[1917]

Likewise, at the end and in the solutions of the arguments, Thomas of Argentina, on II Sentences, distinction 6, question 1, article 1; and on the same distinction Scotus, question 2, especially at "Ad videndum"; Bassolis, question 1, § "Quantum ad secundum"; Gabriel, question 1, article 2, after the second conclusion; Major, question 1, near the end, in solution 4; Capreolus on II Sentences, distinction 4, question 1, article 1, conclusion 1 and 2, and article 2, in the solutions of the arguments against the first conclusion; Marsilius in II, question 1, article 5, conclusion 6 and the following corollaries; Holcot on II, question 3; the Ferrariensis, Contra gentes, cap. 109, § 9, "Circa id, quod dicitur." Of the Fathers, moreover, I do not doubt that Ambrose in Epistle 84, Augustine in City of God, book 22, chapter 1, and St. Gregory in Moralia, book 34, chapter 17 (alias 14), and book 3, chapter 18 (alias 23), were of this opinion, whose words we shall relate below; nor do I doubt it.[1918] Some also of the Scholastics allege that the aforesaid opinion is gathered from Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 4, from which they report these words: "The demon desired that which, if he had attained, he would have stood fast." The words, however, by which the preceding opinion could be more clearly confirmed from Anselm are others. For when he had said that the angel could have desired only two kinds of goods, either the just, or honest, or the advantageous, which we commonly call the delectable, which two alone can be desired for their own sake, he subjoins these words: "He sinned, therefore, by willing some advantage which he neither had, nor then ought to will, which nevertheless could have been for him an increase of beatitude." From these, however, the Scholastics' opinion cannot be gathered. For Anselm does not say that the angel sinned by desiring beatitude itself, but by desiring some particular good, advantageous and delectable, which could have pertained to the piling up and increase of his beatitude. Now this could have been some kind of excellence, by which he would be preeminent over the others: for this too, as a peculiar good, if granted to him by God, could have looked to the increase of beatitude.

But Scotus, thinking that it was Anselm's opinion that the angel sinned by the appetite of beatitude, tries to prove it by three reasons; the first of which, in Scotus's judgment taken from Anselm himself, is of this sort: Either the angel sinned by the appetite of the honest, or by the appetite of the advantageous, which we commonly call the delectable: for the appetite of the ...[1919]

1917. Antissiodorensis, Summa, lib. II, tract. 2, c. 2; Albert the Great, Summa (pars 5), tract. 5, q. 21, m. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars 2, q. 98, m. 3 (in corp. et ad 5), et eod. m. 9 (ad 1 et ad 5); St. Thomas Aquinas, ad hunc articulum cum Caietano et recentioribus Thomistis; Albert the Great, In II Sent., dist. 5, a. 3; Aegidius Romanus, q. 1, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, a. 1, q. 3; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, q. 1, n. 14; Hervaeus Natalis, q. 1, a. 6.

1918. Thomas de Argentina, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 1; John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 2 (ad "Ad videndum"); Bassolis, In II Sent., q. 1, § "Quantum ad secundum"; Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 2 (post concl. 2); John Major, In II Sent., q. 1 (sol. 4 in fine); John Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 (concl. 1 - 2) et a. 2 (solutiones contra primam conclusionem); Marsilius of Inghen, In II, q. 1, a. 5 (concl. 6 et coroll. seq.); Robert Holcot, In II, q. 3; Franciscus de Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Contra Gentiles, cap. 109, § 9 ("Circa id, quod dicitur"). Of the Fathers: St. Ambrose, Ep. 84; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XX, 1; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XXXIV, 17 (alias XIV), and III, 18 (alias XXIII).

1919. On Scotus's development of these reasons, see John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1 - 2.

Disputatio CCXXXV

Caput I - What the Scholastics hold without controversy

"By a useful good," says Scotus, "he could not have sinned; because this is not appetited first and of itself, but for the sake of the honorable (honestum) or the pleasurable (delectabile), since it is a good only as a means," as St. Thomas taught above, First - Second, question 5, article 6. But he could not have sinned by an appetite of the honorable, as is clear: therefore he sinned by an appetite of the useful or pleasurable; and consequently by an appetite of the supremely pleasurable; because this appetite must be first. Yet this reason is not Anselm's, as from what was said is manifest; nor does it prove anything: for even if he sinned by the appetite of some pleasurable object, it was not necessary that that pleasurable be the supremely pleasurable. For the first appetite can be occupied with some particular pleasurable good. Add that even the first sin can be about the useful (utile). For although the useful has goodness only as a means, and a means is not appetible for its own sake, but for the honorable or the pleasurable: nevertheless it can happen that the first malice comes not from a pleasurable end, but from a useful means; as if someone, in order to relieve the distress of his family or a friend, should wish to steal: he does indeed appetit theft as useful, and yet the first malice, indeed the whole of it, comes from that. The same will also happen if someone, for the sake of recreation, seeks money, and not finding it by a loan, is willing to steal it. I pass over Scotus's second reason, which proves nothing other than the preceding.

The third reason comes to the same, which is as follows: The appetitive faculty, which follows upon the cognitive faculty, first appetites the most fitting pleasurable; just as the appetite that follows taste first appetites what is supremely pleasurable to taste: wherefore if sight were to sin, it would sin indeed about the supreme visible; but the supreme pleasurable for the will is beatitude: therefore about that the Angel sinned. But this reason is no less weak than the preceding: because neither with animal appetite, nor with rational, is that first appetited which is supremely pleasurable; but with animal appetite, that which first occurs; with rational appetite, according as the will (voluntas) freely moves itself: now something other pleasurable than beatitude could present itself first to the Angel; and whatever should first present itself, he could have willed it in an ordered way, and some other particular pleasurable have appetited in a disordered way.

For my part, it is indeed most certain that the Angel could have fallen into the sin of pride by an immoderate affection for his own supernatural beatitude; as will be made clear below. Yet that he sinned by some other affection, on account of the authority of so great men, is to me certainly probable. That, however, it can be confirmed by some certain reason, or tradition, I do not see. Nor in this matter ought we to be overly solicitous, when the human mind, destitute of such supports, cannot at all attain unto it. For since it is a matter of fact, and very far removed from sense, it ought not to seem strange that it be hidden from us.

Moreover, in defending the common opinion which we have reported, the scholastics cited do not philosophize in the same way. The variety of opinions bears also, in a certain way, upon the question of possibility; wherefore, that at least it may be clear to us in what manner the Angel could have sinned by the sin of pride, appetiting for himself supernatural beatitude with an immoderate affection, it will be necessary to examine the several opinions.

Caput II - Three ways of explaining and defending the common view

Various are the ways by which those Doctors who embrace this common opinion explain and defend it. The first is of those who say that the appetite for supernatural beatitude in the Angel was inordinate and pertained to pride, because they appetited the excellence of it, not considering that it was to be obtained with the help and grace (gratia) of God, whereas they ought to have considered that. Thus philosophize the Antisiodorensis, Hervaeus, Durandus, Thomas de Argentina, Holcot, Marsilius, and Major in the places cited; and Ferrarensis in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 109, § "Ad huius sententiam," and likewise in chapter 110 at the beginning; and in the same way Caietan presupposes this in question 64, article 2.[1920] Briefly to this. They add, moreover, that it is all the same to appetite supernatural beatitude without considering that it is to be obtained through the means of grace, and to desire to obtain it by one's own powers. And since to desire it in this latter way is a sin of pride and presumption, it will also be a sin to desire it without considering the means of grace by which it is to be attained.

The aforesaid authors had recourse to this sort of inconsideration, lest they should be compelled to concede some intolerable error in the angelic intellect, which it seemed to them necessary to admit, if their sin had been pride by appetiting beatitude beyond the due mode of excellence. But to concede an error in the Angel before the first sin seemed to them incongruous. Therefore they devised that such a sin was committed through a defect of inconsideration.

However, this way of defending the common opinion can be refuted, in my judgment, by two efficacious reasons. The first of which is: Such a sin could not have befallen the Angel, unless he transgressed some precept by which he was bound to appetite beatitude from an express consideration of the divine help: but the Angel had no such precept: therefore, in appetiting beatitude without a consideration of the divine help, he did not sin. Now that the Angel was bound by no such precept can be shown not obscurely. For either such a precept was natural, that is, arising from the very nature of the thing, although it was about a supernatural object; or it was posited for the Angel by God's will alone, which we call positive in the Schools. First, that it was natural could not be: because the precept of desiring beatitude in due mode obliges only to this, that we do not expressly desire to attain it without the help of God by our own powers alone: for daily we desire to be blessed and to contemplate God clearly, considering nothing about the grace of God, by whose help we are to attain it. But if someone should say that, although not always, at least at some time it is necessary to hope for and to desire beatitude from the help of God: surely

1920. Antisiodorensis (William of Auxerre), Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus, Thomas de Argentina, Holcot, Marsilius of Inghen, and John Major, in the loci cited; Franciscus de Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 109, § "Ad huius sententiam," and ch. 110 init.; Caietan, In Iam, q. 64, a. 2.

this can hardly be persuaded. But if he should prove it, it will nevertheless suffice once, especially within a brief space of time, to desire beatitude in this way. And yet already in the first instant in which he loved God above all things, the Angel had this mode of love of beatitude: for then he loved God by faith, and he had the hope of eternal life, as was proved in Disputation 227, cap. 2; every good received, and what he hoped would be in the future, he referred to God the author of all. In vain, therefore, shall we contrive such an obligation of a natural precept on account of which the Angel ought always actually to remain in that consideration and reference.

Next, such a precept was not positive: because neither by reason, nor by authority can it be proved that such a precept was imposed upon the Angel: nay rather, some of the Fathers expressly teach that the Angel fell with no precept imposed upon him. Thus teach Origen, book 3 on the Epistle to the Romans, on that of chapter 3, "Scimus autem, quoniam quaecunque lex," etc.; and St. John Chrysostom, tome 1, in the homily on Adam and Eve, before the middle, and in the homily on the fall of man, near the beginning; in which Chrysostom assigns the difference between the fall of man and of the Angel: for the Angel sinned with no precept imposed upon him; but man sinned with a precept imposed. Wherefore, when Durandus says in the cited question, no. 15, that it could have been that the sin of the Angel was in the transgression of some positive precept, he does not contradict our opinion. For he does not affirm that he so sinned, but that he could have sinned: which is quite another thing.[1921]

The later reason against the same opinion and the way of explaining the common opinion is of this sort: either that inconsideration was such that no thought at all preceded of that which the Angel ought to consider, namely, that beatitude is to be desired only from the help of God; or at least some thought in general preceded about that. If none at all, not even in general, preceded thought about that matter, such inconsideration, or an act arising from it, could not be imputed as fault: for, as we shall say in the First - Second, question 76, article 2, where no thought about some matter preceded, an action which is from that, or together with that, cannot be imputed as fault on account of that very inconsideration: for by deliberation or by freedom a man cannot reduce himself to a first deliberation, as we shall also show in the First - Second, question 14. But if some consideration of the divine help, at least confusedly and in general, preceded in the Angel, it follows that the Angel did not sin from inconsideration, as the Doctors of this opinion contend: and hence it is necessary to admit that there was an error in the Angel's intellect: or, if he could have sinned without error and without inconsideration, there is no need to have recourse to this mode of philosophizing.

Someone could indeed say that the Angel, in the first instant, considered the necessity of the divine help for obtaining beatitude, and in the second instant freely ceased from this consideration; and thus in that same he sinned from inconsideration. But this response is of little moment: because while the Angel in the first instant considered the necessity of the divine help, either he also in some way considered it necessary to remain in that consideration; and thus, ceasing from it,

1921. Origen, In Ep. ad Romanos, book 3, on Rom 3: "Scimus autem quoniam quaecunque lex..."; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. de Adam et Eva (t. 1, before the middle), and Hom. de lapsu hominis (near the beginning), where he distinguishes the fall of man from that of the Angel.

he would not have sinned from inconsideration: or he did not in any way think it necessary to remain in that consideration; and thus the same difficulty returns which was set above. I pass over the argument of certain men, by which they strive to prove that the Angel could not have sinned in any other way than from inconsideration, because since the Angel cannot appetite anything pleasurable, inasmuch as he has no sense, but only the honorable, and around the honorable one cannot sin save from inconsideration, it follows that he could not have sinned except from inconsideration. This argument, therefore, I omit, because it is utterly frivolous. For the pleasurable is found not only with respect to the body, but also with respect to the spirit. Then too it would follow that now the demon does not sin, when he pursues God with hatred, except from inconsideration, and around the honorable object - which is absurd. Add also that around an honorable object there can occur sin in another way than from inconsideration, namely from a bad circumstance; as is sufficiently plain.

The second way of defending and explaining the common opinion is that which Scotus assigns in question 2, "Ad videndum," whom Gabriel follows in the place cited. They say, then, that the Angel therefore sinned by an immoderate appetite of beatitude, because he loved his own beatitude more intensely than he ought, by loving God as his beatifying good with the love of concupiscence more intensely than he loved God with the love of friendship as good in himself. Yet this opinion is frivolous: for to love an object which of itself can be loved without sin, can never be sin merely on account of intensity. For the circumstance "How" (Quomodo), which is put by St. Thomas in the First - Second, question 7, and by the Scholastics among the circumstances, never gives an act its first malice, but only increases that which it finds; as from the same St. Thomas we shall show in the First - Second, question 18, article 11 - unless perhaps when a precept had been imposed that no one should act more intensely than up to a certain degree; but this alone can be positive, as is clear: because by natural law, a work of virtue, however much it grow, can never be evil. But that no positive precept was imposed upon the Angel we have shown above: nay rather, such a kind of precept, namely, that no one act more intensely, is to me difficult [to admit]. Moreover, that someone should love God more intensely with the love of concupiscence, as his own good, than with the love of friendship, as he is good in himself, is not contrary to the nature of the love of friendship, which is called love above all. For when it is said "above all," it is not understood (as they say) intensively, but appretiatively; which consists in this valuation, that one love nothing against true friendship with God; not however that he love nothing else more intensely; as we shall explain more fully in the First - Second, question 109, article 3. Wherefore I judge that in this way not only did the Angel not sin, but also that he could not have sinned.

The third way of defending the same opinion (it was of the same Scotus in the same place) asserts that therefore the Angel sinned because, in desiring beatitude, he wished to obtain it sooner than God willed. But although in this way the Angel could have sinned, if he had had a precept not to desire beatitude except at such a time appointed by God, or if he bore it indignantly that beatitude was not immediately granted to him - because this would be an appetite of his own dignity and excellence beyond the measure granted to him - nonetheless it is ridiculous to affirm that the Angel sinned in this way.

Caput III - A more probable way of defending the common opinion

Although, as I said at the beginning of the disputation, it is sufficiently uncertain that the Angel sinned by a proud appetite of his own beatitude, since the matter rests on a fact, the firm foundation of which we can scarcely have; nevertheless a more probable way, by which the Angel could have sinned with respect to his beatitude by an affection of pride, is that which the older and graver Scholastics followed in explaining the common opinion which we set forth in the first chapter. They say, then, Alexander, Albert, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Aegidius, and Bassolis in the places cited, that the Angels sinned by an excessive desire of their supernatural beatitude, because they longed to attain it by their own powers; and although the aforesaid Doctors...[1922]

The second mode of defending and expounding the common opinion is that which Scotus asserts in question 2, and Gabriel follows in the place cited. They say that the Angel therefore sinned by an immoderate desire of beatitude, because he fixed on his own beatitude - which he ought to have sought by loving God as his supremely blessed good - with the love of concupiscence more intensely than he loved God with the love of friendship as good in Himself. Nevertheless this opinion is frivolous. For to love an object which of itself can be loved without sin can never become evil merely on account of the intensity; since a circumstance, "how," which is posited by St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, question 7, among the circumstances, is not that which gives an act its first malice, but only augments that malice which it finds already present, as we shall show from the doctrine of the same St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, question 18, article 3.[1923] Perhaps, indeed, if there were a precept not to act more intensely beyond a certain degree; but this kind of precept could only be positive, as is clear, because by natural right an act of virtue, however much it increase, can never be evil. But that there was any positive precept for the Angel, we showed above that there was none; nay rather, a precept of such a kind - namely, that no one should act more intensely - is difficult to conceive. Moreover, that a man should love God more intensely with the love of concupiscence as his own good, than with the love of friendship as He is good in Himself, is not contrary to the ratio of the love of friendship, which is called love above all things; for when we say "above all things," we do not understand it (as they say) intensively, but appretiatively; which is settled in such a way that nothing is against true friendship with God if one love Him, though not so that one may not love something else more intensely - as we shall explain more fully in the Prima Secundae, question 109, article 3. Wherefore I judge that in this way not only did the Angel not sin, but also that he could not have sinned.

A third mode of defending the same opinion, and it too is that of the same Scotus in the same place, asserts that the Angel therefore sinned because he desired beatitude, and wished to obtain it sooner than God willed. But although in this way the Angel could have sinned, if he had had a precept not to desire beatitude except at such a time set by God, or if he had taken it ill that

1922. Alexander of Hales; Albert the Great; St. Thomas; St. Bonaventure; Aegidius (of Rome); Bassolis, in the loci cited.
1923. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 7; I - II, q. 18, a. 3.

beatitude was not granted to him immediately - for that would have been an appetite of his own dignity and excellence beyond the measure granted to him - nevertheless it is quite ridiculous to affirm that in this way the Angel sinned.

A more probable mode of defending the common opinion

Although, as I said at the beginning of the disputation, it is sufficiently uncertain whether the Angel sinned by a proud desire of his own beatitude - since the matter is one of fact, the firm foundation of which we can scarcely have - yet the more probable mode, by which the Angel could have sinned concerning his own beatitude with the affect of pride, is that which the more ancient and graver Scholastics followed in explaining the common opinion, which in the first chapter we reported. They say, therefore - Alexander, Albert, St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Aegidius, and Bassolis in the places cited - that the Angels sinned by an excessive desire of their supernatural beatitude, because they longed to attain it by their own powers; and although the aforesaid Doctors, except Aegidius, do not explain whether the Angel sought expressly by desire to have beatitude in this mode, or whether only on account of a lack of consideration of the divine aid, to which he ought to have leaned, it is said that he sinned by seeking beatitude by his own powers as it were interpretatively (as they say); nevertheless, since they speak absolutely, they clearly seem to understand that the Angel expressly sought beatitude from his own powers, and not only interpretatively, on account of lack of consideration of the divine aid on which he had to rely, as Aegidius plainly taught in the place cited; nay more, Aegidius adds that the Angel not only sought beatitude by his own powers, but was also deceived by an error of the intellect. For he holds that the Angel cannot err concerning natural things, but can err well enough concerning supernatural objects. A similar error also seems to be attributed to the Angel by St. Thomas in question 64, article 2, reply to the third, and by Bonaventure in the second book, distinction 7, first part, article 1, question 2, when they say that the first sin remained indeed in the demon as to the affect, whereby he sought his own excellence, yet not as to this, that he judged he could attain it.[1924]

But I, as I said, judge this mode of defending the common opinion to be much more true, so that I firmly believe that in this way the Angel could have sinned with the express affect of seeking beatitude by his own powers, as I shall show below; yet not that he fell in this kind of sin deceived by an error of the intellect. Whether indeed the Angel in fact sinned by this kind of sin is not known to me. Nevertheless, besides the Scholastics cited, there are some Fathers who so favor this last way of thinking as to assert plainly that he sinned in this way. First indeed St. Ambrose, Epistle 84, a little before the middle, where, describing the kinds of pride, he speaks thus: "For some are puffed up in one way, who by a desire for singular eminence strive to be preferred before all; others swell in another way, who, rejecting the aid of God in those things which cannot be done without His working, contend to be perfected by their own virtue, and withdraw their hope from God: this kind of pride took its beginning from the devil, who, because he was pleased by his own power and dignity, which he had received from the Creator, compared himself to the author of his own glory; with those Angels whom he drew into consent with his impiety he was cast down from heavenly

1924. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 7, pars 1, a. 1, q. 2; Aegidius (of Rome), in the place cited above.

height." By which words nothing could be said more clearly to show that the first sin by which the Angel fell was a proud appetite of obtaining supernatural beatitude by his own powers.[1925] Then St. Augustine no less clearly hands down the same in book 22 of the City of God, chapter 1, in these words: "He (namely, God), since He foreknew that certain Angels by an elation, whereby they would wish to suffice themselves for the blessed life, would be deserters of the Good, did not take away from them this power," etc.[1926] Finally St. Gregory expressed the same in book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 7 (otherwise 14), in this way: "For having left the principle to which he ought to have adhered, he (namely, the demon) in a way made himself a kind of principle: having left Him who truly could suffice for him, he indicated that he himself could suffice for himself." And although these Fathers seem to admit an error in the Angel when he sinned by that sin of pride, nevertheless they must be interpreted in a good sense, as we shall say below.[1927]

Therefore we must first explain by what reason there can be in the Angel and in man an affect of pride and presumption by arrogating to oneself the supernatural gifts of God, and by seeking beatitude itself to be attained by one's own powers without error. For the explanation of this, we must note what in the Prima Secundae, question 14, article 1, and question 77, article 2, will be proved more fully, namely, that the will of man and of the Angel is moved to a good work and to evil out of freedom without a judgment of composition and division in the intellect, but by the mere simple proposal of the object. And since in such a simple apprehension error cannot exist: it could also have happened that a man or an Angel sinned by this affect of pride and presumption, seeking to attain beatitude by his own powers without any error. By the same reason it could have happened that an Angel or a man sinned by the proud appetite of equality with God according to nature, without any error in the intellect: I do not say without defect, but without error. But the defect which always precedes - as in that question 77, article 2, we shall explain, and as we have already in part said in disputation 230, chapter 4 - is that those things are represented to us more efficaciously which move to sin than those which ought to draw us back from sin. The Angel, therefore, could apprehend his beatitude as full and absolute, as if it were suitable for him from his own powers, and in this way he could take complacency in it; and, on the contrary, he could be saddened seeing that he could not in reality by his own powers attain it. And each affect would be of pride and presumption, both the one which would consist in the affect of prosecution and complacency, and the one which would consist in the affect of flight and displeasure; and in this the same reason would exist of contraries. But each would be inefficacious and, as it is wont to be said, simple, as in the preceding disputation, chapter 2, was noted when we assigned the difference between an efficacious and a simple affect.

1925. St. Ambrose, Epistle 84, near the middle.
1926. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, book 22, ch. 1.
1927. St. Gregory, Moralia, book 34, ch. 7 (alias 14).

But, with an efficacious affect and will, the Angel could not seek to attain his beatitude by his own powers: because, as I said in the place cited, and as in the Prima Secundae, question 13, article 4, it will be proved, an efficacious will, which tends to effecting a thing in deed, cannot be of impossibilities; but immediately when the intellect sees the impossibility of a thing, it ceases from consultation, election, and from any efficacious will, retaining only the will of simple complacency.

Then it must be proved that the Angel did not sin in this kind of sin deceived by any error, or by any similar one. For either he erred because he did not know that beatitude was above his powers, and this had not yet been revealed to him; and in that way it would not have been that sin to seek expressly for himself beatitude to be attained by his own powers: because by ignorance he would desire it for himself in that mode, and thus would be excused from sin. Or already the Angel knew that he could not attain his beatitude, either because it had been so revealed to him, or because he was plainly convinced that he could not reach with the sight of the intellect to the clear vision of God; for however much he might try, he would in himself experience that by his own power he could not attain to the vision of God; and in this way the Angel could not err in the way by judging that he could by his own powers attain his own beatitude: since even the demons have no such error; indeed neither can they have it: for they "believe and tremble," being convicted by the very truth, as James 2 says, and they believe nothing contrary to the faith.

But someone will say that indeed there could have been some error in the Angel's intellect which in no way would be contrary to our faith, in the way in which St. Thomas, in the Secunda Secundae, question 162, article 4, to the first, teaches that the presumption whereby someone presumes that he has a good which is not from God, or that grace was granted to him from his merits, is not necessarily conjoined with an error against the faith, because an error against the faith is only an estimation in universal and not a singular estimation: thus if someone should think universally that not every good is from God, and that grace is given to us from our merits, he would err against the faith. St. Thomas further adds an example: just as when someone should judge universally that fornication is good, he would be an unbeliever; but if he should judge in a particular case that it is good for him to fornicate, such a judgment would not be against the faith. The same doctrine is had by the same holy Doctor in the Secunda Secundae, question 20, article 2, in the body, and to the second, to show that despair can be without infidelity.

Yet it is difficult for me to excuse from an error against the faith that singular judgment, just as also the universal judgment, if under the same formal ratio each is held, as I shall show more at length in the Prima Secundae, question 77, article 2. For if someone should judge that fornication is good - that is, that it is honest and according to reason - not only would he sin against the faith in judging this universally, but also in judging this of a singular fornication. But if someone should judge that fornication is good - that is, that it is delectable - neither by judging universally, nor by judging this of a singular fornication, would he err against the faith. In the same way in the sin of presumption it seems that one ought to say this: either the universal and common judgment is not against the faith, and then the singular judgment is not; or if the universal judgment is against the faith, the singular is also, if under the same formal ratio each is held. For if someone in his intellect should judge that he can by his own powers attain beatitude and merit grace for himself, whether

he should judge this universally, or specially and singularly in a particular case, he would err against our faith: for the faith teaches in the same way universally that no creature suffices to itself for attaining its beatitude and for meriting grace for itself from God, and specially and singularly in any particular case whatsoever; therefore he who would judge the contrary either universally, or in a particular case, would err against the faith in the same way.

It remains, therefore, that we say that the Angel could have sinned concerning beatitude by seeking it immoderately from his own powers by a mere simple apprehension, whereby beatitude would be proposed to him in that mode as if it had been acquired by his own powers, as was explained above; or at least, if some judgment of composition preceded in the Angel, he could only have judged that it seemed to him a delectable good to have beatitude in that mode; which judgment indeed would have been sufficient to move the affect to simple complacency, not however to an efficacious desire of attaining beatitude: for to that efficacious affect a judgment was necessary affirming that it was possible for the Angel to attain beatitude by his own powers, as we noted above.

Caput IV - An objection against the foregoing doctrine

To what has been said up to this point a man could not without difficulty object as follows. If the Angel sinned by the sin of presumption, he did not sin by one sin of pride alone, but by a threefold kind of sin. First, against hope; because presumption also is opposed to hope, which has its beginning from grace and merits, as St. Thomas teaches in the Secunda Secundae, question 21, article 2; for because he hopes to attain beatitude without the merits of grace, he hopes vainly, and is said to presume. Secondly, he would sin against magnanimity, which consists in this, according to Aristotle, Ethics 4, chapter 3, and St. Thomas in the Secunda Secundae, question 129, namely, that it moderates the affections about great honors and dignities, which it seeks according to reason; wherefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity in respect of excellence, as St. Thomas teaches in the Secunda Secundae, question 130, article 2, in so far as a man seeks great things beyond the mode of right reason and beyond his measure. Thirdly, the Angel would have sinned by the sin of pride against humility; because presumption also is a species of pride, as St. Thomas holds in the Secunda Secundae, question 162, article 4, and as St. Gregory hands down in book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 14 (otherwise 4).[1928]

The objection is resolved

First I answer, if we say that the Angel sinned by the sin of presumption, nevertheless we must say that the Angel did not sin by that sin of presumption which is opposed to the virtue of hope. For, as St. Thomas rightly observes in the Secunda Secundae, question 21, article 1, the presumption which is opposed to hope is of this sort, namely, when someone hopes for something from God by His power and mercy, but not in that mode and order in which God willed to bestow upon His fallen ones - for example, the remission of sins without penance, or glory without merits

1928. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 21, a. 2; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 4, ch. 3; St. Thomas, II - II, q. 129; II - II, q. 130, a. 2; II - II, q. 162, a. 4; St. Gregory, Moralia, book 34, ch. 14 (alias 4).

from grace. For hope, which is a theological virtue, regards God as its formal object; and its formal act is to ask something of God, which is proper to the formal object of a theological virtue: wherefore the opposite vice of presumption must also regard God as the one of whom we hope, so that in a peculiar way it may be opposed. But the presumption which is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity is borne only toward one's own excellence through one's own powers, as if it did not defer to God.

Next it must be said that, to the ratio of the sin of presumption which is opposed to hope, there must belong not only desire and a simple affect of complacency, but also an affect of attaining that which is desired: for hope can never exist unless someone believes that what he asks is possible, indeed in some way assured; but the Angel did not believe, indeed could not believe, that it was possible for him to attain his beatitude by his own powers; and thus he did not hope, and consequently neither did he sin against hope; but he only desired by a simple affect - which indeed is not opposed to hope, but to another virtue, as will be explained below. For that certain persons constitute the habit of hope as if it flowed into a certain simple complacency and into a delight concerning it in the fatherland, and therefore say that this habit remains in the fatherland, is against the common sentence; and the reason for that opinion we shall treat in its proper place.[1929]

Finally, although it is true that there can be a sin against theological hope, not only by hoping for something from God contrary to the due mode, but also by hoping from man or from an Angel for what ought to be hoped for from God alone; nevertheless this is not properly called the sin of presumption, but would be called by another name: yet in no way could someone sin against hope by hoping to attain by his own powers what he ought to hope for from God - namely, from the help of God, of which he stands in need.

From what has been said thus far, someone could propose this difficulty. If the Angel had sinned with the sin of presumption, he would not only have sinned by one sin of pride, but also by a threefold kind of sin. First, against hope: for presumption also is opposed to hope, which rests upon grace and merits, as St. Thomas teaches in the Second Part of the Second, question 21, article 2: for he who hopes to attain beatitude without the merits of grace, hopes vainly and is said to presume.[1930] Second, he would sin against magnanimity, which consists, as Aristotle testifies in Ethics 4, chapter 3, and St. Thomas in the Second Part of the Second, question 129, in moderating the affections concerning great honors and dignities which it seeks according to reason. Wherefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity on the side of excess, as St. Thomas teaches in the Second Part of the Second, question 130, article 2, in so far as a man desires great things not simply, that is, not as great in themselves, but relatively, that is, as great for his own powers. Third, the Angel would have sinned with the sin of pride against humility: for presumption also is a species of pride, as St. Thomas acknowledges in the Second Part of the Second, question 162, article 4, and St. Gregory taught in book 23 of the Moralia, chapter 4 (alias 7).[1931]

1929. On this question see the treatment of the state of the virtues in patria (e.g., whether hope remains in the blessed), as commonly discussed by theologians in their loci; cf. Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 67; III, q. 4, a. 4.

1930. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 21, a. 2.

1931. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 4, ch. 3; St. Thomas, II - II, q. 129; II - II, q. 130, a. 2; II - II, q. 162, a. 4; St. Gregory, Moralia, bk. 23, ch. 4 (alias 7).

It is answered first, if we say that the Angel sinned by that sin of presumption: nevertheless it must be said that the Angel did not sin with the sin of presumption which is opposed to the virtue of hope. For, as St. Thomas rightly warns in that same Second Part of the Second, question 21, article 1, the presumption which is opposed to hope consists in this composite, that one should hope from God for something by His power and mercy, yet not in the way and order in which God willed: as if someone should hope from God for the remission of sins without penance, or for glory without merits by grace.[1932] For hope, which is a theological virtue, regards God as its formal object, from whom we hope for some other thing, which is proper to the formal object of a theological virtue; and therefore the vice of presumption opposed to it ought to regard God precisely as Him from whom we hope, that it may be set in opposition to Him under that peculiar ratio. But the presumption which is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity is borne only toward an excellence beyond one's proper power, as though that excellence were one's own when in fact it is not of one's proper virtue.

Then it must be said that, for the notion of the sin of presumption which is opposed to hope, there is required not only a desire and simple affection of complacency in the hope of obtaining that which is desired, but also a hopeful estimate that it will be obtained: for hope can never exist unless someone believes that what he hopes for is possible, indeed in some way future. But the Angel neither believed, nor indeed could he believe, that it was possible for him to attain his beatitude by his own powers; and so he did not hope, and therefore neither did he sin against hope, but he only desired with a simple affection; which indeed is not opposed to hope, but to another virtue, as will be explained below. For what some posit as the habit of hope by adding to faith a simple affection of hoping for beatitude and of delighting in it in the fatherland, and therefore say that this habit remains in the fatherland, is against the common opinion and we will easily refute it by reason in the Second Part of the Second, question 10, and in the Third Part, question 7, article 4.[1933]

Lastly, although it is true that one can sin against theological hope, not only by hoping to receive something from God contrary to the due mode, but also by hoping from man, or from an angel, that which is to be hoped for from God alone (for thus a peculiar irreverence would be shown to God, from whom it ought to be hoped: which certainly would not be called the sin of presumption, but ought to be named otherwise), nevertheless no one can sin against hope by hoping to obtain by his own powers that which he ought to hope for from God: because no one can hope from himself to do anything by his own virtue, except in so far as he trusts that, with the help of God of which he stands in need, he will act rightly.

The reason indeed is, that every act of hoping has as its object something arduous; but the arduousness and difficulty lies in this, that we hope to receive from another what we desire; whereas what we desire to be brought about by ourselves, we do not hope for, in so far as it is going

1932. St. Thomas, II - II, q. 21, a. 1.
1933. St. Thomas, II - II, q. 10; III, q. 7, a. 4.

to be from ourselves alone: for on that score it is easy, nor can it be the object of hope, as I noted above in Disputation 84, chapter 1. We do, however, sometimes hope for something to be from ourselves, by reason of the removal of impediments which must be removed by another.

As to that which in the same difficulty was proposed - namely, in what way the sin of presumption is distinguished as it is opposed to magnanimity and to humility, and whether humility is the same virtue with magnanimity, or a different virtue - it is not for this place to define. Nevertheless I will set forth the things which I have read written on this matter, and I will leave the defining of the thing to its place in the Second Part of the Second. St. Thomas, in the places cited of the Second Part of the Second, and Cajetan there plainly teach that magnanimity and humility are two distinct virtues; and consequently that presumption is a sin in a twofold respect opposed to these two virtues. Cajetan, in the Second Part of the Second, question 161, article 1, explains the ratio of the virtue of humility, so as to distinguish it from magnanimity, in this way, that humility formally consists in due subjection to God, not as to one commanding (for this is obedience) but to God simply as God: wherefore presumption, in the sentence of Cajetan, so far as it pertains to the sin of pride and is opposed to the virtue of humility, will be a not willing to be subject to God. Magnanimity, on the other hand, in his view, is a virtue which is conversant about dignities and honors according to a due and fitting mode; and thus presumption opposed to magnanimity will be an immoderate affection for honor and dignity beyond the measure that is due and fitting. But this way does not assign sufficiently the discrimination between these two virtues and between those two vices. For humility is not only in due subjection to God, but also in moderating the affection for honor and dignity. In like manner pride is not only a not being subject to God, but also an appetite and complacency in honor and dignity beyond the due measure. Therefore, in another way, magnanimity and humility must be distinguished: the presumption that pertains to pride, which is opposed to humility, and the presumption opposed to magnanimity.

St. Thomas, in that Second Part of the Second, question 161, article 1, among those two virtues assigns this difference, that humility restrains the mind lest it tend immoderately to sublime things; but magnanimity impels, against despair, toward the attainment of great things according to the due mode. From which difference it seems difficult to gather the discrimination between the presumption opposed to humility, which is a species of pride, and the presumption opposed to magnanimity.

Finally, Martinus de Magistris, in the first question on humility, thinks that humility and magnanimity are the same virtue. He proves it thus, because they have one and the same contrary, namely presumption under the same precise notion, to wit, in so far as it is the appetite for honor, excellence, and dignity beyond the due measure. For this opinion, first, the authority of Aristotle makes for it, who, concerning honors and dignities, never established any other virtue than magnanimity holding the mean, which he treats in Ethics 4, chapter 3; nor does he anywhere else treat humility as a distinct virtue. The extremes and vices opposed to magnanimity he clearly posits: pusillanimity on one side by defect, because it does not care for the dignity and honor that is due; the other extreme by excess he calls the vain man (ventosus), whom we can call the proud and presumptuous; of which below we will speak in its place. But these two vices are opposed to

humility: by defect indeed it is pusillanimity. Second, St. Thomas in the Second Part of the Second, questions 131 and 132, assigns as vices opposed to magnanimity by excess, vainglory and ambition. Who, however, would doubt that these vices are opposed to humility? Third, for this opinion this reason can be formed: the mean is the same between the same extremes; that which is kept by magnanimity and humility alike, namely, between excessive honors and dignities and abject tasks; and each virtue has two acts of the same kind: for both humility and magnanimity impel the soul, lest, from fear of going too far in honors and dignities, it should not dare great things; and each restrains the appetite, lest it should tend to greater things: therefore the same is the virtue of magnanimity and humility. For the mean between extremes is the formal object constituting any virtue and distinguishing it from the others. It matters little, therefore, that there are two acts, one of restraining the appetite, the other of impelling: since these acts are conversant among extremes to constitute a due mean between them. For every virtue that is conversant about an object consisting in a mean between extremes has two acts in the same way, as is evident.

But someone will object: Christians often, by the virtue of humility, choose for themselves the most abject state, and treat themselves as most vile; which does not seem to be of magnanimity, since it rather inclines to the extreme of pusillanimity; and yet it is a work of Christian humility, which Aristotle and the philosophers did not know: therefore it is necessary to distinguish humility from magnanimity.

I answer, this kind of Christian humility is not alien from the true magnanimity which the philosophers knew: because Christians considered themselves, not in so far as they are worthy of such an honor in the commonwealth, or of the office which they exercise, but in so far as they recognize themselves sinners before God: they plainly see and judge that it is not smallness but greatness of soul to treat themselves thus. Nevertheless, along with this, on the other side they ought to have regard to the office which they exercise, whether of a Bishop or of a King, or another in the commonwealth, lest in such works of humility, assumed from the consideration of sin, they decline into the vice of pusillanimity. Although therefore the philosophers did not know this cause of humility, namely the consideration of sins before God, yet they do not seem to have been ignorant of the rationale of humility in general. These are the things which occur to me in passing to be proposed in this difficulty; the definition and force of which are deferred to the Second Part of the Second.

Caput V - By what reason the Angel could sin by the appetite of natural beatitude

We have explained thus far in what way the Angel could have sinned by the appetite for his own supernatural beatitude. Now it remains to be examined, whether he sinned by the appetite for natural beatitude, or at least could have sinned. St. Thomas, whom also Caietan follows in this article, and the Ferrariensis, in the third book Contra gentes, chapter 109; Hervaeus, and Bassolis, in the places cited, teach that the Angel sinned by an immoderate appetite for natural beatitude: because that pleased him as an ultimate end in such a way that he turned himself away from supernatural beatitude. With these also makes for the same Aegidius; and Richard seems to agree,

although they do not agree in the explanation of this opinion. Richard understands it thus, that the Angel by deliberation preferred his own excellence to the divine; in which respect indeed he seemed to constitute as his last end his own excellence and natural beatitude rather than the divine. But by what comparison there was a greater love of his own excellence than of the divine, namely than of the divine beatitude which he was going to receive from God if he persevered, Richard does not explain.

St. Thomas sets out his opinion in this way, that the Angel sinned by desiring the likeness of God in such a way that he rested in his natural perfection as in a last end; but he turned away his appetite from the supernatural beatitude which he was going to receive from God. Yet because it seemed difficult that the Angel first, by his own sin, expressly willed to avert himself from his last supernatural beatitude - whence there would seem to have to be conceded an error in the intellect of the Angel, so that he sinned by such an affection, which is absurd - therefore Hervaeus, Caietan, the Ferrariensis in that cited chapter, and more recent Thomists, to whom add also Aegidius and Bassolis in the place alleged, interpret the mind of St. Thomas thus: that the Angel did not sin with an express will of averting himself from supernatural beatitude, but because he so loved his natural beatitude and excellence that he did not refer it to the supernatural, to which he was bound to refer it. And that the omission of this reference arose from inconsideration, they affirm...

We have explained above how the angel could sin by a proud appetite of his own supernatural beatitude. Now there remains to be examined whether he sinned by the appetite of natural beatitude, or at least could sin thus. St. Thomas, whom Cajetan also follows in this article, together with Ferrarensis in the third book Contra gentes, chapter 109, Hervaeus, and Bassolis in the places cited, teach that the angel sinned by an immoderate appetite of natural beatitude: because that pleased him in such a way as an ultimate end that he averted himself from supernatural beatitude.[1934] With these Aegidius also agrees, and Richard seems to consent, although in their explanation of this position they do not agree.[1935] Richard understands it thus: that the angel by deliberation loved his own excellence more than the divine; by which reasoning he seemed to constitute his ultimate end in natural excellence and beatitude. But by what comparison that love of his own excellence was greater than the divine - namely, than the divine beatitude that he was to receive from God if he stood firm - Richard does not explain.

St. Thomas sets out his view in this way: that the angel sinned by so seeking a likeness of God as to rest in his own natural perfection as in his last end; but he averted his appetite from the supernatural beatitude which he was to receive from God. However, because it seems difficult that the angel in his first sin expressly willed to avert himself from ultimate supernatural beatitude - whence an error in the angel's intellect would seem to have to be conceded, which is absurd - therefore Hervaeus, Cajetan, Ferrarensis in the cited chapter, § Ad evidentiam rationis, and recent Thomists (to whom they also add Aegidius and Bassolis in the place alleged) interpret the mind of St. Thomas in such a way that the angel did not sin with an express will of averting himself from

1934. Cajetan, ad hunc articulum; Ferrarensis, III Contra gentes, c. 109; Hervaeus; Bassolis.
1935. Aegidius; Richard.

beatitude, but because he so loved his natural beatitude that he did not refer it to the supernatural, to which he was bound to refer it. And that the omission of this reference arose from inconsideration, Hervaeus and Ferrarensis affirm; others say nothing about inconsideration.

Yet to me this way of explaining the angel's sin by that omission of reference is refuted as false. First, by no means, if it be said that it came from inconsideration: for, as was said in chapter 2, a sin could not befall the angel from inconsideration. Next also, because such a sin would not be pride (*superbia*), if the angel had sinned from the sole omission of reference: and so in this way one cannot defend the common view which asserts that the first sin of the angel was pride. For if the angel were to advert that there was a precept to him of referring his own excellence and natural beatitude to the supernatural, and he did not refer it, he would not sin by the sin of pride: because to take delight in one's own excellence and natural beatitude - without attributing it to oneself as author, either by thought or by affection, even a simple one - is not a sin of pride: for that sin is the appetite (*appetitus*) of an excellence beyond one's proper dignity. But he who delights in his own natural beatitude and excellence, as in that whereby he is made to the likeness of God, capable of grace (*gratia*) and gifts, does not seek an excellence beyond his own dignity. Therefore, if the angel had thus taken delight in his natural beatitude and perfection, while otherwise rightly acknowledging that he had received all that from God as author, he would not have sinned by the sin of pride. Nor indeed would he have sinned by the sin of pride because he omitted to refer his own beatitude and natural perfection to supernatural beatitude. For if there had been a precept of referring natural beatitude to the supernatural that obliged the angel, and he had so omitted to refer that the omission were imputed as culpable, it would not have been a sin of pride: because it would not have been an appetite of excellence beyond his own dignity; and no sin of pride consists in omission, but every sin of pride is of commission. Therefore it would have been an omission-sin either against hope or against charity, from which that obligation of referring would have arisen: because in truth it would not have been merely an omission of a circumstance, but the omission of an act of some virtue. Moreover, even if that complacency in one's own natural excellence were the cause of not referring, and thus of transgressing the precept of another virtue, nevertheless it would not on that account have been a sin of pride - just as, if someone, delighting in his own natural excellence, should not attribute it to himself as author, neither by thought nor affection even simple, it is not a sin of pride: for that sin is the appetite of an excellence beyond one's proper dignity.

Add also that by no reasoning can it be proved that the angel in the first instant had a precept of referring his own natural beatitude to the supernatural, as in chapter 2 we said about another like precept. For there was neither a positive precept, since none was imposed on the angel, as we proved from the sentiment of the Fathers; nor can it by any reasoning be shown that there was a precept of order from the very nature of the thing, as we also deduced there about another like case.

My opinion therefore is that the angel's sin could indeed be one of pride in the appetite and complacency of natural beatitude, but with an express aversion from supernatural beatitude, as will immediately be explained - in which point this opinion is most consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas: but that the angel did sin by such a sin cannot be held as certain.

And to begin with this latter part: in the first place it is certain that by reason alone it cannot be inferred what sort the angel's sin was, since this matter consists in the fact. Wherefore it must be established for us by authority alone. Now, as has been sufficiently shown above, the common sense of the Fathers teaches only that the sin was pride: which, to be sure, could have occurred in a thousand ways. But that it was this or that sin about this or that object, certainly we do not have from their common doctrine. And if some, as we have seen above, assign some object and mode of this pride in the angel, yet no one says that the angel sinned by the appetite of his natural beatitude, averting himself from supernatural beatitude. But Cajetan at the end of this article holds himself persuaded that the angel sinned by this sin of pride: because the proud are more impelled to the sin of pride by delight in a natural good and perfection. I for my part do not see why we ought to affirm this assertively: especially in an angel, to whom, since he clearly saw that the natural perfection he had was from God, it would not easily have displeased him to be able to have another greater from the same.

But as to the former part, which is only about the possible, we can by sure reason explain and prove that the angel could sin with a sin of pride. For it could so please the angel - his own nature and natural perfection - that it would displease him to need another supernatural and extrinsic perfection which he would have to expect from God by merits: in which there would indeed be an express aversion from supernatural beatitude, not by an efficacious act but by a simple affect of displeasure: and there would be a manifest affect of pride, and an appetite of one's own excellence beyond a due mode: which, however, would be a sin of pride not by reason that there was complacency over one's own excellence, but by reason of the aversion from supernatural beatitude. Now such an affect could indeed occur without error of the intellect, from a merely assumed proposition (as we explained above), proposed under the appearance that he somewhat needed further extrinsic perfection, and that his intrinsic and natural perfection, which he had, did not suffice him.

However, that we may defend that in the appetite and complacency for natural beatitude there could have been a sin of pride, Ferrarensis notes that it could do no harm that the love of natural perfection is necessary as to its specific line. For since it is free as to exercise (*exercitium*), this suffices, that in it there be freedom sufficient for sin. But since this sin of pride would have occurred from this, that it displeased the angel to need extrinsic beatitude, and in this affect there would be freedom as to exercise and as to specification, there is no reason for us to have recourse to what Ferrarensis notes.

Caput VI - How the angel could sin by desiring to be preferred to others

Finally, to explain the nature of the sin by which the angel is said to have sinned from pride, the Doctors discuss whether he desired to be preferred to others or to preside over others, or at least to be subject to none: and it will be clear below that by these two modes he could sin by an affect of pride. Not a few scholastic Doctors, and some holy Fathers as well, have held that the sin of the angel was this, that he desired to preside and to be subject to none. Of the Scholastics, Alexander teaches this in the Second Part, question 98, member 3, in the body; and he at the same time also teaches that he sinned by an immoderate affect of beatitude.[1936] The same is affirmed by St. Bonaventure on II, dist. an., q. 2; by Nicholas of Lyra on Isaiah 14, "I will ascend into heaven"; by Burgensis in the addition to that chapter; by Toringus in the reply to the same; and by William of Paris, De universo, part 2 of the principal part, chapters 109 and 110.[1937] Among the lesser ones, first St. Augustine in book 14 of the City of God, in one chapter with the words, "After that proud angel, and thereby the world, by the same pride turned himself from God to himself, to exercise over his subjects a certain as it were tyrannical dominion, he cast himself out of the spiritual paradise."[1938] Second, St. Basil in Oration 17, which is on humility, where he speaks thus: "He (namely the demon), when he had lifted himself above men, dragged down all men."[1939] Third, St. Gregory in book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 17 (alias 14), says thus: "He (namely the demon) lusted for the license of liberty, to be preferred to the rest, that he might be subject to none."[1940] Fourth, St. Bernard in Sermons 17 and 69 on the Canticles plainly asserts that the demon desired to preside over men as master and head, and that he was indignant that, for the remedy of men, the divine Word should take flesh; and therefore that he said, "To what purpose is this waste of ointment?" as if he were to say that so great a remedy was not needed.[1941]

Whether the angel desired to preside over angels, or only over men, is not taught in the same way by the Doctors: Basil and Bernard seem to assert that the angel desired to preside only over men, for they make no mention of the angels; others, however, seem to speak with respect to the angels. I for my part think that the angel could have sinned in either way. But whether he sinned in this way or in that, I do not know for certain, nor do I see whence we might be able to gather it.

Moreover, by what rationale the angel desired to preside over men or angels, the Doctors alleged do not explain. This nevertheless we can assert by certain reasoning: that their sin, in order to be one of pride, had to be in the appetite and complacency, not of the excellence that is natural, by which he naturally excelled others (for this complacency would not have been a sin of pride - for that a man rejoices to be superior to brute animals is not a sin of pride), but it had to be in the appetite of some excellence which by its very nature did not befit him: for thus he would have desired some excellence beyond his proper dignity. Whether therefore that excellence was that of

1936. Alexander of Hales, Summa, II, q. 98, m. 3, in corp.

1937. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. an., q. 2; Nicholas of Lyra, on Isaiah 14, "In caelum ascendam"; Paulus Burgensis, addition to that chapter; Toringus, reply to the same; William of Paris, De universo, pars 2 partis principalis, cc. 109 - 110.

1938. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 14, cited words beginning "Postquam superbus ille Angelus..."

1939. St. Basil, Oratio 17, De humilitate.

1940. St. Gregory, Moralia, l. 34, c. 17 (alias 14).

1941. St. Bernard, Serm. 17 et 69 in Cantica.

the redeemer, which the angel desired for himself, or that of the teacher of men, to lead them into life eternal, or some other beyond his proper dignity, it would indeed have been a sin of pride; and it could befall him without error of the intellect, as we showed above about the appetite of equality with God according to nature, and of attaining beatitude by one's own powers.

Finally, to an angel who by nature was subject to another as being inferior to him according to nature, there could befall a sin of pride from a displeasure at such subjection; because it would displease him to be inferior to another according to nature: and this also would be pride, as is clearly gathered from the definition of pride. Whether the angel sinned in this way no one can define.

Lastly, among some of the Doctors alleged in this chapter there is a dissent about whether the angel could desire not to be subject to God; and by this rationale sin from pride. For the Fathers alleged, who say that the angel desired not to be subject, do not explain whether to God, or to the other angels. But as to the supreme case, if he sinned, it must be certain that he did not sin from this, that he desired not to be subject to others by nature: since by his own nature he excelled all. The rest indeed could sin by this appetite, as we have said, and it would be a sin of pride. But whether the angel could sin by desiring not to be subject to God, is a question among some Doctors. Nicholas of Lyra and Toringus in the places alleged judged that the angel desired not to be subject to God as a rule of operations; but that not to be subject to God according to existence he could not desire: because the former was possible, and so could fall under appetite; but the latter was not possible, and therefore the angel could not desire it. "For there cannot be a will about impossibles according to the order of making," says Toringus; "but there can be a will about the impossible in the order of doing: because many things are in the order of things which are in themselves possible, yet are impossible for someone." Of this kind are what Cajetan, as we saw in chapter 2 of this disputation, calls "impossibles per accidens": as not to have sinned, when now the sin is past.[1942]

Yet the opinion of Burgensis pleases me in the place cited, who affirms that the angel could will to be subject to God in no way, and in this way sin by pride: not only not to be subject to God commanding, but also not to be subject to God according to existence: not by efficacious desire, because the angel saw this to be impossible, and there is no efficacious will of the impossible; but by a simple affect, by reason that it displeased him to be inferior to God according to nature: and this indeed would be a sin of pride, as is clear. That there can be a simple affect of complacency or of displeasure about an impossible, and without error in the intellect, has been sufficiently proved by us above in chapter 2.

Moreover, the appetite by which the angel would will not to be subject to God as preceptor could occur in various ways. First, the angel could will not to be subject to God according to power, that is, to be so free from God's dominion that God could not impose a precept upon him: and this is as impossible as that God should not be superior to him according to essence: and accordingly, the very same must be said about this affect as about the preceding one, namely, that it could be a

1942. Cajetan, on chapter 2 of this disputation, on "impossibilia per accidens."

simple affect: which assuredly would be a sin of pride. Next, the angel could desire not to be subject to God actually commanding; and this in two ways. In one way, by transgressing his precept; and this affect could be efficacious: but it would be a sin, not of pride, but of the special inobedience, if it were done from an express intention not to obey, according to what we shall say in I - II, question 73, article 8: for if it were done without this express intention, it would only be a sin in that species in which the matter of the precept was constituted, according to what we shall also note there. In the other way, the angel could desire not to be subject to a precept, bearing it indignantly that a precept be imposed upon him, as though he judged it unworthy that anything should be commanded him by God: and this would be an affect of pride. Let these things suffice about this whole controversy, in which by enumeration we have shown in what ways the angel could sin. And as to the fact and the sin by which he sinned - what is certain, and what is not so certain - we have also pointed out incidentally.

Articulus IV - Whether some demons are naturally evil

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that some demons are naturally evil. For Porphyry says, as St. Augustine reports in book 10 of the City of God, that there are certain ...[1943]

...displeasure at such subjection; for it would be displeasing, if it could happen, to will not to be subject to God; and this too would be pride, as is clearly gathered from the definition of pride. Whether in fact the Angel sinned in this manner no one can determine.

Lastly, among some of the Doctors adduced in this chapter there is disagreement whether the Angel could desire not to be subject to God, and for this reason sin by pride. For the Fathers alleged, who say that the Angel desired not to be subject, do not explain whether not to God, or not to other angels. As to the supreme [angel], if he sinned, it must be certain that he did not sin on the ground that he desired not to be subject to others by nature; for by his own nature he was pre-eminent over all. The rest, however, could sin by this appetite, as we have said, and it would be a sin of pride. But whether the Angel could sin by desiring not to be subject to God is a question among certain Doctors. Nicholas of Lyra and Toringus, in the places cited, thought that the Angel desired not to be subject to God as the rule of operations; but that not to be subject to God as to existence he could not desire, because the former was possible and therefore could fall under the Angel's appetite, whereas the latter was not possible and therefore the Angel could not desire it. For, says Toringus, with respect to impossibles in the order of bringing-into-being there cannot be will; with respect to impossibles in the order of doing there can be, because many things in that order are in themselves possible which are nevertheless impossible for someone. Such are those which Cajetan called, as we saw in chapter 2 of this disputation, "accidental impossibles," as, after sin has already been committed, not to have sinned.[1944]

1943. Porphyry, as introduced by St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 10. The following scholastic reference string in the margin is to the Sentences: II, d. 7, q. 1; and commentators, c. 107.

1944. Cajetan, on chapter 2 of this disputation, on "accidental impossibles."

However, the opinion of Burgensis in the place cited pleases me, who affirms that the Angel could will in no way to be subject to God, and in this manner sin by pride: not only not to be subject to God when commanding, but also not to be subject to God according to being; not by an efficacious will of effecting, but by an affection of displeasure at being inferior according to nature; and this, too, would be the sin of pride, as is clearly gathered from the definition of pride. Whether indeed the Angel sinned in this manner no one can define.

And such an affection of displeasure could occur, and without an error in the intellect, as was proved above in chapter 2. In various ways, moreover, this affection - by which the Angel might here desire - could occur.

- First, the Angel could desire to be exempt from God's dominion, so that He could not impose [His command]; a thing impossible as regards the order of being - just as God is not subject according to essence - and thus this would be a simple affection, which indeed would be a sin of pride.
- Next, the Angel could desire not to be subject to God commanding; and here the affection could pass into a transgression, and this affection could be a special sin of disobedience, if a precept were given with an expressly formed intention of not obeying; and then the sin would be in that species in which is the matter of the precept, according to what we shall note.
- In another way, he could desire not to be subject to one imposing a precept upon him, judging it unworthy that anything be imposed upon him by another; and here the affection would be of pride.

Let these things suffice concerning this whole imagining, in which we have shown in what modes the Angel could sin. As to the fact itself, and the sin, that he did sin is certain; what indeed he willed, we have also shown.

Whether some demons are naturally evil

Objicitur that some demons are naturally evil.

1. For, as Augustine introduces Porphyry, there is, as he says, a certain kind of demons by nature deceitful, feigning themselves gods and the souls of the dead. But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally evil.
2. Further, just as angels are created by God, so also are men. But some men are naturally evil, of whom it is said (Wisdom 12[17]): "Their malice was natural to them." Therefore some angels too can be naturally evil.
3. Further, some irrational animals have certain natural wickednesses: as the fox is by nature sly, and the wolf by nature rapacious; and yet they are creatures of God. Therefore demons also, although they are creatures of God, can be naturally evil.

But on the contrary: Dionysius says in book 4, chapter On the Divine Names, that demons are not naturally evil.

I answer: Everything that is, insofar as it is and has some nature (*natura*), tends by nature toward some good, as existing from a good principle; for the effect is always converted into its principle. But it happens that some evil is adjoined to some particular good, as this evil is adjoined to fire, that it consumes other things. But no evil can be adjoined to the universal good. If, therefore, there be something whose nature is ordered to some particular good, it can naturally tend into some evil, not insofar as it is evil, but per accidens, insofar as it is conjoined to some good. But if there be something whose nature is ordered to some good according to the common notion of the good, this according to its nature cannot tend into any evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature (*natura intellectualis*) has an order to the universal good, which it can apprehend, and which is the object of the will (*voluntas*). Hence, since demons are intellectual substances, in no way can they have a natural inclination into any evil whatsoever. And therefore they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply to the first: Augustine there reproves Porphyry for having said that demons were naturally deceitful; saying that they are not naturally deceitful, but by their own will. Now Porphyry on this account supposed demons to be by nature deceitful, because he posited that demons are animals having a sensitive nature (*natura sensitiva*). But the sensitive nature is ordered to some particular good, to which evil can be conjoined. And according to this they can have some natural inclination to an evil per accidens, namely insofar as the evil is conjoined to some good.

Reply to the second: The malice of some men can be called natural either on account of custom, which is a second nature, or on account of a natural inclination on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion; as some are said to be naturally irascible or concupiscent. Not, however, on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply to the third: The souls of brute animals, according to the sensitive nature, have a natural inclination to certain particular goods, to which some evils are conjoined: as the fox to procure sustenance sagaciously, to which craftiness is adjoined. Hence, to be crafty is not evil for the fox, since it is natural to it; just as to be furious is not evil for a dog: as Dionysius says in book 4, chapter On the Divine Names.

Notationes circa Articulum.

The conclusion is negative and, beyond controversy. Concerning which it is to be noted that a double sense of "to be able to be" is possible. The prior sense is that angels are not evil according to their nature and substance; and this is defined de fide in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith; and in the First Council of Braga, canon 7; and by Leo I in Epistle 91, which is to Turibius, chapter 6, where he defines the same thing against the Priscillianists, who in this erred with the Manichee, and used to say that the demon is by his nature evil and the author of every evil, and was never good nor made good by God, but welled up out of chaos and darkness. In this error was Manichaeus, as Augustine testifies in the book On Heresies, chapter 46.[1945] The posterior sense of the conclusion is that the Angel is not naturally evil; and in this sense also the conclusion is true, because in very truth in the Angel there is no natural inclination to evil.

Passing over the reason of St. Thomas which you have in the text, another no less easily can be proved, which is as follows. In an angel there cannot be an inclination to sin except by reason of the will, which alone is the principle of sinning; but the will of a rational creature cannot be naturally inclined to evil. For a natural inclination of the will can be nothing else than an inclination according to the mode of nature, that is, by a necessary determination to one part, either as to exercise or as to specification: but no created will can be inclined of necessity to any sin, neither as to exercise - for there is no object of sin which is so loved by the will that it cannot fail to be loved - nor as to specification, for the will so loves no sin that it cannot hate it. Therefore in no way is a created will inclined to sin. Nor can a natural inclination to sin be said to exist in a rational creature by way of an innate potency merely to receive a form: for this inclination is said to be natural only when it is to a natural perfection. Nor is it enough to have a capacity arising from proper principles; for with respect to a supernatural form this capacity is wont to be called not natural but obediential. Wherefore, with respect to sin, which is against nature, it ought not to be called natural. But in man, by reason of sense, there is a certain natural inclination to a work which, with the accession of free consent of the will, would be sin (as will be explained in I - II, q. 71, a. 2). Therefore in demons there is a free inclination to sin, and in no way a natural one.

Further, concerning the doctrine of Aristotle against certain more recent theologians, observe that it is wrongly gathered by them, from the fact that an angel cannot sin in pure nature against the natural law, that he has no natural inclination to evil. For, in order that he be able to sin, such an inclination is not required, but the freedom of the will suffices. Otherwise even man could not sin against the natural law; because although he has a natural inclination on the part of the appetite to a work which, with consent supervening, would be sin, nevertheless he does not have a natural inclination to the very consent of sin, on which the ratio of sin essentially depends.

1945. Lateran IV under Innocent III, cap. Firmiter (on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith); First Council of Braga, canon 7; Leo I, Epistle 91 to Turibius, cap. 6; against the Priscillianists and Manichees. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 46.

Articulus V - Whether the devil was evil in the first instant of his creation, by the fault of his own will

Dico quinto sic proceditur.

It seems that the devil in the very first instant of his creation was evil by the fault of his own will. For it is said in John 8 of the devil: "He was a murderer from the beginning."

1. Further, according to Augustine on Genesis ad litteram, the formlessness of a creature did not precede its formation in time, but only in origin. But by "heaven," which is read to have been first created (as he says in the second book), the formless angelic nature is understood. By what is said, that God said, "Let there be light," is understood its formation through conversion to the Word. Therefore at once the angelic nature was created, and was made light; but at the same time that it was made light, it was distinguished from the darkness, by which the sinning angels are understood. Therefore, in the first instant of their creation, some angels were beatified, and some sinned.
2. Further, sin is opposed to merit. But in the first instant of its creation any intellectual nature could merit, as the soul of Christ, or even the good angels themselves. Therefore the demons also in the first instant of their creation could sin.
3. Further, the angelic nature is more virtuous than a bodily nature. But a bodily thing in the first instant of its creation begins to have its operation, as fire in the first instant in which it is generated begins to move upward. Therefore the angel too in the first instant of his creation could operate. Either therefore he had a right operation, or not right. If right, since they had grace, by it they merited beatitude. But in angels the reward follows immediately upon merit, as was said above. Therefore they would have been at once blessed, and thus would never have sinned. Which is false. It remains, therefore, that in the first instant, by not operating rightly, they sinned.

But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 1: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the demons. Therefore even the demons at some time were good.

I answer that some have held that straightway the demons in the first instant of their creation were evil, not indeed by nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, from when he became the devil, he refused justice. To which opinion, as Augustine says in the City of God, some have assented; not with those heretics, namely the Manichees, who say that the devil has a natural evil. But because this opinion contradicts the authority of Scripture - for it is said under the figure of the prince of Babylon of the devil, Isaiah 14: "How has Lucifer fallen, who did rise in the morning?" and Ezekiel 28: "Thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God," said to the devil under the person of the king of Tyre - therefore among the Masters this opinion has been rejected as irrational. Hence others have said that the angels in the first instant of their creation were able to sin, but did not sin. But this opinion also by some is reproved for this reason: since when two

operations follow one another, it seems impossible that in the same now both operations should be terminated. But manifest it is that the sin of the angel was an operation posterior to creation. Now the terminus of creation is the very existence (*esse*) of the angel; but the terminus of the operation of sin is that which was evil. It seems therefore impossible that in the first instant in which the angel began to exist, he was evil.

But this reason does not seem sufficient. For it has place only in temporal motions, which are carried out successively; as, if local motion follows upon alteration, in the same instant the alteration cannot be terminated and the local motion begin. But if the changes are instantaneous, the first and second terminus of the change can be together in the same instant: as in the same instant in which the moon is illuminated by the sun, it is illuminated by the moon. Now it is manifest that creation is instantaneous, and similarly the motion of free choice in angels; for they do not need weighing and discourse of reason, as was shown above. Hence nothing prevents terminus of creation and terminus of free choice from being together in the same instant. And therefore it is to be said otherwise, that it is impossible that an angel should have sinned in the first instant by an inordinate act of free choice. For although a thing in the first instant in which it begins to be can at once begin to operate, nevertheless that operation which it at once begins together with the being of the thing is to it from the agent from which it has being: as to be moved upward inheres in fire from the generating agent. Hence, if some thing has being from a deficient agent, which can be the cause of a defect of action, it can in the first instant in which it begins to be have a defect in its operation: as if a leg-bone, which is born lame from a defect in the seed, at once begins to limp. But the agent which produced the angels into being - namely God - cannot be the cause of sin. Therefore the angel could not sin in the first instant; rather he was at first good, and then sinned.

Wherefore it cannot be said that the devil was evil in the first instant of his creation.

Reply to the first: As St. Augustine says in De civitate Dei XI, when it is said that the devil sinned from the beginning, he is not to be understood to have sinned from the beginning from which he was created, but from the beginning of his sin, namely because he never departed from his sin.

Reply to the second: That distinction of light and darkness, in so far as by darkness the sins of the demons are understood, is to be taken according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says in the same book XI of De civitate Dei, that he alone could discern light and darkness who could also, before they fell, foreknow that they would fall.

Reply to the third: Whatever there is in merit is from God. And therefore the angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. But the case is not similar as regards sin, as has been said.

Reply to the fourth: God did not make a distinction among the angels before the aversion of some and the conversion of others, as Augustine says in De civitate Dei XI. And therefore all, having been created in grace, merited in the first instant. But some of them at once supplied an impediment to their beatitude, mortifying the preceding merit. And therefore they have been deprived of the beatitude which they merited.

The first conclusion is: The evil angels did not sin in the first instant of their creation. The second conclusion: No angel could sin in the first instant.

Disputatio CCXXXVI - Whether an angel could sin in the first instant of his existence

Angels did not sin in the first instant: this is the common and truer opinion. Caput 1.

That angels could have sinned in the first instant: some affirm this, others deny it. Caput 2.

Judgment concerning each opinion. Caput 3.

That in the first instant of their creation the angels could merit. Caput 4.

Caput I - The common and truer opinion: that the angels did not sin in the first instant

From the things we said in Disputation 226 it was clear that the angels did not sin in the first instant of their existence. For we showed, against not a few Scholastics, that the angels were created in grace, with which sin could not exist, not even by God's absolute power - a point that ought to be most certain for us who, against the heretics of our time, defend the true justice and sanctity inhering in the just, as we will show in I - II, q.113, a.2.[1946] But because among those Doctors who deny that the angels were created in grace, many also think that nevertheless the angel did not sin in the first instant, whereas one or another alone teaches the opposite, therefore, before we examine the proposed question concerning possibility, it seemed good first to establish how certain it ought to be that the angels did not sin in the first instant.

Accordingly, among those who teach that the angels were not created in the grace of God, Augustine Eugubinus in book 8 of De perenni philosophia, chapter 38, did not hesitate to affirm that the evil angels sinned from the beginning of their creation. He cites in favor of his opinion a certain Latin theologian, Theodore by name, and the words by which he expressly asserted this. The same opinion had previously been defended as probable by Alexander in 2, q.98, m.11, though not quite consistently with his own principles, as we shall see below.[1947] Among the Fathers, Augustine would seem to have been uselessly pressed into service, in book XI of De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 23, where he says that the devil fell not from what he had received, but from what he would have received had he willed to be subject; and in book XI of De civitate Dei, chapter 13, when he affirms that whoever thinks that the angels sinned by their own will from the beginning of their creation does not agree with the Manichee: for the Manichee taught that the angels are evil not only by their own will, but also by their very nature; whereas he would assert only this, that the angels from the beginning of their creation were evil by their will alone, and fell. But, as Augustine admonishes in that same book XI of De Genesi, chapter 23, if the angel by his nature from God had

1946. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q.113, a.2.
1947. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 2, q.98, memb. 11.

been made evil, he would not be said to have fallen. In Scripture, however, I find no foundation for this opinion that has any appearance of probability except that saying of John 8: "He" (namely the demon) "was a murderer from the beginning," and "he did not stand in the truth."

The opposite opinion, however, is most certain and confirmed by the common vote of all the Scholastics, who all, in II, distinction 4, in the places cited by us in Disputation 226, agree with St. Thomas in this article that the angels did not sin in the first instant, although they disagree among themselves whether they were created in grace or in pure nature. And St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure deem this opinion so true that St. Thomas insinuates the opposite to be erroneous, and Bonaventure says it borders upon heresy. Bonaventure and Thomas of Argentina also report that it was condemned by the bishop of Paris together with all the theologians of that university; and in confirmation of that condemnation more recent theologians heap up many considerations, which must be examined one by one. But first, from Augustine let us have it as certain that he does not fall into the Manichaean heresy who would say that the angel sinned by his own will from the beginning of his creation - which also we above have demonstrated by the best reasoning.

But let us see what Scriptural testimonies some bring forward by which they strive to condemn the opinion of Eugubinus. One is Isaiah 14: "How art thou fallen, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning." To this is similar that of Ezekiel 28: "Thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God," by which it seems to be proved that the angelic deserter had first been in the grace of God. Yet that these testimonies are not to be understood in the literal sense about the demon has been more than sufficiently shown above in Disputation 223, chapter 4; but to understand them of the demon by figure and accommodation does not seem sufficient to define a matter of faith, unless it is clear that the Holy Spirit willed by some fact of the one to signify the fact of the other.

Another testimony is that of John 8: "He did not stand in the truth," that is, in the holiness in which he was constituted. From this, however, it is not sufficiently proved that the angel had first been in grace before he sinned; this we showed at greater length in Disputation 227, chapter 2; and from that the foundation of the opinion of Eugubinus is also overthrown, who for this reason proves from that testimony that the angel sinned from the beginning of his creation, because it is said, "He was a murderer from the beginning." For that phrase "from the beginning" does not denote the very individual instant of his creation, or of the whole world; but a little after the beginning of the world, by reason of which small distance it is said "from the beginning"; either because, deceiving our first parents in paradise, he killed them spiritually, or because not long after he deceived Cain so that he killed his brother Abel. This sense, in my judgment, more fits the text of John. For there to the Jews who wished to kill Christ corporally, Christ said, "You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you wish to do: he was a murderer from the beginning," that is, from the beginning of the world he instigated to homicide. For the same John in his First Epistle, chapter 3, when he had said, "In this the children of God and the children of the devil are manifest: everyone who is not just is not of God, and he who does not love his brother; for this is the announcement which you have heard from the beginning, that you should love one another," to persuade them to brotherly love, subjoins, "Not as Cain, who was of the evil one, and killed his brother." There he opposes this, namely "to be of the evil one," to that which is "to be of

God"; and thus for John it comes to the same, "to be of the evil one," which he said in that chapter 3 of his First Epistle, as "to be of the devil as father," as he had said in the Gospel, chapter 8 - namely alluding to that deed by which, at the devil's persuasion, Cain killed his brother - so that for this reason the devil is said to be a murderer "from the beginning." In the same way Augustine, book XI of De civitate Dei, chapter 13, explains that saying of John 3, "the devil sins from the beginning," so that the phrase "from the beginning" signifies the same as "around the beginning of the world" or "of his condition."

Next, more recent theologians bring forward, to the condemnation of the opinion of Eugubinus, the Church's definition in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, where it is said: "For the devil and the other demons were indeed created by God naturally good, but they themselves by themselves became evil." From this place, however, Eugubinus's opinion cannot be so clearly noted. For the council there only defines that the demons were by their nature created good, in order to show against the Manichee that the angels are not evil by nature.[1948]

Caput II - Authorities and divisions of opinion

...not by nature evil, but made evil by their own will. Whether, however, they were good earlier in time before they sinned, the Council does not explain.

Wherefore two testimonies alone seem to me to remain by which the truth of the common opinion is sufficiently proved, and by which the falsity of Eugubinus's opinion is shown to deserve no light censure. The first testimony is Scripture, Jude in his Epistle, where about the evil angels it is said: "But the angels who did not keep their principality, but deserted their own habitation" etc. [1949] For if the evil angels had never been good, but always evil, they would not be said to have abandoned a habitation, namely that of innocence: for they would never have had it; nor would they be said not to have kept their principality, since they would never have been in it, but always from the beginning would have been in the abject and most vile state of sin. I know indeed that some recent interpreters of Scripture understand by those angels the princes and kings of the land of promise; but the former interpretation is the common and truer one.

The second testimony is the Council of Braga, canon 7, which is the sixth canon of Leo the Great's Letter 91 against the Priscillianists. For in that Council the aforesaid Letter, with all its decrees, was read, and received by the consent of the whole Council, and confirmed under the malediction of anathema. In that Canon therefore it is thus defined: If anyone says that the devil was not first an angel made good by God, nor that his nature was God's handiwork, but says that he emerged from darkness, and that he has no author, but that he himself is the principle and substance of evil, as Manichaeus and Priscillian said, let him be anathema.[1950] Someone could

1948. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), under Innocent III, cap. Firmiter (De summa Trinitate et fide catholica): "Diabolus enim, et alii dæmones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali."

1949. Jude 6: "Angelos vero, qui non servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium..."

1950. Council of Braga (Concilium Bracharense), canon 7, receiving Leo the Great, Epistle 91, against the Priscillianists; definition cited verbatim in that canon.

indeed say that in that canon it is not defined whether the angel was earlier in time good and without sin before he sinned, or not, because in this there was no controversy with Manichaeus and Priscillian, but only that he be condemned who would say that the demon is not God's handiwork, but emerged from darkness. And as to Leo, this is manifest, since he wrote that Letter only against Priscillian. As to the Council of Braga, the same is gathered from its proemium, where it is plainly said that the mind of the council was to eradicate utterly the errors of Priscillian, which were still flourishing in Spain. Yet I do not see by what reason it can be denied that in the Council of Braga it is also defined, or at least supposed as true, that the angels were previously good, not only according to nature, but also earlier in time without any fault. Wherefore I judge him deserving of no light censure who with Eugubinus would assert that the angels sinned in the first instant of their creation. St. Augustine, moreover, in the places alleged by them by no means holds that the angel sinned in the first instant; rather, when in that book 11 On Genesis literally, chapter 23, he said that the angel did not fall from what he had received, but from what he would receive, he indicated that the angel fell from the state of beatitude, to which he would have come if he had willed to obey God. Whether, however, he fell from the state of grace, or of pure nature in which he was before sin, Augustine does not treat there. And what he said in that book 11 On the City of God, chapter 13 - that he does not agree with the Manichee, who says that the angel sinned in the first instant of his creation - we indeed grant, as also above we have shown; yet on that account one would not be free from every other censure who should affirm it, especially after the definition of the Council of Braga and of Leo.[1951]

Angels in the first instant could sin, some affirm, others deny.

The theologians alleged in the preceding chapter, who by common consent, against Eugubinus, teach that the angels did not sin in the first instant of their creation, do not philosophize in the same way concerning the proposed controversy whether at least they could have sinned, but are divided into opposite opinions. Some of them have held that the angels could not sin in the first instant. Thus held Hugo of St. Victor in the Summa sententiarum, title 2, chapter 2; Alexander in the second part, question 29, member 1, article 7, in the body and in the solution of the arguments; St. Thomas, Cajetan, and later theologians on this article; and more suavely the same holy Doctor in De malo, question 16, article 4; Albert the Great in II, distinction 3, article 14, to the second; St. Bonaventure in the second part of the distinction, article 1, question 2, to the third; Richard in article 2, question 2; Durandus, d. 5, q. 2; Capreolus, question 2, article 2, and in distinction 4, rare question, conclusion 4, and article 3 in the solution of the arguments against the fourth conclusion; Thomas of Argentina in II, distinction 6, question 1, article 2; Henry in Quodlibet 8, question 10; Holcot in II, question 3, to the ninth; the Ferrarian in Contra gentes, book 3, chapter 109, n. 9.[1952] But concerning the foregoing: although they agree as to the very same conclusion which we have

1951. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI, 23; De civitate Dei XI, 13.

1952. Hugo of St. Victor, Summa sententiarum, tit. 2, c. 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars 2, q. 29, m. 1, a. 7; St. Thomas Aquinas on this article, and De malo q. 16 a. 4; Cajetan, ad loc.; Albert the Great, II, d. 3, a. 14, ad 2; St. Bonaventure, II, dist., pars 2, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3; Richard, a. 2 q. 2; Durandus, II (or V), q. 2; Capreolus, q. 2 a. 2; idem, dist. 4, quaest. rara, concl. 4, et a. 3 (solut. arg. contra 4. concl.); Thomas de Argentina, II, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2; Henry (of Ghent), Quodl. 8, q. 10; Holcot, II, q. 3, ad 9; the Ferrarian, Contra gentes III, c. 109, n. 9.

stated, nevertheless, since they were led to it by diverse reasons in order to defend that it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant, I judge that they are not in one and the same mind. Their various foundations we shall report in the next chapter and examine one by one.

Others, however, said that the angel could sin no less in the first instant of his creation than in the subsequent instants. Thus taught Scotus on II, distinction 5, question 2, I. Respondeo primo and in the following; and on III, distinction 18, question 1, to the fourth; Gregory on II on the same distinctions, question 1, article 2; Balliolus, question 1, article 2; Major, question 3, conclusion 2; Gabriel on the same, distinction 4, question 1, article 3, doubt 1; Marsilius on II, question 3, article 2, in the responsory conclusion.[1953] Whose opinion is to be understood thus, that the angel in the first instant of his creation not only could elicit an action with a defect, but even one which would be imputed as guilt. This I have noted on account of Aureolus who, as Thomas of Argentina reports in the place cited, taught that the angel could have an action with a defect, but not an action which would be imputed as guilt: which two do not cohere together, as Thomas rightly noted.[1954] This opinion rests on this single foundation: The angel in all other instants, except the first, could sin; therefore also in the first: for in the first instant he had nothing which in the others he would not have, and conversely; therefore, if in the others he had a ready potency to sin, he also had it ready in the first. Moreover, that he did not have in the other instants anything which, in order that he might be able to sin, he would not have had in the first, will be made clear by induction in the next chapter.

Caput III - Judgment on the two opinions

Although the authority of the Doctors who followed the former opinion ought to be esteemed by all as great, yet I candidly confess that the reasons by which they try to show that the angel could not sin in the first instant are not so effective as to convince adversaries manifestly; nay, some of them are so frivolous that they have long since been exploded by the schools, as in this chapter we shall show one by one.

The first reason, which indeed Alexander used, is of this sort: In the same instant in which a thing is produced, it cannot operate by any kind of operation; rather, the production of the thing must first be terminated in duration before there is the operation of that thing, because two operations (such as the generation of the thing and the operation of the thing itself), of which one follows the other, cannot be together; therefore the creation of the angel ought first in duration to have been terminated to the existence of the angel himself, before the angel operated. And since sin consists in operation, or in the omission of a due operation, it follows that the angel could not in the first instant sin, since he could not co-operate.

St. Thomas rightly rejects this reason, although he agrees with Alexander in the conclusion, for it manifestly contradicts philosophy. For who has denied that in the same instant in which the luminous body was created, it illuminated the air? Alexander's reason about operations, of which

1953. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 5, q. 2, and d. 18, q. 1; Gregory (of Rimini), In II Sent., ead. dist., q. 1, a. 2; Balliolus, q. 1, a. 2; Major, q. 3, concl. 2; Gabriel (Biel), ead. dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 1; Marsilius (of Inghen), II, q. 3, a. 2, in conclus. responsali.

one follows upon another, holds only in successive motions, of which one is the cause of another, as motion according to place is the cause of heating; but one action which is in an instant can very well be simultaneous in duration with another action which follows it only in the order of cause, as the production of the luminous with the illumination which proceeds from the luminous. The reason for the difference is that the production of a thing which is done in an instant is together with the thing itself produced; but the thing produced, by the very fact that it is, can operate. A successive motion, however, from which, as from a cause, another motion arises, ought for the most part to precede; because in these motions, in order that the form and term produced by one be the cause of another following, it must first arrive at a certain grade, which it cannot reach in an instant; and therefore it is necessary that some time intervene until from the prior motion the posterior follows. I said "for the most part," because sometimes a twofold successive motion is also simultaneous, of which one arises from the other as from a cause: for the production of sound is born from the beating of the air, which is made by motion according to place; yet there is no time of the beating or of the motion according to place in which there is not a motion toward the sound, and conversely.

The second reason is that of Hugh, which Holcot embraces in the places alleged to this purpose: For sinning liberty is required; but in the first instant the angel could not have liberty in operating; therefore in the first instant the angel could not sin. Moreover they prove that in the first instant there could not be liberty by this: because liberty is only with respect to the future as it is future, for about the present it cannot be, as also the Master felt in II, distinction 25, chapter 2, and Hugh himself had taught earlier in book 1 De sacramentis, part 5, chapter 22.[1955] And from the sentiment of these Doctors it follows that, for the will to operate freely, it must be first in duration before it operates, so that in the prior duration it may be indifferent and free toward the future operation.

This second reason is easily refuted; its foundation is refuted by the whole School, as we have shown at length above in disputation 68, chapter 7. For it is enough that the will be free, even if prior by nature, considered in itself, it be indifferent, so that it can operate in this way or another; that it be prior in duration makes absolutely nothing to the point. Therefore an angel could in the very first instant of his creation operate freely, because his will of itself is indifferent, whether it operate in this way or, on the contrary, in that way.

The third reason of Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Henry, which, although akin to the preceding, differs, is this: The notion of sin requires liberty; but liberty cannot be in an operation unless deliberation precede; again, deliberation cannot be without time; therefore an angel in the sole first instant of his creation could not sin, since he could not even deliberate. Henry adds that, if there could be deliberation in an instant sufficient for liberty, then an angel could also sin in an instant; and the same those must assert, as many as are brought by this reason to defend the prior opinion.

This third reason is frivolous: for although in us, who understand only by discursus, time is required that we consult about means, after comparing them inter se; yet in angels even for the choice of means time does not seem necessary, since they understand without discursus and

compare many things among themselves, as was said above in disputation 221. Add that sin does not necessarily require consultation and choice of means inter se: for sin can happen in the very will of an end, as in the will of the delectable and of the advantageous, which has the character of an end and is desirable for its own sake; but that the will freely tend to the advantageous or delectable, there is required only the proposal of the object with indifference. And this is posited when the intellect attends not only to the ratio of the delectable and of the advantageous, by which the will is enticed, but also to the ratio of malice and of sin which can be in the prosecution of that object, as we shall note at 1 - 2, q. 74, arts. 6 and 7.

The fourth reason is that of Richard in the place cited, and of Capreolus in that article 3 cited, in the solutions of the arguments against the fourth conclusion and article 3. In the proof of the same conclusion it runs thus: A natural will must precede a deliberated one; but the natural, however, is not capable of sin; therefore the first operation could not in an angel be sinful; and consequently neither in the first instant, in which the first operation of the angel ought to have preceded, could the angel sin. And thus Capreolus explains the reason of St. Thomas, which we shall report below, who therefore said that in the first operation there could not be sin, because he judges the first to be from the author of nature, to whom in no way can sin be referred. Capreolus therefore explains it thus: because the first operation ought to be natural, and therefore from a natural inclination; and since the inclination is from the author of nature, the operation of such inclination ought to be from the same author.[1956]

But this reason has no more force than the preceding ones refuted by us, because the natural operation of the will need not precede the free one; rather both can be together in duration, even if the natural be the effect of a free cause. For the angel can at one and the same time love himself with a natural love, and God with a free love, or by another ordering toward his own perfection. Next, the operation of the will in life is not called natural because it is necessary as to exercise, but only as to specification: for there is no object toward which in an instant necessity moves the will as to exercise.

Secunda ratio is that of Hugh, which Holcot embraced in the places cited to this purpose: for sin there is required liberty; but in the first instant the angel could not have had liberty in acting; therefore in the first instant the angel could not sin. Moreover, that in the first instant liberty could not have been, they prove from this: because liberty is only with respect to the future as future; it cannot be about the present - thus also the Master felt in the second book, distinction 25, chapter 2, and Hugh himself had taught before, in book 1 of De sacramentis, part 5, chapter 22. Wherefore, according to the sentiment of these Doctors, in order that the will (*voluntas*) operate freely, it must first be in duration before it operates, so that in a prior duration it be indifferent and free to the future operation.

1954. Aureolus; cf. Thomas de Argentina, loc. cit., reporting Aureolus's view that an angel could have an action with a defect, but not one imputable as guilt.

1955. Peter Lombard, Sentences II, dist. 25, c. 2; Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis I, p. 5, c. 22.

1956. Richard (of St. Victor or of Mediavilla, as cited), loc. cit.; Capreolus, In II Sent., art. 3 (solutions against the fourth conclusion), explaining St. Thomas's reason.

But this reason rests on a false foundation, and is by now refuted by the whole School, as has been set out at length above in disputation 68, chapter 7. For that the will be free, it is enough if, considered in itself, it be indifferent so as to be able to operate in this or in the opposite way; to be prior according to duration matters not at all. An angel, therefore, could, in the very first instant of his creation, operate freely; because of itself his will is indifferent to operate thus or contrariwise.

The third reason of Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Henry, which differs little from the preceding, is this: to the notion of sin liberty (*libertas*) is required; but this cannot be in an operation unless deliberation (*deliberatio*) precede; and deliberation cannot be without time: therefore the angel in the first instant of his creation could not sin, just as neither could he deliberate. Henry adds that, if there could be in an instant a deliberation sufficient for liberty, then the angel could also sin in an instant. And the same must be asserted by as many as have been induced by this reason to defend the prior opinion.

This reason, however, is trifling. For although in us, who understand only by discourse, time is required in order that we take counsel about means, after comparing them among themselves; yet in angels time does not seem necessary even for the choice of means, since in one intuition they understand and compare many things among themselves, as was said above in disputation 221. Besides, sin does not necessarily demand consultation and election among means; for it can happen by the very will of an end, as in the will of the pleasurable and the expedient, which has the notion of an end and is appetible for its own sake. In order that the will be borne toward the expedient and the pleasurable, the mere proposal of the object with indifference suffices; this posited, so that the intellect attend to the notion of the pleasurable and the expedient, the will is allured - though also to the notion of felicity and of sin which can be in respect of itself - as we shall treat in I-II, q. 74, a....

Another illustration: when there are simultaneously two successive motions, one of which has its origin from the other as from a cause, as the production of sound is born from the striking of the air, which is by motion according to place - there is no time of the striking or of the motion according to place in which there is not motion toward sound, and vice versa.

The fourth reason is Richard's in the place cited, and that of Capreolus in that article 3 cited in the solutions against the arguments against the fourth conclusion, and in article 1 in proving the same fourth conclusion; it runs thus: the natural will must precede the deliberated; but the natural [will] is not capable of sin: therefore the first operation could not in the angel have been sin; and accordingly neither in the first instant, in which the first operation of the angel ought to have preceded, could the angel have sinned. And in this way Capreolus explains the reason of St. Thomas, which we shall report below, who for this reason said that in the first operation there could not be sin, because the first is attributed to the author of nature, to whom in no way can sin be referred. Capreolus, then, explains it thus: because the first operation ought to be natural, and therefore from natural inclination; and since the inclination is from the author of nature, the operation of such an inclination ought to be from the same author.

But this reason has no more weight than the preceding ones. First, because the natural operation of the will ought not in time to precede the free [operation], but both can be together in duration, even if the natural were the cause of the free. For the angel can at the same time love himself with natural love, and God with free love, or the intermediate things ordered to his perfection. Next, an operation of the will on the way is not called natural because it is necessary as to exercise (*exercitium*), but only as to specification (*specificationem*). For there is no object, except God clearly seen, which necessarily moves a created will as to exercise.

And thus even in an angel, as we noted above in question 60, article 3, there could be liberty as to exercise; therefore in the natural will there could be liberty with respect to exercise, and consequently in it there could be sin and merit (*meritum*). This reason seems to have been approved by Cajetan, and that he also understood the mind of the holy Doctor thus: for he says in this article that the prior action of the will is natural, and that this cannot be evil. But since he plainly concedes that in the first instant the angel could have merited - indeed also did merit - by an act of charity, as we shall see in the following chapter, in his sentence the foregoing reason can have no force. Capreolus, however, used this reason consistently with his own conclusions; for he plainly defends that the angel in the first instant could neither sin nor merit.

The fifth reason, which Durandus mentions in the question cited, number 5, should be framed thus: no one can sin unless he apprehend an apparent good, about which alone sin can be; but an apparent good cannot be apprehended unless first the true good be apprehended: therefore the angel ought first to have operated about the true good rather than about the apparent good.

Durandus judges this reason less sufficient, and deservedly so. But, omitting Durandus's refutation, it can easily be refuted thus: it is not necessary first to apprehend the honest good before the delectable; rather the delectable can occur first, and from it the affection be moved; and if such delectation be against reason, as very often happens, there will be sin in regard to it. And this happens without any error at all, as we showed above in the preceding disputation, chapter three, and shall prove in the Second Part, question 77, article 2, from this alone, that the delectable is proposed more efficaciously than the opposed honestum, or than that which ought to draw back the affection from the delectable and the expedient.

The sixth reason, which Durandus himself uses, is of this sort: either the angel is created in the grace of God, or in pure nature. If in the grace of God, it plainly follows that he cannot sin; because he cannot at once sin and be in the grace of God. Or he is created in pure nature; and then either with only natural knowledge, or with supernatural. If with only natural knowledge, it follows that he cannot sin: because the angel cannot sin in regard to the law that is altogether natural. If with supernatural knowledge, it is likewise brought about that he cannot sin: because he could not have sinned in regard to the supernatural law except from inconsideration, as above from the same Durandus we reported in disputation 230.

Yet this reason is less effective than the preceding. First indeed, although it be true that with grace there cannot be sin, yet the present controversy is only whether of itself the angel can sin. Next, even if in pure nature he be left without any supernatural cognition concerning the

supernatural law, he can rightly sin, as in the same disputation against Durandus and others was proved. Lastly, because in regard to the supernatural law he can sin in a way other than by inconsideration; indeed by mere inconsideration he cannot, as we showed in disputation 235, chapter two.

The seventh and last reason, and the most effective of all that are wont to be adduced for this side, is that of St. Thomas in this article 5. He attempts to prove that the angel could not sin about supernatural objects just as also about natural ones, in this way: the first operation of the will ought to be from God, and to it the will cannot determine itself; therefore that cannot be sin; otherwise sin would be attributed to God, who determined the will of the angel to such an operation; or at least, if it be not attributed to God, in such a way that fault be imputed to him (as the heretics of our time say, that our will is inclined and impelled by God to sin, and yet that fault is not to be imputed to God, since he is not capable of fault), at least it follows that fault cannot be imputed to the angel, if in his first operation he is determined by God to the work of sin, just as above in disputation 99, chapter 4, we inferred that a man cannot have fault imputed in individual operations, if he himself be determined by God to the work of sin and be applied first to it. Next, that the first operation of the will is from God, and that the created will does not move itself to it, is the doctrine of Anselm in the book De casu diaboli, chapter 12, where he teaches that the angel could not have his first will from himself; and the same must he say of man. The foundation, moreover, which Anselm uses is, that in order that someone be said to move himself to some act of will, it does not suffice to elicit the act of will to which he is said to move himself; but there is need first to have another act of will, from which he may move himself to the subsequent one; wherefore he says: therefore he who wills nothing can in no way move himself to willing. And from this he gathers that the angel's first will is from God. Which in chapters 13 and 14 he pursues further.[1957]

This reason seems to me difficult. I confess indeed that, through slowness of mind, I do not fully grasp the force of this argument. I shall therefore propose what is difficult to me about it, and I shall gladly listen to the judgment of others in this matter. First, I for my part do not sufficiently understand that the first act of will is from God by a more peculiar reason than that the first cogitation is from God determining, as I shall show at length in I-II, question 9, article 3, and as I have already shown above in disputation 221, chapter 4; because to the first cogitation the will cannot apply the intellect. And this is not only true in that operation of the will which in origin of time was the very first of all, but also in any first one which, in an angel or in a man, begins about some genus of business or of object. Yet this does not seem to stand in the way, so as to prevent the angel from being able to sin by consent of the will to such an object thought upon; just as, in the first volition about a new object which first presents itself, he can sin. For such proposal of the object, even if it be proposed by God or determining the intellect, nevertheless leaves the will free so that it can consent or not consent. Therefore the angel could, the object having been proposed which by precept was to be pursued, not pursue it, and hence sin. He could also have the intellect determined by God to propose to the will, by the same cogitation, an object in the pursuit of which there would be sin, and in the flight and displeasure of which there would be merit before God; and

1957. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 12 - 14.

the will by its first act could pursue that object and, by pursuing, sin, which it ought to have shunned. In neither case, however, would sin be attributed to God, even if he himself determined the intellect to that first cogitation from which the consent of sin was going to result. For such a proposition and cogitation, to which God determined the intellect, left the will free to follow whichever part it wished; just as we said in disputation 95, chapter 10, that God sometimes offers us occasions from which he sees that sin will be future, and yet sin is not imputed to God, nor on that account are we excused from fault; because such a cogitation leaves the will free, so that it stretch forth the hand to what it wills.

Next, what Anselm asserts - that to the first operation the will cannot move itself - does not lack difficulty. For, that the will be said to move itself to willing, there does not seem necessary another will by virtue of which it impels itself, as Henry observed against Anselm. This the example which Anselm himself objects to himself clearly convinces: for sight is said to move itself to seeing, not by virtue of some prior vision, but, in individual operations, by this alone, that the operation itself of seeing is from sight itself as from a principle. By the same reason Scotus, in the place cited, teaches that the first operation is no less from the will moving itself than the others, since in the same way all proceed from the will as efficient.[1958]

I pass over other reasons by which it is wont to be proved that the angel could not sin in the first instant, such as that the action both of sin and of merit ought to begin in time, and others like it, which are founded on false principles: such as Scotus has in the place cited. Gregory very well solves how sin and merit ought to begin, in the question cited: because since the operation of the will can be wholly at once, there is no doubt that it can begin in an instant of our time. Add also that, even if it could begin in time, some Authors of the posterior sentence would say that such a first operation cannot be sin - namely, all who defend that in the first operation sin cannot be.

Caput IV - In the first instant of their creation the angels could have merited

Since the Doctors who hold that the angels could not have sinned in the first instant were brought to that opinion by diverse reasons, the result is that, about their good merit - namely, whether in the first instant they could have merited eternal life - they have not thought in the same way. Some of them affirm that, in the first...

That in the first instant an angel could not have merited, Hugo of St. Victor, Alexander, Holcot, and Capreolus expressly taught in the places cited in chapter 2; and from their reason this is necessarily deduced. First indeed, from the reason of Hugo and Holcot, who think that in the first instant the angel was not free for that same instant, but only for a future time. Then by Alexander's reason the same is proved: because, according to his opinion, no thing can operate in the same instant in which it is first brought into being. Finally, from Capreolus's reason the same is gathered: because he thinks the angel's first operation must necessarily be natural, in which, according to his opinion, merit (*meritum*) cannot be. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Henry would be forced to admit this very point, who hold that in the first instant there could not have been

1958. Scotus, in the place already cited.

freedom: because there could not be consultation and deliberation. Lastly, Richard ought to be in the same opinion, although he does not assert that very thing: because, with Capreolus, he proved that the angel could not have sinned in the first instant, since the first operation had to be natural, capable of neither sin nor merit.

Much truer, however, is the opposite opinion, which affirms that the angels could have merited eternal life in the first instant. Whether in fact they did merit it depends on that controversy, whether they were created in grace (*gratia*), or in pure nature, which above in disputation 226 we treated at length. But as regards the potency (*potentia*) of meriting, all those embraced this opinion whom in chapter e. we adduced for the posterior view. And of those who followed the prior, Ferrariensis likewise handed it down, 3 Contra gentes, chapter 110, n. 9. After these things were said, Cajetan and Durandus in the places there cited; and it is the express opinion of St. Thomas, as Ferrariensis rightly observed: for, as we shall show below, he plainly taught that the angels not only could have merited, but also did merit eternal life. Moreover, this opinion is proved from this: because, if something stood in the way so that the angels could not in the first instant merit, such would be the reasons of Hugo, Alexander, St. Bonaventure, or Richard, by which they tried to prove that the angels could not have sinned in the first instant; for if by those reasons it were proved that the angels could not have sinned, it would also be proved that they could not have merited: because for both there would be altogether the same rationale, as is clear. But by those reasons nothing is proved against the angel's potency to sin, as was more than sufficiently shown by us in the preceding chapter: therefore, by altogether the same reasoning, it remains shown that, those reasons notwithstanding, the angels could have merited eternal life. And other reasons cannot be devised which in any way would prove that the angels could not have merited: therefore there is no cause why we should deny to the angel in that instant the potency to merit.

Furthermore, that Blessed Thomas was in this opinion Ferrariensis rightly proves. For in this article 5, ad 3, he writes thus: "Whatever is in merit is from God: and therefore in the first instant of his creation an angel could have merited; but the case is not similar with sin."[1959] And in the following article he says thus: "Since the angels arrive at beatitude through a single meritorious act, as was said above: if the devil in the first instant of his creation merited, he would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant, unless immediately he had set an impediment by sinning."[1960] He had said, moreover, in that article, and in question 62, article 3, that the angel created in grace had a motion of free choice.[1961] But to these testimonies Capreolus replies, in that article 3, in the solution against the fifth conclusion, that St. Thomas only said that the demons in the first instant were worthy of glory by the grace in which they were created, not by any merit. However, this answer is quite frivolous: since St. Thomas plainly grants that there was in the angels a motion of free choice in the first instant, and that they too, being just, stood by the grace of God:

1959. St. Thomas, in this article 5, ad 3.
1960. In the following article.
1961. Question 62, article 3.

but a good work done in the state of grace, especially if it be of the love of God - as St. Thomas grants it to have been in the angels - is a merit of eternal life. As to the other requisites for the notion of merit we shall speak in 1 - 2, q. 114, arts. 1, 2, 3, and 4.[1962]

Articulus VI - Whether there was any delay between creation and the fall

To the sixth, we proceed thus. It seems that there was some delay between the creation and the fall of the angel. For it is said in Ezekiel 28: "You walked perfect in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you." But walking, since it is a continuous motion, requires some duration. Therefore there was some delay between the creation of the devil and his fall.

Moreover, Origen says that the ancient serpent did not straightway walk upon his breast and belly. By which is understood his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin immediately after the first instant of his creation.[1963]

Moreover, to be able to sin is common to man and to angel. But there was some delay between the formation of man and his sin. Therefore by equal reasoning there was some delay between the formation of the devil and his sin.

Moreover, there was a different instant in which the devil sinned from the instant in which he was created. But between any two instants a mean time falls. Therefore there was some delay between his creation and his fall.

But on the contrary: it is said of the devil in John 8 that "he did not stand in the truth." And as St. Augustine says in De Civitate Dei XI, we must take this thus, that "he stood in the truth, but did not remain."[1964]

I answer that there is a twofold opinion on this matter. But the more probable and more consonant with the sayings of the Saints is that immediately after the first instant of his creation the devil sinned. And this it is necessary to say, if it be posited that in the first instant of his creation he burst forth into an act (*actus*) of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), and that he was created with grace, as we said above. For since the angels reach beatitude through a single meritorious act, as was said above, if the devil, created in grace in the first instant, merited, he would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant, unless immediately he had set an impediment by sinning. But if it be posited that the angel was not created in grace, or that in the first instant he could not have an act of free choice, nothing prevents there having been some delay between creation and the fall.

Reply to the first: By bodily motions, which are measured by time, sometimes in Sacred Scripture are understood metaphorically instantaneous spiritual motions. And thus by walking is understood the motion of free choice tending to the good.

1962. 1 - 2, q. 114, arts. 1 - 4.
1963. Origen, Homilies on Ezekiel, hom. 10 (tome 2), near the middle.
1964. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XI.

Reply to the second: Origen says that the ancient serpent did not from the beginning, nor straightway, walk upon his breast on account of the first instant in which he was not evil.

Reply to the third: The angel has free choice inflexible after election. And therefore unless immediately after the first instant, in which he had a natural motion toward the good, he had set an impediment to beatitude, he would have been made firm in the good. But it is not similar with man. And therefore the reasoning does not follow.

Reply to the fourth: That between any two instants there is a mean time has truth insofar as time is continuous, as is proved in Physics VI.[1965] But nevertheless in angels, who are not subject to the celestial motion which is first measured by continuous time, time is taken for the very succession of the operations of the intellect, or also of the affections. Thus, then, the first instant in angels is understood to correspond to an operation of the angelic mind, by which it turns to itself by vespertine cognition, because in the first day evening is commemorated but not morning. And this operation indeed was good in all. But from this operation some were turned by matutine cognition to the praise of the Word, whereas others, remaining in themselves, were made night, swelling with pride, as St. Augustine says On Genesis ad litteram IV.[1966] And thus the first operation was common to all. But in the second they are distinct. And therefore in the first instant all were...

[conclusion carried over]

And therefore in the first instant all were good, but in the second they were distinguished, the good from the evil; and its brightness, as it surpassed, was by comparison the clearer.

The conclusion is: Immediately after the first instant of their creation the Angel sinned; but this must be understood not of an instant of the duration of our time, but of an instant of discrete time, as if it were said that after the first operation he straightway sinned. The truth of this conclusion has been sufficiently explained by us above in Disputation 126, chapters 10 and 11.

Articulus VII - Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest among all

It is proceeded to the seventh as follows.

It is objected that the angel who was highest among the sinners was not the highest among all. For it is said in Ezekiel 28: "You are the extended and protecting Cherub; I set you on the holy mountain of God." But the order of the Cherubim is beneath the order of the Seraphim, as Pseudo-Dionysius says on the angelic hierarchy.[1967] Therefore the angel who was highest among the sinners was not highest among all.

Further, God made the intellectual nature for the obtaining of beatitude. If, therefore, the angel who was highest among all sinned, it follows that the divine ordering was frustrated in the most noble creature. Which is unfitting.

1965. Aristotle, Physics VI.
1966. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV.
1967. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia (on the angelic hierarchy).

Further, the more something is inclined toward a thing, the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, the more he is inclined toward God. Therefore he is less able to fall away from God by sinning. And thus it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest among all, but of the lower.

But on the contrary: Gregory says in the homily on the Hundred Sheep that the first angel who sinned, while he was prelate over all the ranks of the angels.[1968]

I answer that in sin two things are to be considered, namely, proneness to sin and the motive for sinning. If, therefore, we consider in angels a proneness to sin, it seems less that the higher angels sinned than the lower. And for this reason St. John Damascene says that the greater part of those who sinned held preeminence over terrestrial order; and this opinion seems consonant with the position of the Platonists, which St. Augustine recounts in the City of God, books 8 and 10: for they say that all the gods were good, but that of the demons some were good and some evil, calling "gods" the intellectual substances which are above the lunar globe, and "demons" the intellectual substances which are below the lunar globe, superior to men in the order of nature.[1969] Nor is this opinion to be rejected as alien from the faith: for the whole corporeal creation is administered by God through angels, as St. Augustine says in book 3 On the Trinity.[1970] Whence nothing prevents our saying that the lower angels are divinely distributed to administer lower bodies, the higher to administer the higher bodies, but the supreme to assist God. And according to this St. John Damascene says that those who fell were from the lower, in whose order also certain good angels remained.[1971]

If, however, the motive for sinning is considered, a greater one is found in the higher than in the lower. For the sin of the demons was pride, as was said above. The motive of which is excellence, which was greater in the higher. And therefore St. Gregory says that the one who sinned was higher than all. And this seems more probable. For the angel's sin did not proceed from any proneness, but from free will (*liberum arbitrium*) alone. Whence the account to be considered seems rather that which is taken from the motive to sinning. Yet this does not prejudice the other opinion, because even in the prince of the lower angels there could be some motive to sinning.

Reply to the first: "Cherub" is interpreted "fullness of knowledge," "Seraphim" is interpreted "burning" or "intending." And thus it is clear that "Cherub" is denominated from knowledge, which can be with mortal sin, but "Seraphim" is denominated from the ardor of charity (*caritas*), which cannot be with mortal sin. And therefore the first angel sinning is not denominated "Seraphim," but "Cherub."

1968. St. Gregory the Great, Homily on the Hundred Sheep.
1969. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 8 and 10, reporting the Platonists' position.
1970. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 3.
1971. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.4 (on the fall of angels of the lower order).

Reply to the second: The divine intention is not frustrated, neither in those who sin nor in those who are saved. For God foreknows both outcomes and from each has glory, since he saves these out of his goodness, but punishes those out of his justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any sublime creature whatever. For the intellectual creature is so established by God that it is placed in its power to act for the end.

Reply to the third: However great the inclination to the good was in the highest angel, nevertheless it did not induce necessity. Hence he could, by free will, fail to follow it.

The conclusion is: It is more probable that the one who was the highest among all the angels was the highest among those who sinned.

Is Lucifer, the first among the rebel angels, from the supreme orders, or did he hold preeminence? Disputation 237.

Disputatio CCXXXVII - Two opposite opinions

Conclusion of Article 7; although it is approved by all the scholastics, yet among the ancient Fathers it is not without controversy

For St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 4, thinks that the angels who fell were not from the highest, but from the lowest order. For he says: "Of these angelic hosts, he who held the principate of the terrestrial order, to whom by God the care of the earth had been entrusted, not created evil by nature, but endowed with goodness and created for the sake of the good, and such that not even the slightest trace of life impressed by the Creator failed him - he, not preserving by free will the splendor and honor which he had obtained by the Creator's beneficence, was changed from that which was according to nature into that which was against nature."[1972] St. Augustine makes mention of this opinion in book 3 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 10, and inflicts on it no censure. Of the same he also makes mention in book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 19, and immediately subjoins that he does not see from what place of Scripture that opinion can be proved. Finally, in the same book 11, chapter 26, he says that it cannot be defended.[1973]

Yet many Fathers affirm that the angel who was supreme among those who fell was also supreme among the rest. Thus Tertullian teaches, book 2 Against Marcion, chapter 10, far from the beginning, where he expounds those words of Ezekiel 28, "You are the seal of the likeness of God, etc.," by which he thinks the fall of the demon is described, of the most eminent of the angels, of the Archangel, of the most wise of all - understanding the name "Archangel" not according to the order of the lowest hierarchy, but as the prince of all the angels; otherwise he would not call him most eminent and most wise.[1974] The same is the sentiment of St. John Chrysostom, in tome 7, in the homily on Adam and Eve, not far from the beginning: for he says, "One angel first, who was

1972. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.4, on the angel who held principate over the terrestrial order.
1973. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.10; 11.19; 11.26.
1974. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 2.10, on Ezekiel 28.

called Sathahel, assumed a wicked presumption," etc.; and in the Homily on the fall of the first man, he says that Sathahel held the principate among the angels.[1975] In the same opinion were St. Jerome on that passage Job 40, "He is the beginning of the ways of the Lord" - because in Ezekiel 28 it is written, "You walked in the head of the fiery stones"; St. Gregory in book 4 of the Moralia, chapter 13 (elsewhere 12), and in book 9, chapter 2, where he calls the demon "the highest spirit"; the author of book 1 On the Marvels of Holy Scripture; St. Isidore, book 1 De summo bono, chapter 12; and St. Bernard, Sermon 1 on Advent, where he calls the demon the first of the angels.[1976] Some also report for this opinion Origen, tractate 9 on Matthew, on those words, "The last shall be first," etc., where he calls the angel who fell "first" in relation only to man, but the man himself he calls "last"; and they understand by those words, "The last shall be first," the things aforesaid.[1977]

Caput II - Judgment concerning both opinions

Assuredly, the opinion of these Fathers and of the scholastics seems probable on account of their authority. However, from Sacred Scripture nothing certain can be gathered, as will be made plain by induction.

The first place from which some deduce the aforesaid opinion is Ezekiel 28, where St. Jerome, in the place cited, thus reads: "You have walked on the head of the fiery stones." But he thought that the "fiery stones" are called angels, among whom Lucifer was placed as first in the head. But this reading was not followed by St. Jerome himself in that place of Ezekiel in his translation, nor did the Seventy so render; but according to both readings, "You have walked in the midst of the fiery stones," etc. Moreover, as to how much that place proves about the fall of the devil, enough and more than enough has been said by us in Disputation 232, chapter 4, where we showed that, according to the literal sense, those words are to be taken of the prince of Tyre, and only in a spiritual sense can they be accommodated to the demon. But of that prince it is said, "You have walked in the midst of the fiery stones," so as to show the precious adornment of his garments, which he previously had in the glory of his kingdom: for he used to walk adorned with precious stones, which he calls "fiery" on account of the color of fire. But they must be accommodated to the angel thus: because, before he fell from his most happy state, he was adorned with virtues and the gifts of grace. But if by the fiery stones you wish to understand other angels, from that place it cannot be proved that Lucifer was the first of the angels, if the common reading and that of the Seventy interpreters be followed; but only this follows, that Lucifer was in the midst of the angels who are called "fiery stones."

The second testimony customarily adduced for proving the common opinion is that Ezekiel 31: "The cedars in the paradise of God were not higher than he; the firs did not equal his height." This place, however, is understood of the king of Egypt, in order that the power and majesty of his kingdom, whose ruin the Prophet threatened, might be shown, as is manifest from the text itself.

1975. St. John Chrysostom, Homily on Adam and Eve; Homily on the fall of the first man (tome 7).

1976. St. Jerome, on Job 40; Ezekiel 28; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 4.13 (alias 12) and 9.2; Author of De mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae 1; St. Isidore, De summo bono 1.12; St. Bernard, Sermon 1 on Advent.

1977. Origen, Tractate 9 on Matthew, on "The last shall be first."

A third testimony could be Job 40: "He is the beginning of the ways of the Lord," which place is to be understood not of the beginning according to duration, but according to dignity, as we have noted above in Disputation 224, chapter 6. Nevertheless even from this testimony, even so understood, nothing can be proved. For in that chapter Job does not speak of the demon, but of Behemoth, which some think to be a terrestrial animal, others a kind of serpent living in the waters or in moist places.

But if we inquire after the ground of the aforesaid common opinion - since the matter is one of fact - I do not see that anything can be supplied for its confirmation; for it could have happened this way or otherwise, although there are not lacking congruent reasons on account of which, if it happened so, we should say that God by his supreme wisdom rightly permitted the first angel to fall into sin; which reasons I have judged it worthwhile for now to pass over.

Now indeed, the sentence of those Fathers and Scholastics, on account of their very authority, seems probable. However, from Sacred Scripture nothing certain can be gathered, as an induction will show.

The first place whence some derive the aforesaid opinion is Ezekiel 28, where St. Jerome, in the place cited, thus reads: "Thou hast walked on the head of the fiery stones." They suppose, moreover, that the fiery stones are called Angels, among whom Lucifer, as the first, was placed at the head. But Jerome himself did not follow this reading in that place of Ezekiel in his own translation, nor do the Seventy so render it; rather, according to both readings it is: "In the midst of the fiery stones thou didst walk," etc. Furthermore, how much that place proves concerning the fall of the devil we have more than sufficiently said in Disputation 232, cap. 4, where we showed that, according to the literal sense, those words are to be taken of the prince of Tyre, and can be applied to the demons only in a spiritual sense. Of that prince it is said that "he walked in the midst of the fiery stones," to show the precious ornament of his garments which he formerly had in the glory of his kingdom; for he walked adorned with precious stones, which he calls "fiery" on account of the color of fire. But the passage ought to be accommodated to the Angel in this way: that, before he fell from his most happy state, he was adorned with virtues and the gifts of grace. And if by the fiery stones you wish to understand the other Angels, from that place it cannot be proved that Lucifer was the first of the Angels, if one follows the common reading and that of the Seventy interpreters; rather only this follows, that Lucifer was in the midst of the Angels, who are called fiery stones.

In the same chapter that other phrase, "Thou an extended and protecting Cherub," is adduced, which some apply to Lucifer. This, however, does not prove the opinion. First, because there, too, it is said of the king of Tyre, as is manifest from the very text; and therefore, if these things are accommodated to Lucifer, they ought to be accommodated only so far as they can agree with an Angel, namely, that he was once happy and powerful. Moreover, if those words were to be understood literally of Lucifer, they would at most prove that he was a Cherub, and not a Seraph. On this point St. Thomas replies in this article, ad 1, that he would not therefore have been of the supreme order of the Cherubim; for although he is called a Cherub, nevertheless "Seraphim" signifies "burning," and denotes the ardor of charity; but "Cherub" signifies "knowing"; the ardor of

charity did not remain in the demon, whereas knowledge did remain. If, then, one were to argue from this testimony that he belonged to the supreme order, or to infer from it that he was supreme among the Cherubim, the conclusion would not follow.

According to the common opinion one might also adduce Ezekiel 31: "The cedars in the paradise of God envied him," and similar statements there. By this, however, the majesty of the Babylonian king is understood, and his impending ruin threatened, as is clear; and thus the place concerns the majesty of a kingdom, not directly the case at hand.

Something perhaps could be inferred from Job 40; but that place, as we noted above in Disputation 224, cap. 6, is to be understood according to duration; nothing, however, in this way pertains to the issue. Nor in that chapter is speech made of Behemoth in such sort as to concern an angelic nature; some indeed hold him to be an earthly beast; others take him for some of the animals endowed with earthly abodes and endowed with sense. But since the matter is such that other reasons could be supplied for this and in another way it could be explained, and since reasons for the contrary are not wanting, let us say that God in his supreme wisdom rightly permitted him to fall headlong, for reasons which I have judged fitting to set forth.

Articulus VIII - Whether the sin of the first angel was the cause of the others' sinning

It seems that the sin of the first sinning Angel was not the cause of the others' sinning.

1. A cause is prior to what is caused. But all sinned at the same time, as St. John Damascene says. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning.[1978]
2. Further, the first sin of an Angel cannot be anything but pride, as was said above. But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more repugnant to excellence that someone be subject to an inferior than to a superior. And thus it does not seem that the demons sinned by willing to be subject to some superior among the Angels rather than to God. However, the sin of one Angel would have been the cause of the others' sinning if he had induced them to this, namely, that they be subjected to himself. Therefore it does not seem that the sin of the first Angel was the cause of sinning for the others.
3. Further, it is a greater sin to will to be subject to another against God, than to will to be set over another against God, because the former has less of a motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the first Angel was the cause of the others' sinning in this, that he induced them to be subjected to himself, the inferior Angels would have sinned more gravely than the supreme; which is contrary to that of Psalm 103. In the Gloss: "This dragon, whom thou hast formed," is said to be he "who was more excellent than the rest in being, [but] was made greater in malice."[1979] Therefore the sin of the first Angel was not the cause of sinning for the others.

1978. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.4.
1979. Gloss on Psalm 103(104): "This dragon, whom thou hast formed..." cited in the scholastic tradition.

But on the contrary: It is said in Apocalypse 12 that the dragon drew with him the third part of the stars.

I answer: The sin of the first Angel was the cause of the others' sinning, not indeed by compelling, but by inducing with a certain quasi-exhortation. A sign of this appears from the fact that all those demons are subject to the supreme one, as is made manifest by that word which the Lord says in Matthew 25: "Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels." For such is the order of divine justice, that he to whose suggestion someone consents in fault be subjected to his power in punishment, according to 2 Peter 2: "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."

Reply to the first: Although the demons sinned at the same time, nevertheless the sin of one could be the cause of the others' sinning. For an Angel does not need delay of time for choosing, exhorting, or even consenting, as does man, who needs deliberation for choosing and consenting, and vocal locution for exhorting - both of which are performed in time. But it is manifest that even a man, when he has conceived something already in his heart, in the same instant begins to speak. And in the last instant of locution, in which one seizes the sense of the speaker, he can assent to that which is being said, as appears especially in the first conceptions which each one approves upon hearing them. With time of locution and deliberation removed, which in us are required, in the same instant in which the first Angel expressed his affection by intelligible locution, it was possible for the others to consent to it.

Reply to the second: Other things being equal, one more readily wills to be subject to a superior than to an inferior. But if some excellence is to be obtained under an inferior which cannot be attained under a superior, one prefers to be subject to an inferior rather than to a superior. Thus it was not contrary to the pride of the demons that they willed to be subject to an inferior, consenting to his principate, desiring to have him as prince and leader, so that by his natural power they might attain their beatitude; especially because by the order of nature even then they were subject to the supreme Angel.

Reply to the third: As was said above, an Angel has nothing retarding him, but according to his total power he is moved to that to which he is moved, whether to good or to evil. Therefore, since the supreme Angel had a greater natural power than the inferiors, he fell into sin by a more intense motion. And thus he was also made greater in malice.

The conclusion is: The first sin of the Angel was a cause of the others' sinning, not by compulsion, but by inducement. Concerning this, a controversy will be had by us.

Disputatio CCXXXVIII - An peccatum primi Angeli fuerit aliis causa peccandi

- Two opposed opinions. Caput I.
- Judgment concerning each opinion. Caput II.
- That the inferior Angels and the supreme sinned at the same time. Caput III.

• What the sin of the inferior Angels was. Caput IV.

Caput I - Two opposed opinions

Although it has been set in controversy whether the supreme Angel among those who sinned was first among the rest or not, as we saw in the preceding disputation, yet it is certain and without controversy among all that among those who sinned there was someone supreme and of a more perfect nature. Now, therefore, the difficulty is proposed concerning this Angel, whether by his sin he was to the others a cause and occasion of sinning, not indeed by compulsion, but either by persuasion or by inducing them in some way. In this difficulty too the Scholastic Doctors are divided. For certain ones assert that no Angel inferior was induced by the supreme, but that each one sinned of himself without the persuasion or occasion of another. Thus teach Albert,[1980] William of Paris,[1981] and Alphonsus de Castro against the heresies under the word "Peccatum," heresy 3; also reported for the same opinion is Alexander, 2 p. q. 99, m. 2, where he only says that the sin could indeed be by imitation - something which does not seem otherwise possible, unless the superior insinuated his will to the inferiors. The same, and nothing else, is affirmed by the author of Auxerre, book 2, tract. 2, cap. 3.[1982] For this opinion there seems to be only a single reason: because it is not without some foundation to assert that the Angels sinned by imitation and persuasion; yet we have no foundation for asserting this, as will appear below: therefore it is not to be asserted.

A more common opinion among the Scholastics affirms that the inferior Angels sinned by the persuasion of the first. Thus think St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists on this article; St. Bonaventure in 2, d. 5, a. 2, q. 4, a. 2; Richard, ar. r., q. 2, ar. 2, conclusion; Giles in 2, d. 6, q. 1, ar. 3; Thomas of Argentina in the same, q. 1, a. 3, dubium 3; Gabriel; Maior, q. 2, near the end, to the second doubt; and Durandus confesses this to be the common opinion in q. 2, although he affirms that nothing certain in this matter can be had. There are indeed testimonies of the Fathers for this sentence: St. John Damascene, 2 De fide, c. 4, after he has described the sin of the first Angel, subjoins: "Together with him there was torn away, and added as a companion to him, and together there fell, an innumerable multitude of Angels of his ranks"; and moreover St. Ambrose, epistle 84, about the middle; and St. Gregory, book 3 of the Moralia, c. 18, alias 23, who expressly affirm this; the same seems to have been said by St. Jerome on Isaiah 14: "Thou hast lost thy land," etc.; for expounding these words of Lucifer he says: "Those, namely, who believed thee to be their governor," who, in my judgment, seem to be none other than the inferior Angels.[1983]

1980. Albert the Great, on 2 Sentences, d. 6, a. 3.

1981. William of Paris, Summa de universo, part 1, principal part 2, c. 112.

1982. Alexander of Hales, Summa, 2 p., q. 99, m. 2; Author of Auxerre (Anselm of Laon/Alexander of Villedieu tradition), lib. 2, tract. 2, cap. 3.

1983. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.4; St. Ambrose, Epistle 84; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 3.18 (alias 23); St. Jerome, on Isaiah 14.

Caput II - Judgment concerning each opinion

In this controversy I for my part think that it was possible for the inferiors to be induced in some way by the superior, as will be explained below: nevertheless, nothing certain can be defined in this matter. And first, to take my starting-point hence, it can easily be proved by an induction that nothing certain is had here, if we run through the several places which authors are wont to use.

The first testimony which we can use to show that the other, inferior Angels were by a superior induced in some way is Ezekiel 31: "They have emulated him from all the trees of pleasure which were in the paradise of God." This, however, is a weak testimony: for there the speech is with Pharaoh, king of Egypt, whose ruin the Prophet threatens, because his heart was lifted up in his altitude. To this end he first describes the loftiness of his kingdom under the likeness of trees, and compares it to a most lofty tree and very leafy, whose beauty was such that the other trees, even those of paradise itself, seemed as it were most greatly to admire its beauty or to imitate it. Of the fall of the devil the Prophet does not speak in that chapter; nay rather, even if he did speak of it, nothing could be proved therefrom, for by those words not the sin, but the beauty of the devil would be described, after the manner of a most beautiful tree whose beauty other trees imitate.

The second testimony is Isaiah 14: "Thou hast fallen down to the earth, thou that didst wound the nations"; and: "Thy land is lost, thy people are slain"; this some would interpret thus: that thou hast destroyed the other Angels beneath thee; "thy land is lost," that is, the inferior Angels to thee; "thy people are slain," that is, those inferior to thee. From this place, however, nothing certain can be had; because all those things, according to the literal sense, are to be understood of the king of Babylon, as we proved in Disputation 232, cap. 4, and, as far as some reason can accommodate these words to the demon, we there said as much as was necessary concerning the things which must be applied; there too we declared that whatever the Babylonians were saying of their king according to the literal sense, we return and apply to the king of Babylon; namely, that because through pride he had lost the favor of his people, this is on account of his superb bearing, by which his own people were destroyed by him, as St. Jerome expounds.[1984]

Third, Giles proves it from Job 41: "He is king over all the sons of pride": for one is called king of others because by his will and command he moves others, as it were. But this testimony has little weight: because Job is not speaking there of the devil, but of Leviathan, a sea-beast, which he calls king over the sons of pride; that is, the greatest among the other great sea monsters, which by their magnitude he calls "proud."[1985]

Fourth, Giles adduces that of Apocalypse 12, where it is said of the dragon that with his tail he drew the third part of the stars; which otherwise cannot be understood than that he drew them by his own force and example. But this testimony too is rather weak: for, as we showed above in Disputation 232, cap. 2, there is no mention made of the first fall of the devil, but of the battle

1984. See Disputatio 232, cap. 4; St. Jerome, comment on Isaiah 14.

1985. Job 41:34 (Vulg. 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride" - here applied by some to Leviathan in the literal sense.

waged with him in the Church, in which he was cast down, and drew with himself the third part of the stars, that is, he seduced a good part of the men who in the Church of God, as it were stars of the firmament, shone with sanctity and virtue.

Therefore it is established that there is no firm foundation in Scripture from which it can be gathered that the inferior Angels were induced by a superior to sin. Moreover, it is manifest that in tradition there is no foundation; wherefore in this controversy, reason, with the authority subjoined, must have place. Durandus recently said, whose opinion we approve in this matter, that nothing certain in this controversy can be defined.[1986]

Next, to what we proposed earlier, namely, that it could so have happened that the inferior Angels, by the example or persuasion of the superior, were provoked to sin, we can easily offer proof. For the supreme Angel could in many ways have sinned, and the very thing aimed at by him would be something which, by his own sin, could have been for the others an occasion of sinning.

First indeed, if the supreme Angel, out of pride, desired a hypostatic union to his own nature, he could have persuaded the others that they too should desire that same union; because their nature, too, seemed to them worthy of it. Yet that he actually did this is not credible; for if out of pride he desired a hypostatic union, he desired it for himself alone. And even supposing he desired a union for his own nature as being the highest, the rest would rather take complacency in the union of his nature than in the union of the human nature with the Word. Whether, however, this would have been a sin of pride, we shall see below.

Second, if the supreme Angel sinned by an immoderate appetite for supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo*), namely, because he wished to attain it by his own powers, with a certain affect of complacency, in that he took it grievously to stand in need of God's help for attaining it, as we explained above in Disputation 235, cap. 3, then he could certainly have induced and moved the others to the same kind of desire and complacency. But if he had only immoderately desired beatitude out of inconsiderateness - of which some think, whom we recalled in the same Disputation, cap. 2 - then he could not have caused the superiors to assent to his persuasion, nor by his example provoked them to sin; for to that sort of inconsiderateness, from which a sin ought to arise, no one is moved by another's persuasion or by example.

The pleasure which was in the paradise of God. This testimony is weak: for there the discourse is with Pharaoh king of Egypt, whose ruin the Prophet foretells, because his heart was lifted up in his own height. To this end he first describes the loftiness of his kingdom by the likeness of trees, and compares it to a most tall and most leafy tree, whose beauty was so great that the other trees, even those of paradise itself, seemed to rival or imitate its beauty as the greatest. But the Prophet in that chapter does not speak of the fall of the devil; nay rather, even if he did speak, nothing could be proved therefrom: because by those words not the sin, but the beauty of the devil would be described, like a most beautiful tree whose beauty the other trees imitate.

The second testimony is Isaiah 14: "Thou art fallen to the earth, who didst wound the nations," and lower: "Thou hast destroyed thy land, thou hast slain thy people," that is, the Angels inferior to thee. Yet from this passage nothing certain can be had: for all those things must be understood, according to the literal sense, of the King of Babylon, as we proved in Disputation 232, chapter 4; and although in some way these words may be accommodated to the demon, as we said there, nevertheless it is not necessary that each single thing which, according to the literal sense, is said of that king, be applied to the demon. But those which we cited were said of that King of Babylon, namely, that by his pride he destroyed his people, that is, that on account of his pride his people was destroyed, as St. Jerome expounds.

Third, Giles proves it from Job 41: "He is king over all the children of pride"; but one is called the king of others, because by his will and command he somehow moves them. Truly this testimony has little weight: for Job is not speaking of the devil, but of Leviathan, a sea-beast, whom he calls king over the children of pride, that is, greatest among the other great sea-beasts, which by their greatness he calls "proud."

Fourth, Giles adduces that of Apocalypse 12, where it is said of the dragon that "with his tail he drew the third part of the stars," which cannot be understood otherwise than of persuasion and example. But this testimony is weak enough: for, as we showed above in Disputation 225, chapter 2, there is no mention there of the first fall of the devil, but of the battle waged with him in the Church, in which he himself cast down, dragged with him the third part of the stars, that is, he seduced a good part of the men who in the Church of God shone like the stars of the firmament by holiness and virtue.

It is clear, therefore, that there is no firm foundation in Scripture from which we might gather that the lower Angels were induced to sin by a superior. Moreover, it is manifest that there is no foundation in tradition; and reason, in this controversy when not supported by authority, can have no place. Rightly, therefore, said Durandus, whose opinion in this matter we approve, that nothing certain can be defined in this controversy.

Next, what we proposed before, namely, that it could have happened in such a way that the lower Angels were provoked to sin by the example or persuasion of a superior, we can easily prove. But because the supreme Angel could have sinned in various ways, it must be seen in detail by what ways even by his sin he could have been to others an occasion of sinning.

And, first indeed, if the supreme Angel out of pride desired the hypostatic union for his own nature, he could certainly persuade others, and move them to desire for themselves also that same union, because it was fitting to their nature; which, however, is not credible that he did: for if out of pride he desired the hypostatic union, he desired it for himself alone. And that the others should rejoice over the union of his own nature, as being supreme, rather than over the union of human nature with the Word - whether this sin would be of pride, we shall see below.

Second, if the supreme Angel had sinned by an immoderate appetite of supernatural beatitude, because he would wish to attain it by his own powers with a certain complacency of affection, in that he would bear it indignantly that he needed God's help for the attainment of that, as was explained above in Disputation 235, chapter 3: he could indeed have invited and moved the others to the same kind of desire and complacency. But if he had immoderately desired beatitude only out of inconsideration, as some have thought, of whom we made mention in the same disputation, chapter 2, then he could not by persuasion or his example have moved the others to sin: because to inconsideration, from which the sin would have had to be, no one is moved by another's persuasion or example. The same, and in the same proportion, must be said if the supreme Angel sinned by an immoderate appetite of natural beatitude, according to what we said in that same disputation, chapter 3.

Third, if the supreme Angel desired some excellence and dignity of mastership, or over men, or over Angels, he could indeed induce others to a similar affection; but it is rather to be believed that he did not do this: because if he had sinned in this way, he would rather have affected that dignity for himself alone than have proposed it as desirable also to others. For a proud man never does this.

At the same time the lower Angels and the supreme sinned.

Caput III - Whether all sinned at the same time, or first the supreme, then the rest

Among those who affirm that the lower Angels were induced to sin by the supreme, it has been placed in controversy whether all sinned with the supreme at the same time in duration, or whether the supreme sinned before the rest. Bonaventure, in the place cited above, teaches that Lucifer sinned earlier in time than the other Angels who by his imitation fell. He confirms it by this reason: because, just as in the supreme Angel himself who sinned there was earlier in time the cogitation of the object than the sin in the will about it, so that the will might be freely borne toward the foreknown; so also in the lower Angels the insinuation of Lucifer's will was earlier in time known than that they imitated the affection itself: therefore, earlier in time did Lucifer sin than the rest.

The opposite opinion was followed by Giles, Durandus, and the Argentine in the places alleged, where they affirm that only in the order of cause did Lucifer sin earlier than the rest who imitated him. Yet into this opinion they have been led by certain frivolous reasons. Giles proves it thus: if the first Angel had sinned earlier in time than the rest, he would have been condemned earlier in time than the others, and therefore could not induce them to sin. And although he could move others to sin, just as even now, after he has been condemned, he induces men, nevertheless no Angel would be deceived by him, seeing his misery and the punishment for sin - just as neither could men be induced or persuaded by him to sin, if they clearly saw his misery and punishment.

But this reason is weak: for an angel could, for some span of time, persevere with the first sin, just as indeed he persevered, before he was thrust down into the prison of hell and was given over to the torments of fire. And although from the very beginning of the sin he would fall into the punishment of obduration, of which in the whole following question we are going to treat, nevertheless this could be hidden from the other angels, because this came from God's will abandoning the Angel without any help of grace. Besides, as we shall say in Disputation 241, chapter 4, not from the very beginning of the sin, but a little after, did the demon fall into the punishment of obduration; therefore, for that time the lower angel could be persuaded by the superior, the sin having already been committed, before the supreme fell into the punishment of obduration.

Then, to confirm the same opinion, Durandus uses this reason: No one, looking at evil, acts and sins; but if the sin of the first Angel had preceded in time, his malice would be manifest to the inferiors; therefore, they themselves, looking at his malice, would not sin. This reason, understood universally both of angels and of men, is frivolous. For that proposition, "No one, looking at evil, acts or sins," is not to be understood in such a way that no one can sin knowing the malice of the sin which he pursues with affection: for men for the most part sin knowingly; but to sin knowingly is nothing else than not to be ignorant, but to know and to attend to the malice of the sin, and nonetheless, with the affection drawn by some reason of utility, advantage, or delight, to pursue and embrace the very work of sin. The true sense, however, of that proposition - both in angels and in men - is that no one's will is carried to a sinful work drawn by the malice of it, but by some reason of utility, advantage, or delight, which the intellect apprehends as conjoined with the malice of the sin, as we shall show in I - II, question 77, article ... But if that proposition be understood of the angels alone, so that none of them could first sin knowingly and prudently, but the first of them must have sinned out of inconsideration, as some contend: in this way Durandus's reason seems to have some weight; because if the first angel could not first sin knowingly and prudently, but out of inconsideration, it was necessary that he sin earlier in time than that he could induce and persuade others to sin, and that others sin by his persuasion. But since already above, in Disputation 235, chapter 2, it has been shown that an angel could not sin out of inconsideration, this reason does not seem supported by a firm foundation.

Therefore the true reason, on account of which it seems to me that one must say that the first Angel did not sin earlier in duration than the rest, even if they sinned by his persuasion and example, is that in any instant of time there can be first the cognition of the object and a free consent about it, in which the sin consists. For the liberty of the will is not only with respect to the future; but in the very same instant in which the Angel begins to be, he can also act freely, as in Disputation 235, chapter 3, was noted by us. Then also, in the same individual instant of time, there can be both the sin of the supreme Angel and the insinuation of his will, which would be made to the rest. Moreover, the other Angels could, in the same instant, know the insinuation of

1986. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In 2 Sent., q. 2.

the will of the supreme Angel, and follow it. Why, then, ought we to assert that there intervened a delay of time between the sin of the supreme Angel and that of the others, since in the same instant all could sin with the supreme, and all are of a most acute nature in understanding and acting?

Caput IV - What was the sin of the lower Angels

What, then, was the sin of the lower Angels, in the opinion of those who assert that they sinned by the persuasion or imitation of the supreme Angel, is a question. In which Bonaventure, in 2 Sentences, distinction 7, article 2, question 1, and Richard, article, question 2, Alexander, and Gabriel, and Maior, in the places cited in the first chapter, hold that the sin of the lower Angels was pride. Yet they do not all set forth this kind of sin in the same way. Alexander and Bonaventure say that the lower Angels sinned by an appetite of their own excellence, which, without merits - just as also the first Angel - they desired. Bonaventure adds that they, in the same way, also desired it for the supreme Angel, because they saw that it would not be granted to them unless it were granted also to him. What, however, this excellence was, Bonaventure does not explain: he had said, however, in the same distinction, article 1, question 2, that it was the excellence of presiding over others. Yet I do not see how each would desire for himself and for the supreme this dignity, when one of them ought to be subject to the other: unless he would desire that he and the supreme together be placed over the rest; which does not seem credible: since a proud man, greedy of dominion, scarcely endures a companion and partner with himself.

Richard judged that their pride was in this, that they desired to have, without merits, the excellence to which they were created - like a proud man; and by excellence he understands supernatural beatitude: because to this indeed all Angels were created. And indeed, that the lower Angels could have sinned in one of these two ways by the induction of the supreme, I showed in the first chapter of this disputation; and the manner also by which they could have been induced by the supreme, I there explained.

Moreover, Gabriel and Maior placed the sin of the lower Angels in this, that they coveted for the supreme Angel this excellence, that to him, not to God, all should be subjected. And although this may seem a sin of pusillanimity, nevertheless they say it was a sin of pride: because they did not wish to be subject to God, but to the supreme Angel, that they might live more freely. Yet I do not see by what reason this sin could have been one of pride, if by this assent they refused to be subject to God. This sin could indeed have been pride, if they had desired for the supreme Angel this excellence, disdaining to be subjects of God: in the way that it happens that someone of an inferior order is chosen prince by electors because they bear it ill to be subject to another whom they see to be near to being elected. The sin of the lower Angels could also have been pride, if they had desired for the supreme the hypostatic union, which he also himself would desire for himself, that by it their own nature might obtain the highest honor, because they would bear it ill that their nature be so subject. But to define that their sin happened in this or that way - who can do so, or on what foundation will he rely to assert this or that?

Quaestio LXIV - On the punishment of the demons

Article 1 (Articulus 1)

Explanation of the Article.

The first conclusion is: that, as regards natural cognitions, the intellect of the Angel is not harmed. Saint Thomas proves this from Dionysius (chapter 4 of De Divinis Nominibus, part 4), where he asserts that natural things remained intact in the demons. The second conclusion: that speculative supernatural cognition, which comes from the mysteries, was not altogether taken away from the demons, but diminished. The Holy Doctor proves this: because concerning the mysteries and divine secrets they are revealed to them as far as is needful, either by means of good angels, or by certain signs and effects of divine power. The third conclusion: that supernatural practical cognition which moves one to act well does not remain in the demons.

Concerning the first conclusion I see no difficulty at all; because that doctrine of Dionysius, once confirmed, is approved by all Scholastics. Concerning the second conclusion there could be controversy, whether theological faith remained in the demons in that way and from the same principle as it was in them. The reason for the difficulty, on the one hand, is that in the demons no supernatural gift of grace remained; therefore, since faith is a supernatural gift of grace, it seems to follow that faith did not remain in them. On the other hand it seems to have remained in them, because in the Epistle of James, chapter 2, it is said, "The demons also believe and shudder." But so that the argument of James may have some force, it must be understood of divine faith. For by the example of the demons he argues against Christian faithful who wished to be content with divine faith alone, in order to show them that this does not suffice for them, since indeed even the demons believe. Of this matter, however, we shall treat more conveniently in I.2, quaest. 5, art. 2. Concerning the third conclusion there could be a difficulty, about which we shall discuss in disputation 241.

Article 2 (Articulus 2)

The conclusion is. Damon's will is so obstinate in his sin that they are to remain in it for eternity.

Disputation 239 (Disputatio 239)

What is the cause of the perpetual obduracy of demons (Quaenam sit causa perpetuae obdurationis daemonum)

Disputation 239. What is the cause of the perpetual obduracy of demons.

State of the controversy, chap. 1. No one refers the cause of the obduracy to their nature, chap. 2. The Damascene and Fulgentius are objected against the foregoing reason, chap. 3. Against the same reason it is shown that angels can change their wills and their elections, chap. 4. Another cause of the demons' obduracy in evil from a perverse disposition of nature, chap. 5. The opinion of Henry concerning the same matter, chap. 6. The true cause of the demons' obduracy, chap. 7.

Caput I - (Chapter I)

CHAPTER I. State of the controversy.

Besides the tremendous torments by which, as the Catholic faith teaches, demons are to be punished forever, there is another and much greater punishment for demons, which theologians call the penalty of loss.

This punishment consists in the perpetual privation of glory, and in the demon's perpetual obstinacy in evil.

By "obstinacy" I mean not that which consists in a perverse hardening of the mind in evil and in a fixed purpose always to sin, but that which consists in the privation of divine grace, by which one could both rise again from sin and perform some good; for obstinacy may be taken in both senses, as I showed above, Disput. 95, chap. 10.

And I demonstrated that obstinacy which is a fault God is not the cause of, whereas obstinacy which is a punishment God is the author of.

But the obstinacy which is a punishment, about which we must now speak, is twofold.

One part consists in that demons cannot rise again from sin and be justified a second time; and of this we shall discourse in the present and following disputations.

The other part consists in that demons cannot perform any good; and of this we shall treat in Disput. 240.

The present controversy, however, about the impotence of the demon to be converted to God, is not about God's cause; for it is confessed by all that conversion to God cannot be effected without grace, and that no one can deny that God, even by his absolute power, could by his grace so prevent demons that they would turn to him and truly repent of their sins.

For there is no will so rebellious and hardened in evil that God by his mercy could not convert and soften.

Although Anselm in Book 1 of Cur Deus Homo, chap. 16, judges it impossible that angels once fallen into sin could be reconciled with God - which he does not prove by any sound reason, nor can he prove it in any way.

But the question to be explained alone will be this: why, whereas God delays long and much for sinful men and expects that after many sins they may return to their heart and does not withdraw his grace from them so that they may be able to convert, yet with the angels immediately after one sin He has withdrawn his grace and deserted them perpetually so that they can no longer return to their former state.

For no one doubts of their perpetual damnation after one sin.

As to the time of their obduracy and damnation, whether it began at the first instant when the sin began, or after some duration of it, and whether it begins on the way or only in hell, this has been said above, Disput. 228, chap. 7.

Caput II - (Chapter II)

CHAPTER II. Some refer the cause of obduracy to the nature of the demons themselves.

In the aforesaid difficulty some scholastic authors judged that for this reason God denied his grace to the demons after one act of sin and left them perpetually obstinate, namely because the angel's will is from itself so free with respect to election that it remains immovably attached to that which it once chose with full deliberation.

For since God confers his grace according to the manner of the subject, this opinion seemed most agreeable to reason, that immediately after one sin committed from a full election He would deny his grace perpetually to the demons.

For the authors of this opinion do not think it impossible for God to give to the demons grace so that they might convert to him by repentance; but they only assert that God observed the due manner of denying to the demons his grace of conversion immediately after one sin, because this was according to the mode of their nature, as has been explained.

Those have followed this opinion: Alexander (?), [text: Alex. 3. p. q. 1. m. 2.], St. Thomas, Cajetan and the more recent Thomists in this article 2, Capreolus in 2 d. 7. q. 1. art. 1, concl. 2, art. 8 against the arguments of Scotus, brought in the third place against the same conclusion; but especially Ferrara in Contra Gentiles chap. 95 § 4. (note: references preserved as in the text).

Secondly it must be noted what reason St. Thomas also touched on at the end of that chapter; Paludanus in 4th Distinction 50 q.1 also refers to the same reason, yet he himself assigns a different reason, which we will also recall below.

But how an angel after a free election should adhere immovably to the thing which he has chosen, they explain in this way.

The appetitive faculty has proportion in its operation to the cognitive faculty by which it is moved, just as a mobile has proportion to its mover.

But the apprehension and cognition by which an angel grasps and knows something differ from the apprehension which a man has; for the angel apprehends all things so that the first principles are known to him immediately;

because whatever an angel knows he knows without discursiveness, whereas man knows first principles in this immediate way, the remaining things he understands only by way of discourse.

Therefore, just as a man is immovable in relation to first principles because he knows them without discourse, but can be moved with respect to other things because discourse can alter them,

in the same manner an angel in his intellect not only adheres immovably to first principles but to all the rest of the things which he knows.

And since the will and the appetitive faculty have a proportion in their operation to the cognitive faculty, it follows that after an election of some thing the will will adhere immovably to it, just as the intellect would adhere to a thing which it once understood.

Marsilius, reporting this reasoning of St. Thomas in 2 Quaest. 5, art. 5, thus interprets his meaning, that he speaks of God's ordained power, not that an angel, considered according to his nature, could not be turned from what he once chose.

Caput III - (Chapter III)

CHAPTER III. The Damascene and Fulgentius are objected against the preceding reason.

The foundation of the aforesaid reason, namely that an angel adheres immovably to the thing which he once freely chose, has seemed to many difficult to understand and not sufficiently firm upon which the said reasoning could rest.

Aegidius and a disciple and auditor of St. Thomas, Scotus, Duranus, and Gregotius openly attack it in places which will be cited below;

of whose objections we shall first set them forth, so that from them, if possible, we may interpret the presented reasoning in a more favorable sense.

First indeed the interpretation which Marsilius used must be rejected, since it manifestly contains (as they say) a petitio principii, as he himself also observed.

For when we ask why so quickly after one act the demons remained obdurate perpetually; if the aforementioned doctors respond that therefore the angel is obdurate after one act because by the ordained power of God refusing his grace to repentance he cannot be turned, nor moved from what he once chose,

certainly their account is less sufficient, for we seek the reason of this, and there is such controversy among the Doctors about why God so quickly denied the aid of his grace so that not a single angel could be recalled to repentance.

The doctors cited in chap. 2 try to assign a corresponding reason, namely that God so quickly denied his grace perpetually to the demons because it was fitting to their nature that that which they freely chose would adhere to them perpetually.

But, as I have said, the principle of this supposition, namely that an angel adheres immovably to an election once made, seemed difficult to many.

First, Damascene in Book 2 On the Faith, chap. 3, near the beginning, seems to teach the opposite plainly.

For there he defines the nature of the angel with these words.

Therefore the angel is a participant in the nature of reason, understanding by perpetual motion, endowed with the liberty of the will and mutable according to the reason of judgment; that is, having a free will towards either party.

There is in Greek the word ἀκίνητος, which he rightly translated. Bilius renders it "endowed with perpetual motion," for in Greek ἀκίνητος, if you render word for word, is entirely the same as in Latin: always movable.

But Damascene means that the angel is so of free will that not only before election he can embrace either party, but also that after election he can be moved into the contrary party.

First, because, as will be proved below, free will which from itself can incline to either part before election can also after election; because immutability in the will cannot arise from a free election.

Moreover, because if the angel were only free before election to choose either part as he wished, and then afterwards adhered immovably to the part he chose, he would not rightly be called ever movable or endowed with perpetual motion; for, having made the election, he could no longer be moved from it.

Further Damascene did not only say that the angel is always movable, but also mutable in judgment (Greek τρεπτή κατὰ γνώμην), that is, mutable according to judgment; he also says that the angel is mutable in will (Greek ἐθελότρεπτος), that is, mutable in will.

But from the fact that an angel is free toward either part, it is not said that his judgment and will are mutable;

for it is the same to say that someone's judgment and will are mutable as to say that they can change the judgment and will which he once had;

for he who cannot change the judgment or will which once he freely chose, by what reason can it be said that his judgment and will are mutable?

Otherwise even God, who freely discerns and determines many things whose opposites He could will, would be said to have mutable judgment and will, which is absurd.

They confirm from that which Damascene said in this way: Whatever is created is necessarily subject also to mutation.

For one thing is outside the hazard of mutation, which has nothing from which it is created.

Since therefore the angel's will is created, and only the divine will is uncreated, it follows that the angel's will can be changed, and the divine alone cannot.

And having said that the angel is endowed with the liberty of free choice, he adds: the angel therefore, being a participant in the force of reason and intelligence, is of free choice, and as a created being was in that condition that change could be received.

And it would be free to him either to remain in good and to make progress, or to be bent into evil.

Therefore he establishes the mutability of the angel's will in the fact that he can remain in good begun and can decline into evil.

But to abandon the good begun is to change the will toward good.

Therefore in the same way he could relinquish his will and purpose of evil and be changed from it - not, I say, by true and salutary penitence by his proper powers, but by some withdrawal of the bad will by his own nature,

for neither can a man by his own powers withdraw a bad will by true salutary penitence;

yet for this reason he is not said to be by his own nature inflexible from that evil which he once chose.

Someone will reply that this mutability is only from good into evil:

because concerning supernatural objects the angel is not inflexible:

and so it is possible that he change from a begun supernatural good, while the immutability of his will is about natural objects, good or bad.

But this response can be easily refuted.

First, for at least from this we would have that the angel's will can be turned from good to evil by his own powers, but from evil to good by the grace of God; and therefore grace would not have been denied to him because his nature was altogether inflexible.

Second, because Damascene draws from the fact that the angel's will is created that it is mutable; but it is created with respect to natural objects; therefore it is mutable with respect to those.

Third, because in Disput. 231 chap. 4 we showed sufficiently clearly that an angel, because he is a creature, can sin not only concerning supernatural precepts but also concerning natural ones, as he does not sin every day; therefore his will can be turned from a natural good to evil: why then would he be inflexible from evil to good, I do not say by salutary penitence by his own powers, but by any kind of turning back?

Secondly someone might reply that the angel cannot be turned from what he once fully chose; and therefore the fact that he willed in the first instant to sin could have been changed in the second instant by the sin.

I will show below that this response is frivolous.

Third, someone might object to us the same Damascene, who in the cited chapter says: moreover he is by no means capable of penitence for this reason, because he is without a body.

By these words he seems to teach that by his nature an angel is not capable of penitence.

Damascene's reply is that by the name "penitence" he does not understand any retraction of a prior will: for he plainly concedes this to the angel, since he said that his judgment and will are mutable.

But he clearly understands penitence as the gift of the Holy Spirit by which sin is wiped away.

Of this Damascene says that the demon is not capable, that is, this penitence is not given to him, whereas it is given to men.

Because the demon lacks a body, that is, he sinned without carnal incentives.

He uses the Greek word ἀνετίδεκτος, which signifies "not capable, not admitting"; not to deny the capacity and penitence of receiving such a gift in an angel (for no one can assert that with any kind of probability), but to denote that such a gift was not granted to the angel.

Furthermore against the same reason alleged above one may object the very saying of Damascene in the same chapter near the end, where, having said that angels by their own nature can be moved with difficulty toward evil, he adds:

"Now however (that is, when they are already in beatitude) they are in such a condition that they can scarcely be moved or bent at all; which nevertheless is to be attributed not to their nature but to grace."

But if what the doctors mentioned in chap. 2 suppose in their reasoning were true, namely that angels by their nature are inflexible from that which they once chose, it would follow that angels, after their merit is confirmed and perfected on the road, could no longer sin; and thus that would not be to be attributed to the grace of God, as Damascene says.

That all inflexibility belongs to the creature by the gift of God's grace we showed at length from the doctrine of the Fathers above in Disput. 130.

Against the same reason we could object Fulgentius in the book On Faith to Peter, chap. 3 before the middle, where, having said that the faculty to know and to love God was so given by God to angels and men that each could have it and lose it, he adds:

"If, however, someone were to lose it voluntarily, he would not be able thenceforth by his own arbitrium to recover it, so that he could reinfuse the beginnings of holy thought gratuitously by the gift of goodness to those whom he wished, which was his to ordain in the very outset of creation for spirits and bodies, places and affections, as he wisely wished, fittingly and wonderfully."

In that passage Fulgentius says there is an equitable reason in both cases: not to recover justice by penitence, because to recover it belongs to the divine gift, not to nature.

And therefore St. Fulgentius does not refer the impossibility of recovering it to the flexibility of nature, but to the perpetual privation of grace.

Fulgentius then proves it with these words: "He evidently shows that the beginning of good will and of holy thought is not born in man from himself but is divinely prepared and granted by God in him;"

"because neither the devil nor any of his angels, from whom by the merit of that ruin they have been thrust into this lower darkness, could or will be able to recover the good will."

"If it were possible that the human nature, after being turned away from God and having lost the goodness of will, could again have it from itself, it would be much more possible for the angelic nature to have it, which, insofar as it is less weighed down by the burden of a terrestrial body, would be endowed with this faculty to a greater extent."

These are Fulgentius' words.

From which I gather two arguments against the reason advanced in the preceding chapter.

The first is: if it were true what the cited doctors there affirm, namely that the angel is by himself inflexible from that which he once chose, Fulgentius would not rightly prove that the lost good will is recoverable by divine grace from the fact that the demon did not recover it; for anyone could easily say that the angel did not recover the previous state by penitence because once having made his election he cannot repent for that reason, because he is inflexible.

But that a man can be restored by penitence to his former state is due to the fact that by his own nature he can be made penitent, and that he is flexible from that which he once fully chose.

The second argument is: if the forementioned proposition which the reasoning in the preceding chapter supposes were true, Fulgentius would not rightly infer from the fact that man can by his own powers recover his former good will that the highest angel could do so more easily.

For although a man, weighed down by the mass of a body, could do it, it would not be right to say that it would be possible even for the angel if a man can be turned from that which he once willed: whereas the angel cannot be turned from that which he once chose.

Therefore Fulgentius supposes that the angel could also be changed, as he infers directly; it would be easier for an angel to recover a former good will than for a man, if a man can recover it by his own powers.

Caput IV - (Chapter IV)

CHAPTER IV. Against the same reason it is shown that angels can change their wills and their elections.

Against the foundation of the preceding reason we can act not only by authority but also by effective arguments, and above all demonstrate that not only could an angel have changed his election which he once had, but in fact did change it

First indeed, because it is evident that demons changed their election and judgment which they previously had concerning the death of Christ:

for the devil before, when he put it into the heart of Judas to betray Christ to the Jews (John 13), diligently procured Christ's death;

afterwards he tried by Pilate's wife (Matthew 27) to persuade Pilate not to crucify Christ.

For the woman wrote to Pilate as he sat on the tribunal: "Nothing to you, and to the just one, etc." (text preserved as in source).

Cajetan responds in this article § to the preceding doubt, whom the more recent Thomists follow when they say that the doctors cited mean the angel's will to be immutable from that which he once indicated and chose, understood as a full judgment and election;

whereas the demon when he first urged Judas to betray Christ to the Jews did not judge fully nor act from a full election, and therefore afterwards it was changed.

But who does not see that Cajetan devised this escape without foundation?

From what then could he divine that the demon did not judge fully and choose fully what he first decreed concerning Christ's death;

but let us reason against him.

Either Cajetan understands by full judgment and election that which suffices for mortal sin, and in this sense one cannot deny that the angel by full election and deliberation decreed to induce Judas to betray Christ to the Jews, as is manifest;

or by full election he understands that which proceeds from judgment without any inadvertence of some circumstance and without defect;

And certainly, if according to Cajetan the demon sinned by his first sin from inadvertence, as we reported in Disput. 234 chap. 2, it follows plainly against him that the demon could not less well have revoked the will of the first sin than that other will of persuading Christ's death, if he had willed and induced it not by full election but by some inadvertence.

If however he could revoke the will of killing Christ because he sinned from some defect of intellect, since it is certain that every sin is born from some defect of the intellect (as I noted Disput. 231 chap. 5), and must be proved in 1-2 q.77 a.2, it follows that the demon does not adhere by himself immovably to the sin which he committed from election.

Then it is also certain that all angels who sin changed the prior will in which they were created.

For according to the opinion of St. Thomas, which I showed to be truer in Disput. 227, all were created in grace and in the love of God, and yet afterwards sinned and followed God with inward hatred;

therefore angels do not adhere immovably to the thing which they once chose.

Perhaps someone will reply that the angel can be turned from good to evil because this can be without God's grace; but not from evil to good, because for this he needs the grace of God.

But this response does not in the least harm the proposed argument, because when we contend here that the angel can be turned from what he once chose, and does not adhere immovably to it, we speak not of conversion by salutary penitence but of any kind of retraction whatsoever, from whatever end, which is sufficient to remove in us any adhesion of the will to what it once chose.

For if the speech were of conversion to a prior good will by fruitful penitence, the same would be said of man as of the angel, namely that he cannot truly repent of sin.

(References: Cajetan in this article § a doubt against the foregoing and Ferrara cited chap. §).

It must be observed however that the doctrine of St. Thomas is to be understood of the will of a perfect and complete election, from a perfect apprehension of judgment, so that from this election once made the angel cannot be moved.

And they call perfect election that which is with indifference and liberty toward both evil and good.

And because the angel in the first instant could not sin, and therefore did not thus choose perfectly, he could not be moved from that election.

But this solution can be easily refuted.

First because that the angel could not sin in the first instant is very difficult, as I showed above Disput. 235.

Then if the whole reason why the angel cannot be moved from an election once perfectly made is because perfect election is made from perfect judgment, in the same way the angel could not be moved from the election which he made in the first instant without the liberty of sinning, just as from that which he afterwards would have made with that liberty:

because even that which was done in the first instant was from a full and perfect judgment;

for nothing prevents the plenitude and perfection of judgment from the impotence of sinning;

otherwise there would not be a perfect judgment in God, which is absurd.

Therefore, when in the first instant the angel chose the good perfectly and without deliberation and without any defect of intellect, he could never be torn away from this election by any perversity.

And certainly if the first act in the angels, by which they loved God, had been natural and not at all free, as the doctors who think the angel could not sin in the first instant contend,

it would be more difficult for the angel to be moved from that first will than from any other which were not natural.

If you say that therefore the angel could be separated from the love with which he loved God in the first instant and could hate God because he could newly consider some reasons by which he would have hatred of him, which he did not consider at first, against this we would object that the angel could also revoke his sin which he committed first by some new consideration.

Moreover in the opinion of those who say the angel sinned from inadvertence, among whom are Cajetan and Ferrara as we saw in Disput. 234 chap. 2 (against whom we are now disputing), thus the angel could afterward consider that which he considered.

Also this is in all opinions: for there is no sin which is not committed from the defect of some perfect consideration by which one could be drawn back from sin, as we said above.

Then from these things a not slight other argument is taken against the aforesaid reason, which at least has force against Cajetan and Ferrara.

For if the angel sinned from inadvertence, as they assert, and afterwards the angel saw that he had not considered what he ought (for demons believe and tremble, James 2, chap. 10, and could not be ignorant that they had not considered what they ought), he easily had in that very judgment of reason the principle whereby he could revoke that perverse election and retract it by any fruitful penitence, if God would grant him grace.

Cajetan however answers in this article §: in brief he says that the angel indeed sinned from inadvertence; and afterwards, when he perceives that inadvertence has ceased in him speculatively but not affectively (so he speaks), that is, the inadvertence was not supplied by a fruitful consideration which would move the affective state in the contrary direction.

The response, however, is frivolous: for the argument does not contend that after a sin from inadvertence the demon had had such a consideration whereby it would move the affectus to penitence; for this is outside the controversy, since without God's grace that cannot be had, and grace has been denied to the angels perpetually after the first sin;

but the argument contended that the angel had seen speculatively his inadvertence from which he sinned, and therefore did not have in that sin from the part of judgment the principle of perpetual adhesion; rather he had the principle by which he could retract the prior election, having known the defect of his prior judgment:

If indeed according to the opinion of the doctors whom we mentioned in the first chap., the immutability of election in angels must arise from a perfect judgment without defect.

Finally, as we said above, since every perverse affection of the will, even in angels, proceeds from some defect in the intellect by which one considers those things which ought to withdraw the soul from sin less than those which move it to sins, it follows from the part of judgment that even in angels there remains the principle of mutability from that which the angel once chose.

And this also has place in all elections in which there is no sin, in the angels:

otherwise he could not be moved away from an honest thing which the angel chose rightly according to virtue as from that which he once perversely chose and cannot be torn away from, which is absurd.

Rather, if the angel's judgment were always so perfect that he could not be changed from an election once made, it would also follow that there is not in the angel a liberty toward either part before election.

For if immediately by that perfect judgment the angel can choose into one part, in the same way, having once made the election from that perfect judgment he could recall into the contrary that part which he judged.

For there does not seem a greater reason why the will from such a judgment would be left free to either part before election and not after election.

If however, with that perfect judgment standing, he cannot revoke the made election but is bound necessarily to the part which he chose, it follows that liberty is taken away from him before election from that judgment, which is absurd.

For to have chosen or not to have chosen does not determine the will nor take away its liberty.

Especially since the authors cited reduce the entire root and cause of immobile adhesion to one part not to the made election but to the perfection of the judgment.

Scotus seems to have touched this reasoning in 2 d. 7. q. 1. §.

Against that conclusion thus: the will is not the cause of willing except insofar as it is prior according to the nature of the operation of willing: therefore it is compared in the same manner with some volition and object so long as it does not vary in itself

Further Scotus proves that the will, insofar as it is the principle of willing, has the same manner in itself before and after election; because to produce various effects from itself in that it produces one does not impede the production of another.

Add also that if the will after election remained in itself entirely unchanged, it would not remain free; this at least should arise from a varying apprehension of the reason.

For the will of the blessed, being in itself entirely unchanged, does not remain free because the cognition of the object is varied.

But the cognition of the angel on the road, whether before election or after it, does not vary;

therefore, if with that kind of thought and judgment the will was free to choose whichever part it wished, it will also remain free so that it can be moved from an election once made no less than it was before free toward either part.

Caput V - (Chapter V)

CHAPTER V. Another cause of the demons' obduracy in evil from a perverse disposition of nature.

St. Thomas also assigns another cause of the demons' obduracy from their own part in Contra Gentiles 4 chap. 95 in this way.

The end with respect to the will stands as the first principles do with respect to the intellect in speculative matters.

But error in speculative matters must be corrected otherwise than error concerning conclusions.

For an error concerning conclusions can be corrected by true principles rightly disposed in argumentation;

whereas an error concerning principles cannot otherwise be treated and corrected than by removing the perverse disposition from which it arises.

Likewise in the will it happens concerning the end:

for everyone has a natural desire for the ultimate end, and thus the desire of beatitude is natural to every rational nature.

That this or that is desired under the reason of the ultimate end and of beatitude proceeds from some particular disposition of nature;

which Aristotle rightly indicated in Ethics 3 chap. 4 in that sentence: "As each one is, such an end seems to him."

Therefore, if this disposition of the will, from which it proceeds that something is desired by a rational creature as the ultimate end, as happens in any sin, cannot be removed, the will cannot be amended concerning the ultimate end nor retracted.

But from a man living in this life that perverse disposition can be removed, though not from a soul in another life; and for the same reason neither from an angel.

This reasoning, however, does not satisfy the difficulty if one wishes to assign something peculiar on the part of the demon which is not in man, on account of which God would deny the help of his grace and thereby the demon remain obstinate.

First then, the perverse disposition on the part of the intellect, by which it happens to err concerning principles, is posited only in this way: that man does not apprehend the extreme proposition which is the first principle, or if he apprehends it, because nevertheless he knows it through alien concepts and not as they are, the power of the intellect does not attain that express form of knowledge by which those extremes are represented to itself appropriately.

But concerning the ultimate end it happens to err in one of two ways: either from an error of the intellect, because it judges that in some created thing the complement of all good is to be found, as many philosophers thought; and in this way the angel cannot be deceived, but man can while he is in this life;

however the separated soul is easily convicted of this error by the very experiment; therefore from this part it will not adhere immovably to the ultimate end which it once thus chose.

If the angel also in this way had erred at any time concerning the ultimate end, without doubt by the very event of damnation he would have been convicted and removed from the error of the intellect; and therefore from this part he would not adhere immovably to the end which he once chose.

But we speak of the retraction of a prior election not by fruitful penitence and according to virtue, but from any other end, as we warned above.

Or concerning the ultimate end it happens to err through any mortal sin, by which we say the ultimate end is constituted in a creature:

and in this way most angels and men have sinned: for few were those who erred in constituting the highest happiness in some created thing.

In whatever mortal sin the ultimate end is constituted, not indeed of felicity, but of a certain apparent good, because something is loved for the sake of itself against God, beloved by the love of charity, precisely because it is loved against his precept, and such a love is notable that it dissolves the bond of charity with God, as will be explained in R. 2 quaest.1 art.5 and quaest.113 art.2.

And in this way the will of the angels erred concerning the end without an error of judgment in the intellect, but either from inadvertence, as the Thomist authors say in Disput. 234 chap. 2, or, which is truer, from a defect of the intellect more effectively presenting that which inclined to sin than that which ought to draw away from sin.

This defect of the intellect is not of its nature immutable: indeed the created intellect even of an angel is such that at one time it proposes one thing more effectively, at another time another: therefore the error of the will concerning the end arising from such an error of the intellect, by its own nature is not immutable in the angel, as it is in man.

But some Thomists explain this disposition of the separated soul or of the angel, by which they adhere immovably to the thing which they once chose, in this way:

not that it is some quality left from sin inducing necessity to the will (for who would say that!), but because just as a heavy thing tends downward while it is outside its proper place and requires the concurrence of the first cause so that it be kept down according to the due order of nature, and otherwise it would be contrary to nature:

when however it is in its center, no further concurrence is owed to it:

likewise to an intellectual nature when it is in its terminus no concurrence is due: but rather it is so ordered that it rests in its end which it has chosen for itself.

And this is that the perverse affection concerning the end to which the angel adhered on the way cannot be removed.

But these Thomists do not defend the reason of Saint Thomas but apply a new one:

for St. Thomas did not say that therefore angels cannot repent because they are in the terminus, but because their disposition of the will concerning the end cannot be removed from them, so that he demonstrates from this that they are already in their terminus.

Moreover we will inquire from these doctors whether the angels after sin are in a natural terminus, as a stone is in the center, or in a terminus beyond nature, God so disposing because of their sins, although he could have granted them a longer way so that they might be converted to penitence?

Certainly it cannot be said that they are in the terminus as a stone is in its natural center:

for it is not natural that an angel be punished with the penalty of loss and obstinacy, but supernaturally beyond nature:

although their sins do most justly merit that punishment.

Therefore one must say that the angels are in the terminus from the mere will of God denying them perpetually his grace because of their sins:

not because the angel by his own nature adheres to that perverse disposition so that in no way can he be torn away from it, not only by salutary penitence but by any end whatsoever.

Caput VI - (Chapter VI)

CHAPTER VI. Henry's opinion on the same matter.

Finally Henry in Quaestiones quodlibetales 3 q.11 reports the opinion of some who said that the demons' and souls' obstinacy in evil proceeds from this, namely because the more free and more perfect the will is, the more vehemently it immerses itself in the pleasure and thing which it chooses; that is, the greater the love with which it adheres to it.

Since therefore the nature of the angel and of the separated soul is so perfectly free that, if without any carnal stimulus they are moved from themselves to the thing which they love, they so vehemently immerse and fix themselves in it that they cannot in any way be moved away from it.

Although Henry consents to this opinion, he adds that in this way the mode of the angels' and separated souls' obstinacy in evil is not sufficiently explained.

Concerning which he himself tries to explain it further with these words.

"When the will being in perfect liberty, having had complete deliberation, runs into sin with such force as to place in it the ultimate end, that, coming to the obstacle of synderesis, it not only does not stop there but despising it rushes upon it, and there it is so fixed that it neither wants nor can withdraw itself."

"Just as an acute iron, piercing the flesh into the inner parts of the bones, is blunted so that it cannot be drawn out."

On the contrary a man pilgrim, because he cannot strike with such force, can therefore always return as long as he is on the way

So far Henry.

This mode of philosophizing therefore agrees with the first, insofar as it teaches that the angel from himself so freely bears toward that which he follows with full deliberation that afterwards he cannot be torn away from it; and thus in general the intellect suffers entirely the same difficulties as the first mode.

But it differs from it in that the latter refers the whole cause of this immutability after election to the perspicacity of the intellect, against which mode in chapters 3 and 4 we proposed some difficulties.

But this mode reduces all immutability to the great and most free impetus with which the will of the angel and of the separated soul is carried toward the thing it loves.

But the author of that [opinion] tries to explain this matter by a parable, as Scotus rightly noted in 2 distinct. 7 q.1 § contra conclusionem in the verse "Against the second way", so that no reason can be understood and the thing itself becomes more difficult.

For it was necessary to explain what the free will of the angel and separated soul has after election that it be blunted and thus remain fixed so that it cannot be torn away.

For that example of a sharp iron is too gross and in no way explains the matter.

Then it is false that he says that the more free the will is the more it is always carried with greater impetus into the object;

for since it is perfectly free, it is in its power more or less to be carried into the object.

Moreover that this sentence seems to say that the separated soul contracts obstinacy by some act after separation is no less false, as Scotus rightly noted in the cited place.

For if by an act in another life he contracted obstinacy, especially by the first act, and therefore the first act did not proceed from obstinacy, it would follow that the angel could retract by that first act the sins which he committed on the way, and there would be a place for penitence in the other life.

For this reason Scotus uses this against the aforesaid mode of Henry.

Caput VII - (Chapter VII)

CHAPTER VII. The true cause of the demons' obduracy

In this difficulty I first judge the unique and proper cause of the inflexible obstinacy of the demons, that they cannot resume a good will, to be the subtraction of divine grace which by a just judgment God removed on account of their sins.

Then from the part of the angel himself there was also some reason of congruity, on account of which God, although he could have sustained them for a longer time, so soon closed their way, as will be explained below.

The former part is taught by Antisiodorus in book 2 of the Summa tract. 2 t.6; Albertus (2 p. tract.5 q.25 art.4); Bonaventure in 2 dist.7 p.1 art.1 q.1; Ricardus art.2 in the body and solutions of the arguments; Durandus q.2; Scotus q.1 § (I say in the second); and in the quoted places of the same d. q.3; Gregor. q.1 art.2; Bassolus q.1 art.2; Maior q.1; to whom also we could add Gabriel and Occham whom we will cite in the following disputation, Marsilius in 2 quaest.5 art.3; and Paludanus in 4th distinction 50 question - all of whom refer the obduracy of angels to the sole will of God in denying the help of his grace, not to any immutability of their nature.

They speak of the demons' obstinacy not insofar as it consists in a mind hardened to sin (for they themselves are the proper cause of that, nor can God be the proper cause of it) but of the inflexible state of them and the impotence of resuming a good will.

Indeed the aforementioned doctors Scotus, Paludanus, Gregotius, Gabriel, Occham and others expressly refute that cause which in chap. 2 we assigned from the opinion of some, which consists in the immutability of the angels' nature after election; but we will expound that in a favorable sense below.

Therefore there is no doubt that this is the proper cause of the demons' immutability from the state of sin, nor has any of the cited doctors taught the opposite.

For no Catholic denies that the angel's free will cannot by itself be recalled to the prior state in which it was before sin, or that the prior good will which it lost be recovered by itself.

Moreover all confess that God could have granted the demons the grace of penitence; if granted without doubt they would rise again.

For what seems to be demonstrated by Anselm in Book 2 Cur Deus Homo chap. 21, that an angel once fallen could not be freed from sin if understood with regard to God's absolute power, is too severe an opinion which scholastics commonly do not approve.

Finally they concede that demons could now have some good will if God did not deny his grace to them.

Therefore the proper cause of the demons' immutability and inflexibility, so to speak, is the removal of divine grace; as the impediment or removal of the object is the proper cause that an eye which could see does not see.

Furthermore the holy Fathers assign many causes of congruity whereby, after so brief an interval, God denied to demons the grace which he could have liberally granted, with the best and most fitting justice and dignity immediately after one sin; whereas he waits long and long for fallen men and grants his grace to them.

And first those who assert that the angels were obdurate after one sin, some Fathers affirm this, indeed the matter is most certain of faith.

Thus they thought from the Fathers: Nyssen (or rather Nemesius, who is believed to be the author of that book) book 1 philosophical chap. 3; and Damascene 2 On the Faith chap. 4, who compare the fall of the angels to the death of men since no place for penitence is granted.

Gregory likewise held it in Book 2 of the Morals chap. 3 and elsewhere 4 and in Book 4 of the Morals chap. 9 and 10 where he says God by no means ever recalls the apostate spirit to penitence.

Chrysostom said the same expressly in the Homily on Adam and Eve before the middle; the author De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae in Augustine Book 1 chap. 2; and Cassian in Collation 4 chap. 13 and 14; and it is plainly evident from 2 Peter 2 ("For if God did not spare the angels when they sinned..." etc.) and from that which Judas says in his canonical [writings], "But the angels, who did not keep their principality but left their own dwelling, he has reserved in eternal bonds under darkness for judgment" etc.

Why therefore angels did not obtain pardon and grace from God after sin as man does, the Fathers are wont to explain variously.

The first reason is that man obtained mercy because of the weakness of the flesh, that is, because clothed in the garment of the flesh he sinned.

But the angel because, being a pure spirit, he fell (in which the gravity of his fault is more manifest) therefore did not obtain pardon from God.

Nyssenus in that book 1 of Philosophy chap.3; Cassian in Collation 4 chap.14; Damascene Book 2 On the Faith chap.3; Gregory the Great in Book 4 of the Morals chap.9; Isidore in De Summo Bono chap.12 sentence 11 assert this reason; but Bonaventure in the cited place attacks it: because man obtained pardon even though he did not have carnal incentives to sin, so that he might sin.

Moreover those aforesaid Fathers do not say that man obtained pardon because he sinned being attracted by the flesh: but they establish the difference between angel and man in this, that the angel, being without the garment of the flesh, had greater perspicacity to avoid sin;

whereas man, though not enticed by the flesh and having sinned without its incentive, because his spirit was covered by the garment of the flesh, was not so perspicacious so as to avoid sin;

therefore on account of this weakness he obtained mercy from God.

The second reason is that the angel sinned by no suggestion; but man even in paradise was deceived by the suggestion of the demon.

This reason is attributed to Cassian; but in truth he did not hand it down thus.

It is in Gregory Book 4 Morals chap.10 and else 9; and Prosper in the book entitled Dimidium Temporis chap.2; and Alexander 2 par. question 99 member 7; however St. Thomas in this article ad 4 and Bonaventure in the cited place refuted it: because although the supreme angel did not sin by another suggesting to him, the others nonetheless fell by suggestion and example of the supreme.

But it is not so certain; we noted this above Disput. 238 chap. 2.

The third reason is that in the angels not the whole nature has fallen but a part of it; whereas in man the whole nature fell.

Augustine used this in the Enchiridion chap.29, and Richard follows in the cited place in the Magister in 2 dist.21 chap. penultimate and Alexander 2 p.q.99 memb.7.

To this reason however there seems to stand an objection, that not only Adam, in whom the whole human race sinned, found a place of penitence, but also afterwards individual men who sinned found it.

This objection, however, is not of great moment: for conceding once the remedy of penitence to Adam, it ought also to have been conceded to the whole posterity, since all were from the same stock.

Quarta ratio, quam sequutus est Ricard. loco ad tato, est huiusmodi, quia angelus corruit toto co natu a

Disputation 240 (Disputatio 240)

How God by what means perpetually denies to demons the grace of justification, so that they may not be converted (Quo pacto Deus suam gratiam iustificationis daemonibus perpetuo deneget, ne conuertantur)

Opinio Scoti, cap. 1. Duae aliae Scholasticorum sententiae, cap. 2. Vera opinio, ca. (Opinio Scoti, capit. 1. Duae aliae Scholasticorum sententiae, cap. 2 Vera opinio, ca)

Chapter 1 (Caput I) - The opinion of Scotus (Opinio Scoti).

We have said that the principal cause, on account of which a demon cannot be converted to God by penitence, is the perpetual privation of divine grace. However, among the Doctors who refer the obstinacy of demons, that is, the impotence to do penance, to this single privation as to the cause, it is still disputed in what way by the subtraction of God's grace a demon is rendered impotent so that he may not return to the heart and obtain from God the grace of the remission of sins. Scotus in his reports on the 2nd distinction, 7 q. 3 art. 2, who answers the second question, teaches two things. The one is that an angel cannot perform any meritorious work, nor have meritorial contrition: because he is perpetually lacking the habitual grace which is necessary for merit. The other is that this habitual grace is never to be given to demons: because they will never have the due disposition. How moreover the angels will never have the due disposition he explains according to his doctrine, which he delivered explicitly in the 4th distinction, question 14, question 2, section "De secundo." There he says first that, with the natural and general concurrence, without any gift of grace distinct from the gift of creation, a man, and therefore also an angel, can repent of his sins, even insofar as they are offenses against God, a sorrow which Scotus himself does not call contrition but attrition during the whole time in which he is not yet joined with habitual grace: for that which after the arrival of habitual grace Scotus calls contrition. Scotus furthermore teaches that such a sorrow, drawn forth from the powers of mere nature, is such a disposition to justification that, by congruity, it merits the remission of sins through the infusion of habitual grace, which God will most certainly confer, if that contrition should grow up to a certain degree of intensity.

According to this doctrine therefore Scotus explains how God, after the fall, denies His grace to the angel so that he may not be able to be justified and amended from sin. He says moreover that this can be understood in one of two ways: in one way, because the angel could not elicit that act of attrition which Scotus said is a disposition for habitual grace, because God would deny to him the natural and general concurrence due; and therefore God would deny habitual grace to the angel because the angel would not be duly disposed. But this mode does not please Scotus: because this would be a perpetual damnable miracle, and a certain perpetual force imposed on the angel; just as it would also happen to a stone lying outside a hundred, if the due concurrence, by which it ought to be moved downward, were denied it. In the other way it could be understood that God denies to the angel his habitual grace: because although the demon, from his own powers, would grieve for the sins committed, God would not accept this as attrition as a disposition for habitual grace; and thus even though the demon is grieved from his own powers, God would forever deny his grace; since God would not accept the demons' attrition, they would not be said by it to be disposed to habitual grace. Whether however according to Scotus's opinion demons now have or ever have had this sorrow for sins or not, we will see in the following disputation. And Scotus judges that this latter mode is easier to understand by what arrangement God can perpetually deny his grace to demons without any force or miracle.

This opinion of Scotus is in many respects not acceptable to me. And first indeed it has already been sufficiently and more than sufficiently attacked by us in Disputation 91, chapters 10 and 11, insofar as he asserts that some disposition can be from us even of congruity to habitual grace; and that same judgment ought to be about angels is gathered from the reasons brought by us in that disputation, chapters 14 and 15. Then that which he asserts, that God cannot impede the act of contrition in demons without some force and miracle, is manifestly false: for although we would say that for this sort of attrition the supernatural help of God is not necessary according to substance, yet we cannot certainly deny that a prior cogitation is necessary, and that this cogitation may be such that it would not move the will to consent, and also such that it would move it. Moreover it must be confessed that it is in God's hand to introduce various cogitations by which that cogitation moving toward attrition is so delayed that the will does not consent, even though it might, as is gathered from Disputation 65 ch. 10 and Disputation 98 ch. 6; and this without any violence or miracle: for although it would be violent and against the impulse of the will to deny him the concurrence to consent whenever he is so prepared by a fitting cogitation that he would immediately consent of himself, nevertheless to deny him such a cogitation, by which the will would in fact be moved, by arranging all things and introducing various cogitations, is not violence to the will: for since the first cogitation about some thing is determined to the intellect - both human and angelic - by God, as was shown above in Disputation 235 chapter 3, God could introduce various cogitations about other things while the angel was thinking of the pain of sins. Add also that since the blessed angel's first cogitation about some thing is determined by God, God could so dispose the angel's intellect without any violence that it would never come into his mind that it is good to grieve over sins.

Finally, since the aforementioned doctrine of Scotus, as applied to angels, rests in part on the ground that an angel sometimes performs a moral good from every circumstance - which thing in the following disputation is to be attacked - therefore this opinion of Scotus is in no way acceptable to us.

Chapter 2 (Caput II) - Two other opinions of the Schoolmen (Duae aliae Scholasticorum sententiae).

Others however think that the impotence of demons, so that they cannot grieve for sins and thereby be justified and cleansed, proceeds from something produced in them by God, by reason of which they are altogether affected so as not to grieve for sins. In assigning, however, the reason from which this impotence originates, they differ among themselves. Marsilius in the second question 5 art. 3 reports the opinion of Aureolus, who said that therefore a demon after sin cannot be converted to God by penitence, because God poured into his will a certain vehement habit of malice inclined necessarily the will to evil, and hatred of God, by reason of which they are not permitted to retract the former will by penitence and be converted to God. The Major regards this opinion as probable in Distinction 7 question 1, who also reports the same opinion from Aureolus. For he thinks that God can produce some habit in which the will, otherwise free, is determined by necessity to one side.

But Marsilius does not approve Aureolus's opinion: because from it would follow that God is the author of sin: for he alone would infuse into the will a habit which necessarily would move it to sin. Nevertheless Marsilius's reasoning is of little weight. For if there were such a habit which could necessarily move the will to hatred of God, it would follow that hatred of God in demons would not be sin: for the reason of sin cannot in any way be conceived without voluntary freedom; moreover hatred of God would be in demons no otherwise without liberty than in madmen: therefore although God would be the author of such hatred, nevertheless he would not be the author of sin.

Nevertheless the aforementioned opinion of Aureolus is not approved by me: for, besides that such a habit seems altogether to lack any foundation from considerations, since we can explain this demon impotence by an easier way, there cannot be any habit which necessarily moves the will to evil or hinders its freedom. For we have shown in Disputation 90 ch. 2 and Disputation 99 ch. 8 that a rational creature cannot suffer any violent necessity other than that which would impede its freedom except by a clear vision to love God, and to not sin by the hypostatic union likewise to not sin; and in men by disturbed senses and impeded use of reason.

The foundation of this teaching is that, whatever habit be infused into the will, the intellect remains indifferent, so that it proposes various objects and none under every respect of good, except by clear vision; but an object which is not proposed under every respect of good on its own part and on the part of exercise concerning itself cannot necessarily move the will, as we will show in 1st Part, 2nd Question 10 article 2; therefore with whatever habit infused, freedom still remains in the will. Add that there can be no habit which, although it cannot be with the act of good and of contrition, could so impede the will that it would have the good act less, and thereby drive out such a habit: just as habitual grace, which by its own nature, even considered in absolute potency, cannot be with sin, nonetheless cannot prevent the will from sinning so that the grace itself be expelled by that sin. This peculiarity belongs to the hypostatic union, so that not only is it impossible for true sin to be with it, but also the will of the assumed nature cannot by sin itself destroy the union, as we shall show in 3rd Part, Question 14 article 2.

Moreover, if it were true what Aureolus teaches, that such a vehement habit is poured into the will of the angel that it would necessarily move it to hatred of God, it would follow rightly that the angel cannot be converted to contrition and penitence: not because hatred of God would be contrary to penitence, as guilt is to holiness - for in truth such hatred would not be sin, as has been shown - but because it is impossible for someone at the same time to hate God with the hatred of enmity and to repent with true contrition of his sins insofar as they are offenses against God; for true contrition, which is said to be for the sake of God most beloved, regards God also as the object of friendship, not only by a distinct act of love which contrition seems to presuppose, but also because contrition itself is essentially love of God, as I will show in 3rd Part, Question 85: hatred of God however is opposed to love of him.

Others again exist who hold that demons cannot be converted to penitence because God infuses something into their will in another manner - they explain differently. They say therefore that God (which is His omnipotence) infuses into the demons' will hatred of Himself, and preserves that perpetually in them: but since penitence for sins cannot be at the same time with hatred of God, as

has been explained above, Ockham embraces this opinion as probable in 2 q. 19 and Quodlibet 1 q. 14, and Gabriel in the 2nd distinction 7 q. 1 art. 1 after the second conclusion; for they think the acts of the will and intellect can be produced by God alone. And as I will recall in 1st Part, 2nd Question 4 article 4, by this same reasoning the aforementioned authors teach that the blessed cannot sin: because with the love of God no one can commit sin; and God infuses and perpetually conserves the love of Himself in the blessed: for if the love of God in the blessed were produced by God as from an efficient cause, the doctors reckon that one would have to suppose the blessed could be deprived of it by Him, and thus be able to sin.

This opinion is usually attacked by some for this reason: because in this way we would make God the author of the greatest sin. But this reasoning is firm: because if in that way God produced in the will of demons the act of hatred, even though thereby the will might hate God, yet it would not be sin: for that act would not be free; but liberty is necessary to the nature of sin.

Nevertheless the aforesaid opinion greatly displeases me. First, because I consider it impossible that an act of hatred, or any other vital act of intellect and will, be produced by God alone, as I will show in 1st Part, 2nd Question 3 article 2; secondly, because even if it were possible that God produce such an act, we would be mistaken to say it is produced by God in demons, when we can explain the impotence of demons to penitence by another, easier way. And if the opinion of those doctors were true, it would follow beyond doubt that the demon could not repent of his sins by penitence, because penitence with regard to God cannot be together with hatred of God.

Chapter 3 (Caput III) - The truer opinion (Verior opinio).

Much truer, and much easier to understand, is the opinion of those who refer the whole cause of the demons' impotence to penitence and justification from sin to the privation of divine grace which God has perpetually denied as a punishment for their sins. This is the opinion of all those whom I cited in the previous disputation, chapter 7, except Ockham and Gabriel, who say that the impotence of the angel proceeds from the act of hatred which God produces and preserves perpetually in them; although Gabriel also says that therefore the demon cannot do a meritorious work, because God perpetually denies to him the help of his grace: Marsilius said the same, and those who will think similarly about contrition. But when we reduce the demons' impotence so that they might repent of their sins to the subtraction of divine grace, we speak not only of habitual grace, but also of the help of divine grace by which demons ought to be prepared for grace either beforehand in time or at the same time in nature with the habitual grace itself. For the authors alleged do not clearly explain of which grace they speak, except Aegidius, who plainly also speaks of the help of grace, which he calls "impetus." By the name "help" however we understand not only the help of cooperating grace, which is simultaneous with the cooperation of the will, but also the help of operative and exciting grace, about which we have said more than enough in Disputation 88. By this very mode, without any violence done to the demon, he remains perpetually impotent to be converted to God. For if he were preceded by an exciting or operating congruous grace, and was denied the concurrence of God by which that grace would become cooperating, manifest

violence would be done to the demon's will, as we noted in this Disputation chapter 1. But if the demon is denied not only the help of cooperating grace, but also the help of operative and even prevenient grace, which consists in a holy cogitation and in an undeliberated motion of the will, without any violence the demon is rendered impotent to penitence and justification.

Fulgentius indeed seems to have expressed this cause in the book On Faith addressed to Peter, chapter 3 before the middle, with these words: "He evidently shows that the beginning of good will and cogitation does not arise in man from himself but is prepared and bestowed in him divinely: for neither the devil nor any of his angels, by whom because of that ruin they are justly plunged into this lower darkness, can or will be able to resume a good will." By these words he plainly shows that the demon cannot recover a good will or be purified from the state of his sin: because the beginning of good will, namely the holy cogitation, is from God, which he perpetually denies to the demons. Isidore likewise indicated this in Book 1 On the Highest Good ch. 12 sententia 9 when he says, "The Devil therefore does not ask for pardon, because he is not moved to penitence." To be moved to penitence, according to Isidore, seems to be the first undeliberated motion of compunction, born from holy cogitation, in which the operative or prevenient grace, as we said in Disputation 88, is present. Therefore Isidore says that the angel does not repent of sins nor seek their pardon: because he is not moved, that is, the grace of God is not prevenient.

In the same sense Prosper in his book On the Contemplative Life ch. 3 says that the demon has lost the will to return and the faculty - namely by 'faculty' understanding not the natural power of the will (for this remained intact, as we noted from Dionysius in Question 1) but the faculty and virtue which prevenient grace provides - just as Fulgentius also said in his book On the Incarnation ch. 13 that our first parent by his sin lost the faculty of thinking about those things which pertain to God.

This same cause is for souls separated from the body, on account of which they cannot be converted to penitence. For this reason I willingly pass over many things which more recent writers invent to explain some particular reason in souls which does not befit angels. For I do not see by what reason souls contract this impotence from some act elicited in this or in another life: which is manifestly refuted by the same reasons by which I proved that this does not happen in angels.

But as for what Cajetan says in this article - that separated souls by the first act deserve their obstinacy, that is, deserve the impotence of rising again from sin - I say they deserve it not as on the way but as at the term, as he had said about angels in q. 63 art. 5, which we have already sufficiently contested in Disputation 128 ch. 7; and indeed concerning souls I think it is expressly stated in Scripture that rewards are merited only in this life as long as they are in the body, since Scripture says in 2 Corinthians 5 that each one receives in another life the reward or punishment which he had prepared in the body.

But someone may ask whether God denies to demons the holy cogitation effective for penitence, which I called "congruous" in Disputation 88, or also the uncongruous which is only sufficient but would not have effect. If we say that a sufficient one is indeed granted, but that only the efficacious and congruous one is denied, we seem to place the demons in the same state as reproved men in

this life within a certain period; for it is certain that for a certain final period of life the reprobate are not granted an efficacious vocation but only a sufficient one. I answer that even if we said that a sufficient cogitation is granted to demons just as to the reprobates at the extreme time of life, nevertheless it would not be the same state of the two, as we will see in the following disputation. Moreover, if we speak of the cogitation to penitence which is of supernatural order, I hold it much truer that not even the smallest such cogitation is granted to demons. For it seems to me that they lack entirely even the minimal help of grace, and the reason is not the same as to grant it to demons as is the case for reprobate men in this life: for to the latter it is given so that they may be justifiable when they are judged; this reason does not apply to demons.

Disputation 241 (Disputatio 241)

Whether the will of demons is so depraved that it can will no good work, even a moral one (An voluntas daemonum ita sit deprauata, vt nullum bonum opus, etiam motale, possit velle)

Disputation 241. Whether the will of demons is so depraved that it cannot will any good work, even a moral one? Most judge it far more probable that demons cannot perform any moral good. Chapter 1. The reasons of Aureolus and the Nominalists by which the aforesaid sentence is commonly supported. Chapter 2. Three other reasons of the same opinion. Chapter 3. The aforesaid sentence is confirmed by the best reason. Chapter 4. The arguments of Scotus are dissolved. Chapter 5.

Chapter 1 (Caput 1)

Chapter I. Most judge it more probable that demons cannot perform any moral good. If indeed to a demon the grace of vocation by which he is converted to God is denied, as was shown in the preceding disputation, he could nonetheless remain able to other good moral works which are said to belong to the natural order and according to every necessary circumstance. Wherefore a new controversy remains, whether the demon is so confirmed in every kind of sin that he can perform absolutely no moral good according to any circumstance; in which our Scholastics are also divided. Scotus in 2 d. 7. q. 1. § "Restat nunc dicendum" and q. 3 in the reports in the same distinction; Bassolis in 2 d. 7. q. 1. art. 1; Durandus q. 2 num. 12 affirm that a damned Angel can indeed perform some moral good from some circumstance: nor has the opposite been sufficiently proved hitherto. They add nevertheless that Scotus, who in that first § "Quantum ergo ad istum", and Bassolis in the place cited, teach that the demon, because of his great malice, can never act well. But Durandus teaches nothing at all as to the question of fact. This opinion is first proved because a moral work, good in every moral circumstance, is not above the natural faculty of an Angel. And natural faculties remain intact in demons, as I noted in article 1 of this question from Dionysius: therefore a demon will be able to do some moral good. Moreover from this same principle we can press the adversaries and prove not only that demons can perform a moral good, but also that they can sometimes perform some. For a power which will have no act in infinite time seems to be in vain. If therefore demons have a native power of operating good, they cannot in the infinite time

during which their damnation will last be entirely without any good work. Further it is proved at least that the demon does not always and continuously sin: because it is in the power of a free will to suspend every act. Therefore since the demon is of free will, he can cease from every act and consequently for some time cease from sin by ceasing from action. And a sin cannot be without an action unless it is a pure omission. But this does not happen among demons, because they are rarely or never bound by any affirmative precept. But most of the Scholastics much more probably affirm that a demon cannot perform any moral good good in every circumstance. They say "good in every circumstance", for all admit that a demon can do a good deprived of some circumstance. Thus teach Antisiodorensis book 2 Summa tract 2 ch. 7 q. 1; St. Thomas in this article ad 5; Caietanus and the more recent Ferrar in the cited places, Contra Gentes ch. 95; and the Master in 2 d. 7. cap. seem to agree. "Now therefore," he says, "the evil angels are so obdurate in vice that they cannot live well." The same Scholastics embrace the same opinion in like manner. Thus: St. Thomas q. 1 art. 2; Bonaventure 1st part art. q. 2; Aegidius q. 1 art. 2; Richard art. 2 q. 2; Gregory q. 1 art. 2; Capreolus q. 1 art. 1 conclusion 2 on the obstinacy of demons; Maior q. 1 conclusion 5; Marsilius in 2 q. 5 art. 3 in the opinion, especially in the solutions of arguments; Scotus in 4th distinction 51 q. 1 a. 5; Holcot in 2 q. 4 letter RR - although not all concur in the same way with this opinion. Antisiodorensis, St. Thomas in this article, Bonaventure and Marsilius alone say the demon never acts well: which Scotus does not deny, indeed he thinks it more probable: whether he can do some moral good they do not discuss. However others, and the same Holy Doctor in the second cited place, not only assert that demons never act well, but also that they cannot, although they are led to this by different reasons, affirm it.

Chapter 2 (Caput 2) - The reasons of Aureolus and the Nominalists by which the aforesaid sentence is usually supported

The latter opinion, which I said in the preceding chapter to be more probable, is commonly supported by various reasons. The first of these is that of Aureolus, which I mentioned in the preceding disputation, chapter two, and which Holcot used in the cited place: because into the will of demons a certain habit is infused by God necessarily inclining their will to do evil; mention of which reasoning Scotus and Gabriel made in the cited places. When therefore the will is necessarily inclined to evil, insofar as something will meet it according to its power, the angel will not be able to act well. Holcot however proves that the freedom of an angel can be altogether impeded when some necessity from a habit is imposed, because the freedom of the Angel is finite, and through a vicious habit can be diminished day by day, as St. Thomas teaches I-II q.85 art. 1. Therefore finally it can be ended: for every finite thing, if continuously diminished, will at last be exhausted. Yet this reasoning is frivolous. First, because, as I showed in the preceding disputation ch. 2, no habit can impede the native freedom of the will. What Holcot adduces in confirmation has no weight: for as we will show in I-II q.85 art. 1 & 2, the freedom of the will to the good is not diminished intrinsically by perverse and vicious habits; but it is said to be diminished extrinsically only in that it is more inclined to evil by reason of the habits. This extrinsic diminution, however much it increases, could never entirely impede and extinguish native freedom; for since it takes away

nothing of it but only diminishes it by inclining it to the opposite, yet leaves it intact in itself, it can never wholly remove it, as we will more fully show there. Otherwise not only could God infuse such a habit that would altogether impede freedom, but every demon and man could, by multiplied sins, acquire such a vicious habit for themselves that would altogether obstruct their freedom on the way - which is absurd. Further, if such a habit were infused into a demon which necessarily inclined him to evil without liberty, it would follow that the demon would never sin: for there cannot be sin without liberty. Finally, since such a habit seems contrived without foundation, it seems rightly to be rejected for this sole reason. The second reason is that of Ockham and Gabriel, which is this. Since God by Himself alone produces in the will of the demon hatred of God, without the concurrence of his will, from which the demon can never cease, as we reported from the same Doctors in the preceding disputation ch. 2, it follows that the will of the demon can never perform any good that is good in every circumstance: for among the circumstances required for goodness there is one, the end. This reasoning, however, in the same way does not please me. First, because, as I noted in that chapter, the act of hatred cannot be produced by God alone. Secondly, because although God could produce hatred of Himself in the will of an angel, without the foundation mentioned by the aforesaid Doctors that would seem to be an impious suggestion, as I said there. Third, even if such an act of hatred were produced by God alone, it would not necessarily follow that every other act of the demon would be evil. For if other acts were evil, that would be either because they lacked the circumstance of the ultimate end, namely love of God above all, as Gabriel says, since simultaneously God cannot be hated and loved; otherwise by that account no act would be evil. For as will be proved against Gregory in I-II q.109 art. 2, the circumstance of the ultimate end, namely God, is not required for the moral goodness of an act, since it suffices to have as object the good of the particular virtue. Or the other acts would be evil, as Ockham indicates, because they would be tainted by that act of hatred of God: but neither would they be evil in this way; because that act of hatred, since it would be from God alone, would not be a free human act capable of sin and guilt, and therefore could not taint any other human act. For a human act cannot be infected by any malice of the will's end unless that will from which it is infected is a free and human act. Moreover, although hatred of God would be a human act and sin, nevertheless it would not be repugnant for there to be at the same time some act of moral virtue which is good in every circumstance. For it is possible for the will to be displeased with God and at the same time to take pleasure in the good of one's neighbor for its own sake out of mercy; just as although one cannot love God with the love of friendship above all and at the same time mortally sin against God's will. The reason of the distinction is this: because love of friendship toward God and toward a friend is of such a nature that it does not permit with itself anything that is notably against the will of God and of the friend. For it prefers the friend and his will to every other thing; and therefore it does not permit with itself a mortal sin, which is a notable offense against God and against his will. But hatred of God does not necessarily bring with it every kind of sin and offense against God: because hatred of someone is not a desire of every evil that is against his will. Therefore although hatred of

God does not permit with itself an act of virtue insofar as it pleases God, nevertheless at the same time there can be an act of a particular virtue which possesses the honesty of virtue itself alone without any order toward God.

Chapter 3 (Caput 3) - Three other reasons of the same opinion

The third reason which Gregory assigns is of this kind. Since the demon is in perpetual torment and punishment, he is always sorrowful; and this sorrow is the cause of perpetual murmuring against God, who is the cause of such punishment: and since with such murmuring the demon cannot act well, therefore he can never do any good. Gabriel also proves this reason in the cited place in his second conclusion concerning the obduration of demons. Moreover he adds that demons sin perpetually, because they continually desire their own beatitude and the absence of the punishment which they suffer, while God always wishes to deny them beatitude and to inflict punishment perpetually: therefore they sin, says Gabriel, because they do not have their will conformed to the divine. This reasoning, however, is weak. And first indeed, let us begin from that which Gabriel adds: it is frivolous to assert that demons sin in that they continually desire their own beatitude. For if they do not will effectively to strive for it (for truly they cannot will it, because to will what is impossible is impossible, and the will cannot be efficacious toward the impossible, as was proved above in Disputation 234 ch. 2 from Aristotle), they will not sin from that alone because they desire for themselves in mere affection beatitude and to be without the punishment which they suffer, unless they desire them from pride against God and from hatred toward that same thing. Moreover, if an angel has either will necessarily and not freely, as Gabriel says because he can cease from none of them, it follows that none of them is sin, for sin cannot be without liberty. But likewise this author does not sufficiently show here why the demon cannot cease from any of those volitions. Then, what Gregory and Gabriel say, that from the continuous torment it follows that demons perform no good, is not sufficiently proved. First because it has not been sufficiently shown for what reason the demon could not cease from the act of sorrow and hatred against God, if it is elicited by his will. Second because although demons are perpetually saddened against God, and hate Him, it does not follow from that that every other operation of the demon is evil, as we showed in the previous chapter. The fourth reason, which Saint Thomas assigns in that second distinction 7, and Capreolus, Caietanus, Ferrariensis, and Richard in the cited places, is this: whatever will of the demon either is the will of the end which he first desired, or proceeds from that will: therefore every will of the demon is evil either according to itself, if it is the will of the end which he first desired, or because it is vitiated by that will. Moreover they prove that every will of the demons is either that of the end which he first desired, or born from the will of that end thus: the first will, with which the angel sinned, was not the will of some particular end, but of the ultimate and most universal end. But every will is either of the ultimate end or for the sake of the ultimate end: therefore every will of an Angel is either the ultimate end, which he constituted to himself in the first act, or for that ultimate end at least virtually (as Caietanus says). Caietanus and other recent ones explain how demons are said to act for the end which they first set for themselves not only because the will is said to remain according to the habit turned toward that end which it

first proposed to itself, but because the other wills by virtue participate in that will of the first end which the will proposed to itself, just as the will of any particular good by virtue participates in the will of the ultimate end, namely beatitude. This reasoning, if it has any weight, proves that the demon wills all things which he wills because of the end which he set for himself through the first sin, so that he cannot but will them for that end: otherwise it would not prove that the demon cannot but act badly. In my judgment, however, this reasoning is not only weak, but also something absurd seems to follow from it. And first indeed from it it seems to be gathered that a man sins by whatever subsequent will after the first with which he sinned morally and set the ultimate end in a creature for himself; and so he cannot perform any moral good in every circumstance, because in every subsequent will his first will will remain by virtue as long as it has not been retracted by penance; and therefore it will corrupt all the remaining wills by its depravity, if it does this even in the demon; or they must assign a difference between a man sinner on the way and an Angel at the terminus, on account of which the works of the man on the way are not tainted by that first will, but those at the terminus are vitiated. Then the infirmity of the aforementioned reasoning is shown by a prior reason. For in order that some past will of the end, which does not move actually, is said to influence subsequent wills and taint them, it is necessary that at least something be operatively carried into them, as I will show from the sentences of Bonaventure, Scotus, Richard, and Gabriel in I-II q.1 a.6 and q.8 art. 2 and q.114 art. 4 and 3 p. in the treatise on Confession. But only is the will of the end said to operate in subsequent wills when the subsequent ones are derived by some continuous connection from the first, at least through another intermediate will which proceeded from the first. For if the will of the end has no more than the relation of cause with respect to the subsequent ones, it cannot be a circumstance of them. And moreover it cannot have the relation of cause unless it moves the will of the subsequent ones by itself or through others. But the demon so constituted the ultimate end for himself by the first sinful will that that will neither by itself nor through another moves all the subsequent ones. Therefore it cannot be compared with them as a circumstance of them, and therefore it is not said to remain by virtue in the subsequent [wills]. What Caietanus adduces about the will of beatitude, which they say all particular wills participate in somehow, is not to be understood thus, that some first will of beatitude preceded in general which afterwards remains in the subsequent ones by virtue and is their proximate or remote cause, as we said; because it can happen that such a will of beatitude did not precede, or if it preceded, it does not in any manner influence all the other particular wills, and therefore it would not be true that in every particular will the will of beatitude participates as St. Thomas contends I-II q.1 a.6; but it is said that the will of beatitude is participated by other particular wills because whatever we desire, we desire it under some notion of good. That we lack some evil; in this however there is a certain similarity and imitation of beatitude, which consists in it that we lack every evil and have every good. From this it cannot be inferred that the first will by which the demon by sin constituted for himself the ultimate end in a creature is participated as a circumstance by all the remaining subsequent wills, by reason of which participation it would be said that the demon sins.

Chapter 4 (Caput 4) - The aforesaid sentence is confirmed by the best reason

Since acting well, not only in man but also in an Angel, depends on the aid and motion of God as the first cause, it does not seem to me that any better reason remains by which demons cannot act morally well than that God, by His just judgment, denies them His aid with which they could act well. This is so whether that aid be the aid of grace distinct from the gift of creation, or whether it be the aid which some theologians call general, which they think is not the aid of grace. This reason was touched upon by Paludanus and Marsilius in the cited places. Paludanus adds that this happens without miracle: just as there will be no miracle of the elements acting after the day of judgment - for just as the elements were only necessary for generations and corruptions, and since after the day of judgment there will be no future generation and corruption, without any miracle God will deny the elements the aid with the elements by which they were needed to act - in the same way, because demons are already at the terminus, as the elements after the day of judgment would be, without any miracle God denies them His aid, without which they could not act well, which had been granted to them when they were on the way. However the aforementioned authors do not explain whether God withdraws from demons His operative aid, or only His cooperating aid, since much difference is involved in speaking of this or that kind of aid. Therefore it must be explained what aid God denies to demons so that they may not be able to act well. Now operative aid (whether it be of grace, or whether it be not of grace but called general and common) is a certain suggestion of the intellect and motion of the non-deliberate will which precedes the free consent of it. This is said to excite, to precede, and to prepare the will for consent. The cooperating aid, however, is the same suggestion and motion of the non-deliberate will inasmuch as it cooperates with the will to consent, in which cooperation the concurrence of God as the first cause is also required, whose operation and the cooperation of any created cause operate. I say therefore that demons cannot act well, not because God, after their wills are prepared to act, denies to them the concurrence of His cooperation (for that would be violent, as we noted in Disputation 139 ch. 1), but because He denies them the operative and preceding aid of whatever kind it is; that is, because He does not precede them with the suggestion and motion not deliberated which they need in order to act rightly. It should be noted moreover the distinction which we there introduced between other natural agents, as the elements, and Angels or men who are called "agents from a propos", namely that natural agents by their natural constitution, without any other extrinsic principle, are at hand and (so to speak) in first act to act, so that they do not need anything extrinsic except the concurrence of God as first cause and the proximate matter about which they operate. But every rational creature by creation is not constituted to be in first act; it needs a suggestion, after which sometimes necessarily follows a motion of the will not deliberated. And furthermore, in order to be brought to act, it needs the concurrence of God as first cause: and we said that the determination of the suggestion comes from God. Moreover any suggestion that a rational creature has can be delayed by God with other various suggestions, so as not to allure the will to consent, and this is in the hand of God, who can insert various suggestions without at all violating our freedom, and that of the Angel. Therefore if God were to deny the concurrence at any time to the elements remaining in their natural disposition and with proximate matter, it would be

violence to the nature of the elements, as is plainly gathered from the things we will say in I-II q.6 a.2.4; likewise if to a rational creature a congruous suggestion prepared for consent were given and God denied His concurrence, it would be violent. But to deny a rational creature the suggestion by which the will would be prepared to consent is not at all violence, as is manifest. It is therefore easier to assert that the demon cannot act well because God denies to him the operative aid of preceding suggestion necessary for acting rightly. Since this can be done without any violence, and if the suggestion of a good action is taken away, it is impossible for anything to be done rightly. However the suggestion by which the will can be anticipated to the good work is twofold, according to what was noted in Disputation 88 ch. 11 and Disputation 98 ch. 6: some congruous, which God knows will have the effect considering all circumstances; and some not congruous, which God knows will not have the effect, which however is commonly called sufficient, because with it the will can consent though it is not consenting. Hence the difficulty is which suggestion God denies to demons so that they do not bring about any good work, whether congruous only, or also the non-congruous and sufficient. The reason of the difficulty is this. For if God denies the congruous only, it follows that the demon cannot act well from mere consequent impossibility: just as any reprobate in all the time during which only a merely sufficient suggestion is granted to him and the congruous is denied - and likewise the predestined in that occasion of temptation which is sometimes overcome (for then a congruous suggestion is not denied) - thus the impotence of reprobates in this life and of those who are overcome by temptation would be of the same kind as the impotence of demons and the damned in another respect; which seems false. Therefore it seems to be said that God denies to demons not only the congruous suggestion but also the non-congruous sufficient suggestion so that, by the preceding impossibility, they cannot perform any good.

On the other hand it seems impossible that every good suggestion, even a sufficient one, be denied to a demon

For it is impossible that some temptation occur to a demon which invites to sin without the reason of evil and good in the temptation being proposed to him by the intellect as indifferent. For this naturally occurs in any temptation; indeed this is necessary that the free will be left (to choose). Since therefore the will of the demon, even in hell, follows sin in such a way that his will is moved by no necessity but freely, it is necessary that every temptation occurring to the will of demons propose both good and evil indifferently; that is, that not only the thing which is sin but also the opposite good be proposed to the demon. On account of this argument I think that not every good moral suggestion is denied to demons, not even the non - congruous, but only the congruous and efficacious one; and thus by the consequent impossibility the demons cannot perform moral good Nevertheless they differ from the reprobate and the predestined who are overcome by temptation in this life not by way of impossibility, because that is the same in both, but because to demons after the first instant the congruous suggestion is so denied that the law of God already manifested denies them, and so nothing remains for them; nor can hope remain. But in the case of the reprobate and the predestined, because they are overcome by temptation in this

life, the congruous call from the manifest law of God is not denied, and thus no hope of salvation and of congruous vocation is taken away, as is from the demons at the first instant. About the preceding and consequent impossibility we have said more than enough in Disputation 68 ch. 4.

Chapter 5 (Caput 5) - The arguments of Scotus are dissolved

Now I shall not be unwilling to dissolve the arguments of Scotus. To the first we concede with Dionysius in the chapter on the divine names that the natural capacities remain intact in demons. This however is not sufficient that demons act well; but also the preceding suggestion which God bestows as He wills is required. And by His manifest law God denies to demons that suggestion which would be congruous and efficacious: which being denied, it is impossible by consequent impossibility that the demon act well. To the second I say it cannot be that an Angel ceases from every operation of the will: and his liberty is not understood in this that he can not act, but in that he can choose or will this or that. And although we would concede that the demon can cease from every operation of the will, from that it would nevertheless not be permitted to infer that he can sometimes act well, but only that he can cease from every act of sinning. But to the third someone might object to us that passage of Luke 16 where the soul of the rich man in hell begged Abraham that he would send someone to his brothers who would warn them not to come into that place: which act seems to have been good. The same reasoning seems to apply about demons and about damned souls, that they can, or cannot, perform some good. Scotus in the cited place responds first that in that example Christ wished only to show the bitterness of torments, not the mercy of that soul of the rich man toward his brothers. Then he responds that that act could have been good in respect of the object, yet it was vitiated either by an evil end of vainglory toward other men, whom he knew to be saved - because he bore it hard that his brothers should be damned while others were saved - or by an evil end of hatred of God, lest God find in his brothers someone whom He could rightly punish. Finally someone might ask whether the sins and evil works of demons in the state of damnation merit a new punishment. I do not say whether thereby a new kind of fiery punishment is inflicted, but whether they merit a new punishment. I indeed have not read anyone who asserted that demons by those works merit a new punishment. Someone could say, however, that therefore they do not merit a new punishment because the reason of merit not only depends on the dignity of the work but also on the law and promise or threat of God; and therefore the works of demons in hell do not merit a new punishment because God has not threatened by His law a punishment to those who do evil in that life but in the present. However by that reasoning we cannot say that the works of demons in hell are not meritorious of punishment. First because, as will be proved in the first part of the second question 114 article 3, the reason of merit does not depend on the promise or threat of punishment, but on the dignity of the work itself. Also especially because with sins it is certain to all that a threat is not required for the reason of merit. For truly a man by sin is said to deserve his annihilation, although God has threatened nothing such to him, which we will more fully show in that place. Therefore I answer that the evil works of demons are not meritorious of a new essential punishment, just as we said that the good works of Angels in beatitude are not meritorious of a new reward, because both kinds of works are not done

in the way but at the terminus. And thus, as good works are fruits of beatitude, not merits of it, so also evil works are fruits of damnation, not merits. Therefore when it is said that the reason of merit follows the goodness or wickedness of the work, it must be understood not absolutely of the work, but of works in the way and in the struggle; about which more will be discussed at length in the cited place.

Article 3 (Articulus 3)

The conclusion is an affirmation, and concerns faith, as we shall see in the subsequent disputation, chapter 1.

Disputation 242 (Disputatio 242)

On the sadness and pain of demons (De tristitia, et dolore daemonum)

DISPUT. CCXLII. On the sadness and pain of demons.

It is certain that demons are afflicted by spiritual pain. Every sadness which demons suffer pertains to the punishment of sense. Such is the pain and sadness of demons that they do not experience any true delight. That the demon cannot not be saddened.

Chapter 1 (Caput 1)

Proposition I. It is certain that demons are afflicted by spiritual pain.

Pain in living beings has two things, namely the formal reason of pain, and a passion or bodily commotion joined to it; that which is common to every affect, as we noted in Disputation 84. Moreover, when we inquire concerning any genus of affect, whether it belongs to God or to a spiritual creature, we do not understand it according to the bodily passion which it has joined to it in animate beings, but only according to the formal reason of such an affect; and in that sense there we show that some affections are to be attributed to God, and others to creatures. Therefore it is most certain among the Scholastics that pain and sadness belong to demons, and this can be confirmed from many places of Scripture. First St. Thomas proves it in this article in the argument Sed contra from that passage of the Apocalypse ch. 18: "As much as she glorified herself and was in delights, to that extent give her torment and mourning." For St. Thomas draws this argument from the major premise: for if man is to be tormented by pain in Hell, a demon ought to be tormented much more. Secondly it can be proved from Apocalypse ch. 20 where it is said that the devil is sent into the lake of fire and sulfur, where the beasts were tormented day and night. Thirdly the same is most clearly proved by 2 Peter 2 in those words, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment," etc.; and to be crucified does not happen without pain.

But perhaps someone will say that these places are not to be understood according to propriety and without metaphor: for it is said in Genesis 6 concerning God, "He regretted in the inward pain of his heart," and yet these words are to be understood by metaphor, insofar as it is said that he regretted because he manifested himself outwardly, as if led by sorrow and punishment he had retracted that which he had done when he destroyed all flesh; for he who destroys that which he had earlier made seems to indicate sorrow and punishment of his soul. Why then shall other places which speak of angels be understood without metaphor? This objection, however, is vain. First, because when places of Scripture can be conveniently understood in their proper sense without any absurdity, they ought not to be explained metaphorically; and because of God one cannot understand pain or punishment without some absurdity - for we showed in Disputation 84 that God is not capable of pain - and because his will is immutable, and potency is not without pain and change of will, therefore we are compelled to interpret the aforesaid places metaphorically. But to understand the testimonies alleged concerning angels without metaphor is not absurd, as will be clear from the definition of pain; therefore they are to be understood without metaphor. Moreover, even if we wished to understand these things concerning angels by metaphor we could not. For concerning God we interpret thus because we see something done by God which seemed to indicate sorrow and repentance; but in angels we do not see this. Add that since 2 Peter 2 speaks of the pain of the damned demons as a punishment of their sins, and no metaphorical pain can be a punishment, it is necessary to explain the aforesaid testimonies without metaphor.

Furthermore, that pain and sadness cannot be attributed to God according to propriety, but rightly befit angels, it is necessary to expound the definition and the formal reason of pain. In this matter, before we bring it from our own opinion, we will briefly recount what others hold. Some more recent writers say: therefore there is no pain in God according to proper reason, but there is in angels, because no one grieves except about those things which happen against his will; but against God's will nothing happens, whereas many things happen against the will of a demon; therefore demons can be saddened, but God not likewise. Yet by this reasoning they cannot sufficiently explain what we contend. For many things happen against God's will, as the sins of men: why then would God not grieve? If you say that these happen only against God's inefficacious will, and that pain is only about those things which are against an efficacious will, another manifest reason opposes this answer: for penitence, which is a certain pain about committed sins, is about those things which are against the simple will and not the efficacious will of him who grieves; for he who grieves about sins does not have an efficacious will by which he would wish not to have sinned - for that is already impossible for him; and the will is not efficacious with respect to impossibilities, as was shown in Disputation 234, chapter 2.

A much easier reason can be assigned why sadness and pain cannot be attributed to God in propriety, but do befit angels. The reason is taken from the definition, the formal nature of the affections, in this way. Delight, as St. Thomas teaches in I-II, question 35, article 1, which is opposed to sadness and pain, is about a good joined and known as joined. But on the contrary sadness and pain must be about an evil which is in some way judged to be joined. I say this because one can be saddened about the evil of a friend which he deems his own. But God cannot have an

evil joined to himself in any manner, nor can he deem another's evil to be his own; therefore he cannot grieve nor be saddened, as I also noted in that Disputation 84, chapter 1, where I also spoke of fear and other affections which cannot be fitting to God.

On the contrary, when an angel can have an evil proper and joined to himself, he can also be saddened and grieve about it

Such is the punishment which he suffers in Hell.

Chapter 2 (Caput 2)

Chapter II. That every sadness which demons suffer pertains to the punishment of sense.

No one doubts that this pain and sadness pertain to the punishment of the demons. But whether every pain pertains to the punishment of sense, or whether some also pertain to the punishment of loss, is a question among the Doctors. Some of the more recent ones judge there to be a pain which regards the punishment of loss and one which regards the punishment of sense. For they say the pain arising from the consideration of the punishment of loss is also a punishment of God; but the pain coming from the fire is the punishment of sense.

But to me the opinion of Scotus in 4th Distinction 56, question 1, article 4, conclusion 2 is approved, who affirms universally that every pain which arises from any apprehended evil is a punishment of sense. For the sake of this matter it must be noted that every punishment is an evil, and sometimes proceeds from some evil. Now something can be an evil to someone in two ways. First, actually, without any cognition and without the sadness which arises from cognition; and this evil has the nature of loss for the one to whom it is evil and the nature of the punishment of loss whenever it is inflicted because of sins. Such a punishment and evil can be suffered by children and the insane: because the nature of this evil does not depend on cognition and sadness, but consists in the privation of some good, as in the privation of some spiritual gift or some temporal convenience; and therefore this punishment is not a punishment of sense, because its malice does not depend on sense or cognition. Such in demons is the privation of beatitude: therefore demons are said to suffer this punishment, not insofar as, feeling it, they are saddened, but insofar as by that thing itself they suffer injury and loss.

But another kind of evil is such only insofar as it is felt or known, and the knownness brings about known sadness; and this evil, whenever it is inflicted because of sins, is called the punishment of sense - not because it is only by bodily sense, but because it is also by cognition, which we commonly call sense, because the punishment of bodily sense is more notable. Therefore every object is said to bring the punishment of sense insofar as it brings sadness; and because one suffers it insofar as he is saddened, he is said to be punished insofar as he is sad. Hence it is clear that every sadness even arising from the thought of the punishment of loss is a punishment of sense; or else one must contrive another definition from his own brain.

What Scotus says, namely that there is another punishment greatest of all for the damned, namely perpetual hatred with which they pursue God, and that it is the more culpable and therefore the greatest of all, is by no means established in true doctrine which St. Thomas teaches (I-II q.87 art.2), and we will confirm the same more fully. For according to St. Thomas's doctrine a sin, insofar as it is sin, cannot be the punishment of a prior sin; that is, the malice of sin cannot be the malice of a punishment even when related to some prior sin; although a subsequent sin, besides the malice of the fault, can have joined to it another malice of punishment, for instance of infamy, disease, and other such things, by reason of which it can be a punishment of the prior, as will be explained there. Therefore the hatred by which demons continually pursue God can be a punishment of the prior sin only insofar as it brings the torment and pain which it carries with it; for everyone who hates someone is tormented by that very thing, that the evil which he desires does not follow, which he desires; but hatred, insofar as it has malice insofar as it is sin, cannot be a punishment. From which it also follows that hatred of God is not the greatest punishment of all.

Chapter 3 (Caput 3)

Chapter III. Such is the pain and sadness of demons that they do not experience any true delight.

Since the sadness by which demons are perpetually vexed is very vehement, a difficulty may arise. Can they rejoice about anything? St. Thomas in 4 d.45 q.2 art.2 q.1 ad 4 admits that demons sometimes rejoice about something, namely from the fact that they overcome men in temptation; and it seems that this was Augustine's opinion in book 3 against the Manichaeans, chapter 17 in book I, which St. Thomas cites in this article in the first argument. And the same Augustine felt in the resolution of that question; and Alexander likewise in 2 p. q.100 m.4 art.1 & 2. But St. Thomas called this joy or delight phantastic, that is, not real but apparent. Alexander called it joy full of bitterness. And this opinion can be proved: because in demons there is hope and desire, which are about a future good; but to hope and desire corresponds delight after that which was desired has been obtained; therefore there is delight in demons.

I indeed first think that there is in a demon no such delight as in any way to alleviate or make milder the pain and torment which he suffers for his sin; for as the punishment of sense in demons is eternal, so likewise in the same way it will always persevere, and this must be undoubted by all. Next I say that no true delight arises for demons from any event, although they may have a burning desire for some future thing, which they apprehend as their good. Therefore, even if they ardently desire to overcome men by the temptation to sin, nevertheless I judge that they do not truly rejoice about that which they attain, for this doctrine is manifestly gathered from Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, book 7, chapter 14. For after the middle of the chapter he says: "Pleasure, or any of its contraries, provided it be vehement, drives away pain," that is, not only pleasure which is of an object considered under one respect necessarily drives away the pain of the same object apprehended under the same respect (for these are contraries), but also any pleasure, namely either about the same object considered under another respect, or about any other whatever, if it

be vehement, does not suffer any sadness with it; for the more someone delights in one thing, the less he is saddened about any other thing: because he estimates any other occurring evil the less, the more clearly the good which he possesses appears; which is verified by experience. Therefore delight can be such that it drives away every pain, as Aristotle says.

And by exactly the same reasoning it will be true for sadness and pain, that if they are greatest they drive away all joy, especially if the joy does not arise from a vehement object. Therefore, since the sadness of demons is most vehement, and those things which are able to bring them joy are of lesser moment and have no good except as apprehended by mere thought (for example, to overcome men in the temptation to sin), it must be said that demons take no delight at all even if they obtain that which they eagerly desired. Gabriel follows this opinion in 2nd Distinction 7 question 1 article 3 doubt 1; Ockham in 2 question 19 ad 7, the doubt at the end of the question. They prove moreover that demons never rejoice over that which they desired because God withdraws his concurrence so that they cannot rejoice in the good now obtained which they desired. This reasoning, however, is not to be admitted: because this would be a certain perpetual violence, as I noted in Disputation 239, chapter 1, which it is not necessary to admit. Then they prove that that state of the utmost sadness endures with a desire about a future good apprehended, but not with joy. This reasoning pleases me most. For the greatest sadness, such as the demons have, does not allow delight with it for the reason given; but it does not conflict with desire: indeed the more someone is delighted, the more he can fear; and the more he is saddened, the more he can desire: for he who is very sad very strongly desires to be rid of that evil about which he is sad; but vehement sadness does not permit delight in any good. And hence the solution of the argument which was brought for the prior opinion is clear. For from what was said it is evident why someone can, with the greatest sadness, have desire but not joy: because the good which is the object of desire is absent, and thus can be apprehended so as to be pleasing as future; however when attained it is not esteemed as a good in such great sadness, and therefore it does not delight.

Finally I judge the opinion of St. Thomas to be true and in no way contrary to our opinion insofar as he asserts that demons take some delight from the victory which they obtain against men: yet that delight is not real but only apparent, which he himself calls phantastic; which, however, is not to be understood as if demons seem to themselves to be delighted when in truth they are not delighted (for such deception cannot happen to them), but because they stand in the temptation of men as if, when victory is obtained, they were truly delighted. For although they may conquer a man once and again and take no will from it for the reason given above, nevertheless they are so perversely affected that they attack him again or another man, apprehending in a future victory a new cause of joy for themselves which they did not find in the preceding victory: in this they are like those who rejoice. And this can rightly happen because of their perverse disposition, from which it follows that from past victories, from which they obtained no pleasure, they do not become more cautious. Augustine is to be understood in the same way.

Chapter 4 (Caput 4)

Chapter IV. That the demon cannot not be saddened.

Finally in this disputation must be treated whether demons are so saddened that it is in their power not to be saddened; on this difficulty the Doctors do not all agree. Scotus in 2 Distinction 7 q.1 § "Restat nunc dicere," and in the reports of the same Distinction question 3 judges that the damned can cease from the act of the will. From this opinion it follows that they can also cease from pain and sadness, which are acts of the will. For although Scotus himself in 3 d.1 § "Aliter potest dici" and in 4th Distinction 49 q.7 thinks that sadness formally is not an action elicited by the appetitive faculty but a passion from the object (which opinion I will refute in 2nd Quaest. 4 art.1), and from this side the damned could not cease from sadness, yet since he also thinks there that prior to this passion of sadness there is a certain act of the will elicited, without which sadness would not be, it plainly follows from his opinion that the damned can cease from sadness: because they can cease from that act which must necessarily precede sadness.

Gregory in 2 Distinction 7 question 1 article 2 and Bassolis in question 1 article 3 remembered this opinion and judge it to be false. For if it were true, it would follow that demons could free themselves from the punishment of sense; which opinion would indeed be in some respects worse than the error of Origen, for Origen so said that the punishments of the damned would be ended, that this would occur not from their own will but from God's mercy. But Scotus in the reported notes on that question 3, in order to defend himself, teaches that the act of sadness by which demons are saddened is produced and conserved by God alone, and thus demons cannot cease from it. However, as we said above in Disputation 139, chapter 2, it is impossible that an act of intellect or will be produced by God alone; and so the aforesaid opinion cannot be defended on that ground.

One might indeed concede that demons cannot cease from sadness because of a consequent impossibility: because God always injects such a thought as he knows will be the future cause of sadness, and removes those by which a demon could be induced to cease from sadness; which impossibility is consequent on the knowledge with which God sends in various thoughts and removes others. To me, however, it seems much truer that a demon cannot cease from sadness because of an antecedent impossibility, which is called an impossibility from the part of the preventing cause, about which we said enough in Disputation 68, chapter 4. That is, by such a cogitation of present evil in which by God's will to remain in the cogitation one is moved to sadness, so that from that sadness no other cogitation, except the sole beatific vision, can cause cessation; just as a blessed man by the clear vision of God is so necessarily delighted that he cannot but be delighted, by an antecedent impossibility from the part of the cause and of cogitation.

But someone may object in this way: that for the will to love something or to be delighted in it necessarily with respect to the exercise, that is, so that it cannot cease from love and delight, it must not only appear in the object with the highest ratio of good, but also in the exercise there must appear no ratio of evil; for if some ratio of evil could appear, then in that very way the will could cease from the exercise: and yet in the very exercise and operation of sadness the ratio of a

most grave evil appears; therefore the demon can freely cease from it. I respond: then the will can cease from the act of love and of delight even if there is the highest ratio of good in the object, if in the exercise there appears some ratio of evil which can remove from the intellect the consideration of the object from which love or delight arises; if however one were compelled to remain in that, he could not not love and delight; and because demons are compelled to remain in the cogitation of the evil and the punishment by which they are damned, and such an evil thought cannot fail to bring sadness, therefore they cannot fail to be saddened: however much they find in the very act of sadness the ratio of evil, and therefore cannot be freed from it.

Article 4 (Articulus 4)

This is the conclusion. Some demons are in hell, as in the place of punishment destined for them: others, however, remain in a murky air.

Disputatio CCXLIII - How demons suffer from fire (Quo pacto daemones patiantur ab igne)

Disput. 243. How demons suffer from fire (Quo pacto daemones patiantur ab igne).

Some think that demons are tormented only by the apprehension of apparent evil (Damones torqueri solum apprehensione appare nonnulli autumant). cap. 1. Some think that demons are tormented in Hell only by the apprehension of despoiled good, others think (Daemones torqueri in inferno sola apprehensione nis desidorati boni, alij existimant). c. 2. Some have taught that demons are tortured by fire through a species or a cognition derived from it (Daemones ab igne cruciari per speciem aut cognitiones eo deriuatam, nonnulli docuerunt). c. 3. Henry and Scotus supposed that demons and separated souls are tormented by fire in the same manner in which souls in the body are tormented by fire (Daemones & animas separatas eodem modo ab igi queri, quo animae in corpore cruciantur, Henricu Scotus putarunt). c.4. The more recent authors affirm that demons suffer from fire by a quality derived from the fire (Daemonem pati ab igne per qualitatem ab ign recentiores affirmant). c. 5. A more probable opinion is that demons are tormented by fire in a certain occult manner and by a kind of alligation (Daemones occulto quodam modo per alligationem ac torqueri probabilior sententia est). c. 6.

It is undoubted among Catholics that demons are tortured by some kind of torment, although what kind of genus of torment and pain this is has been much disputed among the scholastic doctors.

But before we refer to the opinions of individuals, it must first be supposed as certain that, as St. Thomas teaches in the conclusion of the article, there is a place of Hell in which demons are tortured, of which place it is not necessary here to treat at length (Verum an tequam singulorum sententias referamus, est in primis supponendum tanquam certum id, quod S. Th. in conclusione art. docet, nempe esse locum infernum, in quo daemones cruciantur, de quo hic non est ex professo disserendum).

Alphonsus de Castro against the heresies, and Sixtus of Siena in book 5 of the Annotated Bible, dispute about that place; but in this place most hold that demons remain there, although many also have remained in this air until the day of judgment (Disputant autem de illo Alphonsus de Castro contra haereses verbe Infernus, & Sixtus Senensis lib. 5. Biblioth sanctae annota tione 141. in hoc autem loco daemones plerique detinentur, tametsi multi etiam manserint in hoc aëre, vsque ad diem iudicij).

Next it must be premised that the fire of Hell is corporeal, which opinion is common to all the scholastics (Deinde praemittendum est, ignem inferni esse corporeum, quae sententia est communis omnium Scholasticorum).

See the fourth part, distinction 44 of Scotus, in the fourth part, distinction 50, question 1, article 1, and although the more recent writers say the opposite and assert that this is an error, yet it does not seem to have been expressly defined by the Church (in 4. d. 44. Scoti in 4. d. 50. q. 1. a. 1. & quamuis recentiores dicant, errorem esse, op positum assere; tamen non videtur id adhuc defi nitum expresse ab Ecclesia).

Indeed, when the Greeks in the Council of Florence asserted that the fire of Purgatory is not true and corporeal fire, in the last session in the definition of the faith, where many things are defined against them, nothing is said about the fire of Purgatory (imo cum Graeci in Concilio Florentino assererent, ignem purgato rij non esse verum & corporeum ignem, in sess. vlt. in definitione fidei, vbi multa contra ipsos de finiuntur, nihil de igne purgatorij dicitur).

The foundation of this opinion is firm in Scripture, in which fire is often called the fire into which the damned are destined (Firmu tamen huius sententiae fundamentum est in Scri ptura, in qua saepius vocatur ignis in quem desti nantur damnati).

And the words of Scripture ought to be explained in their proper sense when this can be done without some absurdity (Verba autem Scripturae in pro prium sensum explicanda sunt, quando sine ab surdo aliquo id fieri potest).

Clidhoueus disputes in the last chapter of book 4 of Damascene's De Fide whether the fire of Hell and the fire of Purgatory are of the same species as our fire; of this there is no need to treat here (Disputat autem Clid houeus in caput vlt. libri 4. de fide Damasceni, an ignis inferni, & purgatorij sit eiusdem speciei cum no stro: de quo in hoc loco disserendum non est).

Having set these things, the first controversy arises about those who say that demons are tormented by cogitation or by apprehension, not by anything contrary or disconvenient in reality, but only by the apprehension of apparent evil, as men in dreams are wont to be greatly saddened by cogitations of imagination alone (His constitutis in praesenti controuersia prima sententia fit eorum, qui dicunt, daemones torquer cogitatione, siue apprehensione non aliculus com trarij, aut disconuenientis, quod reipsa patiantur sed apprehensione tantum apparentis mali, sicut homines in somnis ex sola imaginationis cogita tione vehementer tristari solent).

They say, therefore, that demons are indeed tormented by fire, not because the fire is in truth contrary to them or disconvenient to them, but because demons apprehend it as disconvenient to themselves (Dicunt igitur daemones quidem ab igne torqueri, non quod reuera ignis ipsis contrarius aut disconueniens sit: sed quod daemones eum vt sibi disconue nientem apprehendant).

This was the opinion of Vicenna in Metaphysics book 9, where he teaches that separated souls imagine the punishment which they suffered in this life and are tormented by that imagination; Albert also seems to assent in the fourth part, distinction 44, article 20, to the Last, and Bonaventure regards it as probable, as will be alleged below (Haec fuit sententia ui cennae 9. Metaphysicesc. vlt. vbi docet, animas separa tas a corpore cogitare poenam, quam in hac vita perpessae sunt, & ea imaginatione vehemente torqueri: consentire etiam videtur Albertus in 4. d. 44. art. 20. ad vlt. idque probabile censet Bona. loco inferius allegando).

But Aegidius is falsely cited for this opinion; for in another place he was openly against it, as we shall see below (Falso tamen pro hac opinione refertur Aegidius: in alia enim ipse aperte fuit, vt inferius videbimus).

It can be proved from Gregory in book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 29, where of the spirit that is tormented in Hell he says, "For he suffers the fire by that very fact, because it is given to him, and, because he sees himself to be burned, he is burned" (Probari autem potest ex Gre in 4. libro dialog c. 29. vbi de spiritu, qui cruciatur in inferno, inquit, Ignem namque eo ipso patitur, quod vi detur, &, quia cremari se aspicit, crematur).

He judges that all grief and passion arises from the mere apprehension of apparent evil (Omnem igi tur tristitiam & passionem ex sola apprehensione apparentis mali esse existimat).

For if he is saddened only because he sees that he is being tortured, then not because he is truly tortured and endures anything from the fire, but because he apprehends the fire as if it were burning him (Nam si tristatur tantum, quia aspicit, se cruciari: ergo non quia reuera cruciatur, & aliquid vere ab igne patitur, sed quia ita ignem apprehendit, ac si ab eo cre maretur).

And it can be confirmed by reason because this way is much easier for explaining the torment of demons; for it is scarcely understandable, much less explicable, what evil a demon can suffer from fire in reality; but a form apprehended by thought alone is no less able to affect the soul with sadness than a true one (Ratione vero confirmari potest: quia haec via multo facilior est ad explicandum crucia tum daemonis. Vix enim intelligi, nedum expli¬ cari potest, quid mali daemon ab igne reipsa pati queat: forma autem sola cogitatione apprehensa non minus potest animam tristitia afficere, quam vera).

This opinion is rightly rejected by theologians of the highest authority (Haec sententia a Theologis iure optimo reij citur).

For although we cannot deny that a form apprehended by thought and imagination can affect the mind no less than if it were true, nevertheless two reasons in the case of demons forbid granting this (Nam quamuis negare non possimus, for mam sola cogitatione & imaginatione apprehen sam non minus animum torquere, quam si vera esset: nihilominus duabus de causis in daemoni bus, id concedi non debet).

The first is that the angelic intellect cannot be so deceived as to apprehend as evil something which in reality is not, especially so as to torment it so violently as men are daily tormented by imagination (Prior est, quia intelle ctus Angeli non potest ita deludi, vt possit appre hendere tanquam malum, aliquid, quod reuera non est: praesertim quod ita vehementer cruciet ipsum, sicut homines imaginatione quotidie de cipiuntur).

For although the angelic intellect can apprehend as possible what is impossible and thus may be tempted, for that reason we said in Disputation 234 cap. 2 that an angel could have sinned by the appetite of equality with God; and although an angel can be deceived by a perverse affection, by the apprehension of future evil or good, as we said in the preceding disputation cap. 3, yet to be tormented with sadness, especially so vehemently, the angel must apprehend present evil not in any way but with some opinion; for this is required to bring pain or sadness as to the reason of fear; therefore he must judge that that is evil to himself in some way, which cannot fall into the intellect of an angel (Nam quamuis intellectus Angeli ap prehendere possit, vt possibile sit, quod impossi bile est, & ita ei placeat: qua rattone diximus disp. 234 cap. 2. potuisse peccare appetitu aequalitatis Dei; & quamuis Angelus deludi possit ex prauo affectu, apprehensione mali, aut boni futuri, vt praeced. disput. cap. 3. diximus: tamen vt crucietur tristitia: praesertim tam vehementi, apprehendere debet malum praesens non quomodocunque sed cum aliqua opinione: hoc enim requiritur, vt afferat dolorem aut tristitiam sicut ad rationem etiam timoris: quare existimare debet, illud sibi aliqua ratione malum esse: hoc autem non potest in intellectum Angeli cadere: neque enim in rebus naturalibus decipi potest, nisi apprehendat Deum tanquam minitantem sibi, aliquod malum: quod non tam esset causa tristitiae, quam timoris).

The second reason is that this opinion does not satisfy the Scriptures which assert that demons are tormented by true fire; and for this reason Matthew 25 says that that fire is prepared for the devil and his angels for the purpose of tormenting them, and the soul of the rich man said in Luke 16, "I am tormented in this flame" (Posterior ratio est: quia secundum hanc senten tiam non satisfit Scripturis asserentibus, daemo nes a vero igne torqueri. Qua etiam ratione Mat thaei 25. dicitur ignis ille paratus diabolo, & An gelis eius, nempe ad cruciandum eos, & anima epulonis Lucae 16. dicebat, Quia crucior in hac flam ma).

Similarly, according to this opinion, the testimonies of the Fathers, by which below it will be proved that demons are truly tormented by fire, cannot be made to agree (Similiter etiam iuxta hanc sententiam satis fieri non potest testimonijs Patrum, quibus inferius probabitur daemones verae ab igne tor queri).

To the testimony of Gregory brought for this opinion I reply that he explained himself sufficiently in the same chapter (Ad testimonium Gregorij allatum pro ha sententia, respondeo, se satis explicuisse in eodem capite).

For besides the words cited above, by which he seemed to assert that demons are tormented by the mere apprehension of apparent evil, he subjoins that visible fire draws forth an invisible ardor and pain, and that by corporeal fire an incorporeal mind is also tormented by an incorporeal flame

(Nam praeter verba superius citata, quibus videbatur asserere, daemones torqueri sola appre hensione apparentis mali, subiungit, igne visibili ardor ac dolor inuisibilis trahitur, & per ignem corporeum mens incorporea etiam incorporea flamma cruciatur).

By these words, although Gregory refers the torment of demons to apprehension, as to a cause which, since it is spiritual, is also called by Gregory invisible ardor and incorporeal flame, yet as he says that the flame is derived from corporeal fire, so he also teaches that the spiritual apprehension arises from the fire itself, and he calls that spiritual flame what he more clearly explained subsequently by these words (Quibus verbis quamuis St. Gregory referat cru ciatum daemonum in apprehensionem, sicut in causam, quae cum sit spiritualis, dicitur etiam a Greg. ardor inuisibilis, & flamma incorporea: ta men sicut dicit flammam ab igne corporeo deri uati, sic etiam docet apprehensionem spiritualem ab ipso igne oriri, eamque flammam spiritualem appellat id quod multo clarius explicuit deinde his verbis).

"Although we are able to collect from the said evangelic words that the soul suffers the conflagration not only by seeing but also by experiencing it" - by which he plainly teaches that a demon is tormented not by an apparent evil but by an evil which he himself truly experiences - and as we shall see below, all the Fathers attribute to that very fire and flame the true cause by which demons are tormented (Quamuis colligere ex dictis euangelicis possu mus, quia incendium anima non solum videndo, sed etiam experiendo patiatur. Quibus aperte docet, daemo nem non apparenti malo, sed malo quod revera ipse experitur, cruciari: & vt inferius videbimus, Patres omnes in ipsum ignem & flammam tanquam in veram causam reserunt daemones cruciatum).

The second opinion is of those who affirm that separated souls and demons in Hell are indeed tormented in cogitation by some evil which they really suffer, but not by any other than the privation of the desired good (SEcunda opinio sit eorum, qui affirmant, ani mas separatas, & daemones in inferno torque ri quidem cogitatione alicuius mali, quod reuera patiuntur: sed non alterius, quam priuationis de siderati boni).

Therefore they think that there is no other punishment of demons and separated souls than the pain of loss which consists in the privation of the beatitude, and a sensory pain arising from the consideration of that (Quare existimant, nullam aliam esse poenam daemonum, & animarum separatarum, quam poenam damni, quae in priuatione beatitu dinis consistit, & poenam sensus ortam ex consi deratione illius).

Richard makes mention of this opinion, being cited below, and it is commonly ascribed to Al-Ghazali in book 5 of the Physics, chapter 5, where he speaks of the punishment of souls (Huius sententiae mentionem fecit Ricardus loco inferius allegando, & tribui so let Algazeli 5. Physic. cap. 5. vbi de poena animarum loquitur).

In this way Ambrose also seems to have been in book 7 on Luke chapter 14 near the end, where after saying that the outward darkness which the damned suffer is nothing else than being without Christ, he adds: "Therefore neither will there be any other clashing of teeth in the body, nor any fire of the corporal flames, nor corporal worms; but these are so because, as from much crudity and fevers worms arise, so if anyone does not ripen his sins by a certain soberness of interposition but

contracts old and recent sins by mingling sins with sins like crudity of the old and the new offenses, he will be consumed by fire proper to him and by his own worms" (In ea etiam fuisse videtur Ambros.lib. 7. in Lucam cap. 14. prope finem, vbi postquam dixit, tenebras exteriores, quas patiuntur damnati, ni hil aliud esse, quim esse sine Christo: subdit. Ergo nec corpor alium stridor aliquis dentium: neque ignis ali quis perpetuus flam narum corporalium, neque vermis es corporalis; sed haec ideo, quia sicut ex multa cruditate & febres nascuntur, & vermes, ita siquis non decoquat pec cata sua velut quadam interposita sobrietate abstinentiae sed miscendo peccata peccatis tanquam cruditatem quan dam contrahat veterum, & recentium delictorum, igne aduretur proprio, & suis vermibus consumetur).

And a little later: "Fire is that which is produced by the sorrow of sins; worm is that which gnaws the mind by reason of the irrational sins of the soul and in some way consumes the entrails of conscience" (Et paucis interpositis, Ignis est, quem generat moestitia delictorum vermis est eo quod irrationabilia animae peccata mentem rei, sensunque compungunt, & quadam exedunt viscera conscientiae).

Jerome mentions this opinion in the last chapter of Isaiah while explaining the words "Their worm dieth not," where he writes thus: "The fire which is not quenched is for the most part taken from the conscience of sins, which torment those placed in punishments, because by their vice and sin they have been deprived of the good of the elect, according to that which is written, I was occupied in misery, while a thorn is fixed in me" (De hac opinione meminit Hieron. in cap. vlt. Isaiae explicans illa verba, Vermis eorum non morie tur: vbi ita scribit, Ignis, qui non extinguitur, a pleris que conscientia accipitur peccatorum, quae torquent in su plicijs constitutos, quare vitio suo atque peccato caruerint electorum bono, iuxta illud quod scribitur, versatus sum in miseria, dum configitur mihi spina).

Jerome does not disapprove of this opinion but seems to admit it with this limitation, that they do not in any way deny the eternal punishments of the transgressors and of those who deny the Lord; he said this because of the error of those who said that the punishments of Hell would not be perpetual (Quarum senten tiam non improbat Hieronym. sed cum hac li mitatione eam videtur admittere, Ita duntaxat v. non negent praeuaricatorum, & dominum negantium aeterna suplicia: quod dixit, propter errorem eorum, qui dicebant, poenas inferni non futuras perpe tuas).

For a similar opinion appears to be that of Isidore in book 1 of De Summo Bono chapter 13, the first sentence, where he says that the damned have a twofold punishment in Gehenna, "whose mind is burnt by sorrow, and whose body by flame" (Pro eadem sententia videtur esse Isid. lib. 1. de summo bono, cap. decimo tertio, sententia prima, vb ait, duplicem esse damnatorum poenam in ge henna, Quorum & mentem vrit tristitia, & corpus flamma).

Finally, Innocent III in book 3 of De Contemptu Mundi chapters 2 and 6 teaches that there are only two kinds of punishments in Hell, one from the memory of sins, as has been explained by us, the other from fire, and this latter is derived only to bodies (Demum Innocentius III. in libro 3. de

Contempti Mundi cag 2. & 6. duo tantum genera poenarum docet esse in inferno, vnum ex memoria peccato rum, vt a nobis explicatum est: alterum ex igne, & hoc posterius tantum in corpora deriuari).

Therefore it is possible to feel that the spirit alone is tormented by remorse for its offenses (Videtur igitur sentire, spiritus solum torqueri me moria suorum delictorum).

This opinion seems to be interpreted among the scholastics by Durandus in the fourth distinction 44 question 11, when he says that demons are tormented by the memory of sins and can be said by a certain accommodation to be tormented by fire, because every pain is compared to fire, which among sensible things torments most (Quam opinionem ex Scholasticis interpretari videtur Durandus in 4. distinctione 44. quaestione vndecima, cum inquit, ex memoria delictorum daemones torqueri, & per accommodationem quandam dici posse ab igne cruciari: quia omnis dolor comparatur igni, qui inter alia sensibilia maxime cruciat).

He confesses, however, that demons are tormented not only in this way but also by true fire, which we will report below (Fatetur tamen non solum hoc modo, sed etiam a vero igne alia ratione daemones torqueri, vt infra refe remus).

This opinion, however, has by now been properly rejected in the schools; for the common opinion of all theologians, whom we will refer to below, is that demons are tormented not only by cogitation of loss but also by true fire (Haec tamen sententia merito iam in Scholis reijcitur, Communis enim Theologorum om¬ nium, quos infra referemus, opinio est, daemones non solum cogitatione, sul damni, sed etiam a ve ro igne torqueri).

And the Fathers thus explicitly hand down: Origen in Periarchon book 2 chapter 11, Nyssenus in the disputation on the soul and resurrection a little before the middle, Augustine book 21 of De Civitate chapter 10, Gregory in book 4 of the Dialogues chapter 29, in book 9 of the Morals chapter 38 (or 46) and chapter 39 (or 48), where he plainly teaches that demons in Hell are tormented by corporeal fire (Et patribus ita expresse tradunt Orig. lib. 2. Periarchon c. 11. Nyssenus in disputatione de. anima & resurrectione, paulo ance medium, August. 21. de ciuitate cap. 10. St. Gregory 4. lib. dialog. cap. 29. c. lib. 9. moral. cap. 38. alias 46. & cap 39. alias 48. vb. plane docet, daemones in inferno ab igne corpo reo cruciari).

He adds, at the end of chapter 35 (or 50), these words: "And although the nature of angels and men is far different, yet one punishment implicates those whom crime binds together in one guilt" (Subdit autem in fine capitis 35. alias 50. haec verba, Et quamuis Angelorum, atque hominum longe sit natura disssimilis: vna tamen poena implicat quos vno in crimine reatus ligat).

To the same opinion agrees Hugh of Saint Victor in question 3 of the Epistle to the Thessalonians, where he says that the damned are tormented not only by the remorse of conscience but also by fire (Eidem sententiae consen tit Hugo de S. Victote qu 3. in epist. ad Thessal. vbi ait, damnatos non solum remorsu conscientiae, sed etiam igne torqueri: loquitur autem de spiri tibus, vt constat ex quaest. 4).

Add also Laurentius Justinianus in the book De Casto Connubio Verbi et Animae chapter 16, where speaking of the fire of Hell he says: "Burning bodies, not heating but tormenting" (Adde etiam Lauren tium Iustinianum in libro de Casto connubio verbi, & animae capite 16. vbi de igne infermi sic loquitur, Corpora concremans spiritus, non calefaciens, sed crucians).

He adds moreover that this is done by divine power, because he had said of that fire that it did not need fuel of woods and matter, and therefore by divine power it can burn bodies and torment spirits (Addit vero, id fieri diuina virtute, eo quod ille de illo igne dixerat, non indigere fo mento lignorum & materiae, ob idque diuina virtute posse corpora cremare, & spiritus tor quere).

It is proved by reason. For although grief arising from the cogitation of punishment pertains to the punishment of sense, as we saw in the preceding disputation cap. 2, and thus for this reason alone we could assign to demons the punishment of loss and of sense, nevertheless because Scripture manifestly indicates that demons are tormented by fire (for otherwise the fire would not be said to be prepared for the devil and his angels, and those other things which we above recounted), therefore it is not sufficient to assign to the demons the punishment of sense arising from mere cogitation of loss; but it is necessary also to attribute to them a punishment derived from fire (Ratione vero probatur. Nam quamuis tristi tia orta ex cogitatione poenaedamni, ad poenam sensus pertineat, vt disp. praecedenti c. 2. monstra uimus, & ita hac sola ratione possemus daemoni bus assignare poenam damni, & sensus: tamen quia Scriptura manifeste indicat, daemones ab igne cruciari (nam alioquin ignis non diceretur para tus diabolo, & Angelis eius, & alia, quae supra re tulimus) ideo non satis est, poenam sensus ortam ex sola cogitatione damni daemonibus assignare: sed opus etiam est, paenam ab igne deriuatam ipsis tribuere).

All the scholastics whom we refer to in this chapter and the following agree that a demon suffers from corporeal fire (IAm vero Scholastici omnes, quos in hoc cap. & sequentibus referemus, in eo conueniunt vt daemon ab igne corporeo patiatur).

But as to the manner in which he is tormented by the fire, they vary in opinion (Verum de modo, quo ab igne torquetur, varie sentiunt).

Therefore the third opinion is of those who say that a demon is crucified by the fire through some species or through a cognition derived in him from the fire (Ter tia igitur sententia sit eorum, qui dicunt, cruciari, daemonem ab igne per speciem quandam, aut cognitionem ab ipso igne in eum deriuatam).

Thus Aegidius taught in quodlibet 2 question 9 and quodlibet 4 question 15, and Scotus in the fourth part distinction 44 question 2 paragraph; and of the second mode and following Ricardus art. 2 question 3 supplement, Gabriel in question 3 article 2 conclusion 5 to which Ockham refers in quodlibet 1 question 19, from which doctors Aegidius and Ricardus said that by the force of God burning fire as an instrument derives into the angel a certain intelligible species, which they call intentional, and that this is the cause of sadness (Ita docuit AEgidius quodlib. 2. quaest. 9. & quodlib. 4. q. 15 Scotus en 4. d. 44. quaest. 2. §. De secundo modo, & sequq Ricardus artic. 2. quaest. 3. supplementum, Gabrielis quaest. 3. art. 2. conclusione 5. in quam sententiam re fert

Ocamum quodlib. 1. quaest. 19. ex quibus Docto ribus Aegidius, & Ricardus dixerunt, virtute Dei vrente igne vt instrumento, speciem quandam intelligibilem, quam vocant intentionalem, in Angelum deriuari, & hanc esse cansam tristitiae).

How the impression of that species is the cause of sadness in the angel they do not explain in the same way (Quomodo autem impressio illius speciei sit causa tristitiae in Angelo, non eodem modo explicant).

Richard says that that species is produced so violently that it disturbs the intellect of the angel and prevents it from the consideration of other things; the fire detains him, and this is the cause of annoyance and sadness in the angel (Ricardus inquit, speciem illam adeo vehemen tem produci, vt perturbet intellectum Angeli, & impediat ab aliarum rerum consideratione ignis detineat: atque hoc sit Angelo molestiae, & tri stitiae causa).

Aegidius says that from the mere impression of that species the demon is sad, although in us there is no cause of sadness from a species derived from a phantasm by the active intellect, because our possible intellect which receives species produced by the active intellect from the phantasm depends on it only as to operation not as to being; and therefore in the reception of a species produced by that power the virtue itself is not saddened; but our intellect and that of the demon depend on God not only as to operation but also as to being (Aegidius vero ait, ex sola impressione illius speciei ideo daemonem tristari, cum tamen nobis nulla sit causa tristitiae species a phanta¬smate deriuata vittute intellectus agentis, quia in tellectus noster possibilis, qui recipit species ab intellectu agenti ex phantasmate productas, pen det ab eo solum quoad operationem, noij quoad esse; & ideo in receptione speciei productae vir tute ipsius non tristatur: at vero intellectus no ster, & daemonis pendet a Deo non tantum quo ad operationem, sed etiam quoad esse).

Pain and sadness, they say, cannot be derived into the appetitive faculty except from that from which the faculty itself depends as to being; just as in the senses annoyance is not derived except from sensible qualities from which the faculty depends as to being (Dolor au tem, & tristitia non potest deriuari in facultatem appetentem, nisi ab eo, a quo ipsa facultas pen det quoad esse: quemadmodum in sensibus mo lestia non deriuatur, nisi a qualitatibus sensibili bus, a quibus ipsa facultas pendet quoad esse).

But Scotus, Gabriel and Ockham say that the demon is tormented by the fire not by the impression of an intelligible species but by the impression of an actual cognition which God by his power derives into the angel through the fire as through an instrument (Ar vero Scotus, Gabr. & Ocam dicunt, daemonem ab igne torqueri, non per impressionem specier intelligibilis, sed per impressionem cognitionis actualis, quam Deus virtute sua per ignem, tan quam per instrumentum, in Angelum deriuat).

From this impression they say it follows that the demon's intellect is determined to that cognition so that, whether he wills or not, by it he perceives perpetually and vehemently; from which it also follows that demons are saddened because they would now consider this, now that, and so as they would wish to cease consideration of the one object and then of the other (ex qua impressione dicunt prouenire, vt daemo nis intellectus ad eam cognitionem determine tur, vt, velit,

nolit, per eam perpetuo vehementer intelligat: ex quo etiam efficitur, vt daemones tri stentur, quia vellent nunc hoc, nunc illud consi derare, & vt placuisset nunc ab huius objecti nunc ab illius consideratione cessare).

Moreover they explain such a determination derived from God by the example of the active intellect and the phantasm, from which our possible intellect is determined (Porro ta lem determinationem a Deo deriuatam expli cant exemplo intellectus agentis, & phantasma tis, a quibus noster intellectus possibilis determi natur).

And since Scotus concedes that demons are also tormented by an alligation in which they are detained in the fire, he nevertheless says that when explained in this way demons are tormented by the fire more than if they were tormented by it only through alligation; because in the said manner the fire is the cause of sadness and pain in demons in two ways: first by imprinting a cognition of itself and thereby determining the intellect of the demon; secondly by the manner of an object, while the angel is compelled to know the fire itself and to remain in that knowledge; but by mere detention it torments not so violently, because it torments only as an object (Cumque concedat Scotus daemones etiam cruciari per alligationem, qua detinentur in igne inquit tamen, hoc modo explicato magìs daemo nes ab igne torqueri, quam si solum per alligatio nem cruciarentur ab eo: quoniam praedicto mo do ignis est causa tristitiae, & doloris in daemoni bus dupliciter, primum imprimens cognitionem sui, & per eam determinans intellectum daemo nis: deinde per modum obiecti, dum cogitur Angelus ipsum ignem cognoscere: & in eius co gnitione manere: at per solam detentionem non tam vehementer ignis torquet daemones, quia solum per modum obiecti torquet).

Moreover Scotus proves that greater torment in a demon arises from the impression of the cognition derived from the fire than from alligation, because the nobler the faculty of understanding in the angel compared to the faculty of moving, the greater is the sadness which arises from a force applied to the intellectual faculty to understand, than the sadness which arises from a force applied to the motor faculty, to prevent the angel from moving as he wishes; for the latter hinders a smaller perfection in the angel than the former (Praeterea ma iorem esse cruciatum daemoni ex impressione co gnitionis ab igne deriuata, quam ex alligatione probat Scot. quia quanto nobilior est facultas in telligendi in Angelo, quam facultas se mouendi tanto est maior tristitia, quae nascitur ex vi allata facultati intelligenti ad intelligendum, quam tri stitia, quae oritur ex vi illata facultati motrici, ne moueatur angelus quo voluerit: quia haec impe dit minorem perfectionem in Angelo quam illa).

This opinion, however explained, is not approved by me (Haec sententia quocunque modo explicata mihi non pro batur).

And first, as it is explained by Scotus, it can be refuted by the reason which I proved above in d. 176 c. 3, that a thing cannot be taken by God as a physical instrument to any effect except that which has some prior action in some way conducive to the effect, as I explained there; the fire of Hell does not have such a prior operation in itself; therefore it cannot be taken as an instrument to imprint a species or cognition in the angel's intellect (Atque inprimis contra illam pu gnat ratio,

qua sup. d. 176. c. 3. probaui, non posse assumi a Deo vt instrumentum physicum quam cunque rem ad quemcunque effectum: sed eam duntaxat, quae habet aliquam praeuiam actionem aliquo modo conducentem ad effectum, vt ibid explicui: ignis a. inferni non habet talem opera tionem praeuiam ex se: ergo assumi nequit vt in strumentum ad imprimendam speciem, aut co gnitionem in intellectu Angeli).

Add that although God could assume fire as a medium instrument to produce a species, yet he could not produce and instill into the possible intellect a notion and knowledge (notitia and cognitionem) by that means (Adde, quod, licet posset Deus assumere vt instrumentum ignem ad producendam speciem, tamen non posset ad pro ducendam & infundendam in intellectu possibil notitiam & cognitionem).

Secondly, because it seems difficult that by the impression of an intelligible species a demon should be tormented, since a species is the intelligible form perfecting the intellect (Secundo quia difficile videtur, per impressionem speciei intelligibilis torqueri daemonem, cum species sit forma intel ligibilis perficiens intellectum).

Thus St. Thomas argues against this opinion in the fourth, chapter 9 contra gentiles: for that the angel should receive it from God by means of the fire as a medium is not a sufficient cause of any, much less of so violent a sadness as the demon suffers; and the same applies to cognition if it were impressed by God by means of an instrument (Sic arguit contra hanc opin. S. Th. 4. c. 9. con. gen. nam, quod eam recipiat Angelus a Deo medio igne tanquam in strumento non videtur sufficiens causa vllius, nedum tam vehementis tristitiae, quam patitui daemon: atque eadem ratio est de cognitione, si ea imprimeretur a Deo medio instrumento).

I say this against the more recent some Thomists who make the whole cause of sadness to be that the demon receives a species from a certain lowest nature, namely from the fire as an instrument (Hoc dixerim propter recentiores, aliquos Thom. qui in eo constituunt totam causam tristitiae, quod daemon speciem recipiat ab infima quadam na tura, nempe ab igne tanquam instrumento).

But some say, whom Richard mentions, that demons are saddened by the impression of that species because it is some excellent species, just as an excellent sensible species is wont to be the cause of annoyance in sense (Sed dicunt aliqui, quorum meminit Ricard. ideo dae mones tristari impressione illius speciei, quia est species quaedam excellens, quemadmodum species etiam excellens in sensu solet esse causa molestiae).

However, as Richard rightly observed, in sense it is indeed an excellent species, or rather an excellent sensible, that is the cause of pain or annoyance because it harms the sense; but an intelligible species, however excellent and of the most excellent object, cannot harm the intellect, as is evident; therefore it cannot be the cause of sadness; otherwise the species of the divine essence (if any) would produce the greatest sadness, which no one will say (Ceterum, vt ipse Ricar. recte obseruauit in sensu potest, quidem species excellens aut potius (vt ego arbitror) sensibile excellens esse causa dolo tis, aut molestiae, eo quod laedit sensum: at species intelligibilis, quantumuis sit

excellens, & excel lentissimi obiecti, non potest laedere intellectum, vt patet: ac proinde nequit esse causa tristitiae: alioquin & species essentiae diuinae (si aliqua, maxime tristitiam afferret: quod nemo dicet).

I said that the harm to the sense is produced rather by the sensible object than by the species, because every harm which arises from some natural intemperance is made by a physical and real action of some quality in the organ coming from the sensible object rather than from the species, as I have shown at length in De Anima book 2 and will show below in this second part (Dixi a. laesionem sensus prouenire potius a sensi bili obiecto, quam ab specie: quia omnis laesio quae fit per naturalem aliquam intemperiem, fi actione physica & reali alterius qualitatis in or gano ab obiecto sensibili proueniente, quam ab specie, vt late ostendi in 2. de Ani. & Deo duce in ferius in hac 2. par. monstrabo).

The reason therefore which the defenders allege for this opinion, that the impression of a species or of that knowledge is the cause of sadness, is that the angel is compelled to persevere in the cognition of such an object against his will (Ratio igitur ob quam Dd. alleg. pro hac sententia, dicunt. impres sionem speciei, aut notitiae illius esse causam tri stitiae, est, quia cogitur Angelus in cognitione ta lis obiecti contra voluntatem suam perseuerare).

Although this seems difficult to some, at least to be effected by mere impression of a species, yet let us at least concede that it can be done by an impressed notion or by an impressed species (quod quamuis aliquibus difficile videatur, saltem per solam impressionem speciei: tamen id liben ter concedamus, siue per impressam notitiam, siue per speciem impressam fieri posse).

Nevertheless it does not seem a sufficient cause to be assigned for so violent a sadness as the demon suffers (nihilo minus non videtur sufficiens causa assignari tam vehementis tristitiae, quam patitur daemon).

First, if it were for some reason a cause of great sadness because by that cognition the cogitation of other things and their consideration would be impeded in the angel, this is against experience, for demons, as appears from those possessed, consider many other things (Pri mum quidem si aliqua ratione esset causa tristi tiae, maximae quia ea cogitatione aliarum rerum cogitatio & consideratio in Angelo impediretur: at hoc est contra experientiam: nam daemones, vt constat ex energumenis, multa alia considerant).

Then if the notion were impressed by God as Scotus asserts, the angel could not be hindered by it from thinking other objects, because the power of understanding is not distracted by that cognition; nothing of power is contributed by it for eliciting that cogitation, but only that he suffers and receives it (Deinde si imprimeretur notitia ab ipso Deo, vt asseruit Scot. non posset Angelus per illam impe diri, ne alia obiecta libere cogitaret: quia virtur intelligendi nihil per eam cogitationem distra hetur: cum nihil virtutis ad eam eliciendam in tellectus conferret, sed solum eam pateretur, & reciperet).

Finally, even if only an intelligible species were impressed, there could not be such an intensity of thought by that species that consideration of other things would be impeded; for with the understanding of that thing which the angel clearly understands he can without labor consider

many other things (Postremo etiamsi impressio solum esset speciei intelligibilis, non posset esse tanta cogita tionis intensio per illam speciem, vt aliarum rerum consideratio impediretur; nam cum intellectione eius rei, quam Angelus clare intuetur, potest sine labore plura alia considerare).

The reason why Aegidius said that the angel is tormented by a species which he receives from God, but our intellect is not tormented by the species which it received from the active intellect, is frivolous: for that the substance of the angel depends on God is not a sufficient cause that a species impressed by God should produce sadness, unless that species be contrary and disconvenient to the angel, as against our possible intellect we would be tormented by a species given by our active intellect if we received a species contrary to us even if the substance of our possible intellect did not depend on the active intellect (Ratio v. ob quam dicebat Aegid. Angelum tor queri ab speciei, quam recipit a Deo, intellectum, a. nostrum non cruciari ab specie, quam accepit ab intellectu agenti, friuola est: nam quod sub stantia Angeli pendeat a Deo non est sufficiens causa, vt species impressa a Deo afferat tristitiam, nisi illa sit contraria & disconueniens Angelo: sicut contra etiam intellectus possibilis, & nos torqueremur a nostro intellectu agenti, si reci peremus speciem nobis contrariam, etiamsi sub stautia nostri intellectus possibilis non pendeat ab intellectu agente).

That which is to be considered about our sense being affected by sensible quantities is not for that reason, because the substance of the sense depends on those as efficient causes, but because qualities can impress on the sense the species of an object that is contrary, troublesome and disconvenient in nature (Quod V. sensus noster a quan tatibus sensibilibus affici possit tristitia: non ideo est, quia ab illis pendeat substantia eius vt ab effi cientibus, sed quia qualitates imptimere possunt sensui speciem obiecti contrarij molesti & dis conuenientis naturae).

The fourth opinion is that of Domingo de Soto in the fourth part, distinction 50 question 1 article near the end, who teaches that souls outside bodies and demons are tormented in the same way by fire as souls in the body are tormented by fire, and that this power is communicated to the fire by God; and that this is what Augustine said: "in wondrous, yet true modes demons are tormented by fire," as we will report below (QVarta sententia sit Domin. de Soto in 4. d. 50. q. 1. cart. sub fin qui docet, animas extra corpora, & daemones eodem modo torqueri ab igne, quo animae in ipso corpore ab igne cruciantur: & hanc virtutem communicatam esse igne a Deo idque esse, quod dixit Angust. miris, veris tamen modis daemones ab igne torqueri, vt inf. referemus).

Whether from this any quality is derived from the fire into demons or souls, or in some other way, he does not explain (Vtrum a hoc fiat deriuata aliqua qualitate ab igne in daemones, aut animas, an alio modo, ipse non explicat).

Hent. agrees with Soto in part in book 8 q. 34 which teaches that a demon suffers from fire insofar as the fire is hot, and he rejects that it is a true passion like that which the senses receive; Hent. therefore seems to think that the passion which torments the demon by the fire is of the same reason as that which the sense would receive (Cum Soto conuenit ex parte Hent. quod li. 8. q. 34. qui docet, daemonem ab igne pati, qua tenus ignis calidus est: ac proiude vera passione, qualem sensus reciperet, daemonem ab igne tor queri. Videtur autem hic autor existimare passio nem, quae daemon ab igne torquetur, eiusdem esse rationis cum ea, quam sensus pateretur).

But Soto does not concede that the pain and passion of the soul or demon are of the same reason as those of the sense of a body; rather he says that a separated soul and a demon are tormented in the same way as the soul in the body is tormented, not by the passion of bodily punishment, but by something else derived from the body (At Sotus non concedit eiusdem esse rationis dolorem, & passionem animae, seu daemonis, & sensus corpo rei: sed animam separatam, & daemonem eodem modo torqueri, quo anima in corpore cruciare tur non passione poena corporea, sed quadam alia a corpore deriuata).

Moreover Henticus and in this perhaps differs from Soto, that that passion of demons from fire is derived by the proper virtue of the fire itself, while Soto teaches that it is by the virtue of God communicated to the fire, from which the fire is assumed as an instrument; Henticus however adds that some other virtue is communicated to the demon by God so that it is capable of suffering and of being tormented which is derived from the fire; thus both acknowledge a supernatural virtue of God in the punishment of demons: but Soto concedes it from the side of the fire, Henticus from the side of the demon (Addit praeterea Henticus & in hoc forsan a Soto differt, illam passionem dae monis ab igne deriuari virtute propria ipsius ignis: cum tamen Sot. virtute Dei igni commu nicata, a quo ignis assumitur vt instrumentum, id fieri doceat: subiungit tamen Hen. virtutem ali quam communicari daemoni a Deo, vt capax sit doloris & cruciatus, qui ab igne in ipsum deriua tur. Itaque vterque in poena daemonum agnoscit virtutem Dei supernaturalem: sed Sot. eam con cedit ex parte ignis Hen. a. ex parte daemonis).

This opinion when explained in either way is not approved by me (Haec opinio vtroque modo explicata mihi non pro batur).

First as explained by Soto it can be refuted thus. The sadness which the demon experiences from the fire is a certain act of the will consisting in some displeasure; therefore it must be directed around some object as evil and disconvenient; therefore either it has for its object some quality derived from the fire into the demon, or it has the fire itself as object (Primum quidem vt explicatur a Soto hac ratione refelli potest. Tristitia, quam patitur dae mon ab igne, est actus quidam voluntatis in dis plicentia quadam consistens: quare circa aliquod obiectum malum & disconueniens versari debet ergo aut habet pro obiecto qualitatem aliquam ab igne in ipsum daemonem deriuatam, aut habe ipsum ignem).

First it cannot have a quality derived from the fire into the demon; for besides that such a quality is chimerical, as will be shown below, the sadness of the demon and of the separated soul would not be of the same reason as the sadness of the soul conjoined to the body (Primum non potest habere quali tatem ab igne in ipsum daemonem deriuatam: nam praeterquam quod talis qualitas commenti tia est, vt c. seq. ostendemus: tristitia daemonis, & animae separatae non esset eiusdem rationis cum tristitia animae coniunctae corpori).

For the sadness of the soul conjoined to a body which it suffers from fire by the touch of the body when the body is burned has for its object some corporeal quality which they call dolorific, impressed on the body itself; or at least, as some prefer, the division of the continuum (which I do not approve) from which the species and pain in the sense is produced, and thence into the

sentient appetite and thence into the will the sadness is derived: a quality impressed into an angel or separated soul would be of another reason; it would be spiritual; therefore the sadness and the pain about it would be different from the sadness which the soul in the body suffers from fire (Nam tristitia animae coniunctae, quam patitur ab igne per ta ctum corporis, quando corpus comburitur, ha bet pro obiecto qualitatem quamdam corpoream quam vocant dolorificam, impressam ipsi corpori: vel certe vt alijs placet diuisionem continui (quod mihi non probatur) ex quibus prouenit species, & dolor in sensu tactus, & inde in appetitum sen tientem, & inde in voluntatem deriuatur: quali tas a. impressa Angelo, aut ansmae separatae alte rius esset rationis: esset enim spiritualis: ergo eti tristitia, & dolor de illa diuersus esset a tristitia, quam anima in corpore ex igne patitur).

Then if the sadness of the demon or separated soul had for its object the fire apprehended by it as an evil and disconvenient to itself, it would not be of the same reason as the sadness of the soul in the body when the body is burned; for the sadness of the soul in the body is not from the fire apprehended as an evil disconvenient, but as I said from a quality derived from the fire in touch (Deinde si tristitia daemonis, & animae separatae haberet pro obiecto ipsum ignem apprehensum vt malum, & sibi disconuenientem, non esset eius dem rationis cum tristitia animae in corpore, dum ab igne comburitur: nam tristitia animae in corpore non est ab ipso igne apprehenso vt malo discon ueniente: sed, vt dixi, de qualitate ab igne in ta ctum deriuata: nam tristitia de aliquo extrinseco malo alterius rationis est, quam de qualitate, & alteratione intrinseca ab extrinseco agente deri uata).

A separated soul, indeed, receiving nothing actually from the fire except the memory of the pain which it suffered from the fire by touch, could be tormented; and then as object it would not have the fire but a quality and passion derived from the fire in the body of which it retains memory; but a demon, who has never been experienced in a body nor can experience such a kind of sadness and pain, cannot be tormented by memory of that (Posset quidem anima separata nihil actu re cipiens ab igne, tantum ex memoria doloris, que ab igne per tactum passa esset, cruciari: & tunc pro obiecto non haberet ignem, sed qualitatem, & passionem ab igne deriuatam in corpus, cuius retineret memoriam: at daemon, qui nunquam in corpore expertus est, nec experiti potest tale ge nus tristitiae, & doloris, non potest memoria illius torqueri).

Moreover when a separated soul is in Hell, it would not be said to be tormented by the fire of Hell but to be tormented from the mere memory of the fire by which it was burned in the body; for as one who is near a fire and not burned by it but remembers that he was burned by another fire, and by the apprehension of a past burning grieves, it would not be said that he is tormented by the present fire but by an absent and past one (nihilominus anima separata a corpore, cum esset in inferno, non diceretur ab igne in ferni torqueri, sed ex sola memoria ignis, a quo in corpore passa est, cruciaretur: veluti qui esset iuxta ignem, & ab eo non combureretur, sed re cordaretur, se fuisse ab alio igne combustum, & apprehensione praeteritae combustionis tristaretur: non diceretur ab igne praesenti, sed ab absenti & praeterito torqueri).

Then this opinion as defended by Henry can be more easily impugned (Deinde esam sententiam vt ab Henr. defenditur, facilius potest impugnari).

First, as Scotus and Durandus note below in the cited place against Henry, either that virtue which gives to the spirit the capacity so far that it may suffer from the fire is corporeal or spiritual; if spiritual, it cannot receive anything and make the demon a suitable subject to be suffered by corporeal fire; for if the substance of the angel who is spiritual is not from itself able to be suffered by corporeal fire, it cannot be made suitable to be suffered by it even by a spiritual quality; if the quality were corporeal it cannot be received in a spiritual substance, as is manifest; therefore such a quality is altogether fictitious (Primum, vt notant Scotus & Durand. loco inferius citando, contra Henr. aut virtus illa, quae datu spiritui, vt possit ab igne pati, est corporea au spiritualis. Si spiritualis, non potest aliquid reci pere, & daemonem facere idoneum subiectum, vt ab igne corporeo patiatur: nam si substantia ipsa angeli, qui spiritualis est, ex se capax non erat, vt ab igne corporeo pateretur, non poterit per qua litatem etiam spiritualem idonea reddi, vt ab eo dem igne patiatur: qualitas vero illa corporea esse non potest: quia in substantia spirituali corporea qualitas recipi nequit, vt manifestum est: ergo talis qualitas omnino commentitia est).

Moreover if we concede that the substance of the angel is capable in itself, or at least by a quality communicated by God, to be made capable that it may suffer from the fire, nonetheless the sadness of the demon or separated soul derived from the fire cannot be the same as that which the soul conjoined to a body has when the body is burned (Praeterea etiam si concedamus, substantiam Angeli esse ca pacem ex se, aut saltem per qualitatem a Deo con municatam capacem effici, vt ige patiatur nihilo minus tristitia illius, & animae separatae deriuata ab igne, non potest esse eadem cum ea, quam ha bet anima coiuncta corpori, quando ab igne cor pus crematur).

For either the object of this sadness would be the fire itself or something derived from the fire; if the fire itself, the sadness would not be of the same reason as above against Scotus; if something derived from the fire into the substance of the angel, that thing would be either spiritual or corporeal; if spiritual, besides being undefendable (because a spiritual effect cannot be derived from a corporeal agent by its own power), the sadness from that would not be of the same reason as the sadness which the soul in a body has when the body is burned; for the sadness of the soul in the body from burning is from some corporeal quality, namely from intemperance or division of the continuum or from a sensible quality called dolorific; sadness of the demon in that way would be from some spiritual quality (Nam vel obiectum huius tristitiae esset ipse ignis, vel aliquid ab igne deriuatum. Si esset ipse ignis, tristitia non esset eiusdem ratio nis, vt supra contra Scotum demonstrauimus. Si autem esset aliquid ab igne deriuatum in substan tia Angeli: vel illud esset spirituale, vel corporeum. Si dicas esse spirituale, praeterquam quod id de fendi non potest (quia ab agente corporeo pro pria virtute non potest effectus spiritualis deri uari) dolor tristitia de illo non esset eiusdem ra tionis, cum tristitia, quam habet anima in corpore quando ab igne corpus comburitur: quia tristitia animae in corpore ex combustione ignis est de aliquo corpore, nempe de intemperie, aut diui sione continui, aut qualitate sensibili, quam dolo rificam vocant: tristitia a. daemonis eo modo esset de qualitate aliqua spirituali).

If you say that that which is derived from the fire into the spirit is corporeal, yet the pain would still not be of the same reason as the pain of a soul in the body from combustion; for the pain of a soul in the body from combustion is of some sensible quality; but a corporeal quality impressed

into a demon would not be sensible; therefore the pain from that would not be of the same reason as the sadness of the soul from combustion (Si v. id, quod deriua retur ab igne in spiritum, esset corporeum, adhuc dolor non esset eiusdem rationis cum dolore ani mae in corpore ex combustione: nam dolor ani mae in corpore ex combustione, est de qualitate aliqua sensibili: qualitas autem corporea impressa daemoni non esset sensibilis: ergo dolor de illa non esset eiusdem rationis cum tristitia animae ex combustione).

But someone might say that the demon's will could be elevated so that it is saddened by that sensible quality which arises from combustion and perceives it as if it were in the body (At dicat aliquis, eleuari, quidem voluntatem daemonis, vt tristetur de qualitate illa sensibili, quae nascitur ex combustione, & illam percipiat, ac si esset in corpore).

This can be easily confuted. No appetitive or cognitive faculty can be elevated to operate about an object which is not contained somehow within its proper latitude; for example, the eye cannot be elevated to hear, the ear to see, the intellect to sense; otherwise every faculty could be elevated to any genus of operation which is absurd (Verum hoc facile confutari potest. Nam nulla facultas appetens, aut cogno scens, eleuari potest ad operandum circa obiectum aliquod, quod intra latitudinem proprij aliquo modo non continetur. veluti oculus ad audien dum, & auris ad videndum, & intellectus ad sen tiendum eleuari nequit: alioquin & quaeuis res eleuari posset ad quoduis genus operationis virae quod est absurdum).

That the created intellect is elevated to see God clearly is because God is in some way contained within the latitude of the object of created intellect; for God can naturally be known by the created intellect, at least not in a proper concept nor quiditatively; and therefore from one kind of cognition about the same object it can be elevated to another kind more perfect; but to that which in no way is contained under the object of some faculty the faculty cannot be elevated (Quod vero intellectus crea tus eleuetur ad videndum clare Deum, est, quia Deus intra latitudinem obiecti intellectus creati aliquo modo continetur: nam & naturaliter Deus cognosci potest ab intellectu creato; saltem non proprio conceptu, nec quiditatiuo: & ideo ex vno genere cognitionis circa idem obiectum, ad aliud genus perfectius eleuari potest: ad id tamen quod nullo modo continetur sub obiecto alicuius facul tatis, non potest facultas eleuari).

Thus likewise an apprehending faculty cannot be elevated to operate about that which is not in any way contained in analogy and latitude of its object (etiam eodem modo facultas apperens eleuari non potest ad operan dum circa id: quod aliquo modo intra analogiam & latitudinem obiecti sui non continetur).

Since therefore the pain which is in the will of the soul conjoined with the body from the burning of the body is of this sort - that first the touch itself is affected by a troublesome cognition of that quality which we call dolorific, or as the more probable opinion carries, of intemperance or a division of the continuum; then the animal appetite is saddened about the same object as disconvenient; lastly the will is affected with pain and sadness about the same thing by a certain sympathy - it follows that a demon cannot be tormented in this way by any quality derived from the fire into him (Cum igitur dolor, qui est in voluntate animae coniuncta cum corpore ex conbustione

corporis ab igne, hoc modo fiat vt primum afficiatur ipse tactus molesta quadam cognitione qualitatis illius, quam doloriferam vocamus, vt probabilior opinio fert aut intemperiei, aut diuisionis continui, vt ali existimant: deinde appetitus animalis tristetur de eodem obiecto tanquam disconuenienti: postre mo voluntas dolore, & tristitia de eadem re affi ciatur per sympathiam quandam: efficitur, demo nem non posse hoc modo torqueri quacunque qualitate ab igne in ipsum deriuata).

The fifth opinion is of the more recent who assert that a certain quality is derived from the fire into the demon by the virtue of God using it as an instrument, and that the demon suffers from and is saddened by that quality, not indeed by the same kind of sadness as that which a soul united to a body suffers when the body is burned, but because the demon sees that that quality is most unsuitable to him and contrary to him as a stain, shameful and deformed - as the human body is by intemperance or that dolorific quality (QVinta sententia est recentiorum qui autu mant, qualitatem quandam ab igne virture Dei vtentis ipso vt instrumento in daemonem de riuari, & ab ea daemonem pati, & de ea tristari: non quidem eodem genere tristitiae, quo tristatur anima coniuncta corpori, cum ab igne corpus cre matur: sed quia videt daemon, se ea qualitate sibi minime conuenienti, & contraria quasi macula tum, turpem, & deformem: sicut corpus anima lis per intemperiem, vel qualitatem illam dolori feram mase se habet).

This opinion is indicated by Albert in the fourth part, distinction 44, article 20 to the Last, although he considers the first opinion (that mentioned above) more probable (Hanc sententiam indicat Albertus in 4. d. 44. a. 20. ad vlt. quamuis existimet probabiliorem prima, quam supra cap. 1. retuli mus).

The same opinion is ascribed to the more recent Durandus, so that he has some ancient scholastic as patron, although Durandus in the last question of distinction 44 number 15 only reports it as of others and from intention attacks it (Eandem quoque opinionem tribuunt recen tiores Durando, vt aliquem ex Scholasticis anti quioribus habeant patronum: cum tamen Dura in 4. distinct. 44. q vlt. num. 15. eam solum tanquam aliorum referat, & ex professo impugnet).

It can be confirmed by testimonies of Fathers and Scripture cited in chapter 2 of this disputation, in which it is said that demons are burned and tormented by fire; which cannot comfortably be understood in any other way than in that which this opinion defends, as is clear by induction from those things we have said against other opinions (Confirmati autem potest testimonijs Patrum & Scri pturae cap. 2. huius disp. citatis, quibus dicitur, dae mones ab igne cremari, & cruciari: quod nullo alio modo commode videtur intelligi posse, quan hoc, quem haec opinio defendit, vt inductione constat ex ijs, quae contra alias sententias diximus).

But especially it can be corroborated by the authority and words of Gregory in book 4 of the Dialogues chapter 29: "For the soul suffers the conflagration of fire not only by seeing but also by experiencing it" (Sed praesertim authoritate, & verbis Gregor. 4. dia log cap. 29. comprobars potest: inquit enim, ani mam pati incendium ignis, non tantum videndo, sed etiam experiendo).

Add also places of Scripture in which this kind of torment is explained: Luke 16, the soul of the rich man said "I am tormented in this flame"; Apocalypse 20 says that the beast and the false prophets shall be tormented day and night in the lake of fire (Adde etiam loca Scripturae. in quibus hoc genus tormenti explicatur Luc. 16. anima diuitis dicebat. Quia crucior in hac flamma: Apocal. 20. dicitur bestiam, & Pseudoprophetas cruciandos die ac nocte in stagno ignis).

This opinion in the schools has appeared the more plausible inasmuch as it follows sense; for since those things which we experience by sense we more easily understand, and our manner of understanding is commonly most led by sense, as soon as we hear that spirit is tormented by fire we conceive its sadness like corporeal pain (Haec sententia eo plausibilior in Scholis visa est, quo magis sensum sequuta videtur. Cum enim ea quae sensu experimur, facilius intelligamus: & noster modus intelligendi communiter sensu maxime ducatur: simul atque audimus, spiritum ab igne torqueri, tristitiam eius instar corporei doloris concipimus).

But if in this spiritual matter we desert sense and are led only by reason so that we ought to philosophize, the aforesaid opinion is not less difficult than the others; and omitting the reasoning of Durandus in that cited question number 16, sufficiently explained by us in disputation 177 cap. 3, in which he effectively refutes the aforesaid opinion because no thing of the world can be assumed by God as a physical instrument unless it has a prior operation, which the fire does not have in regard to spirit, another proper reason may refute it (Si tamen in hac re spirituali deseramus sensum, & sola ratione ducti, vt opor tet Philosophemur: praedictam opinionem non minus, quam alias, difficilem iudicabimus, omissa vero ratione Durandi quaest. illa citara nu. 16. satis superque a nobis explicata dispur. 177. cap. 3. qua praedictam sententiam efficaciter ille confutat, quia videlicet quaeuis res mundi non potest assumita Deo vt physicum instrumentum, nisi habeat prae uiam operationem, qualem non habet ignis in spiritum: alia ratione huic materiae propria refelli potest).

But first it must be supposed about pain and sadness arising in us from the sense of touch, that it is either the cognition of touch itself by which the disconvenient quality is perceived, or it is the flight of the appetite and will derived from that cognition of touch; for speaking about pain in one way or the other is not much a difference of things but of words, provided that it is confessed that that contrary quality is a cognition in touch, and a flight or displeasure in the appetite and will (Supponendum autem in primis est, dolo rem & tristitiam ortam in nobis ex sensu tactus, vel esse ipsam cognitionem tactus, qua percipitur qualitas disconueniens: vel esse fugam appetitus & voluntatis deriuatam ex illa cognitione tactus, qua percipitur qualitas disconueniens: hoc enim aut illo modo de dolore loqui, non magna rerum, sed parua vocum dissenssio est, dummodo fatea mur illius qualitatis contrariae esse cognitionem in tactu, & fugam seu displicentiam in appetitu & voluntate).

This supposed, it is easily shown that there cannot be flight and displeasure in the will of an angel proceeding from the impression of some quality derived from the fire; for if in us some sadness arises from the impression of some extraneous quality, this only happens because that extraneous quality is contrary to the natural temper of our proper nature or because it in some way makes us deformed; in the former way not only is sadness in the will produced by mere cognition

and apprehension of the intellect and the sensation, but nature also provides in the sense the faculty to perceive such a disconvenient quality and hence into the appetite and will as I have said; in the latter way sadness occurs in the will by itself, or in the appetite without the external sense being touched, from the fact that someone considering himself deformed by such a quality would grieve, as one would grieve if he saw himself stained by some quality by which he would be made shameful (Hoc supposito facile ostenditur, non posse esse fugam & displicentiam in voluntate Angeli prouenientem ex impressione alicuius qualitatis ab igne deriuatae: nam si in nobis aliqua tristitia oritur ex impressione alicuius extraneae qualitatis: ea solum contingit, quia extranea illa qualitas est contra naturalem temperiem debiti nostrae naturae: aut quia aliquo pacto deformes nos efficit. Priori modo non solum efficitur rristi tia in voluntate media solum cogitatione & ap prehensione intellectus: sed etiam natura proui dit in sensu facultatem, vt disconuenientem il lam qualitatem, quam doloriferam vocant, per cipiamus, & inde in appetitum, & in voluntatem eo modo, quo diximus deriuetur. Posteriori vero modo contingit tristitia solum in voluntate, aut appetitu absque eo, quod sensu externo tactus qualitas illa percipiatur, ex eo solum quod quis per tam qualitatem deformem se considerans tristatur, veluti siquis videret se maculari aliqua qualitate, qua turpis efficeretur, doleret sane, & tristaretur).

But neither in the former way can it be that a demon be saddened by an impressed quality; indeed, those who admit the former way confess ingenuously and are convinced by reason: because no quality can be printed on an angel against the nature of his constitution so as to dispose him to some corruption, as is evident (Et quidem priori modo daemonem non tristari, ad uersarij, ingenue fatentur, & ratione ipsa conuin citur: quia nulla qualitas imprimi porest Angelo contra naturam illius constitutionem ad corru ptionem aliquam disponens, vt constat).

But neither in the latter way can it be that he be saddened: first because no reason can be devised by which some quality impressed would make a demon deformed unless to avoid present difficulty; and also because as no quality can be to anyone the cause of deformity unless it takes away some quality necessary for the preservation of his beauty, so also no quality impressed by God can make the angel deformed, since being infused supernaturally it cannot be of any created natural nature according to the principles required; it follows that it would be supernatural according to its substance; and by what reason could an angel be made deformed by a quality supernaturally infused and supernatural according to its substance? nay if any such existed it would rather pertain to the beauty of the angel (Sed neque posteriori modo tristari potest: tum quia nulla potest excogitari ratio ob quam qualitate aliqua impressa daemon efficiatur deformis, nisi vt praesentem difficultatem effugiamus: tum etiam quia sicut nulla qualitas esse potest alicui contra ria disponens ad eius corruptionem, nisi quae tol lat aliquam qualitatem necessariam ad conserua tionem ipsius; sic etiam non potest aliqua esse a licui causa deformitatis, nisi quae tollat qualitate aut substantiam necessariam ad illius pulchritu dinem: si enim integre reliquit omnia necessaria ad pulchritudinem, integra manebit pulchritudo, & nulla erit deformitas: atqui nulla qualitas An gelo inprimi potest a Deo, quae tollat aliquid ne cessarium ad eius pulchritudinem: ergo nulla hu iusmodi qualitate reddi potest deformis).

Add that since that quality would be infused by God supernaturally and could not be natural to any created nature according to the principes naturaliter required, it follows that it is supernatural according to its nature and substance, and how could a quality thus supernaturally infused and supernatural in its substance render the angel deformed? indeed it would rather add to his beauty (Adde, quod cum qualitas illa infundatur a Deo superna turaliter, & nulli creatae naturae possit esse natura lis ex principijs ipsius naturaliter requisita: se quitur, esse supernaturalem secundum suam naturam & substantiam: qua ergo ratione fieri poterit, v Angelus deformis reddatur qualitate supernatu raliter infusa, & secundum suam substantiam su pernaturali? imo vero si talis aliqua esset, potius ad pulchritudinem Angeli pertineret).

To the testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture which we alleged for this opinion there is one-word answer: demons are indeed tormented by fire, as we showed above in chapters 1 and 2 against the first and second opinion; nevertheless they are not tormented in the same way as this opinion contends, but in another easier way, which we shall explain in chapter 6 according to the opinion of St. Thomas (Ad testi monia vero Patrum, & Scripturae, quae pro hac sententia allegauimus, vnico verbo respondetur, daemones quidem ab igne torqueri, vt supra etiam c. 1. & 2. contra primam & secundam sententiam ostendimus: tamen non cruciari eodem modo, quo haec sententia contendit, sed alio faciliori, quem c. seque ex sententia S. Thomae explicabimus).

A much easier and more common among Thomists is the opinion which many of the ancient theologians handed down, namely that demons are tormented by the fire by an alligation from which they suffer against their will and from which they cannot free themselves (MVlto faciliot, & apud Thomistas commu Inior sententia est, quam non pauci ex an tiquis Theologis tradiderunt, nempe daemones ab igne torqueri per alligationem, quam contri suam voluntatem patiuntur, & a qua non possunt se ipsos liberare).

This opinion was followed by St. Thomas in this article in the third solution most clearly in the fourth contra gentiles chapter 90, and by Bonaventure in 4. d. 44 part 2 art. 3 question 2; though he assigns elsewhere another mode of torment to angels, namely that they flee the heat of the fire, although it cannot harm them, and they tremble with fear where there is no fear; and that this is done by divine omnipotence, a way by which he seems to fall into the opinion which we have refuted (S. Th. in hoc art. in solutione tertia clarissime tamer 4. contra gentes c. 90. & Ferrariensis, ibi. Bona. in. 4. d. 44. p. 2. art. 3. qu. 2. tam etsi ibidem alium modum cruciatus angelis assignet, nempe vt refugiant ca lorem ignis, quamuis nocere non possit, & trepi denttimore vbi non est timor: idque fieri ex di uina omnipotentia: quo pacto incidere videtur in opinionem 1.c. a nobis impugnatam).

In the same opinion about alligation were Scotus and Gabriel in the places cited, although they also assign another mode of torments, as was said in chapter 3 (In eadem sententia, de alligatione, fuerunt Scotus, & Ga briel locis allegatis, quamnis alium etiam modi torquendi igni assignent, de quo capite 3. dictum est).

Durandus in the fourth distinction 44 last question, Paludanus question 7 in the fifth opinion, Major question 6, and perhaps Hugh of Saint Victor wished nothing else in question 4 of the Epistle to the Thessalonians when he says that spirits are tormented by the fire even if they are not touched by it; for it is not possible that any corporeal thing be suffered by someone receiving nothing from it (namely being not touched) unless by alligation (Idem senserunt Durandus in 4. d. 44. q vlt. Palud quaestione 7. in quinta opinione. Maior quaestione 6. nec aliud videtur voluisse Hugo de Sancto Victore in quaestione quarta in Epistolam ad Thessaloni censes, cum ait spiritus ab igne, etiamsi ab illo non contingantur: nam fieri non potest, vt ali quis ab aliquo corpore patiatur, nihil ab eo reci piens (quod est ab eo non contingi) nisi per alll auiouem).

This opinion is to be confirmed by no better foundation than that there seems to remain no other mode whereby demons are tormented by fire except those enumerated, each of which has many difficulties as we have hitherto seen; but this alligation seems to have none; therefore until something else is made known to us by revelation (for otherwise it cannot be known), it will be permissible to explain to ourselves the punishment which demons suffer from the fire in this way (Haec opinio nullo alio meliori fundamento confirmari debet, quam quia nullus alius videtur superesse modus, quo torqueantur daemones per ignem, praeter enumeratos: ex quibus nullus est, qui multas non habeat difficultates, vt hactenus vidimus: hic autem nullas videtur habere. Erg. quandiu alius nobis non constat reuelatione D (aliter enim constare non potest,) hoc pacto li cebit nobis poenam, quam daemones patiuntur ab igne, explicare).

Moreover by this mode we can easily defend two things which must necessarily be asserted (Porro hoc modo facile de fendere possumus duo, quae necessario asserenda sunt).

One is that the pain of the fire is not equal in all demons; for by the virtue of God it can be that one is tormented more vehemently than another (Vnum est, aequalem non esse poenam ignis in omnibus daemonibus, nam virtute Dei fieri potest, vt vnus vehementius, quam alius torquea tur).

The other is that demons who remained in this air are not less tormented by the fire than if they were in the fire itself, as St. Thomas says in the third solution, namely by this, that they apprehend themselves to be destined to be always allied to the fire; and God can send such an apprehension into a demon so efficaciously that it torments him no less than when he sees himself afterwards detained in the very fire (Alterum vero est, daemones, qui in hoc aëre manserunt, non minus cruciari ab igne, quam si in ipso igne essent, vt ait Sanctus Thomas in so lutione tertia, nempe per hoc, quod apprehen dant, se destinatos esse, vt igni sint perpetuo alli gati: quam quidem apprehensionem potest Deus immittere Daemoni adeo efficacem, vt non mi nus cruciet; quam cum se videat postea in ipso igne detentum).

By this reason it must also be asserted that the punishment of these demons is not to be increased after the day of judgment, which Caietanus seems falsely to indicate against that passage in 2 Peter 2 (Qua etiam ratione asserendum est, poenam horum daemonum non esse augendam post diem iudicij: cuius oppositum falso indi care videtur Caietanus in illud 2. Petri 2).

If God did not spare the angels who sinned, etc., indeed... (Si enim Deus Angelis peccantibus non pepercit, &c.). We must however defend this opinion so that we do not deny that demons are tormented by fire in ways other than by alligation; but only assert that another mode of their torment is altogether unknown to us, and with Augustine in the place cited say "in wondrous but true ways," that is, in true modes but unknown to us, demons are tormented by the fire (Verum hanc sententiam defendere debemus, vt non nege mus, daemones alio modo ab igne cruciari, quam per alligationem: sed solum assetamus alium mo dum cruciatus nobis plane esse ignotum: & cum Augustino loco citato in secundo capite dica mus, miris, veris tamen modis, hoc est, veris mo dis, nobis tamen ignotis, daemones ab igne tor queri).

For from the modes of torment which we have enumerated hitherto no one can be defended without some inconvenience; and so it will be better to confess our ignorance in this matter than to affirm anything without a firm foundation (nam ex his modis cruciatus, quos hacte nus enumerauimus, nullus absque vllo incom modo defendi potest: & ita satius erit, nostram in hac re fateri ignorantiam, quam absque firmo fun damento aliquid affirmare).

Concerning separated souls there is no doubt that they are also tormented by the fire in a way other than by alligation, and that the manner of such torment is manifest to us; for when they are conjoined to a body and the body is burned by the fire, they suffer not only by alligation but also by a dolorific quality inserted to the sense of touch and known by them, from whose cognition sadness is derived into the sentient appetite and into the will, which we call pain (De animabus separa tis dubitandum non est, eas etiam alio modo ab igne torqueri, quam per allegationem: & modum talis cruciatus nobis esse manifestum: nam quando corpori coniunctae sunt, & corpus igne crematur, non solum patiuntur per alligationem, sed per doloriferam etiam qualitatem immissam sensui tactus, & ab eis cognitam, ex cuius cognitione deriuatur in appetitum sentientem, & in ipsam voluntatem tristitia, quam & dolorem vocamus).

Therefore by this same sort of pain from the apprehension of that dolorific quality which causes pain in touch separated souls will be tormented; for before the body is actually burned God could in the meantime send so efficaciously into a separated soul such an apprehension as if the fire present were burning the body, as I think must be necessarily asserted, lest we be compelled to concede that the sensory punishment is derived from the fire in the bodies after union with the souls (Hoc igitur eodem doloris genere ex apprehen sione illius qualitatis doloriferae, quae dolorem gignit in tactu, torquentur animae separatae: nam antea quam corpus ab igne comburatur actu, po test Deus tale genus apprehensionis non minus efficaciter animae separatae immittere, quam s ignis praesens corpus cremaret: hoc autem exi stimo necessario asserendum, ne cogamur conce dere, poenam sensus ab igne deriuatam angell in animabus post vnionem cum corpore).

But this kind of torment cannot suit an angel, whether the fire be absent or present, as touch likewise cannot suit him, from which this kind of pain necessarily derives (Ceterum hoc genus cruciatus Angelo conuenire non po test, siue absente igne, siue praesente, sicut nec ta ctus ei conuenire potest, ex quo hoc genus do loris necessario deriuatur).

Therefore separated souls and demons agree in this, that they are not only tormented by alligation but also in another way by the fire; they differ however because the manner in which, besides alligation, demons suffer is unknown to us, whereas the manner by which souls are tormented is sufficiently manifest (Conueniunt igitur ani mae separatae, & daemones in eo, vt non tantum per alligationem, sed etiam alio modo ab igne cru cientur. Differunt tamen, quia modus, quo praeter alligationem daemones patiuntur, ignotus nobis est: modus autem, quo animae torquentur, satis est manifestus).

Finally it must be added that although the element of fire is most apt by its nature to torment souls, because by its nature it is most effective on bodies, and it torments more vehemently than another element, and from the torment of the body sadness and pain are derived into the soul, still there is no reason available to prove that by its nature this element is more apt to torment demons than any other element (Postremo addendum est, quamuis elementum ignis aptissimum sit ad cruciandas animas, quia natura sua efficacissimum est in corpora: eaque vehementius, quam aliud elementum cruciat: et cruciatu autem corporis tristitia, & dolor in ans mam deriuatur: tamen nullam nobis suppetere rationem ad probandum, aptius olementum esse natura sua ad cruciandum daemones, quam sit quodcumque aliud elementum).

First because by the reason of alligation the same reason would hold for other elements as is evident (tum quia ratione alligationis aequa esset ratio aliorum, vt constat).

Secondly because another mode in which demons are tormented by fire is unknown to us (Tum quia alius modus quo ab igne daemones torquentur, nobis ignotus est).

But God in the best right prepared especially this element as the punishment of demons, since also it was to be for the souls of the damned a cause of torment (Deus autem iure optimo hoc elementum praecipue supplicio dae monum praeparauit: cum futurum quoque esset animabus damnatorum causa tormenti).

Thus far we have not only elucidated what St. Thomas teaches in this first part question 50 up to 64, but also what he treats below from question 106 up to 112; for those things which he disputes about illumination questions 106, 108, 109, 111 and about the illumination by which men are enlightened by angels and the power of angels over created bodies we have sufficiently examined in disputations 215, 216, 217; what the Doctor treats about the speech of angels question 107 we have treated from presupposition in disputations 211 and 213; it only remains that we say something about the mission and custody of angels and about the assault of demons, about which St. Thomas treats below questions 112, 113, 114 (Hactenus non solum elucidauimus, quae docet S. Th. in hac 1. p. a q. 50. vsque ad 64. sed etiam ea, quae tractat infra a qu. 106. vsque 112. nam quae disputat de illuminatione q. 106. 108. 109. 111.& de illuminatione, qua homines ab Angelis illu minantur, & de virtute Angelorum supra creatu ram corpoream, satis superque examinauimu. disput. 215. 216. 217. quae S. Doctor tractat de lo cutione Angelorum q 107. tractauimus ex pro feslo disp. 211. & 213. solum restat, vt de missione & custodia Angelorum, & de oppugnatione dae monum aliqua dicamus, de quibus disserit S. Th. infra q. 112. 113. 114).

Disputation 244 (Disputatio 244)

Which angels are sent into the service of men (Quinam Angeli in ministerium hominum mittantur)

Disput. 244. Which angels are sent into the service of men.

Two opposite opinions. ch. 1. Judgment concerning each opinion. ch. 2.

Chapter 1 (Caput I). Two opposite opinions.

From all these things which have been said by us up to now it is plain that there are two classes of angels, one of the good, which adheres to God by a clear vision and perpetual charity, the other of the evil, which is attached to the eternal torments of hell. From which two others are divided, one of the evil, whom God permitted to be set against the salvation of men; the other of the good, whom he constituted as guardians for us, that not only against the snares of demons our spiritual salvation might be defended, but that the human race might be preserved safe from other evils as well. Therefore concerning the guardianship of the good and the assault of the evil we must in this last place discourse, about which St. Thomas disputes in q. 112, 113 and 114. Whereby it will come to pass that all which he notes from q. 50 up to 64 and from q. 106 up to 114 we will elucidate in these our commentaries and disputations.

But that we may proceed in the disputation about the guardianship of angels, it must be explained at present which angels are sent to us from heaven into the ministry of men; about which St. Doctor treats in that question 112. It is above all certain among all that angels are sometimes sent to men. For this is established by Scripture: Exodus 23, "Behold, I will send my angel who shall go before thee"; and Luke 1, "The angel Gabriel was sent from God"; and Acts 12, "Now I perceive truly that the Lord hath sent his angel and hath delivered me out of the hand of Herod." From the Fathers moreover they explicitly teach this as certain: Dionysius ch. 13 of the Celestial Hierarchy, and Gregory in Book 2 of the Morals ch. 3 and Homily 24 on the Gospel, and many others incidentally; and they suppose it as most well-known together with St. Thomas below in q. 112, article 1.

St. Thomas proves it in that article 1, because, as he taught above in q. 43, art. 1, that which is said to be sent by another is that which proceeds from another in some manner, namely to begin to be somewhere where it was not before, or where it was before in another manner: but an angel proceeds from God in this manner; for, when he is in heaven, he comes to us, and this by the nod and command of God, who governs all things in the lower things, which is to proceed from God: therefore he is sent also by God. The distinction however between the sending of angels by God and the sending of one divine Person by another is manifestly collected from what was said in disputation 170; for the sending of one divine Person by another is a procession from it, not

according to command but according to substance, connoting with respect to a new manner of presence in place, as we explained there: but the procession of an angel is according to command, about which there is no doubt.

But among the doctors it is brought into controversy whether all angels are sent, even those of the highest hierarchy in which Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones are reckoned, or not. Some theologians have judged that by ordinary law angels are sent to us only from the inferior orders, and by extraordinary law sometimes also sent from the highest hierarchy; nay, even from the supreme order of the supreme hierarchy. Durand in 2d dist. 10 q.1 judges this opinion probable; Scotus q.1, Marsilius in 2 q.7 a.3 in the 2nd part, along with others assert that sometimes the supreme angels are sent to us. More recent theologians confirm that opinion in many ways.

First, because it is established that Gabriel was sent to the blessed Virgin (Luke 1) and elsewhere in Scripture. And Gabriel was supreme, or one of the supreme angels, according to Bernard in Homily 1 on that "He was sent" (Luke 1) and the Magister in 2d dist. 10, whose opinion Scotus follows in that distinction q.1 and Durand q.1, and Gregory seems to favor them in Homily 34 on the Gospel when he says that Gabriel was one of the supreme angels: for by "angels" it is not permitted to understand only spirits of the lowest order of the lowest hierarchy, whom we commonly call angels, but the whole angelic nature. And this seems most fitting: for as the mystery of the Incarnation and of Christ is the greatest, so it was fitting that the greatest among all the angels should be sent to announce it. And an angel Gabriel was never sent except to Daniel, to whom he revealed this future mystery, and to the Virgin Mother of Christ, to whom he immediately announced that which was to be done; as the same Bernard in the same sermon senses, to Joseph spouse of the virgin and foster-father of the same Christ, when in dreams he strengthened him (Matt. 1) so that he might take Mary as his wife; and finally, as I also judge, it was fitting that to Christ himself, when he was set in agony and prayed to the Father (Luke 22), an angel should come: for it was fitting that Gabriel, who is called the "strength of God," should be sent either to strengthen Christ's humanity against the agony of death, or to praise his eminent strength. Many indeed rightly and in agreement with divine letters think that the angel delegated to comfort Christ was not sent to corroborate the weakness of the flesh, but to praise his extraordinary strength; and they contend that this is signified by the name "comfort" in Scripture: of whose opinion we more fully confirmed at length in the year 1585, when in the 3rd part of St. Thomas, a. 4 q. 12, at Complutense in our college we were interpreting, which things we will publish printed to that place, God willing.

Secondly, Isaiah 6 says, "One of the seraphim flew to me and touched my mouth." Therefore one seraph was sent to Isaiah, who without doubt is placed in the supreme order of the first hierarchy. Third, Tobit 12 has Raphael, who had been sent to Tobit, saying, "I am Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord." These seven however seem to be supreme, or among the supreme: for Revelation 1 says, "Grace to you and peace from him who is and who was and who is to come, and from the seven spirits who are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ who is the faithful witness"; by these words the seven spirits seem to be signified as the principal seven among those who attend God, from whom peace is implored for the faithful to whom he writes: moreover it would

not be more fitting to implore peace from the seven spirits than from others, since it had been implored from God and Christ, unless those seven spirits were principal. Fourth, Daniel 10 says, "Behold Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me": where the Scripture testifies Michael to be of the chief princes, that is, of the angels; and yet he is said to have been sent to the help of the people of God. Fifth, Hebrews ch. 1, when Paul said, "To which of the angels did he ever say, 'Sit on my right hand'?" he contends by these words to prefer Christ above all the angels; he adds, "Are not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister for those who shall inherit salvation?" which certainly, unless understood of all the angels, would not in this way have sufficiently commended the glory of Christ by comparison with the angels.

Against these things, however, St. Thomas below in q. 112, art. 2 first contends that higher angels are never sent to us, but only lower ones. Then in art. 4 he teaches that the superiors who are not sent are Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, which St. Thomas himself in q. 108 a.6 places in the first hierarchy according to the opinion of Dionysius; and furthermore Dominations, which in the same a.6 are placed in the second hierarchy: for he judges that the remaining orders are sent down to us, two of the second hierarchy namely Virtues and Powers, and all three of the third hierarchy namely Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. St. Thomas proves the former part of this opinion from the argument "But against (this) by the authority of Dionysius," which Gregory reports in Homily 34 on the Gospel after the middle, where he writes thus: "Dionysius the Areopagite, ancient and venerable father, is said to say that from the hosts of the lesser angels they are sent forth to accomplish ministry either visibly or invisibly, namely because to human consolations either angels or archangels come: for those higher hosts never depart from the intimates." The same Saint Thomas furthermore confirms this opinion by reason: because if the order of grace sometimes omits the order of nature, this is because it is expedient so for the confirmation of faith, as we see in miracles which are done beyond the order of nature; otherwise it seems fitting that the order of grace should preserve the order of nature. But it does not seem at all that sending some superior angel to us conduces to the confirmation of faith, because this is not evident to us; and on the other hand a sufficient number of inferior angels is enough that they come to us: therefore it is not to be said that the highest orders are sent to us as well: which seems naturally to suit the inferiors. That there is a sufficient number even fit to announce the greatest things is most assuredly confirmed by the fact that one of the archangels, namely Gabriel, as Gregory testifies in the same homily, was sent to announce the highest and greatest of all mysteries: therefore from this it will be permitted to conjecture that the number of inferior angels is sufficient so that some of them are sent to us. The latter part of this opinion St. Thomas proves from the signification of the names: for the names of two orders of the second hierarchy and three names of the third seem to denote some ministry; the names of the other orders do not

Chapter 2 (Caput II). Judgment concerning each opinion.

My opinion in this matter is that there is no firm foundation neither in the Fathers nor in Scripture so that we should confidently maintain one part or the other. Although anyone may without inconvenience defend whichever he wishes. Therefore the Master of Sentences in 2d dist.

10, having set down both opinions and shown the manner by which each might be defended from the objections of the opposite, prudently did not define anything in this matter. And indeed, first, if we had any firm foundation from the Fathers for the opinion of St. Thomas as he himself contends, there would be Gregory the Great in that Homily 34 on the Gospel and Dionysius. But Gregory the Great does not dare to affirm anything: he only reports the opinion of the great Dionysius from the report of others, as is evident from the words quoted above; and the passage of Isaiah by which it seemed to be proved that seraphim are sent to us likewise is interpreted in such a good sense that we are not forced to assert that the highest angels are sent to us: and that interpretation was indeed that of a certain theologian, as Dionysius recounts. He nevertheless adds: "But because in certain places of Scripture we learn that some things are done by cherubim, and in others by seraphim, whether these do them by themselves or act through their subordinate hosts, which, as is said, come from the greater and receive the names of their superiors, we do not wish to assert that, for we do not approve that which is not supported by clear testimonies."

But Dionysius in chapters 7 and 8 of the Celestial Hierarchy, where he is often cited, has not a single word about this matter: chapter 9, however, has these words by which he seems to have expressed the opinion reported by Gregory. For concerning the order of the Archangels he says, "It receives divine illuminations in the manner and institution of the first [orders], and it kindly proclaims them to the angels, and through the angels declares them to us." Thence about the angels he adds, "And therefore rather angels are called by us interpreters of the superiors than the superiors of the superiors, by which their most holy principality is engaged in clearer and more evident things and more nearly touches the world," or as another translation has it, "it almost touches the world." Concerning the supreme hierarchy he then adds, "For the highest, as has been said, description of spirits which is nearest to God in the hidden order ought to preside obscurely over the second." These words, however, if they have any bearing on the present matter, also prove that archangels are never sent to us: which no one has hitherto said. Therefore it must be said that here Dionysius only said that angels are illuminated indeed by archangels and are sent to us by them; because through angels more, or at least almost, all these lower things are administered; and that the highest hierarchy ought to preside obscurely over the second; but he does not say, nor lightly insinuate, that from it none is sent to us.

Lastly chapter 13 of the same book is commonly brought forward where this question seems to be explained expressly. But in that place he treats only the passage of Isaiah which we adduced for the prior opinion, "One of the seraphim flew to me," etc. There he does not dispute whether angels of only the lower hierarchy are sent to us or whether also the supreme are sent; but why a seraph is said to have been sent to purify the prophet Isaiah and not some inferior angels. Of other missions whether in them inferior angels only are sent, or whether sometimes also supreme ones are sent, Dionysius does not dispute. He expounds the place of Isaiah two ways; we shall relate both interpretations below. And although he says that the former interpretation is that of some, and the latter he had heard from some other, yet he accepted neither from his initiator in sacred doctrine, namely from Paul, from whom he himself testifies in chapter 6 that he received the doctrine of that book, as is manifest from the fact that near the end of that chapter 13 when he addresses Timothy

to whom he writes that book he treats of both interpretations: "Now for thee, Timothy, to whom I write that book, to understand and to distinguish the causes of the things which have been set forth, and to explain one before the other," etc. He therefore does not definitively approve either but leaves that to be judged by Timothy. If he had learned any of these things from his master Paul, he would without doubt have boldly affirmed it. From these things it is clear that among the holy Fathers there is no firm foundation for definitively pronouncing anything; rather they have given us an example that in so secret a matter we should not presume to define.

Furthermore the reasoning of St. Thomas does not prove that the supreme angels are never sent to us. For although they are superior by their nature, and the order of nature should not be set aside except for the confirmation of faith, yet there may nonetheless be some reason that supreme angels are sent to us, namely that they might announce to us some extraordinary message and Gospel, such as the mystery of the Incarnation: for kings also are accustomed to observe that when they wish to bring about some great thing with those absent, for example if a king wished to consummate the marriage of his son with someone's daughter, they send one of the princes and chiefs of the realm who are accustomed to stand continually within the royal palace. What then is wonderful if God, wishing to make a marriage of his Son with the Church and to unite his person to humanity in the womb of a virgin with a closer bond than that of marriage, were to send one of the first and not the lowest angels, who are perpetually in the sight of his throne?

But that which the holy Doctor says, namely that from the inferiors only two orders of the second hierarchy and three orders of the third are sent, cannot be certain either. For although the names of these seem more to denote ministry than the others, this does not prevent that sometimes other orders also, albeit more rarely, are sent. What he said, that if anyone were ever to be sent to the Virgin it should have been a seraph, we rather admit that for this mystery one ought to have been sent; yet even this is not certain, as will be shown in due order: nor can it be certain that it was only an archangel of the third hierarchy as Gregory calls him; for Gregory himself did not dare to define whether some of the highest spirits were sent. Perhaps therefore he called him "archangel" by a certain common term to signify a certain principal angel, as he earlier said "a certain highest angel." From these things it follows that there is no effective argument or firm foundation of authority for the latter opinion, that we should say that none of the supreme angels were ever sent to us. But nor is there any for the prior opinion, as we will presently show by way of induction, dissolving each of its arguments.

The first argument was about Gabriel, which is alleged that he was sent to the Virgin and that he was of the supreme, as Bernard testifies, since the very nature of the embassy required it. Yet this argument has not much force: for Bernard did not explicitly say that he was one of the supreames, but said, "I do not think this angel is of the lesser ones, who are often wont for various reasons to perform legations upon the earth." And this could be true even if he were of the order of the Archangels, who are in the lowest hierarchy. From Bernard's reasoning it seems to be collected that he was of the supreames; for he says he was therefore said to be sent by God because he was not of the lesser: for the lesser, according to the opinion of the scholastics, are not sent directly by God but by other superiors. Moreover Bernard adds another reason why he is said to be sent by God;

therefore he does not so assert with certainty that Gabriel was of the supreames that we should be bound to pronounce it definitively. Nor could Bernard be a firm foundation for definitively asserting that Gabriel was one of the supreames, because Scripture says "The angel Gabriel was sent by God": for inferior angels as well, who are sent by God through middle superiors, are said to be sent by God. For Exodus 23 says of God, "Behold, I will send my angel," namely to Moses to lead forth the children of Israel, whom the doctors infer to have been Michael the prince of that people from Daniel 10, about which we shall speak below. And in Acts 12 Peter said, "Now I know for sure that the Lord hath sent his angel," which certainly was the guardian angel of Peter; this is most probable: yet no one dared to affirm that he was certainly one of the supreames. Gregory, however, did not say of Gabriel that he was the highest angel of the order of the seraphim, since plainly he says he was an archangel: but he could understand "highest angel" by comparison with those who are numbered in the inferior order. And although the excellence of announcing the mystery would befit the supreme angel, if he were sent by God, nor could he by any means be unworthy; yet it would not be incongruous if it were announced by some archangel. For in either way it could be revealed and announced from God; therefore from congruity we are not compelled to affirm definitively what was done.

The second locus, Isaiah "One of the seraphim flew to me," etc., which was brought for the prior opinion, does not compel that the angel sent to Isaiah was of the supreme order of angels; but, as Dionysius says in chapter 13 of the Celestial Hierarchy, one may answer that he is called a seraph as though "fiery" from the office and duty of purifying; especially since the prophet's purification was to be by fire: and thus it was said to be one of the seraphim, that is, of those expiatory virtues which preside over us, which interpretation seems to me most probable and which the same Dionysius testifies to be that of other theologians. Thus that angel was called a seraph because he attributed his power and knowledge of expiation to God as author, and to a seraph as to the chief pontiff of sacred things, just as we attribute the expiation of sins not only to God as author but also to Christ according to the humanity as to the first priest: which exposition Dionysius brings from a certain theologian, as we said above. Saint Thomas also proves both these things in q.112 a.2 ad 2. Moreover, since Isaiah's vision was so much in the spirit and not with bodily eyes, as was said in disputation 55 ch. 5, from that place one cannot prove that a seraph was actually sent to Isaiah in reality, but only that he was present in an imaginative vision.

The third scriptural place for the prior opinion was Tobit 12 where Raphael, who was sent to Tobit, says he is one of the seven who stand before the Lord: yet this place has less weight. For we admit that Raphael is one of the seven princes who stand before God: nevertheless we say these spirits are not seraphim but seven angels placed over the whole world who have the care of it, as was largely shown above in disputation 180 ch. 1; from whom also John implores peace and grace for the faithful as from ministers, to whom he writes in Revelation ch. 1. He therefore prays from them first rather than from Christ either that he might show that Christ according to the humanity was in some respect less than the angels, or because, since he would afterwards speak many things about Christ, he preferred to mention him at the later place so that thenceforth he would speak only about him. But what some contend, namely that by the seven spirits there are not meant

angels but the seven principalities of the earth, or that the reference is not to prefer Christ in the prayer to angels but rather to the Holy Spirit or his charisms, does not please me; partly because John would express the Holy Spirit ineptly by "seven spirits": for although he is said to be sevenfold in spirit, he is nevertheless never called "seven spirits"; partly also because the charisms of the spirit would not be fitly signified: for we do not pray for grace and peace from gifts, nor are the gifts themselves said to stand before the throne of God.

The fourth place Daniel 10 concerning Michael, who is said to be one of the first princes, is to be understood in the same manner, that the princes are called those seven spirits set over the whole world. The fifth place is Hebrews 1 "Are not all ministering spirits?" Saint Thomas first responds in question 112 article 2 ad 1 that indeed all angels are ministering spirits, because they are sent into ministry either by an interior mission to other lower angels to whom they reveal mysteries, or by an exterior mission to us so that they might work some external act: and thus Christ is compared to all the angels. This solution, however, is not without difficulty. For illumination is not an invisible sending: for a superior angel illuminating an inferior does not come to him, nor does he depart, because he is not moved in place; and for him to be sent it is necessary that he come according to place or appear in a new manner. Moreover it cannot be said that he is "sent" because something is effected to the sending of the inferior: for that would be very improperly said; and the Apostle says "all are sent."

Then the holy Doctor answers that Paul there compares Christ not to all the angels but only to those by whom the law of Moses was given. Yet in my judgment this would be insufficient. For Paul intends simply to preeminent over all in order to show that he himself is truly the Son of God: and therefore he prefaced those words, "To which of the angels did he ever say, 'You are my Son'?" and again, "To which of the angels did he ever say, 'Sit on my right hand'?" and afterwards he adds, "Are not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister?" etc. If Christ were not compared to all the angels, he would not prove him to be the Son of God: because Paul would not have shown that God could not have said the same to some angel.

Wherefore I answer: those words "Are not all...?" are indeed to be referred to all orders and hierarchies: yet by those words "sent to minister" it is not signified that angels from all hierarchies are actually sent into ministry; for just as the word "all" refers to all hierarchies and orders, so it also refers to individual angels of whatever order. For Paul intends to prefer Christ against individual angels of whatever order no less than against individual orders and hierarchies in the whole: yet no one will say that individual angels of the supreme, middle, and inferior are all sent; therefore from that passage it cannot be proved that anyone from the supreme hierarchy was sent.

Moreover Paul's argument is the best: for by showing the condition of one angel, even the lowest, he rightly shows the nature of each; and if one is by nature and condition a minister and servant sent into ministry, the others also will be of the same condition so as to be sent, although they have not yet been sent: for nor does a king, who has many ministers in his house, send each of them separately to some place; yet each is by condition such that he can be sent, nor is any one of them said "Sit at my right hand." This solution has force not only especially if we say all angels are of the same species, but even if we judge them to differ in species it proves in the same way: for

Paul says of all that they are ministering spirits sent into ministry because they are fit to be sent. Therefore since we cannot deny that it is fitting to any angel by his proper nature that he could be sent into ministry, and the question whether some supreme one was sent or not is a question of fact about which nothing is certain for us, it will be wiser to pronounce nothing definite in this matter.

Disputation 245 (Disputatio 245)

On Guardian Angels and Attacking Demons (De Angelis tutelaribus, et daemonibus oppugnatoribus)

Disput. 245. On guardian angels and attacking demons.

On the guardianship of good angels, chap. 1. On the assault of demons, chap. 2

Chapter 1 (Caput 1)

From the angels who are sent to us it is indubitable from Scripture that some are guardian spirits by which men are wont to be delivered from evils. For it is said, Gen. 19: "The angels brought Lot out and set him outside the city, saying, Save thy soul." And in Gen. 48 Jacob says, "The angel who delivered me from all evils"; the same is found in Tobit 12 and Acts 12; and in Psalm 90 it is said, "He commanded his angels concerning you, that they should keep you in all your ways." Nevertheless Calvin in Book 1 of the Institutes, chap. 14, section 7, thinks that the popular opinion - namely that single angels are appointed to the custody of individual men - is merely a vulgar opinion. From the Fathers, however, Origen in his fifth homily on Matthew, treating that passage "their angels always behold the face [of the Father]" etc., reports two opinions: one of those who said that angels are only delegated to the custody of the predestined from the instant of their nativity; another of those who thought that guardian angels are deputed only to holy men, from the day of baptism. Both opinions, moreover, St. Thomas recalls from Origen in Question 5 (cf. Quaest. 113 in another place), as is seen in his work. Besides these, Hilary on that place of Matthew, and Cyril in his fourth book against Celsus, and Chrysostom in Homily 70 on Matthew assert that individual angels are given to righteous men for guardianship; concerning wicked men they say nothing.

But the common opinion of the Fathers and of the Scholastics - which it is not permitted to deny without a mark of grave temerity - is that to each individual man, of whatever quality and condition he may be, single angels are deputed for guardianship: for from Matthew 18 "their angels always behold the face of the Father" the Fathers collect that to each individual man from the day of his nativity single angels are deputed. Moreover, in Acts 12, when Peter, fleeing from prison, knocked at the door of the house of Mary the mother of Mark, and the maid said it was Peter, the others, not believing - since they thought him still in prison - said "It is his angel"; therefore they believed that to Peter, and to any other, an angel had been assigned for custody. Indeed the Fathers testify to the

same so plainly: Origen in his third book Periarchon ch. 2 after the middle, Basil in his ninth homily on Psalm 33 and in his thirteenth on Psalm 48 and in his third book against Eunomius at the beginning, and his follower Gregory of Nyssa in the book On the Life of Moses, Theodoret in Oration 10 on Daniel, where he also cites that place Matthew 18, Theophylact on that passage in Matthew. From the Latins, Jerome in his commentary on that chapter of Matthew, Anselm and Bede, and the more recent interpreters all on the same passage. Wherefore I do not see for what reason the Master in the second distinction of 11 doubts whether single angels are deputed to single men, or whether one angel of many may have the care of many men as well.

But there is no Scholastic who, in that distinction, does not assert that single angels are deputed to the custody of single men. St. Thomas taught the same in Question 113, Article 2; moreover this seems to be the most ancient tradition of men, which the Gentiles likewise seem to have received from the Hebrews, as many other things. By what other method could they have learned this truth? for some of those whom we shall cite in the following chapter report that to each individual man a good and an evil daimon attend on the day of his nativity. Calvin, unjustly and without foundation, stigmatizes Catholic Doctors as if they so referred the guardianship of each man to one guardian angel that they denied men could be aided by other angels; for no Catholic affirms this: but all contend that one is deputed to the peculiar care and tutelage of each man; from which it does not follow that sometimes some men are not aided by angels other than their own guardian.

Furthermore Jerome and St. Thomas, Article 5, and the rest of the Scholastics in that distinction, plainly taught that an angel is deputed to the custody of each one from the origin of his nativity; nor only after baptism, as some have erroneously thought, whom St. Thomas records in that article; otherwise the Gentiles would not have a guardian angel, which is contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers, who attribute guardian angels not only to Christians but to all individual men. Nor does the guardianship of an angel endure after the death of a man: for its custody is only necessary for the time during which we peregrinate in this life, as is manifest. But an angel is not seen to be necessary in the custody of an infant before birth, since he is conveniently guarded by the same angel by whom his mother is guarded: for then he is as it were part of the mother, as St. Thomas rightly noted in that article; and therefore he ought to fall under the care and custody of the same.

Moreover certain things must be observed concerning the manner of guardianship. First, it must be noted in general that the manner of guardianship is twofold: one, by the removal of those things which, even without our knowledge, can harm us - and these are removed by angels without us; the other, by instruction and discipline, whereby they teach and admonish us to flee evils and to pursue goods, and this they do in us in the manner which we said in Disputation 217, chap. 4 - for in no other way can they directly change our will. Secondly, note that there are various modes of changing our will, as we said: by terror, by love, by hope; finally by every kind of good affection to which they can excite us; concerning which Gerson treats more fully in Treatise 8 on the Magnificat, the third part, which is in the 83rd Alphabet. Thirdly it must be noted that men are so guarded by angels that sometimes they permit them to fall: for in this guardianship the angels themselves govern by the will of God; when therefore they see that it is the will of God to permit

men to fall, they permit it: nor is this a desertion of their care, for they do not permit from negligence and forgetfulness, but knowing and prudent for the reason just given, as St. Thomas rightly admonishes in that question 113, article 6. From which it follows that when some evil happens to men the guardian angels are not saddened, as the same holy Doctor teaches in article 7, for when they see that it did not happen by their negligence but that by the will of God men were thus left, there could be no reason of sadness for them.

Add also that since they see God clearly, they can be sad about nothing. For the highest delight drives away all sadness, as we said above in Disputation 241, chap. 1.

Moreover, guardian angels are not only charged with the care and custody of men, but also offer the prayers of their own to God, according to Tobit 12: "When you were proving with tears and burying the dead, I offered your prayer to the Lord." and Revelation 8: "The smoke of the incense of the prayers of the saints ascended from the hand of the angel." Guardians are indeed said to offer the prayers of those they guard when they at the same time present their supplications; not that they make those prayers manifest to God, since nothing is hidden from Him, but that they themselves together pray on our behalf.

What we have hitherto said about men, namely that single angels are deputed to the custody of single persons, some also not unreasonably apply to cities, provinces, and colleges; and St. Thomas in Q.113, a.2 - indeed the same holy Doctor asserts - that it is probable that to single species of things single angels are set over them. Plato, indeed, in the book On the State says that to each god single regions of the world are committed; moreover even to each kind of animals. But Origen (Hom. 14 on Numbers) says there is need of angels who are over beasts, and who rule hosts, and over the nativity of animals, of shrubs and plantations; and he cites the book of the Pastor; Clement of Alexandria also in book 6 of the Stromata assigns angels to nations and cities.

Augustine moreover seems to assert, not only to single species but even to individuals, that angels are appointed as prefects, when he says in book 83 Questions 74: "Each visible thing in this world has an angelic power appointed over it." These words however may be explained not that single angels stand over every other thing besides man, but because one angel has the care of the whole species. And therefore in Apocalypse ch. 14 mention is made of an angel having power over fire, and in ch. 16 another is called the angel of the waters. From that place Aretas gathers that angels preside not only over nations but also over the elements. And Andreas, bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, explaining that passage of Revelation 14 in his not-yet-published commentaries, "Who had power over fire," says: "Hence we learn that angelic powers are placed over creatures - this indeed over waters, that over fire, that over birds, another over some part of creation."

Finally Damascene, book 2 On the Faith ch. 3, affirms that angels are rulers of parts of the earth, of places and of nations. Whether single angels are placed over single species of things, or whether only those seven spirits who have the care of the whole orb are assigned to these things, the Fathers do not explain; yet it seems probable that there are others distinct from those seven. But these matters are not so certain as that which we said before about men. Nevertheless it is far

more certain that the government of the whole earth has been entrusted to the seven principal spirits, as was said in the preceding disputation chap. 2, than that, besides these, there are also other single angels distinguished for each species of things and for each college and city.

Lastly it must be observed, although it is doubtful whether the highest angels are ever sent to us for some particular business, that no one has hitherto said that guardian angels are deputed to custody ex officio from the supreme hierarchy; but all the ancient writers confess them to be of the lowest order of the lowest hierarchy; wherefore some recent men are mistaken who say that the ordinary custody of some man is sometimes committed to the highest angels: and they prove their opinion from Chrysostom Homily 60 on Matthew where he says that "their angels always behold the face" was spoken of the most eminent angels. But if this testimony had any weight, it would prove that all guardian angels are of the supreme order, which no one has yet said: for Chrysostom speaks of all. Therefore it must be said that Chrysostom called all guardians "supereminent" not by comparison with other angels, but either by comparison with men, or absolutely.

Chapter 2 (Caput 2)

Chapter II. On the assault of demons.

The Catholic faith teaches that demons, insofar as they are permitted by God, assail our salvation with snares in the same manner in which the good angels provide for our salvation; for it is evident from Genesis that men were led into sin by the suggestion of the demon. And John 13 says, "When Satan had already put into the heart of Judas to betray him." Ephesians 6: "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of this world," etc. And 1 Peter 5: "Your adversary the devil walks about seeking whom he may devour."

Moreover that to individual men some demon is deputed to assail them, as an angel is to guard them, is not certain in the same manner; nevertheless among the Scholastics the Master in the second distinction of 11 affirms that to single men single demons are delegated to attack. From the Fathers indeed they teach thus: Origen in his third book Periarchon ch. 2 after the middle; Gregory of Nyssa in the book On the Life of Moses before the middle; Plutarch also in the book On Tranquility and Serenity of Soul (folio 3 at the end) reports Menander as saying that to every man a good daemon immediately assists from the day of his birth; whose opinion he refutes and approves the opinion of Empedocles, who asserted a twin daemon, one good and one bad, appointed to each man from the day of his nativity.

Plato also posited a good genius with no mention of evil, in the Phaedo, in the Theages, and in the Apology to the Athenians; and Pythagoras, as Iamblichus reports in his Life, and Iamblichus likewise in The Mysteries of the Egyptians, segment 3, chs. 3 and 6. That to individual men, besides a good angel, an opposing demon is assigned seems to be gathered from 2 Cor. 12: "A thorn was given me in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to buffet me"; and indeed if sufficient number remained in this dark air I would not doubt that the supreme demon is solicitous in assigning to individual men individual opponents, as God is in assigning to individual men individual

guardians. For although demons existing in the air are tormented in the same way as those existing in hell are tormented, yet it is not to be said that so many demons are sent to us from hell; but that men are assailed by those existing in this air.

There is, however, a distinction between the delegation of the good to guardianship and of the bad to assault. For the delegation of the good is effected by God designating them to guardianship: but of the bad it does not happen by God so ordaining, but by permitting. And it is effected by some chief demon, which Paul seems to indicate in 2 Corinthians 12 when he called the demon by whom he was assailed "an angel of Satan." Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches in Q.114 art.1, although the assault of the demon is not from God, nevertheless its order is from God. Which must be understood in this way: not because God constituted or commanded such an order by which demons are to attack us; but because the assault by which they use against us is referred by God to the ends of his providence, just as He does not will that sins be done, yet He refers things done to the end of his providence, as we showed in Q.22 art.2. The manner, however, in which demons attack us is not by directly changing our will or understanding, but through phantasy, in the way which we said concerning guardianship. Whether indeed every sin arises from the assault of demons, which St. Thomas discusses in Q.114 art.3, we will treat in II, q. 80, art.4.

The same St. Thomas also teaches in that question and article 5 that a demon, when he has been overcome by one man whom he was assailing, withdraws somewhat from him. He collects this from Luke 4: "And when the devil had ended every temptation, he departed from him until a time" - where "until a time" is said, lest we think that demons never again returned to assail him whom they had once been overcome. How, however, he departed from Christ "until a time" Theophylact explains "until the time of the Passion," when again the devil attacked Christ. Cajetan, however, on that passage of Paul says that he reads nowhere how the devil by himself again attacked Christ, although he often tempted him by means of apparitions.

Moreover James 4 plainly teaches that the devil withdraws from us when resisted, when he says "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you": but that he withdraws not so as never to return is evident from Matthew 12: "I will return to my house whence I came out."

These things we have had concerning the nature, properties, grace, sin, beatitude, and punishment of angels, which we undertook to treat for the elucidation of the doctrine of St. Thomas: if we have not attained his mind and truth as correctly as was required, pardon is to be granted us; for the matter is very obscure and has always seemed so difficult to human reason that in it many grave theologians, with no small labor, have been divided into various opinions. That we might choose the truer and that which more agrees with reason I have labored not a little: both on account of the authority of those who, though agreeing among themselves, were of contrary opinions, and because of the diverse weights of the reasons upon which the opponents relied to teach opposites.

To God the Father of lights, in whose light we see light, be glory and dominion for ever. Amen.

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Condition — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Caput VII*

Confession — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput I*

Confirmation — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Caput VI, Disputatio CLX, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXIX, Quaestio XLIII, Disputatio CLXXIII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV*

Conjecture — *Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXXI, Quaestio L, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CCIII, Quaestio LVI, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CCVII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCVII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCVIII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCVIII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CCXI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput II*

Conjunction — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVII, Articulus II*

Connection — *Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus VI, Disputatio CCI, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput VIII, Disputatio CCXIV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CCXVIII, Quaestio LVII, Caput II*

Consent — *Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CLXIX, Quaestio XLII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CLXIX, Quaestio XLIII, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus I*

Consequence — *Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXVII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CLXVIII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CCXVI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput III*

Conservation — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio L, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput VIII, Disputatio CCXIV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput IV*

Consideration — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I*

Consist — *Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CLVIII, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXIX, Quaestio L, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio L, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXCV, Quaestio LIII, Articulus I, Caput V*

Constitution — *Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLVIII, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLVIII, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CLVIII, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput II*

Contemplation — *Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CXCVIII, Quaestio LIV, Articulus III, Disputatio CCXIX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus I, Caput IV*

Continuation — *Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXXIX, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXCVI, Quaestio LIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIV, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput VI*

Contradiction — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus I*

Conversion — *Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXXVI, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXCIX, Quaestio LIV, Articulus IV, Caput I*

Corruption — *Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio L, Articulus I*

Creation — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXV, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CLVIII, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II*

Creature — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II*

D

Damnation — *Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput IX, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput XI, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus VII*

Darkness — *Disputatio CXXXII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CCXIV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXXIV, Quaestio LXI, Articulus III, Caput VI, Disputatio CCXXIV, Quaestio LXI, Articulus IV*

Definition — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

Demonstration — *Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXXIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus VIII, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXXV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXCII, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput II*

Denomination — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I*

Desire — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXI, Quaestio XLI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXII, Quaestio XLI, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput XI, Disputatio CCXII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CCXIX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus I, Caput I*

Destruction — *Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus VI, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVIII, Quaestio L, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio L, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio LI, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXIV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput II*

Determination — *Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLXI, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXI, Quaestio XLI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXIV, Quaestio XLI, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput III*

Diction — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXLI, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CLXIV, Quaestio XLI, Articulus V, Caput III*

Difference — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV*

Dignity — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXXII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput V*

Dilection — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus II*

Disposition — *Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXCV, Quaestio LIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCI, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CCVII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput I*

Disputation — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I*

Distance — *Disputatio CLXXII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXXIX, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXIX, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXCII, Quaestio LII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXCIII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXCV, Quaestio LIII, Articulus I, Caput IV*

Distinction — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V*

Diversity — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus II*

Divinity — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II*

Division — *Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Caput V, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I*

Donation — *Disputatio CLII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLIII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus I, Caput II*

Duration — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XL, Disputatio CLX, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXI, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Caput II*

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Election — *Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXVI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXVI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus VI, Disputatio CCXLIII, Quaestio LXIV, Caput VI*

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Equality — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput II*

Essence — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III*

Eternity — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus IV*

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Evidence — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CLII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCIII, Quaestio LVI, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CCVI, Quaestio LVI, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXIV, Quaestio LVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXIX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus I, Caput III*

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Existence — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II*

Experience — *Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXC, Quaestio LII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXCIX, Quaestio LV, Disputatio CC, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CCVIII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXVIII, Quaestio LVII, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXIX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CCXX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

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Falsity — *Disputatio CXXXIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CXCIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CCXI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput VI, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus VI, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LIX, Articulus I*

Fecundity — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXIV, Quaestio XLI, Articulus V, Caput III*

Filiation — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III*

Florence — *Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput VI, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II*

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Friendship — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus IV, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus V, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LXI, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV*

Future — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput V*

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Genus — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV*

Glory — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXV, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXV, Articulus II, Caput IV*

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Grace — *Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus VII, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus VIII*

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Habit — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus IV*

Habitude — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XL, Disputatio CLXII, Quaestio XLI, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CLXVII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXVII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus I*

Holiness — *Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXVII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXVII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXVIII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXVIII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput III*

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Humility — *Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput V*

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Immortality — *Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio L, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio L, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio LI, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXXII, Quaestio LI, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus I, Caput IV*

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Inconsideration — *Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CCXXXVI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXVIII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus VIII, Caput IV*

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Innascibility — *Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXVII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus III*

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Intelligence — *Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXIX, Quaestio L, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CCIII, Quaestio LVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CCXI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput XI, Disputatio CCXVIII, Quaestio LVII, Caput IV*

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Justice — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus IV*

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K

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Magnanimity — *Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput V*

Magnitude — *Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXVIII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXIX, Quaestio XLII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXVIII, Quaestio L, Articulus I, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXX, Quaestio L, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXCIII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXCIV, Quaestio LIII, Articulus I, Caput III*

Malice — *Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CCXXXVIII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus VIII, Caput II*

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Mention — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III*

Merit — *Disputatio CXXXIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus IV, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXVII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput I*

Mission — *Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CLIII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXIX, Quaestio XLIII, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus VII, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus VIII*

Moment — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVI, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CLII, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput VI*

Monologion — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLI, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus II, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III*

Motion — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXV, Articulus II, Caput IV*

Multiplication — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXX, Quaestio L, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXI, Quaestio L, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXI, Quaestio L, Articulus IV, Caput III*

Multitude — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Caput V, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II*

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Nature — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I*

Nearness — *Disputatio CLXVIII, Quaestio XLII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput V, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXXIX, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CCVIII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput VII, Disputatio CCXIII, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput I*

Necessity — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I*

Negation — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II*

Notation — *Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLIII, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus VI, Disputatio CLXI, Quaestio XLI, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CLXIV, Quaestio XLI, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXIII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXX, Quaestio L, Articulus III, Caput I*

Notion — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

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Object — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II*

Objection — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII*

Obstinacy — *Disputatio CCXLIII, Quaestio LXIV, Caput VI*

Occasion — *Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput VI, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLIX, Quaestio XL, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXVI, Quaestio XLII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio L, Articulus I, Disputatio CLXXIX, Quaestio L, Articulus II, Caput III*

Omnipotence — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput VI, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CXLIX, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus I, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus III, Caput VIII, Disputatio CLXIII, Quaestio XLI, Articulus IV, Caput III*

Operation — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II*

Opposition — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III*

Oration — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput I*

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Participation — *Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CLXII, Quaestio XLI, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus II, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio XLIX, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVII, Quaestio L, Articulus I, Disputatio CXCVIII, Quaestio LIV, Articulus III, Disputatio CC, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput I*

Passion — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II*

Paternity — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II*

Penitence — *Disputatio CCXXVII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXX, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CCXLIII, Quaestio LXIV, Caput VI*

Perfection — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II*

Perseverance — *Disputatio CLXXIV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus IV, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXVI, Quaestio LXII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXVII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXVIII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXVIII, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput XI*

Person — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II*

Personality — *Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus II*

Persuasion — *Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXXVIII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus VIII, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXVIII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus VIII, Caput IV*

Plurality — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

Position — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI*

Potency — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput VI, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I*

Power — *Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V*

Precept — *Disputatio CCXXIII, Quaestio LX, Articulus V, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus V, Caput V, Disputatio CCXXIX, Quaestio LXII, Articulus VII, Disputatio CCXXXI, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXIII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXIV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III*

Predicament — *Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus IV*

Predication — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Caput III*

Preposition — *Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLII, Quaestio XXXVII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XL, Disputatio CLXII, Quaestio XLI, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus I, Caput II*

Presence — *Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXXIV, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CLXX, Quaestio XLIII, Articulus V, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLV, Articulus VI, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput V*

Presumption — *Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput V*

Priority — *Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio CXLIV, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CXLVII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus IV, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV*

Privation — *Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXVIII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CLXXII, Quaestio XLV, Articulus III, Disputatio CLXXVI, Quaestio XLVI, Articulus I*

Procession — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CVIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXI, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput II, Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V*

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Propinquity — *Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXVIII, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CLXXXIX, Quaestio LII, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio CCX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CCXI, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput VI*

Proportion — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXX, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXX, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXI, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio CXXXI, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXLVIII, Quaestio XXXVI, Articulus III, Disputatio CLIV, Quaestio XXXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

Proposition — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXIX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II*

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Quality — *Disputatio CXII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput III, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III*

Quantity — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus I, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXXIII, Quaestio XXIX, Articulus I, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus II*

Quaternity — *Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXXVIII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXXXVI, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CLV, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus IV, Caput IV*

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Reality — *Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VI, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Disputatio CXIII, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput VII, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I*

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Reference — *Disputatio CIX, Quaestio XXVII, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VII, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXL, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXX, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput IV, Disputatio CCXXXV, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput III*

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Resistance — *Disputatio CLXXV, Quaestio XLV, Articulus V, Caput I, Disputatio CLXXXIV, Quaestio LI, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIII, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXCVII, Quaestio LIV, Disputatio CCXXI, Quaestio LVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

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Sadness — *Disputatio CCXXXII, Quaestio LXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio CCXLIII, Quaestio LXIV, Caput VI*

Science — *Disputatio CXXXII, Quaestio XXXII, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio CXXXIX, Quaestio XXXIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXLII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CXLIII, Quaestio XXXIV, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio CLVII, Quaestio XXXIX, Articulus VIII, Disputatio CLXXI, Quaestio XLIV, Articulus IV, Disputatio CXCIX, Quaestio LIV, Articulus IV, Caput I, Disputatio CC, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CC, Quaestio LV, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CCIX, Quaestio LVII, Articulus IV, Caput I*

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Simplicity — *Quaestio XXVII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput IV, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput I, Disputatio CXVIII, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXX, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III*

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Subsist — *Disputatio CXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXIV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio CXXV, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput VI, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio CXXVI, Quaestio XXVIII, Articulus III, Disputatio CXXVII, Quaestio XXX, Articulus II*

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Suggestion — *Disputatio CCXLIII, Quaestio LXIV, Caput VI*

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